Civil Society Syria

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State and Civil Society in SyriaAuthor(s): Raymond A. HinnebuschSource: Middle East Journal, Vol. 47, No. 2 (Spring, 1993), pp. 243-257Published by: Middle East InstituteStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4328570

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STATEAND CIVIL SOCIETYIN SYRIARaymondA. Hinnebusch

'' A SADSESCU"-the graffition Damascuswalls reputedlyread whenthe Rumanian egimeof Nicolae Ceau?escu,ostensiblysimilar o Hafizal-Asad'sSyria, succumbed to revolution at the end of 1989.The widespreadcollapse ofauthoritarianismhas given more credibility to claims that "modernization"broadens the base of pluralism.In erodingprimordialsolation and generatingamultitudeof interests, it creates a mobilizedcomplex society which, beyond acertainthreshold,arguablycannotbe governedwithoutpoliticalliberalization.A key variable in a stable pluralisttransition is a viable civil society, anetworkof voluntaryassociations, sufficientlyautonomousof state and primor-dial community, to bridge societal cleavages while bufferingsociety from, yetlinking it to, state power. In Syria's case, "traditional"associations, such asguilds,religiousbrotherhoods,andmosques-which grewdirectlyout of premod-ernquarters,villages, andfamilies-are legitimateelementsof civil society. Withmodernization,many adaptedand survived; they were, moreover,joined by aproliferationof "modern"parties, professionalsyndicates,unions, andbusinessassociations.EasternEuropeapparentlyhas passedthe pluralist hreshold, while in LatinAmericaandEast Asia authoritarianegimeshaveretreatedbefore morecomplexsocieties. The Middle East is not immune;in Egypt and Jordanregimes havefound thatthe effectivegoverningof a moremobilizedcitizenryrequirespluralistconcessions such as a multipartysystem and a freer press. The 1992electoralvictory of the Islamic Salvation Front and subsequentmilitarycoup d'etat inAlgeriasuggest the alternative s massive repressionandinstability. In Syria, nocopycat uprisingfollowed Ceau?escu'sdemise, and authoritarian ule appearsRaymond A. Hinnebusch is professor of political science, College of St. Catherine, St. Paul, MN.

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remarkablydurable n spite of increasingsocioeconomicmodernization. s Syriaan actualcase of "Middle East exceptionalism"?

The connection between social differentiation nd political pluralization nSyria has been diluted by many interveningvariables that raise the pluralistthreshold; the regime deploys such still viable substitutes for pluralism asclientalismand corporatism.Syria is, however, undergoing limited iberalizationas the regimeadaptsits rule to a revival of civil society dictatedby the exhaustionof statistdevelopment.The privatesector is being encouraged,Asad is broaden-ing his base beyond the party, government controls over society are beingincrementally elaxed,andsignsof a revival of civil society canbe detected. Thiswill not produce democratization any time soon, but it may permit a moreautonomousand developed civil society, creatingthe base for future politicalpluralization.THE HISTORIC IMBALANCE OF STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY

Historic imbalancesobstructeda stableintegrationof state and civil societyin Syria datingfromat least the Ottomanperiod.The Ottomanstate was initiallya military-fiscalapparatus mposed by conquest on a primordially ragmentedsociety with a thin layer of civil society between them. There were waqfs, sufiorders,andguildsin the urbanquarters,while in the Qalamunmountainsand theDamascusGhuta, village associationsmanagedwaterworks; n time, local ayanwaxed powerful as a parasitic tax-farming trata between the imperialtreasuryand the peasants. Civil society was discontinuous, however, and did not effec-tively bridge the state-society gap. Periodic local revolts and the clientalistconnectionsof communaland tribal eadersto the state deflectedarbitrary ower,but, until the YoungTurkrevolution, society neverattainedpower-sharing n theform of a parliament.Imperialrule discouraged he emergenceof an independentmerchantbour-geoisie that might have united the cities to demand such representation. Inobstructing he emergenceof privateproperty nland untilthe nineteenthcentury,the state discouraged the consolidation of a landed aristocracy, an advancebeyond tribalfragmentationcrucial to state-society linkage.' In the absence ofpowerful independentcorporate groups-estates of aristocraticclasses and freecities, a religious hierarchy separate from the state-state power was chieflybluntedby the practical imits of premodern echnology.Under French rule, the Ottomansuperstructurewas supplantedby a semi-liberal one lacking indigenous traditions. This state failed to consolidate stronglinkages to civil society, which itself did not uniformly advance in the post-Ottomanenvironment.The French ntroduced epresentative nstitutions,and thenationalist struggle generated indigenous leaders and rudimentaryparties with

