Civil Society's Next Frontier: Security Sector Reform (SSR) Advocacy in the Philippines

7/29/2019 Civil Society's Next Frontier: Security Sector Reform (SSR) Advocacy in the Philippines

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CIVIL SOCIETYS NEXT FRONTIER: SECURITYSECTOR REFORM (SSR) ADVOCACY IN THEPHILIPPINES

ARIES A. ARUGAY1

Abstract

The increasing attention on the security sector is due to the vital role that itplays in the provision of the security of the state and its people, its capacity tosupport or thwart democratization processes and its contribution in the pursuit of alasting peace. Used to only be comprised of the armed forces, the security sectorhas expanded to include all those (whether statutory or not) that have an impact in

the provision of (in) security in a given country. The expanded security sector nowincludes the police, the intelligence services, paramilitary organizations, militias,private armed groups as well as civilian oversight institutions, judicial and penalagencies and even civil society organizations. While the government, the donorcommunity, and multilateral organizations are already on board in helping realizeSSR in the developing world, it could be observed that not much parallel effort iscoming from civil society in the Philippines. Relative to other issues pursued bynongovernmental associations such as social development, peace, human rights,and democracy, little attention has been paid on how SSR could help realize thisbasket of advocacies. This paper seeks to explain the significance of SSR inhelping civil societys work for development, democracy, and peace in the

Philippines. By way of conclusion, this paper enumerates the ways in which civilsociety can further contribute to SSR in the Philippines.

Introduction

Security Sector Reform (SSR) is one of the most novel concepts to beincluded in the existing discourses on democracy, security, peace, and development.

The attention given to the security sector is mainly due to the vital role it plays in theprovision of the security of the state and its people. Moreover, in countries of thedeveloping world, the security sector has also seen to be an important actor for itscapacity to support or undermine democratization processes, promote or undermine

good governance and contribute to the pursuit of sustainable peace. Scholars,policymakers, multilateral organizations and the donor community have all agreedthat in order to have sustainable development, it is imperative that the security sectoris governed in accordance with democratic principles while ensuring that theyperform their mandated functions in an efficient and effective manner. Those workingin the pursuit of human security, democratic consolidation, good governance, humandevelopment, and post-conflict peacebuilding all underscore the idea that SSR is aproject that must be pursued with firm resolve and commitment among all itsstakeholders.

1Faculty member,Department of Political Science University of the Philippines Diliman Quezon City

Paper presented at the 5th

ISTR Asia-Pacific Conference (Manila, Philippines, October 2007) 1


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Used to only be comprised of the armed forces, the security sector hasexpanded to include all those (whether statutory or not) that have an impact in theprovision of (in) security in a given country (Hnggi 2003; 2004). It departs from thetraditional preoccupation of defending the state, as the new focus of security is nowevery human being in society.2 In addition, the increasing acceptance of the global

norm of democratic civilian control (Diamond and Plattner 1996; Alagappa 2001) hasenlarged the security sector to include the police, the intelligence services,paramilitary organizations, militias, private armed groups as well as civilian oversightinstitutions, judicial and penal agencies and even civil society organizations. SSRseeks a comprehensive and simultaneous transformation of institutions and groupsin order for them to guarantee the physical security of the people but in doing so alsorespect democratic principles and human rights.

J ust like the rest of the developing world, the Philippines takes no exceptionas a country where there is a need to embark on a comprehensive SSR project. Thisis justified based on three grounds shared by the concept of human security. First,

SSR is pivotal in a country attempting to improve the quality of its democratic regime.As the security sector also comprises the institutions tasked to oversee and managesecurity forces such as the executive bureaucracy, legislatures, and courts, thepursuit of SSR is also in conjunction with much of the task of institution-buildingnecessary for democratic consolidation. Second, there is an understanding on theimportance of the security sector in conflict prevention and peace-building (HDN2005). Being in the forefront in lingering internal conflicts in the Philippines, ademocratically managed and professional security sector is an indispensablecomponent of the peace program of the government. Lastly, the security sectoroccupies a substantial portion of the Philippine government. If successfully carriedout, SSR will hugely contribute to good governance of a country that has often beenperceived as one of the most corrupt countries in the world (TransparencyInternational 2004).

While the government, the donor community, and multilateral organizationsare already on board in helping realize SSR in the developing world, it could beobserved that not much parallel effort is coming from civil society in the Philippines.Relative to other issues pursued by nongovernmental associations such as socialdevelopment, peace, human rights, and democracy, little attention has been paid onhow SSR could help realize this basket of advocacies. This paper seeks to explainthe significance of SSR in helping civil societys work for development, democracy,

and peace in the Philippines. It will also discuss the challenges and obstacles facedin advocating SSR from the perspective of civil society. By way of conclusion, thispaper enumerates the ways in which civil society can further contribute to SSR in thePhilippines.

2Scholars have also observed that with the traditional understanding of security, it is often the statewhose dysfunctionality or overt persecution of its own citizens that is the cause of insecurity andviolence (Ball and Brzoska 2002).




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Security Sector Reform (SSR): A Conceptual Overview

As a concept, SSR has been barely fifteen years old. Some scholars said thatit is a by-product of the end of the Cold War. The reduction of the prominence oftraditional military assistance in the form of arms, weapons, technology, and

equipment and the expansion of the notion of security had implications on howsecurity could be provided. It also reconfigured all existing security relations at thebilateral and multilateral level (Wulf 2004; Andersen 2006: 6; GFN SSR 2006).

What composes the Security Sector?

There is no consensual idea of what comprises the security sector.The traditional or minimalist notion only involves core securityforces such as the military, police, and paramilitary forces. On theother hand a maximalist notion includes almost every institution and

group in the government and civil society. Perhaps, it is best to adopta middle range view which is composed of the following:

Core security forces (armed forces, paramilitary forces,intelligence services, police, border and customs officials)

Security management and oversight bodies(executivedepartments, congressional committees, human rightsinstitutions

J ustice and law enforcement institutions(ombudsman,courts)

Societal groups(academe, policy think-tanks, peace and humanrights movements, investigative media)

SSR first received attention in a speech of Clare Short, the United Kingdom(UK) Minister for InternationalDevelopment in 1998 (Wulf2004).3 On the broadestsense, SSR may pertain to aplethora of issues andactivities related to the reform

of the elements of the publicsector charged with theprovision of external andinternal security (Hnggi2004: 4). The UKsDepartment for InternationalDevelopment (DFID) definedSSR as: the transformationof the security system whichincludes all the actors, theirroles, responsibilities and actions, so that it is manages and operated in a mannerconsistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, andthus contributes to a well-functioning security framework (2003: 30).

