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8/12/2019 Civil Procedure Cases (Judgements; Remedies and Execution)
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ST. PETER MEMORIAL PARK, INC., petitioner,vs.HON. JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR. and/or COURT O IRST INSTANCE ORI!AL "#$e%on Cit&, RE'INO CLEOAS, and LUCIA (E LACRU!, respondents.
'.R. No. L)*++- Mar 01, 1+2-
3ANCO ILIPINO SA4IN'S 5 MORT'A'E 3ANK, petitioner,vs.HON. JOSE CAMPOS, RE'INO CLEOAS, and LUCIA (E LA CRU!,respondents.
Feliciano C. Tumale for petitioner St. Peter Memorial Park, Inc.
Tan Law Office for petitioner Banco Filipino Savings an MortgageBank.
!uan T. "#uino for responents.
FERNANDEZ,J.:+.wph!1
The Court decided to dispose of these two cases in a consolidated decision,considering that the facts in both are the same and the issues areintertwined.
n the Court of First nstance of Ri!al, the spouses Regino Cleofas and "uciade la Cru! filed suit against #t. $eter %emorial $ar&, nc. 'or %emorial $ar&for short(, Araceli )i*angco del Rosario, National n+estment andDe+elopment Corporation 'or NDC(, anco Filipino #a+ings and %ortgagean& 'or anco Filipino for short(, the Register of Deeds of Ri!al, theRegister of Deeds of -ue!on Cit and the #heriff of -ue!on Cit 'Ci+il CaseNo. -/01220(. n their amended complaint, the spouses praed that the bedeclared the rightful owners of "ot No. 304 of the $iedad Estate, that theTorrens Title to said lot be reconstituted, the title thereto of their deceasedpredecessor, Antonio Cleofas, ha+ing been burned in a fire in 04556 that thecertificates of title o+er said lot in the name of the %emorial $ar&, and that inthe name of )i*angco del Rosario, and all the certificates of title from whichthese certificates were deri+ed be declared null and +oid6 that the mortgageso+er said, lot constituted in fa+or of anco Filipino and the NDC be declarednull and +oid6 and that the %emorial $ar& be ordered to pa plaintiffs
damages. The amended complaint li&ewise sought issuance of preliminarin*unction and the appointment of a recei+er. The lower court ordered
appointment of a recei+er, but upon filing of a bond b the %emorial $ar&, therecei+ership was lifted.
After trial, the lower court, on %a 7, 0435, rendered a decision in fa+or ofthe plaintiffs and against the defendants. The %emorial $ar& and ancoFilipino, on 8une 75, 0435, filed their *oint motion for reconsideration of thedecision. 9n 8une 52, 0435, the filed a *oint motion for new trial. 9n 8ul 4,0435, the %emorial $ar& filed a supplement to the motion for reconsideration
with praer for new trial. $laintiffs opposed the motion for reconsiderationand:or new trial. 9n 8anuar 02, 043;, the plaintiffs mo+ed for issuance ofwrit of preliminar in*unction and restoration of recei+ership. 9n Februar 1,043;, the trial court denied new trial. 9n Februar 70, 043;, anco Filipinoand the %emorial $ar& filed their notice of appeal from the decision of %a 7,0435, and filed their cash bond. )ithin the reglementar period the filedtheir *oint record on appeal.
9n Februar 7
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?owe+er, on 8ul
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'-ue!on Cit(, the disco+ered that the lot was alread co+ered b TCT No.70
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from TCT No. 01G22 up to TCT No. 01G44 to disco+er theremaining two digits and finall, the missing lin&.
T/G5 at the boo& of I was a +ital clue. t turned out to be a+olume in the Register of Deeds of Ri!al containing 722TCTs 'from No. 01120 to 01G44(, and as con*ectured,included the 01G22 series. And defendant #t. $eterdisco+ered TCT No. 01G4;>
0( in the name of Antonio Cleofas, et als.
7( co+ering "ot No. G;2 'not 304( of the $iedad Estate.
5( transferred from 9CT No. G0;.
;( and referring to #heet 01 of 9CT No. G0;.
1( issued on 8ul 01, 0474.
The hunch of defendant #t. $eter became a realit. Theentr on sheet or page 01 of 9CT no. G0; refers to anotherlot 'not 304( and another title 'TCT No. 01G4; co+ering "otNo. G;2 of the $iedad Estate(.
t is important to state as the Register of Deeds of Ri!al willtestif, that there is no otherTCT in the series from No.01G20 to 01G44 'ecept for No. 01G4;( in the name ofAntonio Cleofas, alleged processor of plaintiff.
Defendant #t. $eter still had another clue> Bicente Harcia,the notar whose name &ept cropping up in the +arious
documents in+ol+ed in the case at bar.
Another search was conducted in the must record of theand files of Notar $ublic Bicente Harcia were found to beintact The disclosed>t.hqw
0( Entr No. 0433 in the Notar=s boo&referring to Deed No. 0
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Makalintal .J. an" #ntonio J. concur.1$wph%1.&t
#quino J. is on lea'e.
#eparate 9pinions
ARRED9,J. concurring>
would li&e to ma&e clear that m reason for concurring in the holding in themain opinion thatcertiorari
is the proper remed in relation to the trial court=sdenial of petitioners= motion for new trial notwithstanding that the hadalread filed their respecti+e notices of appeal, appeal bonds and motions foretension to file their records on appeal is that such special ci+il action mabe resorted to when it is patent from the nature of the purported newldisco+ered e+idence that mo+ant can more or less conclusi+el show that the
factual issue to which such e+idence relates would ha+e to be decideddifferentl if the same were to be admitted b the court. n such a situation, itis ob+ious to me that to gi+e due course to the appeal and merel allow thedenial of the motion for new trial to be assigned as an error in appellant=sbrief would onl result in unnecessar dela of the final disposition of thecontro+ers between the parties. #ince it is more li&el that the decisionwould ha+e to be changed or modified after the new e+idence is presented, see no sense in lea+ing the uestion of its admission for resolution in theappeal, when after all the alread e+ident ultimate result would be to returnthe case to the trial court for its reception.
The other aspect of respondents= contention that the e+idence in+ol+ed in
these cases is not newl disco+ered is to m mind secondar. Assumingthere is some plausibilit in respondents= pose in this respect, ampersuaded ne+ertheless that substantial *ustice would be better attained badmitting the preferred e+idence, which as alread obser+ed, appears to beindubitable. The main opinion prefers to reser+e *udgment on this point, but feel it is more honest to sa that if new trial must be granted in these in spiteof the fact that petitioners ha+e alread ta&en their appeal within thereglementar period, it is onl because the facts anone can infer or deducefrom the e+idence being offered, which is documentar and official, areapparentl more proimate to the truth, in the light of common eperience.
As see it, the net result of 9ur decision cannot pre*udice the respondents. t
is uite ob+ious that it is "ot G;2 and not "ot 304 that belongs to them, andthe do not pretend that the ha+e acuired more than one lot in $iedad
Estate, so as to entitle them to both "ots G;2 and 304. The accident thatcaused the loss of their title, TCT 01G4; is no reason at all for courts toun*ustl enrich them b ad*udicating to them "ot 304, when all the ha+e todo is assert their right o+er "ot G;2 which is the one that appears recorded intheir name in the official records which up to now stand unchallenged, muchless impugned.
