Civpro Pascua-heirs of Padilla

8/13/2019 Civpro Pascua-heirs of Padilla

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G.R. No. L-39047 April 30, 1985ALBERTO PASCUA, CRISPINA PASCUA, SOTERA PASCUA, !" E#UAR#O$OLINA, petitioners,vs.%ON. AL&RE#O C. &LOREN#O, C&I o' C()!, CLE$ENTE CASTRO, !" *ULIANA O.CASTRO,respondents.Hermenigildo G. Rapanan for petitioner.GUTTIERE+, *R., J.:This is a petition for review on certiorari, seeking to annul the decision of the Court of FirstInstance of Cagayan which dismissed the petitioners' action for reconveyance with damages onthe ground that the period within which to file the same had already prescribed.Petitioners, as plaintiffs, filed a complaint for reconveyance with damages against the privaterespondents, spouses Clemente and uliana Castro. The latter, as defendants, in lieu of filing ananswer, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the complaint states nocause of action and that the same is already barred by the statute of limitations.The trial court denied the respondents' motion after finding that the grounds relied upon by themdid not appear on the face of the complaint. The court subse!uently declared the respondents indefault for their having failed to file an answer within the reglementary period. Thus, thepetitioners proceeded to present their evidence e"#parte

$fter receiving the petitioners' evidence, the trial court made the following findings%From the evidence adduced during the presentation of evidence byplaintiffs, it was shown that $lberto Pascua is one of the plaintiffs in thiscase& that he knows his co#plaintiffs Crispina, otera, surnamed Pascua,and (duardo )olina, the first two being his sisters while the last is hisnephew being the son of his sister $le*andra& that his father is ordan

Pascua while his mother is )agdalena +umadag& that both his parents arealready dead ("hibits $, -, and C& that $le*andra Pascua is also dead&that during the lifetime of ordan and )agdalena +umadag, they begot fivechildren, namely $lberto, $le*andra, Crispina, )artin and otera& thatordan Pascua and )agdalena +umadag ac!uired a parcel of land locatedat +acalafugo, Camalaniugan, Cagayan, consisting of /.01.10 hectares anddescribed in paragraph 2 of the complaint& that lately they came to knowthat their brother )artin Pascua sold the property to Clemente Castro, aresident of Camalaniugan, Cagayan& that when they went to complain to the

$grarian office in Tuguegarao Clemente Castro showed them the deed ofsale which they "ero" copied ("hibit +& that the signature $lberto Pascuaappearing in ("hibit + is not his signature& that the genuine signature of

$lberto Pascua appears in ("hibit (& that he and this co#plaintiffs did notgive consent to the sale of the land sub*ect matter of this case& that thesignature otera Pascua, appearing in ("hibit + is not also the signature of

otera Pascua& that he and his co#plaintiffs did not appear before the 3otaryPublic& that the land sub*ect matter of this case was never given to )artinPascua by their deceased father& that )artin Pascua is already dead& thatthe land is now titled in the name of the defendant uliana 4. Castro("hibits F and F#/ while the deed of sale was e"ecuted in favor ofClemente Castro ("hibit +& that the land is declared for ta"ation purposesunder Ta" +eclaration 3o. /56 ("hibit 7 in the name of uliana Castro&that plaintiffs and the defendants have been neighbors since before the warand defendants know that the land sold to them and sub*ect matter of thissuit was inherited by the plaintiffs from their deceased father& that theyplaintiffs have been deprived of the fruits of the land for more than 10years& that the land yields from thirty to forty sacks of palay valued at P20.00 each& and that plaintiffs agreed to pay their counsel the amount of P/,100.00 out of which they have already paid P 100.00.From ("hibit + of the plaintiffs, it appears that the deed of sale was

e"ecuted in favor the defendant Clemente Castro married to uliana 4rte8aby )artin Pascua on )ay 9, /:5/. $lberto Pascua and otera Pascua

testified that lately they came to know that this land was conveyed by )artinPascua to the defendants and that said defendants have been inpossession of the land in !uestion for more than 10 years. They testifiedfurther, however, that they have been deprived of the fruits of the land formore than twenty years. If such is the case, it is clear that the defendantshave entered and occupied the property for more than twenty years and it isinconceivable that the plaintiffs did not come to know that the defendantsbought the property from their brother )artin Pascua when they admittedthat they have suffered damages by virtue of the dispossession for morethan twenty years. The conclusion is obvious that the plaintiffs hadknowledge of the transaction made by their brother about twenty years ago.From the evidence of the plaintiffs, the Court finds that there was reallyfraud committed by )artin Pascua in selling the entire property which said)artin Pascua and plaintiffs inherited from their parents thus e"cluding theshares of the plaintiffs. Certainly, )artin Pascua could only sell one#fifth ofthe property and that the four#fifths were fraudulently conveyed by him. It isclear that there was fraud on the part of )artin Pascua in selling the sharesof his brother and sisters. The action for relief on the ground of fraud,however, may be brought only within four years from the discovery of thefraud. $rticle /2:/, 3ew Civil Code& ection ;2 c $ct /:0.""" """ """In view of the fact that the deed of sale was e"ecuted on )ay 9, /:5/, orover twenty years before the filing of the complaint on )ay 2/, /:62, it ishard to believe that plaintiffs did not come to know of this deed of salee"ecuted by their brother. The Court, therefore, comes to the inevitableconclusion that this action, having been filed 11 years after the e"ecution of

the deed of sale, has long prescribed.3ot satisfied with the trial court's decision, petitioners elevated the case to this Court through thispetition. The petitioners ask us to e"amine the following alleged errors of the respondent court%

/. T C4?=T (==(+ I3 +I)II37 TT$I3TIFF $>TT.

The petitioners contend that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion when, afterhearing their evidence presented e"#parte, the respondents having been declared in default, itdismissed the case on the ground that the action had already prescribed. Bhen the sameground was earlier raised, the court denied the motion to dismiss filed by the respondents. Thepetitioners argue that because of its denying the motion to dismiss, the trial court is estoppedfrom dismissing the case on the same ground. Petitioners further contend that the court's

conclusion that they had knowledge of the sale e"ecuted by their deceased brother, )artinPascua about twenty years ago is based merely on surmises and con*ectures because, inreality, it was only in /:62 when they came to learn of the deed of sale e"ecuted by theirdeceased brother in /:5/. In /:62, the deed was shown to them by respondent ClementeCastro at the $grarian office. Therefore, the period of prescription should be counted from theknowledge of the petitioners of the deed of sale and not from the date it was e"ecuted.Petitioners' contention are without merit.The trial court denied the motion to dismiss because the grounds relied upon by the respondentsfor their motiondid not appear on the face of the complaint. There was no finding that theallegation of prescription had no merit. It cannot be said, therefore, that the trial court wasalready estopped from passing upon the issue of prescription. The issue was not ad*udicated onits merits and the doctrine of res *udicata had not set in yet.Be likewise find the petitioners' contention, that they came to know of the deed of sale by )artinPascua in favor of the respondents only in /:62, highly improbable. $s the trial court correctlyobserved, it is inconceivable that the petitioners did not come to know about the purchase by the

respondents of property from )artin Pascua. They admitted that they have been neighbors ofthe respondents since before the war or period of about 20 years and that the latter had

CIVPRO CASES: PASCUA TO HEIRS OF PADILLA | 1


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deprived them of the fruits of the land in !uestion for more than 10 years. $lberto Pascua, one ofthe petitioners testified that his parents from whom they inherited the property died more than 15years ago yet the children never e"erted any effort to have the property partitioned. This factindicates that petitioners had knowledge of the sale, which e"plains why they had no interest atall in any pro*ect of partition. )ore important is the fact that after the respondents purchased theland they worked to secure an 4riginal Certificate of Title on the basis of a free patentapplication. This was way back in /:59, /5 years before the petitioners decided to file the actionbelow. Clearly, the petitioners' action is now barred by the statute of limitations.In the case of Iglesia ni Cristo v. Hon. Judge, Court of First instance of Nueva Ecija, r. I/12C=$ 512, !uoting the case of !a"ora v. #a$ang%hirang 26 C=$ 2;, we ruled%

The rule in this *urisdiction, regarding public patents and the character of thecertificate of title that may be issued by virtue thereof, is that where land isgranted by the government to a private individual, the corresponding patenttherefore, is recorded, and the certificate of title is issued to the grantee&thereafter, the land is automatically brought within the operation of the >and=egistration $ct, the title issued to the grantee becoming entitled to all thesafeguards provided in ection 29 of said $ct. In other words, upon thee"piration of one year from its issuance, the certificate of title becomesirrevocable and indefeasible like a certificate issued in a registrationproceeding.

