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Evidences from 1984 Sikh massacre in Delhi and 2002 Godhra riots of Ahmedabad.
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CitySpacesandEffectsofViolenceonSpatialFormationsofCommunities:Evidencesfrom1984SikhmassacreinDelhiand
2002GodhrariotsofAhmedabad
Submitted by
Raghav Raghunathan (12M66)
Simranpreet Singh Oberoi (12M89)
TermPaperforSCIENCESPO
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Contents
TOPICS Page No.
Abstract 3
Introduction 4
Violence and City Spaces 5
Hindu-Muslim Violence 7
Segregation and Cities 9
Case History of Ahmedabad 10
Delhi and the 1984 Debacle 12
Interview with H.S.Phoolka 13
Role of State Machinery 23
Tilak Vihar 24
Conclusion 27
Bibliography 29
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Abstract
The design of cities with a clear and well demarcated boundary meant to be governed with a
definite rule of law with a municipal structure and a local government was introduced to India by
the British Raj. With the rapid pace of urbanisation that this brought, it has brought together
people from different religious communities to imagine a common idea of India. However the
machinations of the Raj by means of enumeration and classification of individuals into categories
of caste and religion, by means of political discourse and use of urban spaces, the lines of exclusion
got strengthened. While after independence some cities went to grow out of these demarcations,
in some cities like Ahmedabad this wasn’t the case. This we believe was fundamental to laying the
structural foundations of communal tensions between the majority Hindus and the minority
Muslim population in Ahmedabad leading to incessant instances of violence leading to economic
and spatial marginalisation and eventual Ghettoisation of Muslims supported covertly a political
framework of the state. Thus we argue that the 2002 riots would have taken place even if it hadn’t
been supported by state actors. The design and progress of Delhi however was in stark contrast to
the development of Ahmedabad over which the upper caste Hindus had a hegemonic control.
Delhi being the capital city had a more secular design constantly a far more liberal and modern
process hence not creating structures for communal violence, least of all a clash between Sikh and
Hindus to take place. The 1984 massacre therefore is an external shock, engineered end to end by
a political machination triggered by the spectacular instance of Indira Gandhi’s assassination. The
fact that Sikhs did not get forced into a ghetto is not just a testimony to the fact that Delhi had a
more secular design but also that ’84 was not at all an instance of sporadic violence simmering
from a structural and systemic tension in the city unlike in case of Ahmedabad.
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Introduction
India has been registering a higher pace of urbanization in the last many years, at a pace that is
higher than even population growth in rural India (Economist 2007). These urban areas are seen as
nodal centers of innovation and economic growth which have better infrastructure, housing and
services and thus present a strong case of for migration from across a spectrum of populace. Along
with the influx, this also brings or rather forces together communities to be amongst people who
have otherwise been segregated based on religious and caste divides.
We wish to examine in this paper how urban design can accentuate ethnic clashes and also the
effects of constant skirmishes on segregation and ghettoisation. We will also seek to understand
the role of government and the mechanisms it can use to avoid escalation of violence. The paper
would seek to assess how these mechanisms were subverted in two specific instances, the Godhra
riots and the 1984 Anti‐Sikh Massacre, and look at the after effects in terms of changes in pattern
of clustering amongst these communities. We gather from our interviews, views ranging from
instances of direct use of the state machinery to gross dereliction of duty by the police during the
1984 massacre. The paper briefly studies Ahmedabad and the factors that make a violence prone
city, we then go onto discuss various aspects of the Sikh massacre of 1984 which would form the
crux of this paper and then contrast both these instances with regard to causative factors and after
effects.
While looking at patterns in migration and clustering we wish to understand if sporadic and
spontaneous instances of violence affect migration differently from violence which can be
regarded as a state pogrom. Finally the interplay between state institutions, private institutions,
networks and other processes that can help create structures that foment riots based on a
PESTLE(political, economic, social, technological, legal) framework was looked into.
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Violence and City Spaces
In this section we attempt to explore how violence can be an actor that shapes distribution
of population in a city. The built form of the city and the accompanying urban planning can
often lead to forms of segregation1 (Arvind Rajagopal, 2010) which further along with
socio‐cultural practices, give the necessary ignition for a violence to erupt.
Notwithstanding centuries of experience managing urban violence at the center and
periphery, the record of city authorities is a mixed one. This is partly due to the
extraordinary heterogeneity and diversity of cities themselves. On the one side, some
cities are evolving into complex global networks of accumulation, innovation and
transformation, offering an exit from poverty to tens if not hundreds of millions of
people2.The use of public spaces therefore becomes very important to understand and
study spectacular events of communal violence in cities.
Communal violence has always taken a political undertone and the relationship between
violence and political domination has been such that violence has been used by politics
and sometimes even used as a goal of the state, in those cases of violence characterized as
state pogroms. The PESTLE framework, political, economic, social, technological and legal
setting influences the environments that ordinary people inhibit in and can often create
the necessary conditions for events of violence to fester.
