Republic Act No. 386

June 18, 1949

The Civil Code of the Philippines

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication. (1a)

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners, vs.HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:

Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.

Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:

a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.

b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.

c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.

d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.

e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.

f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.

g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.

The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:

SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.

Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given due course.

The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].

Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:

We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the particular circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'

No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different from those in the United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no other person could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and represent the people in cases of this character.

The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this case.

Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...

The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long line of decisions, 4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.

Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:

Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ...

The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records—no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad. 5

The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such publication.

The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6

It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:

In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette as the official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know where to obtain their official and specific contents.

The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:

The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application,

demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.

Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by this Court.

Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."

From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

SO ORDERED.

Tanada vs. Tuvera, G. R. No. 63915, April 24, 1985

Facts: In this case petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. Petitioners contend that in order for these laws to be effective it must be published in the Official Gazette.

The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the case should be dismissed on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality. Without showing that the non-publication of these laws would bring injury to the petitioners, they have no cause of action, as provided for under the Rules of Court.

Issues: (1) Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.

(2) Whether or not various laws in question should be published to be valid and enforceable.

Held: (1) The petitioners have legal standing. The Supreme Court has already decided in various cases that a party has a cause of action when the question posed is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty. Under such, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws.

(2) As to the necessity of publication, the Supreme Court ruled that laws should be published. The clear object of such is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned.

Republic Act No. 386

June 18, 1949

The Civil Code of the Philippines

CHAPTER 2

HUMAN RELATIONS (n)

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 146322             December 6, 2006

ERNESTO RAMAS UYPITCHING and RAMAS UYPITCHING SONS, INC., petitioners, vs.ERNESTO QUIAMCO, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CORONA, J.:

Honeste vivere, non alterum laedere et jus suum cuique tribuere. To live virtuously, not to injure others and to give everyone his due. These supreme norms of justice are the underlying principles of law and order in society. We reaffirm them in this petition for review on certiorari assailing the July 26, 2000 decision1 and October 18, 2000 resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 47571.

In 1982, respondent Ernesto C. Quiamco was approached by Juan Davalan,2 Josefino Gabutero and Raul Generoso to amicably settle the civil aspect of a criminal case for robbery3 filed by Quiamco against them. They surrendered to him a red Honda XL-100 motorcycle and a photocopy of its certificate of registration. Respondent asked for the original certificate of registration but the three accused never came to see him again. Meanwhile, the motorcycle was parked in an open space inside respondent’s business establishment, Avesco-AVNE Enterprises, where it was visible and accessible to the public.

It turned out that, in October 1981, the motorcycle had been sold on installment basis to Gabutero by petitioner Ramas Uypitching Sons, Inc., a family-owned corporation managed by petitioner Atty. Ernesto Ramas Uypitching. To secure its payment, the motorcycle was mortgaged to petitioner corporation.4

When Gabutero could no longer pay the installments, Davalan assumed the obligation and continued the payments. In September 1982, however, Davalan stopped paying the remaining installments and told petitioner corporation’s collector, Wilfredo Veraño, that the motorcycle had allegedly been "taken by respondent’s men."

Nine years later, on January 26, 1991, petitioner Uypitching, accompanied by policemen,5 went to Avesco-AVNE Enterprises to recover the motorcycle. The leader of the police team, P/Lt. Arturo Vendiola, talked to the clerk in charge and asked for respondent. While P/Lt. Vendiola and the clerk were talking, petitioner Uypitching paced back and forth inside the establishment uttering "Quiamco is a thief of a motorcycle."

On learning that respondent was not in Avesco-AVNE Enterprises, the policemen left to look for respondent in his residence while petitioner Uypitching stayed in the establishment to take photographs of the motorcycle. Unable to find respondent, the policemen went back to Avesco-AVNE Enterprises and, on petitioner Uypitching’s instruction and over the clerk’s objection, took the motorcycle.

On February 18, 1991, petitioner Uypitching filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law6 against respondent in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dumaguete City.7 Respondent moved for dismissal because the complaint did not charge an offense as he had neither stolen nor bought the motorcycle. The Office of the City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint8 and denied petitioner Uypitching’s subsequent motion for reconsideration.

Respondent filed an action for damages against petitioners in the RTC of Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental, Branch 37.9 He sought to hold the petitioners liable for the following: (1) unlawful taking of the motorcycle; (2) utterance of a defamatory remark (that respondent was a thief) and (3) precipitate filing of a baseless and malicious complaint. These acts humiliated and embarrassed the respondent and injured his reputation and integrity.

On July 30, 1994, the trial court rendered a decision10 finding that petitioner Uypitching was motivated with malice and ill will when he called respondent a thief, took the motorcycle in an abusive manner and filed a baseless complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law. Petitioners’ acts were found to be contrary to Articles 1911 and 2012 of the Civil Code. Hence, the trial court held petitioners liable to respondent for P500,000 moral damages, P200,000 exemplary damages and P50,000 attorney’s fees plus costs.

Petitioners appealed the RTC decision but the CA affirmed the trial court’s decision with modification, reducing the award of moral and exemplary damages to P300,000 and P100,000, respectively.13 Petitioners sought reconsideration but it was denied. Thus, this petition.

In their petition and memorandum, petitioners submit that the sole (allegedly) issue to be resolved here is whether the filing of a complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law in the Office of the City Prosecutor warranted the award of moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs in favor of respondent.

Petitioners’ suggestion is misleading. They were held liable for damages not only for instituting a groundless complaint against respondent but also for making a slanderous remark and for taking the motorcycle from respondent’s establishment in an abusive manner.

Correctness of the Findings of the RTC and CA

As they never questioned the findings of the RTC and CA that malice and ill will attended not only the public imputation of a crime to respondent14 but also the taking of the motorcycle, petitioners were deemed to have accepted the correctness of such findings. This alone was sufficient to hold petitioners liable for damages to respondent.