(ernan"o J. concurs.
#eparate 9pinions
ARRED9,J. concurring>
would li&e to ma&e clear that m reason for concurring in the holding in themain opinion thatcertiorari
is the proper remed in relation to the trial court=sdenial of petitioners= motion for new trial notwithstanding that the hadalread filed their respecti+e notices of appeal, appeal bonds and motions foretension to file their records on appeal is that such special ci+il action mabe resorted to when it is patent from the nature of the purported newldisco+ered e+idence that mo+ant can more or less conclusi+el show that thefactual issue to which such e+idence relates would ha+e to be decideddifferentl if the same were to be admitted b the court. n such a situation, itis ob+ious to me that to gi+e due course to the appeal and merel allow thedenial of the motion for new trial to be assigned as an error in appellant=sbrief would onl result in unnecessar dela of the final disposition of thecontro+ers between the parties. #ince it is more li&el that the decisionwould ha+e to be changed or modified after the new e+idence is presented, see no sense in lea+ing the uestion of its admission for resolution in theappeal, when after all the alread e+ident ultimate result would be to returnthe case to the trial court for its reception.
The other aspect of respondents= contention that the e+idence in+ol+ed inthese cases is not newl disco+ered is to m mind secondar. Assumingthere is some plausibilit in respondents= pose in this respect, ampersuaded ne+ertheless that substantial *ustice would be better attained badmitting the preferred e+idence, which as alread obser+ed, appears to beindubitable. The main opinion prefers to reser+e *udgment on this point, but feel it is more honest to sa that if new trial must be granted in these in spiteof the fact that petitioners ha+e alread ta&en their appeal within thereglementar period, it is onl because the facts anone can infer or deducefrom the e+idence being offered, which is documentar and official, are
apparentl more proimate to the truth, in the light of common eperience.
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As see it, the net result of 9ur decision cannot pre*udice the respondents. tis uite ob+ious that it is "ot G;2 and not "ot 304 that belongs to them, andthe do not pretend that the ha+e acuired more than one lot in $iedadEstate, so as to entitle them to both "ots G;2 and 304. The accident thatcaused the loss of their title, TCT 01G4; is no reason at all for courts toun*ustl enrich them b ad*udicating to them "ot 304, when all the ha+e todo is assert their right o+er "ot G;2 which is the one that appears recorded intheir name in the official records which up to now stand unchallenged, muchless impugned.
(ernan"o J. concurs.
EMILIO TUASON,petitioner, vs. COURT O APPEALS and MARIA
4ICTORIA L. TUASON, responents.
#@""A#
0. RE%EDA" "A)6 CB" $R9CEDRE6 RE"EF FR9% 8DH%ENT6
A""9)ED 9N"@ N ELCE$T9NA" CA#E# )?ERE T?ERE # N9
9T?ER ABA"A"E 9R ADE-ATE RE%ED@. / A petition for relief from
*udgment is an euitable remed6 it is allowed onl in eceptional cases
where there is no other a+ailable or adeuate remed. )hen a part has
another remed a+ailable to him, which ma be either a motion for new trial
or appeal from an ad+erse decision of the trial court, and he was not
pre+ented b fraud, accident, mista&e or ecusable negligence from filing
such motion or ta&ing such appeal, he cannot a+ail himself of this
petition. ndeed, relief will not be granted to a part who see&s a+oidance
from the effects of the *udgment when the loss of the remed at law was due
to his own negligence6 otherwise the petition for relief can be used to re+i+e
the right to appeal which ha+e been lost thru inecusable negligence.
7. D.6 D.6 D.6 )?EN ABA"ED %#T E A#ED 9N T?E HR9ND 9F
FRAD, ACCDENT, %#TAE 9R ELC#A"E NEH"HENCE AND
T?AT T # #?9)N T?AT $ETT9NER ?A# A H99D, ##TANTA"
AND %ERT9R9# DEFEN#E 9R CA#E 9F ACT9N. / A petition for
relief from *udgment is go+erned b Rule 5
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his opposition to pri+ate respondents motion for dissolution of the con*ugal
partnership of gains.
3. CB" "A)6 FA%"@ C9DE6 ANN"%ENT, DEC"ARAT9N 9F
N""T@ AND "EHA" #E$ARAT9N6 $R9#ECTNH ATT9RNE@ 9R
F#CA" %A@ E 9RDERED @ T?E C9RT T9 NTERBENE 9N E?A"F
9F T?E #TATE T9 $REBENT C9""#9N ET)EEN T?E $ARTE#. / A
grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation b default is fraught with
the danger of collusion. ?ence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of
nullit of marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting attorne or fiscal is
ordered to appear on behalf of the state for the purpose of pre+enting an
collusion between the parties and to ta&e care that their e+idence is not
fabricated or suppressed. f the defendant spouse fails to answer the
complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should
order the prosecuting attorne to determine if collusion eists between the
parties. The prosecuting attorne or fiscal ma oppose the application for
legal separation or annulment through the presentation of his own e+idence,
if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated.
This petition for re+iew on certiorari see&s to annul and set aside the decision
dated 8ul 74, 044; of the Court of Appeals in CA/H.R. CB No. 53471
dening petitioners appeal from an order of the Regional Trial Court, ranch
0;4, %a&ati in Ci+il Case No. 53G4.
This case arose from the following facts>
n 04
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who had been ta&ing prohibited drugs and had a serious affair with another
man6 that petitioners wor& as owner and operator of a radio and tele+ision
station eposed him to malicious gossip lin&ing him to +arious women in
media and the entertainment world6 and that since 04
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Q#ection 7. $etition to Court of First nstance for relief from *udgment or other
proceedings thereof. / )hen a *udgment or order is entered, or an other
proceeding is ta&en, against a part in a court of first instance through fraud,
accident, mista&e, or ecusable negligence, he ma file a petition in such
court and in the same cause praing that the *udgment, order or proceeding
be set aside.
nder the rules, a final and eecutor *udgment or order of the Regional Trial
Court ma be set aside on the ground of fraud, accident, mista&e or
ecusable negligence. n addition, the petitioner must assert facts showing
that he has a good, substantial and meritorious defense or cause of action.O00Pf the petition is granted, the court shall proceed to hear and determine the
case as if a timel motion for new trial had been granted therein. O07P
n the case at bar, the decision annulling petitioners marriage to pri+ate
respondent had alread become final and eecutor when petitioner failed to
appeal during the reglementar period. $etitioner howe+er claims that the
decision of the trial court was null and +oid for +iolation of his right to due
process. ?e contends he was denied due process when, after failing to
appear on two scheduled hearings, the trial court deemed him to ha+e
wai+ed his right to present e+idence and rendered *udgment on the basis of
the e+idence for pri+ate respondent. $etitioner *ustifies his absence at the
hearings on the ground that he was then Qconfined for medical and:or
rehabilitation reasons.O05Pn his affida+it of merit before the trial court, he
attached a certification b "t. Col. $laridel F. Bidal, Director of the Narcotics
Command, Drug Rehabilitation Center which states that on %arch 73, 0442
petitioner was admitted for treatment of drug dependenc at the Drug
Rehabilitation Center at Camp agong Diwa, icutan, Taguig, %etro %anila
of the $hilippine Constabular/ntegrated National $olice. O0;PThe records,
howe+er, show that the former counsel of petitioner did not inform the trialcourt of this confinement. And when the court rendered its decision, the
same counsel was out of the countr for which reason the decision became
final and eecutor as no appeal was ta&en therefrom.O01P
The failure of petitioners counsel to notif him on time of the ad+erse
*udgment to enable him to appeal therefrom is negligence which is not
ecusable. Notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon the client and the
neglect or failure of counsel to inform him of an ad+erse *udgment resulting in
the loss of his right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a *udgment
+alid and regular on its face.O0GP
#imilarl inecusable was the failure of his former counsel to inform the trial
court of petitioners confinement and medical treatment as the reason for his
non/appearance at the scheduled hearings. $etitioner has not gi+en an
reason wh his former counsel, intentionall or unintentionall, did not inform
the court of this fact. This led the trial court to order the case deemed
submitted for decision on the basis of the e+idence presented b the pri+ate
respondent alone. To compound the negligence of petitioners counsel, the
order of the trial court was ne+er assailed +ia a motion for reconsideration.
