Embed Size (px)
DESCRIPTION
Christopher g. Halnin Case Digests No. 3
Citation preview
Assignment No. 3
Case Digests in SCARP AND SPECPRO
Submitted by Christopher G. Halnin
To Atty. Christian “Kit” Villasis
1. Adoma vs. Gatcheco
A.M. No. P-05-1942
January 17, 2005
FACTS:
Complainant Alibsar Adoma claimed that on August 16, 2003 a writ of replevin for the
recovery of an L-300 van was issued in his favor. On the same day, respondent sheriff
Romeo Gatcheco implemented the writ. He was accompanied by respondent Eugenio
Taguba, a process server of Branch 2 of MTCC, Santiago City, who volunteered to assist
respondent sheriff. After the two respondents seized the vehicle, they demanded payment of
P8,000.00, allegedly promised by complainant but the latter was able to give only P1,000.00
and another P1,000.00 the following day.
The writ of replevin stated that the vehicle will be delivered to complainant after 5 days from
the implementation thereof. With the vehicle still undelivered on the 7th day, complainant
threatened to file an administrative case against respondent sheriff. Finally, on August 29,
2003, the latter was forced to release the vehicle to complainant. Respondents, however,
continued to demand P6,000.00, hence complainant filed the instant administrative case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the writ of replevin was properly implemented?
HELD:
The Court held in the negative. As correctly found by the OCA, respondent sheriff
deliberately failed to place complainant in possession of the vehicle after five days from the
implementation of the writ because the latter failed to give the whole amount he promised.
Since the adverse party did not object to the complainant’s bond nor posted a redelivery bond
to recover possession of the vehicle taken under the writ of replevin, respondent sheriff is
under obligation to deliver the van to complainant. However, it took respondent sheriff 13
days before he released the vehicle to complainant, a clear violation of Section 6, Rule 60 of
the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which provides –
SEC. 6. Disposition of property by sheriff.—If within five (5) days after the taking of the
property by the sheriff, the adverse party does not object to the sufficiency of the bond, or of
the surety or sureties thereon; or if the adverse party so objects and the court affirms its
approval of the applicant’s bond or approves a new bond, or if the adverse party requires the
return of the property but his bond is objected to and found insufficient and he does not
1
forthwith file an approved bond, the property shall be delivered to the applicant. If for any
reason the property is not delivered to the applicant, the sheriff must return it to the adverse
party.
2. Yang vs. Valdez
G.R. No. 73317
August 31, 1989
FACTS:
Respondent spouses Ricardo and Milagros Morante filed an action in the RTC Branch 22 of
General Santos City to recover possession of two (2) Isuzu Cargo Trucks against Petitioner
Thomas Yang and Manuel Yaphuckon. The trucks were however registered in the name of
petitioner Thomas Yangand the same were in the possession of ManuelYaphuckon.
On January 7,1985, respondent judge issued an order of seizure directing the Provincial
Sheriff of South Cotabato to take immediate possession and custody of the vehicles involved.
On January 10, 1985, Manuel Yaphuckon fileda motion seeking repossession of the cargo
trucks and posted a replevin counter-bond of P560,000.00 which was disapproved on January
18,1985 by the respondent judge.
The respondent spouses amended their complaint on January 13, 1985by excluding
ManuelYaphuckonas party defendant. The trial court ordered the release and delivery of the
cargo trucks to respondent spouses.
On January 25,1985, petitioner put up a counter-bond in the amount of P560,000.00 which
was rejected by the respondent judge for having filed out of time.
ISSUES:
1. Whether respondent judge erred in issuing replevin though the trucks were registered in
the name of petitioner?
2. Whether petitioner’s counter-bond filed out of time?
HELD:
The provisional remedy of replevin is in the nature of possessory action and the applicant
who seeks immediate possession of the property involved need not be the holder of legal title
to the property. It suffices, if at the time he applies for a writ of replevin, he is, in the words
of Section 2, Rule 60, entitled to the possession thereof.
Section 2. Rule 60. Affidavit and Bond. – The applicant must show by his own affidavit or
that of some other person who personally knows the facts:
2
(a) That the applicant is the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing it,
or is entitled to the possession thereof;
(b) That the property is wrongfully detained by the adverse party, alleging the cause
of detention thereof according to the best of his knowledge, information, and
belief;
(c) That the property has not been distrained or taken for a tax assessment or a fine
pursuant to a law, or seized under a writ of execution or preliminary attachment,
or otherwise placed under custodial egis, or if so seized, that it is exempt from
such seizure or custody; and
(d) The actual market value of the property.
After defendant had been duly represented by counsel even at the inception of the service of
summons and a copy of the order of replevin on January 7, 1985, defendant Thomas Yang
had already been duly served, especially so, when counsel manifested in their comment to the
opposition filed by the plaintiffs that Manuel Yaphuckon has duly authorize to represent
Thomas Yang. From then on defendant should have been on guard as to the provision of
Section 6. Rule 60, the five (5) days period within which to file the counter-replevin for the
approval of the court, counted from the actual taking of the property by the sheriff on January
7, 1985.
3. Serg’s Products vs. PCI Leasing
G.R. No. 137705
August 22, 2000
FACTS:
“After agreeing to a contract stipulating that a real or immovable property be considered as
personal or movable, a party is estopped from subsequently claiming otherwise. Hence, such
property is a proper subject of a writ of replevin obtained by the other contracting party.”
"On February 13, 1998, respondent PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. filed with the RTC-QC a
complaint for a sum of money with an application for a writ of replevin docketed as Civil
Case No. Q-98-33500.
"On March 6, 1998, upon an ex-parte application of PCI Leasing, respondent judge issued a
writ of replevin directing its sheriff to seize and deliver the machineries and equipment to
PCI Leasing after 5 days and upon the payment of the necessary expenses.
"On March 24, 1998, in implementation of said writ, the sheriff proceeded to petitioner’s
factory, seized one machinery with the word that he would return for the other machineries.
"On March 25, 1998, petitioners filed a motion for special protective order invoking the
power of the court to control the conduct of its officers and amend and control its processes,
praying for a directive for the sheriff to defer enforcement of the writ of replevin.
3
"This motion was opposed by PCI Leasing on the ground that the properties were still
personal and therefore still subject to seizure and a writ of replevin.
"In their Reply, petitioners asserted that the properties sought to be seized were immovable
as defined in Article 415 of the Civil Code, the parties’ agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding. They argued that to give effect to the agreement would be prejudicial to
innocent third parties. They further stated that PCI Leasing was estopped from treating these
machineries as personal because the contracts in which the alleged agreement were embodied
were totally sham and farcical.
Petitioners contend that the subject machines used in their factory were not proper subjects of
the Writ issued by the RTC, because they were in fact real property. Serious policy
considerations, they argue, militate against a contrary characterization.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the aforementioned property is subject to writ of replevin?
HELD:
The Court held in the affirmative. Rule 60 of the Rules of Court provides that writs of
replevin are issued for the recovery of personal property only. Section 3 thereof reads:
"SEC. 3. Order. -- Upon the filing of such affidavit and approval of the bond, the court shall
issue an order and the corresponding writ of replevin describing the personal property alleged
to be wrongfully detained and requiring the sheriff forthwith to take such property into his
custody."
In the present case, the machines that were the subjects of the Writ of Seizure were placed by
petitioners in the factory built on their own land. Indisputably, they were essential and
principal elements of their chocolate-making industry. Hence, although each of them was
movable or personal property on its own, all of them have become "immobilized by
destination because they are essential and principal elements in the industry." In that sense,
petitioners are correct in arguing that the said machines are real, not personal, property
pursuant to Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code.
Be that as it may, we disagree with the submission of the petitioners that the said machines
are not proper subjects of the Writ of Seizure.
The Court has held that contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be
considered as personal.18After agreeing to such stipulation, they are consequently estopped
from claiming otherwise. Under the principle of estoppel, a party to a contract is ordinarily
precluded from denying the truth of any material fact found therein.
4
In the present case, the Lease Agreement clearly provides that the machines in question are to
be considered as personal property. Specifically, Section 12.1 of the Agreement reads as
follows:21
"12.1 The PROPERTY is, and shall at all times be and remain, personal property
notwithstanding that the PROPERTY or any part thereof may now be, or hereafter become,
in any manner affixed or attached to or embedded in, or permanently resting upon, real
property or any building thereon, or attached in any manner to what is permanent."
Clearly then, petitioners are estopped from denying the characterization of the subject
machines as personal property. Under the circumstances, they are proper subjects of the Writ
of Seizure.
It should be stressed, however, that our holding -- that the machines should be deemed
personal property pursuant to the Lease Agreement – is good only insofar as the contracting
parties are concerned.
4. San Juan vs. Hon. Valenzuela
G.R. No. L-59906
October 23, 1982
FACTS:
Petitioner Buenaventura San Juan and private respondent Dorotea Mejia’s marriage
solemnized on October 2, 1973, was declared null and void by the Court of First Instance of
Rizal on the ground of a prior and subsisting marriage between petitioner and one Isabel
Bandin. On February 25, 1981, respondent Mejia instituted the instance action against
petitioner, seeking support for herself and her two minor children. After issues were joined,
the respondent judge, on motion of Mejia, rendered the judgement to wit; pursuant to Section
5, Rule 61 support pendente lite is hereby granted, and the same is fixed at P2,500.00 a
month commencing from January 1, 1982 to be paid to the plaintiff on or the 5th day of each
month until this case is finally adjudicated without prejudice to any judgment for support in
arrears due the plaintiff if the evidence will so warrant after trial.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the grounds that; The amount was
disproportionate, petitioner is not obliged to support respondent, the marriage being null and
void and that no evidence was presented as petitioners resources which altogether was denied
wherein petitioner subsequently instituted this petition.
Pending resolution of this petition, petitioner filed with the trial court a manifestation
proposing to settle his obligation of P15,000.00, representing the amount of support which
accrued from January to June, 1982 and to pay the same in three equal installments, the first
to be paid upon approval by the court of his scheme of payment, and the balance within a
period of two (2) months thereafter which was subsequently approved by the court. Petitioner
also prayed the reduction of the amount of support pendente lite to P1,000.00 monthly on the
5
ground that the sum of P2,500.00 previously fixed by respondent judge is now beyond his
means to pay According to private respondent. the court had not yet acted on petitioner's
request for reduction of the monthly support because the respondent judge left for abroad.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the amount of support rendered by the lower court was proper and whether or
not petitioner is obliged to support respondent and her minor children the marriage being null
and void.
HELD:
Unquestionably, the petitioner's willingness to pay the amount of support pendente lite in the
mariner indicated in his manifestation, and the approval thereof by the respondent Judge have
rendered this petition moot and academic.
As to the factual issue of whether the amount of P2,500.00 previously fixed by respondent
judge is now beyond the means of petitioner, the same should be resolved by the lower court
on the basis of the evidence to be presented at the proper hearing. The order of December 24
fixing the amount of support pendente lite is not final in character in the sense that it can be
the subject of modification, depending on the changing conditions affecting the ability of the
obligor to pay the amount fixed for support.
5. Sps. Estanislao vs. East West Banking Corporation
G.R. No. 178537
February 11, 2008
FACTS:
Sometime in July 1997, petitioners obtained a loan from the respondent in the amount of
P3,925,000.00 evidenced by a promissory note and secured by two deeds of chattel mortgage
dated July 10, 1997 one covering two dump trucks and a bulldozer to secure the loan amount
of P2,375,000.00, and another covering bulldozer and a wheel loader to secure the loan
amount of P1,550,000.00. Petitioners defaulted in the amortizations and the entire obligation
became due and demandable.