Nevertheless, to address petitioners’ concern, we also find that the trial and appellate courts correctly ruled that the filing of the complaint was tainted with malice and bad faith. Petitioners themselves in fact described their action as a "precipitate act."15 Petitioners were bent on portraying respondent as a thief. In this connection, we quote with approval the following findings of the RTC, as adopted by the CA:

x x x There was malice or ill-will [in filing the complaint before the City Prosecutor’s Office] because Atty. Ernesto Ramas Uypitching knew or ought to have known as he is a lawyer, that there was no probable cause at all for filing a criminal complaint for qualified theft and fencing activity against [respondent]. Atty. Uypitching had no personal knowledge that [respondent] stole the motorcycle in question. He was merely told by his bill collector ([i.e.] the bill collector of Ramas Uypitching Sons, Inc.)[,] Wilfredo Veraño[,] that Juan Dabalan will [no longer] pay the remaining installment(s) for the motorcycle because the motorcycle was taken by the men of [respondent]. It must be noted that the term used by Wilfredo Veraño in informing Atty. Ernesto Ramas Uypitching of the refusal of Juan Dabalan to pay for the remaining installment was [‘]taken[’], not [‘]unlawfully taken[’] or ‘stolen.’ Yet, despite the double hearsay, Atty. Ernesto Ramas Uypitching not only executed the [complaint-affidavit] wherein he named [respondent] as ‘the suspect’ of the stolen motorcycle but also charged [respondent] of ‘qualified theft and fencing activity’ before the City [Prosecutor’s] Office of Dumaguete. The absence of probable cause necessarily signifies the presence of malice. What is deplorable in all these is that Juan Dabalan, the owner of the motorcycle, did not accuse [respondent] or the latter’s men of stealing the motorcycle[,] much less bother[ed] to file a case for qualified theft before the authorities. That Atty. Uypitching’s act in charging [respondent] with qualified theft and fencing activity is tainted with malice is also shown by his answer to the question of Cupid Gonzaga16 [during one of their conversations] - "why should you still file a complaint? You have already recovered the motorcycle…"[:] "Aron motagam ang kawatan ug motor." ("To teach a lesson to the thief of motorcycle.")17

Moreover, the existence of malice, ill will or bad faith is a factual matter. As a rule, findings of fact of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, are conclusive on this Court. We see no compelling reason to reverse the findings of the RTC and the CA.

Petitioners Abused Their Right of Recovery as Mortgagee(s)

Petitioners claim that they should not be held liable for petitioner corporation’s exercise of its right as seller-mortgagee to recover the mortgaged vehicle preliminary to the enforcement of its right to foreclose on the mortgage in case of default. They are clearly mistaken.

True, a mortgagee may take steps to recover the mortgaged property to enable it to enforce or protect its foreclosure right thereon. There is, however, a well-defined procedure for the recovery of possession of mortgaged property: if a mortgagee is unable to obtain possession of a mortgaged property for its sale on foreclosure, he must bring a civil action either to recover such possession as a preliminary step to the sale, or to obtain judicial foreclosure.18

Petitioner corporation failed to bring the proper civil action necessary to acquire legal possession of the motorcycle. Instead, petitioner Uypitching descended on respondent’s establishment with his policemen and ordered the seizure of the motorcycle without a search warrant or court order. Worse, in the course of the illegal seizure of the motorcycle, petitioner Uypitching even mouthed a slanderous statement.

No doubt, petitioner corporation, acting through its co-petitioner Uypitching, blatantly disregarded the lawful procedure for the enforcement of its right, to the prejudice of respondent. Petitioners’ acts violated the law as well as public morals, and transgressed the proper norms of human relations.

The basic principle of human relations, embodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code, provides:

Art. 19. Every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give every one his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Article 19, also known as the "principle of abuse of right," prescribes that a person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith, otherwise he opens himself to liability.19 It seeks to preclude the use of, or the tendency to use, a legal right (or duty) as a means to unjust ends.

There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to prejudice or injure another.20 The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to harm another.21 Otherwise, liability for damages to the injured party will attach.

In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle was taken at petitioners’ instance was not only attended by bad faith but also contrary to the procedure laid down by law. Considered in conjunction with the defamatory statement, petitioners’ exercise of the right to recover the mortgaged vehicle was utterly prejudicial and injurious to respondent. On the other hand, the precipitate act of filing an unfounded complaint could not in any way be considered to be in accordance with the purpose for which the right to prosecute a crime was established. Thus, the totality of petitioners’ actions showed a calculated design to embarrass, humiliate and publicly ridicule respondent. Petitioners acted in an excessively harsh fashion to the prejudice of respondent. Contrary to law, petitioners willfully caused damage to respondent. Hence, they should indemnify him.22

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The July 26, 2000 decision and October 18, 2000 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 47571 are AFFIRMED.

Triple costs against petitioners, considering that petitioner Ernesto Ramas Uypitching is a lawyer and an officer of the court, for his improper behavior.

SO ORDERED.

Uypitching, et al. v. Quiamco, G.R. No. 146322, December 6, 2006

In Uypitching, et al. v. Quiamco, G.R. No. 146322, December 6, 2006, there was a sale of a motorcycle with mortgage as security

for the payment of the balance of the purchase price. When the vendee failed to pay, the seller went to the buyer’s establishment

with the police and ordered the seizure of the motorcycle which he even mouthed slanderous statement. Sued for damages, he

contended that there is no liability for the exercise of the right as seller-mortgagee to recover the mortgaged vehicle preliminary to

the enforcement of its right to foreclose on the mortgage in case of default. Is the contention correct? Why?

Answer: No. True, a mortgagee may take steps to recover the mortgaged property to enable it to enforce or protect its foreclosure

right thereon. There is, however, a well-defined procedure for the recovery of possession of mortgaged property: if a mortgagee is

unable to obtain possession of a mortgaged property for its sale on foreclosure, he must bring a civil action either to recover such

possession as a preliminary step to the sale, or to obtain judicial foreclosure. (Filinvest Credit Corp. v. CA, G.R. No. 115902,

September 27, 1995, 248 SCRA 549).

 

            The seller failed to bring the proper civil action necessary to acquire legal possession of the motorcycle. Instead, he

descended to the buyer’s establishment with his policemen and ordered the seizure of the motorcycle without a search warrant or

court order. Worse, in the course of the illegal seizure of the motorcycle, petitioner Uypitching even mouthed a slanderous

statement.

            No doubt, the seller, acting through its co-petitioner Uypitching, blatantly disregarded the lawful procedure for the

enforcement of its right, to the prejudice of respondent. Its acts violated the law as well as public morals, and transgressed the

proper norms of human relations.

