CJTF7-CG 2003 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy

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    UNCLASSIFIED

    DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMYHEADQUARTERS, COMBINED

    JOINT TASK FORCE SEVENCAMP VICTORY, BAGHDAD, IRAQ

    APO AE 09335

    CJTF7-CG 14 SEP 2003

    MEMORANDUM FOR Commander. U.S. Central Command, 7115South Boundary Boulevard, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida 33621-5101

    SUBJECT: CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy

    Enclosed is the CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy,modeled on the one implemented for interrogations conducted atGuantanamo Bay, but modified for applicability to a theater of war in

    which the Geneva Conventions apply. Unless otherwise directed, myintent is to implement this policy immediately.

    Encl RICARDO S. SANCHEZas Lieutenant General, U.S. Army

    Commanding

    UNCLASSIFIED

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    HEADQUARTERS

    COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE SEVENBaghdad, IRAQAPO AE 09335

    CJTF7-CG 14 SEP 2003

    MEMORANDUM FOR

    C2, Combined Joint Task Force Seven, Baghdad, Iraq 09335C3, Combined Joint Task Force Seven, Baghdad, Iraq 09335Commander, 305th Military Intelligence Bdgada, Baghdad, Iraq 09335

    SUBJECT: CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Realisation Policy

    1. (U) This memorandum establishes the interrogation and counter-resistance policy for CJTF-7.

    2. (U) I approve the late of specified interrogation and counter-resistance techniques A-DD, as described in enclosure 1, subject tothe following:a. (U) These techniques must be used within safeguards described in

    enclosure 2.b. (U) Use of these techniques is limited to interrogations of detainees,

    security internees and enemy prisoners of war under the control ofCJTF-7.

    c. (U) Use of techniques B, I, O, X, Y, AA and CC on enemy pris-

    oners of war must be approved by me personally prior to use.Submit written requests for use of these techniques, with sup-porting rationale, to me through the CJTF-7 C2. A legal reviewfrom the CJTF-7 SJA must accompany each request.

    3. (U) CJTF-7 is operating in a theater of war in which the GenevaConventions are applicable. Coalition forces will continue to treatall persons under their control humanely.

    4. (U) Requests for use of techniques not listed in enclosure 1 will besubmitted to me through the CJTF-7 C2, and include a descriptionof the proposed techniques and recommended safeguards. A legalreview from the CJTF-7 SJA must accompany each request.

    5. (U) Nothing in this policy limits existing authority for maintenanceof good order and discipline among detainees.

    6. (U) POC is DNVT DSN

    2 Encls RICARDO S. SANCHEZ1. Interrogation Techniques Lieutenant General, USA2. General Safeguards Commanding

    CF. Commander, US Central Command

    UNCLASSIFIED

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    Enclosure I

    INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES

    (U) The use of techniques A-CC are subject to the general safeguards asprovided below as well as specific implementation guidelines to be pro-

    vided by 205th

    MI BDE Commander. Specific implementation guidancewith respect to techniques A-CC is provided in U.S. Army Field Manual34-52. Further implementation guidance will be developed by 205thMIBDE Commander.

    (U) Of the techniques set forth below, the policy aspects of certaintechniques should be considered to the extent they reflect the views ofother Coalition contributing nations. The description of the techniques issupported to include some policy issues that should be considered beforeapplication of the technique.

    A. (U) Direct: Asking straightforward questions. B. (U) Incentive/Removal of Incentive: Providing a reward on remov-

    ing a privilege, above and beyond those that are required by theGeneva Convention, from detainees. [Caution: Other nations thatbelieve detainees are entitled to EPW protection may consider thatprovision and retention of religious items (e.g. the Koran) are pro-tected under international law (ucc, Geneva III, Article 34).]

    C. (U) Emotional Love: Playing on the love a detainee has for anindividual or group.

    D. (U) Emotional Hate: Playing on the hatred a detainee has for anindividual or group.

    E. (U) Fear Up Harsh: Significantly increasing the fear level in adetainee.

    F. (U) Fear Up Mild: Moderately increasing the fear level in adetainee.

    G. (U) Reduced Fear: Reducing the fear level in a detainee. H. (U) Pride and Ego Up: Boosting the ego of a detainee. I. (U) Pride and Ego Down: Attacking or insulting the ego of a

    detainee, not beyond the limits that would apply to an EPW. [Cau-tion: Article 17 of Geneva III provides, Prisoners of war whorefuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to anyunpleasant of disadvantageous treatment of any kind. Othernations that believe detainees are entitled to EPW protections mayconsider this technique inconsistent with the provisions ofGeneva.]

    J. (U) Futility: Invoking the feeling of futility of a detainee. K. (U) We Know All: Convincing the detainee that the interrogator

    already knows the answers to questions he asks the detainee.

    UNCLASSIFIED

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    L. (U) Establish Your Identity: Convincing the detainee that theinterrogator has mistaken the detainee for someone else.

    M. (U) Repetition: Continuously repeating the same question to thedetainee within interrogation periods of normal duration.

    N. (U) File and Dossier: Convincing detainee that the interrogatorhas a damning and inaccurate file, which must be fixed.

