CIVPRO Digest Pool.docx

JURISDICTIONCivil Service Commission Vs. Court Of Appeals, Dr. Dante G. Guevarra And Atty. Augustus F. Cezar, G.R. No. 176162, October 09, 2012 (ATIENZA)

FactsRespondents Dante G. Guevarra (Guevarra) and Augustus F. Cezar (Cezar) were the Officer-in-Charge/President and the Vice President for Administration, respectively, of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP) in 2005.

On September 27, 2005, petitioner Honesto L. Cueva (Cueva), then PUP Chief Legal Counsel, filed an administrative case against Guevarra and Cezar for gross dishonesty, grave misconduct, falsification of official documents, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, being notoriously undesirable, and for violating Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713. Cueva charged Guevarra with falsification of a public document, specifically the Application for Bond of Accountable Officials and Employees of the Republic of the Philippines, in which the latter denied the existence of his pending criminal and administrative cases, despite the fact that Guevarra and Cezar have 17 cases pending before th Sandiganbayan.

On March 24, 2006, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) formally charged Guevarra with Dishonesty and Cezar with Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. Subsequently, the respondents filed their Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Declare Absence of Prima Facie Case. This was denied and Guevarra was subsequently placed under preventive suspension for ninety (90) days.

Guevarra and Cezar filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA essentially questioning the jurisdiction of the CSC. On December 29, 2006, the CA rendered its Decision granting the petition and nullifying and setting aside the questioned resolutions of the CSC for having been rendered without jurisdiction citing EO 292 (Administrative Code of 1987) which states that heads of agencies and instrumentalities "shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction" thereby bestowing upon the Board of Regents the jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against respondents Guevarra and Cezar.

ISSUE: WON the Civil Service Commission have jurisdiction over the case?

HELD: YESAccording to the SC, the CSC have original jurisdiction over cases filed to it. The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the government, has the power to discipline its officials and employees and to hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal.

Based on the constitution, the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. By virtue of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1341, PUP became a chartered state university, thereby making it a government-owned or controlled corporation with an original charter whose employees are part of the Civil Service and are subject to the provisions of E.O. No. 292

In the case of Camacho v. Gloria, the SC stated that under E.O. No. 292, a complaint against a state university official may be filed with either the universitys Board of Regents or directly with the Civil Service Commission.

This is further emphasized on Sec. 4 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases stating that The Civil Service Commission shall hear and decide administrative cases instituted by, or brought before it, directly or on appeal. Also, Sec. 7 of the same rules further provides that Heads of Departments, agencies, provinces, cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities shall have original concurrent jurisdiction, with the Commission, over their respective officers and employees. These rules, according to the SC, are a reasonable interpretation of EO 292 (Administrative Code).

This concurrent jurisdiction means that if a case is filed to the CSC and the CSC assumes jurisdiction over the case, then it shall be to the exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction (The disciplinary tribunal of PUP or its Board of regents in this particular case). Even if the CSC delegates the investigation to other department or agency like the disciplinary tribunal, it does not deprive the CSC of its jurisdiction. In the same way, if the Disciplinary tribunal of PUP or its Board of Regents takes jurisdiction over the case, it shall be to the exclusion of the CSC.

OTHER ISSUES DISCUSSED:

On the issue that EO 292 expressly mentions A complaint may be filed directly with the Commission by a private citizen against a government official or employee, the SC held that a literal interpretation is unreasonable as this would mean that only private citizens can file directly to the CSC and that government employees could only appeal decisions to CSC. It is unreasonable as it would be tantamount to disenfranchising government employees. That is why the SC ruled that even government employees can file directly to the CSC

On WON there is distinction between career and non career: NONE. All members of the civil service are under the jurisdiction of the CSC, unless otherwise provided by law. Career or non-career, a civil service official or employee is within the jurisdiction of the CSC.

Melana v. Tappa, G.R. No. 181303, September 17, 2009 (BOMBALES) Facts: Petitioners filed a complaint before the RTC for Reivindicacion, Quieting of Title, and Damages against respondents. Petitioners alleged:o That they are the owners of a parcel of land they inherited from Anastacio Danao who died intestate.o That during the lifetime of Anastacio, he allowed respondents (Consuelo and her family members) to build on and occupy the southern portion of the subject property with the agreement that the property will be vacated at any time Anatacio and his heirs will need it.o And that respondents refused to vacate the property despite petitioners demand and instead claims ownership and built their respective residences using permanent materials. Petitioners then referred this land dispute to the Lupong Tagapamayapa for conciliation. o During the conciliation proceeding: Respondents presented documents ostensibly supporting their claim of ownership. Petitioner claims that respondents documents were highly dubious, falsified, and incapable of proving the latters claim of ownership over the subject property. Hence, petitioners were compelled to file a complaint with RTC to remove such cloud from their title. RTC dismissed the Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction by virtue of RA 7691 or other wise known as Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, which vests the RTC with jurisdiction over real actions, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds P20,000.00 and since it was found that the subject property had a value of less than P20,000.00 (The assessed value was actually-P410 as evidenced by Tax Dec).o Clearly, petitioners action to recover the same was outside the jurisdiction of the RTC. Petitioners filed an MR and argued that their principal cause of action was for quieting of title hence the complaint should not have been dismissed, since Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court states that an action to quiet title falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC.

Issue: W/N RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners Complaint motu proprio.

Ruling: NO The RTC in dismissing the case, made a distinction b/w the first and 2nd paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, which provides:Section 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this Rule.

The first paragraph refers to an action for declaratory relief, which should be brought before the RTC. The second paragraph, however, refers to a different set of remedies, which includes an action to quiet title to real property.

The second paragraph must be read in relation to Republic Act No. 7691, which vests the MTC with jurisdiction over real actions, where the assessed value of the real property involved does not exceed P50,000.00 in Metro Manila and P20,000.00 in all other places.

As correctly found by the RTC, the assessed value of the subject property as stated in Tax Declaration is only P410 therefore petitioners complaint involving title to and possession of the said property is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC not RTC.

Hence, the RTC, in dismissing petitioners Complaint, acted in complete accord with law and jurisprudence, it cannot be said to have done so with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

HERALD BLACK DACASIN VS. SHARON DEL MUNDO DACASIN, G.R. No. 168785, February 05, 2010 (BUENAVENTURA)

Facts: Petitioner Herald Dacasin, American, and respondent Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin, Filipino, were married in Manila in April 1994. They have one daughter, Stephanie, born on 21 September 1995. In June 1999, respondent sought and obtained from the Circuit Court, 19th Judicial Circuit, Lake County, Illinois (Illinois court) a divorce decree against petitioner. In its ruling, the Illinois court dissolved the marriage of petitioner and respondent, awarded to respondent sole custody of Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over the case for enforcement purposes. On 28 January 2002, petitioner and respondent executed in Manila a contract (Agreement) for the joint custody of Stephanie. The parties chose Philippine courts as exclusive forum to adjudicate disputes arising from the Agreement. Respondent undertook to obtain from the Illinois court an order relinquishing jurisdiction to Philippine courts. In 2004, petitioner sued respondent in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 60 (trial court) to enforce the Agreement. Petitioner alleged that in violation of the Agreement, respondent exercised sole custody over Stephanie. Respondent sought the dismissal of the complaint for, among others, lack of jurisdiction because of the Illinois courts retention of jurisdiction to enforce the divorce decree. Issue: Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioners suit and enforce the Agreement on the joint custody of the parties child. Ruling of the Court: YES, the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain petitioners suit but not to enforce the Agreement which is void. However, factual and equity considerations militate against the dismissal of petitioners suit and call for the remand of the case to settle the question of Stephanies custody. Regional Trial Courts Vested With Jurisdictionto Enforce Contracts Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. At the time petitioner filed his suit in the trial court, statutory law vests on Regional Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions incapable of pecuniary estimation. An action for specific performance, such as petitioners suit to enforce the Agreement on joint child custody, belongs to this species of actions. Thus, jurisdiction-wise, petitioner went to the right court. Indeed, the trial courts refusal to entertain petitioners suit was grounded not on its lack of power to do so but on its thinking that the Illinois courts divorce decree stripped it of jurisdiction. This conclusion is unfounded. What the Illinois court retained was jurisdiction x x x for the purpose of enforcing all and sundry the various provisions of [its] Judgment for Dissolution. Petitioners suit seeks the enforcement not of the various provisions of the divorce decree but of the post-divorce Agreement on joint child custody. Thus, the action lies beyond the zone of the Illinois courts so-called retained jurisdiction.

