CIA: Maker of Policy or Tool? - Wicker, Finney, Frankel, Kenworthy, NY Times, 25 April 1966

7/22/2019 CIA: Maker of Policy or Tool? - Wicker, Finney, Frankel, Kenworthy, NY Times, 25 April 1966

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neighbors about the agency andenhancing his own political po-sition.Ultimately, the Incident ledthe United States Governmentto tell a lie in public and thento admit the lie even more pub-licly.The lie was no sooner dis-closed than a world predisposedto suspicion of the C.I.A. andunaware of what really hadhappened in Singapore fiveyears earlier began to repeatquestions that have dogged theintelligence agency and theUnited states Government foryears:

lianas this secret body, whichWas known to have overthrowngovernments and Installedothers, raised armies staged an

Continued From Page 1 Col 4ly asked around the world. Someof them were raised again re-cently when it was disclosedthat Michigan State Universitywas the cover for some CIA.agents in South Vietnam duringa multimillion-dollar technicalassistance program the univer-

sity conducted for the regime ofthe late Prasident Ngo DinhDiem.Last week, it also becameknown that an Estonian refugeewho was being sued for slanderin a Federal District Court inBaltimore was resting his de-fense on the fact that the al-leged slander had been commit-ted in the course of his dutiesas a C.I.A. agent.In a public memorandum ad-

C.I.A.Survey Finds WidelyFeared Agency IsTightly ControlledPalialcing is the first of Jive

articles on the Central Intelli-gence Agency. The articles arcby is team of New York Timescorrespondents consisting ofTO Wicker, John W. Finney,Maxrrankel H. W. Kenworthyand other member of the Timesstaff. L#2...1744

Special la the trio York TineWASHINGTON, April 24'One day in 1960 am agent of theCentral Intelligence Agencycaught a plane in Tokyo, flewto Singapore and checked intoa. hotel room in time to receivea. visitor. The agent plugged alie detector into an overloadedelectrical circuit and blew outthe lights in the building.In the investigation that fol-lowed. the agent and a C.I.A.colleague were arrested andjailed as American spies.The result was an interne-Lionel incident that infuriatedLondon, not once but twice. Itembarrassed an American Am-bassador. It led an AmericanSecretary of State to write arare letter of apology to a for-eign Chief of State.Five years later that foreignleader was handed an opportu-

nity to denounce the perfidy ofall Americans and of the C.I.A.in particular, thus increasingthe apprehension of his Oriental

invasion of Cuba, spied andcounterspied, established air-lines, radio stations and schoolsand supported books, magazinesand businesses, running out ofthe control of Its supposed poli-tical master ? nWas it in fact damaging,while it sought to advance, thenational interest ? Could it spendhuge sums for ransoms, bribesand subversion witaunit checkor regard for the consequences?cad it lie to or influence thepolitical leaders of the UnitedStates to such an extent that itreally was an "invisible govern-ment" more powerful than even

the President?These are questions constant-

a

Continuedon Page 2D Column 1

creased to the court, the C.I.A.skated that it had ordered theagent, Aril Raus, to disclose nofurther details of the case, inorder to protect the nation sforeign intelligence apparatus.Mr. Raus is claiming completelegal immunity from the suit onthe grounds that he had actedas an official agent of the Fed-eral Government.Such incidents, bringing theactivities of the C.I.A. into dimand often dismaying public view,have caused members of Con-gress and many publications toquestion ever more persistentlythe role and propriety of one ofWashington's most discussedand least understood institu-tions. Some of the misgivingshave been shared by at leasttwtnAmerican President. HarryS. Truman and John F. Ken-nedy.