On April 10, 2000, respondent bank filed a suit before the RTC of Antipolo for replevin with
damages, praying that the equipment covered by the first deed of chattel mortgage be seized
and delivered to it. Subsequently, respondent moved for suspension of the proceedings on
account of an earnest attempt to arrive at an amicable settlement of the case. The trial court
suspended the proceedings, and during the course of negotiations, a deed of assignment was
drafted stating that, “the ASSIGNOR is indebted to the ASSIGNEE in the aggregate sum of
P7,305,459.52, inclusive of accrued interests and penalties as of August 16, 2000, and in full
payment thereof, the ASSIGNOR does hereby ASSIGN, TRANSFER and CONVEY unto
6
the ASSIGNEE those motor vehicles, with all their tools and accessories. That
the ASSIGNEE hereby accepts the assignment in full payment of the above-mentioned debt.”
However, on June 20, 2001, respondent filed a manifestation and motion to admit an
amended complaint for the seizure and delivery of two more heavy equipment which are
covered under the second deed of chattel mortgage.
Petitioners sought to dismiss the amended complaint. They alleged that their previous
payments on loan amortizations, the execution of the deed of assignment on August 16,
2000, and respondent’s acceptance of the three units of heavy equipment, had the effect of
full payment or satisfaction of their total outstanding obligation which is a bar on respondent
bank from recovering any more amounts from them.
The trial court dismissed the amended complaint for lack of merit. It held that the deed of
assignment and the petitioners’ delivery of the heavy equipment effectively extinguished
petitioners’ total loan obligation.
Upon appeal to the CA by the respondent the decision of the RTC was reversed.
Hence, this petition to the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is entitled to replevin on the alleged second chattel mortgage?
HELD:
The Court held in the negative. The appellate court erroneously denominated the replevin suit
as a collection case. A reading of the original and amended complaints show that what the
respondent initiated was a pure replevin suit, and not a collection case. Recovery of the
heavy equipment was the principal aim of the suit; payment of the total obligation was
merely an alternative prayer which respondent sought in the event manual delivery of the
heavy equipment could no longer be made.
Replevin, broadly understood, is both a form of principal remedy and a provisional relief. It
may refer either to the action itself, i.e., to regain the possession of personal chattels being
wrongfully detained from the plaintiff by another, or to the provisional remedy that would
allow the plaintiff to retain the thing during the pendency of the action and hold it pendente
lite.
The deed of assignment was a perfected agreement which extinguished petitioners’ total
outstanding obligation to the respondent. The deed explicitly provides that the assignor
(petitioners), "in full payment" of its obligation in the amount of P7,305,459.52, shall deliver
the three units of heavy equipment to the assignee (respondent), which "accepts the
7
assignment in full payment of the above-mentioned debt." This could only mean that should
petitioners complete the delivery of the three units of heavy equipment covered by the deed,
respondent’s credit would have been satisfied in full, and petitioners’ aggregate indebtedness
of P7,305,459.52 would then be considered to have been paid in full as well.
Since there is no more credit to collect, no principal obligation to speak of, then there is no
more second deed of chattel mortgage that may subsist. A chattel mortgage cannot exist as an
independent contract since its consideration is the same as that of the principal contract.
Being a mere accessory contract, its validity would depend on the validity of the loan secured
by it. This being so, the amended complaint for replevin should be dismissed, because the
chattel mortgage agreement upon which it is based had been rendered ineffectual.
6. David vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 111180
November 16, 1995
FACTS:
Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private respondent Ramon R. Villar, a
businessman in Angeles City. Private respondent is a married man and the father of four
children, all grown-up. After a while, the relationship between petitioner and private
respondent developed into an intimate one, as a result of which a son, Christopher J., was
born on March 9, 1985 to them. Christopher J. was followed by two more children, both
girls, namely Christine, born on June 9, 1986, and Cathy Mae on April 24, 1988.
The relationship became known to private respondent's wife when Daisie took Christopher J,
to Villar's house at Villa Teresa in Angeles City sometime in 1986 and introduced him to
Villar's legal wife.
After this, the children of Daisie were freely brought by Villar to his house as they were
eventually accepted by his legal family.
In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., then six years of age, to
go with his family to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar refused to give back the
child. Villar said he had enrolled Christopher J. at the Holy Family Academy for the next
school year.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to an action for support pendente lite?
HELD:
The Regional Trial Court ordered private respondent to give temporary support to petitioner
in the amount of P3,000.00 a month, pending the filing of an action for support, after finding
8
that private respondent did not give any support to his three children by Daisie, except the
meager amount of P500.00 a week which he stopped giving them on June 23, 1992. He is a
rich man who professes love for his children. In fact he filed a motion for the execution of
the decision of the Court of Appeals, alleging that he had observed his son "to be physically
weak and pale because of malnutrition and deprivation of the luxury and amenities he was
accustomed to when in the former custody of the respondent." He prayed that he be given the
custody of the child so that he can provide him with the "proper care and education."
Although the question of support is proper in a proceeding for that purpose, the grant of
support in this case is justified by the fact that private respondent has expressed willingness
to support the minor child. The order for payment of allowance need not be conditioned on
the grant to him of custody of the child. Under Art. 204 of the Family Code, a person obliged
to give support can fulfill his obligation either by paying the allowance fixed by the court or
by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who is entitled to support
unless, in the latter case, there is "a moral or legal obstacle thereto."
In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out, Christopher J., being less than seven years
of age at least at the time the case was decided by the RTC, cannot be taken from the
mother's custody. Even now that the child is over seven years of age, the mother's custody
over him will have to be upheld because the child categorically expressed preference to live
with his mother. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, courts must respect the "choice of the
child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit" and here it has not been
shown that the mother is in any way unfit to have custody of her child. Indeed, if private
respondent loves his child, he should not condition the grant of support for him on the award
of his custody to him (private respondent).
7. Lerma vs. Hon. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-33352
December 20, 1974
FACTS:
Petitioner Lerma and private respondent Diaz are husband and wife, married in 951. In 1969
petitioner filed a criminal complaint for adultery against the respondent and a certain
Teodoro Ramirez with the CFI of Rizal. Three months after the said filing, the respondent
filed with the lower court, a complaint against the petitioner for legal separation and/or
separation of properties, custody of their children and support, with an urgent petition for
support pendente lite for her and their youngest son. The respondent’s complaint for legal
separation is based on two grounds: concubinage and attempt against her life.
The petitioner filed his opposition to the respondent’s application for support pendente lite,
setting up as defense the adultery charge he had filed against the Respondent.
9
The Judge granted the respondent’s application for support pendente lite. Petitioner then filed
with respondent Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction to annul the order of the trial court on the ground that they were issued with grave
abuse of discretion. The next day the respondent court issued a writ of preliminary injunction
to stop the Judge from enforcing his order.
The respondent court, in its decision, set aside the assailed orders and granted the petitioner
an opportunity to present evidence before the lower court in support of his defense against
the application for support pendente lite. The respondent moved to reconsider the decision
and this time, the respondent court, set aside its prior decision and rendered another,
dismissing the petition.
This is now the subject of the instant petition for review by certiorari. During the pendency
of the petition, petitioner filed an urgent motion for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
restraining order, alleging among others that the respondent’s action for support should be
dismissed on the ground that the respondent and her co-accused, Teddy Ramirez, had been
convicted by the Court of First Instance of Rizal and said judgment of conviction was
pending appeal in the Court of Appeals and that there has been an order issued ordering the
petitioner to pay the respondent the awarded support pendente lite and that unless the lower
court was enjoined from enforcing its assailed orders, the present petition would be rendered
moot and academic, to the prejudice of the petitioner.
The Court, acting on the petitioner’s motion, resolved "to issue a temporary restraining order
effective immediately and until further orders from this Court."
Required to comment on the petitioner’s urgent motion for preliminary injunction, the
respondent filed an opposition, with a prayer for the immediate lifting of the temporary
restraining order issued ex-parte. The opposition reiterated that: (1) that an order granting
support pendente lite, although interlocutory, is immediately executory even if appealed,
unless enjoined; (2) that the dismissal of the petition by the respondent Court of Appeals
rendered functus oficio the writ of preliminary injunction it had previously issued; and (3)
that under Article 292 of the New Civil Code, which provides that "during the proceedings
for legal separation, or for annulment of marriage, the spouses and children shall be
supported from the conjugal partnership property . . .," such support is mandatory even if
there be a showing that the wife is guilty of adultery.
In a minute resolution the Court denied the petitioner’s urgent motion for a writ of
preliminary injunction. The petitioner filed this instant motion for reconsideration, to which
the Court, granted and consequently, reinstated the temporary restraining order previously
issued until further orders.
10
The petitioner maintains the lower court disregarded the procedural law on support pendente
lite which is Rule 61 of the Revised Rules of Court, specifically Section 5 thereof, when it
issued the disputed orders without provisionally determining the pertinent facts of the case,
particularly insofar as they might have a bearing on its probable outcome, merely relying on
the bare allegations of the complaint.
The petitioner also claims he was deprived of the opportunity to present evidence in support
of his
defense of adultery against the respondent’s application for support pendente lite.
ISSUES:
Whether adultery is a good defense against the respondent’s claim for support pendente lite?
HELD:
Yes, adultery is a good defense against an action for support pendente lite. This ruling has
been adopted by the Court in various cases. However, while adultery may be a defense in an
action for personal support, that is, support of the wife by the husband from his own funds, it
is not a defense when the support is to be taken from the conjugal partnership property.
The procedural law on support pendente lite is Rule 61 of the Revised Rules of Court,
specifically Section 5 thereof, which partly provides:
"The court shall determine provisionally the pertinent facts, and shall render such order as
equity and justice may require, having due regard to the necessities of the applicant, the
means of the adverse party, the probable outcome of the case, and such other circumstances
as may aid in the proper elucidation of the questions involved. . . ."
The question of whether or not the petitioner should be allowed to present evidence in the
lower court in support of his defense that his wife had committed adultery has become moot
and academic.
The respondent Court of Appeals, in upholding the questioned orders of the lower court,
relied on Article 292 of the Civil Code, which reads:
"ART. 292. During the proceedings for legal separation, or for annulment of marriage, the
spouses and children shall be supported from the conjugal partnership property. After the
final judgment of legal separation, or of annulment of marriage, the obligation of mutual
support between the spouses ceases. However, in case of legal separation, the court may
order that the guilty spouse shall give support to the innocent one, the judgment specifying
the terms of such order."
It is suggested that while adultery may be a defense in an action for personal support, that is,
11
support of the wife by the husband from his own funds, it is not a defense when the support is
to be taken from the conjugal partnership property.
The Court did not see that the distinction is material in this case. In the first place Article 292
is not in itself the source of the legal right to receive support. It merely states that the support,
not only of the spouses but also of the children, shall be taken from the conjugal property
during the pendency of the legal separation proceeding. It does not preclude the loss of such
right in certain cases. In the second place, the said article contemplates the pendency of a
court action and, inferentially at least, a prima facie showing that the action will prosper. For
if the action is shown to be groundless, the mere filing thereof will not necessarily set Article
292 in operation.
This is also the sense of Section 5 of Rule 61, which requires, among other things, when
support pendente lite is applied for, that the court determine provisionally "the probable
outcome of the case."
Article 100 of the Civil Code provides that "the legal separation may be claimed only by the
innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or
concubinage .. (and) where both spouses are offenders, a legal separation cannot be claimed
by either of them . . ."