It is !uite obvious, therefore, that the respondents' title has already become indefeasible andirrevocable, the one#year period provided by law having e"pired in /:5:.)oreover, even if we add the lower court's finding that there was fraud on the part of )artinPascua when he effected the sale of the disputed lot in favor of the respondents, the petitionersare still barred from recovering the lot because their action should have been filed within four ;years from their discovery of the fraud, which in turn, is deemed at the latest to have taken place

in /:59, when the respondents were issued an original certificate of title. This was our ruling inthe case of al"in v. &edalla/09 C=$ where we stated%

$n action for reconveyance of real property resulting from fraud may bebarred by the statute of limitations, which re!uires that the action shall befiled within four ; years from the discovery of the fraud. uch discovery isdeemed to have taken place when the petitioners herein were issuedoriginal certificates of title through either homestead or free patent grants,for the registration of said patents constitutes constructive notice to thewhole world. 7erona v. de 7u8man, // C=$ /52, and cited cases thereof.In the case at bar, the latest patent was issued on 4ctober /;, /:5:. Thereis, therefore, merit in petitioners' contention that if any action forreconveyance should be commenced, the same should be filed on or before4ctober /;, /:2. -ut private respondents' complaint for reconveyance andannulment of titles with damages was filed only on $ugust 20, /:62 or more

than /; years had already elapsed from the date of the issuance of therespective titles of the defendants. Conse!uently, the action forreconveyance of land titled in the names of defendants petitioners hereinhad already prescribed.

The petitioners raise as a second issue that the respondent court had no alternative but to grantthe relief prayed for in their complaint as this was evident in the tenor of the summons issued bysaid court which in part stated%

... if you fail to appear within the time aforesaid, the plaintiff will take*udgment against you by default and demand from this Court the reliefapplied for in said complaint. ...

Petitioners also anchor their contention on =ule /9, ection / of the =ules of Court whichprovides%

udgment by default.DIf the defendant fails to answer within the timespecified in these rules, the court shall, upon motion of the plaintiff andproof of such failure, declare the defendant in default. Thereupon the court

shall proceed to receive the plaintiff's evidence and render *udgmentgranting him such relief as the complaint and the facts proven may warrant.

This provision applies where no answer is made to a counter#claim, cross#claim or third#party complaint within the period provided in this =ule.

3owhere in the afore!uoted provision nor in the summons issued by the respondent court is itstated that the petitioners are automatically entitled to the relief prayed for, once therespondents are declared in default.Favorable relief can be granted only after the court has ascertained that the evidence offeredand the facts proven by the presenting party, petitioners in this case, warrant the grant of thesame. 4therwise, it would be meaningless to re!uire presentation of evidence if everytime theother party is declared in default, a decision would automatically be rendered in favor of the non#defaulting party and e"actly according to the tenor of his prayer. This is not contemplated by the=ules nor is it sanctioned by the due process clause.In the case of !im 'anhu v. Ramolete C=$ ;51#;52, we had occasion to elaborate on thispoint. Be ruled%

The =ules of Court contain a separate rule on the sub*ect of default, =ule/9. -ut said rule is concerned solely with default resulting from failure of thedefendant or defendants to answer within the reglementary period.=eferring to the simplest form of default, that is, where there is only onedefendant in the action and he fails to answer on time, ection I of the ruleprovides that upon 'proof of such failure, the court shall declare thedefendant in default. Thereupon the court shall proceed to receive theplaintiff's evidence and render *udgment granting him such relief as thecomplaint and the facts proven may warrant.' This last clause is clarified byection 5 which says that 'a *udgment entered against a party in defaultshall not e"ceed the amount or be different in kind from that prayed for'.?ne!uivocal, in the literal sense, as these provisions are, they do not readilyconvey the full import of what they contemplate. To begin with, contrary to

the immediate notion that can be drawn from their language, theseprovisions are not to be understood as meaning that default or the failure ofthe defendant to answer should be 'interpreted as an admission by the saiddefendant that the plaintiff's cause of action find support in the law or thatplaintiff is entitled to the relief prayed for.' )oran,supra, p. 525 citing)acondray E Co. v. (usta!uio, ; Phil. ;, citing with approval Chaffin v.)cFadden, ;/ $rk ;1& ohnson v. Pierce, /1 $rk. 5::& )ayden v. ohnson,5: 7a. /05& People v. =ust, 1:1 Ill. 219& en v. >eopold, 1/ Ill. $. /2&Chicago, etc. (lectric =. Co. v. rempel, // Ill. $. 152.""" """ """In other words, a defaulted defendant is not actually thrown out of court.Bhile in a sense it may be said that by defaulting he leaves himself at themercy of the court, the rules see to it that any *udgment against him must bein accordance with law. The evidence to support the plaintiff's cause is, ofcourse, presented in his absence, but the court is not supposed to admit

that which is basically incompetent. $lthough the defendant would not be ina position to ob*ect, elementary *ustice re!uires that only legal evidenceshould be considered against him. If the evidence presented should not besufficient to *ustify a *udgment for the plaintiff, the complaint must bedismissed. $nd if an unfavorable *udgment should be *ustifiable, it cannote"ceed in amount or be different in kind from what is prayed for in thecomplaint.

In the instant case, from the evidence presented e"#parte by the petitioners and from their veryown allegations, the only *udgment that is warranted is the dismissal of the complaint. It is barredby the statute of limitations.B


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G.R. No. 151098 $r 1, 00/ERLIN#A GA*U#O, &ERNAN#O GA*U#O, *R., ESTELITA GA*U#O, BALTA+ARGA*U#O !" #ANILO ARA%AN C%UA, Petitioners,vs.TRA#ERS ROAL BAN,/=espondent.+ ( C I I 4 3PANGANIBAN, CJ:The mere fact that a defendant is declared in default does not automatically result in thegrant of the prayers of the plaintiff. To win, the latter must still present the same !uantumof evidence that would be re!uired if the defendant were still present. $ party that defaults

is not deprived of its rights, e"cept the right to be heard and to present evidence to the trialcourt. If the evidence presented does not support a *udgment for the plaintiff, the complaintshould be dismissed, even if the defendant may not have been heard or allowed to presentany countervailing evidence.T2 C2-efore us is a Petition for =eview1under =ule ;5 of the =ules of Court, assailing the une1:, 100/ +ecision2and +ecember , 100/ =esolution;of the Court of $ppeals C$ in C$#7= C@ 3o. ;299:. The C$ disposed as follows%G?P43 T


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with )otion/0asking the C$ to discharge them as parties, because the case against themhad already been dismissed on the basis of their Compromise $greement//withpetitioners. 4n )ay /;, /::, the C$ issued a =esolution /1granting Ceroferr et al.Hs)anifestation with )otion to discharge movants as parties to the appeal. The Court,though, deferred resolution of the matters raised in the Comment/2of respondent bank.The latter contended that the Partial +ecision had been novated by the Compromise

$greement, whose effect of res *udicata had rendered that +ecision functus officio.=uling of the Court of $ppealsThe C$ ruled in favor of respondent bank. +eemed, however, to have rested on shakyground was the latterHs G)otion to et $side Partial +ecision by +efault $gainst Traders

=oyal -ank and $dmit +efendant Traders =oyal -ankHs $nswer.G/;The reasons offered bythe bank for failing to file an answer were considered by the appellate court to be Gat oncespecious, shallow and sophistical and can hardly be dignified as a MmistakeH or Me"cusablenegligence,H which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against.G/5

In particular, the C$ ruled that the erroneous docket number placed on the $nswer filedbefore the trial court was not an e"cusable negligence by the bankHs counsel. The latterhad a bounden duty to be scrupulously careful in reviewing pleadings. $lso, there wereseveral opportunities to discover and rectify the mistake, but these were not taken.)oreover, the bankHs )otion to et $side the Partial +ecision and to $dmit theJ $nswerwas not accompanied by an affidavit of merit. These mistakes and the ine"cusablenegligence committed by respondentHs lawyer were binding on the bank.4n the issue of whether petitioners had convincingly established their right to relief, theappellate court held that there was no ground to invalidate the foreclosure sale of themortgaged property. First, under ection 2 of $ct 3o. 2/25, an e"tra*udicial foreclosure

sale did not re!uire personal notice to the mortgagor. econd, there was no allegation orproof of noncompliance with the publication re!uirement and the public posting of thenotice of sale, provided under $ct 3o. 2/25, as amended. Third, there was no showing ofinade!uacy of price as no competent evidence was presented to show the real marketvalue of the land sold or the readiness of another buyer to offer a price higher than that atwhich the property had been sold.)oreover, petitioners failed to prove that the bank had agreed to sell the property back tothem. $fter pointing out that the redemption period had long e"pired, respondentHs writtencommunications to Petitioner Chua only showed, at most, that the former had made aproposal for the latter to buy back the property at the current market price& and thatPetitioner Chua was re!uested to make an offer to repurchase the property, becauseanother buyer had already made an offer to buy it. 4n the other hand, respondent notedthat the Interbank check for P;,000 was for Gdeposit only.G Thus, there was no showingthat the check had been issued to cover part of the repurchase price.

The appellate court also held that the Compromise $greement had not resulted in thenovation of the Partial +ecision, because the two were not incompatible. In fact, the bankwas not even a party to the $greement. PetitionersH recognition of CeroferrHs title to themortgaged property was intended to preclude future litigation against it.


