I. EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS
1
U N I V E R S I T Y
O F S A N T O
T O M A S
F a c u l t a d d e D e r e c h o i v i l
ACADEMICS CHAIR: LESTER JAY ALAN E. FLORES II
VICE CHAIRS FOR ACADEMICS: KAREN JOY G. SABUGO & JOHN HENRY C. MENDOZA
VICE CHAIR FOR ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCE: JEANELLE C. LEE
VICE CHAIRS FOR LAYOUT AND DESIGN: EARL LOUIE M. MASACAYAN & THEENA C. MARTINEZ
A. WHEN LAW TAKES EFFECT
Q:
When did the Civil Code take effect?
A: August 30, 1950
A: Laws take effect:
its publication in the official
gazette or
newspaper of general circulation.
the 16 th
XPN: unless otherwise provided by the law.
Q: What is meant by the
phrase “unless it is otherwise
provided” in the provision on
effectivity of laws?
A: 15day period may be lengthened or shortened
by Congress. The exception refers
to the 15day
period, not the requirement
of publication,
publication being mandated by due process.
Note: No one shall be charged
with notice of the
statutes
provision until the publication is completed
and the 15 day period has expired. The law produces
no effect until and unless it
completes the
requirement of publication.
Q: When will the law take effect if
it is made to
take effect “immediately”?
A: It shall take effect
immediately after
publication. The 15 day period after publication is
dispensed with but publication is not.
Q: When will the law take effect if it states that
it shall be “effective upon approval”?
A: The clause "unless it is
otherwise provided"
refers to the date of
effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in
any event be omitted. This clause does not mean
that the legislator may make
the law effective
immediately upon approval, or on any other date
without its previous publication.
extended.
Inasmuch as the law has no
specific date for its
effectivity and neither can it
become effective
upon its approval notwithstanding its
express
statement, following Article 2
of the Civil Code
and the doctrine enunciated in
Tanada, supra, it
took effect fifteen days after
its publication.
(Umali v Estanislao, G.R.
No. 104037, May 29,
1992, [citing Tanada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. L63915,
Dec. 29, 1986])
RULES ON PUBLICATION
A:
GR: Yes. Publication is indispensable.
XPN: 1. Municipal Ordinances (governed by the
Local Government Code not the
Civil
Code)
in nature.
administrative supervisors on
internal
agency.
regulations that require publication:
or enforce existing laws pursuant
to a
valid delegation;
individuals
Q: Honasan questions the authority
and jurisdiction of the
DOJ panel of prosecutors to
conduct a preliminary investigation
and to
eventually file charges against him, claiming that
since he is a senator with a salary grade of 31, it
is the Office of the
Ombudsman, not the DOJ,
which has authority and jurisdiction
to conduct the preliminary
investigation. DOJ claims that it
has concurrent jurisdiction, invoking
an OMB DOJ Joint Circular which
outlines the authority and
responsibilities among prosecutors of
the DOJ and the Office of
the Ombudsman in the conduct
of preliminary investigations.
Honasan
counters that said circular is ineffective as it was
never published.
UST GOLDENNOTES2011
A: No. OMBDOJ Circular No. 95001 is merely an
internal circular between the two
offices which
outlines the authority and responsibilities among
prosecutors of the DOJ and
of the Office of
the
Ombudsman in the conduct of
preliminary
investigations. It does not contain
any penal
provision nor prescribe a mandatory
act or
prohibit any under pain of
penalty. Further, it
does not regulate the conduct
of persons or the
public, in general. As such
therefore, it need not
be published. (Honasan, II v.
The Panel of
Investigating Prosecutors of the
Department of
Justice, G.R. No. 159747, Jun. 15, 2004)
2 CIVIL LAW TEAM:
ADVISER: ATTY. ELMER T. RABUYA; SUBJECT
HEAD: ALFREDO B. DIMAFELIX II;
ASST. SUBJECT HEADS: KAREN FELIZ G. SUPNAD, LAMBERTO L. SANTOS III; MEMBERS: PAUL ELBERT E. AMON, ALSTON ANARNA, OZAN J.
FULLEROS, CECILIO M. JIMENO, JR., ISMAEL SARANGAYA, JR.; CONTRIBUTORS: LOISE RAE G. NAVAL, MONICA JUCOM
Q: What is the effect of
nonpublication of the
law?
A: The
law shall not be effective. It
is a violation
of due process.
with the publication requirement?
A: Publication must be in full
or it is no
publication at all since its purpose is to inform the
public of the contents of
the laws…the mere
mention of the number of
the presidential
decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts,
the supposed date of
effectivity, and in a mere
supplement of
the Official Gazette cannot satisfy
the publication requirement. This is
not even
substantial compliance. (Tañada v.
Tuvera, G.R.
No. L63915, Dec. 29, 1986)
Q: Judicial decisions form part of the law or the
legal system of the land.
Is compliance with the
publication requirement for effectivity
of laws
necessary for judicial decisions to be effective?
A: No. The term “laws” do
not include decisions
of the Supreme Court because
lawyers in the
active law practice must keep
abreast of
decisions, particularly where issues
have been
clarified, consistently reiterated and published
in
advance reports and the SCRA (Roy v. CA, G.R. No.
80718, Jan. 29, 1988)
general circulation or in the
Official
Gazette.When is a newspaper of
general
circulation?