1 Rajagopal, Arvind (2010) ‘Special Political Zone: urban planning, spatial segregation and the infrastructure of violence in Ahmedabad’, South Asian History and Culture, 1(4), pp. 529-556. 2 Baud, I.S.A.; de Wit, Joop (eds.) (2008) New Forms of Urban Governance in India. Shifts, Models, Networks and Contestations, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 402 pages + xiv, ISBN 978-81-7829-905-
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Various studies (Chandra, 1984, Surya Prakash, 2012)3 have argued that communalism to
be an outcome of competitive forces of domination that began during the colonial times.
These forces were shaped up by a need to forge common identity which would progress
towards framing the sense of nationalism needed for integrating the idea of India.
However the divisions created continued to remain much after independence and the
underlying tension gets accentuated sometimes in sporadic skirmishes and some other
times due to party machinations that lead to events of violence. Therefore rather than
viewing events of violence as an external shock, we will try to examine the factors that are
structurally built into the communities that exacerbate these historically prevalent
tensions.
3 Chandra, Bipan (1984) Communalism in Modern India, New Delhi: Advent Books.
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Hindu‐Muslim Violence
The nature of Hindu‐Muslim violence is such that there has been a primordial conflict ever
since Muslim invasion and that they have formed monolithic communities that have been
at odds with each other4(Dumont, 1980) who claims that though nationalistic identity goes
beyond communal identity, in cases division of a country has taken place on religious
grounds there exists a hierarchical relationship that the majority group presupposes which
imposes a sense of inferiority on the minority population. Nationalism can be a
commonality that forces communities to take up to the idea of tolerating each other but
this essentially means that there emerges the idea that the ‘other’ has to be tolerated is
embedded within the communities. Though this made it possible for people to imagine the
common notion of Indians and constrained events of conflict, this was mainly due to
reciprocal indifference towards the other community as opposed to a genuine and mutual
adoration5(Khilnani, 2002). The city space therefore unlike in western societies where it
created the right environment for intermingling and free societies, in India, practices such
as divided electorates on communal lines only made exclusionary identities stronger.
Roshni Sengupta in her essay6 Communal Violence In India mentions that Hindu‐Muslim
violence needs to be viewed as an extension of general social conflict which includes inter
as well as intra communal riots, caste violence and other forms of sectional upheavals.
4 Dumont, Loius(1980) Traces of Dumont from India, Suomen Antropologi: Journal of the Finnish Anthropological Socie;Spring2009, Vol. 34 Issue 1, p88
5 Khilnani, Sunil(2012), The Idea of India, Penguin 6 Communal Violence In India: Perspectives On The Causative Factors by Roshni Sengupta
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She quotes Ashutosh Varshney who argues that this conflict between Hindus and Muslims
is the outcome of the absence of civic ties across communities. He refers Ahmedabad as a
riot prone city and it was observed that one reason for that could be the closure of textile
mills as after that the violence had escalated.
There is an interesting mention about three phases in the production process of riots in
the paper. The riot has been compared with a 'staged drama' by Prof. Brass7. The first
phase is the preparation where the motive is to raise tensions. Cow Killing or kidnapping a
Hindu girl fall into this category. Then comes activation and for a riot to get enacted the
right kind of political environment is necessary. The last one is the phase of interpretation.
Prof. Brass has written that riot systems are institutionalized and there are Specific roles
assigned to people who become informants, rumormongers and propagandists.
The Minorities Commission8 figures on communal riots (1985‐87) brings out that in most of
the communal violence, it is the minorities that has to face the heat. The fact that some
state governments succeed in controlling riot situations and preventing one from occurring
and others don’t seems more of an issue of political will rather than capability. It follows
that these riots would be prevented if at all it is in their interest to do so.
7 Brass, Paul, The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence in Contemporary India', University of Washington Press, 2003 8 Minorities Commission Reports, 1986-88 found that between 1985-87, 60% of the 443 people killed were Muslims and that Muslims had suffered 73% of the nine crores in reported property damage.
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Segregation and Cities
The rapid rise in urbanization in India has resulted in enmeshing of communities that were
otherwise by natural inclination separated on religious and caste based divisions. Thus the
cities had a built in tension to it and the constant skirmishes lead to development of
colonies that were separated on ethnic grounds. Ghettoisation is a specific socio spatial
formation where the majority group forces a “negatively typed”9 population to be separate
and limit themselves to an isolated space. The inhabitants of a Ghetto are ethnic minorities
who also constitute the weakest of economic sections ranked an inferior status by the
dominant majority. It is held that in Ahmedabad, there is general opinion among the
Hindus that Muslims are an unsanitary and criminal‐minded population. This when gets
reinforced by economic marginalization leads to their segregation in Ghettos. This process
of limitation is carried out by repeated use of violence and the tacit support by political
parties condones such a practice. Thus a more stringent definition of Ghetto would
necessitate the following conditions: that it would have taken a spectacular incidence of a
history of violence to force the segregation; the ghettoisation is not limited only to the
economically weaker sections but even middle class gravitate to settle in the ghetto for
need of security though they can afford to live in more affluent areas; and the area faces
general neglect from the state and civic authorities leading to isolation of the area and
from the city in general.