Clearl, petitioner cannot now claim that he was depri+ed of due
process. ?e ma ha+e lost his right to present e+idence but he was not
denied his da in court. As the records show, petitioner, through counsel,
acti+el participated in the proceedings below. ?e filed his answer to the
petition, cross/eamined pri+ate respondents witnesses and e+en submitted
his opposition to pri+ate respondents motion for dissolution of the con*ugal
partnership of gains.O03P
A petition for relief from *udgment is an euitable remed6 it is allowed onl in
eceptional cases where there is no other a+ailable or adeuate remed.
)hen a part has another remed a+ailable to him, which ma be either a
motion for new trial or appeal from an ad+erse decision of the trial court, and
he was not pre+ented b fraud, accident, mista&e or ecusable negligence
from filing such motion or ta&ing such appeal, he cannot a+ail himself of this
petition.O0
QArt. ;
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it to appear on behalf of the #tate to ta&e steps to pre+ent collusion between
the parties and to ta&e care that e+idence is not fabricated or suppressed.
n the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no *udgment shall be
based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of *udgment.
QArt. G2. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a stipulation offacts or a confession of *udgment.
n an case, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorne or fiscal assigned
to it to ta&e steps to pre+ent collusion between the parties and to ta&e care
that the e+idence is not fabricated or suppressed.O70P
A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation b default is fraught with
the danger of collusion.O77P?ence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of
nullit of marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting attorne or fiscal is
ordered to appear on behalf of the state for the purpose of pre+enting an
collusion between the parties and to ta&e care that their e+idence is notfabricated or suppressed. f the defendant spouse fails to answer the
complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should
order the prosecuting attorne to determine if collusion eists between the
parties.O75PThe prosecuting attorne or fiscal ma oppose the application for
legal separation or annulment through the presentation of his own e+idence,
if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated.O7;P9ur
Constitution is committed to the polic of strengthening the famil as a basic
social institution.O71P9ur famil law is based on the polic that marriage is not
a mere contract, but a social institution in which the state is +itall
interested. The state can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and
happ families. The brea& up of families wea&ens our social and moral fabric
and, hence, their preser+ation is not the concern alone of the famil
members.
The facts in the case at bar do not call for the strict application of Articles ; '0( submission of the progressbilling to E#?Rs Engineering Department6 '7( following/up of the
preparation of the $rogress $ament Certificate with the ?ead of the
-uantit #ur+eing Department6 and '5( following/up of the release of the
pament with one E+eln #an $ascual. F adhered to the procedures
agreed upon in all its billings for the period from %a 0, 0440 to 8une 52,
0447, submitting for the purpose the reuired uilders )or& #ummar, the
monthl progress billings, including an e+aluation of the wor& in accordance
with the $ro*ect %anagers nstructions '$%s( and the detailed +aluations
contained in the )or& Bariation 9rders ')B9s( for final re/measurement
under the $%s. F said that the +alues of the )B9s were contained in the
progress billings under the section QChange 9rders.OGP
From %a 0, 0440 to 8une 52, 0447, F submitted a total of 04 progress
billings following the procedure agreed upon. ased on $rogress illing Nos.
0 to 05, E#?R paid F $h$
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n its defense, E#?R claimed ha+ing o+erpaid F for $rogress illing Nos. 0
to 05 and, b wa of counterclaim with damages, as&ed that F be ordered
to refund the ecess paments. E#?R also charged F with incurring dela
and turning up with inferior wor& accomplishment.
Te RTC 9o$nd 9or 3
9n #eptember 75, 044G, the RTC, on the main finding that F, as
plaintiff a quo, is entitled to the pament of its claim co+ered b $rogress
illing Nos. 0; to 04 and to the retention mone corresponding to $rogress
illing Nos. 0 to 00, with interest in both instances, rendered *udgment for
F. The 7alloof the RTC Decision reads>
)?EREF9RE, defendants OE?#RP, RuOfPo . Colaco, Rufino ".
#amaniego, Cnthia del Castillo, uo& hoon Chen, and uo& hoon Tsen,
are *ointl and se+erall hereb ordered to>
0. $a plaintiff the sum of $7;,3
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';( Aggrie+ed, F filed before this Court a petition for re+iew of the CA
Decision, doc&eted as '.R. No. 1*0:--.O02P9n August 00, 044
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. )hether or not the OCAP committed gra+e abuse of discretion in not
holding respondent guilt of dela in the performance of its obligations and,
hence, liable for liuidated damages Oin +iew that respondent is guilt of
dela and that its wor&s were defecti+eP.
. )hether or not the OCAP committed gra+e abuse of discretion in finding
petitioners guilt of malice and e+idence bad faith, and in awarding moral andeemplar damages and attornes fees to respondent.
B. )hether or not the OCAP erred in setting aside its Resolution
dated August 05, 7222.O0;P
The petition has no merit.
$refatoril, it should be stressed that the second and third issues tendered
relate to the correctness of the CAs factual determinations, specificall on
whether or not F was in dela and had come up with defecti+e wor&s, and
whether or not petitioners were guilt of malice and bad faith. t is basic that
in an appeal b certiorari under Rule ;1, onl uestions of law ma be
presented b the parties and re+iewed b the Court.O01P 8ust as basic is the
rule that factual findings of the CA, affirmator of that of the trial court, are
final and conclusi+e on the Court and ma not be re+iewed on appeal, ecept
for the most compelling of reasons, such as when> '0( the conclusion is
grounded on speculations, surmises, or con*ectures6 '7( the inference is
manifestl mista&en, absurd, or impossible6 '5( there is gra+e abuse of
discretion6 ';( the *udgment is based on a misapprehension of facts6 '1( the
findings of fact are conflicting6 'G( such findings are contrar to the
admissions of both parties6 and '3( the CA manifestl o+erloo&ed certain
rele+ant e+idence and undisputed facts, that, if properl considered, would
*ustif a different conclusion.O0GP
n our re+iew of this case, we find that none of the abo+e eceptions obtains.
Accordingl, the factual findings of the trial court, as affirmed b the CA, that
there was dela on the part of E#?R, that there was no proof that Fs wor&
was defecti+e, and that petitioners were guilt of malice and bad faith, ought
to be affirmed.