In a provisional sense at lease, within the meaning of Rule 61 (Section 5), the probable
failure of the respondent’s suit for legal separation can be foreseen since she is not an
innocent spouse, having been convicted of adultery by the Court of First Instance. It is true
that the judgment of conviction is on appeal in the Court of Appeals, but the same
undoubtedly satisfies the standard of provisional showing set by the aforesaid Rule. If legal
separation cannot be claimed by the guilty spouse in the first place, the fact that an action for
that purpose is filed anyway should not be permitted to be used as a means to obtain support
pendente lite, which, without such action, would be denied on the strength of the decisions of
this Court recognizing adultery as a good defense.
Otherwise, as pointed out by the petitioner, all that an erring spouse has to do to circumvent
such defense would be to file a suit for legal separation no matter how groundless.
The right to separate support or maintenance, even from the conjugal partnership property,
presupposes the existence of a justifiable cause for the spouse claiming such right to live
separately. This is implicit in Article 104 of the Civil Code, which states that after the filing
of the petition for legal separation the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each
other. A petition in bad faith, such as that filed by one who is himself or herself guilty of an
act which constitutes a ground for legal separation at the instance of the other spouse, cannot
be considered as within the intendment of the law granting separate support. In fact under
Article 303 of the same Code the obligation to give support shall cease "when the recipient,
12
be he a forced heir or not, has committed some act which gives rise to disinheritance;" and
under Article 921 one of the causes for disinheriting a spouse is "when the spouse has given
cause for legal separation." The loss of the substantive right to support in such a situation is
incompatible with any claim for support pendente lite.
This ruling, of course, is not meant to be a prejudgment of either the legal separation
proceeding pending in the lower court or the criminal case for adultery pending in the Court
of Appeals. It is to be understood only in the light of Rule 61, Section 5, of the Rules of
Court, which specifically governs the subject of support pendente lite.
The Court set aside the resolution of respondent Court of Appeals and the orders of
respondent Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court and their enforcement enjoined, without
prejudice to such judgment as may be rendered in the pending action for legal separation
between the parties.
8. Olayvar vs. Olayvar
G.R. No. L-8088
November 29, 1955
FACTS:
Rosita Veloso De Olayvar instituted an action against Aristoteles Olayvarin the Court of First
Instance of Leyte praying that support be given her and her four children coupled with a
petition for support pendente lite. But earlier, defendant filed a case for legal separation in
Cebu between the same parties on the ground of adultery wherein the right of plaintiff to
demand support is incidentally involved.
Defendant in his answer to the later case (Leyte) set up as special defense about their pending
case for legal separation in Cebu.
While the separation case in Cebu is pending, the court deemed it proper to hold in abeyance
further action on the case for support for the reason that the case in Cebu "should have
priority in order to ascertain the rights of the parties with particular reference to support in
favor of the plaintiff." The court however modified later this ruling on the premise that, as
the legal separation case might take a long time before it is finally disposed of, it is
imperative that the matter of support be given preferential consideration.
After the failed attempt of the defendant to have this ruling reconsidered, he filed a motion to
dismiss predicated on the same plea that there is between the same parties a case for legal
separation in the Court of First Instance of Cebu invoking in his favor the rule that a
complaint may be dismissed where "there is another action pending between the same parties
for the same cause." [Rule 8, section 1(d)] And on March 24, 1954, the court entered an order
dismissing the case in line with the plea of the defendant. This is the order subject of the
13
present appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the defendant’s claim that an action (support pendente lite) may be dismissed on the
ground that "there is another action pending (legal separation) between the same parties for
the same cause" tenable?
HELD:
Yes. The defendant’s claim is tenable, thus the present action must be dismissed. In order
that an action may be dismissed on the ground that "there is another action pending between
the same parties for the same cause" [Rule 8, section 1 (d)], the following requisites must
concur: (1) identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interests in both
actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same facts; and (3) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be
rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res adjudicata in
the other. 1 (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1952 ed., Vol. I, p. 169.)
Do these requisites concur in the two cases under consideration? An analysis of the facts
deducible from the pleadings would reveal an affirmative answer. Note that the present
action is for support not only of plaintiff but of her children. The action is predicated on the
infidelity of defendant who because of his propensity towards other women made him
neglectful of his marital duties. The case of legal separation, on the other hand, asserts
adultery on the part of plaintiff which is a valid defense against an action for support. Our
new Civil Code provides that the obligation to give support shall cease "when the recipient,
be he a forced heir or not, has committed some act which gives rise to disinheritance"
[Article 303 (4)], and under Article 921 of the same Code, it shall be sufficient cause for
disinheritance "when the spouse has given cause for legal separation." It further appears that
in the separation case the wife interposed an answer wherein, repudiating the charge of
adultery, she demanded that she and her children be given the proper maintenance and
support to which they are entitled under the law.
All of the foregoing show that the two cases raise practically the same issues. There is
therefore no need of prosecuting them separately and independently for that would amount to
duplicity of action. And as it appears that the case of legal separation was instituted earlier
than the one for support, it is fair that the latter be dismissed as was correctly done by the
lower court.
9. Perkings vs. Perkins
G.R. No. 35787
September 12, 1932
FACTS:
14
The parties to this action are husband and wife, married in Manila in 1914, and the wife has
entered suit for separate maintenance. The CFI of Manila granted certain amounts for
maintenance and P1000 for cost of Litigation. Prior to the resolution of the action for
separate maintenance filed by the wife, the court ordered for support in certain items of
debts, advances, and living expenses existing at the time of the order fixing the monthly
allowance. Such order is now the subject for appeal. Appellee, in her brief, has moved to
dismiss the appeal contending that the order is interlocutory.
ISSUE:
Whether the extent to give support includes payment of certain items debts, advances, and
living expenses?
HELD:
Article 148 of the Civil Code reads in part:
“The obligation to give support may be enforced whenever the person having a right to claim
it requires such assistance for his or her maintenance; such allowance, however, shall only be
paid from the date of the filing of the complaint,” and the character and the nature of the
support is defined in Article 142. The pertinent portion thereof reads:
By support is understood all that is necessary for food, shelter, clothing and medical
attendance, according to the social standing of the family.
In the opinion of the court, some of the items are clearly without the rules laid down in the
Code, while others may be partly within the rules. Some, in their entirety, long precede the
date of the filing of this suit.
While the item known as the “Manila Hotel” is evidently allowable in part, being for
ordinary necessities of life, it covers a period both before and after the filing of the suit.
Others, such as the claim for money loaned to the wife, are not within the rule (13 R. C. L.,
1209; Ramirez and De Marcaida vs. Redfern, 49 Phil., 849). It is impossible, from the
evidence of record, for this court to state how much should be allowed. It is also noted that
no allowance has as yet been made for the period from the filing of suit to the date of
allowance of temporary maintenance two months thereafter.It is impossible, from the
evidence of record, for this court to state how much should be allowed. It is also noted that
no allowance has as yet been made for the period from the filing of suit to the date of
allowance of temporary maintenance two months thereafter.
It being impossible for this court to state the amount that should be allowed, the case must be
remanded for further proceedings in accord with the views herein expressed, and it is so
ordered. No pronouncement is made regarding costs.
10. Lorenzo Mendoza vs. Gorgonia Parungao
G.R. No. 26231
15
August 7, 1926
FACTS:
On August 7, 1925, the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija rendered judgment in civil
case No. 3745 of said court in which the herein respondent Gorgonia Paruñgao was plaintiff
and the herein petitioner Lorenzo Mendoza defendant, declaring the marriage between the
two null on account of the return of the first husband of the petitioner, who had been though
dead after an absence of more than seven years.
Said judgment annulling the marriage being on appeal, on September 14, 1925, Paruñgao
brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, against Mendoza in which
she alleged the existence of certain conjugal property acquired during her marriage with the
said petitioner, and asked for a settlement of the same and the sum of P300 as alimony during
the pendency of the suit.
The herein respondent and defendant denied generally and specifically the facts alleged
therein.
On November 27, 1925, upon petition of a party the court issued an order directing Mendoza
during the pendency of the case and from the filing of the complaint, to pay the plaintiff the
sum of P50 monthly and in advance by way of support.
On January 20, 1926, upon petition of the plaintiff, the court issued an order directing the
execution of the order of November 27, 1925, granting the said plaintiff support.
On February 8, 1926, the defendant Lorenzo Mendoza filed a motion praying for the
reconsideration of said order of November 27, 1925.
On March 23, 1926, the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija issued another order of
execution of the said order of November 27, 1925.
On March 24, 1926, a writ of execution was issued against the property of the defendant in
order to collect the sum of P325 the total amount of the monthly payments due from
September 14, 1925.
Said writ of execution not having been complied with the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija, then presided over by the Honorable Manuel V. Moran, vacation judge, on June 8,
1926, issued an order citing the defendant Lorenzo Mendoza, the provincial sheriff Manuel
Tecson, the deputy sheriff Laureano Aquino, and the other sheriff, Manuel Munsayac to
appear and show cause why they should not be punished for contempt for not having
complied with said writ of execution.
16
On July 10, 1926, the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija issued an order denying the
motion of the defendant praying that the writs of attachment of the dates of January 20th and
March 23rd of 1926, respectively, be cancelled.
In its decision of July 23, 1926, this court affirmed the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija declaring null and of no effect the marriage contracted by the
petitioner Lorenzo Mendoza and the respondent Gorgonia Paruñgao on February 14, 1916.
Mendoza then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari against Paruñgao, Judge David of the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, ex-officio sheriff Gabriel Belmonte and Judge Moran
praying that a preliminary injunction be issued against the respondent sheriff prohibiting him
from carrying out the sale of the property of the petitioner by virtue of the writ of execution
issued on March 24, 1926, that the respondents, the Honorable Gutierrez David and the
Honorable Manuel V. Moran, be ordered to forward to this court all on the record in said
civil case No. 3962 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija for revision, meanwhile
prohibiting them from taking any further action relative to said case and in due time to render
judgment in favor of the petitioner declaring the order of November 27, 1925, void, as well
as the writ of execution of March 24, 1926.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the remedy of filing a petition for certiorari by Lorenzo Mendoza is proper?
HELD:
In the case now before us, the order of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija of
November 27, 1925, may be considered as an order for the payment of P50 monthly as an
advance payment on account of such share of the conjugal property as may be found from the
liquidation to belong to Gorgonia Paruñgao. This order, however, being of an interlocutory
character and not final (sec. 123, Act No. 190) no writ of execution can be issued thereon
(sec. 443, Act No. 190; 23 C. J., 314); but its unjustified disobedience may constitute
contempt of court and, after the proper proceedings prescribed by law in such cases, may be
punished as such.
The issuance of the writs of execution on January 20 and March 23, 1926, and the order of
June 8, 1926, to show cause in connection with the noncompliance of said writs of execution,
constitutes an excess of jurisdiction, which is the proper subject-matter of the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari.
For the foregoing and not considering it necessary to order the forwarding of the record to
this court, the remedy applied for is granted, declaring void the writ of execution of March
23, 1926, and all the proceedings had therein and making the preliminary injunction issued
by this court absolute, with the costs against the respondents.
17
11. Terlyngrace Rivera vs. Florencio Vargas
G.R. No. 165895
June 5, 2009
FACTS:
Respondent Florencio Vargas (Vargas) filed a complaint against petitioner and several John
Does before Branch 02 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, for
the recovery of a 150 T/H rock crushing plant located in Sariaya, Quezon. In his complaint
and affidavit, Vargas claims ownership of the said equipment, having purchased and
imported the same directly from Hyun Dae Trading Co., in Seoul, South Korea. The
equipment was allegedly entrusted to petitioner’s husband, Jan T. Rivera, who died, as
caretaker of respondents construction aggregates business in Batangas. According to Vargas,
petitioner failed to return the said equipment after her husband’s death despite his repeated
demands, thus forcing him to resort to court action. The complaint was accompanied by a
prayer for the issuance of a writ of replevin and the necessary bond amounting
to P2,400,000.00.
