Circumpolar International

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Arctic Human Development Report

A key component of social welfare is a sense ofeconomic, environmental, and political security.In today’s globalized world, cooperation acrossnational borders is becoming increasinglyimportant to foster this security. It may help todecrease political tension and military con-frontation and thus increase stability in a region.It can also promote human development anddemocracy, strengthen the role of civil society,and it is a necessary part of environmental pro-tection (1-2).

Starting in the late 1980s, international coop-eration in the Arctic has increased to the extentthat a new regional identity is emerging, withnumerous political initiatives and new fora. Thischapter describes this new “Age of the Arctic”(3) by focusing on three main themes. The firstis the increasing circumpolar cooperation byindigenous peoples organizations and sub-national governments: North meets North. Thesecond theme is region-building with nations asmajor actors, focusing on the Arctic Council. Thethird theme is the relationship between theArctic and the outside world. Two questions cutacross these themes: How important are Arcticcooperation and the new international politicalstructures for northern peoples and societies?And how can the new regional identity be usedin facing globalization and in forming newkinds of north-south relationships?

Historical backgroundRelations between peoples across the Arcticstarted long before any state with national inter-ests came to the North. National borders are arather new phenomenon associated with thecolonization and militarization of the region.Early networks and crossroads of culturesincluded frequent traveling, exchanges of goodsand experiences, trade, marriages, migration,

and mutual visits (4). For example, a thousandyears ago Scandinavian peoples created net-works of communication between the NorthAtlantic, northern Europe, and Russia, witheast-west as well as north-south trade connec-tions.

The European North has an especially richtradition of regional social, cultural, and traderelations between indigenous societies andother settlements. People not only traveledbetween different parts of the region but alsocame from the North Atlantic and WesternSiberia via the Northern Sea Route (5). Regionalinteraction continued after national borderswere established, mostly independent of south-ern economic and political centers. One exam-ple is the local border peace treaties betweenKainuu, Sweden, and Vienas Karelia, Russia, inthe 17th and 18th centuries. Another is the Pomortrade between northern Norway and the WhiteSea area in the 18th to 20th centuries.

The Bering Strait area has also served as acrossroad of cultures and peoples for centuries.Interrupted only between 1948 and 1988 by theCold War, frequent travels and mutual visitsbetween the two continents, trade, marriages,and occasionally warfare created an interactingnetwork between indigenous societies, whichboth the US and Soviet governments acknowl-edged.

The Cold War periodWorld War II brought more international activi-ties to the Arctic, mostly based on the military.The Cold War period that followed effectivelydecreased circumpolar connections again as theregion became divided between two rivals: theNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO,which includes five of the Arctic states: theUnited States of America, Canada, Denmark,Iceland, and Norway) and the Warsaw Treaty

207Chapter 12

Lead author: Lassi Heininen, University of Lapland, Finland.

Circumpolar InternationalRelations and Geopolitics

Organization led by the Soviet Union. Finlandand Sweden were non-aligned.

During this period, state control also reachedthe northern seas, when the United NationsConvention on the Law of the Sea gave coastalstates the right to establish exclusive economiczones up to 200 nautical miles out to sea and toprotect ice-covered waters within them (6).Canada and the Soviet Union declared claims ofsovereignty in the two northern passages,Canada over the waters of the NorthwestPassage and the Soviet Union over the NorthernSea Route.

International cooperation in the North wasnot totally frozen, however. As is discussed later,indigenous cooperation continued and becamemore institutionalized. There was some interna-tional scientific cooperation, including theInternational Geophysical Year in 1957/8 andboth the International Congress on CircumpolarHealth and the Northern Sciences Networkunder UNESCO’s Man in the BiosphereProgramme, which started in the early 1980s (7).

There was also some institutionalized inter-governmental and regional cooperation in theArctic during the Cold War. For example, theNorth Calotte Committee within the Nordiccooperation brought together the northernmostcounties of Norway, Sweden, and Finland tocooperate in trade and tourism. An example ofcivic activity was the triennial North Calotte’sPeace Days, which became a forum for cooper-ation between people in Norway, Sweden,Finland, and the Soviet Union aiming to pro-mote peace and disarmament (8). In the North

Pacific, transborder cooperation between coun-ties and provinces started in the 1970s in thecontext of international conferences betweenHokkaido in Japan, Alberta in Canada, andAlaska in the United States. One example ofmultilateral international treaties relevant to theArctic is the Agreement on the Conservation ofPolar Bears reached in 1973. The general state ofthe northern cooperation in the late 1970s iswell summarized in the first comprehensivepolitical and economic overview of the Arctic,“The Circumpolar North: A Political andEconomic Geography of the Arctic and Sub-Arctic” (9) from 1978, which indicated that therewas a “paucity of international relations in theArctic” (10).

Emerging cooperationTimes were changing, however. Northernersbegan to consider the potential of the circumpo-lar North as a means of re-establishing horizon-tal connections across the Cold War politicaldivide. The Arctic states also developed an inter-est in northern issues and Arctic cooperation.For example, in the 1980s, a number of bilateralagreements on scientific and environmentalcooperation between the Soviet Union andother Arctic states were signed. In October1987, a speech by the then Soviet presidentMikhail Gorbachev in Murmansk gave the ini-tial impetus for the current inter-governmentalcooperation in the Arctic (11), leading to the so-called Rovaniemi process and the creation of theArctic Environmental Protection Strategy(AEPS) in 1991.

208 Arctic Human Development Report

The so-called Murmansk Speech by PresidentMikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union is oftenregarded as the initiating event for current region-al cooperation in the Arctic. It had still the Sovietrhetoric on peace but reflected more the processesof glasnost and perestroika in the Soviet Unionthrough its six proposals. The first two were aboutestablishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in north-ern Europe and reducing military activities. Theothers discussed confidence-building measures innorthern seas, civilian cooperation in developingnatural resources, coordination of scientificresearch, cooperation in environmental protec-tion, and opening the Northern Sea Route to for-eign ships.

Many western leaders welcomed the spirit ofthe “Murmansk Initiative” but saw some of theproposals, especially those on arms control, as

one-sided and therefore were suspicious (12). Thespeech, however, was an early indicator of changein the closed nature of the Soviet North and thusmade possible a real turning point for the Arctic.For example, traveling across the Bering Straitrecommenced with a friendship flight in June 1988(13) and governments and civil actors wereencouraged to consider a broader and more insti-tutionalized pattern of international cooperationin the circumpolar North.

Partly due to the positive impact of theMurmansk speech, most of the proposals havebeen successful. As a result of this, the end of theCold War was accompanied by the rebirth of con-nections between northern peoples and societies,and the dawning of a new era of Arctic interna-tional cooperation.

The Murmansk speech

While the Murmansk speech opened a doorfor new connections, the collapse of the SovietUnion permitted a dramatic change in the cir-cumpolar North, as Cold War tensions gave wayto an atmosphere of eagerness, even excite-ment, to cooperate internationally and regional-ly. A new kind of regional dynamics was there-by created in which the state-centric and mili-tary issues that had dominated Arctic geopoli-tics ceded ground to more human-orientedconcerns (14). When we include cooperation inenvironmental protection, indigenous peoples’affairs, and science, this trend can be describedas region-building. The transition since the ColdWar has also involved large-scale utilization ofnatural resources and the globalization of theArctic, with its relevant impacts, which haveattracted the interest of major internationalenvironmental organizations towards theregion. New conflicts over the environmentalimpact of resource use and trans-boundary pol-lution illustrate the complexity of current inter-ests in the region (15). Meanwhile, the stillheavy military presence indicates the North’scontinuing strategic importance.

North meets NorthThere is currently an intensive growth in coop-eration involving indigenous peoples and sub-national governments across the Arctic. This ispartly based on traditions of social and tradenetworks among northern peoples and can beinterpreted as a renaissance of pan-Arcticcooperation. In the background is also the ideathat northern regions share special featuresthat set them apart from other areas of theworld, making it important to have a dialogueamong local and regional decision makers andwith politicians at the national and interna-tional levels.

Indigenous peoples as transnationalactorsMost Arctic indigenous peoples are minoritiesin their countries. Therefore the trend of inter-nationalization is logical when they want tomake their legal position as an indigenous peo-ple clear and assert their right to self-determi-nation against unified states (see also Chapter 6.Legal Systems).

For example, the Sápmi homeland of theSaami people is divided by the national bordersof four different unified states. In 1980-81, theAlta movement against the harnessing of theAlta River in northern Norway mobilized Saamiacross the national borders to reassert theiridentity as an indigenous people and tostrengthen their demands for self-determinationin order to achieve the “collective right to decidetheir own future” (16). Although this radicaltransnational movement lost its fight over thedam, it spawned a national awakening, especial-ly among young Saami and Saami artists. Onevisible result can be seen in the national symbolsshared by all Saami, including the Saami flag

and the national day, symbolizing the determi-nation that the national borders should notundermine self-interpretation (17). The Saami asone nation is thus a natural pan-national actor(18). This fits with the global trend towards treat-ing indigenous peoples as international actorsand subjects, with a population and a territory,and a right to self-determination.