A:
jurisdiction
and general information.
paying subscribers
persons.
B. IGNORANCE OF THE LAW
Q: Differentiate mistake of law
from mistake of
fact.
A:
Want of knowledge of
some fact or facts
hand.
as they apply to the act,
relation, duty, or matter
erroneous conclusion as
good faith
Note: Ignorance of a foreign law is a mistake of fact
Q: Tina charged Eduardo with
bigamy. He
invokes as defense good faith
and that he did
not know that there was still a need
for a prior
declaration of nullity
of marriage before he can
contract a subsequent marriage. Is
his defense
tenable?
malice or evil
intent when he married Tina.
As a
general rule, mistake of
fact or
good faith of the
accused is a valid defense in
a prosecution for a
felony by dolo; such defense
negates malice or
criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is
not an excuse because everyone
is presumed to
know the law.
Ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
(Manuel v. People, G.R. No.
165842, Nov. 29,
2005)
met Tina and proposed marriage, assuring her
that he was single. They got married and lived
together. Tina, upon learning that
Eduardo
had been previously married,
charged
Eduardo for bigamy for which he
was
convicted.
that his first wife was already
dead, having
EFFECT A ND A PPLICATION OF LAWS
not heard from her
for 20 years, and that he did
not know that he had to
go to court to seek for
the nullification of his
first marriage
before marrying Tina.
Is Eduardo liable for the crime of bigamy?
A: Yes. Eduardo is presumed to
have acted
with malice or evil intent when
he married
Tina.
As a general rule, mistake of fact or good
faith of the accused is a
valid defense in a
prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense
negates malice or criminal intent.
However,
ignorance of the law
is not an excuse because
everyone is presumed to know the law.
It was
the burden of the Eduardo to prove his defense
that when he married the Tina,
he was of the
wellgrounded belief that his
first wife was
already dead. He should have
adduced in
evidence a decision of a
competent court
declaring the presumptive death
of his first
wife as required by Article 349
of the Revised
Penal Code, in relation to
Article 41 of the
Family Code. Such judicial
declaration also
constitutes proof that Eduardo
acted in good
faith, and would negate
criminal intent on his
part when he married the private complainant
and, as a consequence, he could
not be held
guilty of bigamy in such
case. Eduardo,
however, failed to discharge his
burden.
(Manuel v. People, G.R. No.
165842, Nov. 29,
2005)
3
U N I V E R S I T Y
O F S A N T O
T O M A S
F a c u l t a d d e D e r e c h o i v i l
ACADEMICS CHAIR: LESTER JAY ALAN E. FLORES II
VICE CHAIRS FOR ACADEMICS: KAREN JOY G. SABUGO & JOHN HENRY C. MENDOZA
VICE CHAIR FOR ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCE: JEANELLE C. LEE
VICE CHAIRS FOR LAYOUT AND DESIGN: EARL LOUIE M. MASACAYAN & THEENA C. MARTINEZ
Q: What is the rule as regards difficult questions
of law?
A: In specific instances provided
by law, mistake
as to difficult questions of law has been given the
same effect as a mistake of
fact. E.g. Mistake
upon a doubtful or difficult
question of law may
be the basis of good faith. [Art. 526 (3)]
C. RETROACTIVITY OF LAWS
A:
GR: Laws shall have no retroactive effect.
XPN: TIN CREEP 1. Tax laws
2. Interpretative statutes
4. Curative Statutes
provided, accused is not
a habitual
criminal
retroactivity would result to: IE
1.
Impairment of obligation of contracts
2. Ex Post Facto Laws
Note: In case of doubt: laws apply prospectively, not
retroactively.
A: No. When a doctrine of
the Supreme Court is
overruled and a different view
is adopted, the
new doctrine should be applied prospectively and
should not apply to parties who had relied on the
old doctrine and acted on the
faith thereon.
(Rabuya, p. 10)
D. MANDATORY OR PROHIBITORY LAWS
Q: What
is the status of acts which are contrary
to law?
A: GR: Acts that are
contrary to the provisions of
mandatory and proibitory law are
void. (Art.
5, NCC)
violator,
not authorized to do so;
2.
Itself authorizes its validity;
3.
Makes the act merely voidable i.e. valid
until annulled;
recognizes its effects as
legally existing,
e.g. Child born after the
annulment of
marriage is considered legitimate.
E. WAIVER OF RIGHTS
A: It is a legally enforceable
claim of one person
against another, that the other
shall do a given
act, or shall not do a given act (Pineda, Persons, p.
23)
A:
of the nature of man and depend upon
personality.
good reputation.
participate, directly or indirectly, in
the
establishment or administration
of
public office, right of petition.
3. Civil Rights – Those
that pertain to a
person by virtue of his
citizenship in a
state or community.
protection of laws, freedom of contract,
trial by jury. (Pineda, Persons, p. 24)
4 CIVIL LAW TEAM:
ADVISER: ATTY. ELMER T. RABUYA; SUBJECT
HEAD: ALFREDO B. DIMAFELIX II;
ASST. SUBJECT HEADS: KAREN FELIZ G. SUPNAD, LAMBERTO L. SANTOS III; MEMBERS: PAUL ELBERT E. AMON, ALSTON ANARNA, OZAN J.