Taking UKs lead, international organizations soon followed suit. One of themost authoritative definitions of SSR came from the Development AssistanceCommittee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD) which defined it as increasing the countrys ability to meet the range ofsecurity needs within their societies in a manner consistent with democratic normsand sound principles of governance, transparency and the rile of law (OECD2004).4 Thus, it extends beyond the narrow focus on defense, intelligence, and

policing. Similar to this vein is the definition provided by the Global ConflictPrevention Pool (GCPP) of the United Kingdom (UK) which includes security policy,legislation, structural and oversight issues.

3The UK is considered to be the most advanced country in terms of supporting SSR worldwide. Asthe leading proponent of SSR, it has created the GCPP which provides the necessary funding for twokey institutions the Security Sector Development Advisory Team (SSDAT) and the GlobalFacilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN SSR).4 Asides from the OECD, the UNDP has been one of the most aggressive international organizations

that has supported SSR initiatives worldwide. In its Human Development Report in 2002, UNDP hasasserted the importance of democratizing security to prevent conflict and build peace (2002: 85-100).




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The important assumption of SSR is the fact that the security sector of thecountry concerned is dysfunctional. These problems or pathologies (Law 2004)could stem from deficits on security (effective and efficient provision) or democracy(lack of oversight or transparency).5 Both are to be considered as equally important.A functional security sector that provides a secure environment but is not subject to

transparency and accountability could still be considered deficient. The essence ofSSR is the idea that security and democracy are not mutually exclusive. One couldstill have an effective and efficient security apparatus but remain embedded in aframework of democratic governance (Bryden and Hnggi 2005: 27).

Some view that these problems could be addressed through a two-stepprocess, differentiating between first generation SSR from second generation SSR.

The former originated from the insights of the literature on civil-military relations as itconcerns the establishment of new constitutional and legal frameworks, institutions,structures, clear lines of responsibility and accountability for the security sector (Fitz-Gerald 2003). The more challenging and difficult part are the reforms associated with

the second generation. This encompasses the consolidation of the first generationreforms as well as ensuring the effective operation of institutions, development ofexpertise and knowledge, the diffusion of reform commitments from lower-levelofficials and other actors, and the engagement with nonstate actors on SSR issuessuch as civil society (Edmunds 2004: 50-53; Yusufi 2003: 5-6).

While there may be a general consensus on the elements of SSR, it must beunderstood that thus far, it does not have a common template or model that could beadopted by all countries where it is perceived to be necessary. The scope of SSR isoften determined by the unique circumstances the country is situated in. One way todetermine this is to look that the particular nuances of a countrys economicdevelopment, political system, and security situation in order to determine what willconstitute the SSR project. More so, the context may give us a slight idea as regardsthe prospects of SSR in a given country (Bryden and Hnggi 2005: 28-295). Relatedto this, Ball provided a more complicated approach. Customizing SSR depends onseveral contexts that include not only the political, economic, and social conditions ofthe country involved. Viewing SSR as a transformative process, it is equallyimportant to look at the psychological, institutional, normative, and geopoliticalcontext (2004: 47-51).

SSR: Linking Security, Democracy and Development

In linking SSR with civil society advocacy, one must consider its contributionsit has on three main areas: (1) development; (2) democratic governance; and (3)sustainable peace.

As adhering to the concept of human security, SSR is ultimately necessary fordevelopment. Some attribute the emergence of SSR as a brainchild of thedevelopment donors which found it difficult to implement development assistanceefficiently and effectively in conflict-torn societies or worse, failed or fragile statessuch as those found in the African continent (e.g., Liberia, South Africa,

5 Thus, it is necessary for a comprehensive assessment of security sector governance (SSG) to befirst undertaken before a list of SSR activities could be formulated.




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Mozambique, and Sierra Leone). This makes most SSR initiatives as donor-drivenas they are often initiated externally even without the consent or input of the countryconcerned. Some scholars and practitioners have cautioned in this imposingtendency of donor agencies of developed countries and international organizations(Wulf 2004). Thus, it has already been considered that local will or commitment to

SSR is deemed necessary before external intervention or assistance could beprovided. The presence of local ownership will greatly inculcate among allstakeholders but also enable SSR to be a sustained endeavor.

It must also be stressed that it is the poor and other marginalized groups (e.g.,women and children) that are often the victims of an ineffective, unaccountable, andabusive security sector (Ball and Brzoska 2002). If not by the security apparatus ofgovernment these vulnerable sectors are susceptible to violence and insecurityperpetrated by non-statutory forces such as gangs, criminal syndicates, and privatemilitias.

SSR also is associated with development as it ensures that the resourcesgiven to the security sector are in proportional with the security conditions of thecountry. Through right-sizing the security sector, any excess in the resources couldbe transferred in implementing the other tasks of government such as the provisionof socioeconomic services and poverty reduction programs.

Security and democracy did not always go together. As reflected in thedebates found in political philosophy, freedoms or rights associated with democracyare often sacrificed in the altar of protection or defense from chaos and disorder. Toa great extent, the hallmark of security institutions such as the military has been itslack of transparency and openness to input from other actors. Though a public good,security has always been a policy area where there has been limited participationfrom other actors.

No less than former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan hashighlighted the linkage between SSR and democratic governance when he notedthat the security sector should be subject to the same standards of efficiency,equity, and accountability as any other service (cited in Hnggi 2004: 4). It is alsoacknowledged that a democratically run and accountable, effective, and efficientsecurity sector is vital in promoting political stability. It has been recognized that thearmed forces by nature is the ultimate expression of the important role of coercion in

governance (Alagappa 2001). The absence or lack of democratic civilian control andprofessionalism constitutes a serious challenge for most consolidating democracies.In the end, the successful implementation of SSR could quell any threats to thedemocratic order and help ensure that democracy will be the only game in town.