Summons was served upon petitioner through her personal secretary at her residence
in Parañaque City. Interestingly, however, the writ of replevin was served upon and signed by
a certain Joseph Rejumo, the security guard on duty in petitioners crushing plant in Sariaya,
Quezon contrary to the sheriffs return stating that the writ was served upon Rivera.
Rivera filed her answer, manifestation, and motion for the acceptance of petitioners
redelivery bond. In her answer, petitioner countered that the rock-crushing plant was ceded
in favor of her husband as his share following the dissolution of the partnership formed
between Jan Rivera and respondent’s wife, Iluminada Vargas (Iluminada), while the
partnerships second rock-crushing plant in Cagayan was ceded in favor of Iluminada. She
further averred that from the time that the partnership was dissolved until Jan Rivera’s death,
it was petitioner’s husband who exercised ownership over the said equipment without any
disturbance from respondent.
The RTC issued an Order disapproving petitioner’s redelivery bond application for failure to
comply with the requirements under Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 60 of the Rules of
Court.Without directly saying so, the RTC faulted petitioner for her failure to file the
application for redelivery bond within 5 days from the date of seizure as provided in the
Rules of Court. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the same was also denied.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying her counter-bond on the
ground that it was filed out of time?
18
HELD:
Replevin is one of the most ancient actions known to law, taking its name from the object of
its process. It originated in common law as a remedy against the wrongful exercise of the
right of distress for rent and, according to some authorities, could only be maintained in such
a case. But by the weight of authority, the remedy is not and never was restricted to cases of
wrongful distress in the absence of any statutes relating to the subject, but is a proper remedy
for any unlawful taking. Replevied, used in its technical sense, means delivered to the
owner,while the words to replevy means to recover possession by an action of replevin.
Broadly understood in this jurisdiction, replevin is both a form of principal remedy and of
provisional relief. It may refer either to the action itself, i.e., to regain the possession of
personal chattels being wrongfully detained from the plaintiff by another, or to the
provisional remedy that would allow the plaintiff to retain the thing during the pendency of
the action and to hold it pendente lite.The action is primarily possessory in nature and
generally determines nothing more than the right of possession.
The law presumes that every possessor is a possessor in good faith. He is entitled to be
respected and protected in his possession as if he were the true owner thereof until a
competent court rules otherwise. Before a final judgment, property cannot be seized unless
by virtue of some provision of law. The Rules of Court, under Rule 60, authorizes such
seizure in cases of replevin. However, a person seeking a remedy in an action for replevin
must follow the course laid down in the statute, since the remedy is penal in nature. When no
attempt is made to comply with the provisions of the law relating to seizure in this kind of
action, the writ or order allowing the seizure is erroneous and may be set aside on motion by
the adverse party. Be it noted, however, that a motion to quash the writ of replevin goes to
the technical regularity of procedure, and not to the merits of the case in the principal action.
The process regarding the execution of the writ of replevin in Section 4 of Rule 60 is
unambiguous: the sheriff, upon receipt of the writ of replevin and prior to the taking of the
property, must serve a copy thereof to the adverse party (petitioner, in this case) together
with the application, the affidavit of merit, and the replevin bond. The reasons are
simple, i.e., to provide proper notice to the adverse party that his property is being seized in
accordance with the courts order upon application by the other party, and ultimately to allow
the adverse party to take the proper remedy consequent thereto.
Service of the writ upon the adverse party is mandatory in line with the constitutional
guaranty on procedural due process and as safeguard against unreasonable searches and
seizures. If the writ was not served upon the adverse party but was instead merely handed to
a person who is neither an agent of the adverse party nor a person authorized to receive court
processes on his behalf, the service thereof is erroneous and is, therefore, invalid, running
afoul of the statutory and constitutional requirements. The service is likewise invalid if the
writ of replevin was served without the required documents. Under these circumstances, no
19
right to seize and to detain the property shall pass, the act of the sheriff being both unlawful
and unconstitutional.
Petitioner avers that the writ of replevin was served upon the security guard where the rock-
crushing plant to be seized was located. The signature of the receiving party indicates that the
writ was received by a certain Joseph Rejumo, the guard on duty in a plant in Sariaya,
Quezon, where the property to be seized was located, and witnessed by Claudio Palatino,
respondents caretaker. The sheriff’s return, however, peremptorily states that both the writ of
replevin and the summons were served upon Rivera. Nine (9) days after the writ was served
on the security guard, petitioner filed an answer to the complaint accompanied by a prayer
for the approval of her redelivery bond. The RTC, however, denied the redelivery bond for
having been filed beyond the five-day mandatory period prescribed in Sections 5 and 6 of
Rule 60.But since the writ was invalidly served, petitioner is correct in contending that there
is no reckoning point from which the mandatory five-day period shall commence to run.
The trial court is reminded that not only should the writ or order of replevin comply with all
the requirements as to matters of form or contents prescribed by the Rules of Court.The writ
must also satisfy proper service in order to be valid and effective: i.e. it should be directed to
the officer who is authorized to serve it; and it should be served upon the person who not
only has the possession or custody of the property involved but who is also a party or agent
of a party to the action. Consequently, a trial court is deemed to have acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction with respect to the ancillary action of replevin if it seizes and detains
a personalty on the basis of a writ that was improperly served, such as what happened in this
case.
At the outset, petitioner’s proper remedy should have been to file a motion to quash the writ
of replevin or a motion to vacate the order of seizure. Nevertheless, petitioners filing of an
application for a redelivery bond, while not necessary, did not thereby waive her right to
question the improper service. It now becomes imperative for the trial court to restore the
parties to their former positions by returning the seized property to petitioner and by
discharging the replevin bond filed by respondent. The trial, with respect to the main action,
shall continue. Respondent may, however, file a new application for replevin should he
choose to do so.
12. BA Finance Corporation vs. Hon. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 102998
July 5, 1996
FACTS:
The spouses Reynaldo and Florencia Manahan executed, on 15 May 1980, a promissory
note binding themselves to pay Carmasters, Inc., the amount of P83,080.00 in thirty-six
20
monthly installments commencing 01 July 1980. To secure payment, the Manahan spouses
executed a deed of chattel mortgage over a motor vehicle.
Carmasters later assigned the promissory note and the chattel mortgage to petitioner BA
Finance Corporation with the conformity of the Manahans. When the latter failed to pay the
due installments, petitioner sent demand letters. The demands not having been heeded,
petitioner, on 02 October 1987, filed a complaint for replevin with damages against the
spouses, as well as against a John Doe, praying for the recovery of the vehicle with an
alternative prayer for the payment of a sum of money should the vehicle not be returned.
Upon petitioner's motion and the filing of a bond in the amount of P169,161.00 the lower
court issued a writ of replevin. The court, however, cautioned petitioner that should summons
be not served on the defendants within thirty (30) days from the writ's issuance, the case
would be dismissed to failure to prosecute. The warning was based on what the court
perceived to be the deplorable practice of some mortgagees of "freezing (the) foreclosure or
replevin cases" which they would so "conveniently utilize as a leverage for the collection of
unpaid installments on mortgaged chattels."
The service of summons upon the spouses Manahan was caused to be served by petitioner at
No. 35 Lantana St., Cubao, Quezon City. The original of the summons had the name and the
signature of private respondent Roberto M. Reyes indicating that he received, on 14 October
1987, a copy of the summons and the complaint.
Petitioner, through its Legal Assistant, Danilo E. Solano, issued a certification to the effect
that it had received from Orson R. Santiago, the deputy sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 20, the Ford Cortina seized from private respondent Roberto M. Reyes, the
John Doe referred to in the complaint, in Sorsogon, Sorsogon. On 20 October 1987, the
lower court came out with an order of seizure.
Alleging possession in good faith, private respondent filed, on 26 October 1987, a motion for
an extension of time within which to file his answer and/or a motion for intervention. The
court granted the motion.
A few months later, or on 18 February 1988, the court issued dismissal order for failure to
prosecute and further ordering the plaintiff to return the property seized with all its
accessories to defendant John Doe in the person of Roberto M. Reyes as there is no showing
that the principal defendants were served with summons inspite of the lapse of four (4)
months.
On 26 February 1988, petitioner filed a notice of dismissal of the case "without prejudice and
without pronouncement as to costs, before service of Summons and Answer, under Section 1,
Rule 17, of the Rules of Court." It also sought in another motion the withdrawal of the
21
replevin bond. In view of the earlier dismissal of the case (for petitioner's failure to
prosecute), the court, on 02 March 1988, merely noted the notice of dismissal and denied the
motion to withdraw the replevin bond considering that the writ of replevin had meanwhile
been implemented.
On 09 March 1988, private respondent filed a motion praying that petitioner be directed to
comply with the court order requiring petitioner to return the vehicle to him. In turn,
petitioner filed, on 14 March 1988, a motion for the reconsideration of the orders of 18
February 1988 and 02 March 1988
On 20 April 1988, the court granted petitioner's motion for reconsideration and accordingly
recalled the order directing the return of the vehicle to private respondent, set aside the order
dismissing the case, directed petitioner "to cause the service of summons together with a
copy of the complaint on the principal defendants within five (5) days from receipt" thereof
at petitioner's expense, and ordered private respondent to answer the complaint.
A few months later, or on 02 August 1988, petitioner filed a motion to declare private
respondent in default. The court granted the motion on that same day and declared private
respondent "in default for his failure to file the . . . answer within the reglementary period."
The court likewise granted petitioner's motion to set the case for the presentation, ex parte, of
evidence. Petitioner, thereupon, submitted the promissory note, the deed of chattel mortgage,
the deed of assignment, a statement of account in the name of Florencia Manahan and two
demand letters.
On 27 February 1989, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint against the
Manahans for failure of petitioner to prosecute the case against them. It also dismissed the
case against private respondent for failure of petitioner to show any legal basis for said
respondent's liability as Roberto M. Reyes is merely ancillary debtor
Petitioner Appeal to the CA and contended the subject motor vehicle was taken from the
possession of said Roberto M. Reyes, a third person with respect to the contract of chattel
mortgage between the appellant and the defendants spouses Manahan. The CA disagree and
subsequently, denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration stating that:
The Civil Code expressly provides that every possessor has a right to be respected in his
possession (Art. 539, New Civil Code); that good faith is always presumed, and upon him
who alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor rests the burden of proof (Art. 527, ibid.);
and that the possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title;
nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may
recover it from the person in possession of the same (Art. 559, ibid.). Thus, it has been held
that a possessor in good faith is entitled to be respected and protected in his possession as if
he were the true owner thereof until a competent court rules otherwise (Chus Hai vs.
22
Kapunan, 104 Phil. 110; Yu, et al. vs. Hon. Honrado, etc., et al., 99 SCRA 237). In the case
at bar, the trial court did not err in holding that the complaint does not state any cause of
action against Roberto M. Reyes, and in ordering the return of the subject chattel to him.
ISSUE:
Whether a mortgagee can maintain an action for replevin against any possessor of the object
of a chattel mortgage even if the latter were not a party to the mortgage?