FULLEROS, CECILIO M. JIMENO, JR., ISMAEL SARANGAYA, JR.; CONTRIBUTORS: LOISE RAE G. NAVAL, MONICA JUCOM
a. Rights of personalty or
human
rights;
A:
public policy, morals or good
customs.
with a right recognized by
law.
a.
A natural right, such as right
to life.
inheritance.
A: EKI
2. The one waiving such right
must have
Knowledge of evidence thereof
(Valderamma v. Macalde, G.R.
A: AFCUNF
right he is renouncing.
waiver
4. Waiver must Not be contrary
to law,
public order, public morals, etc.
5. When Formalities are required, they
must be complied with.
F. REPEAL OF LAWS
A: Repeal may be express or implied. It is express
if the law expressly provides
for such. On the
other hand, it is implied
when the provisions of
the subsequent law are incompatible
or
inconsistent with those of the previous law.
Q: What are the requisites of implied repeal?
A:
Q: What is the rule on repeal of repealing laws?
A: It depends upon how the old law is repealed by
the repealing law:
1. If the old law
is e xpressly repealed and
repealing law is repealed: the Old law is
not revived
repealing law is repealed: the Old law is
revived.
cases.
jurisdiction?
in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence
of what the laws mean.
EFFECT A ND A PPLICATION OF LAWS
Q: When do judicial decisions
form part of the
law of the land?
A: GR: As of the date
of the enactment of
said
law. This is so because the
Supreme Court’s
interpretation merely establishes the
construed law purports to carry into effect.
XPN: When a doctrine is
overruled and a
different view is adopted, the
new doctrine
should be applied prospectively
and should
not prejudice parties who relied
on the old
doctrine.
A: It is adherence
to judicial precedents. Once
a
question of
law has been examined and decided,
it should be deemed settled and closed to further
argument.
when in the
light of changing conditions, a
rule has
ceased to be beneficial to the
society, courts may
depart from it.
earlier decisions of the Supreme Court.
5
U N I V E R S I T Y
O F S A N T O
T O M A S
F a c u l t a d d e D e r e c h o i v i l
ACADEMICS CHAIR: LESTER JAY ALAN E. FLORES II
VICE CHAIRS FOR ACADEMICS: KAREN JOY G. SABUGO & JOHN HENRY C. MENDOZA
VICE CHAIR FOR ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCE: JEANELLE C. LEE
VICE CHAIRS FOR LAYOUT AND DESIGN: EARL LOUIE M. MASACAYAN & THEENA C. MARTINEZ
H. DUTY TO RENDER JUDGMENT
Q: Can the Court decline to render judgment by
reason of silence of the law?
A: No.No judge or court
shall decline to render
judgment by reason of the
silence, obscurity or
insufficiency of the law.
Note: However, this duty
is not a license for courts
to engage in judicial
legislation. The duty of
the
courts is to apply or interpret
the law, not to make
or amend it.
I.PRESUMPTION AND APPLICABILITY OF
CUSTOM
Q: What is the presumption in
case there is doubt in the
interpretation or application of
laws?
A: That the lawmaking body
intended right and
justice to prevail (Art. 10).
Q: What are customs?
obligatory, formed by repetition of acts uniformly
observed as a social rule.
Q: How are customs proved?
A:
GR: Must be proved as a fact, according to the
rules on evidence.
by the same court recognizing the custom.
Q: What are the requisites to make a custom an
obligatory rule?
A: PTOP
2.
Practiced for a long period of Time
3. The community accepts it as
a proper
way of acting, such that it is considered
Obligatory upon all.
group.
A: 1. In civil cases,
customs may be applied
by the courts in cases where
the
applicable law is: SOI a.
Silent
b. Obscure
c. Insufficient
to law, public morals, etc.
2. In criminal cases, customs
cannot be
applied because nullum crimen
nulla
poena sine lege (There is
neither crime
nor punishment, without a law).
J. LEGAL PERIODSS
A: Year – 365 days
Note: Month: if designated by its name: compute by
the number of days which it respectively has.
Week : 7 successive days
regardless of which day
it
would start
Note: In Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v.
Primetown Property Group, Inc., the SC ruled that as
between the Civil Code, which provides that a year is
equivalent to 365 days, and the Administrative Code
of 1987, which states that a year
is composed of 12
calendar months, it is the
latter that must prevail
following the legal maxim, Lex
posteriori derogat
priori.
A: Exclude the first, include the last;
Step 1. From the reckoning
date, add the period
or number of days which will expire.
e.g. Calendar days, not leap year:
Date of commission = September 3, 2005
Prescriptive period = 90 days from commission
3 + 90 = 93
difference shall be the date in
the month
immediately succeeding the last month
whose
number of days was subtracted.
93
days was subtracted; hence, the
remaining
difference of 2 shall be the date in December, the
month immediately succeeding November.
6 CIVIL LAW TEAM:
ADVISER: ATTY. ELMER T. RABUYA; SUBJECT
HEAD: ALFREDO B. DIMAFELIX II;
ASST. SUBJECT HEADS: KAREN FELIZ G. SUPNAD, LAMBERTO L. SANTOS III; MEMBERS: PAUL ELBERT E. AMON, ALSTON ANARNA, OZAN J.
FULLEROS, CECILIO M. JIMENO, JR., ISMAEL SARANGAYA, JR.; CONTRIBUTORS: LOISE RAE G. NAVAL, MONICA JUCOM
Hence, the last day for filing
the action is
December 2, 2005.
