Chptr 19-22 Reviewer

8/6/2019 Chptr 19-22 Reviewer

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Book Outline (Justice Cruz)Atty. Rene Saguisag

CHAPTER 19: SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES

Justice delayed is justice denied especially meaningful in thePhilippines since litigations have been known to drag for years and evendecades.

Reasons for delay:

y The number of litigations filed an indication perhaps of thelitigious nature of our people; for criminal actions theircriminal propensities.

y Lack of dedication and industry on the part of the judges many of whom are not really busy.

y Leniency of the procedural laws which permit the parties toemploy gambits that only result in delay in the decision of their

cases.

Art. III, Sec. 16: all persons shall have the right to speedy disposition oftheir cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies.

- Implementation depends ultimately upon the SC, whichunfortunately is no paragon of speedy justice either, although itmust be added in fairness that this is note entirely its fault.

Art. VIII, Sec. 5(3): the SC is now expressly permitted to temporarily assigna judge from one station to another when the public interest so requires;where there is necessity for a less occupied judge to help a busier

colleague in another district.

Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5): it is required that the rules of court to be promulgatedby the SC shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the

speedy disposition of cases

Art. VIII, Sec. 15(1): maximum periods are prescribed for the decision or

resolution of cases:- SC 24 months- all lower collegiate counts (unless reduced by SC) 12 months- Other lower courts 3 months

(2): A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution

upon the filing of the last pleading, brief or memo required by the Rules ofCourt or by the court i tself.

(3): Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to

this effect signed by the Chief Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwithbe issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case or matter,

and served upon parties. The certification shall state why a decision orresolution has been rendered or issued within said period.

(4): Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the Court,without prejudice to such responsibility as many have been incurred inconsequence thereof, shall decide or resolve the case or matter thereto fordetermination, without further delay.

Art. IX-A, Sec. 7: each (Constitutional) commission shall decide by aMAJORITY VOTE of all its Members any case or matter brought before it

within 60 days from its submission for decision or resolution.

CHAPTER 20: RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED

I. CRIMINAL DUE PROCESSArt. 14 (1): No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense

without due process of law

Requisites:

a. An impartial and competent court in accordance with theprocedure prescribed by law

b. Proper observance of all the right accorded him under theConstitution and the applicable statutes.

It should be noted that the right to preliminary investigation is not amongthe rights granted to the accused under the bill of rights

- it is purely STATUTORY- in the absence of a valid waiver will violate due process.

SALES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Justice Ynares-Santiago): Right to PrelimInvestigation is statutory; a component part of due process in criminaljustice. Is not a mere formal or technical right, but a substantive right. Todeny the accuseds claim to prelim investigation would be to deprive him

of the full measure of his right to due process.

SALONGA VS. PAO: the petitioner moved for the dismissal of thesubversion charges against him on the ground of the lack of a prima facie

case. The motion was denied and he went to the SC, where he wasupheld. HELD: the court found the supposed evidence against himextremely tenuous (weak); the testimony of the prosecution witnesses was

contradictory and incredible. A photograph which he and another accusedappeared was rejected as evidence for subversion, as well as the claim that

his house had been use as contact point of the conspirators; and certainremarks made by the petitioner which were critical of the Marcos adminwere considered protected by freedom of expression.

- Justice Gutierrez: respondent judge should have taken thesefactors into consideration before concluding that a primafacie case exists against the petitioner. Stressing the

citizens right to be free not only from arbitrary arrest andpunishment but also from unwarranted and vexatious

prosecution, he declared that the integrity of a democraticsociety is corrupted if a person is carelessly included on the

trial of around forty persons when on the face of the recordno evidence linking him to the alleged conspiracy exists.

- prelim investigation is part of the guarantee of freedom andfair play which are birthrights of all who live in our country. Itis therefore imperative upon the fiscal or the judge, as thecase may be, to relieve the accused from the pain in goingthrough a trial once it is ascertained that the evidence is

insufficient to sustain a prima facie case or that no probable

cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of theaccused.

- The sincerity of the decision was weakened, however, by thefact that it was rendered after the prosecution, oninstruction from above, had itself moved for the dismissal ofthe charges against Salonga.

- Justice Gutierrez: the Court had earlier decided to grant thepetition, but it was only on 18 Feb 1985, after the President

Marcos had instructed the prosecutor to re-study thecharges that the decision was released.

- Justice Abad Santos: the decision could have had a greaterimpact had it been promulgated prior to the executive action meaning after the concensus was reached on 24 Oct 1984

and the ponencia started to circulate for signature on 2 Nov1984.

The basic ingredient of criminal due process is a trial conducted in

accordance with the rudiments of fair play. Hence, accused has a right to

complain of the judge has a personal or pecuniary interest in the outcomeof the case.

GALMAN vs. SANDIGANBAYAN: SC, acting on a second motion forreconsideration of the decision of respondent court aquitting all the

accused in the slaying of Benigno Aquino and Rolando Galman, reated afac-finding commission which, after holding extensive hearings, concludedthat the trial had been rigged and the acquittal pre-ordained by no lessthan Pres. Marcos himself. The Court, adopting these findings, annulled

the proceedings and ordered a new trial of the case, declaring that the


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interference and pressure of the President was violative of due processand prevented a fair and impartial trial. SC cannot permit such a sham trial

and verdict and traversty of justice to stand unrectified.

A mistrial may be declared if it is shown that the proceedings were held

under such circumstances as would prevent the accused from freelymaking his defense or the judge from freely arriving at his decision.

MOORE vs. DEMPSEY: proceedings were annulled where it was shown thata mob had crowded into and surrounded the courtroom, intimidatingdefense counsel and their clients and practically compelling a conviction.

SHEPPARD vs. MAXWELL: case was annulled where a massive prosecutioncampaign was launched against the defendant by the newspapers and byhis adverse trial by publicity the minds of the jurors were poisoned,resulting in his being declared guilty.

ROCHIN vs. CALIFORNIA: police authorities forced an emetic solutionthrough a tube into the stomach of a suspect to eject 2 narcotic pills he

had swallowed to prevent their use as evidence against him. US SCdescribed the act as too close to rack and screw and absolved the

accused.

BREITHANPAT vs. ABRAM: a doctor extracted a small amount of blood

from a person while he was unconscious to determine whether or not hewas intoxicated at the time of a vehicular accident in which he wasinvolved. HELD: said act and the subsequent use of the results of the blood

test as evidence against him did not violate due process.

MARTELINO vs. ALEJANDRINO: SC declared that the spate of publicity inthis case did not focus on the guilt of the petitioners but rather on the

responsibility of the government for what was claimed to be a massacreof Muslim trainees. If there was a trial by newspaper at all, it was not ofthe petitioners but of the government. Absent here is a showing of failure

of the court martial to protect the accused from massive publicityencouraged by those connected with the conduct of the trial either by afailure to control the release of info or to remove the trial to anothervenue or to postpone it until the deluge of prejudicial publicity shall have

subsided.

Due Process is also DENIED where a person is pleaded for a violation of a

law, administrative regulation or municipal ordinance not previouslypublished as he would not know what acts he must do or avoid to preventprosecution.

Appeal is permitted by the Constitution or by statute, DENIAL thereof willalso militate against due process.

PESIGAN vs. ANGELES: the carabaos the plaintiffs were taking from CamSurto Batangas was confiscated in CamNorte pursuant to EO No. 626-A

prohibiting transporting of carabaos from one province to another.Plaintiffs sued for the recovery of the animals and damages. HELD: the EOshould not have been enforced against them on 2 April 1982, because it

was published only in the OG dated 14 June 1982, more than 2 mos later.The penal regulation became effective only after 15 days from publication,

under Art. 2 of the Civil Code and Sec. 11 of the Rev. Admin. Code.

PEOPLE vs. VERIDIANO: involving the issuance of a bouncing check in May

1979 allegedly in violation of BP 22 as published in the OG dated 9 April1979. The SG argued that the law became effective 15 days from the said

date as, according to Sec. 11 of Rev. Admin. Code, the Gazette isconclusively presumed to be publisjed on the day indicated, therein thedate of issue. However, the accused obtained the certification from the

Government Printing Office that the said issue was officially released frocirculation on 14 June 1979. HELD: the law became effective 15 daysfrom the date of release which is 14 June 1979, which is considered thedate of publication. The dismissal of the charge was affirmed.

EO No. 200 issued 18 June 1987: publication may now be made in anewspaper of general circulation in the Phils. With the same efficacy as

publication in the OG.