Ad;issiress 3i==in> Nos. 17 to 1+,
PMIs and ?4Os
$etitioners fault the CA, and necessaril the trial court, on the matter of the
admission in e+idence of the photocopies of $rogress illing Nos. 0; to 04
and the complementing $%s and the )B9s. According to petitioners, F,
before being allowed to adduce in e+idence the photocopies ad+erted to,
ought to ha+e laid the basis for the presentation of the photocopies as
secondar e+idence, conformabl to the best e+idence rule.
Respondent F, on the other hand, a+ers ha+ing complied with the
laing/the/basis reuirement. Defending the action of the courts below in
admitting into e+idence the photocopies of the documents
aforementioned, F eplained that it could not present the original of the
documents since the were in the possession of E#?R which refused to
hand them o+er to F despite reuests.
)e agree with F. The onl actual rule that the term Qbest e+idence
denotes is the rule reuiring that the original of a writing must, as a general
proposition, be producedO03Pand secondar e+idence of its contents is not
admissible ecept where the original cannot be had. Rule 052, #ection 5 of
the Rules of Court enunciates the best e+idence rule:
#EC. 5. /riinal "ocu4ent 4ust @e pro"uce"2 e9ceptions. M )hen the
sub*ect of inuir is the contents of a document, no e+idence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself, ecept in the following
cases>
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/june2008/145842.htm#_ftn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/june2008/145842.htm#_ftn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/june2008/145842.htm#_ftn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/june2008/145842.htm#_ftn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/june2008/145842.htm#_ftn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/june2008/145842.htm#_ftn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/june2008/145842.htm#_ftn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/june2008/145842.htm#_ftn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/june2008/145842.htm#_ftn188/12/2019 Civil Procedure Cases (Judgements; Remedies and Execution)
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'a( )hen the original has been lost or destroed, or cannot be produced in
court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror6
"ina= is in te $stod& or $nder te ontro= o9 te part&
a>ainst o; te evidene is o99ered, and te =atter 9ai=s to prod$e ita9ter reasona
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Clearl, the circumstances obtaining in this case fall under the eception
under #ec. 5'b( of Rule 052. n other words, the conditions sine qua nonfor
the presentation and reception of the photocopies of the original document
as secondar e+idence ha+e been met. These are> '0( there is proof of the
original documents eecution or eistence6 '7( there is proof of the cause of
the original documents una+ailabilit6 and '5( the offeror is in good faith.O04P)hile perhaps not on all fours because it in+ol+ed a chec&, what the Court
said inMa"a-ao '. >eople, is +er much apt, thus>
To warrant the admissibilit of secondar e+idence when the original of
a writing is in the custod or control of the ad+erse part, #ection G of Rule
052 pro+ides that the ad+erse part must be gi+en reasonable notice, that he
fails or refuses to produce the same in court and that the offeror offers
satisfactor proof of its eistence.
The mere fact that the original of the writing is in the custod or control of the
part against whom it is offered does not warrant the admission of secondar
e+idence. The offeror must pro+e that he has done all in his power to secure
the best e+idence b gi+ing notice to the said part to produce the document.
The notice ma be in the form of a motion for the production of the original or
made in open court in the presence of the ad+erse part or 'iaa su@poena
"uces tecu4, pro+ided that the part in custod of the original has sufficient
time to produce the same. ?en s$ part& as te ori>ina= o9 te
ritin> and does not vo=$ntari=& o99er to prod$e it or re9$ses to
prod$e it, seondar& evidene ;a&
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as ma be recalled further, the appellate court nullified its August 05,
0444 Resolution on the basis of #ec. 1, Rule 54, which pro+ides>
#ec. 1. 877ect o7 re'ersal o7 e9ecute" ?u"4ent. M )here the
eecuted *udgment is re+ersed totall or partiall, or annulled, on appeal or
otherwise, the trial court ma, on motion, issue such orders of restitution or
reparation of damages as euit and *ustice ma warrant under the
circumstances.
9n the strength of the aforeuoted pro+ision, the appellate court
correctl dismissed E#?Rs claim for restitution of its garnished deposits,
the eecuted appealed RTC Decision in Ci+il Case No. G5;51 ha+ing in fact
been upheld in toto.
t is true that the Courts Decision of August 00, 044< in H.R. No. 057G11
recogni!ed the +alidit of the issuance of the desired restitution order. tbears to emphasi!e, howe+er, that the CA had since then decided CA/H.R.
CB No. 13544, the main case,on the merits when it affirmed the underling
RTC Decision in Ci+il Case No. G5;51. This CA Decision on the original and
main case effecti+el rendered our decision on the incidental procedural
matter on restitution moot and academic. Allowing restitution at this point
would not ser+e an purpose, but onl prolong an alread protracted
litigation.
'.R. No. 17-82*
$etitioner Roas/del Castillo, in her separate petition, ecepts from the CA
Decision affirming, in its entiret, the RTC Decision holding her, with the
other indi+idual petitioners in H.R. No. 0;1
. T?E OCAP ERRED N N9T DEC"ARNH T?AT T?E
DEC#9N 9F T?E TRA" C9RT AD8DHNH $ETT9NER
$ER#9NA""@ "A"E T9 RE#$9NDENT B9D F9R N9T #TATNH T?E
FACTA" AND "EHA" A## F9R #C? A)ARD.
. T?E OCAP ERRED N N9T R"NH T?AT A# F9R%ER
DRECT9R, $ETT9NER CANN9T E ?E"D $ER#9NA""@ "A"E F9RAN@ A""EHED REAC? 9F A C9NTRACT ENTERED NT9 @ T?E
C9R$9RAT9N.
. T?E OCAP ERRED N N9T R"NH T?AT RE#$9NDENT #
N9T ENTT"ED T9 AN A)ARD 9F %9RA" DA%AHE#.
B. T?E OCAP ERRED N ?9"DNH $ETT9NER $ER#9NA""@
"A"E T9 RE#$9NDENT F9R ELE%$"AR@ DA%AHE#.
B. T?E OCAP ERRED N N9T R"NH T?AT RE#$9NDENT #
N9T ENTT"ED T9 AN@ A)ARD 9F ATT9RNE@# FEE#.O77P
First off, Roas/del Castillo submits that the RTC decision in uestion+iolated the reuirements of due process and of #ec. 0;, Article B of the
Constitution that states, QNo decision shall be rendered b an court without
epressing therein clearl and distinctl the facts and the law on which it is
based.
Roas/del Castillos threshold posture is correct. ndeed, the RTC decision in
uestion, as couched, does not pro+ide the factual or legal basis for holding
her personall liable under the premises. n fact, onl in the dispositi+e
portion of the decision did her solidar liabilit crop up. And sa+e for her
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inclusion as part defendant in the underling complaint, no reference is
made in other pleadings thus filed as to her liabilit.
The Court notes that the appellate court, b its affirmator ruling, effecti+el
recogni!ed the applicabilit of the doctrine on piercing the +eil of the separate
corporate identit. nder the circumstances of this case, we cannot allow
such application. A corporation, upon coming to eistence, is in+ested b lawwith a personalit separate and distinct from those of the persons composing
it. 9wnership b a single or a small group of stoc&holders of nearl all of the
capital stoc& of the corporation is not, without more, sufficient to disregard
the fiction of separate corporate personalit.O75PThus, obligations incurred b
corporate officers, acting as corporate agents, are not theirs but direct
accountabilities of the corporation the represent. #olidar liabilit on the part
of corporate officers ma at times attach, but onl under eceptional
circumstances, such as when the act with malice or in bad faith. O7;PAlso, in
appropriate cases, the +eil of corporate fiction shall be disregarded when the
separate *uridical personalit of a corporation is abused or used to commit
fraud and perpetrate a social in*ustice, or used as a +ehicle to e+ade
obligations.O71Pn this case, no act of malice or li&e dishonest purpose is
ascribed on petitioner Roas/del Castillo as to warrant the lifting of the
corporate +eil.