SSR has been a framework in order to engage and coordinate defense anddemocratic reforms in post-communist Europe (Hnggi 2004). The most illustrativecase of how SSR is linked with democratization has been the conditions demandedby regional organizations such as the Organization for Security Cooperation inEurope (OSCE), National Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union(EU), and the Council of Europe to countries that are seeking membership. As part

of their new defense diplomacy, they have made programs and initiativesassociated with SSR as strict criteria in order for post-communist countries to qualify




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for membership. These requirements consist of imposing democratic civilian controlto include the judiciary, police, and parliament (Hnggi 2003; Bryden and Hnggi2005: 23; Germann 2002).

From the experience of democratizing societies, it is no guarantee that with

that security will improve in the post-authoritarian period. On the contrary, it hasbeen observed that authoritarianisms propensity to use repression had swept all ofunresolved issues under the rug such that most democratic transitions have alwaysfeatured episodes of armed conflict. Furthermore, Luckham (2003) also argued thatthe rude awakenings from the failure to meet expectations and demands in the post-transition period also could stoke political violence.

From the perspective of good governance, the security sector comprises asubstantial portion of any government which is often have tremendous resourceendowments. Thus, the potential for any misallocation could be a great source ofpoor or malgovernance (Fitz-Gerald 2003). Even if one assumes that a countrys

security sector is democratically governed and lack and propensity to seizer statepower, SSR also is important in socializing civilian politicians not to make anyattempts to draw the armed forces, for example to partisan politics and disruptdemocratic processes (Edmunds 2004: 47).

SSR as Vital for Peacebuilding in the Philippines

The 2005 Philippine Human Development Report hasunderscored SSR as one of the key reforms to beundertaken in the current peace efforts in the country.This entails orienting the military and the police torecognize the peace policy of the government. SSRincludes strengthening civilian control,professionalization, insulation from partisan politics,and curbing corruption. Also noteworthy is the Reportsstress that SSR contains measures that will improve therule of law, human rights, and cultural sensitivityamong the security sector.

Perhaps the more relevant and immediate context of SSR in societies inconflict is its contribution to peace building. The lack of recognition or low regard onthe impact on SSR on peace processes has been one of the major causes of theresilience of armed internal conflict and unpeace. Many have blamed the security

sector as responsible for being thesource of conflict and key obstacleto peace-building (Saferworld2002). Recently, the UN SecurityCouncil became cognizant thatSSR is an essential element ofany stabilization process in anypost-conflict environments (cited inHnggi 2005: 4). First, it is anestablished fact that it is preciselythe security forces which are at theforefront of dealing with armed

insurrection and secessionistmovements. They assume the face of government in these conflict-ridden areas.Thus, an unprofessional security sector not subject to democratic oversight could notonly increase their tendency to commit violations of human rights and internationalhumanitarian law, they could also be ineffective in the performance of theirresponsibilities. Misbehaving members of the armed forces could negatively affectthe level of confidence or trust of the people in the government and may have direimplications for its political legitimacy.

Second, the implementation of any final settlement or resolution between theinvolved parties in the conflict would require the involvement and cooperation of the

security sector (Greene 2003). In this regard, SSR can have a great impact on peacenegotiations, as well as the final resolution and settlement of internal conflicts. In the




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end, the implementation of any final settlement or resolution between the involvedparties in the conflict would require the involvement and cooperation of the securitysector (Greene 2003).

Third, as SSR does not only concern itself with the improvement of the

security forces but includes the development of strong, coherent, and responsivecivilian institutions. They do not merely perform democratic oversight functions butwill be the ones that will be responsible for most of the tasks in post-conflict peace-building. For example, activities related to poverty reduction, infrastructuredevelopment, and conflict resolution are often in the hands of government andpossibly civil society organizations. This forms a significant part of addressing someof the roots of conflict of which the government plays a very crucial role (Hnggi2005: 11). SSR also could pave the way in the institutionalization of effective conflictresolution mechanisms in order to prevent any future conflict from erupting intoviolence. Thus, the strengthening of civilian agencies with functions related to SSRwill be crucial in avoiding the return to conflict in the pacified areas of the country.

The current discourses on human security continue to put a premium on therole of the security sector. What has been challenged by the concept of humansecurity is the replacement of the focus of security from the state to the individual.Definitely, SSR is not at all contradictory to human security as its reorients the roleof the armed forces, police, intelligence bodies, etc. to protect the individual fromthreats of violence. Moreover, one of the most important goals of reforming thesecurity is that it may provide security for the people in an efficient and effectivemanner while being consistent with democracy and human rights. As alreadymentioned, this change was influence by two trends mostly felt by developingcountries such as the Philippines. One is the failure of the state to guarantee thesecurity of the people due to incompetence, inadequate resources, and poorcapacity. Outbreaks of violence and order are often caused by the inability of thesecurity sector to adequately perform their functions. Another is the fact that thesecurity sector itself becomes the perpetrator of violence, criminality, conflict andviolations of human rights. This is common especially in countries where the armedforces and the police become instruments of the survival of authoritarian regimes.

The extreme case is that the state and the security sector become indistinguishablewith force becoming the ultimate means to secure regime legitimacy and stability.

However, it must be noted that SSR does not wholly incorporate the concept

of human security. As it is only concerned with physical security or what isconsidered as threats to the freedom from fear such as violence, crime,aggression, and conflict, it does not accept its idea on the other dimensions ofsecurity (economic, ecological, psychological, etc.).6 Given this, SSR focuses oncontributing to the strategy of protection more than empowerment (Commission onHuman Security 2003). It may also be dangerous that SSR completely adheres tothe concept of human security as it may have implications of the role and mandate ofthe security sector in the performance of functions related to the other aspects of anindividuals security. An expanded definition of security containing aspects that goesbeyond physical security may mean that the core security forces dip their hands in

6

Given that novel character of the concept of SSR, it remains debatable on whether it will be able toinclude the other dimensions of human security. Furthermore, it must also be noted that the conceptof human security also remains in flux.




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nontraditional areas beyond their original or intended mission and afar from theirtraining and expertise.

Civil Society and SSR in the Phil ippines: Strange Bedfellows?