II. SELF-INCRIMINATIONArt. III, Sec. 17: No person shall be compelled to be a witness

against himself.

Based on humanitarian and practical reasons.- Humanitarian: because it is intended to prevent the State, with

all its coercive powers, from extracting from the suspecttestimony that may convict him.

- Practical: because a person subjected to such compulsion islikely to perjure himself for his own protection.

Right available not only in criminal prosecutions but also in all other

government proceedings, including civil actions and administrative orlegislative investigations.

Claimed not only by the person accused of an offense but by any witnessto whom an incriminating question is addressed.

(1) ScopeGEN. RULE: As long as the question will tend to incriminate, the witness isentitled to the privilege.

EXCEPTION:

a. question asked related to a past criminality for which thewitness can no longer be prosecuted, as where the crime wasalready prescribed or he has already been acquitted or

convicted thereof;

b. a question relating to a previously granted immunity under avalidly enacted statute.

The kernel of the right is against not all compulsion but testimonialcompulsion only. Hence, a person may be compelled to submit to a

physical examination of his body to determine his involvement in anoffense of which he is accused.

US vs. TAN TENG: where a person is charged with rape was examined for

gonorrhea, which might have been transmitted to the victim. HELD: theexamination is VALID. It was no different from examining his fingerprintsor other parts or features of his body for identification purposes.

VILLAFLOR vs. SUMMERS: involving an examination of a woman accused of

adultery to ascertain if she was pregnant. HELD (quoted Justice Holmes inthe case of HOLT vs. US): the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminalcourt to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the used of physical

or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusionof his body as evidence when it may be material.

Prohibition applies to compulsion for the production of documents, papersand chattels that may be used as evidence against witness, EXCEPT where

the State has a right to inspect the same, such as books of accounts ofcorporations, under the police power.

The privilege also protects the accused against any attempt to compel himto furnish a specimen of his handwriting in connection with his prosecution

for falsification.

BELTRAN vs. SAMSON: SC said that writing is something more thanmoving the body, or the hand, or the fingers; writing is not a purely

mechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence and


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attention. In the case at bar, writing means that the petitioner herein is tofurnish a means to determine whether or not he is a falsifier.

(2) When AvailableMay be invoked only when and as the incriminating question is asked,since the witness has no way of knowing in advance the nature or effect ofthe question to be put to him ONLY OF THE ORDINARY WITNESS.

FOR THE ACCUSED: it is settled that he can refuse at the outset andaltogether to take the stand as a witness for the prosecution, on thereasonable assumption that the purpose of his interrogation will to be

incriminate him.

CHAVEZ vs. CA: prosecutor called on one of the accused, the petitionerherein, as his first witness. Petitioner demurred (objected), invoking his

right against self-incrimination, but was finally compelled to testify underpressure from the court. Convicted on the strength of testimony elicitedfrom him as the star witness for the prosecution, in the words if the

judge, he filed a petition for habeas corpus. SC granted writ declaring interalia through Justice Sanchez:

- Petitioner is a defendant in a criminal case.- Petitioner objected and invoked the privilege of self-

incrimination. This he broadened by the clearcut statement

that he will not testify. But petitioners protestations were metwith the judges empathetic statement that it is the right of theprosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on the witness-

stand including the accused and that the defense counselcould not object to have the accused called on the witness

stand. The cumulative impact of all these is that the accused-petitioner had to take the stand. He was thus peremptorily

asked to create evidence against himself. The foregoingsituation molds a solid case for petitioner, backed by theConstitution, the law and jurisprudence.

- Petitioner occupies a different tier of protection from anordinary witness. An ordinary witness may be compelled to takethe witness stand and claim the privilege as each questionrequiring as each question requiring an incriminating answer is

shot at him, an accused altogether refuse to take the witness

stand and refuse to answer any and all questions.

(3) WaiverGEN. RULE: may be waived, either directly or by a failure to invoke it,provided the waiver is certain and unequivocal and intelligently,

understandingly and willingly made.

SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM a court summon ordering a named party to

appear before the court and produce documents or other tangible use at ahearing or trial.

One under a subpoena duces tecum voluntarily surrenders anincriminating paper which is put in evidence against him is deemed to have

waived the privilege, as so too is an accused who takes the witness standand offers testimony on his behalf.

The witness may be cross-examined and asked incriminating questions onany matter he testified to on direct examination.

III. CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATIONCUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION questioning initiated by law enforcement

officers after a person has been taken into custody deprived oif hisfreedom in action in any significant way.

RA 7438 custodial investigation shall include the practice of issuing an

invitation to a person who is investigated in connection with an offence

he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of theinviting officer for any violation.

REQUISITES OF EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION TO BE ADMISSIBLE:a.) Must be Voluntaryb.) Must be with assistance of counselc.) Must be in writingd.) Must be expressed.

MIRANDA vs. ARIZONA (CJ Earl Warren):- the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory

or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the

defendant unless it demonstrates the use of proceduralsafeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incriminations.

- By custodial interrogation means by questioning initiated by lawenforcement officers after a person has been taken intocustody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in anysignificant way.

- The defendant may wave effectuation of these rights, providedthe waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.

- If the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that hedoes not wish to be interrogated, the police may not questionhim. The mere fact that he may have answered some questions

or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprivehim of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiriesuntil he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents

to be questioned.

PEOPLE vs. BUSCATO: accused were convicted on the basis of extrajudicialconfessions extracted through their maltreatment during the custodial

investigation from 15-18 Jan 1973. Their conviction was reversed on theground that the physical, mental and moral coercion exerted upon themrendered the confessions inadmissible as contrary to the right against self-

incriminations. HELD (quoting PEOPLE vs. BAGSALA thru Justice Fernando):impress anew on police officials that the imperative requirements of truthand humanity condemn the utilization of force and violence to extractconfessions from unwilling victims. Crimes must be punished and the

guilty must not be allowed to escape. A desirable end cannot, however, be

attained by unconstitutional means. There should be less than full respectfor the law if in the process of enforcing it lawless methods are employed.

PEOPLE vs. RAMOS: admissions of the accused during his custodialinvestigation. The Court observed that the appellant has only finishedGrade VI, which means that he is not adequately educated to understand

fully and fairly the significance of his constitutional rights to silence andcounsel. Interrogating officer must have patience in explaining these rightsto the accused. HELD: Conviction reversed. Records do not reveal that

these requirements have been fully complied with, nor was there anyshowing that the appellant has been represented by counsel during

custodial investigation.

PEOPLE vs. GALIT (reiterated MORALES vs. ENRILE): concerning the

treatment of a person under custodial investigation. The confession wasrejected because of the proven torture inflicted on the accused.

Moreover, before his interrogation followed by the question of whether hewas ready to make his statement, to which he replied Opo. Accdg, toJustice Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr, such a long question, followed by a

monosyllabic answer does not satisfy the requirements of the law that theaccused be informed of his rights,

PEOPLE vs. PECARDAL: at the time the accused-appellant wasapprehended and interrogated, he was only 17 years old. That is a

susceptible age. One can accept how easily a teenager can succumb to thepressure exerted upon him by hardened investigators experiences inextracting confessions through the use of methods less than legal.


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PEOPLE vs. CAPITIN: Confession was completely inadmissible because itwas taken without observance of safeguards for the protection of the

suspect facing custodial investigation. A reading of the supposedconfession shows there was the usual mechanical advise of the suspectsrights, including the right to assistance of counsel; whether or not she is

waiving her right to such assistance; followed by the stereotyped answer inthis nature. If confessions written in advance by the police for persons oflimited intelligence or educational attainment have been outlawed, the

same disapprobation applies where a confession was signed by a personwhose sanity was dubious, where the intelligence was not only limited butimpaired.

PEOPLE vs. BARROS: The Court made a salutary reminder that swearingofficers should have confessants physically examined by independentdoctors before administering the oath, to discourage attempts to secureconfessions through violence.

PEOPLE vs. CABRERA: strength of the medical evidence of the defendantsmanhandling by the police authorities.

Art. 3, Sec. 12 : the right of the person under investigation to competent

and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice to be provided

free if he cannot afford counsel de parte.- It may be waived by the suspect so long as he does this in

writing and in the presence of counsel, who has presumableadvised him.

PEOPLE vs. MACAM (Justice Camilo Quiason):- In GAMBOA vs. CRUZ, SC held that the right to counsel attached

upon the start of the investigation, when the investigatingofficer starts to ask questions to elicit information, confessions

or admissions from the accused.- Historically, the counsel guarantee was intended to assure the

assistance of counsel at the trial, inasmuch as the accused was

confronted with both the intricacies of the law and theadvocacy of the public prosecutor.