Far East Bank v.Shemberg, G.R. NO. 163878, December 12, 2006 (DORIA)

Petitioner: Far East Bank & Trust Company (FEBTC), a domestic banking corporation organized and existing under Philippine laws; now managed and operated by the Bank of the Philippine Islands

Respondents: Shemberg Marketing Corporation, Mackie Industries Corporation, Benson Industries Incorporated, et. al., all duly registered domestic corporations based in Pakna-an, Mandaue City

Individual respondents: all surnamed Dacay, are directors and corporate officers of the said corporations

FACTS:

Prior to 1998, respondents entered into several credit transactions with petitioner bank, secured by several real estate mortgages on several realties they owned in Mandaue City. Respondents failed to pay the loans thus petitioner sought to foreclose the mortgages.On February 28, 2001, respondents filed with the RTC a Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Injunction, Damages, and Annulment of Promissory Notes, Documents, and Contracts. Respondents prayed for reliefs including the issuance of an ex parte TRO for 72 hours and thereafter, upon summary hearing, a TRO for 20 days.On March 9, 2001, the RTC granted respondents prayer for the issuance of a TRO. Far East Bank filed its Answer, Counterclaim, Vigorous Opposition to the Order (regarding the TRO), and a Motion to Dismiss Based On Affirmative Defenses alleging, among others, that: the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case for non-payment of proper docket fees and that such RTC has no jurisdiction to enjoin the foreclosure proceedings.On March 27, 2001, the RTC denied petitioners motion to dismiss, stating that: (1) the question of jurisdiction has not been raised except with the cause of action regarding the annulment of mortgages. Considering however that an annulment of mortgage is incapable of pecuniary estimation the court feels that its jurisdiction is proper.Petitioner then filed with the CA a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, contending that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The CA eventually dismissed the petition for certiorari. It held that as the RTC has jurisdiction over the case, its orders or decisions upon all questions therein, cannot be corrected by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was still denied by the CA. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the case RULING: THE RTC HAS JURISDICTION

Here, the primary reliefs prayed for by respondents are the cancellation of the real estate and chattel mortgages. In Bumayog v. Tumas, the SC ruled that where the issue involves the validity of a mortgage, the action is one incapable of pecuniary estimation. In the more recent case of Russell v. Vestil, the SC held that an action questioning the validity of a mortgage is one incapable of pecuniary estimation. Since respondents paid the docket fees, as computed by the clerk of court, consequently, the trial court acquired jurisdiction.

A court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the payment of the prescribed fees. The importance of filing fees cannot be gainsaid for these are intended to take care of court expenses in the handling of cases in terms of costs of supplies, use of equipment, salaries and fringe benefits of personnel, and others, computed as to man-hours used in the handling of each case. Hence, the non-payment or insufficient payment of docket fees can entail tremendous losses to the government in general and to the judiciary in particular.

Petitioners contention: the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case because being a real action without a stated assessment of the value of properties, there is no adequate basis for computing the proper filing fees. Hence, it necessarily follows that the fees paid are deficient.

Respondents contention: since the suit primarily involves cancellation of mortgages, an action incapable of pecuniary estimation, there is an existing basis for the computation of fees which respondents claim they have sufficiently complied. NOTE: Is an action for cancellation of mortgage incapable of pecuniary estimation?

Under Section 19 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 180, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, Regional Trial Courts have sole, exclusive, and original jurisdiction to hear, try, and decide "all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation."In Singsong v. Isabela Sawmill, this Court laid the test for determining whether the subject matter of an action is incapable of pecuniary estimation, thus: Ascertain the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If the action is primarily for recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation. Whether the trial court has jurisdiction would depend upon the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is only incidental or a consequence of the principal relief sought, the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation

RULE 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS San Miguel Corporation vs. Sandiganbayan G.R. Nos. 104637-38, September 14, 2000, 340 SCRA 289 (FRANCISCO) - Facts too long because 2 cases were discussed in the case

Doctrine:- Any compromise agreement concerning sequestered shares falls within the unquestionnable jurisdiction of and has to be approved by the Sandiganbayan.- In the exercise of its discretion, the Sandiganbayan can require a party-litigant to deliver a sequestered property to the PCGG.- The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.