The study and analysis of the Philippine security sector has receivedsignificant attention from both academic and policymaking circles. However, a fewpreliminary observations could be made regarding the state of its literature anddiscourse. First, the bulk of the literature is biased towards a minimalist conception ofwhat constituted the security sector in the country, partly due to the predominance ofthe traditional (military) security paradigm. Second, the concept of SSG andsecurity sector reform is very novel in the Philippines. From a survey of the existingscholarship, the nearest approximation to it would be the study of civil-military

relations of which, even a few people both from the academic and policymakingarena have made a contribution. Lastly, most studies on the Philippine securitysector have not related them to broader themes or perspectives such asdemocratization and democratic consolidation, the ongoing peace process in thecountry and conflict resolution, and good governance.

In the Philippines, there is increasing recognition on the viability of SSR as anappropriate framework to address issues such as the state of unpeace, insecurity,and poverty. Perhaps the most recent expression of the significance of the adoptionof an SSR agenda 2005 Philippine Human Development Report. It categoricallyestablished the fact that the persistence of armed conflict has a profound impact inhuman security. This, in turn, has implications in the overall low human developmentof the country. While the report concurred with the idea that poverty per se may notfull explain the resort to violence, it argues that poor conditions in the country areoften the result of deprivation, injustice, and the lack of opportunities. This sense ofdiscontent and desperation pushes affected groups to resort to violent means toeffect a change in the status quo. It cannot be denied that armed conflict in thePhilippines is a costly state of affairs affecting lives, property, cultural identity,social cohesion, and human dignity. This is notwithstanding its spillover effects,whether economic (foregone investment and lost output), political (loss of politicalstability and legitimacy of the government) or social (prevalence of prejudice, socio-

cultural tension, and crime) (HDN 2005).

It cannot be doubted that SSR would not be a genuine, meaningful, andtransformative process if there is participation from civil society. Basically, this is

justified on three grounds. First, the emergence of governance discourse and theparadigm of participatory governance give civil society an important role in thereform of the security sector. Second, as the ultimate referent of security has shiftedfrom the state to the individual, it is necessary for civil society as the intermediaryactor, to involve on behalf of and represent the interests of the individual or thecommunity. Finally, as security is a public good, there is an important contributionthat civil society could give in ensuring that its provision will not jeopardize existing

rights and freedoms of individuals and groups.




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Caparini and Fluri (2006) stated that civil society could play three importantroles: (1) as an informal form of civilian oversight by exacting democratic control andaccountability (2) as organizations that can raise public awareness, articulate needsand interests of individuals and groups, and inform the state of the security needsand threats of the people; and (3) as sources of inputs and knowledge that can feed

into security policymaking.

However, this appreciation of the value of SSR has not been picked up bygovernment thus far. It is even interesting to note that recent policies formulated bythe Macapagal-Arroyo administration even ran contrary to the concept of SSR. Thesucceeding discussion presents and analyzes some of these policies and how couldthey be inconsistent and even contradictory to SSR.

1) Philippine Defense Reform Program (PDRP)

The PDRP is a product of a systematic and meticulous assessment of the

countrys defense and military establishment that was completed in 2003. As thegeneral framework for guiding the reform and improvement measures in the ArmedForces of the Philippines (AFP), it aims to implement a transformation process tore-engineer systems and re-tool personnel.7 Composed of ten (10) key areas ofimprovement, the PDRP focuses entirely on capability building of the militaryinstitution to be able to perform what it conceives as its roles in the provision ofdefense and security. In particular, it attempts to improve defense planning systems,operational and training capacity, logistics provision, staff development, personnelmanagement, financial controls, and strategic communications.

By focusing on defense, the PDRP has barely scratched the surface of SSR.While it may be unfair to force the Philippine military and defense establishment toincorporate principles of human security, it has lost a critical opportunity to trulyadapt to the new security environment and realities at the domestic and internationalfrontier. As defense is construed in the traditional sense with a heavily statist andmilitary tone, it cannot be eschewed that the reform of this security sector institutionis oversimplified as merely improving operational effectiveness and to a lesserextent, efficiency in the provision of security. Perhaps the PDRP could still beincorporated to a more comprehensive and systematic SSR program in the future.However, what is problematic is the fact that the military seems to be more thancontented to view reform and transformation of its institution as implementing the

PDRP. For example, the government has not even touched significant SSR issuessuch as weak and ineffective civilian oversight agencies, undemocratic and limitedparticipation in security policymaking, violation or disrespect for human rights often inthe name of combating terrorism and insurgency.

2) Human Security Act of 2007

It was not a surprise that the government was able to pass an anti-terrorism law. Asearly as 2003, the Macapagal-Arroyo administration has promised to enactlegislation that will help curb terrorism. What became a surprise is how Republic Act

7 This assessment has been assisted by the government of the United States through the Joint United StatesMilitary Advisory Group (JUSMAG).




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No. 9372 signed on 6 March 2007 was able to be named as the Human Security Actof 2007. By being an An Act to Secure the State and Protect our People from

Terrorism, this law provides not only the weapons for the government in general andthe security forces in particular in order to sanction acts of terrorism, it also allowsthe possible suppression of previously respect rights and intrusion into the lives and

activities of the Filipino people.

With the exception of its title, this statute has never again used or mention theterm human security. Furthermore, it also conspicuously did not provide a definitionof security. However, it is noteworthy that it stated some principles that areconnected to the human security framework. For example, it recognizes that theterrorism requires a comprehensive approach including conflict management andpost-conflict peace-building. This even includes improving state capacity andpromoting equitable economic development. Finally, the ant-terrorism law alsocategorically stated that it shall not prejudice respect for human rights.8

For civil society advocates and academics, the title of the law is not just amisnomer but also casts the concept of human security in a negative light. It is veryevident that the incorporation of human security in a law that significantly arms thestate to combat terrorism has negative implications on the attempt to mainstreamthis concept. In the end, it also has repercussions on security sector governance inthe Philippines.

The law did not elaborate on how the government can address the rootcauses of terrorism and conflict in the country. This could have been the mostsignificant contribution of this legislation to mainstreaming human security in thePhilippines. What the law was very clear is the substantial role given to the securitysector in implementing the law and curbing terrorism. While it explicitly stated that itis the police that would be the main implementing institution, this is irreconcilable toexisting realities in the Philippines. Internal security remains to be the purview of themilitary with the police often playing a secondary or supporting role as it continues tosuffer from institutional and resource deficiencies. Among others, this could be seenin the involvement of both the agencies within the AFP and the Department ofNational Defense (DND) in the Anti-Terrorism Council, the primary body created bythe law to implement anti-terrorism policy.