A Wide ExaminationTo seek reliable answers to

these questions; to sift, wherepossible, fact tram fancy andtheory from condition: to deter-mine what real questions ofpublic policy and internationalrelations are posed by the exist-ence and operations of theC.I.A., The New York Timeshas compiled information andopinions from informed Ameri-cans throughout the world.It has obtained reports from2D foreign correspondents andeditors with recent service inmore than 35 countries andfrom reporters in Washingtonwho Interviewed more than 50present and former Govern-ment officials, members of Con-gress and military officers.This study, carried out overseveral months, disclosed, fordriktance, that the Singaporeaffair resulted not from a lackrrr politicalcontrol or from reek-lesenese by the C.I.A., but frombad fortune and diplomaticblundering.It found that the C.I.A.., forall its fearsome reputation, isunder far more stringent politi-cal and budgetary control thanmost of its critics know.. or con-cede, and that since the Bay ofPigs disaster in Cuba in 1961these controls have been tightlyexercised.The consensus of those inter-viewed was that the criticsfavorite recommendation for astronger rein an the agency a Congressional committee tooversee the C.I.A.would prob-ably provide little more realcontrol than now exists andmight both restrict the agency'seffectiveness and actually shieldit from those who desire moreknowledge about its operations.

A Matter of WillOther important conclusionsof the study include the follow-ing:While the institutional forms

of political control appear ef-fective and sufficient, it is reallythe will of the political officialswho must exert control that Isimportant and that has mostoften been lacking.nEven when control is tightand effective, a more importantquestion may concern the extentto which C.I.A. information andpolicy judgments affect politicaldecisions in foreign affairs.Whether or not political con-trol is being exercised, the moreserious question is whether thevery existence of an efficientC.I.A. causes the United StatesGovernment to rely too much onclandestine and illicit activities,back-alley tactics, subversionand what is known in officialjargon as "dirty tricks."IlFinally, regardless of thefacts, the C.1.A.'s reputation inthe world is so horrendous andits role In events so exaggeratedthat it is becoming a burden onAmerican foreign policy, ratherthat the secret weapon it wasintended to beThe Singapore incident, withits bizarre repercussions fiveyears later, is an excellent lessonin how that has happened. al-though none of the fears of the,critics are justified by the facts'

The Central Intelligence Agency, which does not oftenappear in the news, made headlines on two counts in recentdays. The agency was found to have interceded in theslander trial of one of its agents in an effort to obtain hisexoneration without explanation except that he had done itsbidding In the interests of national security. And it wasreported to have planted at least five agents among Michi-gan State University scholars engaged in a foreign aidproject some years ago in Vietnam. Although the specificwork of these agents and the circumstances of their em-ployment are in dispute, reports of their activities haveraised many questions about the purposes and methods ofthe C.I.A., and about its relationship to other parts of theGovernment and nongovernmental institutions. Even largerquestions about control of the C.I.A. within the frameworkof a free government and about its role in foreign affairsare periodically brought up in Congress and among othergovernments. To provide background for these questions,and to determine what issues of public policy are posed bythe agency's work, The New York Times has spent severalmonths looking into Its affairs. This series is the result.

: Maker of Policy or Tool?


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of the particularcase.Problem inSingaporeTheill-fatedagentwhoblewnut the lights flewfromTokyotoSingapore only after a pro-longed argument insidetheC.I.A. Singapore, astrategicAsianport with a large Chinesepopulation, was soon to get itsindependence from Britain andenter the MalaysianFederation.

ShouldC.I.A. recruit some well-placed spies, or should it, asbe-fore,relyon 2v1I.8, theBritishsecretservice, and onBritain'sability tomaintain good rela-tions and good sources in Singe-. pore ?AllenW.Dulles,thenthe.I.A.'s director, decidedtoin-filtrate the citywithIts ownagents, to make surethat theBritish were sharing everythingtheyknew, Although the deci-sion was disputed, it Lsnot un-commonIn anyintelligenceserv-a a a _ r a a a a t v i t i l lri 4

iceto bypass or double-check onan ally.(OnVice President Humph-rey s visit latelast year tothecapitalsof Japan, South Korea.Taiwan. and the Philippines,Secret Serviceagents foundatleast three bugs, or listeningdevices, hidden inhis private

t uuarters by one of his hosts.)Theagentwho flewfromkyo toSingapore wasonaiting mission, and the lietector,an instrument used bye C.I.A. onits own employes,as intended totestthe retie-Hayofa local candidatefor apy's job.When the machine shortedout thelightsinthe hotel, thevisitingagent,thewould-bespyandanother C.I.A. man werediscovered.Theywound up inaSingapore jail. Therethey werereported to have been torturedeither forreal,or to extracta ransom.