- After the start of the custodial investigation, any identificationof an uncounseled accused made in a police line-up is

inadmissible, which is particularly true in this case where the

police officers first talked to victims before the confrontationwas held.

- SC seems to have overturned the above case in PEOPLE vs.LAMSING, PEOPLE vs. SALVATIERRA.

DE LA TORRE vs. CA: it reiterated the rule in the GAMBOA CASE that

the right to counsel is not considered part of the custodialinvestigation.

PEOPLE vs. COMPIL: accused was arrested in Quezon, where he hadfled, subjected by the police to informal inculpatory interrogation

that continued during their trip back to Manila, where his formalinvestigation was conducted at the police station. He was not eventhen assisted by counsel, who arrived the following day. HELD: his

right to counsel began when the interrogation started in Quezon.The operative act accdng. To Justice Bellosillo, is when the police

investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime buthas begun to focus on a particular suspect who has been taken intocustody by the police to carry out a process of interrogation that

lends itself to eliciting incrimatory statements.

PEOPLE vs. LUCERO: the counsel de oficio was present at the start ofthe custodial investigation of the accused but left after a while toattend the wake of a friend. The next morning, 2 CIS agents police

took Lucero and his signed confession to the lawyers house and thelawyer asked him if he had freely signed it, the accused sais yes,obviously under pressure from his military escort, the lawyer alsosigned the confession to authenticate its regularity. HELD: Court

rejected the confession, holding that the Constitution requires notjust any kind of counsel but effective and vigilant counsel.

PEOPLE vs SUAREZ: a re-enactment of the crime in the absence ofcounsel in inadmissible evidence against the accused.

PEOPLE vs. BANOLA: SC held as invalid the waiver of the suspectscustodial rights without the assistance of counsel. The suspects

confession was taken by the police before advising him of hiscustodial rights.

PEOPLE vs. ANDAN: evidence against the accused was in admissible.

PEOPLE vs. SERZO: the right to counsel is not unlimited, where theaccused repeatedly asked for postponement of his trial on theground that he was still looking for a lawyer de parte. The court

should then appoint a counsel de oficio for him.

JUSTICE ARTEMIO PANGANIBAN:

- right to counsel of an accused is guaranteed by ourConstitution, our laws and our Rules of Court.

- During custodial investigation, arraignment, trial and even onappeal, the accused id given the option to be represented by acounsel of his choice.

- While the right to be represented by counsel is ABSOLUTE, theaccuseds option to hire one of his own choice is limited. Suchoption cannot be used to sanction reprehensible dilatory

tactics, to trifle with the Rules or to prejudice the equallyimportant rights of the State and the offended party to speedy

and adequate justice.

Art. 3, Sec. 12, Subsec. 4: it is hoped that such abuses may be deterredand, if committed, punished with appropriate civil and criminal sanctionsthat, besides compensating the victims for their injuries, should also serve

as a warning against the repetition of such acts.

GUANZON vs. DE VILLA: petitioners challenged the practice of the militaryof rounding up the residents in a particular area and requiring them to line

up for inspection, to ferret out fugitives from justice and suspected

criminals. SC merely remanded the petition to the RTC of Manila, Malabonand Pasay, where the petitioners may present evidence supporting their

allegations and where specific erring parties may be pinpointed andprosecuted.

- JUSTICE CRUZ (dissent): saturation drive is not unfamiliar to us.It is like the zona of the Japanese Occupation. An area was

surrounded by soldiers and all residents were flushed out oftheir houses and line up, to be looked over by a person with abag over his head. This man pointed to suspected guerillas,

who were immediately arrested and eventually if not instantlyexecuted.

- JUSTICE SARMIENTO (dissent): the problem is not initially forthe SC is to me, an abdication of judicial duty. As indicated, thecontroversy of purely one of law the facts being indisputed.

La, needless to say, is the problem of the SC, not the Executive.

RA 7309: victims of imprisonment, arbitrary or illegal detention, or ofviolent crimes may file a claim for damages with the Board of Claims underthe DOJ.

- Php 1, 000.00 for each month of imprisonment- In all other cases, the award shall not exceed Php 10, 000 or the

expenses incurred for hospitalization, medical treatment, lossof wage, loss of support or other expenses directly related tothe injury, whichever is lower, without prejudice to the right of

the claimant to seek other remedies under existing laws.

IV. BAIL


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Art. 3, Sec. 13: All persons, except those charged with offensespunishable by RP when evidence of guilt is strong shall, before conviction,

be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may beprovided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when theprivilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not

be required.

Rule 114, Sec. 1: BAIL is the security given for the release of a person in

custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon hisappearance before any court as may be required.

- Only persons in detention may petition for bail, to secure theirprovisional release; one who is not in custody cannot ask forbail.

- Bail cannot be denied simply because the person detained hasnot yet been formally charged in court but is till under

investigation for the commission of an offense.- One who has already been indicted is entitled to bail, there is

no reason why another who has not yet been charged and

against whom a prima facie case has not yet been established should be denied a similar right.

Rule 114: any person in custody who is not yet charged in court mayapply for bail with any court in the province, city or municipality where he

is held.

GARCIA-PADILLA vs. ENRILE: the right to bail is preserved even if the

privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has been suspended.

EXCEPTION: Applies to offenses which under the law existing at the time ofits commission and at the time of the application for bail may be punished

by RP or Death, even if a lesser penalty may be imposed upon convictionowing to mitigating circumstances that may be disclosed later. Theaccused is still entitled to bail if, say, he is charged with murder and the

evidence by the prosecution at the hearing on the petition for bailindicates only a case of homicide.

ENRILE vs. SALAZAR: the petitioners were charged with rebellion with

murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed in connection

with the detained without bail. HELD: SC invoked People vs. Hernandez,that the crime of rebellion could not be complexed with murder. Simple

rebellion is punished only with PMa and a fine of P20k and is thereforebailable. Based on the doctrine enunciated in the Hernandez case, thequestioned info filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spousesRebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion

only. Hence, said petitioners are entitled to bail, before final conviction, asa matter of right.

NOTE: even if the crime imputed to the accused is punishable by RP, he isstill entitled to bail if the evidence of guilt is not strong. It is for the

prosecution to prove the contrary, although it is not necessary at this pointto prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

PEOPLE vs. CORTEZ: SC directed that where the accused is convicted of acapital offense or of an offense punishable by RP, his bail shall be canceled

and he shall be placed in confinement pending the resolution of his appeal.

Hearing on the petition of bail is required to satisfy due process, but this

may be summary in nature and held in the course of the trial itself. Aseparate hearing is not indispensable.

Rule 114, Sec. 6: fixing a reasonable amount of bail, the following shouldbe considered:

y Financial ability of the accused to give baily nature and circumstances of the offensey penalty for the offense chargedy character and reputation of the accusedy age and health of the accused

y weight of the evidence against himy probability of his appearing at the trialy forfeiture of other bonds by himy fact that he was a fugitive from justice when arrestedy pendency of other cases in which he is under bond

JUSTICE JACKSON: a teasing illusion like a munificent bequest in apaupers will

DE LA CAMARA vs. ENAGE: accused was required by th lower court to postbail in the amount of P1, 195, 200.00 to secure his temporary libertypending his trial for multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder. He

escaped due to the excessive bail.

YAP vs. CA: the respondent court fixed bail for the appellant in the sum ofP5,500,00, equivalent to his civil liability to the complainant as found bythe trial court. HELD: SC reduced the amount to P200,000 saying that bail

is not intended as a punishment nor as in satisfaction of civil liability whichshould necessarily await the judgment of the appellate court.

Court may limit on the appellants right to travel upon showing that he hadleft the country several times during his trial and there was the possibility

that he would escape abroad to avoid punishment.

V. PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCEArt. 3, Sec. 14 (a): In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall bepresumed innocent until the contrary is proved

It is the responsibility of the prosecution to establish the defendants guiltbeyond reasonable doubt; conviction will not depend on the weakness of

his defense but on the strength of the prosecution.

PEOPLE vs. MALILAY: constitutional mandate that there be evidence

sufficient to remove every vestige of reasonable doubt.

PEOPLE vs. SUNGA: a prosecution of rape. HELD; although the defense ofthe appellant was weak, he nevertheless could not be convicted because

of the constitutional presumption of innocence; evidence of the

prosecution was weaker.