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presentation of evidence e" parte. The same provision also sets down guidelines on thenature and e"tent of the relief that may be granted. In particular, the courtHs *udgment Gshallnot e"ceed the amount or be different in kind from that prayed for nor award unli!uidateddamages.G

$s in other civil cases, basic is the rule that the party making allegations has the burden ofproving them by a preponderance of evidence./:)oreover, parties must rely on thestrength of their own evidence, not upon the weakness of the defense offered by theiropponent.10This principle holds true, especially when the latter has had no opportunity topresent evidence because of a default order. 3eedless to say, the e"tent of the relief thatmay be granted can only be as much as has been alleged and proved 1/with preponderant

evidence re!uired under ection / of =ule /22.=egarding *udgments by default, it was e"plained in Pascua v. Florendo11thatcomplainants are not automatically entitled to the relief prayed for, once the defendants aredeclared in default. Favorable relief can be granted only after the court has ascertainedthat the relief is warranted by the evidence offered and the facts proven by the presentingparty. In +ascua, this Court ruled that G" " " it would be meaningless to re!uirepresentation of evidence if every time the other party is declared in default, a decisionwould automatically be rendered in favor of the non#defaulting party and e"actly accordingto the tenor of his prayer. This is not contemplated by the =ules nor is it sanctioned by thedue process clause.G12

The import of a *udgment by default was further clarified in >im Tanhu v. =amolete. 1;Thefollowing dis!uisition is most instructive%G?ne!uivocal, in the literal sense, as these provisions referring to the sub*ect of defaultthen under =ule /9 of the old =ules of Civil ProcedureJ are, they do not readily convey the

full import of what they contemplate. To begin with, contrary to the immediate notion thatcan be drawn from their language, these provisions are not to be understood as meaningthat default or the failure of the defendant to answer should Mbe interpreted as anadmission by the said defendant that the plaintiffHs cause of action find support in the lawor that plaintiff is entitled to the relief prayed for.H " " "." " " " " " " " "G-eing declared in default does not constitute a waiver of rights e"cept that of being heardand of presenting evidence in the trial court. " " ".GIn other words, a defaulted defendant is not actually thrown out of court. Bhile in a senseit may be said that by defaulting he leaves himself at the mercy of the court, the rules seeto it that any *udgment against him must be in accordance with law. The evidence tosupport the plaintiffHs cause is, of course, presented in his absence, but the court is notsupposed to admit that which is basically incompetent. $lthough the defendant would notbe in a position to ob*ect, elementary *ustice re!uires that only legal evidence should be

considered against him. If the evidence presented should not be sufficient to *ustify a*udgment for the plaintiff, the complaint must be dismissed. $nd if an unfavorable *udgmentshould be *ustifiable, it cannot e"ceed in amount or be different in kind from what is prayedfor in the complaint.G15

In sum, while petitioners were allowed to present evidence e" parte under ection 2 of=ule :, they were not e"cused from establishing their claims for damages by the re!uired!uantum of proof under ection / of =ule /22. tated differently, any advantage they mayhave gained from the e" parte presentation of evidence does not lower the degree of proofre!uired. Clearly then, there is no incompatibility between the two rules.econd and Third Issues%=eview of the (videncePetitioners urge this Court to depart from the general rule that the lower courtsH findings offact are not reviewable in a petition for review. 1In support of their plea, they cite theconflicting findings of the trial and the appellate courts, as well as the alleged con*ecturesand surmises made by the C$ in arriving at its +ecision.Indeed, the differences between the findings of the two courts a uo,leading to entirelydisparate dispositions, is reason enough for this Court to review the evidence in this

case.16Bhether the C$ indulged in surmises and con*ectures when it issued the assailed+ecision will thus be determined.

$t the outset, it behooves this Court to clarify the C$Hs impression that no evidence waspresented in the case which might have contributed to petitionersH challenge to its+ecision. The appellate courtHs observation was based on the notation by the lower courtHsclerk of court that there were no separate folders for e"hibits and transcripts, becauseGthere was no actual hearing conducted in this case.G19

True, there was no hearing conducted "et)een petitioners and respondent, preciselybecause the latter had been declared in default, and petitioners had therefore beenordered to present their evidence e" parte. -ut the absence of a hearing did not mean that

no evidence was presented. The Partial +ecision dated February 9, /::2, in fact clearlyenumerated the pieces of evidence adduced by petitioners during the e" partepresentation on anuary 6, /::2. The documentary evidence they presented consisted ofthe following%

/. $ copy of respondent bankHs Petition for the e"tra*udicial foreclosure andauction sale of the mortgaged parcel of land1:

1. The Certificate of ale that was a conse!uence of the foreclosure sale20

2. $ tatement of $ccount dated February /5, /:9;, showing Petitioner ChuaHsoutstanding debt in the amount of P

;0,/25.522/

;. $ copy of the Interbank check dated February /, /:9;, in the amountof P

;,00021

5. The 4fficial =eceipt issued by the bank acknowledging the check22

. The bankHs letter dated February 10, /:9;, advising Petitioner Chua of thesale of the property at an e"tra*udicial public auction& the lapse of the period of

redemption& and an invitation to purchase the property at its current marketprice2;

6. $nother letter from the bank dated )arch 11, /:9;, inviting Petitioner Chua tosubmit, within five days, an offer to buy the same property, which another buyerhad offered to buy25

9. $ copy of the 3otice of !is +endens, the filing of which was done after that ofthe $mended Complaint2

:. $ copy of the title showing the inscription of the 3otice of !is +endens26

/0. $ copy of the $bsolute +eed of ale to Cerrofer29

//. $ copy of a letter dated $ugust 1:, /:9, made and signed by petitionersHcounsel, re!uesting the cancellation of the 3otice of !is +endens2:

/1. $ copy of a page of the )emorandum of (ncumbrance from TCT 3o.2/;2;/ 6669LT#2:;0


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after the lapse of the period of legal redemption, petitioners needed to show that theparties had agreed to e"tend the period, and that Petitioner Chua had committed to paythe redemption price on a fi"ed date.The letters sent by the bank to Petitioner Chua on February 10 and )arch 11, /:9;, do notconvincingly show that the parties arrived at a firm agreement for the repurchase of theproperty. Bhat can be gleaned from the February 10 letter is that Petitioner Chuaproposed to pay the redemption price for the property, but that the bank refused to accedeto his re!uest, because the one#year redemption period had already lapsed. ;;The bank,though, had offered to sell back the property to him at the current market value. Indeed, ane"amination of his earlier letter of February /6, /:9;, readily reveals that he e"pressed

willingness to settle his account with the bank, but that his Gpresent financial situationprecludes himJ from effecting an immediate settlement " " ".G;5

4n the other hand, the letter dated )arch 11, /:9;, clearly states that G" " " the -ankre*ected hisJ re!uest to redeem said property due to theJ lapse of theJ one / year legalredemption period.G;3onetheless, he was GinvitedJ to submit an offer to buy the sameproperty in five 5 days from receipt of the letterJ.G ;6Petitioner Chua was also informedthat the bank had received an offer to purchase the foreclosed property. $s to the P

;,000check enclosed in his proposal dated February /6, /:9;, as a token of his good faith, hewas advised that the amount was still outstanding in the books of the bank and could beclaimed by him if he thought the invitation was not feasible.)ore important, there was no showing that petitioners had committed to pay theredemption price on a fi"ed date. True, Petitioner Chua had attempted to establish aprevious agreement to repurchase the property for less than its fair market value.


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pi) S2r2r) o' 2 #2pr2! o' E"


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4n une /;, 100;, the =TC rendered a udgment by +efault,19the dispositive portion ofwhich reads%B


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complaint, or that the decision is contrary to law, even without need of the prior filing of amotion to set aside the order of default e"cept that he does not regain his right to adduceevidence.;1 The appellate court, in turn, can review the assailed decision and is notprecluded from reversing the same based solely on the evidence submitted by the plaintiff.The ne"t !uestion to be resolved is whether petitioner has the right to the contested publicoffice and to oust private respondent from its en*oyment. Be answer in the negative.

$ !uo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to thecontested public office and to oust the holder from its en*oyment.;2It is brought against theperson who is alleged to have usurped, intruded into, or unlawfully held or e"ercised thepublic office.;; It may be brought by the =epublic of the Philippines or by the person

claiming to be entitled to such office.;5

In !uo warranto, the petitioner who files the action in his name must prove that he isentitled to the sub*ect public office. In other words, the private person suing must show aclear right to the contested position.;4therwise, the person who holds the same has aright to undisturbed possession and the action for !uo warranto may be dismissed. ;6It isnot even necessary to pass upon the right of the defendant who, by virtue of hisappointment, continues in the undisturbed possession of his office.;9

4n the basis of the evidence presented solely by petitioner and without considering thearguments and attachments made by respondents to rebut petitionerHs claims, we find thatpetitioner failed to prove that she is entitled to the contested position.It is undisputed that petitioner was appointed as the principal of the P3. In addition, shewas designated as the 4IC of the PI3. aid designation was, however, withdrawn.Private respondent was, thereafter, designated as the new 4IC. This prompted petitionerto file the !uo warranto petition before the court a !uo.

The contested position was created by =$ 65. ection 2 of the law provides%ection 2. The school shall be headed by a @ocational chool uperintendent.