            The basic principle of human relations, embodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code, provides:

            Art. 19. Every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with

justice, give every one his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

            Article 19, also known as the “principle of abuse of right”, prescribes that a person should not use his right unjustly or

contrary to honesty and good faith, otherwise he opens himself to liability. (HSBC v. Catalan, G.R. No. 159590-91, October 18,

2004; 440 SCRA 498). It seeks to preclude the use of, or the tendency to use, a legal right (or duty) as a means to unjust ends.

            There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to prejudice or injure another. (HSBC v. Catalan). The exercise of a

right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be

no intention to harm another. (HSBC v. Catalan). Otherwise, liability for damages to the injured party will attach.

            In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle was taken at the seller’s instance was not only attended by bad faith but

also contrary to the procedure laid down by law. Considered in conjunction with the defamatory statement, the seller’s exercise of

the right to recover the mortgaged vehicle was utterly prejudicial and injurious to the buyer. On the other hand, the precipitate act of

filing an unfounded complaint could not in any way be considered to be in accordance with the purpose for which the right to

prosecute a crime was established. Thus, the totality of the buyer’s actions showed a calculated design to embarrass, humiliate and

publicly ridicule the buyer. The seller acted in an excessively harsh fashion to the prejudice of the buyer. Contrary to law, the seller

willfully caused damage to the buyer. Hence, they should indemnify him.

Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-20089      December 26, 1964

BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee, vs.FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.

Jalandoni & Jamir for defendant-appellant.Samson S. Alcantara for plaintiff-appellee.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

The facts that culminated in this case started with dreams and hopes, followed by appropriate planning and serious endeavors, but terminated in frustration and, what is worse, complete public humiliation.

Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided to get married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954 Velez left this note for his bride-to-be:

Dear Bet —

Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it. Am leaving on the Convair today.

Please do not ask too many people about the reason why — That would only create a scandal.

Paquing

But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following telegram:

NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA LOVE .

PAKING

Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.

Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in default. Plaintiff adduced evidence before the clerk of court as commissioner, and on April 29, 1955, judgment was rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; P2,500.00 as attorney's fees; and the costs.

On June 21, 1955 defendant filed a "petition for relief from orders, judgment and proceedings and motion for new trial and reconsideration." Plaintiff moved to strike it cut. But the court, on August 2, 1955, ordered the parties and their attorneys to appear before it on August 23, 1955 "to explore at this stage of the proceedings the possibility of arriving at an amicable settlement." It added that should any of them fail to appear "the petition for relief and the opposition thereto will be deemed submitted for resolution."

On August 23, 1955 defendant failed to appear before court. Instead, on the following day his counsel filed a motion to defer for two weeks the resolution on defendants petition for relief. The counsel stated that he would confer with defendant in Cagayan de Oro City — the latter's residence — on the possibility of an amicable element. The court granted two weeks counted from August 25, 1955.

Plaintiff manifested on June 15, 1956 that the two weeks given by the court had expired on September 8, 1955 but that defendant and his counsel had failed to appear.

Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court in its order of July 6, 1956 calling the parties and their attorneys to appear on July 13, 1956. This time. however, defendant's counsel informed the court that chances of settling the case amicably were nil.

On July 20, 1956 the court issued an order denying defendant's aforesaid petition. Defendant has appealed to this Court. In his petition of June 21, 1955 in the court a quo defendant alleged excusable negligence as ground to set aside the judgment by default. Specifically, it was stated that defendant filed no answer in the belief that an amicable settlement was being negotiated.

A petition for relief from judgment on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, must be duly supported by an affidavit of merits stating facts constituting a valid defense. (Sec. 3, Rule 38, Rules of Court.) Defendant's affidavit of merits attached to his petition of June 21, 1955 stated: "That he has a good and valid defense against plaintiff's cause of action, his failure to marry the plaintiff as scheduled having been due to fortuitous event and/or circumstances beyond his control." An affidavit of merits like this stating mere conclusions or opinions instead of facts is not valid. (Cortes vs. Co Bun Kim, L-3926, Oct. 10, 1951; Vaswani vs. P. Tarrachand Bros., L-15800, December 29, 1960.)

Defendant, however, would contend that the affidavit of merits was in fact unnecessary, or a mere surplusage, because the judgment sought to be set aside was null and void, it having been based on evidence adduced before the clerk of court. In Province of Pangasinan vs. Palisoc, L-16519, October 30, 1962, this Court pointed out that the procedure of designating the clerk of court as commissioner to receive evidence is sanctioned by Rule 34 (now Rule 33) of the Rules of Court. Now as to defendant's consent to said procedure, the same did not have to be obtained for he was declared in default and thus had no standing in court (Velez vs. Ramas, 40 Phil. 787; Alano vs. Court of First Instance, L-14557, October 30, 1959).

In support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration," defendant asserts that the judgment is contrary to law. The reason given is that "there is no provision of the Civil Code authorizing" an action for breach of promise to marry. Indeed, our ruling in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals (L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960), as reiterated in Estopa vs. Biansay (L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960), is that "mere breach of a promise to marry" is not an actionable wrong. We pointed out that Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the new Civil Code the provisions that would have it so.

It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."

The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract marriage, which was subsequently issued (Exhs. A, A-1). Their wedding was set for September 4, 1954. Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh. C). The bride-to-be's trousseau, party drsrses and other apparel for the important occasion were purchased (Tsn., 7-8). Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were given and gifts received (Tsn., 6; Exh. E). And then, with but two days before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28 years old,: simply left a note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it ... " He enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured returning soon." But he never returned and was never heard from again.

Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.

Defendant urges in his afore-stated petition that the damages awarded were excessive. No question is raised as to the award of actual damages. What defendant would really assert hereunder is that the award of moral and exemplary damages, in the amount of P25,000.00, should be totally eliminated.

Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As to exemplary damages, defendant contends that the same could not be adjudged against him because under Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the condition precedent is that "the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." The argument is devoid of merit as under the above-narrated circumstances of this case defendant clearly acted in a "wanton ... , reckless [and] oppressive manner." This Court's opinion, however, is that considering the particular circumstances of this case, P15,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable award.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated modification, the lower court's judgment is hereby affirmed, with costs.