The Price Was High

IsSecretdiscussions--apparent-1 through C.I.A. channelsre heldabout the possibilitybuying the agents' freedomith increasedAmerican for-gnaid but Washington even-allydecided Singapore'spricetoohigh.The menweresubsequently released_Secretary of State Dean Rusk theKennedy Administrationhad succeeded to office inJanu-ary.1961wrotea formal apol-ogy to Premier Lee Kuan Yew

of Singapore andpromised todiscipline the culprits.That appearedto haveendedthe matter until last fall, whenPremierLee broke away fromthe MalaysianFederation andsoughttoestablish himself forpolitical reasons as morenearlyafriendofBritainthan ofthe

UnitedStates, ausiongnmsanti-Americanism wasshortof pro-Communism.Tohelp achievethis purpose,Mr. Leedisclosed the1960 af-front without giving anyde-tails, except tosay that he hadbeenoffered a paltry$3.3-millionbribe when hehad demanded3-million.The State Department, whichadbeen routinely fed adenialfwrongdoing byC.I.A.officialshodid not knowof theRuskpology,described thechargeasEsc. Mr. Lee then publishedMr. Rusks letter of 1961 andthreatened alsotoplay someinteresting tape recordingsforthepress.Hastily, Washington confessednotto thebribe offer, whichis hotlydenied byall officialsconnectedwith theIncident, orto the incident itself, but tohaving done something thathadmeritedan apology.I 1 London, Infuriatedin the firststance bywhatit considerede C.I.A.'s mistrustof M.1-6.wfumeda second timeaboutclumsy tactics inWashington.

Actingon OrdersErrors of bureaucracy andmishaps of chance can easily befound intheSingapore incident,butcriticsoftheC.I.A. cannoteasily find inIt proofof thecharges sooftenraisedabouttheagenoycontrol, makingpolicy and undermining pol-icy.The agent inSingapore wasactingon direct orders fromWashington. Hissuperiors inthe C.I.A. were acting withinthedirectives of the Presidentandthe National SecurityCoun-cil. Themissionwasnot con-trary to American foreign pol-icy, was notundertakentochangeor subvert that policy,and wasnot dangerously fool-hardy. Itwas notmuchmorethan routineandwould nothave beenunusualin any In-telligence service inthe world.Nevertheless, the Sinagporeincidentthedetails of whichhave been shrouded In theC.I.A.'s enforced secrecyadd-ed greatly tothe rising tide ofdark suspicion that many peoplethroughout theworld,includingmany inthis country, harborabout theagencyand its activi-ties..f. Carl Rowan, theformer di-rdctor of theUnited States In-furmation Agency and formerbassador to Finland,wrotet year in his syndicated coi-n that during arecent tourEast Africa and Southeastla, It was made clear to meat suspicion andfear of theI.A. has becomea sort ofchilies heel of American for-eign policy.PresidentSukarnoof Indo-nesia,PrinceNorodomSiha-nouk,Cambodia's Chief ofState,President Jomo KenyattaofKenya, former President Kwarne

Nkrumah ofGhanaand many)other leadershaverepeatedlyinsistedthatbehind the regularAmericangovernmentthereisan invisible government, theC.I.A.. threatening them allwithinfiltration, subversion andeven war. Communist China andthe Soviet Unionsoundthistheme endlessly.The InvisibleGovernmentwas thephr se pplied toAmerican intelligenceagencies,andparticularly the C.I.A.,inabook ofthattitle byDavidWise andThomas B. Ross. Itwas a best-seller in theUnitedStates andamong many gov-ernment officials abroad.Subject ofHumor