There are more connections and deepercooperation between the different indigenouspeoples of the Arctic, for example between theSaami and the Inuit Circumpolar Concerence.Another example can be found in the assistanceacross the Bering Strait initiated by the InuitCircumpolar Conference (19). One institution

209Circumpolar International Relations and GeopoliticsChapter 12

Categories of International Actors in the Circumpolar North (96)

1. Unified states (i.e. governments, parliaments and state organisations such as the army): Canada, Denmark including the Faroe Islands and Greenland as Home Rule entities, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden and the U.S.A.

2. Intergovernmental organisations (IGOs):e.g. Arctic Council, Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) and its Regional Council, Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region (SCPAR), Nordic Council and Nordic Council of Ministers, North Atlantic Marine Mammals Commission (NAMMCO)

3. International non-governmental organizations (INGOs):e.g. Arctic Athabaskan Council, Arctic Leaders’ Summit, Greenpeace International, International Arctic Science Committee (IASC), International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent, Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC), Northern Forum (NF), Northern Research Forum (NRF), Saami Council, Winter Cities Association

4. Sub-national governments (i.e. provinces, counties and municipalities, indigenous peoples’ organisations and civil organizations in one country) e.g. RAIPON

5. Trans-national corporations (TNCs): e.g. mining, and oil and gas companies

responsible for this is the Indigenous Peoples’Secretariat which supports their activities in theArctic Council. Another is the Arctic Leaders’Summit, which gathers indigenous leaders incommon efforts on health, environment, andcultural diversity, as well as in pushing govern-ments to take needed legislative and economicsteps.

Although the Saami Council and the InuitCircumpolar Conference contributed to theRovaniemi Process since almost its very begin-ning, the involvement of indigenous organiza-tions was neither automatic nor clear for sometime. For example, the indigenous peoplesorganizations that had participated in the AEPSwere not made founding members in theSeptember 1996 declaration establishing theArctic Council as the AEPS’ successor (20).Rather, the ICC and the Saami Council, togeth-er with the Russian Association of IndigenousPeoples of the North (RAIPON), were designat-ed Permanent Participants. The same positionwas later accorded to the Aleut InternationalAssociation, the Arctic Athabaskan Council, andthe Gwich’in Council International.

The status in international cooperationenjoyed by the Arctic Council’s PermanentParticipants is rare, if not unique, for indigenouspeoples. It has opened many doors and created

a platform for discussing human developmentand sustainability with the governments of theArctic countries. The indigenous peoples’ repre-sentatives, however, are not equal to the gov-ernments as they are also citizens of the states ofthose governments (21). Moreover, they haveonly very limited financial resources to supporttheir participation in the meetings of theCouncil and its Working Groups.

Generally seen as peacefully inclined, north-ern indigenous peoples can thus be importantactors in reducing tension in the Arctic, but theirhomelands are often of strategic importance,both in military terms and as a result of theirnatural resource endowments. These thereforeattract actors with varying interests from outsidethe region. Environmental damage from pastand present military and industrial activities,coupled with the fact that national interestsoften differ greatly from those of the indigenouspeoples, have also made environmental protec-tion a sensitive international issue in the Arcticand put it on the foreign policy agendas of theunified states (22).

The northern indigenous peoples have alsoactively pushed international work on environ-mental protection, in close collaboration withworking groups under the AEPS and the ArcticCouncil. For example, they acknowledged the


Stephanie Meakin and Terry Fenge,Inuit Circumpolar Conference

On May 17, 2004 the Stockholm Convention onPersistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) entered intoforce and with this the obligations that a coalitionof indigenous peoples from the circumpolar Arctichelped to craft will be implemented. TheStockholm Convention is a global treaty to protecthuman health and the environment from POPs –chemicals, such as PCBs and DDT – that persist inthe environment for long periods, become widelydistributed geographically, accumulate in the fattytissue of living organisms, and are toxic to humansand wildlife. In implementing the convention,governments will take measures to eliminate orreduce the release of POPs into the environment.

Through research, public education, and coordi-nated advocacy and lobbying, Inuit influencedthese international negotiations out of all propor-tion to their numbers. This fact is important inter-nationally, for what Inuit and other indigenouspeoples have done in the global POPs process canbe repeated in additional global environmental

negotiations that address Arctic concerns, such asclimate change and ozone depletion, and perhapseven biodiversity conservation.

In 1988, there was little appreciation beyond theArctic countries of the extent and significance oftransboundary pollution relating to persistentorganic pollutants. Together with the the UnitedNations Economic Commission for Europe’s(UNECE) Convention on Long-rangeTransboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP) POPsProtocol, the Stockholm Convention reflects Arcticscience and Arctic political concerns voiced nation-ally and internationally by Arctic residents, partic-ularly indigenous peoples, and the collective andindividual efforts of the eight Arctic states. The veryexistence of these instruments illustrates thatArctic indigenous peoples are capable of defendingtheir ways of life through international environ-mental and public health negotiations betweenstates. Their involvement in the Stockholm processis likely a harbinger of things to come as economicglobalization and climate change bring the circum-polar Arctic to the attention of decision makers instates far to the south (28).

Indigenous peoples and the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants

work of the Arctic Monitoring AssessmentProgramme in identifying the impacts of pollu-tion in the Arctic (23) and used it to push gov-ernments to sign the global StockholmConvention on Persistent Organic Pollutants(see box on page 210 and Chapter 9. HumanHealth and Well-being). This can be seen as asuccess story of fruitful cooperation betweennorthern indigenous peoples and the Arcticscientific community (24-25). Recently theArctic Climate Impact Assessment and theeffects of climate change on northern tradi-tional livelihoods have featured prominently inthis collaboration.

Not all efforts to highlight Arctic concerns ininternational fora have been particularly effec-tive, however. This was the case, for example,with the negotiation of the recent JohannesburgDeclaration of the World Summit onSustainable Development, which does notinclude the Arctic (26-27). Moreover, competi-tion, even conflicts, between indigenous peo-ples and particular member states may continuein the context of the Arctic Council, especiallywhen trying to define “sustainable develop-ment” in the Arctic.

Inter-regional cooperationSub-regional governments have becomeincreasingly active in developing contacts acrossnational borders. One example is theInternational Association of Mayors of NorthernCities, connecting cities and towns from ten dif-ferent countries. Another is the NorthernForum.

The Northern Forum was established inNovember 1991 and represents sub-national orregional governments. In 2004, this circumpo-lar organization had 19 member regions drawnfrom eleven countries including Mongolia,China, Japan and the Republic of Korea. Thiswide geographical coverage can generate con-troversy, as the Northern Forum is not anexclusively Arctic organization and it is some-times difficult to identify interests shared by allmember regions. Representation of northernindigenous peoples is weak within the organi-zation, except from some of the Russian mem-ber regions. For example, Nunavut andGreenland, both of which have a majority ofindigenous peoples, are not members of theForum.

The Northern Forum represents its memberregions in international fora. For example, theUnited Nations has officially recognized it as a

non-governmental organization, and it isamong the permanent observers of the ArcticCouncil. The Northern Forum and the ArcticCouncil can be seen as contrasting entities. TheArctic Council does not have a regional level orinclude representation of sub-national units ofthe circumpolar countries, unlike northernindigenous peoples organizations which havethe status of Permanent Participants. In theNorthern Forum, indigenous peoples constitutea small minority of both the constituency andtheir representatives. This discrepancy may limitthe role that the Forum can play in deepeninginter-regional cooperation.

Projects within the Northern Forum areaimed at sustainable development and cooper-ative socio-economic initiatives among north-ern regions. For example, the project onReindeer Herding Management provides train-ing to workers in order to improve the qualityof reindeer meat and to develop related prod-ucts. The project on a Sustainable Model forArctic Regional Tourism, which collects andanalyzes best practices relevant to sustainableArctic tourism, is run jointly with the ArcticCouncil (29).

Governance, which deals with relationsbetween regional authorities and central gov-ernments, is not discussed in the NorthernForum’s latest action plan, perhaps indicatingthat this is a sensitive question and also that thework of the Northern Forum is directed more atpractical and concrete matters than at broaderforeign policy concerns. This lack of experienceof international relations may limit deeper inter-national cooperation relevant to sustainabledevelopment. Some of the member-regions,such as Alaska and the Sakha Republic, howev-er, have been very active on the internationalstage, acting in part independently of theircountries, while the Finnish Province ofLapland has even manifested its own regional“foreign” policy (30).

A visible example of local bottom-up cooper-ation across the national borders is the closeconnections between the Finnish town Tornioand the Swedish municipality Haparanda creat-ing the twin town, or Euro-City of Haparanda-Tornio. This can be seen as a laboratory on howa border, or a borderland, influences the identi-ty and culture of a society and region. This coop-eration has in fact promoted integration acrossthe national borders in the Nordic countries andbeen used as a model for inter-municipalitycooperation in Europe.