Facts: March 26, 1986 - the Coconut Industry Investment Fund Holding Companies (CIIF) sold 33,133,266 shares of the outstanding capital stock of San Miguel Corporation to Andres Soriano III of the SMC Group payable in 4 installment April 1, 1986 - Andres Soriano III paid the initial P500M to the UCPB (CIIFs administrator). The sale was transacted through the stock exchange and the shares were registered in the name of Anscor-Hagedorn Securities, Inc. (AHSI). April 7, 1986 - PCGG then led by the former President of the Senate, the Honorable Jovito R. Salonga, sequestered the shares of stock subject of the sale. Due to the sequestration, the SMC Group (hereinafter referred to as the petitioners) suspended payment of the balance of the purchase price of the subject stocks. In retaliation, the UCPB Group rescinded the sale. June 2, 1986 - UCPB and CIIF Holding Companies went to court. They filed a complaint with the RTC of Makati SMC (petitioner) for confirmation of rescission of sale with damages. June 5, 1986 - SMC assailed in the SC (please check page 99, 2nd paragraph in the full text if it is pertaining to SC) the jurisdiction of the Makati RTC on the ground that primary jurisdiction was vested with the PCGG since the SMC shares were sequestered shares. August 10, 1988, SC (please check page 99, 2nd paragraph in the full text if it is pertaining to SC) upheld the petitioners (SMC). SC ordered, among others, the dismissal of the rescission case filed in the Makati RTC without prejudice to the ventilation of the parties' claims before the Sandiganbayan. March 1990, they (SMC and the UCPB group) signed a Compromise Agreement and Amicable Settlement:"3.1. The sale of the shares covered by and corresponding to the first installment of the 1986 Stock Purchase Agreement consisting of Five Million SMC Shares is hereby recognized by the parties as valid and effective as of 1 April 1986. Accordingly, said shares and all stock and cash dividends declared thereon after 1 April 1986 shall pertain, and are hereby assigned, to SMC. x x x3.2. The First Installment Shares shall revert to the SMC treasury for dispersal pursuant to the SMC Stock Dispersal Plan attached as Annex "A-1" hereof. The parties are aware that these First Installment Shares shall be sold to raise funds at the soonest possible time for the expansion program of SMC. x x x3.3. The sale of the shares covered by and corresponding to the second, third and fourth installments of the 1986 Stock Purchase Agreement is hereby rescinded effective 1 April 1986 and deemed null and void, and of no force and effect. Accordingly, all stock and cash dividends declared after 1 April 1986 corresponding to the second, third and fourth installments shall pertain to CIIF Holding Corporations. xxx"[8](emphasis supplied) They likewise agreed to pay an "arbitration fee" of 5,500,000 SMC shares composed of 3,858,831 A shares and 1,641,169 B shares to the PCGG to be held in trust for the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. March 23, 1990- the SMC and the UCPB Group filed with the Sandiganbayan a Joint Petition for Approval of the Compromise Agreement and Amicable Settlement. The petition was docketed as Civil case no. 0102. March 29, 1990, the Sandiganbayan motu proprio directed that copies of the Joint Petition be furnished to E. Cojuangco, Jr., M. Lobregat and others who are defendants in Civil Case No. 0033. The same SMC shares are the subject of Civil Case No. 0033 and alleged as part of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos and his "cronies." April 25, 1990, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the Compromise Agreement and Amicable Settlement. It contended that the involved coco-levy funds, whether in the form of earnings or dividends therefrom, or in the form of the value of liquidated corporate assets represented by all sequestered shares (like the value of assets sold/mortgaged to finance the P500M first installment), or in the form of cash, or, as in the case of subject "Settlement," in the form of "proceeds" of sale or of "payments" of certain alleged obligations are public funds. As public funds, the coco-levy funds, in any form or transformation, are beyond or "outside the commerce," and perforce not within the private disposition of private individuals.The reliefs prayed for by the Solicitor General state:"1. That the "Settlement" be stricken off the record or at most referred back to the PCGG for serious study and consideration.2. That this Petition be consolidated with, or treated as a premature motion or incident in Civil Case No. 0033, and brought by improper parties. To repeat, the plaintiff Republic through PCGG is not a party to what in effect will be a judicial compromise in Civil Case No. 0033. Nowhere does the "Settlement" mention that its terms are subject to the judicial outcome of this Civil Case No. 0033. April 18, 1990 Mr. Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. moved to intervene alleging legal interest in the approval or disapproval of the Compromise Agreement and Amicable Settlement. May 24, 1990 - COCOFED, et al. filed an "Omnibus Class Action Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit: (1) Opposition-in-Intervention, and (2) Compulsory Counter-Petition and Counterclaim for Damages." They alleged that they are the ultimate beneficial owners of the SMC shares subject of the Compromise Agreement. June 18, 1990 - the PCGG filed its Manifestation attaching a copy of the Resolution of the Commission en banc dated June 15, 1990. PCGG joined the Solicitor General in praying that the Joint Petition for Approval of Compromise Agreement should be treated as an incident of Case No. 0033. PCGG, however, interposed no objection to the implementation of the Compromise Agreement subject to the incorporation SMC and the UCPB Group filed their Joint Manifestation accepting the conditions imposed by PCGG. They also opposed the intervention of COCOFED, et al. October 12, 1990, SMC moved for early resolution of the Joint Petition for Approval of the Compromise Agreement and Amicable Settlement together with its pending incidents. October 16, 1990, the Sandiganbayan issued an Order integrating Case No. 0102 as an incident of Civil Case No. 0033, thus:"Considering the interest expressed by the different parties in Civil Case No. 0033, and considering further that the subject matter of the amicable settlement which is presented before this Court for approval, the Court has deemed it best that Civil Case No. 0102 be integrated with, and be made an incident to, Civil Case No. 0033. xxx" SMC did not challenge the Order. November 23, 1990, Sandiganbayan deferred consideration of the Compromise Agreement "until the parties thereto take the initiative to restore the same in the Court's calendar." February 5, 1991, it also deferred resolution of Cojuangco's Motion to Intervene. February 21, 1991 - the UCPB Group filed a Motion to set the Joint Petition for hearing. In its Order dated February 27, 1991, the Sandiganbayan required the parties to comment on the propriety of the said court's continuing to entertain the Compromise Agreement. In compliance with the said Order, SMC filed its Manifestation dated March 15, 1991 expressly recognizing the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to rule on the petition for the approval of the compromise agreement. June 3, 1991, the Sandiganbayan issued the following Resolution"It appearing that the sequestered character of the shares of stock subject of the instant petition for the approval of the compromise agreement, which are shares of stock in the San Miguel Corporation in the name of the CIIF Corporations, is independent of the transaction involving the contracting parties in the Compromise Agreement between what may be labeled as the "SMC Group" and the "UCPB Group," and it appearing further that the said sequestered SMC shares of stock have not been physically seized nor taken over by the PCGG, so much so that the reversions contemplated in said Compromise Agreement are without prejudice to the perpetuation of the sequestration thereon, until such time as a judgment might be rendered on said sequestration (which issue is not before this Court as (sic) this time), and it appearing finally that the PCGG has not interposed any objection to the contractual resolution of the problems confronting the "SMC Group" and the "UCPB Group" to the extent that the sequestered character of the shares in question is not affected, this Court will await the pleasure of the Presidential Commission on Good Government before consideration of the Compromise Agreement is reinstated in the Court's calendar.While this is, in effect, a denial of the "UCPB Group's" Motion to set consideration of the Compromise Agreement herein, this denial is without prejudice to a reiteration of the motion or any other action by the parties should developments hereafter justify the same." July 8, 1991 - Sandiganbayan issued two (2) Orders. The first was to hear the defendants in Civil Case No. 0033 on the matter of the Compromise Agreement whether under Civil Case No. 0102 or as an incident to Civil Case No. 0033.37 The second required the petitioners and the UCPB Group as well as PCGG to formally state in writing the different holders of the SMC shares subject of the compromise agreement. The Sandiganbayan further ordered PCGG to indicate on the face of the subject shares their sequestered character. July 23, 1991, the Sandiganbayan noted the Manifestations of the PCGG, the petitioners and the UCPB group that the certificates of stock for the subject SMC shares which are intended to form part of the corporation's treasury shares have been marked "sequestered" by SMC and are in the custody of the PCGG. August 5, 1991, the Sandiganbayan issued an order requiring SMC to deliver the certificates of stock representing the subject matter of the Compromise Agreement to the PCGG in view of the oral manifestations of Commissioner Maceren seeking clarification of portions of Sandiganbayan's July 23, 1991 Resolution. August 9, 1991, the UCPB Group filed a Motion to Allow it to Utilize Dividends on SMC shares for the payment of the loans of CIIF Companies to UCPB.42 The motion was granted on September 2, 1991. August 15, 1991, COCOFED, et al. filed their Urgent Motion to Compel Surrender of the Cash Dividends pertaining to (a) the 4.5 million SMC shares allegedly delivered to PCGG in trust for the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program and (b) the SMC shares allegedly delivered to SMC as treasury shares. August 22, 1991, SMC filed a Manifestation and Motion stating that the SMC shares have reverted to the SMC treasury as treasury shares and are not entitled to dividends October 1, 1991, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution allowing COCOFED, et al. to intervene.46 On March 30, 1992, it denied the separate motions for reconsideration filed by the petitioners and the UCPB Group. October 25, 1991, the Sandiganbayan issued another Resolution requiring SMC to deliver the 25.45 million SMC treasury shares to the PCGG.48 On March 18, 1992, it denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and further ordered SMC to pay dividends on the said treasury shares and to deliver them to the PCGG. April 13, 1992, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss Intervention and/or Motion for Clarification with Ad Cautelam Motion to Suspend Time. The motion was denied in the Sandiganbayan's Resolution dated March 17, 1993.

Before this Court now are two (2) consolidated petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioners San Miguel Corporation, Neptunia Corporation Limited, Andres Soriano III and Anscor-Hagedorn Securities, Inc. They seek to annul the following resolutions of the Sandiganbayan:

In G.R. No. 104637-38:1. The Resolution dated October 25, 1991 reiterating that all Certificates of Stock representing sequestered shares in the SMC be physically deposited with the PCGG and requiring SMC to pay the cash dividends due or actually earned by the said shares and deliver them to PCGG

2. The Resolution dated March 18, 199254 requiring SMC to deliver to the PCGG the 25.45 million shares as well as the cash and/or stock dividends which have accrued thereto from March 26, 1986 to date and which might have further accrued thereto had not said shares of stock been declared treasury shares.55

In G.R. No. 109797:1. The Resolution dated September 30, 1991 allowing COCOFED and other private respondents to intervene in Case No. 0102 and admitting their Counter-Petition;2. The Resolution dated March 27, 1992 denying the motions of petitioners and the UCPB Group for reconsideration of the Resolution dated September 30, 1991; and573. The Resolution dated March 17, 1993 denying petitioners' motion to dismiss the Counter-Petition filed by COCOFED, et al.

Issue/s:In GR 104637-381. Whether or not Sandiganbayan over-reached its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in the case.

In GR 1097972. Whether or not Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in the case. Held:1. NO. SC found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of Sandiganbayan when it ordered the petitioners to deliver the treasury shares to PCGG and pay their corresponding dividends for the following reasons:

First. The cases at bar do not merely involve a compromise agreement dealing with private interest. The Compromise Agreement here involves sequestered shares of stock now worth more than nine (9) billions of pesos, per estimate given by COCOFED. Their ownership is still under litigation. It is not yet known whether the shares are part of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos and his "cronies." Any Compromise Agreement concerning these sequestered shares falls within the unquestionable jurisdiction of and has to be approved by the Sandiganbayan. The parties themselves recognized this jurisdiction. In the Compromise Agreement itself, the petitioners and the UCPB Group expressly acknowledged the need to obtain the approval by the Sandiganbayan of its terms and conditions, thus:

The petitioners voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by asking for the approval of the said Compromise Agreement. They stated in their Manifestation dated March 15, 1991.