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GON+AGA-REES, J.?-efore us is a petition for review on certiorari under =ule ;5 of the =ules of Court of the=esolution/of the Court of $ppeals dated February 1;, /::: in the case entitled G)a. @ilma .>abad vs. The ?niversity of outheastern PhilippinesG dismissing the appeal of )a. @ilma .>abad herein petitioner and the =esolution dated uly 11, /::: denying the motion forreconsideration of petitioner.The facts of this case are as follows%Petitioner was a probationary faculty member of the ?niversity of outheastern Philippineshereafter respondent >aboratory high school and was designated as the adviser for theschool's yearbook GT=$I> :5G, the school's regular school organ GI3I7


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BRANC% 1, BANSALAN, #A=AO #EL SUR, !" SPOUSES GUALBERTO @ RENECABA%UG-SUPERALES,=espondents.+ ( C I I 4 3LEONAR#O-#E CASTRO, J.:This Petition for Certiorari under =ule 5 of the =ules of Court assails the / =esolution /dated+ecember 10, 100/ of the Court of $ppeals in C$#7.=. P 3o. ;;10#?+, dismissing thePetition for Certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order T=4 and preliminaryin*unction of petitioners spouses =uben and )yrna >eynes spouses >eynes& and 1=esolution dated )ay 6, 1001 of the appellate court in the same case, denying the spouses>eynesH )otion for =econsideration.This case originated from a Complaint 1for forcible entry, damages, and attorneyHs fees filed by

respondents spouses 7ualberto and =ene Cabahug uperales spouses uperales against thespouses >eynes before the )unicipal Circuit Trial Court )CTC, -ranch / of -ansalan#)agsaysay, +avao del ur, and docketed as Civil Case 3o. ;6/ 1000#-. The Complaintalleged the following material facts%

2. That the spouses uperalesJ were the actual occupants and possessors, beinglawful owners of that certain parcel of a residential lot within the 3ebrada ubd.,-ansalan, +avao del ur, known as >ot 3o. 1;12#-#5##1, Psd#//#050;69, being aportion of lot 1;12#-#5#, Psd#//#009/0;, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title 3o.T#;/1;0, containing an area of Three eynesJand protested their intrusion into their property but notwithstanding their protestationsthe spouses >eynesJ continued on their construction and occupation of a portion ofthe spouses uperalesHJ property&. That the spouses uperalesJ reported to the -arangay Captain of -rgy. Poblacion,-ansalan, +avao del ur, the spouses >eynesHJ encroachment on their titled propertyand the illegal construction being made on a portion of their property and theircomplaint was docketed as -rgy. Case 3o. /;:&6. That $micable ettlement of the dispute was however, repudiated by the spouses>eynesJ when they refused to recogni8ed the relocation survey conducted on theproperty of the spouses uperalesJ and prevented the spouses uperalesHJ surveyorfrom planting monuments on the boundary between the spouses uperalesJ and the

spouses >eynesHJ lot&" " " "9. That as per relocation survey conducted, the spouses >eynesJ have encroachedand occupied a total of eventy i" 6 !uare )eters, of the spouses uperalesHJtitled property, thereby reducing the area of the spouses uperalesHJ lot from 22!uare )eters, more or less to 10 !uare )eters, more or less&" " " ":. That the spouses uperalesJ also complained to the )unicipal (ngineerHs 4ffice inorder to stop the illegal construction undertaken by the spouses >eynesJ, butspouses uperalesHJ complaint fell on deaf ears as no action has been taken by the)unicipal (ngineerHs 4ffice on the said illegal construction&" " " "/0. That the spouses >eynesJ have unlawfully occupied and are continuouslyoccupying illegally a portion of the spouses uperalesHJ property consisting of 6!uare )eters, thereby denying the spouses uperalesJ the use and en*oyment of

the said property being unlawfully withheld by the spouses >eynesJ&

//. That the spouses uperalesJ must be promptly restored to the full and peacefulpossession of the portion of 6 !uare )eters, of their property taken forcibly andillegally by the spouses >eynesJ, by ordering the spouses >eynesJ to remove andLordemolish their construction and improvements erected on the lot of the spousesuperalesJ, and should they fail or refuse to do so, spouses uperalesJ be given theauthority to cause the removal of the spouses >eynesHJ improvements at the e"penseof the spouses uperalesJ&/1. That in the meantime that the spouses >eynesJ are occupying a portion of thespouses uperalesHJ property, spouses >eynesJ be made to pay the spousesuperalesJ the amount of P500.00 per month as reasonable rental for the propertyuntil they shall have restored the property to the full and peaceful possession of the

spouses uperalesJ.2ummons together with a copy of the aforementioned Complaint was served on the spouses>eynes on )ay /0, 1000, giving them ten /0 days from receipt within which to file their answerpursuant to ection of the =ules on ummary Procedure. The /0#day period for the filing ofthe spouses >eynesH answer prescribed on )ay 10, 1000, a aturday.The spouses >eynes filed their $nswer with Counterclaim on )ay 11, 1000, and their )otion to

$dmit -elatedly Filed $nswer with attached $nswer with Counterclaim the day after, on )ay 12,1000. The spouses >eynes e"plained that they were not able to file their $nswer withCounterclaim on )ay 10, 1000, even though there were court employees on duty that aturday,because they had to serve first a copy of said pleading on the spouses uperalesH counsel,whose office was located in +avao City. +avao City is appro"imately one#hour ride by bus from+igos City. The spouses >eynes added that they were not even sure if the office of the spousesuperalesH counsel was open on aturdays.;

The spouses uperales opposed the spouses >eynesH )otion to $dmit -elatedly Filed $nswercontending that the answer should have been filed within /0 days from receipt of a copy of the

complaint& and the spouses >eynesH motion to admit is in the nature of a motion for e"tension oftime to file an answer, which is a prohibited pleading in summary proceedings. The spousesuperales further pointed out that the spouses >eynesH motion to admit was not set for hearingand was, thus, a pro f orma motion which should be denied outright.The spouses uperales subse!uently filed an (" Parte )otion for udgment on )ay 12, 1000,in which they prayed that since the spouses >eynes failed to file their answer to the Complaintwithin the prescribed period, then *udgment could now be rendered based on the evidence andallegations contained in the Complaint.4n )ay 1:, 1000, the )CTC rendered its udgment denying the spouses >eynesH )otion to

$dmit -elatedly Filed $nswer and resolving Civil Case 3o. ;6/ 1000#- entirely in the spousesuperalesH favor. aid )CTC *udgment reads%This treats the e"#parte motion for *udgment filed by $tty. =ogelio (. arsaba, counsel for thespouses uperalesJ alleging in substance that the last day of filing of answer for the spouses>eynesJ was on )ay 10, 1000 and the spouses >eynesJ did not file any. -e it noted on suchdate although it was aturday the Court was opened and Court personnel, -enedicta $bagon

and $nastacia @ale were present at that time to receive cases and motions filed in Court. 4n)ay 11, 1000 spouses >eynesJ filed theirJ answer which answer was filed out of the timeprescribed by law. ?nder ection 6 of =ule 60, /::6 =ules of Civil Procedure, the law provides%Ghould the defendants fail to answer the complaint within the period above provided, the court,motu proprio or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render *udgment as may be warranted by thefacts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein. The Court, may in itsdiscretion reduce the amount of damages and attorneys fees claimed for being e"cessive orotherwise unconscionable, without pre*udice to the applicability of ection 2 c, =ule : if thereare two or more defendants.GFrom the foregoing facts, the spouses >eynesJ really failed to answer the complaint within theperiod prescribed by law, which period under the rules cannot be e"tended.B


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1. To pay the spouses uperalesJ the amount of P500.00 per month as reasonablerentals of the 6 s!uare meters lot occupied by the spouses >eynesJ from February1000 until the said area shall have been delivered to the full possession and control ofthe spouses uperalesJ in the concept of damages&2. To pay the spouses uperalesJ the sum of P;,000.00 as reimbursement for thecost of the survey and the relocation of the spouses uperalesHJ property& and;. To pay the spouses uperalesJ the sum of P/5,000.00 as reimbursement forattorney fees.5

$ggrieved, the spouses >eynes appealed the foregoing )CTC udgment to the =egional TrialCourt =TC, -ranch 1/ of -ansalan, +avao del ur. Their appeal was docketed as Civil Case3o. I#119 00. In its +ecision dated uly :, 100/, the =TC affirmed the appealed )CTC

udgment, ruling thus%The lower court was right when it did not allow or entertain the belatedly filed $nswer withCounterclaim of the spouses >eynesJ. The G)otion to $dmit -elated $nswerG partakes of amotion for e"tension of time to file pleading which is not allowed as e"plicitly provided in ection/: of the /::/ =evised =ules on ummary Procedure. ince the law on this matter isunambiguous, une!uivocal, its application is imperative.Bherefore, the *udgment rendered by the )unicipal Circuit Trial Court is hereby affirmed, withthe sole modification that the amount of monthly rental for the eventy#i" 6 s!uare meter#lotbe reduced from P500.00 to P100.00.