Q: In a case for violation
of the Copyright law
filed against her, Soccoro countered
by saying
that since the crime was found
out on
September 3, 1963, while the
information was
filed on September 3, 1965, the
crime had
already prescribed, since 1964 was
a leap year.
Has the crime prescribed?
and 29 of a leap year
should be counted as
separate days in computing periods
of
prescription. Since this case was
filed on
September 3, 1965,
it was filed one day too
late;
considering that the 730th day fell on September
2, 1965 — the year 1964 being a leap year.
With the approval of the
Civil Code of the
Philippines (R.A. 386) we have
reverted to the
provisions of the Spanish Civil Code in accordance
with which a month is to
be considered as the
regular 30month and not the solar or civil month
with the particularity that, whereas
the Spanish
Civil Code merely mentioned 'months,
days or
nights,' ours has added thereto
the term 'years'
and explicitly ordains
in Article 13 that
it shall be
understood that years are of three hundred sixty
five days.(People v. Ramos GR
L25265, May 9,
1978, Ramos v. Ramos GR L25644, May 9, 1978)
However, when the year in
questioned is a leap
year, the 365 day rule is not followed because
February 28 and 29 of a
leap year should be
counted as separate days in computing periods of
prescription (NAMARCO vs Tuazon, GR
No L
29131, Aug. 27, 1969).
Q: What is the rule if
the last day falls on a
Sunday or a legal holiday?
A: It depends. If the act
to be performed within
the period is:
a. the Rules of Court
b.
an Order of the court; or
c. any Other applicable statute
The last day will automatically
be the
next working day.
the act will still become due despite the
fact that the last day falls
on a Sunday
or a legal holiday.
Q: When, where and upon whom
do the
following laws apply?
public security and safety shall
be
obligatory upon all those who
live or
sojourn in the Philippine territory
(Art.
14, NCC)
territory. (Art. 2, RPC)
E.g.
rights and duties, status, condition
and
legal capacity of persons are
binding
upon citizens of the
Philippines
eventhough living abroad (Art. 15, NCC)
GR:Nationality rule – Binding
upon
living abroad.
by an alien pursuant to the
rules
that governs his country, the
Filipino spouse shall be considered
also as divorced.
persons
personal law of an individual
is either the
Domiciliary Rule (Domicile) or
Nationality
Rule (Citizenship)
GR:Lex Rei Sitae – Real property as well
as personal property is subject
to the
law of the country where it
is situated.
(Art. 16)
person whose succession is
under
consideration, applies to:
things only: OAI a.
Order of succession
b.
Amount of successional rights
c. Intrinsic validity of
the
testamentary provisions.
7
U N I V E R S I T Y
O F S A N T O
T O M A S
F a c u l t a d d e D e r e c h o i v i l
ACADEMICS CHAIR: LESTER JAY ALAN E. FLORES II
VICE CHAIRS FOR ACADEMICS: KAREN JOY G. SABUGO & JOHN HENRY C. MENDOZA
VICE CHAIR FOR ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCE: JEANELLE C. LEE
VICE CHAIRS FOR LAYOUT AND DESIGN: EARL LOUIE M. MASACAYAN & THEENA C. MARTINEZ
Note: The enumeration above is governed
by the national law of
the decedent,
regardless of place of death.
4. Law governing extrinsic validity
of
contracts, wills and public instruments.
GR:Lex loci celebrationis(Art. 17) – forms
and solemnities of contracts,
wills and
other public instruments shall
be
governed by the laws of
the country in
which they are executed
following cases even though performed
abroad:
diplomatic or consular officials
of
the Philippines.
public order, public policy and
good customs. (Art. 17, NCC)
A: In its jural and
concrete sense, law means a
rule of conduct formulated and
made obligatory
by
legitimate power of the state. (Diaz, Statutory
Construction, p. 1)
Q: What is the effect of
laws, judgments promulgated or
conventions agreed upon in a
foreign country on Philippine laws?
A: As regards prohibitive laws:
GR: Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their
acts, or property and laws
which have for
their object public order, public policy or good
customs are not rendered ineffective by laws,
judgments promulgated or
conventions
agreed upon in foreign country.
XPN: Art 26, par. 2 of the Family Code (FC), on
mixed marriages where the
foreigner
obtained a divorce decree abroad
and was
thereby capacitated to remarry.
recognized in the Philippines as
a mode of
terminating marriage, still the
marriage is
terminated by virtue of
a judgment of divorce
and
issuance of a divorce decree by a foreign court.
L. CONFLICT OF LAWS, RELATIVE TO DIVORCE
Q: The second clause of
the will of Joseph, a
Turkish citizen and a resident of the Philippines,
states that:
8 CIVIL LAW TEAM:
ADVISER: ATTY. ELMER T. RABUYA; SUBJECT
HEAD: ALFREDO B. DIMAFELIX II;
ASST. SUBJECT HEADS: KAREN FELIZ G. SUPNAD, LAMBERTO L. SANTOS III; MEMBERS: PAUL ELBERT E. AMON, ALSTON ANARNA, OZAN J.
FULLEROS, CECILIO M. JIMENO, JR., ISMAEL SARANGAYA, JR.; CONTRIBUTORS: LOISE RAE G. NAVAL, MONICA JUCOM
disposition found in this will
favorable to
the person or persons who fail
to comply
with this request.
Is the clause abovequoted valid?