1. PerryAnderson,Lineages of the Absolutist State (London:Verso, 1974),p. 372.


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associationallinks to the urbanquarters.Even as new forms of associationweredeveloping, however, older ones were being decimated;for example, capitalistpenetrationdestroyed the guilds of Aleppo artisans headed by shaykhs whosettled disputes and enforced standards.2A landowningupperclass was finallyconsolidated under the French, giving a social base to the state. This class,however, developing largely throughencroachmenton peasant small holdings,never attainedthe legitimacyin the peasantcommunityto give the state stableruralroots. The state was the creatureof thisnotableclass whose politicalpartieswere fragileparliamentary locs unable o incorporate therclasses. Illiteracyandignorancecrippledthe masses' "capacity of . .. politicalcombination.3This narrow-based egimecould not survive the accumulating onsequencesof social change cresting in the late 1950s. Capitalistpenetrationand socialmobilizationeroded the self-sufficiencyand solidarityof segmentalgroups ascommunal and tenuresgave way to individualownership, endogamousmarriagedeclined among educated youth, and modern communications broke downgeographic isolation. The patriarchalauthority and clientalism on which thetraditionalelites depended began eroding. Modernizationalso generated newclasses andoccupationgroups.A smallagro-industrial ourgeoisieemerged,andits investmentsgenerateda workingclass thatformedtradeunions.Expansionofeducation, the bureaucracy,and the army generated a salaried "new middleclass"; the new associations and institutions into which its members wererecruitedfostered loyalties to profession, class, and nation that competed withthose to family, sect, and quarter.4

Modernizationalso stimulatedtraditionalcivil society. The revival of agri-culturewas accompaniedby new associations,such as the firstSyriancooperativefoundedin Dayr Atiyya andmerchant-village artnerships o introduce rrigationpumps in Dayr al-Zur.The spreadof education, far from uniformly displacingtraditionalvalues, spawned new traditionalassociations, such as the religiousbrotherhood hat educatedSalamiyyayouthformed to defend the Isma'ili faith.5This social differentiation esulted n politicalpluralization,as parties, press,and interestgroupsproliferatednthe 1950s.Ideologicalparties, suchas the Baathand the Communists,forgedpoliticalassociationbeyond personaland parochialloyalties andpushedpoliticalactivism out from the divans of the notables and thearmybarracks, nto the streets, campuses, and even villages. This broadeningofthe politicalarena, however, generatedclass conflictthat aborted the consolida-tion of the liberal state. The failure of dependentcapitalism to incorporatethesalariedmiddle class turnedit againstthe liberalmodel, while capitalist agricul-

2. Jocelyne Cornand, "L'Artisanat du textile A Alep survie au dynamisme?" Bulletind'Etudes Orientales Institut Fran(ais de Damas 36 (1984), pp. 104-5.3. Albert Hourani, Syria and Lebanon (London: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 91.4. Philip Khoury, "Syrian Urban Politics in Transition: The Quarters of Damascus during theFrench Mandate," International Journal of Middle East Studies 16, no. 4 (1984), p. 527.5. Norman Lewis, "The Isma'ilis of Syria Today," Journal of the Royal Central Asia Societv(London) 39 (January 1952).


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tureunleashed andlord-peasantonflict. Theancienregimelacked the ruralrootsto counterbalanceurbanradicalismandstrong nstitutions o absorb middleclassactivism. In the late 1950s, nationalist crises and economic stagnation lentcredibility to claims that a powerful state able to mobilize the country fordevelopmentand defense should take precedenceover democracy.THE BAATHISTSTATE