Wassmer v. Velez

12 SCRA 648 – Civil Law – Torts and Damages – Article 21 of the Civil Code – Moral Damages – Exemplary Damages - Breach of Promise to Marry

In 1954, Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer planned their marriage. They decided to schedule it on September 4, 1954. And so Wassmer made preparations such as: making and sending wedding invitations, bought her wedding dress and other apparels, and other wedding necessities. But 2 days before the scheduled day of wedding, Velez sent a letter to Wassmer advising her that he will not be able to attend the wedding because his mom was opposed to said wedding. And one day before the wedding, he sent another message to Wassmer advising her that nothing has changed and that he will be returning soon. However, he never returned.

This prompted Wassmer to file a civil case against Velez. Velez never filed an answer and eventually judgment was made in favor of Wassmer. The court awarded exemplary and moral damages in favor of Wassmer.

On appeal, Velez argued that his failure to attend the scheduled wedding was because of fortuitous events. He further argued that he cannot be held civilly liable for breaching his promise to marry Wassmer because there is no law upon which such an action may be grounded. He also contested the award of exemplary and moral damages against him.

ISSUE: Whether or not the award of damages is proper.

HELD: Yes. The defense of fortuitous events raised by Velez is not tenable and also unsubstantiated. It is true that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. However, in this case, it was not a simple breach of promise to marry. because of such promise, Wassmer made preparations for the wedding. Velez’s unreasonable withdrawal from the wedding is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. Wassmer’s cause of action is supported under Article 21 of the Civil Code which provides in part “any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.”

And under the law, any violation of Article 21 entitles the injured party to receive an award for moral damages as properly awarded by the lower court in this case. Further, the award of exemplary damages is also proper. Here, the circumstances of this case show that Velez, in breaching his promise to Wassmer, acted in wanton, reckless, and oppressive manner – this warrants the imposition of exemplary damages against him.

Art. 35. When a person, claiming to be injured by a criminal offense, charges another with the same, for which no independent civil action is granted in this Code or any special law, but the justice of the peace finds no reasonable

grounds to believe that a crime has been committed, or the prosecuting attorney refuses or fails to institute criminal proceedings, the complaint may bring a civil action for damages against the alleged offender. Such civil action may be

supported by a preponderance of evidence. Upon the defendant's motion, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to indemnify the defendant in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.

If during the pendency of the civil action, an information should be presented by the prosecuting attorney, the civil action shall be suspended until the termination of the criminal proceedings.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 138509. July 31, 2000]

IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS, petitioner, vs. ISAGANI D. BOBIS, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce B. Javier. Without said marriage having been annulled, nullified or terminated, the same respondent contracted a second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis on January 25, 1996 and allegedly a third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez. Based on petitioner’s complaint-affidavit, an information for bigamy was filed against respondent on February 25, 1998, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q98-75611 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 226, Quezon City. Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license. Respondent then filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal case. The trial judge granted the motion to suspend the criminal case in an Order dated December 29, 1998.[1] Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner argues that respondent should have first obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage before entering into the second marriage, inasmuch as the alleged prejudicial question justifying suspension of the bigamy case is no longer a legal truism pursuant to Article 40 of the Family Code.[2]

The issue to be resolved in this petition is whether the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy.

A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein.[3] It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.[4] It must appear not only that the civil case involves facts upon which the criminal action is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would necessarily be determinative of the criminal case.[5] Consequently, the defense must involve an issue similar or intimately related to the same issue raised in the criminal action and its resolution determinative of whether or not the latter action may proceed.[6] Its two essential elements are:[7]

(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and

(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

A prejudicial question does not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused but simply tests the sufficiency of the allegations in the information in order to sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case. A party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all the essential elements of a crime have been adequately alleged in the information, considering that the prosecution has not yet presented a single evidence on the indictment or may not yet have rested its case. A challenge of the allegations in the information on the ground of prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits of the criminal charge through a non-criminal suit.

Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of celebration of the second marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before a party may remarry. The clear implication of this is that it is not for the parties, particularly the accused, to determine the validity or invalidity of the marriage.[8] Whether or not the first marriage was void for lack of a license is a matter of defense because there is still no judicial declaration of its nullity at the time the second marriage was contracted. It should be remembered that bigamy can successfully be prosecuted provided all its elements concur – two of which

are a previous marriage and a subsequent marriage which would have been valid had it not been for the existence at the material time of the first marriage.[9]

In the case at bar, respondent’s clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has to do is to disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a marriage aware of the absence of a requisite - usually the marriage license - and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void. Such scenario would render nugatory the provisions on bigamy. As succinctly held in Landicho v. Relova:[10]

(P)arties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

Respondent alleges that the first marriage in the case before us was void for lack of a marriage license. Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that her marriage to respondent was exempt from the requirement of a marriage license. More specifically, petitioner claims that prior to their marriage, they had already attained the age of majority and had been living together as husband and wife for at least five years.[11] The issue in this case is limited to the existence of a prejudicial question, and we are not called upon to resolve the validity of the first marriage. Be that as it may, suffice it to state that the Civil Code, under which the first marriage was celebrated, provides that "every intendment of law or fact leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds."[12] Hence, parties should not be permitted to judge for themselves the nullity of their marriage, for the same must be submitted to the determination of competent courts. Only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists.[13] No matter how obvious, manifest or patent the absence of an element is, the intervention of the courts must always be resorted to. That is why Article 40 of the Family Code requires a "final judgment," which only the courts can render. Thus, as ruled in Landicho v. Relova,[14] he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity. In a recent case for concubinage, we held that the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial question.[15] This ruling applies here by analogy since both crimes presuppose the subsistence of a marriage.

Ignorance of the existence of Article 40 of the Family Code cannot even be successfully invoked as an excuse.[16] The contracting of a marriage knowing that the requirements of the law have not been complied with or that the marriage is in disregard of a legal impediment is an act penalized by the Revised Penal Code.[17] The legality of a marriage is a matter of law and every person is presumed to know the law. As respondent did not obtain the judicial declaration of nullity when he entered into the second marriage, why should he be allowed to belatedly obtain that judicial declaration in order to delay his criminal prosecution and subsequently defeat it by his own disobedience of the law? If he wants to raise the nullity of the previous marriage, he can do it as a matter of defense when he presents his evidence during the trial proper in the criminal case.