Second. Given its undisputed jurisdiction, the Sandiganbayan ordered that the treasury shares should be delivered to PCGG and that their dividends should be paid pending determination of their real ownership which is the key to the question whether they are part of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos and his "cronies."

SC cannot condemn and annul this order as capricious. In the exercise of its discretion, the Sandiganbayan can require a party-litigant to deliver a sequestered property to the PCGG. We held in Baseco vs. PCGG that "the power of the PCGG to sequester property claimed to be 'ill-gotten' means to place or cause to be placed under its possession or control said property, or any building or office wherein any such property and any records pertaining thereto may be found, including 'business enterprises and entities,' - - - for the purpose of preventing the destruction, concealment or dissipation of, and otherwise conserving and preserving the same - - - until it can be determined, through appropriate judicial proceedings, whether the property was in truth 'ill-gotten,' i.e. acquired through or as a result of improper or illegal use or the conversion of funds belonging to the government or any of its branches, instrumentalities, enterprises, banks or financial institutions, or by taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence, resulting in unjust enrichment of the ostensible owner and grave damage and prejudice to the State."

Petitioners also argue that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it treated the contracting parties to the Compromise Agreement differently.They argue that it should not have allowed the dividend income of the sequestered shares in the name of the CIIF Holding Companies to be applied to their indebtedness to the UCPB. Again, we do not agree for the order of the Sandiganbayan is consistent with the need to preserve and enhance the value of the sequestered assets.

The claim of petitioners to fairness hardly impresses. It is planted on the assumption that their purchase of the subject shares is above board. The assumption begs the question for the Sandiganbayan has yet to decide the real ownership of the subject shares, i.e., whether or not they are part of the alleged illegal wealth of former President Marcos and his "cronies." Nor have petitioners shown that they will suffer a legal prejudice if they deliver the shares and the dividends thereon to the PCGG. It need not be stressed that in the event the petitioners are found to be the lawful owners of these shares, they will be awarded the cash and stock dividends which have accrued thereon. We agree with the conclusion of the Sandiganbayan in its assailed Resolution of March 18, 1992 that "the SMC Group has not justified its desire to retain the custody of the 25.45 million sequestered shares of stock, which it had converted to treasury shares despite sequestration, and to retain the dividends due thereon, on its own merits. 2. NO. SC had the occasion to categorically draw the distinctions between (i) the Sandiganbayan's exclusive jurisdiction to determine the judicial question of ownership over sequestered properties and (ii) the incidents of the exercise by the PCGG of its purely administrative and executive functions as conservator of sequestered properties, as follows: (Republic vs. Sandiganbayan)"In other words, neither in Pea nor in any other case did this Court ever say that orders of sequestration, seizure or take-over of the PCGG or other acts done in the exercise of its so-called 'primary administrative jurisdiction' are beyond judicial review, or beyond the power of the courts to reverse or nullify. It is true, of course, that those acts are entitled to much respect, the findings and conclusions motivating and justifying them should be accorded great weight, 'like the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts,' and such findings and conclusions of the PCGG may not be superseded and substituted by the judgment of the courts. But obviously the principle does not and cannot sanction arbitrary, whimsical, capricious or oppressive exercise of power and discretion on the part of the PCGG, or its performance of acts without or in excess of its authority and competence under the law. And in accordance with applicable law, review of those acts, and correction or invalidation thereof, when called for, can only be undertaken by the Sandiganbayan, which has exclusive original jurisdiction over all cases regarding 'the funds, moneys, assets and properties illegally acquired or misappropriated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents or nominees.'"For the TWO cases involved:A final word. The cases at bar involve shares of stock estimated to be worth more than P9 billion now. These shares were sequestered in 1986 and the government filed Civil Case No. 0033 in 1987 to determine whether they are part of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos and his "cronies." We did not set aside the impugned resolutions of the Sandiganbayan in the cases at bar for they constitute cautious moves to preserve the character of the sequestered shares pending determination of their true owners. Be that as it may, we note that Civil Case No. 0033 has remained unresolved by the Sandiganbayan. The delay is no longer tolerable for it locks in billions of pesos which could well rev-up our sputtering economy. Worse, it constitutes another embarassing evidence of snail-paced justice, so long lamented but mostly by our lips alone. The Sandiganbayan must not be the burial ground of cases of far-reaching importance to our people. It is time for it to write finis to Civil Case No. 0033.The petitions in G.R. Nos. 104637-38 and in G.R. No. 109797 are DISMISSED. No costs.

Gochan vs. GochanG.R. No. 146089, December 13, 2001, 372 SCRA 256 (GATCHALIAN)

FACTS: Respondents were stockholders of the Felix Gochan and Sons Realty Corporation and the Mactan Realty Development Corporation. Respondents offered to sell their shares in the two corporations to the individual petitioners in consideration of the sum of P200,000,000:00. Petitioners accepted and paid the said amount to respondents. (Receipts were issued and given to the petitioners as proof) Respondents, through Crispo Gochan, Jr., required individual petitioners to execute a "promissory note. The former drafted the promissory note in his own handwriting and had the same signed by the petitioners. Unbeknown to petitioners, Crispo Gochan, Jr. inserted in the "promissory note" a phrase that says, "Said amount is in partial consideration of the sale." Respondents filed a complaint against petitioners for specific performance and damages alleging that the petitioners that offered to buy their shares of stock,in consideration of P200M and multiple properties. Accordingly, respondents claimed that they are entitled to the conveyance of the properties, in addition to the amount of P200,000,000.00, which they acknowledge to have received from petitioners plus damages. Petitioners filed their answer, raising the following affirmative defenses one of which is the lack of jurisdiction by the trial court for non-payment of the correct docket fees; Trial court ruled in favor of the defendants. It cited that respondents paid the necessary filing and docket fees of at least P165K. MR denied. Petition for certiorari with CA dismissed. MR denied. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:1. Did the respondent file and pay the necessary docket fees to warrant courts jurisdiction?2. What is the real nature of the case?3. What should be the basis for the assessment of the correct docket fees?

HELD:1. NO2. Real action not specific performance3. Assessed value of the property, or the estimated value

The rule is well-settled that the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees. In the case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion,12 this Court held that it is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action.

Petitioners, that the complaint is in the nature of a real action which affects title to real properties; hence, respondents should have alleged therein the value of the real properties which shall be the basis for the assessment of the correct docket fees.

It is necessary to determine the true nature of the complaint in order to resolve the issue of whether or not respondents paid the correct amount of docket fees therefor. In this jurisdiction, the dictum adhered to is that the nature of an action is determined by the allegations in the body of the pleading or complaint itself, rather than by its title or heading. The caption of the complaint below was denominated as one for "specific performance and damages." The relief sought, however, is the conveyance or transfer of real property, or ultimately, the execution of deeds of conveyance in their favor of the real properties enumerated in the provisional memorandum of agreement. Under these circumstances, the case below was actually a real action, affecting as it does title to or possession of real property.

Real action is one where the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property or, as indicated in section 2(a) of Rule 4 (now Section 1, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), a real action is an action affecting title to or recovery of possession of real property.

In the case at bar, therefore, the complaint filed with the trial court was in the nature of a real action, although ostensibly denominated as one for specific performance. Consequently, the basis for determining the correct docket fees shall be the assessed value of the property, or the estimated value thereof as alleged by the claimant

We are not unmindful of our pronouncement in the case of Sun Insurance, to the effect that in case the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive period. However, the liberal interpretation of the rules relating to the payment of docket fees as applied in the case of Sun Insurance cannot apply to the instant case as respondents have never demonstrated any willingness to abide by the rules and to pay the correct docket fees. Instead, respondents have stubbornly insisted that the case they filed was one for specific performance and damages and that they actually paid the correct docket fees therefor at the time of the filing of the complaint.

