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Page 1 of 8 © Copyright IHS and its affiliated and subsidiary companies, all rights reserved. All
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Jane's Intelligence Review
[Content preview – Subscribe to IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly for full article]
China's ICBM modernisation alters threat profile
China's continuing ballistic missile modernisation programme is expanding the range of its targeting
options. Sean O'Connor examines the implications for the country's nuclear posture towards the United
States, as well as regional states such as Russia and India.
China held a large military parade in Tiananmen Square, Beijing, on 3 September 2015 to celebrate the
70th anniversary of victory over Japan at the end of the Second World War. The huge event reflected
China's growing confidence and military prowess, and the hardware showcased has implications for
regional and international theatres of operation. As well as displaying an impressive suite of anti-
access/area-denial assets designed to reinforce its territorial claims in the South China Sea and the East
China Sea, Beijing took the opportunity to unveil longer-range assets, including the long-speculated DF-5B,
a liquid-fuelled, nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that is believed to be armed with
multiple warheads.
The People's Liberation Army (PLA) Second Artillery Corps' current development efforts have most visibly
consisted of solid-fuelled missiles such as the DF-41 and DF-31 variants. However, the upgrading of the
older liquid-fuelled DF-5 with a multiple-warhead variant shows not only the growing sophistication of
China's capabilities, but also suggests concerns in Beijing over increasing ballistic missile defence (BMD)
perceived by opponents such as the United States.
[Continued in full version…]
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DF-31A ICBMs pass the Tiananmen Gate, Beijing, during a military parade on 3 September 2015. The DF-31A is a main candidate for future deployment as part of China's road-mobile nuclear deterrent. (PA)
1568198
Distant threats
China's land-based nuclear deterrent is credited by the US as currently employing various cruise and
ballistic missile types. If this assessment is correct, these systems would permit a range of targeting options
across the theatre and intercontinental levels of operation. All of China's land-based nuclear-armed missile
systems are operated by the Second Artillery Corps, which also operates the majority of China's
conventionally armed land-based missile systems.
Estimates in the 2013 report, Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat , by the US Department of Defense's
National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), suggest that the total Chinese ICBM force (see Table)
has no more than 60 operational launchers. In contrast, the report suggests that the Second Artillery Corps
operates nearly 400 shorter-range ballistic missile launchers. Although the NASIC report uses missile
launchers to benchmark relative strength, it should be noted that a substantial number of reload missiles
are potentially available for use.
[Continued in full version…]
Nonetheless, this disparity strongly suggests that Beijing has traditionally focused on its perceived regional
threats, such as conflict with Taiwan or Japan. Although the bulk of the shorter-range missile force is
conventionally armed, it is possible that the DF-21 ballistic missile and DH-10 cruise missile have also been
equipped with nuclear warheads.
Although China is carrying out missile modernisation, its original design parameters resulted in the
commissioning of four missiles in the Dong-Feng (East Wind) series to meet strategically designated
targets: the DF-2 was to target Japan; the DF-3, the Philippines; the DF-4, Guam; and the DF-5, the US.
Many of China's older missile systems have already been retired - for example, the last unit operating the
roll-out DF-4 missile, the 805th Missile Brigade, is undergoing conversion to use the road-mobile DF-31A.
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Force structure
All Chinese ICBMs are sited within three of the Second Artillery Corps' bases. These are analogous to a
Russian Strategic Rocket Force Missile Army, and each base controls a number of units within a given
region. Across these, three or four brigades operate the DF-31 or DF-31A, while an additional four brigades
are associated with the DF-5.
Possible force structure for Chinese missile brigades. (2015 IHS)
1640249
At full strength, a given mobile missile brigade operates six battalions; each battalion, in turn, operates two
companies with a single transporter erector launcher (TEL) each. Therefore, at full strength, a standard DF-
31 brigade will operate a total of 12 TELs. Based on the identification of silo locations by IHS Jane's , silo-
based missile units, such as those operating the DF-5, appear to employ a different force structure than
road-mobile systems. A standard DF-5 unit likely operates six silos, split into two sub-units. Assuming the
mobile missile force structure is loosely retained by silo-based forces, a DF-5 brigade may operate two
battalions, with each having three single-silo companies.
Using as a guide the 1999 publication, Chinese Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States ,
by Mark Stokes, executive director of the Project 2049 Institute, a public-policy think tank, and updated
with further imagery analysis, IHS Jane's concludes that within the Second Artillery Corps' 54th Base, the
801st and 804th Brigades operate the DF-5, and the 813th Brigade is the only brigade operating the
original DF-31. The 55th Base operates more than half of the assessed 20 silo-based DF-5 force, with 12
silos split evenly between the 803rd and 814th Brigades. The 55th Base also operates the 805th Brigade, a
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DF-31A unit. The 805th Brigade operates out of Shaoyang but formerly operated from Tongdao as a DF-4
unit, before the Shaoyang garrison was completed in 2010.
Likely composition of mobile and silo missile forces. (2015 IHS)
1640250
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Deployment trends
There may be several reasons for the stable ICBM deployment numbers observed between 2009 and 2015.
First, the lack of new weapons may have been caused by a shortfall in production, caused by shortages in
key components or materiel. However, the continued deployment of shorter-range Chinese solid-
propellant ballistic missiles, and the commonality in materiel required to produce them, make this
explanation unlikely.
Second, production centres may have diverted their resources to focus on efforts to bring new systems or
variants to flight-test readiness. Given the ability of Chinese industry to produce missile airframes for flight-
test programmes, this is also unlikely.
A third explanation relates to the DF-31A. Between 2012 and 2014, four flight tests of the DF-31A were
reported to have taken place. Four tests within a relatively short period suggest a series of validation flight
trials, which, if successful, would permit the system to enter full-rate production. If this is the case, this
could lead to increased estimates of deployed forces in 2016.