Trend summaryArctic cooperation, including new internationaland regional organizations and fora, has offerednorthern peoples and societies useful channelsfor sharing information and platforms for dis-cussing and planning activities together.Further, being active in international coopera-tion on many levels, the North is becoming bet-ter known and its voice more clearly heard incapitals and in other regions. The need to have anorthern voice in international relations andsouthern capitals has been important in estab-lishing cooperation among northern regionsand for indigenous peoples working acrossnational borders. These new forms of interna-tional cooperation outside national govern-ments, however, highlight different interestsand can sometimes cause tensions. Deeper pan-Arctic and inter-governmental cooperation isrelevant for promoting sustainability andhuman development in the region, and can alsocreate better capabilities for coping with thechallenges of globalization.

Region-buildingSince the late 1980s, there have been manyattempts to define the Arctic as a distinct inter-national region (31). This has involved estab-lishing organizations and institutions thatspecifically deal with northern issues, often withthe dual aims of building trust after the ColdWar and promoting environmental protectionand sustainable development in the Arctic. Theinitiatives fall into three categories: intergovern-mental circumpolar-wide cooperation, sub-regional cooperation, and academic coopera-tion. The endeavor provides new platforms andchannels for dialogue between the unified statesand has the potential to secure a stronger voicefor Arctic interests in a global context. Arcticregion building is part of an important trend ininternational relations and represents a newgeopolitical approach; rather than seeking tocontrol through the exercise of power, it focuseson achieving a socially stable and environmen-tally sustainable order.

The Arctic Council and its basis in theRovaniemi processIntergovernmental Arctic cooperation officiallystarted in 1989 with the Rovaniemi process inthe wake of Mikhail Gorbachev’s Murmanskspeech. At the first ministerial meeting in

Rovaniemi, Finland, of the eight Arctic states,which also included three northern indigenouspeoples organizations, the Arctic EnvironmentalProtection Strategy (AEPS) was signed in June1991 (32). The initial focus on environmentalprotection gradually expanded to related fields,notably sustainable development. In 1996, theArctic states replaced the AEPS with the ArcticCouncil as a high-level intergovernmentalforum for Arctic international cooperation thatwould include as Permanent Participants a cer-tain number of transnational northern indige-nous peoples organisations.

The idea of some kind of circumpolar politicalbody had been suggested some twenty yearsearlier and was taken up again at the end of the1980s in a study by Canadian non-governmen-tal organisations. It proposed an umbrella-typepolitical forum for governments, indigenousorganizations, and different interest groups, andwas paralleled by an official Canadian initiativeto create an Arctic Council (33). However, theestablishment of a functioning Arctic Counciltook longer than its supporters anticipated, dueto divergent opinions over its structure, proce-dures and financing, and concerning the relativestatus to be accorded to different types of partic-ipant organizations. Debate also proved to beprotracted over the Terms of Reference for theSustainable Development Program, centeredaround how, if at all, to articulate a frameworkvision for the Council’s work on sustainability inthe Arctic (34).

Almost concurrently, parliamentarians fromthe Arctic countries with an interest in Northernaffairs began to collaborate and the firstParliamentary Conference concerning the Arcticregions and cooperation was held in 1993. Oneoutput was the Standing Committee ofParliamentarians of the Arctic Region (SCPAR).A primary aim of both the Conferences ofParliamentarians of the Region and theStanding Committee was to support the estab-lishment of the Arctic Council, and later, tostimulate as well as promote its work in areassuch as human development in the Arctic.

As the environment-related working groupsof the AEPS were subsumed by the ArcticCouncil, one of its two main areas of attentionwould naturally be the health of Arctic ecosys-tems, including human populations, and thusthe identification, reduction and elimination ofpollution, as well as nature conservation. Thepreviously uncertain future of the AEPS’s TaskForce on Sustainable Development was eventu-


ally resolved with its transformation into theCouncil’s Sustainable Development WorkingGroup (SDWG) (35), with the effect that pro-moting sustainable and human developmentbecame a new priority, expressed through activ-ities such as disseminating information, encour-aging education and research on sustainable

development, and promoting interest in Arctic-related issues (36). This wider mandate alsoincluded discussion on transportation and com-munication, i.e. how to create a connectedArctic, and initiatives in telemedicine and infra-structure. In this way, the agenda has broadenedconsiderably in a fairly short period of time,


Arctic Council Structure and Activities

Ministerial meeting

Senior Arctic Officials (SAOs)

Arctic Council Secretariat (provided by the Chair state)

Indigenous Peoples Secretariat (Copenhagen)

ACTIVITIES

Cross-Cutting Themes

Sustainable development Capacity-building Traditional knowledge

PROGRAMS SELECTED PROJECTS AND OUTPUTS

Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP)

Secretariat – Oslo

Arctic Pollution Issues: A State of the Arctic Environment Report (1997)AMAP Assessment Report: Arctic Pollution Issues (1998)AMAP Assessment Reports (2002)Arctic Pollution 2002 Report (2002)

Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna Working Group (CAFF)

Secretariat – Akureyri

Strategy for Conservation of Biodiversity in the Arctic RegionCircumpolar Protected Area Network (CPAN)UNEP/GEF-funded project ECORA in the Russian ArcticArctic Flora and Fauna: Status and Conservation (2001)

Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response Working Group (EPPR)

Secretariat – Ottawa

Circumpolar Map of Resources at Risk from Oil Spills in the Arctic (2002)Emergency prevention/source control management project, Apatity Vodokanal

Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment Working Group (PAME)

Secretariat – Akureyri

Review of existing international instruments relevant to pollution of the Arctic marine environment (1996)Regional Program of Action for protection of the Arctic marine environment from land-based activitiesGEF-funded project to support the Russian Federation’s National Program of Action-ArcticArctic Waters Oil Transfer GuidelinesStrategic Plan for the protection of the Arctic marine environment

Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG)

Secretariat – Ottawa

Future of Children and Youth in the ArcticCo-management of marine resources in Arctic areasCultural and ecotourismSurvey of living conditions in the Arctic (SLICA)International circumpolar surveillance system for infectious diseasesSustainable reindeer husbandryProduct development and processing in the sustainable reindeer husbandrySustainable development in northern timberline forestsTelemedicineArctic transportation and infrastructure experts networkArctic Human Development Report (2004)

Arctic Council Action Plan to Eliminate Pollution of the Arctic (ACAP)

Multilateral cooperative project for phasing out of PCB use and management of PCB-contaminated wastes in the Russian Federation (RF)Reduction/Elimination of emissions of dioxins and furans in the RFEnvironmentally sound management of stocks of obsolete pesticides in the RFReduction of atmospheric mercury releases from Arctic statesImplementation of cleaner production, eco-efficiency and environmental management systems in the Norilsk Mining and Metallurgical CompanyFact sheets on POPs, heavy metals and radioactivity

Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) (AMAP-CAFF-IASC)

Secretariat – Anchorage

Scientific report, synthesis document, and policy recommendations (Autumn 2004)

Source: David Scrivener

with the Arctic Council and its working groupsconducting a large number of projects coveringmany, diverse fields (37). This has, of course,created new challenges, as financial and staffresources for the projects and their coordinationremain severely limited.

Although the Arctic Council is a high-levelforum for international co-operation betweengovernments and indigenous peoples organiza-tions, little effort has been made, so far, to givethe Council any regulative functions. Based on asoft-law agreement, it is essentially an interna-tional advisory body providing support to thegovernments that are seeking consensus-basedsolutions to common or shared problems in theArctic. Sensitive issues, such as security policy,are excluded from the agenda of the Council,whose founding Declaration states that it“should not deal with matters related to militarysecurity” (38) (see box on page 215). Issues deal-ing with the utilization of natural resources,especially marine mammals, have also beenavoided. The domination of the unified states inthe Arctic Council and their continuing differ-ences over these delicate issues largely explainstheir exclusion from the official agenda.

Protests and activities of environmentalistorganizations directed against nuclear dumpingand consumptive uses of marine mammals, and

those of indigenous peoples against mining andforestry in the North, had already created con-flicts between indigenous peoples’ organiza-tions, national and regional authorities, localentrepreneurs, and industry in general. In thiscontext, the Rovaniemi Process and the AEPScan be interpreted as a sophisticated mecha-nism whereby central governments could regaincontrol over international cooperation andreassert the primacy of their interests as sover-eign states (39). From the perspective of north-ern indigenous peoples, the Arctic Council canbe seen as an international mechanism throughwhich to connect circumpolar environmentsand thus understand them better (40).