The burden of proof to show the dissolution of the first marriage before the second marriage was contracted rests upon the defense,[18] but that is a matter that can be raised in the trial of the bigamy case. In the meantime, it should be stressed that not every defense raised in the civil action may be used as a prejudicial question to obtain the suspension of the criminal action. The lower court, therefore, erred in suspending the criminal case for bigamy. Moreover, when respondent was indicted for bigamy, the fact that he entered into two marriage ceremonies appeared indubitable. It was only after he was sued by petitioner for bigamy that he thought of seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. The obvious intent, therefore, is that respondent merely resorted to the civil action as a potential prejudicial question for the purpose of frustrating or delaying his criminal prosecution. As has been discussed above, this cannot be done.

In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, can not be said to have validly entered into the second marriage. Per current jurisprudence, a marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any party can marry again; otherwise the second marriage will also be void.[19] The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner.[20] Against this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question. As stated above, respondent cannot be permitted to use his own malfeasance to defeat the criminal action against him.[21]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The order dated December 29, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 226 of Quezon City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the trial court is ordered to IMMEDIATELY proceed with Criminal Case No. Q98-75611.

SO ORDERED.

MARBELLA-BOBIS v. BOBIS, July 31, 2000 (G.R. No. 138509)

FACTS: • October 21, 1985, first marriage with one Maria Dulce B. Javier. Not annulled, nullified or terminated

• January 25, 1996, second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis

• Third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez

• February 25, 1998, Imelda Bobis filed bigamy

• Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license

• Petitioner argues that respondent should have first obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage before entering into the second marriage

*After petitioner sued for bigamy, it’s just when the respondent filed a declaration of absolute nullity.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy

HELD: • A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein.3It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. Its two essential elements are:7

(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and

(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed

In Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, can not be said to have validly entered into the second marriage. In the current jurisprudence, a marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any party can marry again; otherwise the second marriage will also be void. The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner.

Any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question

*Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy (Landicho v. Relova)

Marbella – Bobis vs. Bobis, GRN 138509 July 31, 2000

Respondent contracted his second marriage to petitioners notwithstanding the subsistence of a previous marriage. A third marriage was allegedly contracted by respondent thus petitioner filed for a bigamy case. Thereafter, respondent filed an action for the absolute nullity of his first marriage on

the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes prejudicial question.

RULING: A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the

accused. It must appear not only that the civil case involves facts upon which the criminal action is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would necessarily be determinative of the criminal case.

In this case, any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge.

“Damnum absque injuria” – damage without actionable injury

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 140420. February 15 , 2001]

SERGIO AMONOY, petitioner, vs. Spouses JOSE GUTIERREZ and ANGELA FORNILDA, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Damnum absque injuria. Under this principle, the legitimate exercise of a person’s rights, even if it causes loss to another, does not automatically result in an actionable injury. The law does not prescribe a remedy for the loss. This principle does not, however, apply when there is an abuse of a person’s right, or when the exercise of this right is suspended or extinguished pursuant to a court order. Indeed, in the availment of one’s rights, one must act with justice, give others their due, and observe honesty and good faith.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the April 21, 1999 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 41451, which set aside the judgment[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tanay, Rizal. The RTC had earlier dismissed the Complaint for damages filed by herein respondents against petitioner. The dispositive portion of the challenged CA Decision reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is SET ASIDE, and in its stead judgment is rendered ordering the defendant-appellee Sergio Amonoy to pay the plaintiffs-appellants Bruno and Bernardina Gutierrez as actual damages the sum of [t]wo [h]undred [f]ifty [t]housand [p]esos (P250,000.00).”[3]

Likewise assailed is the October 19, 1999 CA Resolution,[4] which denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts

The appellate court narrated the factual antecedents of this case as follows:

“This case had its roots in Special Proceedings No. 3103 of Branch I of the CFI of Pasig, Rizal, for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Julio Cantolos, involving six (6) parcels of land situated in Tanay, Rizal. Amonoy was the counsel of therein Francisca Catolos, Agnes Catolos, Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Formilda. On 12 January 1965, the Project of Partition submitted was approved and x x x two (2) of the said lots were adjudicated to Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Formilda. The attorney’s fees charged by Amonoy was P27,600.00 and on 20 January 1965 Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Formilda executed a deed of real estate mortgage on the said two (2) lots adjudicated to them, in favor of Amonoy to secure the payment of his attorney’s fees. But it was only on 6 August 1969 after the taxes had been paid, the claims settled and the properties adjudicated, that the estate was declared closed and terminated.

“Asuncion Pasamba died on 24 February 1969 while Alfonso Fornilda passed away on 2 July 1969. Among the heirs of the latter was his daughter, plaintiff-appellant Angela Gutierrez.

“Because his attorney’s fees thus secured by the two lots were not paid, on 21 January 1970 Amonoy filed for their foreclosure in Civil Case No. 12726 entitled Sergio Amonoy vs. Heirs of Asuncion Pasamba and Heirs of Alfonso Fornilda before the CFI of Pasig, Rizal, and this was assigned to Branch VIII. The heirs opposed, contending that the attorney’s fees charged [were] unconscionable and that the agreed sum was only P11,695.92. But on 28 September 1972 judgment was rendered in favor of Amonoy requiring the heirs to pay within 90 days the P27,600.00 secured by the mortgage, P11,880.00 as value of the harvests, and P9,645.00 as another round of attorney’s fees. Failing in that, the two (2) lots would be sold at public auction.

“They failed to pay. On 6 February 1973, the said lots were foreclosed and on 23 March 1973 the auction sale was held where Amonoy was the highest bidder at P23,760.00. On 2 May 1973 his bid was judicially confirmed. A deficiency was claimed and to satisfy it another execution sale was conducted, and again the highest bidder was Amonoy at P12,137.50.

“Included in those sold was the lot on which the Gutierrez spouses had their house.

“More than a year after the Decision in Civil Case No. 12726 was rendered, the said decedent’s heirs filed on 19 December 1973 before the CFI of Pasig, Rizal[,] Civil Case No. 18731 entitled Maria Penano, et al vs. Sergio Amonoy, et al, a suit for the annulment thereof. The case was dismissed by the CFI on 7 November 1977, and this was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on 22 July 1981.

“Thereafter, the CFI on 25 July 1985 issued a Writ of Possession and pursuant to which a notice to vacate was made on 26 August 1985. On Amonoy’s motion of 24 April 1986, the Orders of 25 April 1986 and 6 May 1986 were issued for the demolition of structures in the said lots, including the house of the Gutierrez spouses.