So prevalent IstheC.I.A. rep-,lutation of menacein so muchrof the world that even humoristshave takennote of it.The NewYorker mag-aaine lastDecemberprintedacartoon showing twonativesof an unspecified coun-try watchingavoeano erupt.One native is saying totheother: TheC.I.A. did It. Passthe word.In Southeast Asia even themost rational leaders aresaid tobe readyto believeanythingabout theC.I.A.LikeDorothy Parker andthethings she said. oneobservernotes, theC.I.A.gets credit orblameboth for whatit doesandfor many things it has noteventhought of doing.ManyearnestAmericans, too,are bitter critics of the C.I.A.Senator Eugene 3. McCarthy,Democrat ofMinnesota, hascharged that the agency "ismaking foreignpolicyand Insodoing is assumingthe roles ofPresident andCongress. He hasintroduced aproposal to createaspecial ForeignRelations sub-committee tomake a fullandcomplete studyof the effectsofC.I.A. operationson UnitedStates foreign relations.Senator Stephen M. Young,Democrat of Ohio, has proposedthat AjointSenate-Housecom-mittee overseethe C.I.A. be-cause, wrapped in a cloakofsecrecy, the C.I.A. has, in effect,been makingforeignpolicy.Mayor Lindsay of NewYork,while a RepublicanmemberofCongress, indictedthe C.I.A. onethe House floor fora long seriesloffiascos,including the mostfamous blunderinrecentAmer-icanhistorythe Bay of Pigsinvasionof Cuba.Former PresidentHarryS.Truman, whose AdministrationestablishedtheC.I.A.in1947.said in 1963that by then he sawsomethingabout the way the

C.I.A. has beenfunctioningthatis casting a shadowover ourhistoricpositions, and I feelthatwe needto correct it.Kennedy's Bitterness

,I AndPresident Kennedy, asheenormity of the Bayof Pigsdisaster camehome to him,saidtdi one of the highest officials


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i

this Administration thatheted tosplinter theC.I.A.inthousandpiecesandscatter'tothewinds.i

Evensome who defend theI.A. astheindispensableeyesdearsoftheGovernmentr , example AllenPulles, theency's most famousdirector-renwfear that thecumulativecgiticismandsuspicion, at homeslidabroad, have Impaired theI.A.'seffectiveness andthere-rethenation's safety.Theyareanxious to seethecriticismsansweredandthesus-picionsallayed,evenIfin somecasestheagencyshouldthusbecomemoreexposed todomes-ticpolitics andtocompromisesofsecurity.If theestablishmentofaCongressional committeewithresponsibilityforintelligencewouldquiet publicfearsandre-storepublicconfidence LntheC.I.A., Mr. Dullessaidinaninterview, thenInowthinkitwould beworth doingdespitesomeoftheproblemsitwouldcause theagency.Becausethisviewis sharedinvaryingdegreebynumerousfriends of theC.I.A. andbecauseitscriticsare virtuallyunani-mous in calling formore con-trol, most studentsofthe prob-lemhavelookedtoCongress foraremedy.Inthe19yearsthat theC.I.A. hasbeeninexistence.150resolutions fortighter Congres-sional controlhavebeenintro-ducedandput aside.Thestatisticin itselfisevidenceowidespreaduneasinessabout theC.I.A.and of howlittle isknownabout theagency.For thetruthIsthatdespitetheC.I.A.'sinternationalrepu-tation, fewpersonainorout of

the American Government knowmuch aboutitswork, itsorgan-ization. its supervisionorIts re-lationshipto theother armsofthe executivebranch.Aformerchairmanof theJointChiefsof Staff,forin-stance,had noideahow bigtheC.I.A. budget was. A.Senator,experienced in foreignaffairs,proved,Inaninterview, toknowverylittle about,but to fearverymuch, itsoperations.Many criticsdonotknowthatvirtually allC.I.A. expendituresmustbeauthorizedinadvancefirst byanAdministrationcommitteethat includessome ofthehighest-rankingpoliticalof-ficialsandWhiteHousestaffassistants,thenbyofficialsintheBureauofthe Budget,whohavethepower toruleoutorreduceanexpenditure.Theydonotknowthat, In-steadof ablankcheck, theC.I.A.hasan annual budget ofalittlemore than $500-million-onlyone-sixththe $3-billion theGovernmentspends onitsover-all intelligence effort.TheNa-tional SecurityAgency. acrYo-

-,tographic andcode -breakingoperationrunbytheDefenseDepartment, andalmost neverquestionedbyoutsiders, spendstwiceasmuch astheC.I.A.The critics shrugaside thefact that PresidentKennedy,afterthemostrigorousinquiryintotheagency's affairs, meth-ods andproblems after the BayofPigs,didnot splinter itafterallanddidnotrecommendCongressional supervision.Theymaybe unaware thatsincethensupervisionof intelli-genceactivitieshas been tight-ened.WhenPresident Eisen-howerwrotealetter toall Am-bassadors placing theminchargeo all Americanactivities in theirdbuntries, hefollowed it with acretletterspecificallyexempti he C.I.A.; butwhenPresi-nt Kennedyputthe Ambassa-rsincommand ofall activi.es, hesent asecret letterape-IceJlyincludingthe C.I.A. Itstillineffectbut,likealleotives,variouslyinterpreted.