9 Louis Wirth, The Ghetto, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1964 [1928], p. 285
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Case History of Ahmedabad
From some of the telephonic interviews we conducted including with the heads of trade
associations in Ahmedabad, it appears that there exists a particular justification for violence
against Muslims even against a globalizing and liberal backdrop of Ahmedabad. What was striking
was, how swiftly people seemed to accommodate the fact of violence and explain it with pre‐
supposed accounts, often centering on the immiscible presence of Muslims, whose concentration
in ghettos seemed a reflection not on the city or the state but on Muslims themselves, and the
disharmony they allegedly generated. Many Muslims live in the old and formerly walled part of the
city, but over time they have become metonyms for each other, symptoms of a problem that is
neither exclusively spatial nor political entirely but one within the other. This underlying identity,
an identity that seems to be more dominant is one which permeates anti‐muslim sentiment, held
and propagated not only by passive state actors but predominantly by the general populace. This
distinction would form the basis on which the effects of 2002 riots would be contrasted with the
1984 sikh pogrom.
The walled city of Ahmedabad contained within it predominantly economically weaker sections
and increasingly pointed to muslim settlements and signaled a threat thereof to the dominant
Hindu majority. The economic shift away from textiles to engineering, petrochemicals and shift of
industries away from Ahmedabad to South Gujarat has also reinforced the trend of
Ghettoization10. The history of Ahmedabad riots indicate that most of these movements were lead
by middle class and upper caste including the 1969 and 1992 riots. A number of other agitations
that shaped Ahemedabad’s public spaces were dominated by these upper Hindu castes, thus
leading to increasing structural division and solidified lines of exclusion. These forces can amplify
over time and when accentuated by a willing political machination or even covert support leads to
10 Times of India. Times News Network. 2002. ‘Riot’s Impact on Trade, Industry Negligible: Govt’, 22 March
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events such as the 2002 riots. The walled city has gone onto become a place with almost no hold
by city authorities and also as a brewing cauldron for anti‐muslim sentiments to fester. The tightly
woven maze like contours11 of the walled city makes it a predictable place of violence and for it to
spread to the outer regions surrounding it. The origins of this divide go back to the way the Raj
organized their civic spaces where the civil lines which were well maintained while Indians
inhabited regions in dirt and squalor across the river. This divide continued even after
Independence but only went on to become a Hindu‐Muslim divide, with Muslims inhabiting the
crowded and unsanitary areas(Eastern Bank) placing them in a deprived status.
The western bank meanwhile, which had a hindu majority saw rapid development through opening
up of various educational institutions encouraging further upper‐middle class settlement, granting
upper caste Hindus their way in the scheme of development of the city. This also lead to a gradual
economic isolation as newer markets and financial activity was centered in and around areas
populated by the Hindu majority. A major factor in determining spatial formations in the western
bank or the new city was that housing and land was allocated for societies and communities rather
than individuals, this solidified and made stronger pre existing lines of exclusion (Sompura 1983)12 .
The continuous modes of exclusion through economic, political and spatial means thus built a
structural tension and mistrust of each community with the Hindus assuming the dominant
position and the Muslims the weaker and marginalized status. The riots of 1969 and thereafter
apart from being seen as a result of this underlying tension can also causally explain the continued
Ghettoisation as a reinforcement mechanism. The complicity of the general populace in acts of
violence stands vindicated by the fact that they are unwittingly buying into rumours which acts as
trigger points for many instances of violence.
11 From the interviews of one of the fellows, Jayesh Ganesh who is an urban designer and has spent a considerable part in Ahmedabad. 12 Sompura, Chaitanya (1983) ‘Residential Structure and its Evolution—A Historical Analysis of Ahmedabad City’, Post-Graduate Dissertation, School of Planning, Centre for Environmental Planning and Technology, Ahmedabad.
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Delhiandthe1984DebacleOur on ground tryst with the 1984 riots13,14 began with a visit to a photo exhibition15 at Gurudwara
Bangla Sahib to mark the 28th anniversary of the genocide happened over a 3 day period from 31 Oct,
1984 onwards. The travelling photo exhibition was on display at different locations spread over a week
started from the Arts Faculty at Delhi University’s North Campus and finally culminated at Jantar
Mantar on November 3. It is part of a campaign to remind the Indian Government of its failure to
punish the guilty and provide justice to the victims and survivors of the violence.