The fallof the ancienregimeopenedthe wayfortheformationof the Baathistauthoritarian-populisttate. Its leadership,dominatedby ruralminorities,wasdetermined to break the power of the urbanSunni establishment.Oppositionpartiesandprofessionalassociations-political vehicles of upperandmiddleclassrivals-were repressedor controlled.The mobilizationof new pro-regimepartic-ipantsby the BaathPartyapparatusgave the regimesome societal roots.At the sametime,nationalizations estroyedtheeconomicbases of bourgeoispower. Landreformeliminatedthe landlords'role as gatekeepersbetween stateand village and transformed a large part of the landless proletariat into asmall-holdingpeasantrydependentuponthe state. Educationandincreasingstateemployment broadened he state-employedmiddleclass.The increasedfluidityof the class structureandspawningof state-dependentsocial forces createdthe social terrainon whichAsadconstructedan autonomous"Bonapartist"state "above" classes. He useda combinationof kinandsectariansolidarity, Leninist party loyalty, and bureaucraticcommand to concentratepowerin a presidentialmonarchy,while a praetorian uardcommandedby Alawiclansmenshielded himfromchallenges.Control of the public sector and of oil rent acquiredin the 1970sgave theregime features of a patronage state in which societal sectors competed forlargesse throughclientalismpartlyorganizedalong sectarian ines. This enabledthe regime to play off a society fragmentedalong class, regional, and ethnic-sectarian ines. The regimesoughtlegitimacythrough he strugglewith Israel, inwhich it portrayedSyria as the vanguardof Arabnationalism,the most widelyaccepted political identity. The diversion of enormous resources into a hugemilitaryapparatus ncorporating ne-fifthof the laborforce gave the state greatweight in society.

This state sharplyreduced societal autonomy, and destroyed some socialforces while creatingandcooptingothers. The state victimizedsome of the mostdeveloped parts of civil society-the suq, merchants, and industrialists. Indeploying Alawi asabiyya in its primitive power accumulation, it stimulatedprimordial dentities and delegitimized tself in the eyes of many Sunnis. Over-lappingcommunalandclass cleavages sharplybifurcatedregimeandopposition,allowingfor little compromise or civility between them;oppositiontook violentforms while the regimewas unrestrainedby law in its repression.


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The Baathstate was betterlinked to society than its liberalpredecessor,butthe array of corporatist associations through which societal sectors had toarticulate heirinterests underpartytutelage ackedautonomy.Baathistscreatedand led popular organizations (munazzamatsha'biyya), which incorporatedpeasants, youth, and women, and they dominatedthe leadershipof the tradeunions. The professionalassociations (niqabatmihaniyya)of doctors, lawyers,and engineers, in which the Baath was lightly represented,retained a certainindependenceuntilthe Islamist-led ebellion rom 1978 o 1982,duringwhichtheirleaderswere replacedby stateappointees.Theteachers'andagronomists'unionswere Baath-dominated,and even associationsthat escaped Baathcontrolwere,by law, approvedand regulatedby the Ministryof Labor and Social Affairs.

The state-society relationwas not, however, a wholly zero-sumconflict inwhich the gains of the state meantacross-the-boardosses by civil society. Baathcorporatismhad a special populist character.While most corporatistregimesplayedoff competingsocial forces or favoredprivilegedgroupssuch as business-men's associations, the Baath,seekingto mobilize a popularbase againstthe oldclasses it overthrew,organizedpreviouslyexcludedpopularsectors andaccordedthem privileged access to power denied its bourgeoisrivals. Baath corporatismwas, at least initially, a strategy of inclusion rather than of exclusion ordemobilization,whichworkedto the benefitof both the stateandits constituency.Groups that hitherto lacked organizationacquirednew, if still limited, socialweight.Thus, the women'sunion mobilizedsome realactivismon behalfof equalemploymentopportunitiesand child care, althoughmany women activists criti-cized its timidityin pushingfor equalityin mattersof personalstatus.6The peasantsunion exemplifiespopulistcorporatism.Previousregimeshaddiscouragedpeasantorganizing,but the Baath, facing intense urbanopposition,recruited eaders from the smallland-owningpeasantryandbacked theircreationof union branchesin the villages. By the 1990s, much of Syria's peasantrywasorganized. The union's autonomy remainedlimited, however, and there is norecord of dissidentchallengesto its Baathist eadership.Constructed rom the topdown ratherthanthroughstruggle rombelow, the uniontodaylacks the popularmuscle to challengethe state.The unionis not, however, a merepaperorganizationackingpresence in thecorridors fpoweror thevillage. ts relationswith he statearebasedoncertain haredinterests.The unionarticulatespeasant nterestswithinthe limitsdefinedby partystrategy;hus,it refrains rompressing orfurtherandreform, incethe statewishesto encourage nvestmentby theagrarianourgeoisie, nd t hasdeferred o the state'sinterest nthecompulsorymarketingf "strategic rops."Inreturn, heunionenjoysinstitutionalizedhannelsof access;its leaderssiton partyandstatecommitteeshatmakedecisionsaffectingpeasants.The unionplayed a role in energizing he land

6. Bouthaina Shaaban, Both Right and Left Handed: Arab Women Talk about Their Lives(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), pp. 28-79.