Out of a SpyNovelThecritic's,quick to pointtotheagency's publicizedblundersandsetbacks, are notmollifiedbyits genuineachievements-its precisepredictionof thedateonwhichtheChineseCommu-nists would explodeanucleardevice;itsfantasticworldofelectronicdevices; its useof as y, Oleg Penkovskiy, to reachpy,otheKremlinitself; its workkeepingtheCongooutofrnmunist control;orthefeatstraightfromaspynovelofarrangingthingssothatwhen Ga.mal Abdel NassercarnetopowerinEgyptthe manage-mentconsultant whohadanofficenext tothe Arableader'sandwhowas oneof hisprin-cipaladviserswasaC.I.A.operative.Whenthe U-2incident is men-Ionedbycritics, asitalwaysis,eemphasis isusually ontheI.A ..s and theEisenhowerdminist a blunder inpermittingands CaryPow-e s'sflight oertheSoviet Union' 1960, just foreascheduledmitconference.Not muchisally said oFthe incalculabletelligencevalueoftheundis-rbed U-2flightsbetween1956d1960over theheartlandofsa iaAndwhencriticsfrequentlycharge thatC.I.A.operationscontradictand sabotageofficialAmerican policy, they may notknowthat theC.I.A. isoftenoverruledinitspolicyjudg-ments.Asanexample, the C.I.A.stronglyurged theKennedyAd-itinistrationnottorecognizetin Egyptian-backedYemeniigimeandwarnedthatPresi-nt asser wouldnotquicklyII his troopsoutofYemen.mbassador JohnRedeemoughtotherwise. is adviceas accepted. therepublicwascognized, President Nasser'sopsremainedandmuchmill-ryandpoliticaltroublefol-wed that theC.I.A.hadfore-

hen and theState DepartmenthadnotNordo criticsalwaysgivetheC.I.A. creditwhere it is dueforIts vital and daily service s naccurateandencyclopedicsourceofquicknews, information, anal-ysisand deductionaboutevery-thingfromanewpolicechief, nMozambiquetoanaidagree-ment betweenCommunist ChinaandAlbania,,fromthestate ofPresidentSukarno'shealthtothemeaningofNikita S. Khru-shcheyfallfrompower.Yet thecritics' favoriteindict-ments arespectacularenough

toexplainthe world's suspicionsandfears of theC.I.A.anditsoperations.ya sorryepisode inAsiaintile earlyninteen-fifties is afre-qUently citedexample.C.Z.A.agentsgatheredremnants ofthe defeatedChineseNationalistmantesinthejungles of north-westBurma, suppliedthemwithgeld dlnd armsand encouragedthemtoraidCommunistChina.Oneaimwastoharrass Pek-ing'toa pointwhereitmightretaliateagainstBurma,forcingthe BurmesetoturntotheUnited Statesfor protection.Actually,few raidsoccurred,andthearmybecameatrouble-someandcostlyburden.TheC.I.A.had enlistedthe help ofGen.PhanSriyanod, ihe policechief of Thailandandaleadingnarcotics dealer. The National-ilts,withtheplanes andgoldfurnished thembytheagents,ntIntothe opiumbusiness.B thetime the anti-Commu-nt force couldbe disbanded,T u

ItheC.I.A.couldwashitsdsofit, Burmahadre-nced Americanaid, threat-ened to quit the United NationsandmovedclosertoPeking.Moreover, some oftheNation-alist Chinesearestill in north-ernBurma, yearslater, andstillfomentingtroubleand infuriat-inggovernmentsInthatarea,although they have not beensupportedbytheC.I.A. oranyrAmericart agency foradecade.In1958. aC.I.A.-aidedopera-tion InvolvingSouth VietnameseagentsandCambodianrebelswas interpretedby PrinceSiha-noukas anattempttoover-throwhim. It failedbutdrovehimfartherdowntheroadthatultimatelyledtohis breakindiplomaticrelationswithWash-ington.IndonesianVentureIn Indonesia in thesameyear,against the advice of Americandiplomats,theCIA.wasau-

thorizedtofly in suppliesfromTaiwanand thePhilippinestoaidarmyofficersrebellingagainstPresidentSukarno nSumatra andJava. AnAmeri-can pilotwas shot downon abombingmission and was re-leasedonlyatthe insistenturg-ingoftheKennedyAdministra-thanin1962. Mr Sukarno, na-