DUMLAO CASE: challenged the statute disqualified from running for thelocal elective office any person who has committed any act of disloyalty

to the State provided that the filing of the charges of such crimes beforea civil court/military tribunal after prelim investigation shall be prima facieevidence of such fact. HELD: A person disqualified to run for public office

on the ground that charges have been filed against him is virtually placedin the same category as a person already convicted of a crime with the

penalty of Arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty ofsuspension of the right to hold office during the term of the s entence.

PEOPLE vs. TEMPONGKO: the theory of the prosecution has too manyloose ends that it has failed to tie up to the satisfaction of this Court. The

defense is weak, to be sure, but for all the persuasive arguments of theSocGen and the private prosecutor, this Court remains unconvinced that

the appellant raped the complainant.

Nevertheless, the constitutional presumption of innocence may beovercome by contrary presumption based on the experience of humanconduct. (I.e. unexplained flight, failure of the accused to explain his

possession of a stolen property, etc.)

NOTE: under RPC, the inability of an accountable officer to produce funds

or property entrusted to him will be considered prima facie evidence thathe has appropriated them to his personal uses.

PEOPLE vs. MIRANTES(Justice Regalado): the presumption of regularity in

the performance of official functions cannot by itself affect the


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constitutional presumption of innocence enjoyed by the accused,particularly when the prosecutions evidence is weak. The evidence of the

prosecution must be strong enough to pierce the shield of thispresumptive innocence and to establish the guilt of the accused beyondreasonable doubt.

JOSEPH vs. VILLALUZ: after the prosecution has adduced evidence, theconstitutional presumption of innocence must yield to what has been so

amply and persuasively demonstrated.

PEOPLE vs. REGULACION: it is incumbent upon the accused, who hadadmitted the killing, to establish his case of self-defense instead of relying

merely on the weakness of the prosecution.

PEOPLE vs. ARCIAGA: SC said that no inference of guilt may be drawnagainst an accused for his failure to make a statement of any sort. The

neglect or refusal of the accused shall not in any manner prejudice or beused against hi,

PEOPLE vs. SOLIS: while accused have the right to be silent, they run therisk of an inference form the non-production of evidence. Failure or

refusal of the accused to testify may prejudice him if the prosecution has

already established a prima facie case against him, according to People vs.Resano.

VI. RIGHT TO BE HEARDArt. 3, Sec. 14 (a): and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and

counsel

Such a right is indispensable in any criminal prosecution where the stakesare the liberty or even the life of the accused, who must for this reason begiven a chance to defend himself.

PEOPLE vs. LUMAGUE: SC set aside the conviction of 3 co-accused afterfinding that they were denied due process because they had not beengiven a chance to testify and to present additional evidence on their

behalf. The trial court was directed to receive such additional evidence

and to allow the defendants to present sur-rebuttal evidence in case theprosecution should present rebuttal evidence.

Assistance of Counsel

- Begins from the time a person is taken into custody and placedunder investigation for the commission of a crime.

- The right becomes all the more important when he is alreadyon trial and confronted by a skilled and experienced prosecutor.

- Accused is entitled to be heard in his defense not only byhimself but also with the assistance of a counsel.

- Counsel de oficio shall be appointed for him if he cannot affordthe services of a retained lawyer. He should not merely makemotions of defending the accused but exert his utmost effortsas if he were representing a paying client.

PEOPLE vs. HOLGADO: in criminal cases, there can be no fair hearing unless

the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. Once may beconvicted because he is guilty but because he does not know how toestablish his innocence, happens more easily to persons who are ignorant

or uneducated. It is essential that the court could assign one de oficio forthe accused if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time

to procure an attorney of his own.

PEOPLE vs. MAGSI: Justice Makasiar chided the trial court for its pro forma

appointment of a counsel de oficio who did not exert his best efforts forthe protection of his non-paying client and its own failure to explain to thedefendant the meaning of the accusation against him and theconsequences of his plea of guilty. Case remanded to the court a quo for

further proceedings.

PEOPLE vs. MALUNSING: defendant in a murder case manifested at the

start of the trial that he had lost confidence in his former counsel andwanted to retain counsel de parte. Nevertheless, the court appointedsame lawyer as his counsel de oficio. He was asked if he wanted to confer

with his client, he declined and the case then proceeded to trial, duringwhich no evidence was adduced in behalf of the defendant, unlike his co-accused who were actively represented by their lawyers. On appeal, SC

remanded the case for new trial in view of the violation of theconstitutional rights of the accused.

Art. III, Sec. 12 (1): the right to counsel does not cease after trial, but

continues even where the case is appealed.

VII. NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATIONArt. III, Sec. 14 (a): to be informed of the nature and cause of theaccusation against him

- Rules of Court: whenever possible, a complaint or informationshould state the designation given to the offense by the statute,

besides the statement of the acts or omissions constituting thesame; if there is no such designation, reference should be made

to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.- Acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense

must be stated in ordinary and concise language without

repetition, not necessarily in the terms of the statute definingthe offense, but in such form as is sufficient to enable a person

of common understanding to know what offense is intended tobe charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper

judgment.- Description is controlling and not the designation of the

offense.

SORIANO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN: a prosecutor entrapped by the NBI wascharged with and convicted of violating Sec. 3(b) of the Anti-Graft andCorrupt Practices Act. SC agreed with the accused that the said law was

inapplicable but rejected his submission that he could also not be

convicted of bribery under the RPC because this would violate hisconstitutional right to be informed of the nature and the cause of the

accusation against him. Accdg. to Justice Abad Santos, a reading of theinformation clearly makes out a case of bribery.

PEOPLE vs. RAMIREZ: a person charged with rape, of which he was later

absolved, could not be convicted of qualified seduction, which was notincluded in the information.

PEOPLE vs. ALBINO: convicting the appellant of rape by intimidation underthe information charging him with raping his daughter while she was

asleep and unconscious would violate his constitutional right to beinformed of the nature and cause of tha accusation against him.PEOPLE vs. MONTES: trial nevertheless sentences the accused to life

imprisonment plus civil damages for having indirectly caused the death ofthe complainant who had taken her life 2 days after the alleged incident.

SC observed that the judgment may indicate that the accused wasconvicted of homicide. If this is so, the lower court is in grave erro for hewas never charged with the said offense; he was accused of and tried for

rape.

PEOPLE vs. ORTEGA: a person charged at his arraignment with homicide bydrowning could not be convicted of homicide by stabbing which was notthe crime alleged in the information.

VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS RULE where the statute itself is couched in suchindefinite language that it is not possible for men of ordinary intelligenceto determine therefrom what acts or omissions are punished and, hence,

should be avoided.


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GALLEGO cs. SADIGANBAYAN: the use of the words unwarranted,

manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligencewhich all have definite connotations, did not make the Anti-Graft andCorrupt Practices Act invalid for vagueness.

ESTRADA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN: petitioner invoked the VFV rule inquestioning the PLUNDER LAW which he claimed denied him the right to

be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him becauseof its ambiguity in failing to define with precision certain words and phrasein many of its provisions. HELD: SC rejected challenge and declared interalia through Justice Regalado, the test in determining whether a criminal

statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys asufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measuredby common understanding and practice.

- vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree ofcertainty for the statute to be upheld not absolute precisionor mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest.

- An act will not be held invalid merely because it might havebeen more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions.

Charge is communicated to the accused during the ARRAIGNMENT, which

is an indispensible part of the proceedings against him. SC said that it is atthis stage where, in the mode and manner required by the Rules, an

accused for the first time is granted the opportunity to know the precisecharge that confronts him.

- With his counsel by his side, he is thus in a position to enter hisplease with full knowledge of the consequence; though he isnot required to do so immediately; he may also move to quash.

- It thus a vital aspect of the constitutional rights guaranteed tohim.

PEOPLE vs. CRISOLOGO: a deaf-mute was accused of robbery withhomicide, but arraignment was deferred for 6 yrs because there was no

sign language expert to assist him. Finally waiving the reading of theinformation, he was tried, still without the assistance of the sign languageexpert, and was eventually convicted. HELD: absence of a qualifiedinterpreter in sign language and of any other means, whether in writing or

otherwise, to inform the accused of the charges against him denied the

accused his fundamental right to due process of law.

PEOPLE vs. PARAZO: a deaf-mute and mental retardate could notadequately defend himself at the trial for lack of qualifies sign languageexperts or any other means to communicate to him the crime he wasalleged to have committed.