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reformprocessandpromoting systemof cooperativeshat,as channelsof credit,services,and nputs,relievedpeasantsof dependency n landlords nd merchants ndprotected hemfromrenewed andconcentration.The unionis also a player nbureaucratic olitics,pushingwith some successfor higher prices for state-marketed rops in conflictwith agencies representingurban (Ministryof Supply) or industrial(Ministryof Industry)consumers ofagricultural oods. The unionhas organizedsmallpeasantsto counter the powerof larger proprietors,investors, and middlemen.Thus, union pressure helpedimplement avorable legislation, such as the agrarian elations aw, which mightotherwise have remainedpaper decrees. Today the union is seen as a majorobstacle by investors seeking a more favorable law. The union's access todecision makers in the long absence of comparableaccess for landlords andmerchantsenhancedthe weightof peasants againstmonied interests that would,in the normalcourse of things, have been morepotent.7Although he unionfacilitated tate controlof peasants, t also fosteredpeasantassociation hat, if regimecontrolswere relaxed,could acquiregreaterautonomy.Even now the peasantsector is not a state-controlledmonolith;t actuallyretainsconsiderable utonomybecausealternativeso the state exist.Althoughparticipationin cooperativesgivingaccess to creditandinputs mposes constraints uch as statemarketingf strategic rops, peasants anoptoutandmanycrops remainon thefreemarket.Peasantspursue nvestment ndaccumulationtrategies hroughprivatekinassociations, elf-help roupingsoundwidelythroughouthe Levant.Familiesdiver-sify resources:one brotherworkson the land,a secondin a petty business,and thethird n a government r party ob. In this manner,peasantsutilize both state andprivatenetworksas it suits their nterests.8Moregenerally,while the Baath at times aspiredto totalitarian-like ontrol,it never "atomized" civil society, where family, religious, and neighborhoodsolidaritiesretaintheir integrity. Syriais a close-knitsociety where networksoftalk andrumor, nformalgroups,andpersonalconnectionspenetrate he state, cutacross politicalcleavages,and often soften the harshnessof the regime. AlthoughSyria's Baathist structures resembleIraq's, the regime has never deployed thesystematicterrorto pulverizesociety in a way comparable o that used by Iraq.CIVIL SOCIETYUNDER THEBAATH

Resistance and EvasionMajorpartsof Syriancivil society, the "haves" and the "traditionals,"werethreatenedby Baathistredistribution ndmodernization fforts. One reactionwas

7. Raymond Hinnebusch, Authoritarian Power and State Formation in Ba'thist Syria: Army,Party and Peasant (BoulderCO:Westview Press, 1990),pp. 197-219.8. FrangoiseMetral, "Stateand Peasants n Syria:A Local View of a Government rrigationProject,"Peasant Studies 11,no. 2 (1984).


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overt resistance led by Syria's Islamic movement.The center of this resistancewas concentrated where religious institutions and the tradingeconomy cametogether-the traditionalurbanquartersandthe suq. PoliticalIslamspokefor themorepious segmentsof society, notablythe ulamawho resentedthe secularandminority-dominated aathregime.Sinceit was notorganized n a state-controlledinstitutioncomparable o al-Azhar,the ulamaretainedconsiderableautonomyofand capacity to resist the regime.Political Islam also expressed the lingeringurban resentmentof policiespursuedunder the radicalBaathist eadership hatruledfrom 1965to 1970.Landreformand the substitutionof stateagrarian redit andmarketingnetworks ortheold landlord-merchant nes deprivedmerchantsand landlords of influenceandwealthin the villages. Nationalizationof industries,which in a few cases touchedartisanworkshops,was seen as an attackon business and propertyas a whole.The partial takeover of foreign and wholesale tradedeprivedbig merchants ofopportunities,while itinerantpeddlerswho serviced the villageswere threatenedby government retailnetworks. Governmentprice fixingand marketregulationalienated merchants of all sizes. The regime's attempt to win over smallmerchants and artisansfailed because state tradingbodies could not substituteeffectively forthe merchantbourgeoisie.Asad's 1971partial iberalization f tradereopenedopportunities or merchants,but they still had to deal with inefficient,corrupt,or unsympatheticgovernmentofficials.PoliticalIslam's "counterideology"expressed the anti-statistworldviewofthe suq. Along with Alawi and militaryrule, it rejected state dominationof theeconomy. Islamicmanifestosdemanded hatthe bloatedbureaucracybe cut, thatthe state withdraw romcommerce,andthat an Islamiceconomybe instatedthatwould legitimate free enterpriseand the "naturalincentives" of a fair profit.Islam, interpreted o exclude socialism,was a naturalvehicle of protestagainst arural-based egime'sassaulton urban nterests.This Islamic politicalassociation rose out of traditionalcivil society: Anti-regime sermons in the mosques stimulatedrebellion, and the religious schoolswere Ikhwanrecruitmentpools; the suq was a consistentcenter of anti-socialistmerchantstrikes;professionalassociationsfrequentlymobilizedin alliancewiththe suq. The Islamicmovementalso developedthe widerorganizationneededtoconfront the regime, establishing offices, chains of command, representativebodies, andmilitarybranches.The scale anddurabilityof the Islamicrebellionofthe early 1980sindicateda substantialadvancein organizational apabilities.In its mortalconflict with politicalIslam, the state ratchetedup its controlover society. A purge of mosques, religious associations, and professionalsyndicates eliminatedthese as bases of opposition. The survivingmodicumofpress freedomand partypluralismwas deadened.PoliticalIslamlost the battle,but it remainsdeeply rooted in the suq and in the pervasivereligioussensibilitynurturedby the ulama. With a partially autonomous economic base and acounterideology, the traditionalcity remainsthe milieu most resistant to state