The abo+e conclusion would still hold e+en if petitioner Roas/del Castillo, at
the time E#?R defaulted in paing Fs monthl progress bill, was still a
director, for, before she could be held personall liable as corporate director,
it must be shown that she acted in a manner and under the circumstances
contemplated in #ec. 50 of the Corporation Code, which reads>
#ection 50. Directors or trustees whoi==9$==& or Gnoin>=& vote 9or or
assent to patent=& $n=a9$= ats o9 te orporation or a$ire an&
pe$niar& interest in on9=itwith their dut as such directors or trustees
shall be liable *ointl and se+erall for all damages resulting therefrom
suffered b the corporation, its stoc&holders or members and other persons.
'Emphasis ours.(
)e do not find anthing in the testimon of one Crispin alingit to indicate
that Roas/del Castillo made an misrepresentation respecting the pament
of the bills in uestion. alingit, in fact, testified that the submitted but unpaid
billings were still being e+aluated. Further, in the said testimon, in no
instance was bad faith imputed on Roas/del Castillo.
Not lost on the Court are some material dates. As it were, the contro+ers
between the principal parties started in 8ul 0447 when Roas/del Castillo no
longer sat in the E#?R oard, a realit F does not appear to dispute. n
fine, she no longer had an participation in E#?Rs corporate affairs when
what basicall is the E#?R/F dispute erupted. Familiar and fundamental is
the rule that contracts are binding onl among parties to an agreement. Art.
0500 of the Ci+il Code is clear on this point>
Article 0500. Contracts ta&e effect onl between the parties, their assigns
and heirs, ecept in cases where the rights and obligations are not
transmissible b their nature, or b stipulation or b pro+ision of law.
n the instant case, Roas/del Castillo could not plausibl be held liable for
breaches of contract committed b E#?R nor for the alleged wrongdoings ofits go+erning board or corporate officers occurring after she se+ered official
ties with the hotel management.
Hi+en the foregoing perspecti+e, the other issues raised b Roas/del
Castillo as to her liabilit for moral and eemplar damages and attornes
fees are now moot and academic.
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And her other arguments insofar the indirectl impact on the liabilit of
E#?R need not detain us an longer for we ha+e sufficientl passed upon
those concerns in our re+iew of H.R. No. 0;1
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decisions cannot be eecuted where the period of time for the defendant to
perfect his appeal has not et epired. Thus>
#ec. 77. '$ 074( I#ppellate ?uris"iction. B Regional Trial Courts shall
eercise appellate *urisdiction o+er all cases decided b %etropolitan Trial
Courts, %unicipal Trial Courts and %unicipal Circuit Trial Courts in their
respecti+e territorial *urisdiction. #uch cases shall be decided on the basis of
the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such
memoranda and:or briefs as ma be submitted b the parties or reuired bthe Regional Trial Courts. 6he "ecision o7 the ,6 in such cases shall @e
appeala@le @- petition 7or re'iew to the Anter4e"iate #ppellate ourt which
4a- i'e it "ue course onl- when the petition shows pri4a 7acie that the
lower court has co44itte" an error o7 7act or law that will warrant a re'ersal
or 4o"i7ications o7 the "ecision or ?u"4ent souht to @e
re'iewe". 'Emphasis supplied.(
t is useful at this point to re+iew the distinction between a final *udgment
and one which has become final and eecutor.
n >C=6 84plo-ees Dnion '. >C=6 (ree 6elephone
. . . 'A(n order or *udgment is deemed final when it finall disposes of the
pending action so that nothing more can be done with it in the trial court. n
other words, a final order is that which gi+es an end to the litigation . . . when
the order or *udgment does not dispose of the case completel but lea+es
something to be done upon the merits, it is merel interlocutor.
The case of#ntonio '. *a4onte2elaborated on this matter thus>
A final order of *udgment finall disposes of, ad*udicates, or determines therights, or some right or rights of the parties, either on the entire contro+ers
or on some definite and separate branch thereof, and concludes them until it
is re+ersed or set aside . . .)here no issue is left for future consideration,
ecept the fact of compliance or non/compliance with the terms of the
*udgment or order, such *udgment or order is final and appealable.
contrast, in An'est4ents Anc. '. ourt o7 #ppeals, 8we declared>
Now, a final *udgment in the sense *ust described becomes final upon
epiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been dul
perfected or, an appeal therefrom ha+ing been ta&en, the *udgment of the
appellate tribunal in turn becomes final and the records of the case are
returned to the Court of origin. The final *udgment is then correctl
categori!ed as a final and eecutor *udgment in respect to which, as the
law eplicitl pro+ides, eecution shall issue as a matter of right. t bears
stressing that onl a final *udgment or order, i.e., a *udgment or order that
finall dispose of the action of proceeding can become final and eecutor.
A *udgment becomes final and eecutor b operation of law. Finalit of
*udgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementar period toappeal if no appeal is perfected. n such a situation, the pre+ailing part is
entitled to a writ of eecution, and issuance thereof is a ministerial dut of the
court.
oth RA G250 and $ 074 pro+ide that decisions of the regional trial court in
its appellate capacit ma be ele+ated to the Court of Appeals in a petition
for re+iew. n effect, both laws recogni!e that such *udgments are final in
the sense that the finall dispose of, ad*udicate, or determine the rights of
the parties in the case. ut such *udgments are not et final and eecutor
pending the epiration of the reglementar period for appeal. During that
period, eecution of the *udgment cannot et be demanded b the winning
part as a matter of right.
n the present case, the pri+ate respondent had up to 8une 71, 0440, to
appeal the decision of the regional trial court. The motion for eecution was
filed b the petitioner on 8une 02, 0440, before the epiration of the said
reglementar period. As the decision had not et become final and eecutor
on that date, the motion was premature and should therefore not ha+e been
granted. Contrar to the petitioner=s contention, what the trial court authori!ed
was an eecution pending appeal.
)hile it is true that eecution pending appeal is allowed under Rule 54, #ec.
7, of the Rules of Court, this pro+ision must be strictl construed, being an
eception to the general rule. The reason allowing this &ind of eecution must
be of such urgenc as to outweigh the in*ur or damage of the losing part
should it secure a re+ersal of the *udgment on appeal. Absent an such
*ustification, the order of eecution must be struc& down as flawed with gra+e
abuse of discretion. +
)e see no such *ustification in the case before us.