A: No, it is void. The
second clause of the will
regarding the law which shall
govern it and the
condition imposed, is null and
void, being
contrary to law. Article 792
of the Civil Code
provides that “Impossible conditions
and those
contrary to law or good morals
shall be
considered as not imposed and
shall not
prejudice the heir or legatee
in any manner
whatsoever, even should the testator
otherwise
provide.”
ignores the testator's national law
when,
according to article 10 of
the Civil Code, such
national law of the testator
is the one to govern
his testamentary dispositions. Said condition then
is considered unwritten, hence the
institution of
legatees is unconditional and
consequently valid
and effective.
A:
Renvoi takes place when the
conflicts
rule of the forum makes a reference to
a foreign law, but the foreign
law is
found to contain a conflict
rule that
returns or refers the matter back to the
law of the forum (Remission).
2. Transmission theory –
Provides that
when the conflicts rule of
the forum
makes a reference to a foreign
law, but
the foreign law is found to
contain a
conflict rule that refers it to
a third
country, the law of the
third country
shall apply.
should be proved by the
proponent
thereof, otherwise, such law shall
be
presumed to be exactly the same as the
law of the forum.
pursuant to a law which was
subsequently declared unconstitutional
done after the declaration
of
unconstitutionality.
the Philippines. After he executed
his will, he
went back to America and stayed
there. During
the post mortem probate of
the will, Helen, his
illegitimate natural child, opposed
it on the
ground of preterition. She claims that under Art.
16 par. 2 of the Civil Code, in case of succession,
the national law of the deceased
the civil code
of California should govern.,
which provides
that if a Californian not
domiciled in California
dies, the
law of his domicile must govern. Lucy,
on the otherhand, counters that under the same
provision, the national law of
the deceased
should apply. Which law should
be applied –
Philippine law or Californian Law?
A: Philippine Law should be
applied. Where the
testator
(Edward) was a citizen of California, and
domiciled in the Philippines, the
amount of
successional rights should be
governed by his
national law, that is, Californian
law. However,
the conflict of law rules of California provides that
in cases of citizens
who are residents of
another
country, the law of the country of domicile should
apply, hence, Philippine law on
legitimes should
be applied. This is so because California
law itself
refers the case back to the
Philippines. The
Philippine court has no other
alternative but to
accept the referring back, for
to do otherwise,
might result again in its
referring back to the
Philippines, which would give rise to a sort of an
“international football”. (Aznar v. Garcia, G.R. No.
L16749. Jan. 31, 1963)
HUMAN RELATIONS
HUMAN RELATIONS
9
U N I V E R S I T Y
O F S A N T O
T O M A S
F a c u l t a d d e D e r e c h o i v i l
ACADEMICS CHAIR: LESTER JAY ALAN E. FLORES II
VICE CHAIRS FOR ACADEMICS: KAREN JOY G. SABUGO & JOHN HENRY C. MENDOZA
VICE CHAIR FOR ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCE: JEANELLE C. LEE
VICE CHAIRS FOR LAYOUT AND DESIGN: EARL LOUIE M. MASACAYAN & THEENA C. MARTINEZ
A. BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY
Q: Is breach of promise
to marry an actionable wrong?
A:
GR: No, a breach of promise to marry perse in not
an actionable wrong. There is no provision of the
Civil Code authorizing an action
for breach of
promise to marry.
XPN: When the act is not
a mere breach of
promise to marry but constitutes
one where
damages pursuant to Art. 21 of the Civil Code may
be recovered, such as:
seduction. (Gashem Shookat Baksh
v.
CA, G.R. No. 97336, February 19, 1993)
2.
Where one formally sets a wedding and
go through and spend for all
the
preparations and publicity, only to walk
out of it when the
matrimony was
about to be solemnized.( Wassmer
v.
Velez, G.R. No. L20089
, December 26,
1964)
Q: Maria met Ayatollah, an
Iranian medical
student, at the restaurant where she worked. A
few days after, Ayatollah courted and proposed
to marry Maria. The
latter accepted his love on
the condition that they would get married; they
therefore agreed to get married.
When the couple visited Maria's
parents, Ayatollah was
allowed to sleep with Maria during the few days
of their stay. The couple
continued to live together
in an apartment. However, Ayatollah's
attitude towards Maria changed. He maltreated
her and when Maria became pregnant, Ayatollah
gave her medicine to abort the
fetus. Despite the abuses, Maria
continued to live with
Ayatollah and kept reminding him of his promise
to marry her.
However, Ayatollah told her that he
could not do so because he
was already married to a girl
in Bacolod City. Maria left and
filed a complaint
for damages against Ayatollah for
the alleged violation of their
agreement to get married. May
damages be recovered for a
breach of promise to marry
on the basis of
Article 21 of the Civil Code?
A: A breach of promise to marry per se
is not an
actionable wrong. But where a man's promise to
marry is the proximate cause of the acceptance of
his love by a woman and
his representation to
fulfill that promise thereafter
becomes the
proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him
in a sexual congress, proof that
the promise was
only a deceptive device to
inveigle her to obtain
her consent to the sexual act,
could justify the
award of damages pursuant to
Article 21 not
because of such promise to marry but because of
the fraud and deceit behind it
and the willful
injury to her honor and
reputation which
followed thereafter. It
is essential, however, that
such injury should have been
committed in a
manner contrary to morals, good
customs or
public policy. In the instant
case, Ayatollah's
fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for
and promise to marry Maria that
made her
surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and
to live with him on the honest and sincere belief
that he would keep said promise,
In short, Maria
surrendered her virginity, the
cherished
possession of every single Filipina, not because of
lust but because of moral
seduction.(Gashem
Shookat Baksh v. CA,
G.R. No. 97336, February 19,
1993)
Q: Soledad a highschool teacher
used to go
around together with Francisco, who was almost
ten (10) years younger than
she. Eventually,
intimacy developed between them after Soledad
became an underwriter in Cebu.