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turally enough, drewthe obviousconclusions; howmuch of hisfearand dislikeof theUnitedStates canbetracedtothosedaysis hard to say.,,In1960,C.I.A. agents in Laos,

tprisedas military advisers,s fedballot boxesandengi-n redlocal uprisingsto help and-pickedstrongman, Gen,turdNosavan,set upa pro-

-erican government that was. iredby President EisenhowerSecretaryof StateJohnster Dulles. operationsucceededsomuchsothat it stimulatedSo.vlet interventiononthe sideofleftistLaotians, who counter-attackedthePhoundgovern.ment. WhentheKennedyAd.ministration setouttoreversethepolicyoftheEisenhowerAdministration, it foundtheI.A ..A deeplycommittedtoourn1Nosovan andneededo yearsofnegotiationsandatstorestore theneutralistmeofPrinceSouvannaourna.ro-CommunistLaotians, how-

n nver, werenever gin drivenomtheborder of NorthViet-am,and it is throughthat Te-nn thattheVietcong in Southetnamhavebeensuppliedandplenishedintheirwartode-. oy stillanotherC.I.A.-aidedoject, thenon-Communist gov-ent InSaigon.

Catalogue of ChargesItwas theC.I.A. that builtupNgoDinhDiemas thepro-AmericanheadofSouth Viet-namafter theFrench,throughEmperorcesissDai,bad foundhimin amoitiOterycellin Bel-1imand brought himbackto'gon s Prettier, Anditwase C.I.A. that helped persuadetheEisenhowerndKennedyseaminIstrationsIsIride outthewe Um m ese stormwith Diem.peobably toolong.These recordedincidents not

onlyhavepromptedmuchsoul-searchingabouttheinfluenceofaninstrumentsuch as theC.I.A.

on Americanpolicies butalsohave given the C.I.A. a reputa-tionfor deedsandmisdeeds farbeyondItsreal intentions andcapacities.Throughspuriousreports, gos-sip,misunderstandings, deep-seatedfearsandforgeriesandfalsifications, theagencyhasbeenaccusedofalmostany-thing anyone wantedtoaccuseit of.It has beenaccusedof:qPlottingtheassassinationofJawaharlalNehru o India.qProvokingthe1965war be-tween India andPakistan. qEngineeringthe plot ohatbecamethepretextforthemur-derofleadingIndonesiagen-eralslast year.SupportingtherightistarmyplotsinAlgeria.qMurderingPatriceLumum-

ba inthe Congo.KI dnapping MoroccanagentsIn Paris.qPlottlngtheoverthrowofPresident KwameNkrumahofGhana.Allofthesecharges andmanysimilar to themare fabrications,authoritativeofficials outsidetheC.I.A. insist.TheC.I.A.'snotorietyevenenablessonicenemiestorecoverfromtheir ownmistakes. Afor-mer American official uncon-nectedwiththe agencyrecallsthat pro-ChineseelementsinEastAfricaoncecirculatedadocument urgingrevolts againstseveralgovernments. Whenthisinflammatory message backfiredonits authors,theypromptlyspreadthewordthatitwasaC1.A. forgerydesignedtodis-credit themandsomebelievedthefalsehood.