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penetration,an alternativesociety with many aspects of civility. Insofar, how-ever, as its dominantpoliticalexpressionrejectssecularismandfosterscommunalresentment,the historicalcompromise hatcould leadto its incorporationntothepolitical system is obstructed.

Anotherstrategypursuedby threatened lements of civil societywas survivalandevasion. As earlyas 1971,Asad, to win the supportof bourgeoiscivil societyin the wake of his overthrow of the radical Salah Jadid regime, created theconditions for this strategy.Trade was partially iberalized,a role for the privatesector legitimized, and the previous effort to totally control the economyabandoned.Many Syriansacquired ndependence rom the state throughfamilyand work in the Persian Gulf, Africa, or elsewhere and from their ability tosmugglesurpluscapitalout of Syriafor investmentabroad. In the largeinformaland black market sectors of the economy, state control was blunted by thecorruptionof officials.

Resulting variations in the regime's ability to control society produced,alongsidethe more state-penetratedassociations such as the peasantunion andthe chambersof commerce,a moreautonomous"alternative"civil society. Thevitalityof smallenterprises llustrateshow they cangrowin the space left by gapsin statecontrol. Incertainruralareas,suchas Yabrud, ndependent amily-ownedlight industriesdeveloped from a preexistingartisanaltradition. A tradition ofemigrationfostered the importof technology and the accumulationof capital,closeness to Lebanonpermittedsmuggling o overcome rawmaterialconstraints,and productlines were selected from those outside of state price controls. Suchautonomy was not without limits: the habit of hiding assets from potentialnationalization,the fear of competitionfrom state industries, and constantlychanging import-exportregulations deterred the natural expansion of theseindustries nto larger,fully legitimate irms.9Another ase is thatof small extilemanufacturersndartisansnAleppo.Thosewhojoined theofficially pprovedSyndicate f Artisans r theChamber f Industrieswereentitled o buyinputs romstatefactoriesor importagencies, o participatenasocial securityfund, and to obtainexportlicensesfromthe Ministryof Economy.Alternatively,heycouldparticipaten the "parallel"reemarket ontrolledby largemerchants; rtisansweredependentuponthese merchantsor marketing ndsome-times paid higherprices for theirinputs,but they presumablypreferredpersonalrelationswitha patrono dependence n stateofficials. ncases of conflict, heyreliedon traditionalrbiters ather hanthe state'slabor ribunals.'0 espitethe pervasive-ness of government ontrol,therewas an alternative etworkwhereinparticipantscouldforegocertainbenefits orgreaterreedom.

9. Anton Escher, "PrivateBusiness and Tradein the Region of Yabroud,Syria" (Paperpresentedat the Twenty-fourthMiddleEast Studies AssociationConference,San Antonio, TX,November 10-13, 1990).10. Cornand,"L'Artisanatdu textile," pp. I11-41.