The spouses >eynes filed with the =TC a )otion for =econsideration in which they sought therecall of the +ecision dated uly :, 100/ and the remand of the case to the )CTC for trial on themerits. eynesJ, in filing a G)otion to $dmit -elated $nswerG in effect admitted that their$nswer was filed out of time. eynes then filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance ofTemporary =estraining 4rder and Preliminary In*unction with the Court of $ppeals on 3ovember/6, 100/. The petition was docketed as C$#7.=. P 3o. ;;10#?+.In its =esolution dated +ecember 10, 100/, the Court of $ppeals dismissed the spouses>eynesH petition outright for being the wrong remedy and for failure to state the material dates.The appellate court e"plicated that%

/ It is a wrong remedy. ?nder the heading GTimeliness 4f This PetitionG spouses>eynesJ alleged that the petition is directed against Gthe decision of the =egional TrialCourt, -ranch 1/ in -ansalan, +avao del ur in the e"ercise of its appellate

*urisdiction. This case originated from the )unicipal Circuit Trial Court, -ranch /,-ansalan#)agsaysay, +avao del ur docketed as Civil Case 3o. ;6/ 1000J#-where, herein =espondents, pouses 7ualberto and =ene uperales filed aComplaint for Forcible (ntry against Petitioners, pouses =uben and )yrna >eynes.GIf that be so, then the correct and appropriate mode of review should be appeal byway of a petition for review under =ule ;1 of the /::6 =ules. ?nder paragraph ; ofupreme Court Circular 3o. 1#:0, an appeal taken to either the upreme Court or theCourt of $ppeals by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed.1 ?pon the other hand, if the present petition for certiorari were to be regarded asthe correct or appropriate remedy N which it is not N still it is procedurally flawedbecause the spouses >eynesJ violated the amendment introduced to ection 2, =ule; of the /::6 =ules, as amended, by upreme Court Circular 3o. 2:#:9, effective

eptember //, /::9, which states as follows ###ection 2. Contents and filing of petition& effect of non#compliance with re!uirements ###

" " " "In actions filed under =ule 5, the petition shall further indicate the material dates showing whennotice of *udgment or final order or resolution sub*ect thereof was received, when a motion fornew trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed, and when notice of the denial thereof wasreceived." " " "The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing re!uirements shall be sufficientground for the dismissal of the petition.eynesJ did not indicate *ust when it was that they received the notice of thedenial of the motion for reconsideration that they allegedly filed with the =TC of -ansalan,+avao del ur, -ranch 1/, on $ugust /9, 100/, the resolution whereon, denying their motion for

reconsideration was allegedly GstrangelyG dated uly :, 100/.%ERE&ORE, the present petition must be denied due course and conse!uently #IS$ISSE#.3eedless to say, inasmuch as the prayer for a temporary restraining order and preliminaryin*unction is merely an ad*unct to the main petition, the same must be pro tanto #ENIE#.:

4n anuary 19, 1001, the =TC issued an 4rder granting the spouses uperalesH )otion for("ecution. The =TC observed that the Court of $ppeals did not issue a T=4 as prayed for bythe spouses >eynes in their petition in C$#7.=. P 3o. ;;10#?+. Instead, the =TC referred tothe =esolution dated +ecember 10, 100/ of the Court of $ppeals dismissing outright thespouses >eynesH petition in C$#7.=. P 3o. ;;10#?+.ubse!uently, the =TC issued a Brit of ("ecution on February 1, 1001, for the satisfaction of its+ecision dated uly :, 100/.4n February //, 1001, the spouses >eynes filed with the =TC a )anifestation with motion tohold in abeyance the enforcement of the writ of e"ecution, considering their pending )otion for=econsideration of the =esolution dated +ecember 10, 100/ of the Court of $ppeals in C$#7.=.P 3o. ;;10#?+. In its 4rder dated February /5, 1001, the =TC directed the heriff to hold in

abeyance the implementation of the Brit of ("ecution until said trial court has resolved thespouses >eynesH latest motion.In a =esolution dated )ay 6, 1001, the Court of $ppeals found no reason to modify or overturnits earlier =esolution dated +ecember 10, 100/, which dismissed the spouses >eynesH petition inC$#7.=. P 3o. ;;10#?+. The dispositive portion of said =esolution states%B


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IITI37 TI37 the spouses >eynesHJ $3B(= F(>> 43 $$T?=+$A, Tapanday =C, we e"plained the simple reason for therule in this light%GBhen a court e"ercises its *urisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive itof the *urisdiction being e"ercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed bya court would deprive it of its *urisdiction and every erroneous *udgment would be a void

*udgment. This cannot be allowed. The administration of *ustice would not survive such a rule.Conse!uently, an error of *udgment that the court may commit in the e"ercise of its *urisdiction isnot correctaJble through the original civil action of certiorari.GThe supervisory *urisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ of certiorari cannot bee"ercised for the purpose of reviewing the intrinsic correctness of a *udgment of the lower court

N on the basis either of the law or the facts of the case, or of the wisdom or legal soundness ofthe decision. (ven if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has *urisdiction over thecase, such correction is normally beyond the province of certiorari. Bhere the error is not one of

*urisdiction, but of an error of law or fact N a mistake of *udgment N appeal is the remedy.$s to the )anner of Filing. 4ver an appeal, the C$ e"ercises its appellate *urisdiction and powerof review. 4ver a certiorari, the higher court uses its original *urisdiction in accordance with itspower of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts. $n appeal is thus acontinuation of the original suit, while a petition for certiorari is an original and independentaction that was not part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the *udgment or ordercomplained of. The parties to an appeal are the original parties to the action. In contrast, theparties to a petition for certiorari are the aggrieved party who thereby becomes the petitioneragainst the lower court or !uasi#*udicial agency, and the prevailing parties the public and theprivate respondents, respectively.

$s to the ub*ect )atter. 4nly *udgments or final orders and those that the =ules of Court sodeclare are appealable. ince the issue is *urisdiction, an original action for certiorari may be

directed against an interlocutory order of the lower court prior to an appeal from the *udgment& orwhere there is no appeal or any plain, speedy or ade!uate remedy.

$s to the Period of Filing. 4rdinary appeals should be filed within fifteen days from the notice of*udgment or final order appealed from. Bhere a record on appeal is re!uired, the appellant mustfile a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty days from the said notice of *udgmentor final order. $ petition for review should be filed and served within fifteen days from the noticeof denial of the decision, or of the petitionerHs timely filed motion for new trial or motion forreconsideration. In an appeal by certiorari, the petition should be filed also within fifteen daysfrom the notice of *udgment or final order, or of the denial of the petitionerHs motion for new trialor motion for reconsideration.4n the other hand, a petition for certiorari should be filed not later than si"ty days from the noticeof *udgment, order, or resolution. If a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration wastimely filed, the period shall be counted from the denial of the motion.

$s to the 3eed for a )otion for =econsideration. $ motion for reconsideration is generallyre!uired prior to the filing of a petition for certiorari, in order to afford the tribunal an opportunity

to correct the alleged errors. 3ote also that this motion is a plain and ade!uate remedye"pressly available under the law. uch motion is not re!uired before appealing a *udgment orfinal order.Certiorari 3ot the Proper =emedyif $ppeal Is $vailableBhere appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the action for certiorari will not be entertained.=emedies of appeal including petitions for review and certiorari are mutually e"clusive, notalternative or successive. eynes, only thatthey failed to avail of it in time. This much is clear from the following e"planation of the counselfor the spouses >eynes%

/0. ?ntil the proceedings before the =egional Trial Court -ranch 1/, the spouses >eynesJ wererepresented by their former counsel of record, $tty. Christopher $barilla. $ggrieved by the way

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their case was handled by their former counsel of record, the spouses >eynesJ engaged theservices of the undersigned Counsel in the second week of 3ovember 100/ for the purpose ofelevating their case to the Court of $ppeals. ince no other remedy under the =ules of Courtwas no longer available to the spouses >eynesJ because the /5#day period within which to file aCertiorari under =ule ;1 had already lapsed, recourse under =ule 5 was instead resorted to asthere was no appeal, or any plain, speedy and ade!uate remedy in the ordinary course of law bywhich the spouses >eynesJ could !uestion the assailed decisions of both the lower court andthe =TC -ranch 1/./(mphasis ours.Be reiterate the well#settled rule that certiorari is not available where the aggrieved partyHsremedy of appeal is plain, speedy and ade!uate in the ordinary course, the reason being thatcertiorari cannot co#e"ist with an appeal or any other ade!uate remedy. The e"istence and

availability of the right to appeal are antithetical to the availment of the special civil action forcertiorari. These two remedies are mutually e"clusive./6The special civil action of certioraricannot be used as a substitute for an appeal which the petitioner already lost./9

Furthermore, as the Court of $ppeals held, the spouses >eynesH Petition for Certiorariin C$#7.=. P 3o. ;;10#?+ failed to comply with the re!uirement under =ule ;, ection 2 of the=ules of Court that a petition for certiorari should indicate material dates, such as when notice ofthe *udgment or final order or resolution sub*ect thereof was received, when a motion for newtrial or reconsideration, if any, was filed, and when notice of the denial thereof was received. Thespouses >eynes did not refute that their Petition for Certiorari before the Court of $ppeals didnot state the date they received a copy of the =TC =esolution denying their )otion for=econsideration. That the said =esolution was strangely dated uly :, 100/, the same date asthe =TC +ecision sought to be reconsidered, is immaterial. The timeliness of the filing by thespouses >eynes of their petition before the Court of $ppeals is determined from the date theyreceived the challenged =TC resolution and not the date the =TC issued the same.eeking recourse from this Court, the spouses >eynes once more filed a Petition for Certiorari

under =ule 5 of the =ules of Court. The spouses >eynes yet again availed themselves of thewrong remedy.The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of the Court of $ppeals is a petition forreview under =ule ;5 which is not similar to a petition for certiorari under =ule 5 of the =ules ofCourt. $s provided in =ule ;5 of the =ules of Court, decisions, final orders or resolutions of theCourt of $ppeals in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved,may be appealed to us by filing a petition for review, which would be but a continuation of theappellate process over the original case. $ special civil action under =ule 5 is an independentaction based on the specific grounds therein provided and, as a general rule, cannot be availedof as a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal, including that under =ule ;5.