NOTE: The parties in the Sun Insurance case expressed willingness to pay the correct docket fees

De Leon vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 104796, March 6, 1998, (GAUDIEL)

FACTS: A complaint for annulment or rescission of a contract of sale of 2 parcels of land was filed by private respondents in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against petitioners, praying for the following reliefs: (1) ordering nullification or rescission of the Contract of Conditional Sale for having violated the rights of plaintiff (private respondent) guaranteed to them under Article 886 of the Civil Code and/or violation of the terms and conditions of the said contract, and (2) ordering defendants (petitioners) to pay plaintiffs (private respondents) attorneys fees in the amount of P100,000. Upon the filing of the complaint, the clerk of court required private respondents to pay docket and legal fees in the total amount of P610.00, broken down as follows: P450.00 Docket fee for the Judicial Development Fund under Official Receipt No. 1877773 150.00 Docket fee for the General Fund under Official Receipt No. 6834215 10.00 for the Legal Research Fund under Official Receipt No. 6834450. Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by reason of private respondents nonpayment of the correct amount of docket fees. Petitioners contended that in addition to the fees already paid based on the claim for P100,000.00 for attorneys fees, private respondents should have paid docket fees in the amount of P21,640.00, based on the alleged value of the two (2) parcels of land subject matter of the contract of sale sought to be annulled. Private respondents filed opposition to the motion to dismiss, arguing that outright dismissal of their complaint was not warranted on the basis of the alleged nonpayment of the correct amount of docket fees, considering that the amount paid by them was that assessed by the clerk of court. Petitioners filed a reply to which private respondents filed, a rejoinder. Trial court denied petitioners motion to dismiss but required private respondents to pay the amount of docket fees based on the estimated value of the parcels of land in litigation as stated in the complaint. Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration but their motion was denied by the trial court. They therefore, brought the matter to the Court of Appeals which rendering a decision annulling the orders of the trial court. The appellate court held that an action for rescission or annulment of contract is not susceptible of pecuniary estimation and, therefore, the docket fees should not be based on the value of the real property, subject matter of the contract sought to be annulled or rescinded. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but their motion was denied in a resolution. Hence, a petition for review on certiorari was filed. ISSUE: Whether not the basis for the docket fees to be paid for the filing of an action for annulment or rescission of a contract of sale should be assessed as the value of the real property, subject matter of the contract, or whether the action should be considered as one which is not capable of pecuniary estimation and therefore the fee charged should be a flat rate of P400.00 as provided in Rule 141, 7(b)(1) of the Rules of Court.

RULING: The Court holds that Judge Dalisay did not err in considering Civil Case No. V-144 (Bautista v. Lim case) as basically one for rescission or annulment of contract which is not susceptible of pecuniary estimation. It agrees with the cases discussion of actions where the value of the case cannot be estimated, where the court held that an action for rescission of contract is one which cannot be estimated and therefore the docket fee for its filing should be the flat amount of P200.00 as then fixed in the former Rule 141, 5(10). Consequently, the fee for docketing it is P200, an amount already paid by plaintiff, now respondent Matilda Lim. (She should pay also the two pesos legal research fund fee, if she has not paid it, as required in Section 4 of Republic Act No. 3870, the charter of the U.P. Law Center). Thus, although eventually the result may be the recovery of land, it is the nature of the action as one for rescission of contract that is controlling. The Court of Appeals correctly applied the case to the present one.

The applicable basis of the amount of docket fee to be paid is P400 as based on

Rule 141 of the Rules of Court which provides:

SEC. 7. Clerks of Regional Trial Courts. xxx (b) For filing:

1. Actions where the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated ............. P400.00

RULE 2 CAUSE OF ACTION Sta. Clara Homeowners Association vs. Gaston G.R. No. 141961, January 23, 2002, 374 SCRA 396 (LESAVA)

Doctrine: A complaint states a cause of action when it contains these three essential elements: (1) the legal right of the plaintiff, (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of the said legal right.

Facts: Sps. Gaston (respondents) filed a case against Sta. Clara Homeowners Assoc. (SCHA), petitioner, thru its Board of Directors, security guard, John Doe and Sta. Clara estate, Inc.

The complaint alleges that when the Sps. bought their lot in the subdivision, there was no mention or requirement of membership in any homeowners association. From that time on, they have remained non-members of SCHA. For a time, non-membership was not an issue in the issuance of a ticket. This arrangement remained undisturbed until sometime in the middle of March, 1998, when SCHA disseminated a board resolution which decreed that only its members in good standing were to be issued stickers for use in their vehicles. Thereafter, on three separate incidents,

Victor M. Gaston, the son of the Sps. who lives with them was required by the guards on duty employed by SCHA to show his drivers license as a prerequisite to his entrance to the subdivision and to his residence therein despite their knowing him personally and the exact location of his residence.

On another incident, The husband was himself prevented from entering the subdivision and proceeding to his residential abode when petitioner herein security guards Roger Capillo and a John Doe lowered the steel bar of the KAMETAL gate of the subdivision and demanded from him his drivers license for identification. The complaint further alleged that these acts of the petitioners herein done in the presence of other subdivision owners had caused private respondents to suffer moral damage.

In the hearing for a TRO filed by the respondents, the counsel for the petitioners informed the court that he would be filing a motion to dismiss the case. In his motion to dismiss the case, petitioner's lawyer stated the ff. grounds: the trial court ha[d] no jurisdiction over the case as it involve[d] an intra-corporate dispute between SCHA and its members. That private respondents, having become lot owners of Sta. Clara Subdivision after the approval by the SEC of SCHAs articles of incorporation and by-laws, became members automatically. Moreover, the private respondents allegedly enjoyed the privileges and benefits of membership in and abided by the rules of the association, and even attended the general special meeting of the association members. Their non-payment of the association yearly dues [did] not make them non-members of SCHA continued the petitioners. And even granting that the private respondents [were] not members of the association, the petitioners opined that the HIGC still ha[d] jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Section 1 (a), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the HIGC.

RTC ruled: deny motion to dismiss. finding that there existed no intra-corporate controversy since the private respondents alleged that they ha[d] never joined the association; and, thus, the HIGC had no jurisdiction to hear the case.

After this, petitioners filed a motion to resolve defendants motion to dismiss on ground of lack of cause of action.

RTC issued an order denying the motion.

CA: dismissed the Petition and ruled that the RTC had jurisdiction over the dispute. It debunked petitioners contention that an intra-corporate controversy existed between the SCHA and respondents. The CA held that the Complaint had stated a cause of action. It likewise opined that jurisdiction and cause of action were determined by the allegations in the complaint and not by the defenses and theories set up in the answer or the motion to dismiss

Petitioners are now raising that CA erred with the argument that there was no allegation therein that private respondents were actually prevented from entering the subdivision and gaining access to their residential abode.

Issue: WON CA erred in not ruling for a dismissal due to lack of action

Held: NO. In the instant case, the records sufficiently establish a cause of action. First, the Complaint alleged that, under the Constitution, respondents had a right of free access to and from their residential abode. Second, under the law, petitioners have the obligation to respect this right. Third, such right was impaired by petitioners when private respondents were refused access through the Sta. Clara Subdivision, unless they showed their drivers license for identification.

RTC thus has original and exclusive jurisdiction.

In rendering this Decision, this Court is not prejudging the main issue of whether, in truth and in fact, private respondents are entitled to a favorable decision by the RTC. That will be made only after the proper proceedings therein. Later on, if it is proven during the trial that they are indeed members of the SCHA, then the case may be dismissed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. We are merely holding that, on the basis of the allegations in the Complaint, (1) the RTC has jurisdiction over the controversy and (2) the Complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action. Therefore, it is not subject to attack by a motion to dismiss on these grounds.