VIII. THE TRIALArt. III, Sec. 14 (a): to have a speedy, impartial and public trial

The old Constitution, the trial of the accused to be only public and speedy;new Bill of Rights provides that it also be impartial.

IGNACIO vs. VILLALUZ: respondent judge had previously convicted the

petitioner of arson, holding that the motive for the crime was to concealthe acts of malversation committed by the accused. When he wassubsequently prosecuted for malversation before the same judge, the

petitioner moved for the latters disqualification on the ground that hecould not be expected to be objective and impartial in the trial of the case.

The judge denied the motion, hence the petitioner went on certiorari tothe SC, where he was sustained. HELD (Justice Teehankee): in a casewhere he was named responded, MATEO vs. VILLALUZ, decided in 1973,

the Court laid down the principle it is now beyond dispute that dueprocess cannot be satisfied in the absence of that degree of objectivity inthe part of the judge sufficient to reassure litigants of his being fair andjust.

PEOPLE vs. OPIDA: conviction was reversed after the Court found that thetrial judge was biased and had obviously prejudged the accused because of

their appearance and criminal record.

Publicity of trial

- necessary to prevent abuses that may be committed by thecourt to the prejudice of the defendant.

- People have the right to attend the proceeding not onlybecause of their interest therein but also so they can seewhether or not the constitutional safeguards for the benefit ofthe accused are being observed.

- NOT ABSOLUTE. For it is competent for the court to bar thepublic in certain cases such as a rape trial, where the purpose ofthe spectators in attending the proceeding might be only topander to their morbid curiosity

Speedy Trial

- one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays andis intended to relieve the accused of needless anxieties and

inconveniences before sentence is pronounced upon him.- Sec. 16 of Bill of Rights: all persons shall have the right to a

speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-

judicial or administrative bodies.

CONDE vs. RIVERA: SC dismissed all charges against an accused who wasrequired to dance attendance in courts and subjected to a number ofunjustified postponement that resulted in unconscionable delay of her

trial. HELD (Justice Malcolm): accused has been forced to respond to noless than 5 informations for various crimes and misdemeanors, has

appeared with her witnesses and counsel at hearings no less than 8different occasions only to see the case postponed, has twice been

required to come to SC for protection and now after the passage of morethan 1 yr from the time when the first info was filed, seems as far awayfrom a definite resolution of her troubles as she was originally charged.

The Court is thus under a moral and legal obligation to see that theseproceedings come to an end and that the accused is discharged from thecustody of law.

FLORES vs. PEOPLE: accused were charged with robbery in 1951, appealed

their conviction in 1955 to CA, which did not act until 1958. CA remandedback the case to the lower court for a re-hearing and in 1959 set aside the

decision so a trial could be held to receive additional evidence for thedefendants. Nothing was done for about a year despite 6 or 7 scheduledhearings which were not held because of the absence of the offendedparty. Instead of rendering a new decision, the lower court returned the

records to Cam and 5 more years elapsed without anything being done.The accused moved to dismiss the case in 1965 and when their 2

ndmotion

for recon was denied by CA in 1966, went to the SC. They were finally

discharged in 1974 on the strength of their constitutional right to a speedytrial. SC took 8 yrs to decide.

COJUANGCO vs. SADIGANBAYAN: SC held that the respondent courtsdelay of more than 1 yr in resolving the petitioners motion to dismiss the

charges against him violated the right to a speedy trial, considering that allpertinent pleadings required by the Sandiganbayan had already been

submitted.

PADILLA vs. APAS: it was held that since the prosecution, by repeated

motions for postponement, caused the delay of the proceedings from thetime the info was filed on Feb 28, 1996, from which time the test of

violation of the right to a speedy trial is to be counted, the dismissal of thecase, on motion of the accused, amounts to an acquittal. The dismissal ofthe case by trial court on 22 March 2000 was affirmed by the SC.

AMBERTI vs. CA (Justice Teehankee): The Court has consistentlymaintained that although a speedy determination of an action implies aspeedy trial, speed is not the chief objective of a trial. The ends of justice


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and fairness would be served thereby are more important than a race toend the trial.

MARTIN vs. VER: the right to a speedy trial, which begins from the filing ofthe info cannot be quantified into a specified # of days or months but must

be examined in the light of surrounding circumstances such as, in thatcase, the unavailability of witnesses.

Right to be Present is a Personal Right and may be VALIDLY WAIVED

AQUINO vs. MILITARY COMMISSION NO. 2: petitioner was sustained in hisrefusal to be present at his own trial, which he claimed was a mere

mockery because his conviction had already been pre-ordained. HELD:after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of theaccused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear isunjustified.

Presence of the accused may be required if it is necessary for the

purposes of identification

- When the prosecution intends to introduce witnesses who willidentify him

PEOPLE vs. DICHOSO: hearings for the presentation of the evidence for theaccused were reset no less than 11 times in motion of the defense. On the

12th scheduled hearing, the defense counsel manifested that if his clientdid not again appear, he would submit the case without presenting anyevidence. The accused did not show up and counsel did as promised. The

accused was convicted and through new counsel questioned the sentenceon the ground that she had been deprived of her right to be heard. HELD:

she had by her repeated failure to attend the hearings waived her right totrial, adding that speedy justice is as mush a prerogative of and an

accused as of complainant.

Trial in Absentia

Previously, when in the course of the trial, the defendant escaped orotherwise failed or refused to appear, trial will be suspended. This wasmodified by Aquino vs. Military Commission No. 2.

REQUISITES:a.) The accused has already been arraignedb.) He has been duly notified of the trialc.) His failure to appear is unjustified

PEOPLE vs. SALAS: SC declared that the purpose of this rule is to speed up

the disposition of criminal cases, trial of which could in the past beindefinitely deferred, and may times completely abandoned, because ofthe defendants escape. The right to be present at ones trial may now be

waived except only at that stage where the prosecution intends to presentwitnesses who will indentify the accused.

BORJA vs. MENDOZA: a judgment of conviction was set aside by the SCwhen it appeared that the accused had been tried and convicted in his

absence before he had been formally arraigned. HELD: the expressmention in the present Constitution of the need for such a step

emphasizes its importance in the procedural scheme to accord an accuseddue process.

Trial in absentia does not, however, abrogate the provisions of the Rules

of Court regarding forfeiture of the bail bond if the accused fails to

appear at his trial.

PEOPLE vs. PRIETO: the trial court reconsidered its original order and

deferred confiscation of the bail bond of the accused, which had alreadygone abroad and could not attend his trial, as being premature untiljudgment of conviction shall have been rendered. HELD: SC declared thatthere is no justification in law, therefore, for such valid and correct order

being reconsidered, just because of the innovation in the Constitution as to

the trial being held in the absence of an accused. The present Constitutioncertainly has not made a dent on the traditional and correct concept of a

bail as given to allow the release of a person in the custody of the law oncondition that he would appear before any court whenever so required.Upon failure to do so, the warrant of arrest previously issued can be a

sufficient justification for his confinement.

MANOTOC vs. CA: a person is granted bail while facing estafa charges

wanted to leave for abroad to attend to certain business matters.Permission having been denied, he went to SC, where it was sustained.HELD(Justice Fernan): a court has the power to prohibit a person admittedto bail from leaving the Philippines, this is a necessary consequence of the

nature and function of a bail bond. Allowing accused to leave thePhilippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond dthe reachof the courts.

IX. RIGHT OF CONFRONTATIONArt. III, Sec. 14 (a): to meet the witnesses face to face

US vs. JAVIER: SC quoting from American decision declared that the right

to confrontation intends to secure the accused in the right to be tried, sofar as the facts provable by witnesses are concerned, by only such

witnesses as meet him face to face at the trial, who give their testimony inhis presence, and give the accused an opportunity of cross-examination. Itwas intended to prevent to prevent conviction of the accused upon

deposition of ex parte affidavits, and particularly to preserve the right ofthe accused to test the recollection of the witnesses in the exercise of the

right of cross-examination.

PEOPLE vs. RAMOS: an affidavit implicating the accused as a drug pusherwas rejected as mere hearsay by the SC because the affiant had not beenpresented in court and so could not be cross-examined by the defense.

The decision was COMBATE vs. SAN JOSE for convicting the accused onmere affidavits and denying him the right to counsel, to trial and to cross-examine the affiants.