Over there championing this cause was the very famous Jarnail Singh, a Sikh journalist and Dainik
Jagran Defence correspondent, who gained prominence after hurling his shoe at P.Chidambram during
a Congress press conference when the then Union Home Minister refused to answer a query regarding
justice to the victims. This act of his eventually led to the removal of Jagdish Tytler and Sajjan Kumar,
both of whom continuously figure amongst those responsible for the killings, from their candidature.16
In our brief rendezvous with him, he gave a brief on the current state of the victims and his approach
to push government to take some action. Some 50,000 people signed the petition to the PM to appeal
for action on this long deferred case. The Sikh community has been waiting for the closure since long
but the reason we keep on hearing about instances which continue to remind us about those fateful
days is that no attempt has been taken on the government’s part to close the issue.
13 Popular or even academic naming of events severely distorts the nature of them. The commonly used word ‘riots’ for the violence that happened in Nov 1984 is a misnomer and is meant to reduce the violence to just a spontaneous outburst of grief and anger. On the other hand, since it was obviously a very well planned and targeted nature of violence and that the Sikhs of Delhi barely retaliated, it makes it much more accurate to refer it as a ‘pogrom’. 14,16 The Anti-Sikh Pogrom of October 31 to November 4, 1984, in New Delhi Baixas, Lionel, June 2009 15 A travelling tale of anti-Sikh riots, The HINDU
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InterviewwithH.S.Phoolka
Our interview with Shri H.S.Phoolka17, who is a Senior Advocate, Supreme Court of India
and is widely known for spearheading legal "crusades" to gain justice for the victims of
1984 anti‐Sikh genocide and fighting individual cases on the involvement of Congress‐I
leaders H. K. L. Bhagat, Sajjan Kumar and Jagdish Tytler despite the government cover‐up,
has been instrumental in our research and has given key insights in our effort to
understand the riot effect on a city. The special anniversary edition of the Outlook included
Phoolka in its list of 50 people that make a difference in India, alongside Amartya Sen.
When the Nanavati commission18 began, many applications were filed by Shri H.S. Phoolka
for directions to Central Government, Delhi Government and Delhi Police for production of
the relevant record in their possession.
One of the very key and important aspects mentioned by the commission19 was that out of
72 police officials who had been indicted for their negligence and even conniving the riots,
6 had Ministry of Home Affairs as the Disciplinary Authority20, 14 had The Chief Secretary
and the Commissioner of Police for the remaining 52 officers. Out of those 72 officers, 13
had retired and 3 had expired before action could be initiated against them. 12 officers
were exonerated. Departmental inquiry was quashed by the Central Administration
Tribunal in one case. Pension was reduced in one case and three cases remained pending.
17 phoolka.net 18,19Nanavati - Commission Of Inquiry (1984 Anti-Sikh Riots)
20 "Disciplinary Authority" in relation to the imposition of a Penalty on an employee means the authority specified in the schedule, competent to impose upon him that penalty under these rules. Source – NAFED manual
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As regards the remaining 39 non‐gazetted police officers, inquiries were held against 35
officers. Out of them 32 were exonerated, 2 were censured and 1 was warned. Inquiries
against 4 officials remained pending.
The reasons most of the cases ended in acquittal of the accused was, that the 403 FIRs
recorded by Delhi Police with respect to the riots, none was a separate, distinct FIR and
was rather a general, vague type of FIR covering many incidents. The Police had prepared a
format for the aggrieved persons for lodging of complaints and it just consisted of
information regarding their looted or burnt properties and the loss suffered. There was no
mention of a column asking for names of the victims and the offenders.
In view of such serious lapses on the part of Police, the Committee recommended to the
Government to take disciplinary action against the lower level defaulter police officials.
As regards the Deputy Commissioners of Police and Assistant Commissioners of Police,
It was observed that some of them had simply abdicated their responsibility of
supervision and control over investigation of riots cases.
At the time of these riots Delhi was a Union Territory and was administered by
the President of India through an Administrator who was initially designated as Chief
Commissioner and later on as Lt.Governor. Under the set up then existing, maintenance
of law and order including organization and discipline of Police force was one of the
functions to be performed by the Lt.Governor. He was thus, incharge of maintenance of
law and order subject to the general control of the Central Government. The Commissioner
of Police was the Head of the Police establishment. He had below him Deputy Inspector
Generals of Police, Additional Commissioners of Police, Deputy Commissioners of Police,
Asst.Commissioners of Police, Inspectors, Sub‐Inspectors, Head Constables and Constables.
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By November, 1984, Delhi was divided into 6 Police Districts, each being called a range and
each range was managed by a DIG of Police. They were later on designated as Additional
Commissioners of Police. Delhi at that time had 63 Police Stations. Each Police Station
was incharge of a Station House Officer of the rank of Inspector and he was assisted by
some Sub Inspectors, Asst.Sub‐Inspectors, Head Constables and Constables attached to
that Police Station.