One evening, after coming from
the movies, they had sexual
intercourse in Francisco's cabin on
board M/V "Escaño," to which he
was then attached as apprentice
pilot. After a few months, Soledad
advised Francisco that she was
pregnant, whereupon he promised to
marry her. Later their child
was born. However, subsequently,
Francisco married another woman. Soledad filed
a complaint for moral damages
for alleged
breach of promise to marry. May moral damages
be recovered for breach of promise to marry?
A: No. It is the clear
and manifest intent of
our
law making body not to sanction
actions for
breach of promise to marry. Moreover, Francisco
is not morally guilty of
seduction, not only
because he is approximately ten
(10) years
younger than the complainant —
who around
thirtysix (36) years of age,
and as highly
enlightened as a former high school teacher and a
life insurance agent are supposed
to be — when
she became intimate with him,
then a mere
apprentice pilot, but, also, because,
the court of
first instance found that,
complainant
"surrendered herself" to Francisco
because,
"overwhelmed by her
love" for him, she "wanted
to bind" "by having a fruit
of their engagement
even before they had the
benefit of clergy.
10 CIVIL LAW TEAM:
ADVISER: ATTY. ELMER T. RABUYA; SUBJECT
HEAD: ALFREDO B. DIMAFELIX II;
ASST. SUBJECT HEADS: KAREN FELIZ G. SUPNAD, LAMBERTO L. SANTOS III; MEMBERS: PAUL ELBERT E. AMON, ALSTON ANARNA, OZAN J.
FULLEROS, CECILIO M. JIMENO, JR., ISMAEL SARANGAYA, JR.; CONTRIBUTORS: LOISE RAE G. NAVAL, MONICA JUCOM
(Hermosisima v. CA, G.R. No. L14628, September
30, 1960)
sufficient promise or inducement and
the woman
must yield because of the
promise or other
inducement. If she consents merely from carnal
lust
and the intercourse is from
mutual desire, there is
no seduction.
Article 21 of the Civil Code?
A: LCI
customs, public order or policy
3.
the act is done with Intent to injure.
Note: Art. 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores or
contrary to good morals and
presupposes loss or
injury, material or otherwise, which one
may suffer
as a result of such violation
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
I. PERSONS AND PERSONALITY
11
U N I V E R S I T Y
O F S A N T O
T O M A S
F a c u l t a d d e D e r e c h o i v i l
ACADEMICS CHAIR: LESTER JAY ALAN E. FLORES II
VICE CHAIRS FOR ACADEMICS: KAREN JOY G. SABUGO & JOHN HENRY C. MENDOZA
VICE CHAIR FOR ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCE: JEANELLE C. LEE
VICE CHAIRS FOR LAYOUT AND DESIGN: EARL LOUIE M. MASACAYAN & THEENA C. MARTINEZ
A. CAPACITY TO ACT
A:
Definition
legal effect
causes
Can exist without
capacity to act
Q: What are the restrictions on capacity to act?
A: MIDIPC 1. Minority,
2. Insanity,
6. Civil Interdiction
Q: What are the circumstances
that modify or
limit capacity to act?
A: IPAIDFATPIA 1. Insanity
2. Prodigality
3. Age
4. Imbecility
A: It depends upon the classification of persons:
1.
Natural persons – by death
2. Juridical persons
– by termination of
existence
A: GR: Actual /
Permanent Personality –
Personality begins at birth; not at conception
XPN: Presumptive /
Temporary – The law
considers the conceived child as
born
(Conceptus pro nato habetur)
the foetus must be “born later
in accordance
with law” and the purpose for
which such
personality is given must be
beneficial to the
child.
Q: May a fetus be considered
born for all purposes?
A: No. Only for purposes beneficial and favorable
to it.
in accordance with law”.
1. Less than 7 months
– Must survive for
at least 24 hours after its
complete
delivery from the maternal womb
2. At least 7
months – If born alive:
considered born, even
it dies within 24
hours after complete delivery.
Q: Does the conceived child have the right to be
acknowledged even if it is still conceived?
A: Yes. It is a universal rule of jurisprudence that a
child, upon being conceived, becomes a bearer of
legal rights and is capable of being dealt with as a
living person. The fact that it
is yet unborn is no
impediment to the acquisition
of rights provided
it be born later
in accordance with Law (De Jesus
v. Syquia, G.R. No. L39110, Nov. 28, 1933).
A: It depends upon the classification of persons:
1.
Natural persons – by death
2.
Juridical persons – by termination of
existence
as to who died first?
A: It depends on whether the parties are called to
succeed each other.
12 CIVIL LAW TEAM:
ADVISER: ATTY. ELMER T. RABUYA; SUBJECT
HEAD: ALFREDO B. DIMAFELIX II;
ASST. SUBJECT HEADS: KAREN FELIZ G. SUPNAD, LAMBERTO L. SANTOS III; MEMBERS: PAUL ELBERT E. AMON, ALSTON ANARNA, OZAN J.