HELD:
The Court denied the petition. Because the plaintiff was not able to establish the essential
conditions to take possession thereof
A chattel mortgagee, unlike a pledgee, need not be in, nor entitled to the possession of the
property unless and until the mortgagor defaults and the mortgagee thereupon seeks to
foreclose thereon. Since the mortgagee's right of possession is conditioned upon the actual
fact of default which itself may be controverted, the inclusion of other parties like the debtor
or the mortgagor himself, may be required in order to allow a full and conclusive
determination of the case. When the mortgagee seeks a replevin in order to effect the
eventual foreclosure of the mortgage, it is not only the existence of, but also the mortgagor's
default on, the chattel mortgage that, among other things, can properly uphold the right to
replevy the property. The burden to establish a valid justification for that action lies with the
plaintiff. An adverse possessor, who is not the mortgagor, cannot just be deprived of his
possession, let alone be bound by the terms of the chattel mortgage contract, simply because
the mortgagee brings up an action for replevin.
Replevin, broadly understood, is both a form of principal remedy and of a provisional relief.
It may refer either to the action itself, i.e., to regain the possession of personal chattels being
wrongfully detained from the plaintiff by another, or to the provisional remedy that would
allow the plaintiff to retain the thing during the pendency of the action and hold it pendente
lite. The action is primarily possessory in nature and generally determines nothing more than
the right of possession.
Replevin is so usually described as a mixed action, being partly in rem and partly in
personam — in rem insofar as the recovery of specific property is concerned, and in
personam as regards to damages involved. As an "action in rem," the gist of the replevin
action is the right of the plaintiff to obtain possession of specific personal property by reason
of his being the owner or of his having a special interest therein. Consequently, the person in
possession of the property sought to be replevied is ordinary the proper and only necessary
party defendant, and the plaintiff is not required to so join as defendants other persons
claiming a right on the property but not in possession thereof. Rule 60 of the Rules of Court
allows an application for the immediate possession of the property but the plaintiff must
23
show that he has a good legal basis, i.e., a clear title thereto, for seeking
such interimpossession.
Where the right of the plaintiff to the possession of the specific property is so conceded or
evident, the action need only be maintained against him who so possesses the property.
There can be no question that persons having a special right of property in the goods the
recovery of which is sought; such as a chattel mortgagee, may maintain an action for replevin
therefor. Where the mortgage authorizes the mortgagee to take possession of the property on
default, he may maintain an action to recover possession of the mortgaged chattels from the
mortgagor or from any person in whose hands he may find them.In effect then, the
mortgagee, upon the mortgagor's default, is constituted an attorney-in-fact of the mortgagor
enabling such mortgagee to act for and in behalf of the owner.
In case the right of possession on the part of the plaintiff, or his authority to claim such
possession or that of his principal, is put to great doubt (a contending party might contest the
legal bases for plaintiffs cause of action or an adverse and independent claim of ownership or
right of possession is raised by that party), it could become essential to have other persons
involved and accordingly impleaded for a complete determination and resolution of the
controversy.
In a suit for replevin, a clear right of possession must be established. A foreclosure under a
chattel mortgage may properly be commenced only once there is default on the part of the
mortgagor of his obligation secured by the mortgage. The replevin in the instant case has
been sought to pave the way for the foreclosure of the object covered by the chattel
mortgage. The conditions essential for that foreclosure would be to show, firstly, the
existence of the chattel mortgage and, secondly, the default of the mortgagor. These
requirements must be established since the validity of the plaintiffs exercise of the right of
foreclosure are inevitably dependent thereon. (Servicewide Specialists, Inc.,vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 103301, 08 December 1995,).
13. SMART Communications vs. Regina M. Astorga
G.R. No. 148132
January 28, 2008
FACTS:
Regina M. Astorga (Astorga) was employed by respondent Smart Communications,
Incorporated (SMART) as District Sales Manager of the Corporate Sales Marketing Group/
Fixed Services Division (CSMG/FSD). Astorga enjoyed additional benefits, one of which is
a car plan.
SMART launched an organizational realignment to achieve more efficient operations. Part of
the reorganization was the outsourcing of the marketing and sales force. Thus, SMART
24
entered into a joint venture agreement with NTT of Japan, and formed SMART-NTT
Multimedia, Incorporated (SNMI). Since SNMI was formed to do the sales and marketing
work, SMART abolished the CSMG/FSD, Astorga’s division.
To soften the blow of the realignment, SNMI agreed to absorb the CSMG personnel who
would be recommended by SMART. SMART then conducted a performance evaluation of
CSMG personnel and those who garnered the highest ratings were favorably recommended
to SNMI. Astorga landed last in the performance evaluation, thus, she was not recommended
by SMART. SMART, nonetheless, offered her a supervisory position in the Customer Care
Department, but she refused the offer because the position carried lower salary rank and rate.
Despite the abolition of the CSMG/FSD, Astorga continued reporting for work. SMART
issued a memorandum advising Astorga of the termination of her employment on ground of
redundancy,
The termination of her employment prompted Astorga to file a complaint for illegal
dismissal, non-payment of salaries and other benefits with prayer for moral and exemplary
damages against SMART.
SMART responded that there was valid termination and also sent a letter to Astorga
demanding that she pay the current market value of the Honda Civic Sedan which was given
to her under the company’s car plan program, or to surrender the same to the company for
proper disposition. Astorga, however, failed and refused to do either, thus prompting
SMART to file a suit for replevin with the Regional Trial Court of Makati (RTC).
ISSUE:
WON RTC was correct when it assumed jurisdiction over the action for Replevin filed by
SMART?
HELD:
YES. Replevin is an action whereby the owner or person entitled to repossession of goods or
chattels may recover those goods or chattels from one who has wrongfully distrained or
taken, or who wrongfully detains such goods or chattels. It is designed to permit one having
right to possession to recover property in specie from one who has wrongfully taken or
detained the property. The term may refer either to the action itself, for the recovery of
personalty, or to the provisional remedy traditionally associated with it, by which possession
of the property may be obtained by the plaintiff and retained during the pendency of the
action.
Contrary to the CA’s ratiocination, the RTC rightfully assumed jurisdiction over the suit and
acted well within its discretion in denying Astorga’s motion to dismiss. SMART’s demand
for payment of the market value of the car or, in the alternative, the surrender of the car, is
not a labor, but a civil, dispute. It involves the relationship of debtor and creditor rather than
employee-employer relations. As such, the dispute falls within the jurisdiction of the regular
courts.
25
In Basaya, Jr. v. Militante, this Court, in upholding the jurisdiction of the RTC over the
replevin suit, explained:
Replevin is a possessory action, the gist of which is the right of possession in the plaintiff.
The primary relief sought therein is the return of the property in specie wrongfully detained
by another person. It is an ordinary statutory proceeding to adjudicate rights to the title or
possession of personal property. The question of whether or not a party has the right of
possession over the property involved and if so, whether or not the adverse party has
wrongfully taken and detained said property as to require its return to plaintiff, is outside the
pale of competence of a labor tribunal and beyond the field of specialization of Labor
Arbiters.
14. Terlyngrace Rivera vs. Florencio Vargas
G.R. No. 165895
June 5, 2009
FACTS:
Respondent Florencio Vargas (Vargas) filed a complaint against petitioner and several John
Does before Branch 02 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, for
the recovery of a 150 T/H rock crushing plant located in Sariaya, Quezon. In his complaint
and affidavit, Vargas claims ownership of the said equipment, having purchased and
imported the same directly from Hyun Dae Trading Co., in Seoul, South Korea. The
equipment was allegedly entrusted to petitioner’s husband, Jan T. Rivera, who died, as
caretaker of respondents construction aggregates business in Batangas. According to Vargas,
petitioner failed to return the said equipment after her husband’s death despite his repeated
demands, thus forcing him to resort to court action. The complaint was accompanied by a
prayer for the issuance of a writ of replevin and the necessary bond amounting
to P2,400,000.00.
Summons was served upon petitioner through her personal secretary at her residence
in Parañaque City. Interestingly, however, the writ of replevin was served upon and signed by
a certain Joseph Rejumo, the security guard on duty in petitioners crushing plant in Sariaya,
Quezon contrary to the sheriffs return stating that the writ was served upon Rivera.
Rivera filed her answer, manifestation, and motion for the acceptance of petitioners
redelivery bond. In her answer, petitioner countered that the rock-crushing plant was ceded
in favor of her husband as his share following the dissolution of the partnership formed
between Jan Rivera and respondent’s wife, Iluminada Vargas (Iluminada), while the
partnerships second rock-crushing plant in Cagayan was ceded in favor of Iluminada. She
further averred that from the time that the partnership was dissolved until Jan Rivera’s death,
26
it was petitioner’s husband who exercised ownership over the said equipment without any
disturbance from respondent.
The RTC issued an Order disapproving petitioner’s redelivery bond application for failure to
comply with the requirements under Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 60 of the Rules of
Court.Without directly saying so, the RTC faulted petitioner for her failure to file the
application for redelivery bond within 5 days from the date of seizure as provided in the
Rules of Court. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the same was also denied.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying her counter-bond on the
ground that it was filed out of time?
HELD:
Replevin is one of the most ancient actions known to law, taking its name from the object of
its process. It originated in common law as a remedy against the wrongful exercise of the
right of distress for rent and, according to some authorities, could only be maintained in such
a case. But by the weight of authority, the remedy is not and never was restricted to cases of
wrongful distress in the absence of any statutes relating to the subject, but is a proper remedy
for any unlawful taking. Replevied, used in its technical sense, means delivered to the
owner,while the words to replevy means to recover possession by an action of replevin.
Broadly understood in this jurisdiction, replevin is both a form of principal remedy and of
provisional relief. It may refer either to the action itself, i.e., to regain the possession of
personal chattels being wrongfully detained from the plaintiff by another, or to the
provisional remedy that would allow the plaintiff to retain the thing during the pendency of
the action and to hold it pendente lite.The action is primarily possessory in nature and
generally determines nothing more than the right of possession.
The law presumes that every possessor is a possessor in good faith. He is entitled to be
respected and protected in his possession as if he were the true owner thereof until a
competent court rules otherwise. Before a final judgment, property cannot be seized unless
by virtue of some provision of law. The Rules of Court, under Rule 60, authorizes such
seizure in cases of replevin. However, a person seeking a remedy in an action for replevin
must follow the course laid down in the statute, since the remedy is penal in nature. When no
attempt is made to comply with the provisions of the law relating to seizure in this kind of
action, the writ or order allowing the seizure is erroneous and may be set aside on motion by
the adverse party. Be it noted, however, that a motion to quash the writ of replevin goes to
the technical regularity of procedure, and not to the merits of the case in the principal action.
The process regarding the execution of the writ of replevin in Section 4 of Rule 60 is
unambiguous: the sheriff, upon receipt of the writ of replevin and prior to the taking of the
27
property, must serve a copy thereof to the adverse party (petitioner, in this case) together
with the application, the affidavit of merit, and the replevin bond. The reasons are
simple, i.e., to provide proper notice to the adverse party that his property is being seized in
accordance with the courts order upon application by the other party, and ultimately to allow
the adverse party to take the proper remedy consequent thereto.
Service of the writ upon the adverse party is mandatory in line with the constitutional
guaranty on procedural due process and as safeguard against unreasonable searches and
seizures. If the writ was not served upon the adverse party but was instead merely handed to
a person who is neither an agent of the adverse party nor a person authorized to receive court
processes on his behalf, the service thereof is erroneous and is, therefore, invalid, running
afoul of the statutory and constitutional requirements. The service is likewise invalid if the
writ of replevin was served without the required documents. Under these circumstances, no
right to seize and to detain the property shall pass, the act of the sheriff being both unlawful
and unconstitutional.