According to the 1981 Census21 the Sikh population of Delhi was 3,93,921, which worked
out to 6.33% of the total population of Delhi. Moreover, in each of the 6 districts of Delhi,
many jhuggis had come up and the Commission is referring to this fact as it appears on the
basis of the records that poverty stricken and unsatisfied residing in these jhuggis had
played a significant role in the anti Sikh massacre. Substantial increase in the anti social
population also appears to be one of the causes for the large scale looting and killing that
took place. Taking into consideration the manner in which the violent riotous acts were
committed against the Sikhs, we have tried to figure whether those incidents and events
happened as a result of any instigation and whether they could have been prevented by
the police and other authorities responsible for maintenance of law and order.
Mr.Phoolka was quite intrigued with us choosing this topic and felt a lot more needs to be
done and there is lot which the world out there doesn’t know about this and needs to be
explored. He started with saying that no Sikh in Delhi was a supporter of Bhindrawala, but
after he died in Operation Blue Star he was declared a martyr as they say that he stood for
what he preached. People felt bad because Golden Temple was attacked, the sentiments
were for Golden Temple not for Bhindrawale. The manner in which Operation Blue Star
was executed was horrendous. Had Bhindrawale been attacked outside Golden Temple and
21 censusindia.gov.in
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caught died or alive, people wouldn’t have reacted in this manner. The government got a
nice excuse to attack Golden Temple and hurt this minority. They had a nice reason to tell
the world.
On the other hand, Bhindrawale never demanded Khalistan. Government kept on saying
that we want to throw out Khalistanis but in his youtube videos, he mentions that he isn’t
demanding Khalistan but if government gives it to them, they won’t mind. He wanted to
live in this country only but with dignity.
The point for government to attack Bhindrawale was not just that he had weapons because
few months before Blue Star he came to Delhi with all his weapons and by road he went to
Mumbai (then Bombay) and all his weapons were seized there by the police. He never
resisted that, no retaliation, no back firing. The interesting part of the story is that next
day all his weapons were returned to him on orders from the Central Government. So, if
the police could seize all his weapons there very peacefully, government could have done
it again. Instead, he was given a free passage to return to Golden Temple.
This cannot be termed as stupidity from government’s side, instead this was planning to
attack Golden Temple somehow. The eyes were on Akal Takht not on Bhindrawale because
during emergency, Akal Takht was the only place where resistance continued throughout
and everyday a jatha of Sikhs would come out and shout slogans against emergency
throughout the period of 19 months every single day. There is no other place in India
where agitation continued so long. This is what disturbed Mrs.Gandhi and government
realized that this was one place where they had no control whatsoever despite of having
army deployed. So, the underlying idea was to bring down Akal Takht not exactly
Bhindrawale, he just became a good enough reason for government.
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Phoolka further continues that there was speculation that the killings in Delhi originally
were supposed to happen had Sikhs in Delhi would have reacted to Operation Blue Star
and start killing Hindus here. Then this was the plan. As it further emerged that the plan
remained same although the reason changed. Mrs.Gandhi’s assassination became the
reason for the massacre to happen against Sikhs.
Rajiv Gandhi’s infamous comment on the pogrom which happened on subsequent days,
“when a mighty tree fall, the earth shall shake”, incidentally the book written by
H.S.Phoolka on the incident is also called, ‘When a tree shook Delhi’. The pogrom certainly
looks like a conspiracy by the Indian government considering the scale of violence in such a
short span of time. The attack might have been planned since Operation Blue Star22
(Kothari, 1985) and underlines the existence of an institutional riot structure23 (Brass, 2006
: 63‐105).
The scale and nature of violence changed immensely changed between October 31 and
November 1. During this night, several Congress (I) (I for Indira) leaders held meetings in
order to mobilize their local supporters. They were highly instrumental in the instigation
and organization of the pogrom. Free transportation from the outskirts of Delhi to the
areas of city where Sikhs lived, was provided. They were also given weapons as knives,
lathis and kerosene.
From the electoral and school registration, they were also given names and addresses of
Sikhs. There was ample support from the underworld of jhuggi‐jhopri colonies and had
become a critical vote bank for the party.
22 (KOTHARI, Smitu & SETHI, Harsh (eds.), Voices from a Scarred City: The Delhi Carnage in Perspective, Delhi, Lokayan, 1985) 23 (VAN DYKE, Virginia, The Anti-Sikh Riots of 1984 in Delhi: Politicians, Criminals, and the Discourse of Communalism in Paul Brass (ed.), Riots and Pogroms , London, Macmillan Press, 1996, 201-220.)
Page 18 of 30
There was more police in charge of Mrs.Gandhi’s procession than for the security of Sikhs.