Cipriano Centeno vs. Ignacio Centeno G.R. No. 140825, October 13, 2000, 343 SCRA 153 (LIM) FACTS: Cipriano Centeno is the owner of two parcels of rice land in Malolos, Bulacan. The parcels of land were the subject of an earlier case filed before the DAR by Ignacia Centeno for the cancellation of Certificates of Land Transfer (CLT) It was established that Cipriano et al had obtained the CLTs for the parcels of land through fraud and misrepresentation. Consequently, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform orders the cancellation of the CLTs in favor of Cipriano et al and ordered the issuance of a CLT in favor of Ignacia. Ignacia files a complaint with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) praying for preliminary injunction, ejectment, and damages against Cipriano, et al. Ignacia alleges that despite the decision of the DAR recognizing her ownership over the properties as affirmed by the Office of the President, Cipriano, Leonila Calonzo and Ramona Adriano have interfered with and prevented respondent from exercising acts of possession over the properties and kept on harassing, molesting and disturbing her peaceful possession as well as the enjoyment of the fruits thereof, to her great damage and prejudice Cipriano et al insisted that they are better entitled to the possession of the lots in dispute, having been allegedly in long possession thereof, with their houses thereon. On the other hand, the award of said lots to respondent is unauthorized, not only because she has no possession thereof but also because she has other landholdings in the locality. They averred that the complaint should be dismissed for lack of cause of action and for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the DARAB over the case. The DARAB decides in favor of Ignacia. Cipriano et al file a petition for review with the Court of Appeals asserting, (amongst other issues such as jurisdiction) that the complaint states no cause of action. They contend that respondent cannot claim maintenance of peaceful possession when she does not in fact have actual possession of the subject property. They claim that it is they who are in actual possession of said land. Furthermore, they claim that respondent did not even make a demand for them to vacate the land; nor did she present evidence to show that their acts of possession resulted in loss or damage to her. ISSUE: W/N there is a valid cause of action. HELD:Anent petitioners' contention that the complaint states no cause of action, we find this to be, likewise, without merit. A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of another. The elements of a cause of action are: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligations of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. In the instant case, the complaint for maintenance of peaceful possession contains the following allegations, to wit: FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 8. Defendants are persistently interfering in and preventing plaintiff's possession and cultivation of farmlot no. 122, and continue to commit acts tending to eject, oust and remove the plaintiff therefrom, to her great damage and injury; 9. Similarly, defendants are harassing, molesting and disturbing plaintiff's peaceful possession of Home Lot No. 111; SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 10. Without the knowledge and consent of herein plaintiffs, defendants constructed two (2) houses on two portions of Home Lot No. 111, one house belonging to defendant Cipriano Centeno, and the other to defendant Leonila Centeno Calonzo, but occupied by defendant Ramona Adriano; 11. The construction of said houses is patently illegal and deprives plaintiff of the possession and enjoyment thereof, to her great damage and injury.[9] Clearly, the above allegations regarding petitioners' actions with regard to the subject land, if true, violate respondent's rights as adjudicated by the DARAB; hence, these constitute causes of action which entitle the respondent to the relief sought.

City Trust Corporation vs. Villanueva G.R. No. 142011, July 19, 2001, 361 SCRA 446 (MAGSUMBOL) FACTS: Isagani C. Villanueva opened a savings account and current account with Citytrust Banking Corporation (BANK). On May 1986, Villanueva deposited some money in his savings account with the Bank's Legaspi Village Branch in Makati. Realizing that he hadrun out of blan checks, Villanueva requested a new checkbook from one of the Bank's customer service respresentatives. He then filled up a checkbook requisition slip with the obligatory particulars, except for his current account number which he could not remember. He told his predicament to a customer service representative of the Bank, who in turn assured him that she could supply the information from the Bank's account records. After signing the requisition slip, he gave it to the representative.

Rempillo, another customer service representative of the Bank, saw Villanueva's checkbook requisition slip. SHe took it and checked the Bank's checkbook register which contained all the names and account numbers of the Bank's clients who were issued checkbooks. Upon seeing the name "Isagani Villanueva" with Account No. 33-00446-3 in the checkbook register, Rempillo copied the aforesaid account number on the space intended for it in Villanueva's requisition slip.

A month after, Villanueva received his requested checkbook. He immediately signed a check bearing the the amount of P50k payable to the order of Kingly Commodities. Villanueva delivered the check to Helen Chu, his investment consultant at Kingly Commodities, with his express instruction to use said check in placing a trading order at Kingly Commodities' future trading business as soon as a favorable opportunity presented itself. Two days later, he was informed that a trading order has been placed in his behalf and the check has been delivered to Kingly Commodities. He then deposited cash to his savings account to cover the full amount of the check he issued.

However, his check was dishonored due to insufficiency of funds and disparity in the signature. Villanueva called Kingly Commodities and explained that there was a mistake in the dishonor and told them to redeposit the check. He called the Bank's Legaspi Village Branch Operations and inquired about the dishonor of his well-funded check. The manager assured Villanueva that the check would be honored after the sufficiency of the funds was ascertained. But 3 days later, he was informed that the check was again dishonored due to insufficiency of funds and a stop-payment order he allegedly issued.

Dismayed, Villanueva called up the Bank and inquired from the Manager the reason for the dishonor of his well-funded check and the alleged stop-payment order he never issued. The Manager promised to investigate the matter. In the meantime, he was advised to re-deposit the check.

Villanueva then requested Lawrence Chin of Kingly Commodities to give him until 5:30pm that same day to make good his P50k check. He then proceed to the Bank's Legaspi Village Branch Office to personally inqure. There he complained that his trading order was rejected because of the dishonor of the check and that Kingly Commodities threatened to close his trading account unless his check payment would be made good before 5:30pm that day. Upon investigation, it appears that the reason for the dishonor of the check was that the account number assigned to his new checkbook was the account number of another depositor also named "Isagani Villanueva" but with a different middle initial.

To resolve the matter, Genuino promised to send to Kingly Commodities a manager's check for P50k before 5:30pm, the deadline given to Villanueva. She personally called Kingly Commodities and explained the reason for the dishonor of the check.

On June 30, 1986, Villanueva sent a letter to the Bank addressing the President, demanding indemnification for alleged losses and damages suffered by him as a result of the dishonor of his well-funded check. He demanded the amount of P70k as indemnification for actual damages in the form of lost profits and P2M for moral and other damages.

The Bank' s Senior VP answered his letter and apologized for the unfortunate oversight, but reminded VIllanueva that hte dishonor of his check was due to his failure to state his current account number in his requisition slip. He stated furhter that as soon as the mistake was discovered, the Bank promptly sent a manager's check to Kingly COmmodities before the deadline to avoid any damage the dishonor of the check might have caused.

Failing to obtain a facorable action from the Bank, Villanueva filed a complaint for damages based on breach of contract and/or quasi-delict before the RTC of Makati.

ISSUE: W/N Villanueva has sufficient cause of action against the Bank

HELD: No.

It is clear from the records that the Bank was able to remedy the caveat of Kingly Commodities to Villanueva that his trading account would be closed at 5:30pm on June 26 1986. The Bank was able to issue a manager's check in favor of Kingly Commodities before the deadline and was able to likewise explaint to Kingly Commodities the circumstances surrounding the unfortunate situation. Verily, the alleged embarrasment or inconveniece caused to Villanueva as a result of the incident was timely and adequately contained, corrected, mitigated, if not entirely eradicated. Villanueva, thus, failed to support his claim for moral damages.

As for compensatory damages, the SC said that while Villanueva might have suffered some form of inconvenience and discomfort as a result of the dishonor of his check, the same could not have been so grave or intolerable as he attempts to portray it.

The SC also said that the award of attorney's fees should also be deleted. As a general rule, attorney's fees cannot be recovered as part of damages because of the policy that no premium should be place on the right to litigate. They are not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit. This award demands factual, legal and equitable justification.

In view of the foregoing discussion, the SC concluded that Villanueva did not sustain any compensable injury. If any damage had been suffered at all, it could be equivalent to damnum absque injuria, i.e., damage wwithout injury or damage or injury inflicted without injustice, or loss or damage without violation of a legal right, or a wrong done to a man for which the law provides no remedy.