Petitioner avers that the writ of replevin was served upon the security guard where the rock-
crushing plant to be seized was located. The signature of the receiving party indicates that the
writ was received by a certain Joseph Rejumo, the guard on duty in a plant in Sariaya,
Quezon, where the property to be seized was located, and witnessed by Claudio Palatino,
respondents caretaker. The sheriff’s return, however, peremptorily states that both the writ of
replevin and the summons were served upon Rivera. Nine (9) days after the writ was served
on the security guard, petitioner filed an answer to the complaint accompanied by a prayer
for the approval of her redelivery bond. The RTC, however, denied the redelivery bond for
having been filed beyond the five-day mandatory period prescribed in Sections 5 and 6 of
Rule 60.But since the writ was invalidly served, petitioner is correct in contending that there
is no reckoning point from which the mandatory five-day period shall commence to run.
The trial court is reminded that not only should the writ or order of replevin comply with all
the requirements as to matters of form or contents prescribed by the Rules of Court.The writ
must also satisfy proper service in order to be valid and effective: i.e. it should be directed to
the officer who is authorized to serve it; and it should be served upon the person who not
only has the possession or custody of the property involved but who is also a party or agent
of a party to the action. Consequently, a trial court is deemed to have acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction with respect to the ancillary action of replevin if it seizes and detains
a personalty on the basis of a writ that was improperly served, such as what happened in this
case.
At the outset, petitioner’s proper remedy should have been to file a motion to quash the writ
of replevin or a motion to vacate the order of seizure. Nevertheless, petitioners filing of an
application for a redelivery bond, while not necessary, did not thereby waive her right to
question the improper service. It now becomes imperative for the trial court to restore the
28
parties to their former positions by returning the seized property to petitioner and by
discharging the replevin bond filed by respondent. The trial, with respect to the main action,
shall continue. Respondent may, however, file a new application for replevin should he
choose to do so.
15. Roger V. Navarro vs. Hon. Jose L. Escobido
G.R. No. 153788
November 27, 2009
FACTS:
Respondent, Karen T. Go, filed two complaints before the RTC for replevin and/or sum of
money with damages against Navarro. In these complaints, Karen Go prayed that the RTC
issue writs of replevin for the seizure of two (2) motor vehicles in Navarro’s possession. In
his Answers, Navarro alleged as a special affirmative defense that the two complaints stated
no cause of action, since Karen Go was not a party to the Lease Agreements with Option to
Purchase (collectively, the lease agreements) — the actionable documents on which the
complaints were based. RTC dismissed the case but set aside the dismissal on the
presumption that Glenn Go’s (husband) leasing business is a conjugal property and thus
ordered Karen Go to file a motion for the inclusion of Glenn Go as co-plaintiff as per Rule 4,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court. Navarro filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. According
to Navarro, a complaint which failed to state a cause of action could not be converted into
one with a cause of action by mere amendment or supplemental pleading. CA denied
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Karen Go is a real party in interest?
HELD:
YES. Karen Go is the registered owner of the business name Kargo Enterprises, as the
registered owner of Kargo Enterprises, Karen Go is the party who will directly benefit from
or be injured by a judgment in this case. Thus, contrary to Navarro’s contention, Karen Go is
the real party-in-interest, and it is legally incorrect to say that her Complaint does not state a
cause of action because her name did not appear in the Lease Agreement that her husband
signed in behalf of Kargo Enterprises.
Glenn and Karen Go are effectively co-owners of Kargo Enterprises and the properties
registered under this name; hence, both have an equal right to seek possession of these
properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed the suit for
the recovery of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other co-
owners are not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a complete
relief can be accorded in the suit even without their participation, since the suit is presumed
to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners.
29
We hold that since Glenn Go is not strictly an indispensable party in the action to recover
possession of the leased vehicles, he only needs to be impleaded as a pro-forma party to the
suit, based on Section 4, Rule 4 of the Rules, which states: Section 4.Spouses as parties. —
Husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly, except as provided by law.
Even assuming that Glenn Go is an indispensable party to the action, misjoinder or non-
joinder of indispensable parties in a complaint is not a ground for dismissal of action as per
Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court.
16. ADVENT Capital vs. Roland Young
G.R. No. 183018
August 3, 2011
FACTS:
The present controversy stemmed from a replevin suit instituted by petitioner Advent against
respondent Youngto recover the possession of a 1996 Mercedes Benz E230 which is
registered in Advents name.Prior to the replevin case, Advent filed for corporate
rehabilitation with the rehabilitation court. The court issued an Order (stay order) which
states that the enforcement of all claims whether for money or otherwise, and whether such
enforcement is by court action or otherwise, against Advent, its guarantors and sureties not
solidarily liable with it, is stayed.
Young claimed among others, several employee benefits allegedly due him as Advents
former president and chief executive officer. Advent's rehabilitation plan was approved
which included in its assets the subject car which remained in Young's possession at the time.
The trial court issued a Writ of Seizuredirecting the Sheriff to seize the subject car from
Young.Young filed an Answer alleging that as a former employee of Advent, he had the
option to purchase the subject car. The trial court dismissed the replevin case and Young's
counterclaim. The CA ruled in favor of Young and directed the returning the car to him.
ISSUE:
WON the CA committed reversible error in directing the return of the seized car to Young
HELD:
The petition is partially meritorious. We agree with the Court of Appeals in directing the trial
court to return the seized car to Young since this is the necessary consequence of the
dismissal of the replevin case for failure to prosecute without prejudice. Upon the dismissal
of the replevin case for failure to prosecute, the writ of seizure, which is merely ancillary in
nature, became functus officio and should have been lifted. There was no adjudication on the
merits, which means that there was no determination of the issue who has the better right to
30
possess the subject car. Advent cannot therefore retain possession of the subject car
considering that it was not adjudged as the prevailing party entitled to the remedy of replevin.
The dismissal of the replevin case for failure to prosecute results in the restoration of the
parties status prior to litigation, as if no complaint was filed at all. To let the writ of seizure
stand after the dismissal of the complaint would be adjudging Advent as the prevailing party,
when precisely no decision on the merits had been rendered. Accordingly, the parties must be
reverted to their status quo ante. Since Young possessed the subject car before the filing of
the replevin case, the same must be returned to him, as if no complaint was filed at all.
17. Eufemia Almeda vs. Bathala Marketing
G.R. No. 150806
January 28, 2008
FACTS:
Respondent Bathala Marketing Industries, Inc., as lessee, represented by its president
renewed its Contract of Lease withAlmeda, as lessor, husband of petitioner Eufemia and
father of petitioner RomelAlmeda. Under the said contract, Ponciano agreed to lease a
portion of the Almeda Compound.The contract of lease stated that in case of extraordinary
inflation, the value of Philippine peso at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall
be the basis of payment.
During the effectivity of the contract, Ponciano died. Thereafter, respondent dealt with
petitioners. Petitioners advised respondent that the former shall assess and collect VAT on its
monthly rentals. Respondent opposed petitioners' demand and insisted that there was no
extraordinary inflation to warrant the application of Article 1250 in light of the
pronouncement of this Court in various cases. Respondent refused to pay the VAT and
adjusted rentals as demanded by petitioners but continued to pay the stipulated amount set
forth in their contract.
Respondent instituted an action for declaratory relief for purposes of determining the correct
interpretation of conditions of the lease contract to prevent damage and prejudice. Petitioners
in turn filed an action for ejectment, rescission and damages against respondent for failure of
the latter to vacate the premises after the demand made by the former. Petitioners later moved
for the dismissal of the declaratory relief case for being an improper remedy considering that
respondent was already in breach of the obligation and that the case would not end the
litigation and settle the rights of the parties. The trial court, however, was not persuaded, and
consequently, denied the motion.
ISSUE:
WON the action for declaratory relief is proper?
31
HELD:
Yes. Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person interested in a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine any question
of construction or validity arising from the instrument, executive order or regulation, or
statute, and for a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder.
After petitioners demanded payment of adjusted rentals and in the months that followed,
respondent complied with the terms and conditions set forth in their contract of lease by
paying the rentals stipulated therein. Respondent religiously fulfilled its obligations to
petitioners even during the pendency of the present suit. There is no showing that respondent
committed an act constituting a breach of the subject contract of lease. Thus, respondent is
not barred from instituting before the trial court the petition for declaratory relief. Given all
these attendant circumstances, the Court is disposed to entertain the instant declaratory relief
action instead of dismissing it, notwithstanding the pendency of the ejectment/rescission case
before the trial court.Withpremises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the
CA is affirmed.
18. Malana vs. Tappa
G.R. No. 181303
September 17, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioners Carmen DanaoMalana, et al. alleged to be the owners of a land in Tugegarao
which they inherited from AnastacioDanao. During the lifetime of Danao, he allowed
Consuelo Pauig to build on and occupy the southern portion of the subject property. Danao
and Consuelo agreed that the latter would vacate the said land at any time that Danao and his
heirs might need it. Danao’s heirs claimed that respondents BenignoTappa, et al. continued to
occupy the subject property even after Consuelo‘s death, building their residences thereon
using permanent materials. Danao’s heirs also learned that Tappa, et al. were claiming
ownership over the subject property. Averring that they already needed it, Danao’sheirs
demanded that respondents vacate the same. The call was unheeded. Meanwhile, Danao’s
heirs referred their land dispute to the LupongTagapamayapa. During the conciliation
proceedings, respondents asserted that they owned the subject property and presented
documents ostensibly supporting their claim of ownership. The heirs opposed this, saying
that the documents were falsified and highly dubious. This notwithstanding, Tappa, et al.
created a cloud upon theheirs‘ title to the property. Thus, the heirs filed a case for
Reivindicacion, Quieting of Title, and Damages in the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether the judge commit grave abuse of discretion in motuproprio dismissing the complaint
for lack of jurisdiction?
32
HELD:
No. Petition is dismissed. RTC should remand the records to the MTC. An action for
declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or
other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a
regulation or an ordinance. The relief sought under this remedy includes the interpretation
and determination of the validity of the written instrument and the judicial declaration of the
parties‘ rights or duties thereunder. Petitions for declaratory relief are governed by Rule 63.
Section 1 states that an action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title, and to
consolidate ownership in a sale with a right to repurchase ―may be brought under the RTC.
These remedies are considered similar to declaratory relief because they result in the
adjudication of the legal rights of the litigants, often without the need of execution. Whereas
the Rules of Court uses ―may, the amended Judicial Reorganization Act uses the word
―shall in determining jurisdiction. JRA explicitly requires the MTC to exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve title to or possession of real property
where the assessed value does not exceed P20,000 (OMM) or P50,000 (MM).
In this case, the assessed value of the subject property is only P410.00; therefore, the
jurisdiction is with the MTC, not the RTC. Further, an action for declaratory relief
presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of rights
arising thereunder. The purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative
statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed or contract for their
guidance in the enforcement thereof, and not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach
thereof. Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an
action for declaratory relief, the courts can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. In
the present case, the case for quieting of title was filed after Danao heirs already demanded,
and Tappa refused to vacate the subject property. Since the heirs had already been deprived
of the possession of their property, the proper remedy for them is the filing of an
accionpubliciana or an accionreivindicatoria, not a case for declaratory relief. An
accionpubliciana is a suit for the recovery of possession, filed one year after the occurrence
of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.
Jurisdiction over such an action would depend on the value of the property involved. Given
that the property is only at P410.00, then the MTC, not the RTC, has jurisdiction over an
action to recover the same.
19. Com. of Customs vs. Hypermix Feeds Corp.
G.R. No. 179579
February 1, 2012
FACTS:
On 7 November 2003, petitioner Commissioner of Customs issued CMO 27-2003. Under the
Memorandum, for tariff purposes, wheat was classified according to the following: (1)
importer or consignee; (2) country of origin; and (3) port of discharge. The regulation
33
provided an exclusive list of corporations, ports of discharge, commodity descriptions and
countries of origin. Depending on these factors, wheat would be classified either as food
grade or feed grade. The corresponding tariff for food grade wheat was 3%, for feed grade,
7%.