Analysts are also bothered on the power given to the government, particularly

the executive branch, in labeling possible organizations as terrorist or conspiring withterrorists (Hilbay 2007). Such labeling is dangerous on two fronts. On the onehand, the current administration (and probably future ones) can use this to stifledissent, suppress political opponents, or intimidate legitimate organizations. On theother hand, this power to label will open the gate to violation or disrespect for certainrights. The institutional challenges and problems currently faced by the PhilippineNational Police (PNP) bolsters this argument. One could also imagine that themilitary would definitely implement the law in areas where the police does not evenfully control the peace and order situation such as areas controlled by communistinsurgents and Muslim separatist movements in Mindanao.

8 Republic Act No. 9372, Human Security Act of 2007, Section 2.




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Finally, while the law provides for a grievance mechanism and an oversightbody in the implementation of the law, it is observed that there is a noteworthyabsence of civil society participation or involvement. These functions are totally givento government institutions such as the Ombudsman and Congress. Given the similarinstitutional challenges, deficits, and transparency gaps of these oversight

institutions over the security forces, one can question their ability to perform effectiveand strict oversight. The law could have been more inclusive by creating a grievanceboard, oversight agency, and an evaluation or review mechanism that has a broadercomposition that includes civil society, media, and the academe.9

3) Bill amending the National Defense Act

The government also aims to amend the already defunct National DefenseAct in order to be more attuned to the present security context and realities in thedomestic and global frontier. Known as Commonwealth Act No. 1, this law is inurgent need to amendment, if not revision as it is considered as a basic document

that would lay the framework for security policy. This, in turn, would definitely guideinstitutional reform programs and other initiatives to improve the provision of security.

While it remains to be passed, current bills that attempts to amend theNational Defense Act is also found wanting in terms in incorporating principles ofhuman security and SSR. J ust like other security and defense documents, theproposed defense bill defines the state and the citizens as the ultimate object ofsecurity. However, the language of the proposed bill remains couched in theparadigm of traditional military security and the physical safety, stability, and integrityof the Philippine state. Defense is also construed as both internal and external,blurring the distinctions between the two, a norm that is held sacred in good securitysector governance practice. This gives tremendous power to the countrys securitysector as the set of institutions to which the responsibility of the states defense andsecurity is vested.

To a great extent, this proposed bill does not contribute to the mainstreamingof as it does not fully embrace good security sector governance. It does not seek todemilitarize national security decision-making process. Nor does it expand theparticipation in defense and security beyond the traditional security sector to includenonstate actors such as civil society and media. Dangerously, it also provides themilitary certain responsibilities such as socio-economic development, promotion of

national interests, and law enforcement. Therefore, the proposed bill that seeks toamend the National Defense Act does not have a transformative character as it onlyseeks to maintain the status quo by allowing core security forces to dominatesecurity policy formulation vis--vis weak and ineffective civilian oversightinstitutions.

Other countries have utilized this basic main document to set down theframework for security and defense policy in the country. For example, the post-apartheid government in South Africa ensured that rethinking in security and defense

9

The formal non-inclusion of civil society, media, and academe does not construe that they areinhibited from exercising social accountability and informal oversight.




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would truly be reform-oriented, if not transformative. By placing human security asthe primary framework, the new security paradigm of South Africa embodiedprinciples of SSR such as respect for human rights, transparency and accountability,the apolitical character and posture of the security sector, respect for the rule of lawwhile building a balanced, modern, technologically advanced, and affordable security

force (Williams 2005).

Given that the process of amending of the National Defense Act has notformally started, it is critical that advocates of SSR seize this opportunity. Engage thecountrys security sector and initiation of a discussion on how this document couldintegrate principles of SSR within the framework of human security in order to makethe document truly exemplify a holistic and comprehensive approach. Inputs fromother stakeholders and civilian experts for example could have an invaluablecontribution in this endeavor.

4) The National Internal Security Plan (NISP) and Counterinsurgency Program

The NISP is conceived as the governments ultimate strategy to defeatinsurgency and armed challenges to the Philippine state. It is composed of four maincomponents: (1) political, legal, and diplomatic; (2) socioeconomic/psychological; (3)information; and (4) peace and order/security.10 Adopted in 2001, this plan seeks thecooperation and allows the coordination of agencies and institutions within theexecutive branch, both uniformed and civilian. As having a comprehensive andholistic perspective, it seeks to address security threats through the promotion ofgood governance, alleviation of poverty, peace advocacy, and combat operations.

This is based on the realization that insurgency as a source of insecurity and under-or uneven development in the country necessitates a multi-dimensional approach(Esperon 2006).

Guided by the NISP, the military launched a five-year counterinsurgencyprogram involving both the military and civilian agencies of the government in 2002.Called Bantay Laya, this Internal Security Operation plan is based on the NationalInternal Security Plan (NISP) formulated by the DND as well as the National MilitaryStrategy developed and adopted by the AFP. Bantay Layas strategic goal is todecisively defeat the insurgents armed groups in order to obtain and maintain peacefor national development. It applies to the CPP-NPA, the ASG, and the SouthernPhilippine Separatist Groups (SPSGs referring to the MNLF, the Misuari Breakaway

Group or MBG, and the MILF).This goal reflects the victory and institutional positionsrolled into one, with the logic that victory is necessary for national development totake place (Hernandez 2005: 15).

According to Hernandez (2005), this approach in implementing ISOs wasinitiated in 2002 under the name Bantay Laya [Freedom Watch]. What arenoteworthy about this new approach are: (1) its strategy of holistic approachseeking the full cooperation of local government units, civil society, and ordinarycitizens while keeping in mind the governments six paths to peace; (2) its emphasis

10 J ust recently, Secretary Norberto Gonzales, the National Security Adviser (NSA), presented a

revised NISP that includes the legal or judicial component. This will allow the government to use alllegal means to bring insurgents within the fold of the law. The passage of the Human Security Act of2007 is a vital weapon to implement this component.




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on innovative plans and programs to eradicate the so-called roots of insurgency suchas poverty alleviation to be implemented through collaborative efforts amongdifferent government agencies; (3) its priority on the role of information in promotingpeace and public confidence in government through interpersonal and face to faceapproaches particularly in countering insurgent propaganda; (4) its attention to

conflict resolution and maintenance of peace and order by mobilizing the police andlocal government.