Delhi’s Sikhs are present in every part of the city but Phoolka stresses on the fact that
purposely low class Sikhs were targeted by the goons for the conspiracy was that they
could easily be silenced by giving money as compensation and won’t be able to fight long
for justice. On the other hand the high class and well to do families were economically
injured, houses and factories were burnt, and not many killings happened in the upper
strata. The rich feels lucky if his life is saved, but poor thinks about his livelihood if
someone is killed. The rich on one hand if killed, will fight with whatever is left to make
sure the guilty are punished. This couldn’t have been mere coincident throughout Delhi,
this was a very planned pogrom, they knew the poor won’t be able to defend themselves.
The worst affected areas were the resettlement colonies of East, West and North Delhi
such as Trilokpuri, Kalyanpur, and Mangalpuri. At other middle class neighbourhoods more
looting took place. The irony was that the Sikh victims in Delhi had actually nothing to do
neither with the militancy in Punjab nor with the assassination of Indira Gandhi. There
were instead many Congress supporters.
Phoolka says that some 2,20,000 people migrated to Punjab post 1984 genocide. Although,
immediately after the incident there was a natural tendency to be together but Sikhs soon
came into mainstream. Many of those who didn’t move made sure they keep some sort of
property in Punjab so that if there is need to move, they have a place. This is indicative of
the fact that faith was completely lacking in the current machinery.
We spoke on phone with one such family currently living in Ludhiana. They said that soon
after the riots happened they sold off their house in Uttam Nagar area at a throw away
price as not many people were willing to purchase and they wanted to move away.
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Although they got a flat in Ludhiana from the government but still they don’t have the
ownership of that flat, the house they sold off in Delhi in a few thousands is worth crores
today.
One point he continued to stress upon in order to make a point that this entire episode
was planned and not just a sporadic violent breakthrough was that the goons who roamed
around the city were carrying weapons and kerosene were brought to Delhi from outside
and were not the locals. They had come from eastern parts of Uttar Pradesh, nearby areas
of Haryana and some parts of Rajasthan. Train loads of people flushed in and the question
was, who brought them to do these killings. There were Sikhs in the areas they were
coming from as well. Why kill the Sikhs in Delhi only.
Now government says that they came to pay their homage to Mrs.Gandhi, but they didn’t
even go there. There was not much crowd at Teen Murthy, they were only interested in
killing and looting. They were drunk, they were dancing on streets with sharp swords in
hands, indulging in rapes, they were not at all mourners.
When asked about any key differences in 1984 against the 2002 riots, he said, in Godhra, it
seemed that the state machinery was used to sort of appease the larger Hindu vote bank
and one community knew it at all times that the state would back them. So a clear agenda
seems to playing there but it seems unnatural in the case of 1984 killings. There is no
polarization whatsoever as far as Hindus and Sikhs or Muslims and Sikhs are concerned. In
fact the people involved in killings were Hindus, Muslims and even Christians, so it was not
at all a religion versus religion thing. All of them were goons, and it was state (or followers
of Congress) versus a minority.
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The only thing government kept reiterating at that point of time was that Sikhs are anti‐
nationals, so they are teaching them a lesson. They want Khalistan that’s why they ought
to behave like this with them. So in this case, they were propagating more of a nationalist
feeling rather than a Hindutva feeling for so called ‘secular’ objectives. The government
portrayed an image that they were the only savior of the nation, the Sikhs need to be
curbed. Congress wore a mask of Secularism.
Another interesting case in point, he brought out was that there were no elections in
Punjab in 1984. All the elections were fought on Anandpur Sahib Resolution and
government declared it anti‐national. Akal Takht clearly kept on mentioning that by more
powers, they mean more authority to state, they don’t mean a separate nation. But to
brand them anti‐national Congress kept on saying that they meant a separate country. On
the other hand, same demands of a Federal system were laid down by other states like
Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu as well but it was Punjab which was facing the heat.
It was also a clear electoral boost for Congress. They got ¾ majority and BJP just got 2 seats
in the entire country. At that moment congress even termed Atal Behari Vajpayee as anti‐
national. Home Minister Narsimha Rao gave a statement in parliament in the second week
of November that throughout India 650 Sikhs have been killed. Vajpayee declares another
list soon after and it came in all the newspapers on 17th November, 1984 that in Delhi itself
around 2700 Sikhs have been killed. Now, Congress termed Vajpayee anti‐national as they
thought he was on the side of Sikhs. When BJP discussed their debacle of winning just two
seats internally, Vajpayee said it doesn’t matter, we have atleast saved the nation.
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The underlying story emerging is that whether it was Operation Blue Star, the 1984
pogrom, Congress had a belief in one point of view and they wanted to go all out to prove
it by hook or by crook irrespective of other perspectives. They had become total Fascists at
that point of time as the Emergency had also lowered their popularity and on top of it
there was another party trying to propagate the Hindutva philosophy, they had to think of
a way to nullify that and they did it in a very astute fashion.
In 1984 there was hardly anyone in the bureaucracy who could dare to resist the
government unlike Gujarat where people like Sanjiv Bhatt24 are now coming out and
speaking up.