CMO 27-2003 further provided for the proper procedure for protest or Valuation and
Classification Review Committee (VCRC) cases. Under this procedure, the release of the
articles that were the subject of protest required the importer to post a cash bond to cover the
tariff differential.
A month after the issuance of CMO 27-2003, on 19 December 2003, respondent filed a
Petition for Declaratory Relief with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pinas City. It
anticipated the implementation of the regulation on its imported and perishable Chinese
milling wheat in transit from China. Respondent contended that CMO 27-2003 was issued
without following the mandate of the Revised Administrative Code on public participation,
prior notice, and publication or registration with the University of the Philippines Law
Center.
Respondent also alleged that the regulation summarily adjudged it to be a feed grade supplier
without the benefit of prior assessment and examination; thus, despite having imported food
grade wheat, it would be subjected to the 7% tariff upon the arrival of the shipment, forcing
them to pay 133% more than was proper.
Furthermore, respondent claimed that the equal protection clause of the Constitution was
violated when the regulation treated non-flour millers differently from flour millers for no
reason at all.
Lastly, respondent asserted that the retroactive application of the regulation was confiscatory
in nature.
On 19 January 2004, the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) effective for
twenty (20) days from notice.
Petitioners thereafter filed a Motion to Dismiss. They alleged that: (1) the RTC did not have
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, because respondent was asking for a judicial
determination of the classification of wheat; (2) an action for declaratory relief was improper;
(3) CMO 27-2003 was an internal administrative rule and not legislative in nature; and (4)
the claims of respondent were speculative and premature, because the Bureau of Customs
(BOC) had yet to examine respondents products. They likewise opposed the application for a
writ of preliminary injunction on the ground that they had not inflicted any injury through the
issuance of the regulation; and that the action would be contrary to the rule that
administrative issuances are assumed valid until declared otherwise.
34
On 28 February 2005, the parties agreed that the matters raised in the application for
preliminary injunction and the Motion to Dismiss would just be resolved together in the main
case. Thus, on 10 March 2005, the RTC rendered its Decision without having to resolve the
application for preliminary injunction and the Motion to Dismiss.
The trial court ruled in favor of respondent. Dissatisfied with the Decision of the lower court,
petitioners appealed to the CA, raising the same allegations in defense of CMO 27-2003. The
appellate court, however, dismissed the appeal. It held that, since the regulation affected
substantial rights of petitioners and other importers, petitioners should have observed the
requirements of notice, hearing and publication. Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for declaratory relief is the right remedy given the circumstances
of the case?
HELD:
The Court held in the affirmative. The Petition has merit. We shall first discuss the propriety
of an action for declaratory relief. Rule 63, Section 1 provides, Who may file petition. Any
person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are
affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental
regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate
Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a
declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
The requirements of an action for declaratory relief are as follows: (1) there must be a
justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are
adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy;
and (4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination. We find that the Petition
filed by respondent before the lower court meets these requirements.
First, the subject of the controversy is the constitutionality of CMO 27-2003 issued by
petitioner Commissioner of Customs. In Smart Communications v. NTC, we held:
The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative
agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular
courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a
law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the regional trial courts. This is within the
scope of judicial power, which includes the authority of the courts to determine in an
appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. Judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
35
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)
Meanwhile, in Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. v. Department of Finance
Secretary, we said: xxx [A] legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation,
designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof. Xxx
In addition such rule must be published. On the other hand, interpretative rules are designed
to provide guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is in charge of enforcing.
Accordingly, in considering a legislative rule a court is free to make three
inquiries: (i) whether the rule is within the delegated authority of the administrative
agency; (ii)whether it is reasonable; and (iii) whether it was issued pursuant to proper
procedure. But the court is not free to substitute its judgment as to the desirability or wisdom
of the rule for the legislative body, by its delegation of administrative judgment, has
committed those questions to administrative judgments and not to judicial judgments. In the
case of an interpretative rule, the inquiry is not into the validity but into the correctness or
propriety of the rule. As a matter of power a court, when confronted with an interpretative
rule, is free to (i) give the force of law to the rule; (ii) go to the opposite extreme and
substitute its judgment; or (iii) give some intermediate degree of authoritative weight to the
interpretative rule. (Emphasis supplied)
Second, the controversy is between two parties that have adverse interests. Petitioners are
summarily imposing a tariff rate that respondent is refusing to pay.
Third, it is clear that respondent has a legal and substantive interest in the implementation of
CMO 27-2003. Respondent has adequately shown that, as a regular importer of wheat, on 14
August 2003, it has actually made shipments of wheat from China to Subic. The shipment
was set to arrive in December 2003. Upon its arrival, it would be subjected to the conditions
of CMO 27-2003. The regulation calls for the imposition of different tariff rates, depending
on the factors enumerated therein. Thus, respondent alleged that it would be made to pay the
7% tariff applied to feed grade wheat, instead of the 3% tariff on food grade wheat. In
addition, respondent would have to go through the procedure under CMO 27-2003, which
would undoubtedly toll its time and resources. The lower court correctly pointed out as
follows:
xxx As noted above, the fact that petitioner is precisely into the business of importing
wheat, each and every importation will be subjected to constant disputes which will result
into (sic) delays in the delivery, setting aside of funds as cash bond required in the CMO as
well as the resulting expenses thereof. It is easy to see that business uncertainty will be a
constant occurrence for petitioner. That the sums involved are not minimal is shown by the
discussions during the hearings conducted as well as in the pleadings filed. It may be that the
petitioner can later on get a refund but such has been foreclosed because the Collector of
36
Customs and the Commissioner of Customs are bound by their own CMO. Petitioner cannot
get its refund with the said agency. We believe and so find that Petitioner has presented such
a stake in the outcome of this controversy as to vest it with standing to file this
petition. (Emphasis supplied)
Finally, the issue raised by respondent is ripe for judicial determination, because litigation is
inevitable for the simple and uncontroverted reason that respondent is not included in the
enumeration of flour millers classified as food grade wheat importers. Thus, as the trial court
stated, it would have to file a protest case each time it imports food grade wheat and be
subjected to the 7% tariff.
It is therefore clear that a petition for declaratory relief is the right remedy given the
circumstances of the case.
20. Diaz vs. Secretary of Finance
G.R. No. 193007
July 19, 2011
FACTS:
Petitioners filed this petition for declaratory relief assailing the validity of the impending
imposition of value-added tax (VAT) by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) on the
collections of tollway operators. Petitioners claim that, since the VAT would result in
increased toll fees, they have an interest as regular users of tollways in stopping the BIR
action. Petitioners hold the view that Congress did not, when it enacted the NIRC, intend to
include toll fees within the meaning of "sale of services" that are subject to VAT; that a toll
fee is a "user’s tax," not a sale of services; that to impose VAT on toll fees would amount to a
tax on public service; and that, since VAT was never factored into the formula for computing
toll fees, its imposition would violate the non-impairment clause of the constitution.
On August 13, 2010 the Court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO), enjoining the
implementation of the VAT. The Court required the government, represented by respondents
Secretary of the Department of Finance, and Commissioner of Internal Revenue, to comment
on the petition within 10 days from notice. Later, the Court issued another resolution treating
the petition as one for prohibition.
On August 24, 2010 the Court issued a resolution, treating the petition as one for prohibition
rather than one for declaratory relief, the characterization that petitioners Diaz and Timbol
gave their action. The government has sought reconsideration of the Court’s
resolution, however, arguing that petitioners’ allegations clearly made out a case for
declaratory relief, an action over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. The
government adds, moreover, that the petition does not meet the requirements of Rule 65 for
actions for prohibition since the BIR did not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial
37
functions when it sought to impose VAT on toll fees. Besides, petitioners Diaz and Timbol
has a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against the BIR action
in the form of an appeal to the Secretary of Finance.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for declaratory relief can be treated as one for prohibition?
HELD:
The Court held there are precedents for treating a petition for declaratory relief as one for
prohibition if the case has far-reaching implications and raises questions that need to be
resolved for the public good. The Court has also held that a petition for prohibition is a
proper remedy to prohibit or nullify acts of executive officials that amount to usurpation of
legislative authority.
Here, the imposition of VAT on toll fees has far-reaching implications. Its imposition would
impact, not only on the more than half a million motorists who use the tollways everyday, but
more so on the government’s effort to raise revenue for funding various projects and for
reducing budgetary deficits.
To dismiss the petition and resolve the issues later, after the challenged VAT has been
imposed, could cause more mischief both to the tax-paying public and the government. A
belated declaration of nullity of the BIR action would make any attempt to refund to the
motorists what they paid an administrative nightmare with no solution. Consequently, it is
not only the right, but the duty of the Court to take cognizance of and resolve the issues that
the petition raises.
Although the petition does not strictly comply with the requirements of Rule 65, the Court
has ample power to waive such technical requirements when the legal questions to be
resolved are of great importance to the public. The same may be said of the requirement of
locus standi which is a mere procedural requisite.
21. Gamboa vs. Teves
G.R. No. 176579
June 28, 2011
FACTS:
PLDT was granted a franchise to engage in the telecommunications business in 1928 through
Act No. 3436. During the Martial Law 26 percent of the outstanding common shares were
sold by General Telephone and Electronics Corporation (GTE an American Company) to
Philippine Telecommunications Investment Corporation (PTIC), who in turn assigned
111,415 shares os atock of PTIC (46 percent of outstanding capital stock) to Prime Holdings
Inc. (PHI). These shares of PTIC were later sequestered by PCGG and adjudged by the court
to belong to the Republic.
38
Fifity four (54) percent shares were sold to Hong Kong-based firm First Pacific, and the
remaining 46 percent was sold through public bidding by the Inter-agency Privatization
Council, and eventually ended up being bought by First Pacific subsidiary Metro Pacific
Assets Holdings Inc. (MPAH) after the corporation exercise its first refusal. The transaction
was an indirect sale of 12 million shares or 6.3 percent of the outstanding common shares of
PLDT, making First Pacific’s common shareholdings of PLDT to 37 percent and the total
common shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to 81.47 percent. Japanese NTT DoCoMo
owns 51.56 percent of the other foreign shareholdings/equty.
Petitioner gamboa, alleged that the sale of 111,415 shares to MPAH violates Sec. 11 of Art.
XII of the Constitution, which limits foreign ownership of the capital of a public utility to not
more than 40 percent.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner’s choice of remedy was proper?
HELD:
NO. However, since the threshold and purely legal issue on the definition of the term
‘capital’ in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution has far-reaching implications to the
national economy, the Court treats the petition for declaratory relief as one for mandamus. It
is well settled that this Court may treat a petition for declaratory relief as one for mandamus
if the issue involved has far-reaching implications.
22. Verzosa, Jr. vs. Carague
G.R. No. 157838
March 8, 2011
FACTS:
On two separate occasions in December 1992, the Cooperative Development Authority
(CDA) purchased from Tetra Corporation (Tetra) a total of forty-six (46) units of computer
equipment and peripherals in the total amount ofP2,285,279.00. Tetra was chosen from
among three qualified bidders (Tetra, Microcircuits and Columbia). In the technical
evaluation of the units to be supplied by the qualified bidders, CDA engaged the services of
the Development Academy of the Philippines-Technical Evaluation Committee (DAP-TEC).
The bidding was conducted in accordance with the Approved Guidelines and Procedures of
Public Bidding for Information Technology (IT) Resources and Memorandum Order No. 237
issued by the Office of the President. Petitioner who was then the Executive Director of the
CDA approved the purchase.