There are some critical questions for theArctic Council that could act as a barrier todeeper international cooperation. There hasbeen concern about the balance between pro-moting environmental protection – in whichthe cooperation has its roots – and other goals,as witnessed by the protracted debate overadopting the Council’s SustainableDevelopment Programme. Another criticalquestion concerns how the participation ofboth non-indigenous inhabitants and indige-nous peoples of northern regions can bestrengthened. Another important issue con-cerns the extent to which the Arctic Council


Arctic Council - Participants

Member-States Permanent Participants

Observers

States International Organisations

Non-governmental Organisations

Canada Aleut International Association

France Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region (SCPAR)

Advisory Committee on Protection of the Seas (ACOPS)

Denmark (+Greenland/Faroe Islands) Arctic Athabaskan Council

Germany International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)

Association of World Reindeer Herders

Finland

Gwich’in Council International Netherlands

International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN)

Circumpolar Conservation Union (CCU)

Iceland Inuit Circumpolar Conference

Poland Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM)

International Arctic Science Committee (IASC)

Norway RAIPON* United Kingdom Northern Forum International Arctic Social Sciences Association (IASSA)

Russian Federation Saami Council North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission (NAMMCO)

International Union for Circumpolar Health (IUCH)

Sweden UN Economic Commission for Europe (UN-ECE)

International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA)

USA UN Environment Programme (UNEP)

University of the Arctic

UN Development Programme (UNDP)

Worldwide Fund for Nature Arctic Programme (WWFAP)

* Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North

Source: David Scrivener

can, or indeed should, become the “voice ofthe Arctic” in global political fora – a matter ofboth capacity and political will.

Moreover, there has been neither real collab-oration nor a division of labour between theArctic Council and the interregional coopera-tions of the Northern Forum, merely a few jointprojects. Though sharing similar aims, the inter-action of the two bodies is affected by tensionsin center-periphery relations in the Arctic statesand differing attitudes towards the role ofnorthern indigenous peoples’ organizations(43). Meanwhile, the activities of the Arctic par-liamentarians and their gatherings have helpedto draw some of the highest decision makersand lawmakers of the Arctic states into intensiveinternational cooperation in, for example, con-sidering human development in the region.

Nordic cooperation: old tradition withnew Arctic initiativesRegion building is not a new activity in theNorth. Neither is it focussed only on circumpo-lar cooperation. For example, the five Nordicstates started institutionalized cooperation inthe 1950s based on a shared history and similar-ities in culture, as well as shared values on socialand health security, equality, openness, envi-ronmental protection, and peace. The Nordiccountries often work together in internationalfora and they created a passport union in the1950s. In relation to the European Union, how-ever, it has been split. Denmark, Finland andSweden are EU member states, while Iceland,

Norway and the Faroe Islands remain outsidethe union; Greenland was a member but hasleft. The Nordic states are also split in relation toNATO membership.

In relation to the Arctic, Nordic cooperationresulted in an initiative for inter-regional coop-eration between the northern-most counties ofNorway, Sweden, and Finland to promote theNorth Calotte as a political concept (44): estab-lished in 1967, the North Calotte Committeegained official status under the Nordic Councilof Ministers in 1971, and is now called theNorth Calotte Council.

More recent is the cooperation betweennations of the North Atlantic, with the FaroeIslands, Greenland, and Iceland affirming“Western Norden” as a region. It was institu-tionalized through the establishment of theWest Nordic Parliamentarian Council in 1985,now called the West-Nordic Council.

According to the new common Nordic strate-gy, one of the main aims is to promote pan-Nordic interests, develop Nordic integrity andcreate higher Nordic utility, objectives whichapply also to neighboring regions, including theArctic (45).

The Barents Region: an alternative toa military conflict zoneThe Barents Euro-Arctic Region was establishedin 1993 as a new kind of international forum formultilateral and bilateral cooperation. TheKirkenes Declaration (46), the founding docu-ment, is not a legally binding international


Military security is not included in the mandate ofArctic Council, which has limited ability to dealwith environmental issues connected to militaryactivities. Instead, bi- and tri-lateral initiativeshave been much more significant, especiallybetween the United States and Russia, andNorway and Russia, dealing with nuclear safety inthe Russian North. The Joint Norwegian-RussianExpert Group and the priority research project ofthe North Atlantic Cooperation Council onradioactive pollution related to the military wereforerunners (41). They were supported by the jointUnited States-Russian announcement on envi-ronmental protection cooperation in the Arcticsigned by Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsinin 1994, the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission,and, financially, by the US Congress.

These were followed by the Arctic MilitaryEnvironmental Cooperation as a forum for dia-

logue and joint activities among US, Russian, andNorwegian military and environmental officials.This cooperation was established in September1996, almost at the same time as the ArcticCouncil, with the main aim to create technologi-cal methods and equipment for military-relatedenvironmental problems especially dealing withthe Arctic. That the Arctic Council does not dealwith matters related to military security and thatthe Arctic Military Environmental Cooperationwas created at almost the same time suggest thatthe United States, Russia, and Norway, havingcommon interests and overlapping expertise inmilitary-related environmental threats inNorthwest Russia, had a shared interest in pre-serving their own rather tight control over thehandling of these issues and keeping them offthe agenda of the Arctic-wide multilateral coop-eration (42).

Bi- and trilateral initiatives on nuclear safety

agreement and cooperation has focussed onpractical issues along the national bordersbetween the Nordic countries and Russia (47).The fields of cooperation are environmentalprotection, economy, science and technology,regional infrastructure, indigenous peoples,human contacts, culture, and tourism.

The main idea behind creating the BarentEuro-Arctic Region was to develop a new kindof cooperation in the former “military theater”of the European North that would cut cross theformer Iron Curtain and create opportunities forcooperating with Russia (48-49). The ultimateaim was to increase stability in the aftermath ofthe Soviet Union’s disintegration, when Russiawas still mostly seen as the “Other” (50).

This cooperation has a two-level governingstructure: the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, andthe Barents (Euro-Arctic) Regional Council. Thiswas a new, even innovative, design in the Arcticwhen dealing with relations between states andregions, especially in light of the fact that theregion was established by six state governmentsand the Commission of the European Union.The regional cooperation included a workinggroup of indigenous peoples with the Saami,the Nenets and the Veps; this later became thecommon Working Group of Indigenous Peoplesfor both councils. However, the Saami were nei-ther enthusiastic about the Barents Euro-ArcticRegional cooperation nor have they been activein it. The major reasons have been fears of neo-colonialism and their minor position in thecooperation (51).

A major limitation of this initiative is that theofficial cooperation does not cover the BarentsSea, which makes the Barents Region some-

what artificial as a region. This reflects thestrong national interests of Norway and Russiain competition over the rich natural resources ofthe Barents Sea continental shelf. Bilateralnegotiations in search of an agreed boundaryline have continued for many years, and a bilat-eral agreement of the delimitation is possible inthe near future. Security policy is also excludedfrom the cooperation, attesting to the legacy ofthe Cold War and the highly sensitive strategicrole of the ice-free reaches of the Barents andNorwegian Seas. At the same time, manyaspects of the practical cooperation do includethe Barents Sea and address security-relatedissues such as nuclear safety.

If the main aim of the initiative was todecrease tension through transboundary coop-eration, then the first ten years of cooperationcan be taken as a success as the Barents Sea hasemerged from a period of high tension into aphase of international, mostly inter-regionalcooperation (52). Other more concrete achieve-ments include the opening of a new internation-al border crossing between Finland and Russia,and the framework agreement reached in May2003 on a Multilateral Nuclear EnvironmentProgramme in the Russian Federation (53).Environmental cooperation has been rather suc-cessful in terms of agreeing on environmentalaction programs and allocating funding, whileprogress in business and economic cooperationhas been slow.

The Barents Euro-Arctic regional cooperationhas attracted many civil organizations and volun-tary groups as an avenue for bottom-up activitiesacross national borders in various areas includingculture and the media, and women’s issues suchas, a network of crisis centres for women.Recently, official cooperation has also focusedmore on trans-boundary issues relevant in every-day life, such as organized crime and the traffick-ing in drugs and humans (54). That some region-al and indigenous actors feel they have no realmeans to influence the process, however, com-plicates its consolidation at the popular level.Moreover, many of the regional actors involvedhave been frustrated by the many dreams and thebarriers to achieving concrete results.

The Bering Strait: indigenousinitiatives paved the wayCooperation in the Bering Strait provides quite acontrast with the Barents Region. The coopera-tion between Alaska and Chukotka and otherparts of the Russian Far East started in the late


The Barents Euro-Arctic Region (BEAR)includes 5,941 million inhabitants (in 2001),and 4,314 million of them live in the Russianside. The surface are of the Barents Region cov-ers 1,755 million sq.km. (for more informationsee http://www.barentsinfo/org). The memberstates of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council areDenmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Swedenand the Russian Federation. The member sub-national regions of the Barents Euro-ArcticRegional Council are Finnmark, Nordland andTroms from Norway; Norrbotten andVästerbotten from Sweden; Kainuu, Laplandand Northern Otsrobothnia from Finland; andArkhangelsk, Karelia, Komi, Murmansk andNenets from the Russian Federation.