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t is worth remar&ing that as the case was not tried under the Rule on
#ummar procedure, the writ of eecution did not e+en fall under the
following #ection 0< thereof >
d( #ec. 0
nder the Rules of Court the immediate enforcement of a writ of e*ectment
eecution is carried out b gi+ing the defendant notice of such writ, and
ma&ing a demand that defendants compl therewith within a reasonable
period, normall from three '5( to fi+e '1( das, and it is onl after such period
that the sheriff enforces the writ b the bodil remo+al of the defendant and
his personal belonging. 10
9n the issue of the propriet of a special ci+il action for certiorarito assail an
order of eecution pending appeal, this Court has held that I
. . . Although #ec. 0, Rule GG of the Rules of Court pro+ides that the special
ci+il action of certiorarima onl be in+o&ed when there is no appeal, nor anplain, speed and adeuate remed in the 'ordinar( course of law this rule
is not without eception. The a+ailabilit of the ordinar course of appeal
does not constitute sufficient ground to pre+ent a part from ma&ing use of
the etraordinar remed of certiorariwhere the appeal is not an adeuate
remed or euall beneficial, speed and sufficient. t is the ina"equac-
B not the mere absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure
of *ustice without merit that usuall determines the propriet of certiorari. 1*
)hile appeal is normall emploed to uestion an order or writ which +aries
the terms of the decision being eecuted, it is ne+ertheless not the sole and
eclusi+e remed. The special ci+il action of certiorariand prohibition underRule G1 was a+ailable to the pri+ate respondent on the allegation that the
regional trial court, in issuing the writ of eecution, committed gra+e abuse of
discretion and acted beond its *urisdiction and that the ordinar remed of
appeal was inadeuate.
The last uestion to be resol+ed is, assuming that the decision of the regional
trial court had alread become final and eecutor, could the said court
order its eecutionJ
The rule is that if the *udgment of the metropolitan trial court is appealed to
the regional trial court and the decision of the latter is itself ele+ated to theCourt of Appeals, whose decision thereafter became final, the case should
be remanded through the regional trial court to the metropolitan trial court for
eecution. 17The onl eception is the eecution pending appeal, which can
be issued b the regional trial court under #ec. < of Rule 32 or the Court of
Appeals or the #upreme Court under #ec. 02 of the same Rule.
As pre+iousl obser+ed, the petitioner has shown no weight *ustification for
the application of the eception. ?ence, the respondent court committed no
error in re+ersing the Regional Trial Court of %anila and annulling the writ of
eecution issued b it on 8une 02, 0440, pending appeal of its decision.
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ACC9RDNH"@, the petition is D#%##ED, and the challenged decision of
the Court of Appeals is AFFR%ED intoto. No costs.
#9 9RDERED.
Ear'asa Melencio)0errera Futierre Jr. >aras (eliciano >a"illa i"in
Frio)#quino Me"ial"ea ,eala"o =a'i"e Jr. an" ,o4ero JJ. concur.
(ernan .J. is on lea'e.
ICTOR '. 4ALENCIA,petitioner, vs. COURT O APPEALS, HON.
TEOISTO T. 'UIN'ONA, JR., as Ee$tive Seretar&, HON. ERNESTO
'ARILAO, Seretar& o9 A>rarian Re9or;, CRISOSTOMO M. CORPIN,
Re>iona= (iretor, (AR Re>ion 4II, SANTOS 'AR'AFA, JULIANO
MA'(AFAO, CRESCENCIANO RIAS, E(ERICO JARE, ROSEN(O
LO3RESCO, ERNESTO LO3RESCO, ELICIANO LO3RESCO,
CATALINO MANTAC, 4ICTORIANO MONTE)ALCON, RANCISCO
O3AN', AM3ROSIO SEMILLANO, RO'ELIO TAMAFO and E(IL3ERTO
LO3RESCO,responents.
( E C I S I O N
3ELLOSILLO, !.6
T?E TENANC@ CR## N T?E $?"$$NE# is not *ust of recent
+intage. ?istor is replete with instances where tenant/farmers, relegated to
a life of perpetual bondage, ha+e rushed onto the battlefield with hopes of
freedom from imminent thralldom, aptl described b $rofessor ?arold 8.
"as&i as the normal life of the poor / their perpetual fear of the morrow, their
haunting sense of impending disaster, their fitful search for beaut that
perpetuall eludes them.
E+er administration that too& o+er the reins of go+ernment saw the gra+it
of this problem. Thus, each offered to the tenant/tillers its own +ersion of the
appropriate legislation for their emancipation.
6he#ricultural 6enanc- #ct o7 1GHI 'R. A. No. 0044(, the initial attempt of
$resident %agsasa at agrarian reform, was concei+ed as a remedial
legislation to uplift the social and economic status of tenants. t was
insinuated in the legislati+e deliberations that se+eral pro+isions therein
operated to depri+e the landowner of his right to contract and his right topropert without due process of law. ut, it was also argued, this in+ol+ed
societal +alues and the agricultural tenanc act was meant to remed an
eisting social e+il. ?ence, all tenanc laws that followed thereafter were
crafted along this line. This case is now being scrutini!ed and tested against
the bedroc& of legal and euitable safeguards to achie+e a trul successful
and balanced agrarian reform initiati+e.
For more than a uarter of a centur petitioner Bictor H. Balencia, a
go+ernment retiree, sought *ustice through administrati+e and *udicial
channels to regain possession of his two '7( parcels of land which he claims
to ha+e been un*ustl withheld from him b persons claiming to be tenants
with the ostensible complicit of go+ernment officials implementing the
agrarian reform program. n the meantime his appeal for fairness and *ustice
was denied him through procedural infirmities. )e are now as&ed to probe
into his lonel plight with a reminder that it is our solemn dut to dispense
eual *ustice to the rich and the poor.
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9n 3 %a 0413 Bictor H. Balencia acuired the first parcel co+ered b TCT
No. ?/T/053 from a certain onifacio #upnet. The onl tenant of the propert
at that time was a certain Digo esario who was succeeded b his son
8esus esario. 9n 7 8ul 04G0 Balencia and 8esus esario terminated their
landlord/tenant relationship through a public instrument +oluntaril eecuted
b them, thus re+erting the actual phsical possession of the propert to
petitioner Balencia.
9n 77 9ctober 04G7 Balencia entered into a ten '02(/ear ci+il law leaseagreement o+er his two '7( parcels of land with a certain Hlicerio
?enson. efore the ten '02(/ear lease epired, apparentl without ob*ection
from ?enson, Balencia leased the propert for fi+e '1( ears to Fr. Andres
Flores under a ci+il law lease concept beginning 70 August 0432 or until 52
8une 0431 after which the lease was cancelled and inscribed as Entr No.
013< in TCT No. ?/T/053. The lease agreement between Balencia and Fr.
Flores was sub*ect to a prohibition against subleasing or encumbering the
land without Balencias written consent. This was admitted b the parties as
reflected in the DAR An'estiation ,eport an" ,eco44en"ations.O7PThe
prohibition against subleasing or encumbering of the land apparentlincluded the prohibition against installing a leasehold tenant
thereon. ncidentall, it ma be mentioned that in the prior lease agreement
with ?enson no such prohibition was stipulated.
During the period of his lease, ?enson instituted Crescenciano Frias and
%arciano Frias to wor& on the propert, although onl Crescenciano Frias
apparentl remained in the land while %arciano Frias must ha+e abandoned
his cause if an, as he was not impleaded in this case6 neither did he appear
on record to ha+e been issued a C"T in his name.