$ccordingly, when a party adopts an improper remedy, his petition may be dismissed outright./:

3evertheless, we bear in mind that the acceptance of a petition for certiorari, as well as the grantof due course thereto is, in general, addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Theprovisions of the =ules of Court, which are technical rules, may be rela"ed in certain e"ceptionalsituations. Bhere a rigid application of the rule that certiorari cannot be a substitute for appeal

will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of *ustice, it is within our power to suspend therules or e"empt a particular case from its operation.10

Be pronounced in Tanenglian v. >oren8o1/that%$ll things considered, however, we do not agree in the conclusion of the Court of $ppealsdismissing petitioner's Petition based on a procedural fau( pa(. Bhile a petition for certiorariisdismissible for being the wrong remedy, there are e"ceptions to this rule, to wit% a when publicwelfare and the advancement of public policy dictates& b when the broader interest of *ustice sore!uires& c when the writs issued are null and void& or d when the !uestioned order amountsto an oppressive e"ercise of *udicial authority.In /e"astian v. &orales, we ruled that rules of procedure must be faithfully followed e"cept onlywhen, for persuasive reasons, they may be rela"ed to relieve a litigant of an in*ustice notcommensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure, thus%CJonsidering that the petitioner has presented a good cause for the proper and *ustdetermination of his case, the appellate court should have rela"ed the stringent application oftechnical rules of procedure and yielded to consideration of substantial *ustice.

The Court has allowed some meritorious cases to proceed despite inherent procedural defectsand lapses. This is in keeping with the principle that rules of procedure are mere tools designed

to facilitate the attainment of *ustice and that strict and rigid application of rules which wouldresult in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial *ustice must alwaysbe avoided. It is a far better and more prudent cause of action for the court to e"cuse a technicallapse and afford the parties a review of the case to attain the ends of *ustice, rather than disposeof the case on technicality and cause grave in*ustice to the parties, giving a false impression ofspeedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of

*ustice.11(mphases ours.7iven the peculiar circumstances e"tant in the case at bar, the dismissal of the spouses >eynesHPetition for Certiorari would result in the miscarriage of *ustice. The spouses >eynes wereun*ustly declared in default by the )CTC and deprived of the opportunity to present argumentsand evidence to counter the spouses uperalesH Complaint. eynesH petition in the interests of substantial *ustice and e!uity.=eglementary PeriodThe )CTC rendered its udgment dated )ay 1:, 1000 e" parte, declaring the spouses >eynesin default for their failure to file their answer to the spouses uperalesH Complaint within thereglementary period for doing so. $ccording to the )CTC, the spouses >eynes only had until)ay 10, 1000 to file an answer& and although )ay 10, 1000 was a aturday, the court was openand court personnel -enedicta $bagon and $nastacia @ale were present at that time to receivecases and motions filed with the court.Be disagree.ections , =ule 60 of the /::/ =evised =ules on ummary Procedure gives a defendant /0days from service of summons to file hisLher answer%ection . $nswer. # Bithin ten /0 days from service of summons, the defendant shall file hisanswer to the complaint and serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff. $ffirmative and negativedefenses not pleaded therein shall be deemed waived, e"cept lack of *urisdiction over thesub*ect matter. Cross#claims and compulsory counterclaims not asserted in the answer shall be

considered barred. The answer to counterclaims or cross#claims shall be served and filed withinten /0 days from service of the answer in which they are pleaded.In computing said /0#day period, we resort to =ule 11, ection / of the =ules of Court, whichreads%ection /. eynes did file their $nswer with Counterclaim. -ased on the afore!uoted rules, the spouses>eynesH answer was filed within the reglementary period, and they were not in default. The)CTC should not have rendered an e" parte udgment against them.Court personnel were at the )CTC on )ay 10, 1000, a aturday, in compliance with theupreme Court $dministrative Circular 3o. 1#::, on trict 4bservance of Borking


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be notified of their assignment at least three days in advance. $n employee so assigned shallhave a full day#off the following week, on a day to be specified by the usticeLudge concerned.)anual for Clerk of Courts, Chapter II, ection $, / (mphases ours.

$dministrative Circular 3o. 1#:: should not affect the manner by which periods set by the rulesor the courts are computed under =ule 11, ection / of the =ules of Court. $dministrativeCircular 3o. 1#:: is an administrative issuance signed by then Chief ustice eynes, was already raffled to and pending before the )CTC#-ranch / of-ansalan#)agsaysay, +avao del ur& thus, the answer and other pleadings in said case shouldalready be filed with the said -ranch and not with the 4ffice of the Clerk of Court. There is noshowing that the 4ffice of the -ranch Clerk of Court was also open on )ay 10, 1000.)CTC urisdictionBe do not subscribe, however, to the spouses >eynesH argument that the spouses uperalesHComplaint for forcible entry had already prescribed.=ule 60, ection / of the =ules of Court provides%ec. /. Bho may institute proceedings, and when. N ub*ect to the provisions of the ne"t

succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force,intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person againstwhom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the e"piration ortermination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, e"press or implied, or thelegal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee or other person, may, at anytime within one / year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring anaction in the proper )unicipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding ordepriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution ofsuch possession, together with damages and costs. (mphasis ours.In forcible entry cases, the action must be brought within one year from the date of actual entryon the land. In paragraph ; of their Complaint, the spouses uperales alleged that the spouses>eynes, through force, stealth, and strategy, encroached upon and occupied a portion of thespouses uperalesH titled property, consisting of 6 s!uare meters, sometime in February 1000.The spouses uperales already filed their Complaint for forcible entry, damages, and attorneyHsfees, three months thereafter, in )ay 1000.

(ven so, the )CTC rendered *udgment against the spouses >eynes e" parte. The spouses>eynesH $nswer with Counterclaim was not admitted by the )CTC and they had no opportunityto present evidence in support of their defenses.The spouses >eynes averred before us that%;9. It is clear from the language of the law that the spouses uperalesHJ cause of action accruedfrom the very moment they found in /::5 that the spouses >eynesHJ buildings allegedly intrudedinto their supposed property when they ac!uired title over the same. -ut for the ne"t five yearsor so, the spouses uperalesJ never raised a howl of protest over the alleged encroachment.3ot having acted on their rights within the limits stipulated under the law, then the complaint forForcible (ntry should also be considered as belatedly filed before the )CTC -ranch.;:. The spouses uperalesJ, however, have been very careful to allege that the spouses>eynesHJ structures were built in the year 1000 to enable them to get around the prescriptiveperiod imposed by the =ules. -ut the truth is, and the same could have been very wellestablished had a trial on the merits proceeded, the comfort rooms were built in /:95 and thebunkhouse followed two years later. The spouses uperalesJ then were not yet claimants or

possessors of the land they now say is theirs. In /::5 when they surreptitiously ac!uired titleover ose CabahugHs property, they contested for the first time, the location of the spouses

>eynesHJ buildings. Aet, after having done so, the spouses uperalesJ never filed the complaintfor Forcible (ntry within the one / year period as mandated. $t the onset therefore, thespouses uperalesHJ cause of action was already tainted with a serious congenital infirmitywhich, had a trial been convened, would have necessarily resulted in the unwarranted complaintagainst the spouses >eynesJ.1;

These averments obviously involve factual matters which the spouses >eynes must back up withevidence. Be cannot rule on the same since this Court is not a trier of facts. Conse!uently, it isonly prudent that the case be remanded to the )CTC for further proceedings.B


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G.R. No. 133119 A


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I@. T (==(+ I3 4=+(=I37 TITI43 4F T>(7$> T=?CT?=( >4C$T(+ $T 34. /03$==$ P>$C(, F4=-( P$=, )$$TI CITA, C43I+(=I37 T4)$TIC P=()I(G/;

Be grant the petition.First. The instant case is barred due to Forbes ParkHs failure to set it up as acompulsory counterclaim in Civil Case 3o. /5;0, the prior in*unction suitinitiated by Financial -uilding against Forbes Park.$ compulsory counterclaim is one which arises out of or is necessarily connected

with the transaction or occurrence that is the sub*ect matter of the opposingpartyHs claim./5If it is within the *urisdiction of the court and it does not re!uire forits ad*udication the presence of third parties over whom the court cannot ac!uire*urisdiction, such compulsory counterclaim is barred if it is not set up in the actionfiled by the opposing party./