Again, referring to the fascist thought process of the government, he said, the causality be
whatever, if they wanted to have an effect, they’ll make it happen and cook up a reason.
He irritatingly continued that Delhi’s reaction to this whole episode was not very
encouraging. It was unfortunate that people didn’t come out when they were needed. This
fact was also mentioned by Amitav Ghosh25 (Ghosh, 1995) that he once read a passage by
V.S.Naipul where he is sitting in a hotel room and watching people marching past. He is
aware of his wish to go out and join the crowd yet he also knows that he never will, it is
simply not in his nature to join crowds. In that passage, Ghosh had seen an aspect of
himself rendered visible.
Most public just remained a silent spectator, in areas like Lajpat Nagar many peace
committees were formed which were instrumental in not letting any casualty happen in
that region. Now Phoolka, feels that there is somewhere guilt amongst the Delhi residents
that they didn’t do anything to stop it, that’s why they shy away from even discussing it. So 24 wikipedia.org/wiki/Sanjiv_Bhatt 25 The Ghosts Of Mrs Gandhi – by Amitav Ghosh, 1995-07-17, Journal: The New Yorker
Page 22 of 30
many kids are now asking the tough questions to their parents and reasons for their
indifference.
Sikhs certainly have moved on but it doesn’t mean at all that they have forgotten or have
forgiven of what happened. It’s not today in the Sikh psyche that since state won’t protect
us so we need to be together but when we went to Tilak Vihar (pg 21) it was a very shared
feeling that we need to be together and moving out of that place is very difficult.
If you compare this with Godhra riots, socio‐economic conditions have got to do a lot to it.
The indispensability of Sikhs and they been mainstream has been a factor in no
ghettoisation. Amongst Muslims on the other hand, the feeling of staying together has
been there since the very beginning. In the medieval Islamic literature also, the separatist
thoughts are so vivid.
Amongst Sikhs, there was no segregation at all before the riots. Sikh community as a
whole has never felt isolated or insecure but the 1984 was a real shock for them and they
felt alienated for a very long time. But if you see now, they are all in the mainstream,
scattered all over. Even Tilak Vihar, where all the widows were given flats by the
government is a very small area (around 100 flats) and cannot really be called a ghetto;
they didn’t come there on their own. There is no area whatsoever which can be pin
pointed and can be classified as a post riot ghetto. There certainly are a few Sikh
dominated regions and they have always been there before ’84 and after.
Another point worth noting here is that whenever there is a social issue, Sikhs fight it as a
religious issue. According to Dharam Yudh Morcha, there were two demands which can be
said to be religious, namely, declare Amritsar as a holy city on lines with Varanasi and
Kirtan from Golden Temple to be aired on All India Radio (AIR). Although rest all were
economic demands for Punjab but Sikhs would consider it as a religious issue.
Page 23 of 30
RoleofStateMachinery
We met the Assistant Commissioner to inquire about the response the police must have to
such killings by a mob and also to study the power structure which plays in order to trigger
the action. The interview since happened in the police station’s premises was very closed
and the commissioner gave politically correct answers instead of what the reality is.
When asked about what the process is, he said, when a call comes to Police Control Room
(PCR – 100), the nearest Mobile Patrolling Van (MPV) is sent to the site to get situation
under control. Then they have to handover the culprits to local police. The police has right
to take call by itself with no political intervention whatsoever. This is increasingly not
visible in our structure.
If the situation seems out of control with the current workforce, they may demand for
external force to the authority and this decision is taken by the ministry.
Page 24 of 30
TilakVihar:TheclosestcaseofGhetto?
The visit to Tilak Vihar was very moving and at the same time quite depressing as well. The
location is not very remote and is hardly ten minutes from the Tilak Nagar Metro station.
It’s a very small area with the majority of victims staying in the ‘C’ block. The flats allotted
were DDA flats and were given in 1985 along with Rs 10,000 compensation.
Here, the main survivors and witnesses of the pogrom, Sikh widows and their children stay.
They are commonly referred to as Chaurasiye or 84‐ers, hence conferring a new kind of
collective identity to the survivors of the pogrom.
The general environment was similar to as we had read. The young were standing out
joblessly and a close encounter revealed that some of them were drunk as well. Most of
them didn’t wanted to talk about the November killings as it had become a routine for
them and it didn’t had any relevance for them now. They felt, it only served the interests
of scholars, activists to be involved.
The queries were about the general sentiment amongst the people living there. There was
a negative wave in the air in general about life, even in a slum there is a sense of optimism
but over there the air was gloomy. This one statement by a person who was nine years of
age when the 1984 happened sums it up all, he said, “We are living a dead life here.”
Pointing towards his own year old daughter in his hands, he argued, “What would happen
to her if I die today, same happened with me when six of my uncles along with my dad
were burnt alive.”