PEOLE vs. LIWANAG: the accused objected to the inclusion in the evidence

for the prosecution of testimony adduced against him during thepreliminary investigation. The witnesses were subjected to cross-

examination then, and later also at the trial. HELD: no violation of the rightof confrontation.

TALINO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN: SC reiterated the rule where several co-

accused are given a separate trial, the evidence given against them at theother trial where they had no opportunity to cross-examine the witnessesis not admissible against them.

If a prosecution witness dies before his cross-examination can be

completed, his direct testimony cannot be stricken off the record,

provided the material points ofhis direct testimony had been covered.

TAMPAR vs. USMAN: Court shares the concern of petitioners in the used ofyamin in this proceeding, and for that matter, before the Philippine

Sharia courts. Sec. 7 of the Special Rules of Procedure prescribed forSharia courts aforecited provides that if the plaintiff had no evidence toprove his claim, the defendant shall take an oath and judgment shall be

rendered in his favor by the Court. Should the defendant refuse to take anoath, plaintiff may affirm his claim under oath, in which case judgment

shall be rendered in his favor. It denies a party his right to confront thewitnesses against him and to cross-examine them. It should have no placein the Special Rules of Procedure of the Sharia courts of the country.

X. COMPULSORY PROCESS


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Art. III, Sec. 14 (a): and to have compulsory process to secure theattendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf.

SUBPOENA compelling the attendance of witnessesSUBPOENA DECUS TECUM for the production of evidence that he may

need for his defense.

PEOPLE vs. BARDAJE: a witness was subpoenaed on request of the accused

but instead of taking steps to compel her attendance. The judge held thedefense responsible for bringing her to the trial, stating that her testimonywould be dispensed with if she failed to appear. HELD: SC considered thisa denial of the right of the accused to compulsory process.

FAKARDO cs. GARCIA: SC sustained the refusal of the trial court to grantleave to serve written interrogatories on a doctor who had already left forabroad, it appearing that the medical evidence of the injured sustained by

the victim would be adduced through other witnesses and hospitalrecords.

In exceptional circumstances, the defendant may even ask for theconditional examination, of any witness who is:

a.) So sick or infirm as to afford reasonable ground for believingthat he will not be able to attend the trial

b.) Resides more than 100 km from the place of trial and had nomeans to attend the same

c.) Apart from the foregoing, other similar circumstances exist thatwould make him unavailable or prevent him from attending the

trial

The right to compulsory process must be invoked during trial; failure to

do so constitutes a waiver that cannot be rectified and undone on

appeal.

XI. PROHIBITED PUNISHMENTSArt. III, Sec. 19 (1): Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel,degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall the death

penalty be imposed, UNLESS, for compelling reasons involving heinouscrimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already

disposed shall be reduced to RP.

(2): The employment of physical, psychological or degrading punishmentagainst any prisoner or detainee of the use of substandard or inadequatepenal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.

TORTURE a cruel punishment because it involves a deliberate design to

increase the suffering of the prisoner in a manner so flagrant andoppressive as to revolt the moral sense of the community.

LOUISIANA vs. RESWEBER: a mechanical failure in the electric chairprevented the execution of the petitioner, and another execution was

scheduled by the warden. The convict protested, claiming that he wasbeing subjected to a cruel and unusual punishment as he would again be

required to undergo the psychological strain of preparing for his death, anordeal he had previously suffered when the 2st electrocution failed. HELD

(US SC): denied his plea; there was no purpose to inflict unnecessary painnor any unnecessary pain involved in the proposed execution.

All death sentences pending on February 2, 1987, were automatically

reduced to RP.

ECHEGARAY vs. SEC. OF JUSTICE and PEOPLE vs. TONGKO: any infliction ofpain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying out the death

penalty and does not fall within the constitutional proscription againstcruel, degrading or inhuman punishment. The cruelty against which theConstitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of

punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method employedto extinguish life humanely.

PEOPLE vs. DIONISIO: SC held that mere severity does not constitute cruel

and unusual punishment,

PEOPLE vs. ESTOISTA: it takes more than merely being harsh, excessive,

out or proportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to theConstitution to come under the ban, the punishment must be flagrantlyand plainly oppressive, wholly disproportionate to the nature of the

offense as to shock the moral sense of the community.

GENERICA ACT CASE: petitioners also questioned the penalties prescribedfor violation of the law, to wit, from a reprimand to a fine of not more than

P10k and the suspension of the physicians license for 1 yr or longer in thediscretion of the court. HELD: penalty of suspension or cancellation of thephysicians license is neither cruel, inhuman nor degrading. It is nodifferent from the penalty of suspension or disbarment that the SC inflicts

on lawyers and judges who misbehave or violate the laws and the Codes ofProfessional and Judicial Conduct.

PEOPLE vs. DE LA CRUZ: penalty of 5 yrs imprisonment and a fine of P5kimposed upon a person convicted of profiteering was sustained by the SC

as not a cruel punishment in view of the national policy against the offense

which was especially hurtful to the consuming public and the nationaleconomy.

DIONISIO CASE (JBL Reyes): SC affirmed a penalty of one month ofimprisonment imposed upon a bookie. Evils should be corrected as

pernicious to the body politic, and how correction should be done, ismatter primarily addressed to the discretion of the legislative department,

not the courts; and the view that unsupervised gambling is definitelydetrimental to the nation and its citizens counts with respectable support.

Art. 66 of RPC: in imposing fines the courts may fix any amount within thelimits established by law; in fixing the amount in each case, attention shall

be given, not only to the mitigating and aggravating circumstances, butmore particularly to the wealth or means of the culprit.

PEOPLE vs. CHING KUAN (Justice Orteza): a fine is imposed as penalty and

not as payment for a specific loss or injury, and since its lightness or

severity depends upon the culprits wealth or means, it is only just andproper that the latter be taken into account in fixing the amount.

Obviously, to impose the same amount of a fine for the same offense upontwo persons thus differently circumstanced would be to mete out to thema penalty of unequal severity and, hence, unjustly discriminatory.

COMMISION of HUMAN RIGHTS especially entrusted with theenforcement of the prohibition in Subsection 2, to be really effective, mustbe provided with teeth through the enactment of a law imposing the

necessary sanctions upon those violating the rule.

XII. DOUBLE JEOPARDYArt. III, Sec. 21: No person shall be put in double jeopardy of punishmentfor the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and am ordinance,

conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to anotherprosecution for the same act.

res juridicata in prison grey the right against double jeopardy prohibitsthe prosecution again of any person for a crime of which he has previously

been acquitted or convicted. The effects of the 1st

prosecution forever atrest, assuring the accused that he shall not thereafter be subjected to thedangers and anxiety of a second charge against him for the same offense.

PEOPLE vs. YLAGAN: Without the safeguard of this article established infavor of the accused, his fortune, safety and peace of mind would beentirely at the mercy of the complaining witness; accused would never be

free from the cruel and constant menace of a never-ending charge, which


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the malice of the complaining witness might hold indefinitely suspendedover his head.

Rule 117, Section 7

REQUISITES:1.) Valid complaint or information

- Prosecution based on an invalid complaint or informationcannot lead to a valid judgment and hence will not place theaccused under double jeopardy.

- Where the original info is defective and the case of dismissedon motion of the accused, it may validly renewed with the filing

of a corrected info,- But if without the express consent of the accused, the info is

dismissed on the ground that it is defective when it of not so infact, another prosecution based on the same allegation will

constitute double jeopardy.

2.) Filed before a competent court- A court without jurisdiction cannot render a valid judgment;

hence, a person charged before it cannot plead double jeopardy

when tried anew for the same offense by a competent court, as

the first prosecution never placed him in jeopardy.

PEOPLE vs. GALANO: a prosecution for estafa was dismissed by theCFI of Batangas for lack of territorial jurisdiction. Subsequently, acharge for the same offense was commenced in the CFI of Manila and

the accused moved to quash, invoking DJ. HELD: Defense was noyavailable because the defendant had not been in danger of

conviction in the original prosecution.

PEOPLE vs. BRECINIO: the accused was convicted of stealing acarabao by a municipal court in which, however, the proceedingswere not recorded. The decision was appealed to the CFI which, in

the exercise of its concurrent original jurisdiction, convicted theaccused anew. The defendant challenged the second conviction,claiming that it had placed him in DJ. HELD: SC sustained the CFIholding that since the proceedings in the municipal court were totally

void for lack of record, DJ could not attach. Accdng. to Justice Abad

Santos said, DJ requires valid previous proceedings.