1980s as non-governmental and local commu-nity initiatives, which was supported by thegovernments of both sides, on not only com-mon political, economic, and cultural issues, butalso facilitating people-to-people and familyconnections across the Bering Strait. The indige-nous peoples and their organizations played akey role (55) with events on traditional knowl-edge and on stewardship of the Bering Sea envi-ronment. One of the basic ideas is to promoteresource management in indigenous communi-ties in Chukotka, especially of whale, polar bearand fisheries, and to help scientists to collectdata, for example on the harvesting of whales(56). One concrete result of the cooperation isthe 1992 Alaska-Chukotka accord for visa-freetravels for Inuit of the region (57).

Environmental protection was another driv-ing factor, and includes an agreement on theconservation of polar bears and an idea to createan international park in the Bering Strait area.The National Park Service’s Shared BeringianHeritage Program was initiated but an agree-ment to establish a Beringia Park has not yetbeen signed. There are also several structures forscientific cooperation in the region, includingthe Barrow Arctic Science Consortium to sup-port research infrastructure on both sides. TheUniversity of Alaska has been active in promot-ing the transition to democracy and a free mar-ket of the Russian Far East economy throughthe training of entrepreneurs, business man-agers, and government leaders (58).

The initial euphoria over the Bering Sea col-laboration, especially at the political level,decreased in the mid-1990s when Chukotkaexperienced political changes and severe eco-nomic problems. The process now involvesmainly economic cooperation, and thatbetween peoples. Infrastructure improvements,particularly in communication and transporta-tion, are important for trying to improve rela-tions across the Bering Strait, especially fromthe point of view of Alaska, which for 40 yearshas been boundary rather than a crossroads(59-60). Although the tradition of contacts hasbeen important, the main driving force, at leastfrom the US side, has been commercial inter-ests in tourism and trade between the two con-tinents (61).

Unlike the Barents Euro-Arctic Region, thereis no international body for an institutionalizedinter-governmental or regional cooperation inthe Bering Strait region. On the other hand,there is an intercontinental network for contacts

and cooperation that is flexible and based onbottom-up local and regional activities. Thesecontemporary contacts represent both a revivalof pre-Cold-War indigenous contacts of the firsthalf of the 20th century, as the awareness ofthose travels plays an important role, and also asan innovation (62).

The Arctic as a knowledge-based region

In addition to political cooperation, the end ofthe Cold War made possible increased scientificcooperation across borders. Earlier activities,such as the Second International Polar Year in1932-33, did not leave any permanent institu-tionalized arrangement, and the current inter-national scientific work in the circumpolarNorth began in the 1980s. At first it was mostlybased on bilateral cooperation and internation-al research projects on the Arctic. There was alsosome university cooperation in the context ofthe North Calotte Universities and theCircumpolar Universities Conferences.

Closely connected to the Murmansk Speechand its call for scientific co-operation, theInternational Arctic Science Committee (IASC)was founded in 1990. As the first circumpolarscientific organization, its aim was to encourageand facilitate international cooperation onArctic research in all disciplines. The IASC was


The International Arctic Science Committee

Boris Segerståhl

The International Arctic Science Committee(IASC) is a non-governmental organizationwith members from 18 countries. The membersare national science organizations covering allfields of Arctic research. Each national memberprovides ongoing contact with its Arctic sciencecommunity and draws on this structure toidentify scientific priorities. IASC does not pro-vide direct funding for research projects, butsupports networks to implement internationalprojects. An important feature of many projectsis that they are multidisciplinary. Once a year,the International Arctic Science Summit Weekis organized in one of the member countries.

IASC’s influence on research planning andpriorities is not based on economic power buton scientific credibility, and recommendationsare evaluated nationally before funding deci-sions are made in member countries. However,a growing need for international collaborationhas led to a situation where priorities set byIASC have a fairly strong influence on researchpolicies in many countries.

followed by other international scientific andacademic fora, such as the International ArcticSocial Sciences Association, the University ofthe Arctic and the Northern Research Forum.

Scientific assessments conducted by theworking groups of the AEPS/Arctic Councilactivities have also brought together scientistsfrom different countries using the Arctic as acommon ground for cooperation. AnotherInternational Polar Year is planned for 2007-08,with a focus on the importance of the Arctic andAntarctic in the Earth system and their connec-tions, for example to global climate.

Trend summaryRegion-building in the circumpolar North istaking place both regionwide and in severalsub-regions. At the pan-Arctic level, the ArcticCouncil serves as a governmental platform fordiscussing environmental cooperation and sus-tainable development. Correspondingly, theNorthern Forum gathers regional and local gov-ernments across the Arctic but has limitedindigenous participation. Promoting civility andsustainability, region-building is relevant bothArctic-wide and at the sub-regional level in theNorth. It might even be one of the most relevantnew trends in international relations, and thusthe most important observation of this chapter.It includes a range of actors and can be taken asa step towards regionalization, based on bot-tom-up activities. A common theme in all theseefforts is the desire to create a new approach tothe geopolitics of the North.

The Arctic and the outsideworldTraditional security policy, especially militarysecurity, and issues surrounding naturalresource exploitation dominated the relation-ship between the Arctic and the outside worldduring the Cold War. With its end, globalgeopolitics entered into a new phase, withimplications for the Arctic. This changed situa-tion has contrasting features. While a singlesuperpower now enjoys a hegemonic positionamongst states, we also see the rise of newinternational non-state actors, including non-governmental organizations, and ethnic andreligious groups, which act globally and chal-lenge the unified state system.

The Arctic is also affected by intensifyingglobalization. Earlier influences in areas such asthe utilization of marine mammals, trade andcontrol of that, militarization, and long-rangepollution combine with several newer factors.For example, large-scale hydrocarbon exploita-tion has increased and brought the transnation-al corporate presence to the Arctic. Advances ininformation flow and communication technolo-gy make the region less “remote,” while climatechange illustrates the Arctic’s vulnerability toglobal environmental change. Northern indige-nous peoples are being integrated into the glob-al indigenous world.

The Arctic retains its high strategic signifi-cance in security matters for key military powerslike the United States, the Russian Federation,and the United Kingdom. Its rich naturalresources and potential transportation routesalso make it strategically relevant economicallyfor many other countries. However, by the turnof the millennium, intergovernmental andregional cooperation had largely replaced mili-tary competition as the defining feature of cir-cumpolar geopolitics.

From military confrontation tointernational cooperationThe 20th century brought the first wars into thecircumpolar North and with them a general mil-itarization of the Arctic. The Cold War trans-formed the region first into a military flank, thena military front or even a “military theater,”denominated by the nuclear weapons systemsof the United States and the Soviet Union. Forexample, the maritime strategies of the twosuperpowers made the northern seas, especiallythe ice-free reaches of the Barents, Norwegian,


The Northern Research Forum

Boris Segerståhl

The Northern Research Forum (NRF) started in1999 as a forum for dialogue on northern issuesbetween politicians, civil servants, businesspeople, NGO-activists, and academics. It isbased on ad-hoc work rather than an organiza-tional structure. Discussions on relevant con-temporary issues take place at biennial openmeetings. These have discussed themes such as“Northern Economies in the Global Economy”,“Innovation in Northern Governance” and“Applying the Lessons of History.” The aim is toavoid dividing issues along traditional sectorsor disciplines and also to deal with delicateissues. Other aims are to promote policy-rele-vant discussion and to emphasize the socialrole of research (63).

and Greenland Seas, not only a military frontbut also a target of both the Soviet and the USmilitaries (64-66).

The Arctic situation illustrates the use ofgeography for military purposes, which is oftencalled the technology model of geopolitics (67).The Arctic was a critical area as it offered theshortest flight routes for US and Soviet long-range bombers and missiles between Eurasiaand North America. Sparsely populated, it was,and still is, also attractive as an area in which totest new weapons systems and conduct militarytraining exercises – for example, low-levelflights - thereby serving as an arena for the hightechnology arms competition of the Cold Warperiod (68-69).

Against this background, numerous ideas andproposals for arms control and confidence-building in the Arctic and northern seas wereput forward, but formal East-West agreementsrarely embraced this region in any direct way, asillustrated by the lack of any concrete negotia-tions in response even to the military securityaspects of Gorbachev’s 1987 “MurmanskInitiatives”(70).

The end of the Cold war period and the col-lapse of the Soviet Union, with the consequentdissipation of East-West tension, were fol-lowed by cooperation and partnership, evensome sort of euphoria of peace and friendship.This enthusiasm was strengthened by concreteactions for arms control, such as theComprehensive Test Ban Treaty. In the 1990s,global and regional security arrangementswere in transition. Though there were quanti-tative reductions in the armouries, especiallynuclear, of the major powers, economic andtechnical developments led to an emphasis ofquality over quantity.