The other half of the strategy deals with the measures aimed at maintainingthe areas that were one and held over by the military. Formerly known as theconsolidate and develop phases in the (Clear-Hold-Consolidate-Developstrategy), this is called the support phase. The crucial change lies on the secondaryrole now played by the armed forces on this part of any ISO. Unlike previousexperience wherein the military had to perform functions that were the responsibilityof civilian agencies, Hernandez stated that Bantay Laya seeks to correct this as theAFPs role (also constrained by the limits of its capability) would be to strengthen

government control and authority in the contested barangays and help develop localgovernment capability during consolidation, and play a supportive role to the civiliangovernment agencies during the development sub-phases (2005).11

The NISP is a document that was not subject to extensive consultation from

all security stakeholders. Added to this democratic deficit, there is even a difficultyin being able to secure a copy of the said plan. While the security sector ofteninvokes the NISP as the guiding framework in addressing the security issues of thecountry, discussions are often clouded with secrecy and ambiguity. If indeed theNISP is an equivalent of a defense white paper or similar security documents andframework, it does not conform to a document of which most SSR programs wereguided, for example in South Africa, Sierra Leone, and Indonesia.

To a certain extent, Bantay Laya is an internal security operation campaignthat acknowledges the complex nature of insecurity in the country, particularly inareas where there is armed conflict. It actively solicits the help of other governmentinstitutions and even other members of the security sector. Tangentially, it pursuessome components of program that promote good security sector governance.However, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. When the AFP or other membersof core security forces assume responsibilities that are mandated to be performed bycivilian institutions executive agencies and local governments this becomes

dangerous to SSR. By taking up these functions, the security sector veers away fromits supposed role and may undermine its professionalism and role. For example, thiscampaign allows the military to carry out developmental functions and take on non-combat roles which are supposed to be the job of the civilian government. Moreover,this campaign also gives the military a free hand in organizing cooperatives amajor source of nontraditional revenue that makes it an economic actor. Theexperience of countries like Thailand and Indonesia has underscored the hazards ofa military with vested economic interests.

Challenges for Civil Society: Advocating SSR in the Philippines

11

With the departure of the military, the strategy aims to utilize the so-called Civilian Armed Forcegeographical Units Active Auxiliary (CAA, a carry over of the CAFGU concept), civilian volunteerorganizations (CVOs), and other anti-communist barangay-based organizations.




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Given the issues raised in the previous section, the challenges of SSR in thePhilippines are daunting, complicated, and difficult. This part of the paper attempts toexamine some of these challenges for civil society and how overcoming them couldhelp facilitate the implementation of SSR in the country.

As may already be palpable, the first challenge for the Philippines is theabsence of commitment among all stakeholders to embark on comprehensive SSR.

The will to reform is the capital needed in order to implement SSR. J ust like anyother reform initiative, SSR is innately a political project that must be treated withsensitivity (Wulf 2004: 20). As such, understanding the political dynamics andrelations among different political actors is key to even initiate SSR. For countriesundergoing transition, SSR may need to be included in a plethora of other reformsneeded to be dealt with as soon as possible. This may prove difficult for those whosetransition from authoritarian rule was indispensably caused by the security sector. Asan example, most strategic pacts in the democratic transitions in Latin America

(Aguero 1997) and Southern Europe entail maintaining prerogatives and perquisitesenjoyed by the armed forces which is detrimental to democratic SSG.12 A reformistleader or coalition bent on making the security sector subject to democraticprinciples may need to perform a dangerous balancing act appeasing those whowant a reduction in the political powers of the security sector and those who want tomaintain the status quo (Tanner 2000).

Even if a country is done with its democratic transition, there is no assurancethat implementing SSR would be smooth sailing. Most of the members of the so-called third wave of democratization have weak, shallow, immature, and ineffectiveinstitutions (Diamond 1996), a substantial section of which is identified with thesecurity sector. Thus, it is highly probable that SSR projects could be held hostageby partisan politics, accommodation, or worse aborted by the armed forces that maystill pose a threat to democracy.

A related challenge is the problem of complexity (Nathan 2004). Reformingthe security sector after many years of operation may require gargantuan tasks thatmay have to be done simultaneously. Indeed, the holistic nature of SSR demands atransformation of laws, institutions, policies, culture, attitudes, and behavior from thelevel of the state down to the individual. Such a project may prove to be taxing evento the most committed and resource endowed country. In the Philippines, while there

are existing reform initiatives across these institutions AFP Modernization andCapability-Upgrading Project, the PNP Transformation Project, the projects onjudicial and accountability reform, etc. these are not all attuned to SSR. Theyremain to be institution specific, not linked with one another, and not orientedtowards all the objectives of SSR. Coherence is of the essence if ever SSR wouldproduce its intended effects. This entails the appropriate timing, sequencing ofreform activities, and coordination in order to ensure their complementarity(Clingendael 2002: 9).

12 This is particularly relevant especially for those that argue that the Philippines has remained in aperpetual state of transition since the ouster of Marcos in 1986.




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Because of its highly political nature, improving democratic SSG cannot beaddressed by purely technical measures. It is necessary to understand criticalpolitical relationships among key actors, how and why decisions are made, and theincentives and disincentives for change. Strategies are needed to be developed forsupporting reforms and minimizing the impact of spoilers (Ball 2004: 48). J ust like

any type of democratic reform, there is no linear progress as regards SSR. There willalways be the possibility of backsliding, as previous gains and achievements couldbe lost due to lack of sustainability and due diligence to remain on the path of reform.

The third challenge pertains to the absence of knowledge and expertise onSSR. As a concept that is not even two decades old, it is not surprising that only afew could have a complete understanding of the nature of SSR. This expertise mayinclude knowledge on defense, security, development, peace, and democratizationat the theoretical, empirical, and policy level. It is acknowledged that just like othercountries, the Philippines suffers from a dearth of civilians with expertise on SSRissues. For example, it cannot be prevented that former officials of security forces

gets to be appointed to civilian oversight institutions. The other extreme is theplacement of civilians without the necessary expertise could equally be dangerous.From the experience of some postcommunist countries in Europe, inexpert civilianshave treated the military with contempt and made them culpable for past atrocities(Watts 2002).