- Where a court martial and a civil court have concurrent jusridiction, a decision by one court will bar anotherprosecution for the same offense in the other court.

- Where info is motu proprio (automatically) dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by a court which is actually competent to hear it,the dismissal will inure to the benefit of the accused, who isentitled to plead DJ.

OLAGUER vs. MILITARY COMMISSION: it was held that the military

tribunals had no jurisdiction to try cases of civilians, which fall underthe competence of the ordinary civil court even during the period ofmartial law. The judgments of the military tribunals in these cases

were invalidated and the petitioners released. Taking this ruling intoaccount in the subsequent case of CRUZ vs. ENRILE, the SC declared

that no breach of constitutional prohibition against twice putting anaccused in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense would resultfrom the retrial of the petitioners cases, for the simple reason that

the absence of jurisdiction of the court martial to try and convictpetitioners prevented the first jeopardy from attaching.

TAN vs. BARRIOS: in the interest of justice and consistency, we holdthat Olaguer should, in principle be applied prospectively only to

future cases and cases still ongoing or not yet final when thatdecision was promulgated. Hence, there should be no retroactivenullification of final judgments, whether of conviction or acquittal,rendered by military courts against civilians before the promulgation

of the Olaguer decision.

3.) Valid Plea- The defendant is never place in DJ until after he shall have

pleased to the charge against him during the arraignment.- Where a defective complaint was dismissed before the accused

had pleaded and an amended complaint was later filed, his plea

of DJ was rejected because he had nit been exposed to dangerunder the 1

stindictment.

PEOPLE vs. BALISACAN: the accused, after pleading guilty testifies toprove mitigating circumstances. SC held that said testimony had theeffect of vacating his plea of guilty. There having been no standingplea at the time the court rendered its judgment of acquittal, there

can be no DJ with respect to the appeal herein (by the government).

4.) Termination of Cases- The acquittal is executory and entitled the accused to

immediate release; judgment of conviction is appealable within15 days but becomes final if the convict starts serving hissentence even before the expiration of the said period.

BUSTAMANTE vs. MACEREN: it can no longer be set aside by the

court order a new trial or impose a new sentence.

- Difficulty arises where the prosecution is terminated bydismissal 0 because its consequences may vary according to thenature of the dismissal and WON it was expressly consented toby the defendant.

GENERAL RULE: a dismissal with the express consent of the accused

will not bar another prosecution for the same offense; consent isconsidered as a waiver of his right against DJ. Consent to be effective

it must be EXPRESS and this excludes mere silence or failure of theaccused to object to the dismissal.

PEOPLE vs. PILPA: prosecutor moved at the hearing in the morning of20 Nov 1976, for the dismissal of a case for frustrated murder on theground of supposed lack of jurisdiction because intent to kill was notalleged in the info. The defense counsel manifested that he had no

objection, and the court thereupon granted the motion. In the

afternoon of the same day, the accused filed a manifestation signedby him and his two lawyers making a record his opposition to the

dismissal of the case, and the following day filed a motion forreconsideration of the order of dismissal arguing that the court had jurisdiction over the case. The motion was then denied and notappealed. The prosecutor later filed a new info for the same offense

, and the accused moved to quash on the ground of DJ. The court(presided by a different judge) granted the motion, holding that thedismissal was erroneous and not made with the express consent of

the defendant.

HELD: It is conceded that the first info is VALID. The absence of anaverment as to intent to kill was not a fatal defect because the intentto kill may be inferred from the allegation that the stab wound would

have caused the death of the victim. After the accused Pilpa hadentered his plea, the case was terminated. The question is whether

the termination of the case was without his express consent and is abar to his prosecution for frustrated murder under the second info.The oral manifestation at the hearing made by the counsel of the

accused that he had no objection to the dismissal of the case wasequivalent to a declaration of conformity to its dismissal or to an

express consent to its termination within the meaning of Sec. 9, Rule117.

TOYOTA vs. RAMOS: petitioners, as members of a group known asthe Urban Poor were arrested and prosecuted for participating in amarch and rally. No bail was recommended for their provisionalrelease. At the trial, the prosecution was able to present only one

witness despite repeated postponements. The court dismissed the


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case on 9 Nov 1984, but on 5 Dec. 1984, when the petitioners suedfor HC(after being in custody for more than a year) they had not yet

been released, on the ground that a Preventive Detention Action hadbeen issued against them. Later, respondents asked that the case bedismissed as moot and academic because of the temporary release

of the petitioners on 8 Dec 1984, but the latter said they would agreeto the dismissal only if their release was to be considered permanent.

HELD (unanimous except Justice Relova who was abroad and JusticeAquino who took no part): a petition for HC becomes moot andacademic when the restraint on the liberty of the petitioners is liftereither temporarily or permanently. The instant case presents a

different situation; the question to be resolved is whether the Statecan reserve the power to re-arrest a person for an offense after thecourt of competent jurisdiction has absolved him of the offense.Such a reservation is repugnant to the government of laws and not

of men principle. Under this principle, the moment a person isacquitted on a criminal charge he can no longer be detained or re-arrested for the same offense.

1.) Appeal of Prosecution- The prosecution can appeal where the accused is deemed to

have waived or is stopped from invoking his right against DJ.But the defense of DJ will be available to the accused where the

dismissal of the prosecution against him, even with his expressconsent, was based on insufficiency of the evidence of theprosecution or denial of his right to speedy trial because these

dismissals are considered in the nature of acquittal; they cannotbe appealed by the prosecution and will bar another

prosecution of the defendant for the same offense and this istrue even if the dismissal be erroneous.

PEOPLE vs. CITY COURT OF SILAY: the trial court dismissed a chargefor the falsification when, after the prosecution has presented its

evidence and rested its case, the accused moved to dismiss on theground that their guilt had not been proved beyond reasonabledoubt. An action for certiorari was filed to the SC, where accusedinvoked DJ. HELD: The order of dismissal was based on the merits

and, although erroneous, amounted to an acquittal which therefore

could not be appealed by the government. Such error cannot now berighted because of the timely plea of DJ.

ESMEA vs. POGOY: the prosecutor was not ready because hiswitness was absent. The accused insisted on their right to a speedytrial. The judge on his own volition provisionally dismissed the case

without the defendants express consent. HELD: case could not berevived because DJ had been attached.

- The grant of motion to quash, which is filed before thedefendant makes his plea, can be appealed as he has not yet

been placed in jeopardy.- Where the accused is acquitted without giving the prosecution

its day in court, this denial of due process may be validly

appealed.

2.) Crimes CoveredThe accused may not be prosecuted anew for original offense

charged, or for any attempt to commit the same, or frustrationthereof; or for any offenses which necessarily includes or is

necessarily included in the offense charged in the originalcomplaint or information.

a.) Doctrine of Supervening Events- Accused may be prosecuted for another offense if a

subsequent development changes the character of thefirst indictment under which he may have already been

charged or convicted.

PEOPLE vs. ADIL: accused was first prosecuted for slight physical injuries,

but after he had pleaded not guilty, the charge was changed to seriousphysical injuries when it appeared that the wounds inflicted on the victim,after healing, had left permanent scars on his face. HELD: there was no DJ,

as the deformity did not exist and could have been apprehended at thetime the first information was filed.

PEOPLE vs. CITY COURT OF MANILA: suspicious circumstances thatattended the filing of the original charge.

y Accident occurred in 17 October 1972;y info for serious physical injuries was filed in the city court on 18

Oct, same day when the victim died;

y 20 Oct, the accused was arraigned pleaded guilty and wasordered imprisoned for 1 month and 1 day of arresto mayorand commenced serving sentence;

y 24 Oct, he was again charged with homicide thru recklessnegligence based on the same accident;

y On 17 Nov, the city court dismissed the info on the ground ofDJ.

HELD: In the petition for review, the dismissal was affirmed. No new fact

had supervened since the arraignment and conviction of the accusedunder the first information; victims death did not occur after the 1

st

prosecution.

Rule 117, Sec. 7, Rules of Court additionally provides that the conviction ofthe accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense whichnecessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or

information under any of the following instances:

1.) The graver offense developed due to supervening factsarising from the same act or omission constituting theformer charge

2.) Facts constituting the graver charge became known or werediscovered only after the filing of the former complaint orinfo

3.) Plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without theconsent of the prosecutor and of the offenses party except

as provided in Section 1(f) of Rule 116.

b.) Inseparable Offenses- Where the offense is inseparable from another and

proceeds from the same act, they cannot be subjectof separate prosecutions.