Thus, a compulsory counterclaim cannot be the sub*ect of a separate action but itshould instead be asserted in the same suit involving the same transaction oroccurrence, which gave rise to it. /6 To determine whether a counterclaim iscompulsory or not, we have devised the following tests% / $re the issues of factor law raised by the claim and the counterclaim largely the sameS 1 Bould resjudicatabar a subse!uent suit on defendantHs claim absent the compulsorycounterclaim ruleS 2 Bill substantially the same evidence support or refuteplaintiffHs claim as well as the defendantHs counterclaimS and ; Is there any

logical relation between the claim and the counterclaimS $ffirmative answers tothe above !ueries indicate the e"istence of a compulsory counterclaim./9

?ndoubtedly, the prior Civil Case 3o. /5;0 and the instant case arose from thesame occurrence N the construction work done by Financial -uilding on the?=Hs lot in Forbes Park @illage. The issues of fact and law in both cases areidentical. The factual issue is whether the structures erected by Financial-uilding violate Forbes ParkHs rules and regulations, whereas the legal issue iswhether Financial -uilding, as an independent contractor working for the ?=,could be en*oined from continuing with the construction and be held liable fordamages if it is found to have violated Forbes ParkHs rules.$s a result of the controversy, Financial -uilding sei8ed the initiative by filing theprior in*unction case, which was anchored on the contention that Forbes ParkHsprohibition on the construction work in the sub*ect premises was improper. Theinstant case on the other hand was initiated by Forbes Park to compel Financial-uilding to remove the same structures it has erected in the same premisesinvolved in the prior case and to claim damages for undertaking the saidconstruction. Thus, the logical relation between the two cases is patent and it isobvious that substantially the same evidence is involved in the said cases.)oreover, the two cases involve the same parties. The aggregate amount of theclaims in the instant case is within the *urisdiction of the regional trial court, had itbeen set up as a counterclaim in Civil Case 3o. /5;0. Therefore, Forbes ParkHsclaims in the instant case should have been filed as a counterclaim in Civil Case3o. /5;0.econd. ince Forbes Park filed a motion to dismiss in Civil Case 3o. /5;0, itse"isting compulsory counterclaim at that time is now barred.

$ compulsory counterclaim is au"iliary to the proceeding in the original suit andderives its *urisdictional support therefrom./:$ counterclaim presupposes the

e"istence of a claim against the party filing the counterclaim.


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G.R. No. 143188 &26rino -ucad and Florentino Pineda. Thecomplaint, docketed as Civil Case 3o. :5#/6/#), was raffled to -ranch 162 of the=TC of )arikina.

The 7uevara heirs alleged in the complaint that they were the co#owners of aproperty originally covered by 4riginal Certificate of Title 4CT 3o. 29 issued on 6+ecember /:/0 in favor of the spouses (miliano 7uevara and )atilde Crimen. ThecoupleHs son, and the 7uevara heirsH predecessor#in#interest, (liseo 7uevara,allegedly purchased the property on / anuary /:21 and had e"ercised ownershipover the property since then by selling and donating portions thereof to third persons.The 7uevara heirs averred that the sale of the property to (liseo 7uevara wasannotated at the back of 4CT 3o. 29.$ccording to the 7uevara heirs, the defendants illegally claimed ownership andpossession over a certain portion of the property, particularly that area covered byTransfer Certificate of Title TCT 3o. 1122/ issued to the estate of Pedro C.7on8ales. TCT 3o. 1122/ was derived from 4CT 3o. 1:, which the 7uevara heirsdescribed as fake, having been issued only on 1 anuary /:/1 or subse!uent to theissuance of 4CT 3o. 29. $B& $3+,T$C>.2

Counsel for the estate of Pedro 7on8ales filed a CommentL)anifestation,;stating thather clients have adopted and *oined PinedaHs petition praying for the reinstatement ofthe trial courtHs order of dismissal.$t bottom, the petition raises two main issues, to wit% / whether or not the appeal ofthe heirs of 7uevara was improperly elevated to the Court of $ppeals since,

according to them, it raised a pure !uestion of law& and 1 whether or not the trial

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court correctly dismissed the action on the ground of laches without conducting trialon the merits.Petitioner Pineda had ample opportunity to raise before the Court of $ppeals theob*ection on the improper mode of appeal taken by the heirs of 7uevara. This, hefailed to do. The issue of improper appeal was raised only in PinedaHs motion forreconsideration of the Court of $ppealsH +ecision.


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G.R. No. 171/77 *!and, Inc. P$>I, is the owner and developer of @istade >oro Condominium @ista de >oro, a condominium pro*ect that straddles on eight 9 parcelsof land located at the Puerto $8ul -each and ope8, :: Phil. /96, cited in $!uino and 7rio#$!uino,The Civil Code of the Philippines and Family Code, /::0 ed., p. /1. In the cited case, it washeld that the lease of fishponds e"ecuted by a municipality, without the consent of the provincialgovernor as re!uired by law, was merely voidable and not void ab initio. The instant controversyis akin to the )unicipality of Camiling case in that a prior approval or consent by a specificauthority is a pre#re!uisite to the validity of a given transaction. Aet, the absence of suchprevious consent merely makes the transaction voidable, or valid unless and until made void.Conse!uently, the real estate mortgage between the parties without the antecedent ?=-

written approval is only voidable, and remains valid until set aside.

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-ut may not Plaintiff have the mortgage be sic annulled now, which is in fact the remedy itprays forS P$>I has the principle of estoppel against it, having misrepresented itself to have freedisposal of the property sub*ect of the mortgage. It is P$>IHs responsibility to seek ?=-approval of the mortgage. 3ote that ection /9 of P.+. 3o. :56 prohibits a mortgage by anowner or developer without ?=- approval. P$>I is the owner and developer of the @ista de>oro Condominium Pro*ect, sub*ect of the mortgage. ince the prohibition covers Plaintiff, it isincumbent upon it to secure the consent of ?=- before the property can be mortgaged toP3-. P$>I cannot pass the buck to P3- by arguing that it is new in the business and P3- beingvastly e"perienced, the responsibility lies with the latter. Ignorance of the law e"cuses no onefrom compliance therewith $rticle 2, Civil Code. Truly, to nullify the real estate mortgage due toPlaintiffsH failure to secure the re!uired written ?=- approval would be to allow Plaintiff to

un*ustly benefit from its own inaction or negligence at the e"pense of P3-./

P$>I filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari, which was docketed as 7.=. 3o./2266. In a =esolution/6dated une 6, 100;, this Court denied P$>IHs petition. Thus%Considering the allegations, issues, and arguments adduced in the petition for review oncertiorari of the orders of the =egional Trial Court, 3aic, Cavite, -ranch /5, dated $ugust 1:,1002 and )arch 20, 100;, the Court =esolves to +(3A the petition for failure of the petitioner tosufficiently show that the =egional Trial Court committed any reversible error in the challengedorders as to warrant the e"ercise by this Court of its discretionary appellate *urisdiction in thiscase./9

This CourtHs =esolution dated une 6, 100; became final and e"ecutory on eptember /0,100;./:

1nd $nnulment of )ortgage Case4n uly /:, /:::, >im filed with the ?=- a complaint 10against P$>I, P3-, the =egistrar of+eeds of the Province of Cavite and $tty. ude ose F. >atorre, r., a 3otary Public for CaviteCity, seeking for the nullification of the sub*ect mortgage, suspension of P$>IHs license to sell,

and award of damages. >im claimed that apart from the fact that the sub*ect mortgage ispre*udicial to her interest, it is void for lack of the re!uisite approval of the ?=-. >im likewiseemphasi8ed that by the time she learned of the sub*ect mortgage, she had already paid P$>I thetotal amount of P5,651,1/5.1;.The =uling of the ?=-4n 4ctober 15, 1000, the ?=- gave due course to >imHs complaint and rendered a+ecision,1/the dispositive portion of which states%BI and P3- dated )arch 11, /::;involving the @ista de >oro I in order for the latter to cause deliveryof the aforementioned title in the name of complainant, upon payment by the latter ofthe balance of the purchase price in the amount of P;/2,9;6.69&2. 4rdering respondents P$>I and P3- to *ointly and solidarily pay complainant the

following% a the sum of P/0,000.00 as moral damages&b the sum of P/5,000.00 as e"emplary damages&c the sum of P/5,000.00 as attorneyHs fees& andd cost of suit.

;. For violating ection /9 of P+ :56, the >icense to ell of P$>I over the sub*ect pro*ect ishereby ordered suspended and they are further directed to pay this -oard the sumof P/0,000.00 as administrative fine.4 4=+(=(+.11

The ?=- ruled that P$>IHs failure to secure its approval rendered the sub*ect mortgage void.Thus%From the arguments of respondents as well as the documentary e"hibits presented bycomplainant, more particularly the Complaint and $ffidavit of )erit of Cynthia I and P3- was e"ecuted. This act is not only prohibited but

also penali8ed under P.+. 3o. :56.