By the turn of the century, the military pres-ence in the Arctic had contracted, and there wasless tension; meanwhile, increasing internation-al cooperation on civilian and some military-related issues generated a greater sense of sta-bility and cooperative security (71). The verymeaning of security was also being extendedbeyond traditional concerns with “military”threats to focus on environmental and societalproblems such as health, cultural survival, free-dom of expression and security of communica-tion (72). Security is complex, however, and stillincludes nationalistic and militaristic aspects(73), as can be seen in dealing with actual orpotential environmental problems stemmingfrom military activities (see box).

Despite the end of the Cold War, and theincrease in regional cooperation being crafted inthe region, the Arctic has retained its high mili-tary-strategic significance, especially as anunder-ice deployment and hiding area for sub-marines carrying ballistic missiles and for thosethat “shadow” them. These guarantee the pos-sibility of revenge strikes by nuclear weapons,


The military and the environmentThe intensive military presence in the Arctic has had a direct impact onthe environment. Examples include the pollution by the radar stations ofthe Distant Early Warning Line (DEW Line) in the Canadian North (74-76). There have also been accidents, such as the crash of the American B-52 bomber in 1968 in Thule, Greenland, and the loss of of the Kursknuclear submarine in 2000 in the Barents Sea (77). There is also indirectinfluence, i.e. environmental risks and impacts on socioeconomic devel-opment. This is very much the situation in the Barents Sea area, which hasthe largest concentration of nuclear weapons and reactors, and other mil-itary facilities in the circumpolar North (78-79). This presents a new kindof challenge for international cooperation in the Arctic.

and could transfer tensions or armed conflict inother parts of the world to the Arctic.Additionally, climate change in the future willincrease the ice-free areas of the Arctic and cre-ate new possibilities for military patrolling, forexample in the Canadian Arctic archipelago.

The phenomenon of “less quantity and morequality” is a relevant factor in the large andsparsely-populated northern regions. It has ledto fewer military bases, troops and radar sta-tions. In parts of some regions such as theBarents Sea, the Kola Peninsula, and northernNorway, however, the military presence hasintensified, and includes nuclear-weapondeployments and military activities such asintelligence work, training, and testing (80-81).Also, Alaska has come to play a strategically keyrole as a deployment area for the undergroundsilos of missile intercepters and associated com-munication systems of the United States’National Missile Defense system (82). There arealso plans for more intensive use of the US airbase and radar installation in Thule, Greenland.These developments can be interpreted as a re-militarization of the Arctic.

The Arctic in global environmentalissuesThe Arctic has been described as an environ-mental linchpin (see Chapter 1. Introduction).This vision seems relevant at a time when glob-al problems, such as long-range air and sea pol-lution, radioactivity, and climate change createchallenges for northern peoples and communi-ties, for example concerning food security. Thevision is even more relevant because potentiallyeffective responses to such global challengescan only be realized through internationalcooperation between governments and sub-regional and civil actors. This is not an easy task,however. Both global and Arctic-based environ-mental problems are closely connected toindustrialization, the utilization of naturalresources, and the military, and thus with fun-damental interests of the unified states such aswelfare, economic growth and security.

The Arctic could play a critical role in globalenvironmental issues for two reasons: First, theArctic has been a “laboratory” for science,including research on the environment, for sev-eral decades. The emerging intercourse betweenscience and traditional knowledge may furtherstrengthen the knowledge base this provides.Second, the current inter-governmental Arcticcooperation started with environmental protec-

tion and has already created some useful mod-els for future action, as mentioned earlier in thisreport. The global relevance of this knowledgeand “know-how” in region-wide decision mak-ing is sufficient to merit sustained efforts tocommunicate it to the outside world.

Northern dimensionsDuring the late 1990s, the “NorthernDimension” became a political term and policyfocus in both the European Union and Canada.There has also been a corresponding politicaldiscussion in Russia about the need for a long-term northern policy (83) as well as a more aca-demic one about the need to redefine the role ofthe Russian North as a geostrategically impor-tant resource reserve (84-85). The Northerndimension is thus becoming a metaphor fornew kinds of relations between the capitals andthe northern peripheries of the Arctic states.

Initially adopted in 2000, the EU’s NorthernDimension Action Plan is a framework and aprocess for continuing dialogue on cooperationbetween the EU and its neighbors, especiallythe Russian Federation, and for co-ordination,even management, of cross-border cooperationacross the EU borders (86-87). The main aim isto increase stability and civic security, toenhance democratic reforms, and to create pos-itive interdependence and sustainable develop-ment. Special focus is on the threats posed bypollution to Arctic nature and the health prob-lems affecting people living in the North (88).The EU framework covers a geographicallybroad and diverse area, ranging from Greenlandin the west to Northwest Russia in the east, andfrom the Arctic to the southern extremity of theBaltic Sea. The Second Action Plan – for 2004-06focuses more on human resources and socialissues, such as education and public health, andon the environment than was the case with thefirst action plan.

Canada launched the Northern Dimension ofits foreign policy in 2000. The main objectivesare to enhance the security of Canadians andnorthern peoples, to ensure Canada’s sover-eignty in the North, to establish the circumpolarNorth as an integrated entity, and to promotehuman security and sustainable development(89). These objectives are well in line with otherdiscussions on northern issues in Canada, suchas the role of indigenous governance and thegeopolitical, legal and economic implications ofclimate change (90-91).

The processes of the two Northern


Dimensions are different. In Canada, its proce-dure is based on three simultaneous consulta-tion processes: in the federal government,between that and territorial and provincial gov-ernments, and with non-governmental organi-zations and stakeholders (92). The EU’sNorthern Dimension has been mostly devel-oped by the EU institutions in a processbetween the EU member-states and partnercountries, each with their particular emphases.In this process, the partner countries andGreenland have had an almost equal voice andhave been able to take initiatives (93).

The northern dimension has also been adopt-ed as a new item in the political dialoguebetween the EU and Canada, which signifies atleast a potential for using these initiatives as away to cooperate on global and regional chal-lenges (94). Both Northern Dimensions, howev-er, are basically constrained by limited funding.In the EU, the enlargement of 2004 may meanless interest toward the North (95). Anotherchallenge for the EU’s Northern Dimension isits lack of strategic priorities.

Trend summaryThe Arctic is still of high strategic importancebut there has been a shift from quantity to qual-ity in military strategy and presence and greateremphasis on the region’s rich natural resourcesin the global scale. Climate change and relatedsea ice thinning will probably bring intensifiedcivilian transportation and military activities inthe Arctic Ocean, complicating the security situ-ation. The new international Arctic cooperationhas had little direct bearing upon traditionalsecurity policy. It has, however, much greaterimportance in relation to the challenges andopportunities presented by economic develop-ment and climate change.

“Northern Dimension” policies carry thepotential for a new kind of relationship betweenthe Arctic and political centers in the south,even if the concept is still in a formative stage. Tohave the Arctic as a “cross-cutting issue, main-streamed within each key-priority” wouldemphasize the role of northern societies andthus form new and more fruitful kinds of north-south relations.

Key conclusionsThe circumpolar North cannot be insulatedfrom developments at the global level but it alsohas its own special regional dynamics based on

post-Cold-War political changes. Internationalrelations in the Arctic are based on both inter-governmental and inter-regional cooperation.Consequently, the region deals closely withinternationalization and globalization at thesame time as it shows strong signs of region-building and regionalization. Its many interna-tional institutions create possibilities for theNorth to become an active player in world poli-tics with constructive ways to implement itsexperiences and fresh ideas.

Three main themes define the current stageof international relations and geopolitics in theArctic. The first is the intensive inter-regionaland often circumpolar collaboration amongstindigenous peoples, sub-national governments,and civil organizations. This can be seen as arenaissance of pan-Arctic cooperation as itbuilds on traditions of social contacts and tradenetworks between northern peoples and soci-eties. The new international actors have createdspecial regional dynamics in which transbordercooperation is a realistic possibility and consti-tutes a new resource for development. This ispartly connected to political and institutionalchanges in northern governance, bringing moreself-determination and autonomy. As both aprecondition and a result of these develop-ments, Arctic geopolitics have moved from statedomination and militarization towards a morehuman orientation.

The second theme is region-building, whichincludes defining the Arctic as a distinct, com-prehensive region. This has mostly been a top-down, state-dominated activity aimed at reliev-ing tension and fostering stability, but it alsoincludes bottom-up initiatives, illustrated byactivities in the Bering Strait area. Pre-condi-tions for region-building have been the declin-ing relative importance of military-based securi-ty and the more acute awareness of the oftencommon objectives of environmental protectionand human development.