A fourth explanation, also relating to the DF-31A, suggests lack of deployment during 2013-15 is because
the original DF-31 variant had been supplanted by a further improved variant. If true, this is likely to be the
DF-31B, which, according to the Washington Free Beacon news and analysis website, undertook its first
flight test on 25 September 2014.
Differences between the DF-31A and the DF-31B are not conclusively known, but photographs from
Chinese military websites appear to show a new TEL design providing better off-road mobility. Previous DF-
31 and DF-31A TELs were unsophisticated and primarily suitable for travel over prepared surfaces. Airbus
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Defence and Space imagery of Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center captured four days prior to the 25
September 2014 flight test shows a towed TEL virtually identical to that used by the DF-31A deployed on a
missile test pad (see Airbus Defence and Space imagery). If the Washington Free Beacon website, which
has a good track record of reporting on Chinese modernisation efforts, is correct, the vehicle may be
associated with the DF-31B trials programme. Although not supporting theories of a new TEL, it does not
preclude the possibility, as it may be indicative of a test launcher, rather than an operational one.
Airbus Defence and Space imagery shows an apparent DF-31B ICBM mounted on a TEL undergoing pre-launch preparations at Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center, also known as Wuzhai Missile and Space Test Center, in China, four days before a 25 September 2014 test launch. (CNES 2014, Distribution Airbus DS / 2015 IHS)
1640253
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Changing operations?
Chinese ICBM forces differ in their operational practices depending on the basing mode. Silo-based missile
systems may be kept in an alert status, whereas mobile ICBM forces are reactionary systems intended for
dispersal during hostilities. During peacetime, TELs are contained within garrison complexes usually found
close to metropolitan areas for access to utilities and other amenities. Neither missiles nor warheads are
stored at these garrison complexes.
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During launch preparation, a mobile ICBM brigade disperses its TELs to associated underground complexes
where they are mated with missiles and warheads. At this point, the TELs may remain under cover for
protection or be dispersed into the field to conduct launch operations. Mobile ICBM brigades maintain
field garrisons serving multiple pre-surveyed launch points; loaded TELs can disperse through field
garrisons for final checkout and launch-point assignment. Alternatively, unsurveyed launch points may be
employed, but these will require additional calibration time prior to launch.
China's view of the use of nuclear weapons has long been characterised by Mao Zedong's pronouncement
that nuclear weapons were 'paper tigers' - weapons that appear dangerous but lack real power. This
approach led to an early emphasis on a small number of thermonuclear weapons, and relatively inaccurate
ICBMs to deliver them. With these 'city busters', China pledged never to use nuclear weapons against non-
nuclear-armed countries, and never to use them first against other nuclear powers, as part of a policy of
'minimum deterrence'.
It was only with the death of Mao in 1976 and the subsequent establishment of Deng Xiaoping as leader
that Maoist doctrine was permitted to decline and plausible operational concepts were explored. It was
this political change that allowed the development of a range of nuclear capabilities, although pledges of
'no first use' have remained constant.
Nonetheless, China faces internal pressures over its political position. The growth in precision strike
capabilities means Chinese assets may face considerable damage without an opponent resorting to nuclear
weapons. Such concerns may have given rise to considerations of moving away from Beijing's long-held 'no
first use' position.
For example, in 2010 the Japanese newspaper Kyodo News reported Chinese discussions articulated in The
Science of Second Artillery Campaigns that there were plans to abandon 'no first use' should Chinese dams,
nuclear power plants, or other civilian targets be attacked. However, such suspicions have been firmly
rejected in public forums.
China also faces pressure from increasing interest in BMD, currently being pursued by traditional nuclear
rivals such as India, Russia, and the US, as well as other regional states such as Japan and South Korea. With
a relatively small ICBM inventory, even a small loss to missile defences could have far-reaching implications
on perceptions of the credibility of China's strike force. Chinese progress towards deploying missiles with
multiple warheads allows it to increase the penetration capability of its missile forces.
Despite the focus on thermonuclear warheads, the development of smaller nuclear warheads necessary to
provide a tactical and MIRV capability may have occurred during the 1983-96 timeframe. During this
period, 11 warhead tests occurred, with yields ranging from 20 to 150 kilotons. IHS Jane's Strategic
Weapons Systems assesses that these tests validated smaller warhead designs suitable for MIRV use on
weapons such as the DF-31 and the JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM).
Furthermore, a 1995 test of the DF-31 is reported to have deployed three dummy MIRVs, indicating that a
multiple warhead option for the DF-31 and/or the DF-31A may already exist, although the DF-5B is the
country's only known operational MIRV-equipped ICBM.
[Continued in full version…]
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DF-5B ICBMs presented during a military parade in Beijing on 3 September 2015. The multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV)-equipped DF-5B system is likely to have entered service in 2014-15, and is the country's only known operational MIRV-equipped ICBM. (PA)
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Conclusion
China's ICBM modernisation efforts have ramifications regionally and globally. MIRVs imply a level of
miniaturisation in the associated warhead, often corresponding to a reduced yield or amount of energy
released. Reduced yield results in a less-effective system unless there is a corresponding increase in
accuracy.
From this perspective, the addition of MIRVs to the DF-5B and other systems possibly indicates a
developing counterforce capability. Previous Chinese ICBMs relied on large 'city buster' warheads less
suited for attacking pinpoint targets such as ICBM launch control centres or individual silos. The
development of a system including smaller, more accurate warheads able to target such sites may increase
the perceived potential for use.
[Continued in full version…]
Copyright © IHS Global Limited, 2015
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