During the lease of Fr. Andres Flores, he designated Francisco 9bang 'as
o+erseer(, Rogelio Tamao, Federico 8are, Feliciano "obresco, %elchor
%oncada, Rosendo "obresco, Bictoriano %ontefalcon, #antos Hargaa,
Catalino %antac, ?erodita #emillano, Ernesto "obresco, Nati+idad "obresco
and Alfredo Demerin, along with Crescenciano and %arciano Frias, to
culti+ate the land. These farmhands shared their produce with Fr.
Flores. #ubseuentl, Francisco 9bang, #antos Hargaa, Crescenciano
Frias, Federico 8are, Rosendo "obresco, 8uliano %agdaao, Ernesto
"obresco, Feliciano "obresco, Catalino %antac, Bictoriano %ontefalcon,
Ambrosio #emillano, Rogelio Tamao and Edilberto "obresco, became
recipients of C"Ts and are collecti+el referred to herein as pri+ate
respondents.
)hen the lease agreement between Balencia and Fr. Flores epired on 52
8une 0431, Balencia demanded that pri+ate respondents +acate the
premises. nstead of compling with the demand, the refused and
continued culti+ating the land despite the demand for them to
+acate. Balencia wanted to regain possession of his propert so he could
wor& it b administration, ha+ing in fact appointed ernie autista as
o+erseer until petitioner could retire from the go+ernment ser+ice.
n his initial step in his long and agoni!ing *ourne, Balencia filed a letter ofprotest with the %inister of Agrarian Reform to ta&e bac& the actual
possession of his propert that was sub*ect of the ci+il law lease
agreement. 9n 72 %arch 043G his letter was referred to the DAR Regional
9ffice in Cebu Cit.
%eanwhile, without the &nowledge much less consent of Balencia, pri+ate
respondents applied for Certificates of "and Transfer 'C"Ts( under the
9peration "and Transfer '9"T( $rogram pursuant to $residential Decree No.
73 claiming the were @ona 7i"etenants of the propert.
9n 02 December 04
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;. Federico 8are a( 2/30030 2072 2.;G22 ha.
b( 2/30037 2070 2.7122 ha.
1. Rosendo "obresco a( 2/2300
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under R. A. No. GG13 otherwise &nown as 6heo4prehensi'e #rarian
,e7or4 Caw.
9n < 9ctober 0445 Eecuti+e #ecretar Teofisto Huingona, 8r., b authorit
of the $resident, affirmed the order of the DAR of 07 8ul 0440 sub*ect to the
modification that the area acuired b petitioner Balencia as homestead be
ecluded from the co+erage of $. D. No. 73.
Balencia then brought his case to the Court of Appeals contending that theEecuti+e #ecretar erred in recogni!ing pri+ate respondents as tenants and
disallowing him and his se+en '3( Qcompulsor heirs from eercising their
right of retention under R. A. No. GG13. ?owe+er, in a decision promulgated
on 73 8ul 0441 the Court of Appeals dismissed the case on a technical
ground, i.e., that his appeal was filed out of time. O4PThe appellate court ruled
that petitioner should ha+e filed with it a petition for re+iew within fifteen '01(
das from receipt of the order of the DAR #ecretar pursuant to #ec. 1; of R.
A. No. GG13 and #upreme Court Adm. Circ. No. 0/41, instead of ele+ating the
case to the 9ffice of the $resident pursuant to DAR %emo. Circ. No. 5,
series of 044;. ?ence, according to the Court of Appeals, the petition of
Balencia was filed out of time.
9n 77 #eptember 0441 petitioners motion for reconsideration was
denied. n its Resolution the Court of Appeals, citing *hell >hilippines Anc.
'. entral ankO02Pheld that in case of discrepanc between the basic law
and a rule or regulation issued to implement the law, the basic law pre+ails
because the rule or regulation cannot go beond the terms and pro+isions of
the basic law.O00PThus, DAR %emo. Circ. No. 5, series of 044;, according to
the Court of Appeals, cannot be considered +alid and effecti+e since it runs
counter to #ec. 1; of R. A. No. GG13 which pro+ides for an appeal from an
decision, order, award or ruling b the DAR to the Court of Appeals.O07P"i&ewise, the appellate court held that the doctrine of ehaustion of
administrati+e remedies does not appl in the present case where the
respondent is a Department #ecretar whose acts, as alter ego of the
$resident, bear the implied appro+al of the latter.O05P
Balencia filed this >etition 7or ,e'iew on ertiorariunder Rule ;1 of the
Rules of Court see&ing to re+erse and set aside the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA/H.R. #$ No. 57GG4 dated 73 8ul 0441 as well as its
Resolution dening his %otion for Reconsideration of 77 #eptember 0441.
$etitioner contends that DAR %emo. Circ. No. 5, series of 044;, is +alid not
being contrar to law and *urisprudence, and should be accorded respect
being the Agrarian Reform #ecretars construction of the law that his
Department administers and implements.
$ublic respondents, on the other hand, a+er that #ecs. 01 and 72 of oo& B
of E. 9. No. 747 which are cited as the legal bases of DAR %emo. Circ. No.
5 refer to the procedure for administrati+e appeals from an agenc to the
Department ?ead which in this case is the DAR through its #ecretar. The
argue that there is no pro+ision for appeal to the 9ffice of the $resident since
in the administrati+e structure the #ecretar of Agrarian Reform is the alterego of the $resident. The contend that #ec. 75 of oo& B cites the finalit
of the decision of the appellate agenc without pro+iding for a further appeal,
and that #ec. 71 pro+ides for *udicial re+iew from an agenc decision, as the
point to #ec. 1; of R. A. No. GG13 O0;Pand #C Adm. Circ. No. 0/41.O01P
)e agree with petitioner. nterpreting and harmoni!ing laws with laws is the
best method of interpretation. Anterpretare et concor"are lees lei@us est
opti4us interpretan"i 4o"us.O0GPThis manner of construction would pro+ide a
complete, consistent and intelligible sstem to secure the rights of all persons
affected b different legislati+e and uasi/legislati+e acts. )here two '7(
rules on the same sub*ect, or on related sub*ects, are apparentl in conflict
with each other, the are to be reconciled b construction, so far as ma be,
on an fair and reasonable hpothesis. Balidit and legal effect should
therefore be gi+en to both, if this can be done without destroing the e+ident
intent and meaning of the later act. E+er statute should recei+e such a
construction as will harmoni!e it with the pre/eisting bod of laws.
?armoni!ing DAR %emo. Circ. No. 5, series of 044;, with #C Adm. Circ. No.
0/41 and #ec. 1; of R. A. No. GG13 would be consistent with promoting the
ends of substantial *ustice for all parties see&ing the protecti+e mantle of the
law. To reconcile and harmoni!e them, due consideration must be gi+en to
the purpose for which each was promulgated. The purpose of DAR %emo.
Circ. No. 5, series of 044;, is to pro+ide a mode of appeal for matters not
falling within the *urisdictional ambit of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Ad*udication oard 'DARA( under R. A. No. GG13 and correct technical
errors of the administrati+e agenc. n such eceptional cases, the
Department #ecretar has established a mode of appeal from the
Department of Agrarian Reform to the 9ffice of the $resident as a plain,
speed, adeuate and inepensi+e remed in the ordinar course of
law. This would enable the 9ffice of the $resident, through the Eecuti+e
#ecretar, to re+iew technical matters within the epertise of the
administrati+e machiner before *udicial re+iew can be resorted to b wa of
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an appeal to the Court of Appeals under Rule ;5 of the 0443 Rules on Ci+il
$rocedure.