The third theme concerns the changingnature of relations between the Arctic and theoutside world as the military significance of theregion is being supplemented by its strategicrole in the global economy, based on its richnatural resources. Northern economies areincreasingly integrated into the globalizedworld economy and the importance of northernregions may grow with the increased demandfor strategic minerals and oil and gas, with larg-er companies with more capital taking an inter-est in the region, and with technology creating


easier access to raw material sources. This inte-gration is driven more by major states andtransnational corporations than by regionalactors. Within a broader concept of security thatincludes the environment and economy, securi-ty policy retains a critical role. It includes issuesrelated to the sovereignty of unified states andthe maintenance of their jurisdiction over natu-ral resources and transportation, as well as theArctic’s continuing military-strategic signifi-cance.

In summary, globalization is increasinglybringing new actors to the Arctic at the sametime as international cooperation is becomingmore intensive in northern regions. Togetherwith new Northern Dimension initiatives, theseraise the possibility of changes in circumpolargeopolitics by the 2010s. Defining the new rela-tionships between the Arctic and the outsideworld and finding new approaches are political-ly important as well as scientifically interesting.

Gaps in knowledgeThe two most important gaps in knowledge ofthe subject of this chapter are the following:

First, despite slowly increasing attention toregional cooperation in the literature on Arcticdevelopment, there is a need for more researchadopting a comprehensive circumpolarapproach that would complement the still dom-inant national perspectives.

Second, there has been similarly little debateamongst scholars or other stakeholders overhow human and environmentally sustainableregional development are facilitated or con-strained by security policies and military activi-ties in the region. Even though it might usefullyinform our understanding of sustainable devel-opment in the Arctic, defining and addressingsecurity from a regional perspective has been adifficult, or even taboo, issue.

Chapter summaryInternational cooperation in the post-Cold-WarArctic has increased at many different levels.This includes governmental cooperation in theArctic Council but also new fora for cooperationamong indigenous peoples, sub-national gov-ernments, parliamentarians, civil organizationsand in research and education. Since the late1980s, the Arctic has increasingly been recog-nized as a distinct region. This region-buildingis one of the most important trends. Its focus on

social stability and environmental sustainabilitycan be seen as a wish to create a new geopoliti-cal approach. It also helps to secure for Arcticconcerns a visibility and arguably even a voiceon the international scene, especially in envi-ronmental matters. The Arctic is still a theatre ofmilitary preoccupations, but these now have toshare center stage with the often commonpredicaments of its inhabitants, embedded asthey are in the region’s rich yet vulnerable envi-ronment.

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the Northern Dimension (Tampere Peace ResearchInstitute, Research Report No. 61, University ofTampere, Jäljennepalvelu, Tampere, 1995), pp.95-107.

2. W. Östreng, Ed., National Security andInternational Environmental Cooperation in theArctic – the Case of the Northern Sea Route (KluwerAcademic Publishers, Environmental & Policy,Volume 16, Dordrecht, 1999), pp. 16-17.

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6. It is relevant to mention that the Treaty ofSpitzbergen, the first international agreementdealing with the Arctic, was signed in 1920already.

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11. M. Gorbachev, The Speech of President MihailGorbachev on October 2, 1987 in Murmansk. InPravda, October 2.


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15. e.g. G. Osherenko, O. R. Young, The Age of theArctic: Hot Conflicts and Cold Realities (CambridgeUniversity Press, Cambridge, 1989).

16. The UN International Decade of IndigenousPeoples -Common Objectives and JointMeasures of the Saami Parliaments, a declarationof the meeting of the Saami Parliaments duringthe spring and fall of 1997.

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18. L. Heininen, “The Saami as a Pan-nationalActor” in Conflict and Co-operation in the North, K.Karppi, J. Eriksson, Eds. (Kulturens frontlinjer.Skrifter från forskningsprogrammet KulturgränsNorr 38, Umeå, 2002), pp. 223-238.

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26. e.g. ICC 2002. A letter to The Right HonourableJean Chretien, Prime Minister of Canada,October 18, 2002.

27. IPS Update, 2, issue 4 (October 2003).

28. For the full story of the role of the Arctic Counciland Arctic Indigenous peoples in pressing forand negotiating the Stockholm Convention see,D. Downie, T. Fenge, Eds. Northern Lights AgainstPOPs: Combatting Toxic Threats in the Arctic(McGill/Queen’s University Press, Montreal,2003).

29. e.g. Northern Forum, Activity Report (June-July2002).

30. H. Pokka, A Speech of Governor Hannele Pokkaat Kansainvälistyvä Lappi Seminar in February28, 1996 in Rovaniemi, Finland.

31. e.g. Working Group on Arctic InternationalRelations run by Dartmouth College, the USAand University of Toronto, Canada, andInternational Research Project on SustainableDevelopment and Security in the Arctic by theTampere Peace Research Institute, Finland.

32. The Rovaniemi Declaration, signed by the EightArctic Nations, June 14, 1991 in Rovaniemi,Finland.

33. Arctic Council Panel, To Establish an InternationalArctic Council. A Framework Report, Prepared by F.Griffiths, R. Kuptana (Canadian Arctic ResourcesCommittee, 14 May 1991).

34. D. Scrivener 2000.35. D. Scrivener, “Arctic Environmental Cooperation”,

Polar Record, 35 (192), 51 (1999).36. Inari Declaration on the occasion of the Third

Ministerial Meeting of The Arctic Council. InOctober 2002, Inari, Finland.

37. See for example, Ministry for Foreign Affairs ofIceland, Program for the Icelandic Chair of theArctic Council 2002-2004.

38. Declaration on the Establishment of the ArcticCouncil. Ottawa, at the Ministerial meeting of the Arctic Council, Ottawa, Canada, 19th dayof September 1996; www.arcticcouncil.org/establ.asp

39. J. Käkönen, ”Kestävä kehitys ja demokratiaArktiksessa”, in Kestävä kehitys arktisilla alueilla,J. Käkönen, Ed. (Rauhan- ja konfliktintutkimus-laitos, Tutkimustiedotteita No. 49, 1992), pp. 16-34, 75.

40. J. C. D. Paci 2003.41. A decade under the sign of the environment.

Norway and Russia co-operating on environ-mental protection (Miljöverndepartementet,Norge).

42. L. Heininen, B. Segerståhl, “Internationalnegotiations aiming at a reduction of nuclearrisks in the Barents Sea region,” in Containing theAtom: International Negotiations on NuclearSecurity and Safety, R. Avenhaus, V. Kremenyuk,G. Sjöstedt, Eds. (International Institute forApplied Systems Analysis, New York, 2002), pp.243-270.

43. O. R. Young, “Can the Arctic Council and theNorthern Forum Find Common Ground?” PolarRecord 38 (207), 289 (2002).


44. C. Archer, “Arctic Co-operation: A NordicModel”, Bulletin of Peace Proposals 21(2), 165(1990).

45. Nordic Council of Ministers’ Co-operationProgramme with the Arctic, Action Plan 2003.ANP 2003:7; http://www.norden.org/narom-raaden/arktisk/uk/Arctic_action_plan2003.pdf

46. Declaration on cooperation in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region at the Conference of ForeignMinisters in Kirkenes, Norway, 11 January 1993.

47. U. Wiberg, From Vision to Functional Relationshipin the Barents Region. (Umeå University, Centrefor Regional Science, Northern StudiesProgramme, Umeå, Reprint 8, 1995).

48. T. Stoltenberg, The Barents Region: ReorganizingNorthern Europe. International Challenges(Special issue on the Barents Region) Vol. 12. No4 –1992, pp. 5-12.

49. See also G. Hönneland, “Worlds Further Apart?Identity Formation in the Barents Euro-ArcticRegion”, in The Barents Region Revisited,Conference Proceedings, G. Flikke, Ed. (NorwegianInstitute of International Affairs, 1998), pp. 79-93.

50. O. Tunander, “Post-Cold War Europe: Synthesisof a Bipolar Friend-Foe Structure and aHierarchic Cosmos-Chaos Structure?” inGeopolitics in Post-Wall Europe. Security, Territoryand Identity, O. Tunander, P. Baev, V. I. Einagel,Eds. (PRIO, SAGE Publications, London, 1997),pp. 17-44.

51. E. Helander, “The Status of the Sami People inthe Inter-state Cooperation” in Dreaming theBarents Region. Interpreting Cooperation in theEuro-Arctic Rim, Research Report, No. 73, J.Käkönen, Ed. (Tampere Peace Research Institute,Tampere, 1996), pp. 296-306.

52. L. Heininen, “Assessments of the BarentsCooperation Ten Years After it Was Established -Background and Analysis of the Development ofthe Barents Euro-Arctic Region” in The VisionThat Became Reality. The Regional BarentsCooperation 1993-2003, O. Pettersen, (Kirkenes,October 2002), pp. 71-74.

53. Declaration of Principles Regarding aMultilateral Nuclear Environmental Programmein the Russian Federation at the Sixth Session ofthe Barents Euro-Arctic Council, Bodö, 4-5March 1999.