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TABLE 1SyrianLaborForce in Tradeand RestaurantsPercentofLaborForce Total Labor LaborForcein Trade Force in Trade

1970 139,002 1,524,552 9.11984 253,174 2,246,273 11.31989 338,061 2,882,619 11.7Source:SyrianArabRepublic,StatisticalAbstract,1976,pp. 151-2; bid., 1986,pp. 106-7; bid., 1991,pp. 76-7.

The artisanaland merchantpetite bourgeoisie,far fromdecliningunder theBaath, flourished n the vacuum left by the demise of the haute bourgeoisie:itdoubledin size during he socialist decade of the 1960s-from 110,900 o 216,090accordingto one calculation."IThe numbersof merchantsgrew substantially nthe more liberaldecades from 1971to 1991.As table 1 shows, the laborforce intradegrewabout7 percentperyearand,despitethe austerityof the 1980s,hadby1989 increased its proportionof the labor force from 9 percent to almost 12percent.In some respects, the petitebourgeoisie lourished n spiteof the regime,but that it sometimesdeveloped symbioticrelationswith public sector suppliersand buyers suggests it manipulated he regimeto its benefit.The WidenedBases of CivilSociety

Even as the state soughtmorecontrol, its developmentdrive, in fostering aproliferation f social forces enjoyingmorediversifiedresources, was broadeningthe formerly circumscribedbases of civil society. Increases in educationalopportunity,urbanization,andmodernoccupationssociallymobilizedsociety ona majorscale. Table2 indicatesthe expansion n the differentiatedmodernsector.As professionals and workers proliferated, so did membership in syndicates,ostensiblenetworksof civil society. These organizationswere not autonomousofthe government, and the largest growth was in state-dependentprofessionalassociations such as agronomistsandengineers,while lawyers, often a force forchecking state power, lagged. Presumablyautonomous artistic, cultural, andcharitableassociationsactuallydeclined from609in 1975 o 504in 1990.12Ontheother hand, the more autonomoushousing and transportcooperatives, in whichmemberspool resources, grew.

11. Elizabeth Longuenesse, "The Class Nature of the State in Syria," MERIP Reports, May1979, pp. 4-5.12. Syrian Arab Republic, Statistical Abstract, 1976, p. 784; ibid., 1992, p. 413.


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TABLE 2AssociationalMembership,1974 and 19901974 1990

Trade Unions 184,916 522,990Housing Cooperatives 79,435 270,972Lawyers Syndicate 1,661 5,291Engineers Syndicate 6,573 36,198AgronomistsSyndicate 1,979 12,442Source:SyrianArabRepublic,StatisticalAbstract, 1976, pp. 782-96;ibid.,1991, pp. 412-20.

These figuresalso exclude associationsoutsideof government ontrol,suchasthose in whichgovernment-employedrofessionals,o enhance heirfixedincomes,poolresources o import muggled oods. Althoughhere s no reliabledata on theirscale,these informalooperatives roliferateds,after1976,nflationadicallyeducedthepurchasing owerof professionalsn fixedstate salaries.Thus,thedeclineof thestate'sability o control heeconomyandprovideresources timulatedheformationof autonomous ssociations utside ts control.

The sheerincreasein the numbersof educatedprofessionalshasput pressureon the state: To containthe braindrain,to meetexpectations orjobs the state canno longer provide in sufficientnumbers,and to avoid the political threat of theeducatedunemployed,the regimeis movingincrementallyo accommodate heirexpectationsfor greatereconomic and personal freedom. Allowing professionalsyndicates the greaterfreedomthey enjoy in states such as Egypt could satisfysome pent up participationdemands.Retreatof the State, Bourgeois Resurgence

An independentbourgeoisie s theforce most ableto carve out room for civilsociety andpotentiallyto check state power. By the late 1970s, the state, insteadof breakingdown class barriers,beganto reconstruct hem. It either generatedorbecame the pole aroundwhich a new bourgeoisiebegan to coalesce. A "newbourgeoisie"took formas the politicalelite used office to acquire illicit wealth,went into business on the side and formed business, political, and marriagealliances with elements of the private bourgeoisie.At its core was a "military-mercantilecomplex" of Alawi officersand Damascenemerchants.13 The "em-bourgeoisement"of the powerelite differentiated t from its popularbase, mutedits conflicts with the old upper class, and gave it an interest in markets and theprivate sector that eroded its statist ideology. The children of the elite were

13. This concept is attributed by Patrick Seale to Sadiq Al-Azm. See Seale, Asad: The Strugglefor the Middle East (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), p. 456.