Page 25 of 30
It seemed the scars were so deep that they had become skeptical about everything anyone
proposes and were scared to even think of moving out of that place. The government had
promised free electricity and water supply at the time of allotment and now when the
private company comes to put up meters, all of them gather and revolt against them. So,
the unity is insurmountable and those with families work hard as well. Although most of
the bread earners were either Auto Rickshaw drivers or working as Automobile mechanics,
they were very keen on giving their children the best of education. They knew that was the
only way for social mobility, but there weren’t many role models for the kids to look upto.
The downside for living in that area they faced was, when approaching a school for the
25% designated seats for the less privileged, the school simply refused on grounds that
Tilak Vihar is a negative region and they can’t have students coming in their school from
there.
Here, H.S.Phoolka’s statement proved right when almost all replied the same when asked
about justice. They didn’t wanted to fight for justice, there were many other more pressing
issues for them to worry about.
We also went to nearby Tilak Vihar police station and exchanged a few words with the Sub
Inspector there. He corroborated our belief that the residents of that area were anti
everything. They didn’t trust police, the government and even NGOs as many have let
them down. Many organizations have given them high hopes only to later shatter them. He
also pointed that it’s not a good idea to compare police of today with that in 1984, there
was acute shortage in force then.
Page 26 of 30
So, at a city level, Delhi is a place without spatial continuity26 (Dupont,2001) and is a
mosaic of very contrasting sectors. There are large sectors in Delhi which prove to be
relatively heterogeneous in terms of types of settlements and socio‐economic groups of
residents. But still we can’t generalize that residential segregation in Delhi is a mild
phenomenon. Here, institutional actors like the Delhi Development Authority, have had a
major role in shaping the urban landscape and the resulting lines of segregation are the
combined effect of income differentials, socio‐economic status and professional group,
caste and religious affiliation, geographical origin. The ghetto phenomenon is found both
among the privileged and underprivileged population groups, as shown by the examples of
rich families’ co‐operative group housing societies and clusters of poor migrants.
26 Socio-spatial differentiation and residential segregation in Delhi: a question of scale ? by Veronique Dupont, 2001
Page 27 of 30
Conclusion
A commonality between the 2002 riot and 1984 massacre is the State sponsorship though
to different degrees. The common themes was that both were political riots with high
degree of planning, with use of external agents/goondas and use local inputs for which
properties to be destroyed and who should be killed and finally to good measure tried to
impair the state machinery that could have diffused the violence. The first point of
departure is that the Gujarat riots were politically facilitated but organically festered. The
violence grew as underlying tensions exploded and all that it needed was a trigger.
However the Anti Sikh Massacre was politically triggered and engineered from start to
finish and did not have much elements of underlying tensions between any two
communities.
The effects of the violence in terms of spatial reorganization were also drastically different.
While in Ahmedabad this lead to the Ghettoisation of Juhapura where an estimated 4 lakh
Muslims including civil services cadres, laywers, businessmen live amongst slum dwellers
for the want of safety, there is hardly any evidence of Ghettoisation in case of Sikh
community as an aftermath of the massacre. While Tilak Vihar where we conducted
extensive surveys did carry certain characteristics of a Ghetto, the fact it is limited to
around 200 families and that it comprises of only economically weaker sections of the Sikh
community does not qualify for it to be called a Ghetto. Unlike Juhapura it is also well
connected to the city and is well integrated and even has free power and water
connections, though facilities such as schools is absent. In one instance of an interview it
was even reported that schools refuse admission to parents from this area as it was
Page 28 of 30
considered backward. Another key point of distinction is that a Ghetto in the longer run
stands to benefit due to the presence of an educated intelligentsia residing within in,
unlike a slum which is out of bounds for middle‐lower middle classes. Tilak Vihar therefore
carries the risk of moving more towards a slum like condition.
The fact that inspite of over 3000 deaths of Sikhs, they didn’t cluster into a ghetto can be
explained by the fact that unlike in Ahmedabad, the structural factors that developed over
a period of time extending from the colonial times, that of dominance by the majority
population, economic marginalization and previous instances of violence, were absent in
Delhi. The spatial formations did not have components of either forced or self segregation
in Delhi and that the Sikh community was very miscible amongst the Hindu populace.
Unlike amongst Hindus‐Muslims there was no underlying mistrust among Sikh and Hindus
and this ensured that Sikhs could show much better resilience, also aided by the
indispensability to professional services in which they were engaged in. The fact that the
public space in Delhi and the forces that shaped it during its growing years was not at the
hands of a specific religious majority like in Ahmedabad where it rested with the upper
caste Hindus must have ensured that solidified lines of exclusion between Hindus and Sikhs
did not exist.
Thus urban design and use of public spaces can ease structural tensions and thus dissipate
events of violence, however this requires political will and fastidious attention to how
societies and groups are continuously organizing themselves around city spaces. A system
that encourages individual movement over group movement augurs better and can freeze
the detrimental effects of either forced and self imposed community/class based
segregation.
Page 29 of 30
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Page 30 of 30
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