“On 27 September 1985 the petition entitled David Fornilda, et al vs Branch 164 RTC IVth Pasig, Deputy Sheriff Joaquin Antonil and Atty. Sergio Amonoy, G.R. No. L-72306, was filed before the Supreme Court. Among the petitioners was the plaintiff-appellant Angela Gutierrez. On a twin Musiyun (Mahigpit na Musiyon Para Papanagutin Kaugnay ng Paglalapastangan, and Musiyung Makahingi ng Utos sa Pagpapapigil ng Pagpapagiba at Pananagutin sa Paglalapastangan) with full titles as fanciful and elongated as their Petisyung (Petisyung Makapagsuri Taglay and Pagpigil ng Utos), a temporary restraining order was granted on 2 June 1986 enjoining the demolition of the petitioners’ houses.

“Then on 5 October 1988 a Decision was rendered in the said G.R. No. L-72306 disposing that:

“WHEREFORE, Certiorari is granted; the Order of respondent Trial Court, dated 25 July 1985, granting a Writ of Possession, as well as its Orders, dated 25 April 1986 and 16 May 1986, directing and authorizing respondent Sheriff to demolish the houses of petitioners Angela and Leocadia Fornilda are hereby set aside, and the Temporary Restraining Order heretofore issued, is made permanent. The six (6) parcels of land herein controverted are hereby ordered returned to petitioners unless some of them have been conveyed to innocent third persons.”[5]

But by the time the Supreme Court promulgated the above-mentioned Decision, respondents’ house had already been destroyed, supposedly in accordance with a Writ of Demolition ordered by the lower court.

Thus, a Complaint for damages in connection with the destruction of their house was filed by respondents against petitioner before the RTC on December 15, 1989.

In its January 27, 1993 Decision, the RTC dismissed respondents’ suit. On appeal, the CA set aside the lower court’s ruling and ordered petitioner to pay respondents P250,000 as actual damages. Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was also denied.

Hence, this recourse.[6]

The Issue

In his Memorandum,[7] petitioner submits this lone issue for our consideration:

“Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in deciding that the petitioner [was] liable to the respondents for damages”[8]

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

Main Issue: Petitioner’s Liability

Well-settled is the maxim that damage resulting from the legitimate exercise of a person’s rights is a loss without injury -- damnum absque injuria -- for which the law gives no remedy.[9] In other words, one who merely exercises one’s rights does no actionable injury and cannot be held liable for damages.

Petitioner invokes this legal precept in arguing that he is not liable for the demolition of respondents’ house. He maintains that he was merely acting in accordance with the Writ of Demolition ordered by the RTC.

We reject this submission. Damnum absque injuria finds no application to this case.

True, petitioner commenced the demolition of respondents’ house on May 30, 1986 under the authority of a Writ of Demolition issued by the RTC. But the records show that a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), enjoining the demolition of respondents’ house, was issued by the Supreme Court on June 2, 1986. The CA also found, based on the Certificate of Service of the Supreme Court process server, that a copy of the TRO was served on petitioner himself on June 4, 1986.

Petitioner, however, did not heed the TRO of this Court. We agree with the CA that he unlawfully pursued the demolition of respondents’ house well until the middle of 1987. This is clear from Respondent Angela Gutierrez’s testimony. The appellate court quoted the following pertinent portion thereof:[10]

“Q. On May 30, 1986, were they able to destroy your house?

A. Not all, a certain portion only

x x x x x x x x x

Q. Was your house completely demolished?

A. No, sir.

Q. How about the following day?

A. It was completely demolished”

x x x x x x x x x

Q. Until when[,] Mrs. Witness?

A. Until 1987.

Q. About what month of 1987?

A. Middle of the year.

Q. Can you tell the Honorable Court who completed the demolition?

A. The men of Fiscal Amonoy.”[11]

The foregoing disproves the claim of petitioner that the demolition, which allegedly commenced only on May 30, 1986, was completed the following day. It likewise belies his allegation that the demolitions had already ceased when he received notice of the TRO.

Although the acts of petitioner may have been legally justified at the outset, their continuation after the issuance of the TRO amounted to an insidious abuse of his right. Indubitably, his actions were tainted with bad faith. Had he not insisted on completing the demolition, respondents would not have suffered the loss that engendered the suit before the RTC. Verily, his acts constituted not only an abuse of a right, but an invalid exercise of a right that had been suspended when he received the TRO from this Court on June 4, 1986. By then, he was no longer entitled to proceed with the demolition.

A commentator on this topic explains:

“The exercise of a right ends when the right disappears, and it disappears when it is abused, especially to the prejudice of others. The mask of a right without the spirit of justice which gives it life, is repugnant to the modern concept of social law. It cannot be said that a person exercises a right when he unnecessarily prejudices another x x x. Over and above the specific precepts of positive law are the supreme norms of justice x x x; and he who violates them violates the law. For this reason, it is not permissible to abuse our rights to prejudice others.”[12]

Likewise, in Albenson Enterprises Corp. v. CA,[13] the Court discussed the concept of abuse of rights as follows:

“Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights: that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible x x x.”

Clearly then, the demolition of respondents’ house by petitioner, despite his receipt of the TRO, was not only an abuse but also an unlawful exercise of such right. In insisting on his alleged right, he wantonly violated this Court’s Order and wittingly caused the destruction of respondents’ house.

Obviously, petitioner cannot invoke damnum absque injuria, a principle premised on the valid exercise of a right.[14] Anything less or beyond such exercise will not give rise to the legal protection that the principle accords. And when damage or prejudice to another is occasioned thereby, liability cannot be obscured, much less abated.

In the ultimate analysis, petitioner’s liability is premised on the obligation to repair or to make whole the damage caused to another by reason of one’s act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently and whether or not punishable by law.[15]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the appealed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Amonoy v. Gutierrez, G.R No. 140420, 15 Feb 2001

351 SCRA 73 – Civil Law – Article 19 – Abuse of Rights – Damnum Absque Injuria

FACTS: In 1965, Atty. Sergio Amonoy represented Alfonso Fornilda (Formida in some records) in a partition case. Since Fornilda had no money to pay, he agreed to make use of whatever property he acquires as a security for the payment of Amonoy’s attorney’s fees which amounts to P27k. In July 1969, Fornilda died. A month later, the property was finally adjudicated and Fornilda, through his heirs, got his just share from the property in dispute. Fornilda was however unable to pay Amonoy. Hence, Amonoy sought to foreclose the property in 1970. The heirs of Fornilda, the spouses Jose Gutierrez and Angela Fornilda then sued Amonoy questioning the validity of his mortgage agreement with Fornilda. It was their claim that the attorney’s fees he was collecting was unconscionable and that the same was based on an invalid mortgage due to the existing att0rney-client relationship between him and Fornilda at the time the mortgage was executed.