12

>ikewise ruling that litis pendentia will not bar >im from having the sub*ect mortgage annulled,the ?=- ratiocinated as follows%The defense of litis pendentia and forum#shopping presupposes dual actions involving the sameparties with identical reliefs sought. =espondent P$>I failed to submit any evidence to prove thatcomplainant was a party to the case pending before the =egional Trial Court of 3aic, Cavite.urisdiction falls within this -oard over this case since the same involves the relief for violation ofP.+. :56. This falls under the purview of unsound real estate business practice, as enunciated inP.+. /2;;.1;

Conse!uently, P3- filed a Petition for =eview15with the -oard of Commissioners of the ?=-.In a +ecision1dated 4ctober 1, 100/, the Third +ivision of the ?=-Hs -oard ofCommissioners partially affirmed the ?=-Hs +ecision dated 4ctober 15, 1000, vi8%

Bherefore, the decision of the office below is hereby modified with the deletion of the award ofe"emplary damages and of the directive for the suspension of the license to sell of respondentPuerto $8ul >and, Inc.In all other respects, the decision of the office below is affirmed.o ordered.16

P3- appealed to the 4P.19I as it is not a party thereto& b thepower to annul the sub*ect mortgage is *udicial in nature and e"clusively vested with the =TCs&c in +y v. Court of $ppeals,2;this Court stated that there is nothing in ection /9 of P.+. 3o.:56 which provides that a mortgage without the ?=-Hs approval is null and void& d theremedy provided by ection 15 of P.+. 3o. :56 is redemption and not the nullification of themortgage& and e it is a mortgagee in good faith as P$>IHs titles do not bear an annotation ofany lien or encumbrance at the time of the constitution of the sub*ect mortgage.P3- thereafter moved for substitution of parties stating that it had assigned its interest in P$>IHsloan and the sub*ect mortgage to Tranche / P@#$)C, Inc. Tranche / pursuant to =epublic

$ct 3o. :/91.25This was granted by the C$ in a =esolution2dated eptember 1, 1005.The =uling of the C$4n eptember 1:, 1005, the C$ rendered the herein assailed +ecision26partially granting P3-Hspetition. The C$ upheld the ?=-Hs *urisdiction to annul the sub*ect mortgage and dismissedP3-Hs claim that it is a mortgagee in good faith, the rights of which should prevail over >imHsrights as the buyer of ?nit ;9C. The C$, however, reversed the award of moral damages and

attorneyHs fees in >imHs favor for lack of factual basis. The C$ ratiocinated that%Clearly, P$>IHs act of mortgaging parcels of land on which the condominium pro*ect is locatedwithout the approval of the ?=- was not only an unsound real estate business practice butalso highly pre*udicial to the buyer. The *urisdiction of the ?=- to regulate the real estatetrade is broad enough to include *urisdiction over complaints for annulment of the mortgage withdamages


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im. 3o proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may bead*udicated. I for damages, is moot and academic.29

4n 3ovember 1, 1005, Tranche / filed a )otion for Partial =econsideration2:but this was deniedby the C$ in its =esolution;0dated February 12, 100.IssuesThe instant petition seeks the reversal of the herein assailed +ecision dated eptember 1:,1005 and =esolution dated February 12, 100 of the C$, which declared the sub*ect mortgageas null and void. The petition is anchored on the following grounds%

I.T(+, I3 $ FI3$> $3+ ((C?T4=A+(CII43, TI37 Tim, who is a buyer in bad faith. $t the time the sub*ect mortgage wasconstituted, P$>IHs titles bore no annotation of any lien or encumbrance. In contrast thereto, atthe time >im purchased ?nit ;9C, the sub*ect mortgage was already annotated on TCT 3o.;0;10/ and CCT 3o. ;09. im had constructive knowledge ofthe e"istence of the sub*ect mortgage.ection 15;of P.+. 3o. :56 e"plicitly provides for redemption as a remedy available to a buyerof a condominium unit in case an outstanding mortgage covering the purchased property e"ists.>imHs $rgumentsIn her Comment,;6>im stresses that she was not a party to the first annulment of mortgage casefiled with the =TC. Further, the ?=-Hs *urisdiction over her complaint cannot be assailed since

the relief she sought was posed against P$>I and P3-Hs acts which were violative of P.+. 3o.:56.Bhile >im admits that she was not privy to the sub*ect mortgage e"ecuted between P$>I andP3-, she was directly affected by the same.-esides, it is beyond dispute that no mortgage clearance was obtained from the ?=-. Thus,the sub*ect mortgage cannot be enforced against her and the other buyers of units in thecondominium pro*ect.

$s to P3-, it failed to e"ercise due diligence relative to the e"ecution of the sub*ect mortgage.P3- cannot be considered as a mortgagee in good faith in the light of this CourtHspronouncement in pertinent cases, that the rule stating that persons dealing with registeredlands can rely solely on the certificates of title, does not apply to banks.P$>IHs ContentionsIn its Comment,;9P$>I reiterates the arguments it had raised in the first annulment of mortgagecase filed with the =TC and proceedings before the ?=-.P$>I contends that the sub*ect mortgage is void for having been constituted sans ?=-Hs

approval, hence, in contravention of ection /9 of P.+. 3o. :56. Consonant to the foregoing, thisCourt ruled in Far (ast -ank E Trust Co. v. )ar!ue8 ;:that Uthe avowed purpose of P.+. 3o.J:56 compels the reading of ection /9 as prohibitoryVacts committed contrary to it are void.W50

Further, $rticle 5 of the 3ew Civil Code is e"plicit that Gacts e"ecuted against the provisions ofmandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, e"cept when the law itself authori8es their validity.GTherefore, even if P.+. 3o. :56 only provides for fines and imprisonment as penalties, they arenot the sole conse!uences of violations of its provisions. The sub*ect mortgage is void for havingbeen constituted without complying with the re!uirements laid down in P.+. 3o. :56.Citing $lonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc.,5/P$>I also posits that a minute resolution is not aprecedent. P$>I thus concludes that this CourtHs affirmation, by way of a minute resolution, ofthe =TCHs ruling anent the validity of the sub*ect mortgage, does not constitute res *udicata.P$>I likewise refutes Tranche /Hs stance that >im should have instead availed of the remedy ofredemption provided for in P.+. 3o. :56. P$>I emphasi8es that redemption presupposes thatthe sub*ect mortgage is valid. In the case at bar, the mortgage is void, hence, there is nothing tobe redeemed.

4ur =ulingBe partially grant the instant petition.$s the issues raised herein are interrelated, they shall be discussed *ointly.-y reason of res *udicata, thebinding effect of the sub*ectmortgage on P3- and P$>I cannotanymore be assailed.

$s pointed out by Tranche /, this Court had already sustained the validity of the sub*ectmortgage by way of a minute resolution issued on une 6, 100;, which became final ande"ecutory on eptember /0, 100;. The said resolution affirmed the =TCHs finding that even ifthe sub*ect mortgage is voidable, P$>I is already estopped from challenging its validity for torule otherwise would be tantamount to rewarding the latter to benefit from its own inaction ornegligence.P$>I refutes the above and cites $lonso51to argue that a minute resolution is not a precedent.In $lonso, we declared that a Gminute resolution may amount to a final action on the case but it

is not a precedent.G

52


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relative to strangers to an action, nonetheless binds the parties therein, and calls for res*udicataHs application.3ationwide ecurity and $llied ervices, Inc. v. @alderama 55is instructive anent the effects ofthe issuance of a minute resolution, vi8%It is true that, although contained in a minute resolution, our dismissal of the petition was adisposition of the merits of the case. B hen we dismissed the petition, we effectively affirmed theC$ ruling being !uestioned. $s a result, our ruling in that case has already become final." " ".Bith respect to the same sub*ect matter and the same issues concerning the same parties, itconstitutes res *udicata. I and >imThe *urisdiction of the ?=- to regulate the real estate trade is broad enough to include

*urisdiction over complaints for annulment of mortgage.0This is pursuant to the intent of P.+.

3o. :56 to protect hapless buyers from the un*ust practices of unscrupulous developers whichmay constitute mortgages over condominium pro*ects sans the knowledge of the former and theconsent of the ?=-.In Far (ast -ank,/we held that%

$cts e"ecuted against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall bevoid.-)phi-im. Thereafter, P$>I should deliver to >im her titleover the condominium unit free from all liens and encumbrances.The issue of whether or not P3-was a mortgagee in good faith neednot be resolved.The issue of whether or not P3- was in good faith need not be resolved since the validity of themortgage between P$>I and P3- is a settled matter. Bhile diligence on the part of P3- waswanting when it failed to independently conduct in!uiries and verify circumstances surroundingthe e"ecution of the sub*ect mortgage, the fact remains that it e"tended loans to P$>I in /::;long before >im purchased ?nit ;9C of Cluster +ominiko of @ista de >oro. It is thus offensive tothe concept of fair play to declare P3- liable with P$>I for the latterHs violation of >imHs rights.Band, Inc. andPhilippine 3ational -ank remains valid pursuant to the =esolution dated une 6, 100;,which we issued relative to 7.=. 3o. /2266, albeit without pre*udice to the rightsprovided for in ection 15 of Presidential +ecree 3o. :56 accruing to =ina Parayno>

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Civpro Pascua-heirs of Padilla