On May 18, 1993, the Resident Auditor sought the assistance of the Technical Services
Office (TSO), COA in the determination of the reasonableness of the prices of the purchased
computers.3 In its reply-letter dated October 18, 1993, the TSO found that the purchased
39
computers were overpriced/excessive by a total of P881,819.00. It was noted that (1) no
volume discount was given by the supplier, considering the number of units sold; (2) as early
as 1992, there were so much supply of computers in the market so that the prices of
computers were relatively low already; and (3) when CDA first offered to buy computers, of
the three qualified bidders, Microcircuits offered the lowest bid of P1,123,315.00 while Tetra
offered the highest bid of P1,269,630.00.4 The Resident Auditor issued Notice of
Disallowance No. 93-0016-101 dated November 17, 1993, for the amount of P881,819.00.
Petitioner filed a petition for review under Rule 45, after having their motion for
reconsideration to the COA denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for review under Rule 45 is the proper remedy?
HELD:
The Court held in the negative. To begin with, petitioner availed of the wrong remedy in
filing a petition for review under Rule 45. Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution
provides that decisions, orders or rulings of the Commission on Audit may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party. Moreover, under Section 2, Rule 64, of
the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, a judgment or final order or resolution of the
Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on
certiorari under Rule 65. Moreover, on the merits, the petition lacks merit.
Findings of quasi-judicial agencies, such as the COA, which have acquired expertise because
their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but at
times even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence.34 It is only upon a
clear showing that the COA acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction that this Court will set aside its
decisions or final orders.35 We find no such arbitrariness or grave abuse on the part of the
COA when it disallowed in audit the amount representing the overprice in the payment by
CDA for the purchased computer units and peripherals, its findings are well-supported by the
evidence on record.
23. Veloso vs. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 193677
September 06, 2011
FACTS:
On December 7, 2000, the City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8040 entitled An
Ordinance Authorizing the Conferment of Exemplary Public Service Award to Elective
Local Officials of Manila Who Have Been Elected for Three (3) Consecutive Terms in the
Same Position. Section 2 thereof provides, SEC. 2. The EPSA shall consist of a Plaque of
40
Appreciation, retirement and gratuity pay remuneration equivalent to the actual time served
in the position for three (3) consecutive terms, subject to the availability of funds as certified
by the City Treasurer. PROVIDED, That [it] shall be accorded to qualified elected City
Officials on or before the first day of service in an appropriated public ceremony to be
conducted for the purpose. PROVIDED FURTHER, That this Ordinance shall only cover the
Position of Mayor, Vice-Mayor and Councilor: PROVIDED FURTHERMORE, That those
who were elected for this term and run for higher elective position thereafter, after being
elected shall still be eligible for this award for the actual time served: PROVIDED FINALLY
That the necessary and incidental expenses needed to implement the provisions of this
Ordinance shall be appropriated and be included in the executive budget for the year when
any city official will qualify for the Award.
Atty. Gabriel J. Espina (Atty. Espina), Supervising Auditor of the City of Manila, issued
Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) No. 2005-100(05)07(05) with the following
observations:
The initial payment of monetary reward as part of Exemplary Public Service Award (EPSA)
amounting to P9,923,257.00 to former councilors of the City Government of Manila who
have been elected for three (3) consecutive terms to the same position as authorized by City
Ordinance No. 8040 is without legal basis.
The amount granted as monetary reward is excessive and tantamount to double compensation
in contravention to Article 170 (c) of the IRR of RA 7160 which provides that no elective or
appointive local official shall receive additional, double or indirect compensation unless
specifically authorized by law.
The appropriations for retirement gratuity to implement EPSA ordinance was classified as
Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses instead of Personal Services contrary to Section
7, Volume III of the Manual on the New Government Accounting System (NGAS) for local
government units and COA Circular No. 2004-008 dated September 20, 2004 which provide
the updated description of accounts under the NGAS.
After evaluation of the AOM, the Director, Legal and Adjudication Office COA issued
Notice of disallowance No. 06-010-100-05 dated May 24, 2006.
The former councilors filed a Motion to Lift the Notice of Disallowance which was favored
by the Legal and Adjudication Office, the pertinent portion of the decision:
Citing Article 170 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) the Legal and
Adjudication Office held that the monetary reward given to the former councilors can be one
of gratuity and, therefore, cannot be considered as additional, double or indirect
compensation. Giving importance to the principle of local autonomy, the LAO-local upheld
the power of local government units (LGUs) to grant allowances. More importantly, it
41
emphasized that the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) did not disapprove the
appropriation for the EPSA of the City which indicate that the same is valid.
Upon review, the COA rendered the assailed Decision No. 2008-088 sustaining Notice of
Disallowance No. 06-010-100-05 - The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. The
COA opined that the monetary reward under the EPSA is covered by the term
"compensation." Though it recognizes the local autonomy of LGUs, it emphasized the
limitations thereof set forth in the Salary Standardization Law (SSL). It explained that the
SSL does not authorize the grant of such monetary reward or gratuity. It also stressed the
absence of a specific law passed by Congress which ordains the conferment of such monetary
reward or gratuity to the former councilors. In response to the question on its jurisdiction to
rule on the legality of the disbursement, the COA held that it is vested by the Constitution the
power to determine whether government entities comply with laws and regulations in
disbursing government funds and to disallow irregular disbursements.
Petitioners insist that the power and authority of the COA to audit government funds and
accounts does not carry with it in all instances the power to disallow a particular
disbursement. (Citing Guevara v. Gimenez ) and that that the COA has no discretion or
authority to disapprove payments on the ground that the same was unwise or that the amount
is unreasonable. The COA's remedy, according to petitioners, is to bring to the attention of
the proper administrative officer such expenditures that, in its opinion, are irregular,
unnecessary, excessive or extravagant.
Aggrieved, petitioners through special civil action for certiorari alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the COA claiming that The respondent Commission on Audit did not
only commit a reversible error but was, in fact, guilty of grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it ruled that the monetary award given under the EPSA
partakes of the nature of an additional compensation prohibited under the Salary
Standardization Law, and other existing laws, rules and regulations, and not a GRATUITY
"voluntarily given in return for a favor or services rendered purely out of generosity of the
giver or grantor. Apart from being totally oblivious of the fact that the monetary award given
under the EPSA was intended or given in return for the exemplary service rendered by its
recipient(s), the respondent COA further committed grave abuse of discretion when it
effectively nullified a duly-enacted ordinance which is essentially a judicial function.
ISSUE:
Whether the COA committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the disallowance of
P9,923,257.00?
HELD:
It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities,
especially one which is constitutionally-created not only on the basis of the doctrine of
42
separation of powers but also for their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to
enforce.
Findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but also finality when the
decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave
abuse of discretion.
It is only when the COA has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a petition
questioning its rulings.
There is grave abuse of discretion when there is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law as when the
judgment rendered is not based on law and evidence but on caprice, whim and despotism In
this case, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COA in issuing the assailed
decisions.
24. Brenda L. Nazareth vs. Hon. Reynaldo A. Villar
G.R. No. 188635
January 29, 2013
FACTS:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by
law. A violation of this constitutional edict warrants the disallowance of the payment.
However, the refund of the disallowed payment of a benefit granted by law to a covered
person, agency or office of the Government may be barred by the good faith of the approving
official and of the recipient.
Being assailed by petition for certiorari on the ground of its being issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is the decision rendered on June 4,
2009 by the Commission on Audit (COA) in COA Case No. 2009-045 entitled Petition of
Ms. Brenda L. Nazareth, Regional Director, Department of Science and Technology,
Regional Office No. IX, Zamboanga City, for review of Legal and Adjudication Office
(LAO)-National Decision No. 2005-308 dated September 15, 2005 and LAO-National
Resolution No. 2006-308A dated May 12, 2006 on disallowances of subsistence, laundry,
hazard and other benefits in the total amount of P3,591,130.36, affirming the issuance of
notices of disallowance (NDs) by the Audit Team Leader of COA Regional Office No. IX in
Zamboanga City against the payment of benefits to covered officials and employees of the
Department of Science and Technology (DOST) for calendar year (CY) 2001 out of the
savings of the DOST.
43
The petitioner DOST Regional Director hereby seeks to declare the decision dated June 4,
2009 "null and void," and prays for the lifting of the disallowance of the payment of the
benefits for CY2001 for being within the ambit of Republic Act No. 8439 (R.A. No. 8439),
otherwise known as the Magna Carta for Scientists, Engineers, Researchers, and other
Science and Technology Personnel in the Government (Magna Carta, for short), and on the
strength of the Memorandum of Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora dated April 12,
2000 authorizing the use of the savings for the purpose.
Hence, this special civil action for certiorari, with the petitioner insisting that the COA
gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in affirming the
disallowance of the Magna Carta benefits for CY 2001 despite the provisions of R.A. No.
8439, and in ruling that the Memorandum of April 12, 2000 did not cover the payment of the
Magna Carta benefits for CY 2001.
ISSUE:
Whether the special civil action for certiorari is meritorious?
HELD:
The Court held in the negative. The COA is endowed with sufficient latitude to determine,
prevent, and disallow the irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable
expenditures of government funds. It has the power to ascertain whether public funds were
utilized for the purposes for which they had been intended by law. The "Constitution has
made the COA the guardian of public funds, vesting it with broad powers over all accounts
pertaining to government revenue and expenditures and the uses of public funds and
property, including the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination, to
establish the techniques and methods for such review, and to promulgate accounting and
auditing rules and regulations"
Only when the COA has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, may the Court entertain and grant a
petition for certiorari brought to assail its actions. Section 1 of Rule 65, Rules of Court,
demands that the petitioner must show that, one, the tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and, two, there is neither an
appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the
purpose of amending or nullifying the proceeding. Inasmuch as the sole office of the writ of
certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes the commission of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, the petitioner should establish that the
COA gravely abused its discretion. The abuse of discretion must be grave, which means
either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or
44
board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance of the writ.
Section 7 of R. A. No. 8439 confers the Magna Carta benefits consisting of additional
allowances and benefits to DOST officers and employees, such as honorarium, share in
royalties, hazard, subsistence, laundry, and housing and quarter allowances, longevity pay,
and medical examination. But the Magna Carta benefits will remain merely paper benefits
without the corresponding allocation of funds in the GAA.
As we see it, the COA correctly ruled on the matter at hand. Article VI Section 29 (1) of the
1987 Constitution firmly declares that: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law." This constitutional edict requires that the GAA
be purposeful, deliberate, and precise in its provisions and stipulations. As such, the
requirement under Section 20 of R.A. No. 8439 that the amounts needed to fund the Magna
Carta benefits were to be appropriated by the GAA only meant that such funding must be
purposefully, deliberately, and precisely included in the GAA. The funding for the Magna
Carta benefits would not materialize as a matter of course simply by fiat of R.A. No. 8439,
but must initially be proposed by the officials of the DOST as the concerned agency for
submission to and consideration by Congress. That process is what complies with the
constitutional edict. R.A. No. 8439 alone could not fund the payment of the benefits because
the GAA did not mirror every provision of law that referred to it as the source of funding.
The petitioner dismally failed to discharge her burden. We conclude and declare, therefore,
that the COA’s assailed decision was issued in steadfast compliance of its duty under the
Constitution and in the judicious exercise of its general audit power conferred to it by the
Constitution.
45
![[Nego] Digests](https://img.pdfslide.net/doc/110x75/5456d645b1af9fda448b47d1/nego-digests-55844f0cb5a76.jpg)