Macaslang v. Zamora, May 30, 2011, G.R. No. 156375 (MORA) GR 156375; May 30, 2011 FACTS:The respondents (Renato and Melba Zamora) filed a complaint for unlawful detainer in the MTCC, alleging that the petitioner (Dolores Macaslang) sold to the Zamoras a residential land located in Sabang, DanaoCity and that the Macaslang requested to be allowed to live in the house with a promise to vacate as soon as she would be able to find a new residence. They further alleged that despite their demand after a year, the petitioner failed or refused to vacate the premises. Despite the due service of the summons and copy of the complaint, the petitioner did not file her answer. The MTCC declared her in default upon the respondents motion to declare her in default, and proceeded to receive the respondents oral testimony and documentary evidence. Thereafter, the MTCC rendered judgment ordering that Macaslang to vacate the properties in question and to pay Attorneys Fees and the monthly rental from December 1997 until the time Macaslang shall have vacated the properties in question. The petitioner appealed to the RTC, averring the following as reversible errors, namely: 1. Extrinsic Fraud was practiced upon defendant-appellant which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against and by reason of which she has been impaired of her rights. 2. Defendant-Appellant has a meritorious defense in that there was no actual sale considering that the absolute deed of sale relied upon by the plaintiff-appell[ees] is a patent-nullity as her signature therein was procured through fraud and trickery. and praying through her appeal memorandum, that a judgment be rendered in her favor and this case be remanded to the Court of Origin , Municipal Trial Court of Danao City, further proceedings to allow the defendant to present her evidence, and thereafter, to render a judgment anew. The RTC dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action and rendered the petitioners Motion for Execution of Judgment of the lower court, moot. The respondents appealed to the CA, assailing the RTCs decision for disregarding the allegations in the complaint in determining the existence or non-existence of a cause of action. The CA reversed and set aside the RTCs decision and reinstated the MTCCs decision in favor of the respondents, disposing: WHEREFORE,foregoing premises considered, the Petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE. Resultantly, the impugned decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having no basis in fact and in law, and the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. ISSUES:1. Whether or not the CA correctly found that the RTC committed reversible error in ruling on issues not raised by the petitioner in her appeal; Ruling: As an appellate court, the RTC may rule upon an issue not raised on appeal. In its decision, the CA ruled that the RTC could not resolve issues that were not assigned by the petitioner in her appeal memorandum, and yet the Trial Court, in its decision, ruled on issues not raised such as lack of cause of action and no prior demand to vacate having been made. Only errors assigned and properly argued on the brief and those necessarily related thereto, may be considered by the appellate court in resolving an appeal in a civil case. Based on said clear jurisprudence, the court a quo committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it resolved Defendant-appellees appeal based on grounds or issues not raised before it, much less assigned by Defendant-appellee as an error. Not only that. It is settled that an issue which was not raised during the Trial in the court below would not be raised for the first time on appeal as to do so would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process The petitioner disagrees with the CA and contends that the RTC as an appellate court could rule on the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action and the lack of demand to vacate even if not assigned in the appeal. The Court concurs with the petitioner. The CA might have been correct had the appeal been a first appeal from the RTC to the CA or another proper superior court, in which instance Section 8 of Rule 51, which applies to appeals from the RTC to the CA, imposes the express limitation of the review to only those specified in the assignment of errors or closely related to or dependent on an assigned error and properly argued in the appellants brief But the petitioners appeal herein, being taken from the decision of the MTCC to the RTC, was governed by a different rule, specifically Section 18 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, to wit: Section 18. xxxxxxThe judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate Regional Trial Court which shall decide the same on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Court. (7a) As such, the RTC, in exercising appellate jurisdiction, was not limited to the errors assigned in the petitioners appeal memorandum, but could decide on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the trial court and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the RTC. The difference between the procedures for deciding on review is traceable to Section 22 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 12, which provides: Section 22. Appellate Jurisdiction. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Such cases shall be decided on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin [and] such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Courts. The decision of the Regional Trial Courts in such cases shall be appealable by petition for review to the Court of Appeals which may give it due course only when the petition shows prima facie that the lower court has committed an error of fact or law that will warrant a reversal or modification of the decision or judgment sought to be reviewed. As its compliance with the requirement of Section 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 to adopt special rules or procedures applicable to such cases in order to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination thereof without regard to technical rules, the Court promulgated the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, whereby it institutionalized the summary procedure for all the first level courts. Section 21 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedures pecifically stated: Section 21. Appeal. The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate Regional Trial Court which shall decide the same in accordance with Section 22 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. The decision of the Regional Trial Court in civil cases governed by this Rule, including forcible entry and unlawful detainer shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken there from. Section 10 of Rule 70 shall be deemed repealed. Later on, the Court promulgated the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, effective on July 1, 1997, and incorporated in Section 7 of Rule 40 thereof the directive to the RTC to decide appealed cases on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda as are filed, viz: Section 7. Procedure in the Regional Trial Court. (a) Upon receipt of the complete record or the record on appeal, the clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court shall notify the parties of such fact. (b) Within fifteen (15) days from such notice, it shall be the duty of the appellant to submit a memorandum which shall briefly discuss the errors imputed to the lower court, a copy of which shall be furnished by him to the adverse party. Within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the appellants memorandum, the appellee may file his memorandum. Failure of the appellant to file a memorandum shall be a ground for dismissal of the appeal. (c) Upon the filing of the memorandum of the appellee, or the expiration of the period to do so, the case shall be considered submitted for decision. The Regional Trial Court shall decide the case on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda as are filed. (n) As a result, the RTC presently decides all appeals from the MTC based on the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda or briefs as are filed in the RTC. Yet, even without the differentiation in the procedures of deciding appeals, the limitation of the review to only the errors assigned and properly argued in the appeal brief or memorandum and the errors necessarily related to such assigned error sought not to have obstructed the CA from resolving the unassigned issues by virtue of their coming under one or several of the following recognized exceptions to the limitation, namely: (a) When the question affects jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) Matters that are evidently plain or clerical errors within contemplation of law; (c) Matters whose consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case or in serving the interests of justice or avoiding dispensing piecemeal justice; (d) Matters raised in the trial court and are of record having some bearing on the issue submitted that the parties failed to raise or that the lower court ignored; (e) Matters closely related to an error assigned; and (f) Matters upon which the determination of a question properly assigned is dependent. Consequently, the CA improperly disallowed the consideration and resolution of the two errors despite their being: (a) necessary in arriving at a just decision and acomplete resolution of the case; and (b) matters of record having some bearing on the issues submitted that the lower court ignored. 2. Whether or not the CA correctly found that the complaint stated a valid cause of action; Ruling: CA correctly delved into and determined whether or not complaint stated a cause of action. The RTC opined that the complaint failed to state a cause of action because the evidence showed that there was no demand to vacate made upon the petitioner. The CA disagreed, observing in its appealed decision: But what is worse is that a careful reading of Plaintiffs-appellants Complaint would readily reveal that they have sufficiently established (sic) a cause of action against Defendant-appellee. It is undisputed that as alleged in the complaint and testified to by Plaintiffs-appellants, a demand to vacate was made before the action for unlawful detainer was instituted. A complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of possession or the refusal is unlawful without necessarily employing the terminology of the law (Jimenez vs. Patricia, Inc., 340 SCRA 525). In the case at bench, par. 4 of the Complaint alleges, thus: 4. After a period of one (1) year living in the aforementioned house, Plaintiff demanded upon defendant to vacate but she failed and refused; From the foregoing allegation, it cannot be disputed that a demand to vacate has not only been made but that the same was alleged in the complaint. How the Regional Trial Court came to the questionable conclusion that Plaintiffs-appellants had no cause of action is beyond Us. The Supreme Court agrees with the CA. A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it states the following: (a)Initially, the possession of the property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (b)Eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by the plaintiff to the defendant about the termination of the latters right of possession; (c)Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of its enjoyment; and (d)Within one year from the making of the last demand to vacate the property on the defendant, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment. In resolving whether the complaint states a cause of action or not, only the facts alleged in the complaint are considered. The test is whether the court can render a valid judgment on the complaint based on the facts alleged and the prayer asked for. Only ultimate facts, not legal conclusions or evidentiary facts, are considered for purposes of applying the test. Based on its allegations, the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action for unlawful detainer. Firstly, it averred that the petitioner possessed the property by the mere tolerance of the respondents. Secondly, the respondents demanded that the petitioner vacate the property, thereby rendering her possession illegal. Thirdly, she remained in possession of the property despite the demand to vacate. And, fourthly, the respondents instituted the complaint on March 10, 1999, which was well within a year after the demand to vacate was made around September of 1998 or later. Yet, even as the Court rule that the respondents complaint stated a cause of action, we must find and hold that both the RTC and the CA erroneously appreciated the real issue to be about the complaints failure to state a cause of action. It certainly was not so, but the respondents lack of cause of action. Their erroneous appreciation expectedly prevented the correct resolution of the action. Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action are really different from each other. On the one hand, failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the pleading, and is a ground for dismissal under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. On the other hand, lack of cause action refers to a situation where the evidence does not prove the cause of action alleged in the pleading. Justice Regalado, a recognized commentator on remedial law, has explained the distinction: xxx What is contemplated, therefore, is a failure to state a cause of action which is provided in Sec. 1(g) of Rule 16. This is a matter of insufficiency of the pleading. Sec. 5 of Rule 10, which was also included as the last mode for raising the issue to the court, refers to the situation where the evidence does not prove a cause of action. This is, therefore, a matter of insufficiency of evidence. Failure to state a cause of action is different from failure to prove a cause of action. The remedy in the first is to move for dismissal of the pleading, while the remedy in the second is to demur to the evidence, hence reference to Sec. 5 of Rule 10 has been eliminated in this section. The procedure would consequently be to require the pleading to state a cause of action, by timely objection to its deficiency; or, at the trial, to file a demurrer to evidence, if such motion is warranted. A complaint states a cause of action if it avers the existence of the three essential elements of a cause of action, namely: (a) The legal right of the plaintiff; (b) The correlative obligation of the defendant; and (c) The act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. If the allegations of the complaint do not aver the concurrence of these elements, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. Evidently, it is not the lack or absence of a cause of action that is a ground for the dismissal of the complaint but the fact that the complaint states no cause of action. Failure to state a cause of action may be raised at the earliest stages of an action through a motion to dismiss, but lack of cause of action may be raised at any time after the questions of fact have been resolved on the basis of the stipulations, admissions, or evidence presented. Having found that neither Exhibit C nor Exhibit E was a proper demand to vacate, considering that Exhibit C (the respondents letter dated February 11, 1998) demanded the payment ofP1,101,089.90, and Exhibit E (their letter dated January 21, 1999) demanded the payment ofP1,600,000.00, the RTC concluded that the demand alleged in the complaint did not constitute a demand to pay rent and to vacate the premises necessary in an action for unlawful detainer. It was this conclusion that caused the RTC to confuse the defect as failure of the complaint to state a cause of action for unlawful detainer. The Court held that the RTC erred even in that regard. To begin with, it was undeniable that Exhibit D (the respondents letter dated April 28, 1998) constituted the demand to vacate that validly supported their action for unlawful detainer, because of its unmistakable tenor as a demand to vacate, which the following portion indicates: This is to give notice that since the mortgage to your property has long expired and that since the property is already in my name, I will be taking over the occupancy of said property two (2) months from date of this letter.