There are two ways to overcome this challenge. The first could be illustratedby the experience of post-apartheid South Africa. It did not rely on experts from theformer regime which continues to harbor old and conservative ideas on defense andsecurity. Rather, it sought external assistance, particularly from the UK. A team ofexperts was tapped to provide information, training, and design courses in order tohelp the new pool of civilian leaders in security sector bureaucracies. Expertise onhuman rights and international humanitarian law, defense legislation, and defensebudget scrutiny were imparted to the parliament (Nathan 2004: 3).

Another way is to tap the expertise of civil society. It can directly facilitate SSRin three ways: (1) informal oversight as a watchdog; (2) reservoir of independentexpertise; (3) intermediary organizations between the state and its citizens (Caparini2005; Caparini and Fluri 2006).13 However, it shared among other civilians a lack ofinformation on SSR. Relative to other issues pursued by nongovernmentalassociations such as social development, peace, human rights, and democracy, little

attention has been paid on how SSR could help realize this basket of advocacies. Inhindsight, an explanation could come from the negative relations between the armedforces and civil societies as the former became the implementers of authoritarianrule in the country (similar to its neighboring countries in Southeast Asia. Alsonoteworthy is the fact that not only was civil society became the recipients (orvictims) of the iron hand of martial law, but they were also the pivotal force for thedemocratic transition in the Philippines. Many other countries for example in Africashare this similarity. The distrust or animosity of civil society toward security forces isprevalent especially in countries with authoritarian legacies or violent conflicts. Thisprevents some segments of civil society from dealing with the military and police. At

13

The media is also an important actor of SSR. Given its informational role, it can also contribute byraising security defense issues in the public agenda and some of them who engage in investigativejournalism can also address the secretive nature of the armed forces (Caparini 2004).




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most, this negative perception and attitude prevents any understanding oracceptance of any legitimate role for the armed forces (Fitz-Gerald 2003: 15).

For much of the members of civil society, SSR is the crucial unknown thatmay prove to be pivotal in the realization of many of their advocacies. With the

advent of democratic security, there is now the need for civil society asintermediary organizations between the state and the people to help define themechanisms for this public good to be effectively provided and equitably shared bythe entire society. Not only would it jeopardize this package of transformationsaimed at generating accountability, transparency, responsiveness, professionalism,and efficiency, it would also negatively affect some of the basic advocacies that theyare pursuing such as peace, development, and democracy.

However, any meaningful state-civil society engagements on SSR are afunction of existing relations between the two spheres. If there is confidence sharedby both, then it would be relatively easy to embark on a partnership for SSR. But this

may prove to be challenging given the contentious state of political relations betweenthe current government and most members of civil society.

The lack of expertise of civil society reflects the prevailing lack of capacity ofmost civilians in performing oversight functions. These oversight functions could becategorized into three: (1) confirmation of appointments; (2) budget scrutiny andreview; (3) investigations or hearings in aid of legislation. There is substantialinformation that the civilian oversight institutions have not performed these functionsappropriately and with due diligence. Also, the appointment or selection of formermilitary officials in most of these agencies has further jeopardized any meaningfuloversight from being exercised. J ust like in other countries, they ended up to be alittle more than a cheering block for the interests of the security agencies (Tanner2000: 14) and thereby undermining democratic control (Watts 2002: 53).

There is also the challenge ofmaintaining balance in the implementation ofSSR. It is observed that much of the attention has been paid to military as far asSSR is concerned sometimes to the detriment of other members of the core securityforces. The police and the intelligence services are as important as the military inprovision of security in the Philippines. What they unfortunately lack is the tradition orability to instigate serious challenges to democratic stability. This severely diminishestheir power to lobby or argue for capability-building. In the long term, the inability to

address the needs of the police in order to perform its mandated functions will alsocause stress to the military for they will continue to do tasks not related to its originalmission. As long as the police is characterized by inefficiency, corruption, and poortraining, military deployment to fulfill what are supposed to be functions of civilianforces will be necessary.

The current reform initiative of the police was informed by a study conductedin 2005 and supported by the UNDP. Unfortunately and similar to their militarycounterparts, that PNP Transformation Project as presently being implemented hasfocused on the dimension of ensuring that the police improve its operationaleffectiveness. Noteworthy is the absence of any initiative to adopt principles of

democratic policing such as accountability and responsiveness (GOP and UNDP2005).




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SSR efforts must be spread out evenly to ensure both the operationaleffectiveness of the security forces as well as being subject to democratic principlesand human rights. This may prove to be a challenge since the current PhilippineDefense Reform Program (PDRP) is oriented only to modernizing or upgrading the

capability of the armed forces while being wholly silent on the other components ofSSR. This half-baked approach would have dire implications for democraticgovernance as it will only empower the military to the detriment of the civilian sector.Unfortunately, there are clear signals of the governments inability or resolve toimplement some of the reforms laid by the Feliciano Commission.14

What is probably the worse case scenario in any country where there is a

need to implement SSR is the resistance to change by those who perceive to benegatively affected by the reforms. In any reform initiative, this is not surprising assudden changes in the form of new laws, policies, institutions, and relations maycompletely alter and even be at odds with their socialization, training, experience,

and education.

Perhaps the starting point for the SSR project in the Philippines is thegeneration of a systematic and thorough scoping study or assessment of the state ofSSG in the Philippines. This study could be made by different actors with thecooperation and support of relevant government institutions as well as civil societyorganizations. This assessment should include a survey of the local circumstancesand contexts current capacities of security sector institutions, and the security needsof the Filipino people.15 This is one big step in customizing or indigenizing SSR(Williams 2000) so that it could not be dismissed as externally imposed or lacking acomprehensive orientation. More than the output of this study, this could be anopportunity to have a genuine discussion on security and defense issues in thecountry among the different actors. This participatory endeavor could also be aconfidence-building measure among the uniformed services as well as civilianinstitutions and groups (Clingendael 2002: 5-7).

An excellent example is how the Patten Commission embarked on anextensive consultation with all stakeholders before implementing police reform inNorthern Ireland. The extensive dialogue and conversations with rival groups andconflict parties alleviated the animosity of changing the status quo. A different casecould be presented by Guatemala when its SSR project was significantly shaped by

a joint study of local and regional academics. The FLACSO

16

and a local SSR NGOgave the assessment a low public profile, without political bias, and rational analysis(Clingendael 2002: 18 and 19).