ObviateDeductionMany otherwiserationalAf-ricanleaders arereadytotakeforgeriesat facevalue, oneob-server says, because deepdownthey honestly fear the C.I.A.Itsimageinthispart oftheworld

couldn'tbeworse.The imagefeedsontherank-est, of fabricationsaswell asonthe wildest of storiesforthesimplereason that the wildestofstories arenotalwaysfalseandthe C.I.A. is often involvedandalltoo often obvious.When.anembassy subordi-nateinLagos, Nigeria, knowntobetheC.I.A. stationchiefhadafancier housethantheUnited StatesAmbassador,Ni-geriansmadethe obviousdeductionabout whowas In charge.WhenPresident JOA .0 GoulartofBrazilfell frompower in1864andC.I.A. menwereaccusedofbeingamonghis most ener-geticopponents, exaggeratedconclusions as towhohad oust-ed himwerenatural.It isnot onlyabroadthatsuchC.I.A.involvementsreal orimaginery have aroused direfears andsuspicions.TheodoreC. Sorensen haswritten, forin-stance, that thePeace Corps inits early daysstrovemanfully,andapparentlysuccessfully, tokeep Its ranks freeofC.I.A. in-filtration,Other Governmentagencies,Americannewspapersandbusi-nessconcerns, charitablefoun-dations, researchinstitutionsanduniversitieshave, insome-cases, been asdiligent as SovietagentsintryingtoprotectthemselvesfromC.I.A. penetra-tion. Theyhavenot alwaysbeensosuccessful asthePeaceCorps.Someof their fearhas beenmisplaced: the C.I.A.Isno long-ersodependent onclandestineagentsandotherinstitutions'resources. Butas in thecase ofitsoverseas reputation, its ac-tualactivitiesintheUnitedStatesfor instance,itsaid infinancingacenter for interne-tlonal studies at the Massachu-

settsInstituteofTecnnology-havemade thefear of infiltra-tionreal tomany scholarsandbusinesses.The revelationthatCIA.agents servedamong MichiganStateUniversityscholars InSouthVietnamfrom1955to1959hascontributedtothefear.Thenatureof theagents' workand thecircumstancesoftheiremploymentareindispute,buttheirveryinvolvement. evenrelativelylongago, hasarousedconcern thathundreds of schol-arlyandcharitableAmerican

effortsabroadwillbetaintedandhamperedbythesuspicionsofothergovernments.,iThus. Itiseasyforsincerernentobelieve deeplythatthegI A mustbebrought toheel41thenation'sown interest. Yetverywell-InformedofficialandC O F r u e r officialwithrecentowledgeofthe C.I.A. anditstivItles whowasinterviewednfirmedwhat SecretaryofRuskhas saidpublic-at theC.I.A. doesnotitoactionsunknowntotheigpolicy leaders of theCov-ent.le NewYork Times surveyl odoubt that, whateveritsmiscalculations, blundersandmisfortunes,whatevermay havebeenthesituationduringitsbumptiousearlydaysanddur-ingits over-hastyexpansionLnandafterthe KoreanWar, theagencyacts todaynot onItsown but withtheapproval andunderthecontrol of thepoliticalleaders of the UnitedStatesGovernment.But thatvirtuallyundisputedfact raises in itself thecentralquestionsthat emergefromthesurvey: What is control?Andwhoguards the guards?Foritisuponinformationprovidedbythe C.I.A. Itself thatthose whomust approveits ac-tivitiesareusuallyrequired todecide.ItistheC.I.A.that hasthemoney(not unlimitedbut ample)andthetalent as much as anyagency)not only to conceivebut alsotocarryoutprojectsofgreatImportanceandcom-mensuraterisk.

Action, IfNot SuccessItisthe C.I.A.,unliketheDefenseDepartmentwithitsservice rivalries, budgetcon-cernsand political involvements,andunlike theStateDepart.ment withits internationaldip-lomatic. responsibilitiesand itsvulnerability to criticism, thatIs freestof allagenciestoadvo-cate its projects andpress home

itsviews: theC.I.A. canprom-ise action if not success.Andboththeagencyandp sewhomust passuponItslr areshieldedbysecurityfrotheoutsideoversight andrevaewunderwhich virtually allotherofficialsoperate,athome


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Driwins by lan Dunn ea IBM TheNewYvreerhearalne IncTHE C.I.A.GOOD BADOROTHERWISE?Muchdiscussed andcriticized the Cen-tral Intelligence Agency has not escaped humoroustreatmenteither. Its detractorsloudly condemnIt nearlyeveryonetalksaboutit but very few reallyunderstandit.

Documents

CIA: Maker of Policy or Tool? - Wicker, Finney, Frankel, Kenworthy, NY Times, 25 April 1966