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private or joint venture banks are signs of greater tolerance for such a civilsociety. Curbson arbitrary tate power also will be needed.THE POLITICALCONSEQUENCESOF SOCIAL-ECONOMIC HANGE

The regimecurrently s pursuinga strategyof calculatedpoliticaldecompres-sion, whichmaywidenspacefor civil society. Withthe collapseof socialism,theBaathpartyis ideologicallyexhausted andno longera threatto privatebusiness.Asad is broadeninghis basebeyondthe partyto the businessclass, anda revisionof Baathistideology stresses its long-neglected iberalcomponentthat accepteddemocracy,freedoms,and a privatesector. The draconiancontrols of the 1980sare beingrelaxed as the Islamicthreatrecedes, andthe securityforces are beingreined in. Thereis also greaterpressfreedom, evidencedby the media'sabilitytocriticize ministers. The religious schools and mosques are recovering theirautonomyon condition thatoppositionalactivity is eschewed.At this time, however, full-scaleliberalization till holdstoo manyperceivedpoliticaldangersfor the regime.Asadarguesthathis 1970rise to powerinitiateda Syrianperestroika-political relaxationandopeningto the privatesector-longbefore MikhailGorbachev,and that "the phase throughwhich [Syria]is passingis not the most suitablefor implementing competitiveelections]."'6The Baathwould have a hard time survivingthem, and even a more limitedopeningcouldunleashuncontrollable orces.

Until the social cleavage between the state and the bourgeoisie is fullybridged, the Alawis will be threatenedby any returnof power to the Sunni-dominatedbusiness establishment.Fullerpoliticalliberalizationcarries the riskthatpolitical Islam wouldbecome a vehicleof anti-regimemobilizationas longasthe ideologicalgap separatingt fromthe secular,minorityregime s so wide. Theregime is determinedto avoid the recent Algerianand East Europeanscenariosand the securityforces have the firepowerand personalstake in regimesurvivalto defend it. Limited liberalization,at regime discretion, can be reversed if itunleashesdangerousopposition.

There is so far little overt societal pressure for democratization.Thebourgeoisieis too weak; its control of the means of productionremainslimitedandfragmentedwhile Baathcorporatismhas obstructedmostallianceswithotherclasses. Althoughthe politicalupheavals n EasternEurope,Algeria,andJordanhave stimulatedsome yearningfor democracy, the accompanyingdisorderandfears of Islamic extremism made its natural constituents-businessmen andintellectuals-wary of democracy.Muchof the bourgeoisie s secular,liberal,andmoderate n its Islam,and it is this wingthe regimeseeks to coopt.

16. Asad speech reproduced in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report-NearEast and South Asia, May 17, 1990, p. 27.


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Morevaluedby the bourgeoisie s stabilitycombinedwithincreasedpersonaland economic freedoms giving scope for greaterprivateassociation. The bour-geoisie also is now accorded growingaccess to decision makers;the populist-dominatedcorporatistsystem has been opened to them. The prime minister'sCommittee for the Rationalizationof Imports, Exports, and Consumption,inwhich the heads of the chambersof commerceand of industryareincluded,givescrucialbourgeoisaccess to economic decision-making.'7Badral-Dinal-Shallah,head of the Damascus Chamberof Commerce,who earnedAsad's gratitude orkeepingthe Damascene bourgeoisiefromjoining the Islamicuprising,has beenparticularlynfluential n redressingbusinessgrievances.

Parliamentaryelections, althoughcontrolled, provide some outlet for thepoliticallyambitious.Some 10millionaires n parliament re quiteoutspokenanda block of independentmerchants and industrialistssometimes coordinate forcommoninterests. Some religiousandeven Ikhwan-associatedigureshave beencoopted. Althoughthe state is playingoff competing"popular"and "bourgeois"interests, as it becomes increasinglycommittedto capitalistdevelopment,busi-ness associations will acquirea growingcapacityto arguethat this requiresnewpro-businessconcessions.In return or businessfreedom and security,the bourgeoisieseems preparedto defer demandsfor politicalpower. This signifies a modus vivendibetween astate that needs a wealthgenerating,conservativesocial force and a bourgeoisiethat needs the economic opportunitiesand politicalprotectionprovidedby thestate. Since the inegalitarianconsequences of capitalism are likely to heightenpopulardiscontent,neitherbourgeoisienorregimewillwant fulldemocratization.The new corporatism,combinedwith a widenedrole for parliamentand rule oflaw, mayfoster new habitsof accommodationbetweenthemand constrainstatepower, but it detersa pluralistcompetitionof groups andclasses. It also puts theregimein a position to play off groups in a dividedsociety.