54. For example, the Anti-Crime Conferences in2003 and 2004 in Rovaniemi, Finland.

55. V. S. Gofman, A meeting with experts on theBering Strait area cooperation (V. S. Gofman, L.Huskey, W. B. Palmer, G. Protasel, J. Tichotsky) inMay 19, 2004 at the University of Alaska,Anchorage, Alaska, personal notes.

56. J. Tichotsky, A meeting with experts on theBering Strait area cooperation (V. S. Gofman, L.Huskey, W. B. Palmer, G. Protasel, J. Tichotsky) inMay 19, 2004 at the University of Alaska,Anchorage, Alaska, personal notes.

57. N. Krauss, “Crossroads? A Twentieth-CenturyHistory of Contacts across the Bering Strait”, inAnthropology of the North Pacific Rim, W. W.Fitzhugh, V. Chaussonet, Eds. (SmithsonianInstitution Press, Washington D.C., 1994), pp.365-379.

58. Since 1993, the American Russian Centre atUniversity of Alaska Anchorage has run over 500courses and seminars training more than 18,000entrepreneurs, teachers and government offi-cials.

59. W. B. Palmer, A meeting of the experts on theBering Strait area cooperation (V. S. Gofman, L.Huskey, W. B. Palmer, G. Protasel, J. Tichotsky) inMay 19, 2004 at the University of Alaska,Anchorage, Alaska.

60. W. Hickel, “Alaska needs to think about east-west” in Anchorage Daily News, (May 16, 2004);http://www.and.com/opinion/v-printer/story/5077868p-5005502c.html.

61. N. Krauss 1994.62. P. P. Schweitzer 1997.63. For more information see: J. H. Ingimundarson

and A. Golovnev, Eds. Northern Veche: Proceedingsof the Second NRF Open Meeting (StefanssonArctic Institute & University of Akureyri,Akureyri, 2004) both in English and Russian;www.nrf.is.

64. W. Östreng, “The Soviet Union in the ArcticWaters. Security Implications for the NorthernFlank of NATO”, occasional paper, no. 36(1987).

65. S. E. Miller, “The Arctic as a Maritime Theater”, abackground paper for the international projecton Arctic development and security of theTampere Peace Research Instititute (December19, 1989).

66. M. Fægteborg, “Debate on Security Matters inGreenland,” in Soviet Seapower. Facts,Motivations, Impact and Responses, J .K.Skogan, A. O. Bruntland, Eds. (NUPI rapport,(128) June 1989), pp. 109-119.

67. G. Till, Modern Sea Power (Brassey’s Inc., GreatBritain, 1987), vol. 1.

68. L. Heininen, “The Military and the Environment:An Arctic Case,” in Green Security or MilitarizedEnvironment, J. Käkönen, Ed. (DartmouthPublishing Company, Aldershot, 1994), pp. 153-165;

69. B. Lloyd, “Low-Level Training Flights”, PeaceMagazine, 12 (June/July 1989).

70. This is the case especially in the 1980s, whenthere were more than 230 of these kinds of pro-posals (R. G. Purver. Arctic Arms Control:Constrains and Opportunities (CanadianInstitute for International Peace and Security.Occasional Papers 3, February 1988).

71. Östreng 1999: 48-51.72. F. Griffiths, “Defence, Security and Civility in the

Arctic Region” (The Nordic Council’s ArcticConference, Reykjavik 16-17/18, 1993).


73. D. H. Deudney, “Environmental Security: ACritique”, in Contested Grounds. Security andConflict in the New Environmental Politics, D. H.Deudney, R. A. Matthew, Eds. (State Universityof New York Press, Albany, 1999), pp. 187-219.

74. M. Finger, “The Global Environmental Crisis andthe Social Implications of Delaying Action”(Vancouver 1991) mimeo.

75. R. B. Huebert, “Security and the Environment inthe Post Cold War Period”, in Environment andSecurity, 101 (May 2000).

76. J. S. Poland, “The Remediation of FormerMilitary Stations in the Canadian Arctic – ItsRelevance to Antarctica”, in Canadian AntarcticResearch Network, Newsletter Vol-13. (November2001), pp. 4-5.

77. N. Häyrynen, “Environmental Security: The Caseof the Kursk”, Environmental Politics, 12, No.3, 65(Autumn 2003).

78. e.g. R. Bergman, A. Baklanov, B. Segerståhl,“Overview of nuclear risks on the Kola Peninsula.Summary report“(IIASA Radiation Safety of theBiosphere. International Institute for AppliedSystems Analysis, Laxenburg, May 1996).

79. AMAP 2002:59-76.80. e.g. P. Salminen (Director of Department of

Strategic and Defence Studies at NationalDefence College of Finland). Interview in May12, 2004, personal notes.

81. e.g. C. Nelleman, “New Bombing Ranges andtheir Impact on Saami Traditions”, POLAREnvironmental Times 3, 1 (October 2003).

82. M. Burns (AP Military Writer), “Missile defensechief: Work on missile intercepter silos in Alaskawill begin on day U.S. withdraws from treaty”,ICIS – institute for cooperation in space (TuesMay 14, 2002, 5:09 PM ET). from [email protected] Fri, 17 May 2002 08:13:53 -0700

83. President Vladimir Putin proposed this kind ofnorthern policy in the meeting of RussianSecurity Council in April 2004 in Salechard(“Putin Says Northern Regions Need ‘IntelligentLong-term Policy’” ITAR-TASS News Agency,April 28, 2004).

84. Y. V. Neyolov, “Innovations in Governing theNorthern Territories: Experience of the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Region”, in Northern Veche:Proceedings of the Second NRF Open Meeting, J. H.Ingimundarson and A. Golovnev, Eds.(Stefansson Arctic Institute & University ofAkureyri, Akureyri, 2004), pp. 128-134.

85. V. Alekseyev, “The Russian North at theCrossroads of Two Epochs”, in North Meets North.Proceedings of the First Northern Research Forum, T.S. Björnsson, J. H. Ingimundarson, L. Olafsdottir,Eds. (Stefansson Arctic Institute & University ofAkureyri, Akureyri, 2001), pp. 87-89.

86. The European Union, “The Second NorthernDimension Action Plan (2004-2006)”;http://europa.eu.int/external_relations/north_dim/ndap/ap2.htm (12 November 2003).

87. See also, A. Myrjord, “Governance beyond theunion: EU boundaries in the Barents Euro-ArcticRegion,” European Foreign Affairs Review 8: 239(2003).

88. N. Tennberg, ”Ympäristökysymysten hallinnatpohjoisilla alueilla”, in Avaamaton mahdollisuus -pohjoisen ulottuvuuden näköaloja, L. Heininen, J.Käkönen, A. Nokkala, M. Tennberg, (LIKE,Helsinki, 2000), pp. 103-117.

89. The Northern Dimension of Canada’s ForeignPolicy. Department of Foreign Affairs andInternational Trade, Canada, May 2000.

90. R. Huebert, “Climate Change and CanadianSovereignty in the Northwest Passage”, Isuma 2No 4 (Winter 2001); http://www.isuma.net/v02n04/huebert/huebert_e.shtml).

91. See also Presentation Abstracts “On ThinningIce: Climate Change and New Ideas aboutSovereignty and Security in the Canadian Arctic”in January 25-26, 2002, Ottawa, Canada(Canadian Arctic Research Committee, Centrefor Military and Strategic Studies, Canadian PolarCommission).

92. M. Simon, “Canada’s renewed commitment tonorthern Issues through policy development andpartnership-building.” Luncheon address at theInternational Colloquium on the NorthHumanities and Social Sciences, Edmonton,Alberta, May 27, 2000.

93. L. Heininen, “Ideas and Outcomes: Finding aConcrete Form for the Northern DimensionInitiative,” in The Northern Dimension: Fuel for theEU?, H. Ojanen, Ed. (Programme on theNorthern Dimension of the CFSP.Ulkopoliittinen instituutti & Institut furEuropäische Politik, Kauhava, 2001), pp. 20-53.

94. “Declaration 2004”, Declaration on Canada-EURelations. 18 March 2004.

95. E.g. C. S. Browning, P. Joenniemi, “The EuropeanUnion’s two dimensions: the eastern and thenorthern,” Security Dialogue 34: 463 (2003).

96. There is no official or commonly accepted list ofInternational Actors in International Relations,but there are different ways to categorize them,and a common way to divide them into inter-governmental and non-governmental actors. Theenclosed list is based on the categories of J. E.Dougherty and R. L. Jr. Pfaltzgraff, ContendingTheories of International Rela-tions. AComprehensive Survey. Third Edition. HarperCollins Publishers, U.S.A, 1990, pp. 22-28),which also includes individuals and the interna-tional system per se, and has been applied by theauthor (see L. Heininen, Euroopan pohjoinen1990-luvulla. Moniulotteisten ja ristiriitaistenintressien alue (Acta Universitatis Lapponiensis21 – Arktisen keskuksen tiedotteita/Arctic CentreReports 30. Lapin yliopisto, Rovaniemi, 1999),pp. 98-103.


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