FULLEROS, CECILIO M. JIMENO, JR., ISMAEL SARANGAYA, JR.; CONTRIBUTORS: LOISE RAE G. NAVAL, MONICA JUCOM
1.
If successional rights are
involved – Art.
43 of the NCC: Survivorship Rule; and
Rule 131, Sec. 3(kk ):
Presumption of
simultaneity of deaths between persons
called to succeed each other, applies.
2. If no successional
rights are involved –
Rule 131, Sec. 3 (jj) of the Rules of Court
applies. (Presumption of survivorship)
Note: Both are to be applied only
in the absence of
facts.
Q: Jaime, who is 65, and
his son, Willy, who is
25, died in a plane crash. There is no proof as to
who died first. Jaime’s only
surviving heir is his
wife, Julia, who is also
Willy’s mother. Willy’s
surviving heirs are his mother, Julia, and his wife,
Wilma.
successfully claim that her late
husband, Willy,
had a hereditary share since he
was much
younger than his father and therefore, should be
presumed to have survived longer?
A: No, Wilma cannot successfully claim that Willy
had a hereditary share in his father’s estate.
Under Art 43, Civil Code, two
persons “who are
called to succeed each other”
are presumed to
have died at the same time,
in the absence of
proof as to which of
them died first. This
presumption of simultaneous death
applies in
cases involving the question of
succession as
between the two who died, who
in this case, are
mutual heirs, being father and son.
Q: Suppose, Jaime had a life
insurance policy
with his wife Julia, and his
son, Willy, as the
beneficiaries. Can Wilma successfully
claim that
onehalf of the proceeds should belong to Willy’s
estate?
Sec.3(jj) par.5 Rule 131, Rules
of Court, as the
dispute does not involve succession.
Under this presumption, the person between the
ages of 15 and 60 is deemed to have survived one
whose age was over 60 at the time of their
deaths. The estate of Willy endowed with juridical
personality stands in place and stead of Willy, as
beneficiary. (1998 Bar Question)
SURVIVORSHIP RULE UNDER CIVIL CODE
Q: Explain the survivorship rule
under the new
Civil Code.
A: If in doubt as to
who died first between 2
or
more persons called to succeed each other:
Burden of Proof : Whoever
alleges the death of
one prior to the other shall prove the same;
Absent such proof : Presumption is they all died at
the same time. There shall be no transmission of
successional rights.
application of the survivorship rule?
A: It applies when the
following conditions are
present:
2.
There is no proof as to who died first
3. There is doubt as to who died first
Q: What is the presumption
under the
survivorship rule?
two or more persons who are
called to succeed
each other, die, they shall be
presumed to have
died at the same time.
PRESUMPTIONS ON SURVIVORSHIP UNDER THE
RULES OF COURT
under the Rules of Court.
A: The Rules of Court provide that:
1. when two or more persons
2.
perish in the same calamity and
3.
it is not shown who died first, and
from which it can be inferred
that one
died ahead of the other,
The survivorship shall be determined from the
probabilities resulting from the strength and age
of the sexes according to the following rules:
13
U N I V E R S I T Y
O F S A N T O
T O M A S
F a c u l t a d d e D e r e c h o i v i l
ACADEMICS CHAIR: LESTER JAY ALAN E. FLORES II
VICE CHAIRS FOR ACADEMICS: KAREN JOY G. SABUGO & JOHN HENRY C. MENDOZA
VICE CHAIR FOR ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCE: JEANELLE C. LEE
VICE CHAIRS FOR LAYOUT AND DESIGN: EARL LOUIE M. MASACAYAN & THEENA C. MARTINEZ
Age/Sex of decedents at the
time of death
Who presumed to have survived
Decedent A
Decedent B
Under 15 Under 15
Older
Above 60 Above 60
Younger
Under 15 Above 60
Under 15
(younger)
60
Q: Do the statutory rules in the determination of
sequence of death absolutely
apply in a case where indirect
and/or inferential evidence surrounding
the circumstances of the deaths
exists?
A: No. It is manifest from the language of section
69 (ii ) of Rule 123
and that of the foregoing
decision that the evidence of
the survivorship
need not be direct; it may
be indirect,
circumstantial, or inferential. Where
there are
facts, known or knowable,
from which a rational
conclusion can be made, the
presumption does
not step in, and the rule
of preponderance of
evidence controls. It is the
"particular
circumstances from which it (survivorship) can be
inferred" that are required to be certain as tested
by the rules of evidence.
It is enough that "the
circumstances by which it
is sought to prove the
survivorship must be such as are competent and
sufficient when tested by the
general rules of
evidence
in civil cases." (Joaquin v. Navarro, G.R.
No. L5426, May 29, 1953)
Q: At the age 18, Marian
found out that she was pregnant.
She insured her own life and
named her unborn child as her
sole
beneficiary. When she was already due to give
birth, she and her boyfriend Pietro, the father
of her unborn child, were
kidnapped in a
resort in Bataan where they were vacationing.
The military gave
chase and after one week,
they were found in abandoned hut
in Cavite. Marian and Pietro
were hacked with bolos.
Marian and the baby she delivered were both
found dead, with the baby’s
umbilical cord
already cut. Pietro survived.