CONCLUSIONSyria's experience shows that pluralism,no inevitableoutcome of modern-ization, is retarded n the absence of a balancewherebyan institutionalized tateincorporatesanautonomouscivil society. ThepremodernOttoman tatetoleratedan autonomouscivil society, but it was fragmentedand malintegratednto thepolitical structure.The burst of new associations generatedby modernizationbroadenedcivil society, but politicalmobilizationamidst sharpclass cleavagescould not be containedby a fragileliberalpolity unrooted n an indigenousstatetradition.The authorityvacuumwas filledby the rise of an authoritariantate.17. Steven Heydemann, "Liberalization from Above and the Limits of Private Sector Auton-omy in Syria: The Role of Business Associations" (Paper presented at the Twenty-fourth Middle EastStudies Association Conference, San Antonio, TX, November 10-13, 1990).


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The Baath revolution created a more open social structure and a moreclass-inclusiveform of authoritarian-corporatistolitythat now embracesa moremobilized peasantry, a large educated middle class, and a reviving privatebourgeoisie. This stronger state also deadened the fragile political life of thepluralist era and narrowed the autonomy of civil society. Thus, where anauthoritarian-populisttate emerging out of class conflict pulverizes classes,where a weak bourgeoisieevokes a large public sector that clientalizes society,and where internationalconflict fuels a huge national security apparatus,theoverdevelopedstate dominatesandovershadows-but neverwholly suffocates-civil society. Moreover, "modernized"semi-primordial ssociation-sectarianasabiyyaand clientalism-reinforces authoritarian uleand stimulatesa reactionin civil society that retards the modus vivendi with the state needed forliberalization.

Nevertheless, once the Syrianstate was exhausted,it acquiredan interestinhiving off some responsibilitiesto civil society. As its functions and controlstarted o contract,liberalizing oncessions becameunavoidable,andcivil societybeganto revive. The social-economicrequisitesfor pluralism-literacy, modernoccupations, a growing private sector-had meanwhileadvanced. As yet, thestate cannot be forced into morethanlimited iberalization; atrimonial trategiessuch as clientalismremainviable since the large publicsector and oil rentgive thestate the abilityto standabove, playoff, andcooptrivalsectors of the fragmentedsociety. Corporatist orms of state-society linkagemay be enoughto accommo-date societal complexityfor some time, and the regimeholds a largerepressiveapparatus,knitby asabiyya, in reserve.The greaterautonomythat incremental iberalizationaccords civil societywill, however, revive the bourgeoisie,the force withthe resources to construct abusiness-centeredcivil society. Having opted to depend on private capitalistinvestment, the regime will have to be responsive to bourgeois demands forgreater rule of law and a general rollback of the boundaries of state power.Increased societal autonomy is likely, in the longer run, to generate strongersocial forces that cannot readily be controlled except through wider power-sharing.The test of civil society in the shorter term may come with the inevitablesuccession struggle. Until Asad departs, there is little prospect of more thanincremental iberalization,but rivals for the succession will need to bid for thesupportof newly revived societal sectors. The winner may, like Egypt's Anwaral-Sadat,have an interest in buildinga base beyond the core Alawi-army-partycomplex, and in stimulating he economic growthneeded to consolidate it. Thiswillrequireconcessions of furtherautonomy o the bourgeoisieandperhaps o thesyndicatesandunions. The prospects for a peacefulsuccession withoutsectarianstrife and Lebanonizationhave been advancedby the Sunni-Alawialliances andthe modus vivendi between the state and the bourgeoisie that incrementalliberalization s advancing.


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Whilecapitalistdevelopment s boundto deepen civil society, andsuccessionmay providethe turningpointfor greaterpluralization,democratizationdependson politicalrightsand representation or all social forces. Power-sharingor thebourgeoisiemust not mean the exclusionof the popularsectors: If corporatismsnot to become the instrumentordiscipliningpopular orces on behalfof capitalistdevelopment, the associations representing hem must attain the autonomy todefend their interests in a post-populistera. Conversely, the most autonomouspart of civil society, the Islamic suq, must be integrated nto the state withoutdestabilizing t. Only throughsucha political ncorporation f anautonomousandinclusive civil society can democratizationadvance.

Documents

Civil Society Syria