The spouses lost in the trial court as well as in the Court of Appeals but they appealed to the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R.No. L-72306. Meanwhile, in 1973, Amonoy was able to foreclose the property. Amonoy was also the highest bidder in the public sale conducted in view of the foreclosure. He was able to buy the property of Fornilda for P23k. But constructed on said property was the house of the spouses Gutierrez.

Pending the spouses’s appeal with the Supreme Court, Amonoy was able to secure a demolition order and so on May 30, 1986, Amonoy started demolishing the houses of the spouses. But on June 2, 1986, the Supreme Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) against the demolition order. On June 4, 1986, Amonoy received a copy of the TRO. Finally, on June 24, 1989, the Supreme Court promulgated a decision on G.R.No. L-72306 where it ruled that the mortgage between Amonoy and Fornilda is void, hence, Amonoy has no right over the property. But by this time, the house of the spouses was already demolished because it appears that despite the TRO, Amonoy continued demolishing the house until it was fully demolished in the middle of 1987.

The spouses then sued Amonoy for damages. It is now the contention of Amonoy that he incurred no liability because he was merely exercising his right to demolish (pursuant to the demolition order) hence what happened was a case of damnum absque injuria (injury without damage).

ISSUE: Whether or not Amonoy is correct.

HELD: No. Amonoy initially had the right to demolish but when he received the TRO that right had already ceased. Hence, his continued exercise of said right after the TRO was already unjustified. As quoted by the Supreme Court: “The exercise of a right ends when the right disappears, and it disappears when it is abused, especially to the prejudice of others. ”

What Amonoy did is an abuse of right. Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights: that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.

Clearly then, the demolition of the spouses’s house by Amonoy, despite his receipt of the TRO, was not only an abuse but also an unlawful exercise of such right.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 116100. February 9, 1996]

SPOUSES CRISTINO and BRIGIDA CUSTODIO and SPOUSES LITO and MARIA CRISTINA SANTOS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF PACIFICO C. MABASA and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA, BRANCH 181,

respondents.

This petition for review on certiorari assails the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 29115, promulgated on November 10, 1993, which affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court, as well as its resolution dated July 8, 1994 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.[1]

On August 26, 1982, Civil Case No. 47466 for the grant of an easement of right of way was filed by Pacifico Mabasa against Cristino Custodio, Brigida R. Custodio, Rosalina R. Morato, Lito Santos and Maria Cristina C. Santos before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig and assigned to Branch 22 thereof.[2]

The generative facts of the case, as synthesized by the trial court and adopted by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

Perusing the record, this Court finds that the original plaintiff Pacifico Mabasa died during the pendency of this case and was substituted by Ofelia Mabasa, his surviving spouse [and children].

The plaintiff owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment erected thereon situated at Interior P. Burgos St., Palingon, Tipas, Taguig, Metro Manila. The plaintiff was able to acquire said property through a contract of sale with spouses Mamerto Rayos and Teodora Quintero as vendors last September 1981. Said property may be described to be surrounded by other immovables pertaining to defendants herein. Taking P. Burgos Street as the point of reference, on the left side, going to plaintiff’s property, the row of houses will be as follows: That of defendants Cristino and Brigido Custodio, then that of Lito and Maria Cristina Santos and then that of Ofelia Mabasa. On the right side (is) that of defendant Rosalina Morato and then a Septic Tank (Exhibit “D”). As an access to P. Burgos Street from plaintiffs property, there are two possible passageways. The first passageway is approximately one meter wide and is about 20 meters distan(t) from Mabasa’s residence to P. Burgos Street. Such path is passing in between the previously mentioned row of houses. The second passageway is about 3 meters in width and length from plaintiff Mabasa’s residence to P. Burgos Street; it is about 26 meters. In passing thru said passageway, a less than a meter wide path through the septic tank and with 5-6 meters in length has to be traversed.

When said property was purchased by Mabasa, there were tenants occupying the premises and who were acknowledged by plaintiff Mabasa as tenants. However, sometime in February, 1982. one of said tenants vacated the apartment and when plaintiff Mabasa went to see the premises, he saw that there had been built an adobe fence in the first passageway making it narrower in width. Said adobe fence was first constructed by defendants Santoses along their property which is also along the first passageway. Defendant Morato constructed her adobe fence and even extended said fence in such a way that the entire passageway was enclosed (Exhibit “1-Santoses and Custodios,” Exh. “D” for plaintiff, Exhs. “1-C”, “1-D” and “I -E”) And it was then that the remaining tenants of said apartment vacated the area. Defendant Ma. Cristina Santos testified that she constructed said fence because there was an incident when her daughter was dragged by a bicycle pedalled by a son of one of the tenants in said apartment along the first passageway. She also mentioned some other inconveniences of having (at) the front of her house a pathway such as when some of the tenants were drunk and would bang their doors and windows. Some of their footwear were even lost. x x x[3] (Italics in original text; corrections in parentheses supplied)

On February 27, 1990, a decision was rendered by the trial court, with this dispositive part:

Accordingly, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1) Ordering defendants Custodios and Santoses to give plaintiff permanent access - ingress and egress, to the public street;

2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendants Custodios and Santoses the sum of Eight Thousand Pesos (P8,000) as indemnity for the permanent use of the passageway.

The parties to shoulder their respective litigation expenses.[4]

Not satisfied therewith, therein plaintiff represented by his heirs, herein private respondents, went to the Court of Appeals raising the sole issue of whether or not the lower court erred in not awarding damages in their favor. On November 10, 1993, as earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision affirming the judgment of the trial court with modification, the decretal portion of which disposes as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the lower court is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION only insofar as the herein grant of damages to plaintiffs-appellants. The Court hereby orders defendants-appellees to pay plaintiffs-appellants the sum of Sixty Five Thousand (P65,000) Pesos as Actual Damages, Thirty Thousand (P30,000) Pesos as Moral Damages, and Ten Thousand (P10,000) Pesos as Exemplary Damages. The rest of the appealed decision is affirmed to all respects.[5]

On July 8, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.[6] Petitioners then took the present recourse to us, raising two issues, namely, whether or not the grant of right of way to herein private respondents is proper, and whether or not the award of damages is in order.