Can Marian’s baby be the
beneficiary of the
insurance taken on the life of the mother?
A: An unborn child may be
designated as the
beneficiary in the insurance policy
of the
mother. An unborn child shall be considered a
person for purposes favorable to
it provided it
is born later in accordance with the Civil Code.
There is no doubt that the
designation of the
unborn child as a beneficiary is favorable to the
child.
Between Marian and the baby,
who is
presumed to have died ahead?
A: If the baby was not
alive when completely
delivered from the mother’s womb,
it was not
born as a person, then the
question of who
between two persons survived will
not be an
issue. Since the baby had an
intrauterine life
of more than 7 months, it would be considered
born
if it was alive, at the time of its complete
delivery from the mother’s womb.
We can
gather from the facts that the baby was
completely delivered. But whether or
not it
was alive has to be proven by evidence.
If the baby was alive
when completely
delivered from the mother’s womb, then it was
born as a person and the
question of who
survived as between the baby and the mother
shall be resolved by the provisions of the Rules
of Court on survivorship. This
is because the
question has nothing to do with
succession.
Obviously, the resolution of
the question is
needed just for the
implementation of an
insurance contract. Under Rule 13,
Sec. 3, (jj),
(5) as between the baby who
was under 15
years old and Marian who was
18 years old,
Marian is presumed to have survived.
In both cases, therefore, the
baby never
acquired any right under the
insurance policy.
The proceeds of the insurance
will then go to
the estate of Marian.
under the insurance contract, there
is nothing
for Prieto to inherit. (2008 Bar Question)
14 CIVIL LAW TEAM:
ADVISER: ATTY. ELMER T. RABUYA; SUBJECT
HEAD: ALFREDO B. DIMAFELIX II;
ASST. SUBJECT HEADS: KAREN FELIZ G. SUPNAD, LAMBERTO L. SANTOS III; MEMBERS: PAUL ELBERT E. AMON, ALSTON ANARNA, OZAN J.
FULLEROS, CECILIO M. JIMENO, JR., ISMAEL SARANGAYA, JR.; CONTRIBUTORS: LOISE RAE G. NAVAL, MONICA JUCOM
B. DOMICILE AND RESIDENCE OF PERSON
Q: Distinguish between residence
and
domicile.
permanent or temporary. Domicile
denotes a
fixed permanent to which, when
absent, one
has the intention of returning.
Q: Where is the domicile
of a natural person
for the exercise of civil
rights and fullfilment
of civil obligations?
Q: Where is the domicile of juridical persons?
A:
recognizing the juridical person
where their legal representation
is
established or where they
exercise
their principal functions.
union between a man and a woman entered into
in accordance with law for the
establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is
the foundation of the
family and an inviolable social
institution whose
nature, consequences, and incidents
are
governed by law and not subject
to stipulation,
except that marriage settlements may
fix the
property relations during the marriage within the
limits provided by the Family Code. (Art. 1, FC)
A.REQUISITES
Q: What is meant by the
law when it declares
marriage as an inviolable social institution?
A: Marriage is an institution
in which the
community is deeply interested. The
State has
surrounded it with safeguards to
maintain its
purity, continuity and permanence.
The security
and stability of the State are largely dependent on
it. It is in the interest and duty of each member of
the community to prevent the bringing about of a
condition that would shake its
foundation and
lead to its destruction. The incidents of the status
are governed by law, not by will of the parties.
(Beso v. Daguman, A.M. No.
MTJ991211,
January 28, 2000 [citing Jimenez v. Republic, G.R.
No. L12790, August 31,1960])
Q: Distinguish marriage from ordinary contract.
A:
Social institution
Applicable law
persons regardless of
A:
who must be a male and a female
2. Consent freelygiven in
the presence of
the solemnizing officer
Q: What constitute
legal capacity of the parties
to marry?
A: ASI 1.
Age – at least 18yrs
2.
Sex – between male and female
3.
Lack of legal impediment to marry
15
U N I V E R S I T Y
O F S A N T O
T O M A S
F a c u l t a d d e D e r e c h o i v i l
ACADEMICS CHAIR: LESTER JAY ALAN E. FLORES II
VICE CHAIRS FOR ACADEMICS: KAREN JOY G. SABUGO & JOHN HENRY C. MENDOZA
VICE CHAIR FOR ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCE: JEANELLE C. LEE
VICE CHAIRS FOR LAYOUT AND DESIGN: EARL LOUIE M. MASACAYAN & THEENA C. MARTINEZ
Q: Are there other requirements,
taking into consideration the age
of the parties to the
marriage, for the validity of such marriage?
A: Yes, depending upon the age of the contracting
party.
Marriage counselling
Marriage counselling
parental consent does not
make the marriage void
but only voidable.
A: CAL 1. Marriage Ceremony
2.
Authority of the solemnizing officer
3. Valid marriage License
Q: What is the status of marriage in case of:
1. Absence of any of
the essential requisites?
A: Void ab initio
2. Absence of any of
the formal requisites?
A:GR: Void ab initio.
XPN: Valid even in the absence
of
formal requisite:
requirement
good faith that the solemnizing
officer had the proper authority.
3. Defect in essential requisites?
A: Voidable
4. Irregularity in formal requisites?
A: Valid, but the party
responsible for
such irregularity shall be
civilly,
criminally or administratively lia