Any future SSR project in the Philippine must be locally owned. While mostSSR efforts in the world has been implemented by external actors, it is already

14 Its recent appointment of a former military official to become Secretary of Defense is perceived to be aregression. Also, unlike his predecessor, his program of action has the conspicuous absence of any commitmentto implement the Feliciano Commission recommendations.15 An initiative to assess the current state of SSG in the country is being made by a group of academics and

researches in the country. With the assistance of UNDP, the project aims to develop an SSR Index to be appliedin the Philippines.16 FLACSO stands for Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales.




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accepted as best practice that local ownership would not only deliver the optimaloutcome in the country but could give it more acceptance and legitimacy among itscitizens. Local ownership does not only entail sustained willingness and commitmentto reform but would also demand to infusion of resources to SSR activities. Externalsupport or assistance from foreign countries and international organizations could be

a big help. However, the Philippines must seek assistance from a pool oforganizations, eschewing dependence on one particular country, for instance whichmay even require certain conditionalities.

This may not yet be a problem given that the United States (US) has yet tofully embrace the concept of SSR. To a large extent, it continues to view defenseand security assistance in traditional terms. The only nuance lies in the anti-terrorismorientation of most of US defense and security assistance concentrating on thetraditional security sector agencies such as the military and the police (Ball 2005). Tosome, the anti-terror campaign had negative impacts on transparency andaccountability of the security sector by ignoring SSR (Wulf 2004: 24).

In order to break the self-perpetuating cycle of the lack of expertise of civilianswith SSR issues and thus the continued dependence on the security forces on thesematters (Ball and Brzoska 2002: 11), it is time that the Philippine embark on theformulation of a White Defense or Security Paper that is participatory or consultativein nature.17 Most of defense white papers produced in the country are classified andmostly authored by the government, either by the members of the defensedepartment or the military. Countries like Greece and South Africa have publishedtheir white papers (or books) on defense on a regular basis often with the input ofcivilian agencies and more importantly, civil society organizations. This documentmay also be a source of accountability as it often contains details on the plans andreform programs of the security sector (Ball and Brzoska 2002). Finally, it could alsosignal its reform intentions to the international community where there could bepotential partners for its SSR efforts.

Indonesia, a country whose is comparable with the Philippines as far as thesecurity sector is concerned also faces tremendous challenges. In particular, it alsohas a dearth of civilian experts in defense and security issues. This was showcasedin the formulation of its 2003 Defense White Paper which not only reinforced some ofthe military views and interests; it also was not subject to public debate (Anak 2003).

A proof that SSR may not be impossible in the Philippines has been theexperience of the province of Bohol, once a hotbed of communist insurgency.Despite the absence of a national framework on SSR, the Bohol case has shownthat peace and development could only occur with the existence of a professionaland democratically accountable security sector. Through the leadership of theprovincial government with the cooperation of all relevant government agencies andthe support of local civil society as well as the public, Bohol was able to solve itspeace and order problem. As a member of the Bohol Provincial Peace and OrderCouncil (PPOC), the military has effectively performed its duties and accomplished

17 The only available defense white paper for the public was the one created in 1998. Entitled In Defense of the

Philippines, it was formulated by mostly government officials with the input of the Council for SecurityCooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP-Philippines), a quasi-nongovernmental organization as its membershipwhere from government and the academe.




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its intended goals within its target schedule together with the police and other civilianagencies. As a hierarchical institution, the militarys effectiveness is greatlyinfluenced by the character and quality of its leadership. Moreover, the collaborationbetween the military and the police is one of the major principles of SSR. Bothsecurity forces must recognize each others distinct responsibilities but must

regularly coordinate their activities. Also noteworthy is the way the military is orientedas far as the local nuances of the Bohol province and its people are concernedbefore they were deployed. The military respects the approach adopted andmechanism employed by the civilian political leadership and supports all of itsinitiatives. On the other hand, the civilian government submits to the military allmatters pertaining to counterinsurgency and does not burden it with responsibilitiesthat it is supposed to perform.

However, the Bohol case is more the exception rather than the norm in thePhilippines. As a country that continues to grapple with internal conflict, SSRbecomes an imperative. Experiences from other countries have shown that a poor

performing and/or undemocratically manages security sector could cause theoutbreak of violence (Azca 2004). External actors such as the UNDP have alreadyrealized this given their current assistance to SSR in the country.

The Philippines does not need to reinvent the wheel if it would implementSSR. There is a multitude of best practices and lessons from other countries at haveembarked on SSR initiatives. Unlike in other regions such as postcommunist Europe,Latin America, and West Africa, Southeast Asian is relatively a latecomer onembracing SSR. Perhaps one opportunity could come in the ongoing regional projectto produce a charter for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).Interestingly, such a project may contain principles such as democracy, goodgovernance, and human rights that could create a favorable environment and acoherent framework for SSR to be pursued. In particular, there is an initiative (thoughstill in its nascent stage) for ASEAN to adopt a common code of conduct for itsarmed forces such as those in NATO, OSCE and the Economic Community of WestAfrica States (ECOWAS).

It cannot be overestimated why SSR is an urgent matter that all stakeholdersmust attend to. The two attempts to reform the military for example did notmaterialize without the occurrence of a (failed) coup. Should the country wait foranother extraordinary event in order to push an SSR agenda forward? In the end,

the prospects of SSR in the Philippines could dramatically change for the positive ifonly a credible and committed leadership will emerge. Though this may not beexplicitly articulated by the top security sector official in the country (i.e. thePresident), a general vision will definitely set the tone for any SSR project. This maycome in the form of adherence to principles of democracy, good governance,accountability, respect for human rights, and participation. In the end, this will clearlysend a strong signal not only to the security forces and civilian government agenciesbut as well as to Filipino society at large. But from an assessment of the status quo,such leadership or vision may have yet to emerge.

Note




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This paper is generally based from research undertaken by the author and othermembers of the SSR team of the Institute for Strategic and Development Studies,Inc. (ISDS). It currently has a project to undertake studies on SSR from the ConflictPrevention and Peace-Building Programme (CPPB) of the United NationsDevelopment Programme (UNDP) in Manila. The data is mostly based from

consultations, focus group discussions, and interviews with all stakeholders withinthe security sector in the Philippines.

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Documents

Civil Society's Next Frontier: Security Sector Reform (SSR) Advocacy in the Philippines