With respect to the first issue, herein petitioners are already barred from raising the same. Petitioners did not appeal from the decision of the court a quo granting private respondents the right of way, hence they are presumed to be satisfied with the adjudication therein. With the finality of the judgment of the trial court as to petitioners, the issue of propriety of the grant of right of way has already been laid to rest.

For failure to appeal the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, petitioners cannot obtain any affirmative relief other than those granted in the decision of the trial court. That decision of the court below has become final as against them and can no longer be reviewed, much less reversed, by this Court. The rule in this jurisdiction is that whenever an appeal is taken in a civil case, an appellee who has not himself appealed may not obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than what was granted in the decision of the lower court. The appellee can only advance any argument that he may deem necessary to defeat the appellant’s claim or to uphold the decision that is being disputed, and he can assign errors in his brief if such is required to strengthen the views expressed by the court a quo. These assigned errors, in turn, may be considered by the appellate court solely to maintain the appealed decision on other grounds, but not for the purpose of reversing or modifying the judgment in the appellee’s favor and giving him other affirmative reliefs.[7]

However, with respect to the second issue, we agree with petitioners that the Court of Appeals erred in awarding damages in favor of private respondents. The award of damages has no substantial legal basis. A reading of the decision of the Court of Appeals will show that the award of damages was based solely on the fact that the original plaintiff, Pacifico Mabasa, incurred losses in the form of unrealized rentals when the tenants vacated the leased premises by reason of the closure of the passageway.

However, the mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to recover damages. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong.[8]

There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.[9] in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff - a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it.[10] The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be the breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be awarded; it is not sufficient to state that there should be tort liability merely because the plaintiff suffered some pain and suffering)[11]

Many accidents occur and many injuries are inflicted by acts or omissions which cause damage or loss to another but which violate no legal duty to such other person, and consequently create no cause of action in his favor. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone. The law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. [12]

In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, that act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria.[13] If, as may happen in many cases, a person sustains actual damage, that is, harm or loss to his person or property, without sustaining any legal injury, that is, an act or omission which the law does not deem an injury, the damage is regarded as damnum absque injuria.[14]

In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary to the claim of private respondents, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right. In order that the principle of abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can be applied, it is essential that the following requisites concur: (1) The defendant should have acted in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; (2) The acts should be willful; and (3) There was damage or injury to the plaintiff.[15]

The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners, hence not contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations

than those established by law.[16] It is within the right of petitioners, as owners, to enclose and fence their property. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides that “(e)very owner may enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other means without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon.”

At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any servitudes. There was no easement of way existing in favor of private respondents, either by law or by contract. The fact that private respondents had no existing right over the said passageway is confirmed by the very decision of the trial court granting a compulsory right of way in their favor after payment of just compensation. It was only that decision which gave private respondents the right to use the said passageway after payment of the compensation and imposed a corresponding duty on petitioners not to interfere in the exercise of said right.

Hence, prior to said decision, petitioners had an absolute right over their property and their act of fencing and enclosing the same was an act which they may lawfully perform in the employment and exercise of said right. To repeat, whatever injury or damage may have been sustained by private respondents by reason of the rightful use of the said land by petitioners is damnum absque injuria.[17]

A person has a right to the natural use and enjoyment of his own property, according to his pleasure, for all the purposes to which such property is usually applied. As a general rule, therefore, there is no cause of action for acts done by one person upon his own property in a lawful and proper manner, although such acts incidentally cause damage or an unavoidable loss to another, as such damage or loss is damnum absque injuria.[18] When the owner of property makes use thereof in the general and ordinary manner in which the property is used, such as fencing or enclosing the same as in this case, nobody can complain of having been injured, because the inconvenience arising from said use can be considered as a mere consequence of community life.[19]

The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot constitute a legal wrong for which an action will lie,[20] although the act may result in damage to another, for no legal right has been invaded[21] One may use any lawful means to accomplish a lawful purpose and though the means adopted may cause damage to another, no cause of action arises in the latter’s favor. Any injury or damage occasioned thereby is damnum absque injuria. The courts can give no redress for hardship to an individual resulting from action reasonably calculated to achieve a lawful end by lawful means.[22]

WHEREFORE, under the compulsion of the foregoing premises, the appealed decision of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the judgment of the trial court is correspondingly REINSTATED.

Custodio et, al v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116100, 9, 1996

Civil Law – Torts and Damages – Damnum Absque Injuria - Actionable Wrong

FACTS: Pacifico Mabasa owns a property behind the properties of spouses Cristino and Brigida Custodio and spouses Lito and Ma. Cristina Santos.

The passageway leading to Mabasa’s house passes through the properties of the Custodios and the Santoses.

Sometime in 1981, the spouses Lito and Ma. Cristina Santos built a fence around their property.  This effectively deprived Mabasa passage to his

house. Mabasa then sued the Custodios and the Santoses to compel them to grant his right of way with damages. Mabasa claims that he lost tenants

because of the blockade done by the families in front. The trial court ruled in favor of Mabasa. It ordered the Custodios and the Santoses to give

Mabasa a permanent easement and right of way and for Mabasa to pay just compensation. The Santoses and the Custodios appealed. The Court of

Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. However, the CA modified the ruling by awarding damages in favor of Mabasa (Actual damages: P65k,

Moral damages: P30k, Exemplary damages: P10k).

ISSUE: Whether or not the grant of damages by the CA is proper.

HELD: No. The award is not proper. This is an instance of damnum absque injuria.

There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results

from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in

those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty.

In this case, it is true that Mabasa may have incurred losses (damage) when his tenants left because of the fence made by the Santoses. However,

when Santos built the fence, he was well within his right. He built the fence inside his property. There was no existing easement agreement, either by

contract or by operation of law, on his property. Hence, Santos has all the right to build the fence. It was only after the judgment in the trial court that

the easement was created which was even conditioned on the payment of Mabasa of the just compensation. Santos did not commit a legal injury

against Mabasa when he built the fence, therefore, there is no actionable wrong as basis for the award of damages. In this case, the damage has to be

borne by Mabasa.