- It is possible for one act to give rise to several crimes separate prosecutions for each crime may be filed,provided the elements of the several crimes are not

identical.

PEOPLE vs. TAC-AN: it was held that the constitutional right againstDJ protects one against a second or later prosecution for the sameoffense, and that when the subsequent info charges another and

different offense, although arising from the same act or set of acts,there is no prohibited DJ. It would appear self-evident that these two

(2) offenses in themselves are quite different one form the other,such that in principle, the subsequent filing of the criminal case is not

to be regarded as having placed appellant in a prohibited secondjeopardy.

PEREZ vs. CA: a person was previously acquitted of consentedabduction was subsequently charged with qualified seduction arisingfrom the same act on which the earlier prosecution was base. HELD:no DJ; a plea of DJ cannot be accorded merit where two indictments

are perfectly distinct in point of law, however, closely they mayappear to be connected in fact. Protection against DJ may beinvoked only for the same offense or identical offenses.


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ACT VIOLATION LAW AND ORDINANCE

if an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittalunder either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the sameact.

YAP vs. LUTERO: Our Bill of Rights deals with two (2) kinds of DJ.a.) first sentence of clause 20, Sec.1 of Art. III, ordains that no

person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for thesame offense. It prohibits DJ of punishment for the sameoffense. Provided that he is charged with different offenses, orthe offense charged in one case is not included in, or does not

include the charge in the other case.b.) second sentence provides that if an act is punished by a law and

an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shallconstitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act; while

the second contemplates DJ of punishment for the same act. Itapplies even if, the offenses charged are not the same, owingthe fact that the one constitutes a violation of an ordinance and

the other is a violation of a statute.

PEOPLE vs. RELOVA: a person was charged under a city ordinance with

having installed a device in his ice plant that lowered electric meterreadings to the prejudice of the city government. The info was dismissed

on the ground of prescription having been filed more than 2 monthsafter discovery of the offense. The same defendant was charged anew fortheft of electric current under the RPC. On the motion of the accused, the

respondent judge dismissed the case because of DJ. HELD (JusticeFeliciano): the important inquiry relates to the identity of the offenses

charged the constitutional protection against DJ is available only wherean identity is shown to exist between the earlier and the subsequent

offense charged.

CHAPTER 21: FREE ACCESS TO COURTS

Art. III, Sec. 11: free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies andadequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of

poverty.

- Courts of justice should be as available to the pauper as to theaffluent in the protection of t heir respective rights.

- Social justice policy and covered by the equal protection clause, thisrule has been implemented but several provisions of the Rules of

Court in favor of the pauper litigant and by such as the Laurel Law.

LAUREL LAW which permits the provisional release of the accused

without the necessity of posting bail under certain conditions.

- The Integrated Bar of the Philippines provides deserving indigentswith free legal aid, including representation in court, and similarservices are available from DOJ to litigants who cannot afford

retained counsel, like the accused in a criminal case who can ask forthe assistance of counsel de oficio.

- There are also private legal assistance organizations now functioningfor the benefit of penurious clients who otherwise might be unable

to resort to the courts of justice because only of their misfortune ofbeing poor.

CHAPTER 22: CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES

CITIZENSHIP membership in a political community with all itsconcomitant rights and responsibilities.

PERSON natural born or naturalized; protected by the due process andequal protection clauses.

Exclusive rights of citizens:- Rights to vote- To run for public office- To exploit natural resources- To operate public utilities- To administer educational institutions- To manage mass media

Acquired thru by birth

- Jus sanguinis by virtue of blood relationship- Jus soli by virtue of the place of birth

I. Citizens of the PhilippinesUnder the present Constitution:1.) Those who are citizens of the Phils. At the time of the adoption

of this Constitution

2.) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Phils.3.) Those born before 17 January 2972, of Filipino mothers, who

elect Philippine citizenship upon attaining the age of majority.

4.) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.A. Citizenship under the 1935 Constitution:1.) Those who were citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of

the adoption of the Commonwealth Constitution on 15November 1935;

2.) Those born in the Phil. Islands of foreign parents who, prior tothe adoption of the Commonwealth Constitution, had been

elected to public office of the Philippine Islands;3.) Those whose fathers were citizens of the Philippines;4.) Those whose mothers were citizens of the Philippines and,

upon attaining majority age, elected Philippine citizenship; and5.) Those who were naturalized in accordance with law.- Those who were considered or became citizens of the Phils.

Under the 1973 Constitution so long as they retained their

Philippine citizenship on 2 Feb. 1987.

B. Children of Filipino Parents- Commonweath Constitution: only children born to Filipino

fathers were granted natural-born citizenship. If child was born

to an alien father and a Filipino mother, he followed thecitizenship of the father and acquired at best only an inchoatePhilippine citizenship which he could perfect by election upon

attaining majority mage. EXCEPTION: child was born out oflawful wedlock, in which case he acquired the citizenship of the

only legal known parent.

- New Rule: the child is considered a natural-born Filipino citizenprovided wither of his parents is a Filipino citizen. Filipinocitizenship of the mother will now also confer natural-born

Philippine citizenship upon the child, without the necessity ofelection as before upon his attaining majority age. Hasprospective only upon the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution.

C. Election of Philippine Citizenship- Right of election permitted under the present Constitution was

available to those born to Filipino mothers under the 1935

Constitution, who had charter not been changed, would havebeen able to elect Philippine citizenship upon attaining the ageof majority.

- If for some reason or another the Filipino mother lost hercitizenship upon marriage to a foreigner, the right of election


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which would have been available if the birth had occurredunder the old Constitution cannot be claimed by the offspring

born under the new Constitution.- Above-mentioned provision had only transitory operation

ending after the children born to Filipino mother up to the

NOON of 17 January 1973, shall have availed themselves of theright of election.

- GEN RULE: the right could only be exercised within 3 YEARSfrom attainment of the majority age of 18 or only up to 17January 1994.

D. Naturalization- Process by which a foreigner acquires, voluntarily or by

operation of law, the citizenship of another state.

- Kinds:1.) DIRECT naturalization is effected by:

a. Individual proceedings usually judicial, undergeneral naturalization laws;

b. A special act of the legislature often in favorof distinguished foreigners who have rendered

some notable service to the local state.

c. A collective change of nationality(naturalization en masse)as a result of cession

or subjugationd. In some cases, by adoption of orphan minors as

nationals of the State where they are born.

2.) DERIVATIVE naturalization is conferred to:a. The wife of the naturalized husbandb. On the minor children of the naturalized parentc. On the alien woman upon marriage to a

national.

- It does not always follow as a matter of course; it isusually made subject to stringent restrictions andconditions.

a. Procedurei.

At least 1 year before he files his petition fornaturalization, applicant shall file with the Office

of the SocGen a declaration of his intention tobe a citizen of the Philippines.

PURPOSE: to enable the government to make

initial investigations onto his circumstances todetermine at least tentatively, his fitness forPhil. Citizenship and to test his sincerity.

ii. Filing of the petition for naturalization with theRTC of the province or city where the petitionerhas resided for at least 1 year.

- Petition must state among other data they Name or names of the petitionersy Various places of residence in the

Phils.y Date of his arrivaly His occupationy His date and place of birthy Names and personal circumstances

of his wife and children

y If any, besides the allegation that hepossess the qualifications and not ofthe disqualification fornaturalization.

iii. Upon receipt of the petition, the clerk of courtshall have the duty of

1. Publishing the same in OG and onenewspaper of general circulation in the

province or the city once a week for 3consecutive weeks.

2. Post notices thereof and of the hearing.iv. After 6 months after the last publication, but in

no case within 30 days before the election, thehearing will begin, at which the petitioner shall

establish all the allegations of his petition, to becorroborated by at least 2 credible witnesses.

- RP to be represented by SocGen or hisauthorized representative

(provincial/city prosecutor)

- The Philippine naturalization laws require AGE, RESIDENCE,MORAL, OCCUPATIONAL, LANGUAGE and EDUCATIONAL

qualifications.

- Petitioner is REQUIRED to possess the following qualifications:1.) NOT LESS tha n18 yrs old on the date of the hearing of

the petition

2.) Must have RESIDED in the Philippines for a continuousperiod of NOT LESS than 10 years.

3.) Must be of GOOD MORAL CHARACTER and believe inthe principles underlying the Philippine Constitution,and must have CONDUCTED himself in the PROPER andIRREPROACHABLE manner during the

Documents

Chptr 19-22 Reviewer