9n the other hand, the purpose of #C Adm. Circ. No. 0/41, now embodied in
Rule ;5 of the 0443 Rules of Ci+il $rocedure, is to in+o&e the constitutional
power of *udicial re+iew o+er uasi/*udicial agencies, such as the Department
of Agrarian Reform under R. A. No. GG13 and the 9ffice of the $resident in
other cases b pro+iding for an appeal to the Court of Appeals. #ection 1; of
R. A. No. GG13 is consistent with #C Adm. Circ. No. 0/41 and Rule ;5 in thatit establishes a mode of appeal from the DARA to the Court of Appeals.
n#nara '. 8lectoral o44issionthis Court upheld the promulgation of the
rules of procedure of the Commission since the were necessar to the
proper eercise of its epress power to hear and decide election contests
in+ol+ing members of the legislature, although not specificall granted b the
Constitution or statute.O03P)e ruledO0
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protracted conflict that has lasted o+er twent/fi+e '71( ears. )e are
resol+ing the uestion at this point to bring this case once and for all to a *ust,
fair and euitable conclusion. )here there are clear errors of law this Court
must eercise its constitutional power of *udicial re+iew to correct such errors.
The substanti+e issue to be resol+ed ma be epressed in this manner> Can
a contract of ci+il law lease prohibit a ci+il law lessee from emploing a tenant
on the land sub*ect matter of the lease agreementJ 9therwise stated, can
petitioners ci+il law lessee, Fr. Flores, install tenants on the sub*ect premiseswithout epress authorit to do so under Art. 0G;4 of the Ci+il Code, more so
when the lessee is epressl prohibited from doing so, as in the instant
caseJ
Contrar to the impression of pri+ate respondents, #ec. G of R. A. No. 5arties to #ricultural Ceasehol",elations, which assumes that there is alread a leasehold tenant on the
land6 not until then. This is precisel what we are still as&ed to determine in
the instant proceedings.
To better understand #ec. G, let us refer to its precursor, #ec. < of R. A. No.
0044, as amended.O75PAgain, #ec. < of R. A. No. 0044 assumes the eistence
of a tenanc relation. As its epigraph suggests, it is a QCi4itation o7 ,elation,
and the purpose is merel to limit the tenanc Qto the person who furnishes
the land, either as owner, lessee, usufructuar, or legal possessor, and to the
person who actuall wor&s the land himself with the aid of labor a+ailable
from within his immediate farm household. 9nce the tenanc relation is
established, the parties to that relation are limited to the persons therein
stated. 9b+iousl, inherent in the right of landholders to install a tenant is
their authorit-to do so6 otherwise, without such authorit- ci'il law lessees as
lan"hol"ers cannot install a tenant on the lan"hol"in. Eeither *ec. o7 ,.
#. Eo. LII nor *ec. o7 ,. #. Eo. 11GG auto4aticall- authories the
persons na4e" therein to e4plo- a tenant on the lan"hol"in.
According to %r. 8ustice Huillermo #. #antos and CAR Eecuti+e 8udge
Artemio C. %acalino, respected authorities on agrarian reform, the reason for
#ec. G of R. A. No. 5
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aid of labor a+ailable from within his immediate farm household, it eliminated
the nominal tenant or middleman from the picture.O7GP
Another noted authorit on land reform, Dean 8eremias . %ontemaor,O73Peplains the rationale for #ec. < of R. A. No. 0044, the precursor of #ec. G
of R. A. No. 5
*ince the law esta@lishes a special relationship in tenanc- with i4portant
consequences it properl- pinpoints the persons to who4 sai" relationshipshall appl-. 6he spirit o7 the law is to pre'ent @oth lan"hol"er a@senteeis4
an" tenant a@senteeis4. 6hus it woul" see4 that the "iscretionar- powers
an" i4portant "uties o7 the lan"hol"er like the choice o7 crop or see"
cannot @e le7t to the will or capacit- o7 an aent or o'erseer ?ust as the
culti'ation o7 the lan" cannot @e entruste" @- the tenant to so4e other
people. 6enanc- relationship has @een hel" to @e o7 a personal character.O7are?aO55Pthe agricultural leasehold
relations were preser+ed because the Qlegal possessors therein were clearl
clothed with legal authorit or capacit to install tenants. ut e+en assuming
that the were not so authori!ed as in the >oncecase where the ci+il law
lessee was epressl barred from installing a tenant under their contract oflease, the subseuent actions of the landowners in etending the lifetime of
the lease, or in negotiating for better terms with the tenants, placed the
landowners in estoppel to contest the agricultural leasehold
relations. Conseuentl, the tenants in those cases ma be categori!ed as
tenants "e ?ureen*oing tenurial securit guaranteed b the Agricultural
Tenanc "aw, now b the Agricultural "and Reform Code, as amended. This
is not the case before us.
t must be noted that Balencia ne+er etended the term of the ci+il law lease,
nor did he negotiate with respondents for Qbetter terms upon the epiration
of the lease. ?e wanted precisel to reco+er possession of the propert
upon the epiration of the contract on 52 8une 0431, ecept from %antac
with whom he alread entered into a tenanc contract as herein before
stated. Balencia appointed an o+erseer to prepare for his e+entual ta&eo+er
and to culti+ate the propert through labor administration after his long ears
in the go+ernment ser+ice. Beril, the intention of Balencia after the
epiration of the lease contract was for him to culti+ate the land b
administration, or b himself, and not to surrender possession, much less
ownership, to the pri+ate respondents.
There ma be apprehensions that should #ec. G of R. A. No. 5
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b reason alone of the acuiescence b petitioner to the continued
possession of the propert.
The Department of Agrarian Reform in Fanonmade the factual
determination that the agreement entered into between Florisco anhaw
'one of the respondents( and Carolina ". Han!on 'petitioner( was a ci+il law
lease. ?owe+er, there was no e+idence to pro+e that the other defendants in
that case allegedl instituted as tenants were sharing or paing rentals to
Florisco anhaw or to the landowner. The DAR held that mere allegationwithout the corresponding receipts would not sufficientl establish a tenanc
relationship especiall since there was an epress prohibition in the ci+il law
lease contract from subleasing the sub*ect land to an other person. O51P
From the foregoing discussion, it is reasonable to conclude that a ci+il law
lessee cannot auto4aticall- institutetenants on the propert under to #ec. G
of R. A. No. 5
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stating for the record that such stipulation barring the subletting of the
propert was +iolated b Fr. Flores when he subleased the sub*ect parcels of
land to pri+ate respondents.O;
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0. The area acuired b petitioner Bictor H. Balencia under his ?omestead
Application No. ?A/750G20 with Final $roof and Ta Declaration No. 2101 is
ELC"DED from the co+erage of $res. Decree No. 73, hence, must be
retained b him6
7. The Certificates of "and Transfer 'C"Ts( issued to pri+ate respondents
#antos Hargaa 'C"T No. 2/2300G2(, 8uliano %agdaao 'C"Ts Nos. 2/
2300G0, 2/2300G5, 2/2300GG K 2/230031(, Crescenciano Frias 'C"T No. 2/
2300G;(, Federico 8are 'C"Ts Nos. 2/230030 K 2/230037(, Rosendo"obresco 'C"Ts Nos. 2/2300