Exhibit D, despite not explicitly using the word vacate, relayed to the petitioner the respondents desire to take over the possession of the property by giving her no alternative except to vacate. The word vacate, according to Golden Gate Realty Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court, is not a talismanic word that must be employed in all notices to vacate.

RULE 3 PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTION Korea Exchange Bank vs. Filkor Business Integrated, Inc. G.R. No. 138292, April 10, 2002, 380 SCRA 381 (PEREZ) FACTS: On January 9, 1997, Filkor borrowed US$140,000 from petitioner Korea Exchange Bank, payable on July 9, 1997. Of this amount, only US$40,000 was paid by Filkor In addition, Filkor executed nine trust receipts in favor of petitioner. However, Filkor failed to turn over to petitioner the proceeds from the sale of the goods, or the goods themselves as required by the trust receipts in case Filkor could not sell them. Filkor also negotiated to petitioner the proceeds of seventeen letters of credit. When petitioner tried to collect the proceeds of the letters of credit by presenting the bills of exchange drawn to collect the proceeds, they were dishonored because of discrepancies Prior to all the above, in order to secure payment of all its obligations, Filkor executed a Real Estate Mortgage on February 9, 1996. It mortgaged to petitioner the improvements belonging to it constructed on the lot it was leasing at the Cavite Export Processing Zone Authority As respondents failed to fulfill their obligations, petitioner filed Civil Case No. N-6689 in the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, docketed as Korea Exchange Bank vs. Filkor Business Integrated, Inc. In its complaint, petitioner prayed that (a) it be paid by respondents under its twenty-seven causes of action; (b) the property mortgaged be foreclosed and sold at public auction in case respondents failed to pay petitioner within ninety days from entry of judgment; and (c) other reliefs just and equitable be granted. The defendants denied the allegations based on the fact that the provided documents were mere photocopies Moreover, although the RTC granted letter (a) of the petition, it ruled that petitioner had already abandoned its claim under letter (b) because it only filed a simple collection case ISSUES: 1) Is the petitioner entitled to summary proceedings? Yes2) Is petitioners complaint before the trial court an action for foreclosure of a real estate mortgage, or an action for collection of a sum of money? REM3) Is the appeal correctly lodged before SC rather than with the Court of Appeals? SC HELD:1) Yes. A summary of judgment is one granted by the court upon motion by a party for an expeditious settlement of the case, there appearing from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits that there are no important questions or issues of fact involved (except as to the amount of damages) and that, therefore, the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law (Sections 1, 2, 3, Rule 35, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). In the case at bar, there is clearly no substantial triable issue, since it appears that Defendants denied all material allegations of the complaint only because the documents attached were mere photocopies. Hence, the motion for summary judgment filed by plaintiff is proper. 2) The plaintiffs allegation satisfies in part the requirements of Section 1, Rule 68 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on foreclosure of real estate mortgage, which provides:SECTION 1. Complaint in action for foreclosure. In an action for the foreclosure of a mortgage or other encumbrance upon real estate, the complaint shall set forth the date and due execution of the mortgage; its assignments, if any; the names and residences of the mortgagor and the mortgagee; a description of the mortgaged property; a statement of the date of the note or other documentary evidence of the obligation secured by the mortgage, the amount claimed to be unpaid thereon; and the names and residences of all persons having or claiming an interest in the property subordinate in right to that of the holder of the mortgage, all of whom shall be made defendants in the action. In Paragraph 183 of the plaintiffs allegation, the date and due execution of the real estate mortgage are alleged. The properties mortgaged are stated and described therein as well. In addition, the names and residences of respondent Filkor, as mortgagor, and of petitioner, as mortgagee, are alleged in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the complaint.[13] The dates of the obligations secured by the mortgage and the amounts unpaid thereon are alleged in petitioners first to twenty-seventh causes of action.[14] Moreover, the very prayer of the complaint before the trial court states that judgment be rendered to foreclose the said property, and have it sold at public auction in case defendants fail to pay plaintiff within ninety (90) days from entry of judgment.o Section 2 of Rule 68 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that payment shall be rendered 90 120 days from date of judgment. Otherwise such default would lead to the foreclosure of defendants property 3) Appeal was appropriately filed with the SC because it involves a question of law. This is pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure What the petitioner impugns is the determination by the trial court of the nature of action filed by petitioner, based on the allegations in the complaint. Such a determination as to the correctness of the conclusions drawn from the pleadings undoubtedly involves a question of law.

Relucio vs. Mejia Lopez G.R. No. 138497, January 16, 2002, 373 SCRA 578 (SUPAPO) Subject guide: Real Party in Interest; Necessary Party

Facts:Angelina Mejia Lopez (legal wife) filed a petition for APPOINTMENT AS SIX OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF PROPERTIES, FORFEITURE, ETC., Alberto Lopez (husband) and Imelda Relucio, in the RTC of Makati. In the petition, Angelina alleged that Alberto, abandoned the latter and their four legitimate children; that he arrogated unto himself full and exclusive control and administration of the conjugal properties, spending and using the same for his sole gain and benefit to the total exclusion of the private respondent and their four children. It was further alleged that Alberto and Relucio, during their period of cohabitation since 1976, have amassed a fortune. And, that Alberto placed substantial portions of these conjugal properties in the name of Relucio. A Motion to Dismiss the Petition was filed by Relucio on the ground that Angelina has no cause of action against her. Respondent Judge denied the Motion to Dismiss on the ground that she is impleaded as a necessary or indispensable party because some of the subject properties are registered in her name and defendant Lopez, or solely in her name. The Motion for reconsideration was also denied. CA denied her Petition for Certiorari. Issue:

Whether Relucios inclusion as party defendant is essential in the proceedings for a complete adjudication of the controversy. (Whether Relucio is a real party in interest/necessary party/indispensable party) Held: No.

Nowhere in the allegations does it appear that relief is sought against petitioner. Respondents causes of action were all against her husband.The first cause of action is for judicial appointment of respondent as administratrix of the conjugal partnership or absolute community property arising from her marriage to Alberto J. Lopez. Petitioner is a complete stranger to this cause of action. The administration of the property of the marriage is entirely between them, to the exclusion of all other persons. Respondent alleges that Alberto J. Lopez is her husband.