    O. (U) Mutt and Jeff: A team consisting of a friendly and harsh inter-rogator. The harsh interrogator might employ the Pride and EgoDown technique. [Caution: Other nations that believe that EPWprotections apply to detainees may view this techniques as incon-sistent with Geneva III, Article 13 which provides that EPWs mustbe protected against acts of intimidation. Consideration should begiven to these views prior to application of the techniques.]

    P. (U) Rapid Fire: Questioning in rapid succession without allowingdetainee to answer.

    Q. (U) Silence: Staring at the detainee to encourage discomfort. R. (U) Change of Scenery Up: Removing the detainee from the stan-

    dard interrogation setting (generally to a location more pleasant, butno worse).

    S. (U) Change of Scenery Down: Removing the detainee from thestandard interrogation setting and placing him in a setting that maybe less comfortable; would not constitute a substantial change inenvironmental quality.

    T. (U) Dietary Manipulation: Changing the diet of a detainee; nointended deprivation of food or water; no adverse medical or cul-

    tural effect and without intent to deprive subject of food or water,e.g., hot rations to MREs.

    U. (U) Environmental Manipulation: Altering the environment tocreate moderate discomfort (e.g. adjusting temperature or intro-ducing an unpleasant smell). Conditions may not be such that theyinjure the detainee. Detainee is accompanied by interrogator at alltimes. [Caution: Based on court cases in other countries, somenations may view application of this technique in certain circum-stances to be inhumane. Consideration of these views should be

    given prior to use of this technique.) V. (U) Sleep Adjustment: Adjusting the sleeping times of the detainee(e.g. reversing sleep cycles from night to day). This technique isNOT sleep deprivation.

    W. (U) False Flag: Convincing the detainee that individuals from acountry other than the United States are interrogating him.

    UNCLASSIFIED

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    X. (U) Isolation: Isolating the detainee from other detainees while stillcomplying with basic standards of treatment. [Caution: the use ofisolation as an interrogation technique requires detailed implemen-tation instructions, including specific guidelines regarding thelength of isolation, medical and psychological review, and approvalfor extensions of the length of isolation by the 205th MI BDE

    Commander. Use of this technique for more than 30 days, whethercontinuous or not, must be briefed to 205thMI BDE Commanderprior to implementation.

    Y. (U) Presence of Military Working Dog: Exploits Arab fear of dogswhile maintaining security during interrogations. Dogs will bemuzzled and under control of MWD handler at all times to pre-vent contact with detainee.

    Z. (U) Sleep Management: Detainee provided minimum 4 hours ofsleep per 24 hour period, not to exceed 72 continuous hours.

    AA. (U) Yelling, Loud Music, and Light Control: Used to create fear,disorient detainee and prolong capture shock. Volume controlledto prevent injury.

    BB. (U) Deception: Use of falsified representations including docu-ments and reports.

    CC. (U) Stress Positions Use of physical postures (sitting, standing,kneeling, prone, etc.) for no more than 1 hour per use. Use oftechnique(s)) will not exceed 4 hours and adequate rest betweenuse of each position will be provided.

    UNCLASSIFIED

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    Enclosure 2

    GENERAL SAFEGUARDS

    (U) Application of these interrogation techniques is subject to thefollowing general safeguards: (i) limited to use at interrogation facilities

    only; (ii) there is a reasonable basis to believe that the detainee possessescritical intelligence; (iii) the detainee is medically and operationally evalu-ated as suitable (considering all techniques to be used in combination);(iv) interrogators are specifically trained for the techniques(s); (v) a spe-cific interrogation plan (including reasonable safeguards, limits on dura-tion, intervals between applications, termination criteria and the presenceor availability of qualified medical personnel) has been developed; (vi) thereis appropriate supervision; and, (vii) there is appropriate specified seniorapproval as identified by 205thMI BDB Commander for use with anyspecific detainee (after considering the foregoing and receiving legaladvice).

    (U) The purpose of all interviews and interrogations is to get the mostinformation from detainee with the least intrusive method, always appliedin a humane and lawful manner with sufficient oversight by trained inves-tigators or interrogators. Operating instructions must be developed basedon command policies to insure uniform, careful, and safe application ofinterrogations of detainees.

    (U) Interrogations must always be planned, deliberate actions that takeinto account factors such as a detainees current and past performance in

    both decoration and interrogation; a detainees emotional and physicalstrengths and weakness; assessment of possible approaches that may workon a certain detainee in an effort to gain the trust of the detainee; strengthand weakness of interrogators; and augmentation by other personnel for acertain detainee based on other factors.

    (U) Interrogation approaches are designed to manipulate the detain-ees emotions and weaknesses to gain his willing cooperation. Interroga-tion operations are never conducted in a vacuum; they are conducted inclose cooperation with the unit detaining the individuals. The policies

    established by the detaining units that pertain to marching, silencingand segregating also play a role in the interrogation of the detainee.Detainee interrogation involves developing a plan tailored to an individ-ual and approved by senior interrogations. Strict adherence to policies/standard operating procedures governing the administration or interro-gation techniques and oversight is essential.

    UNCLASSIFIED

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    (U) It is important that interrogators be provided reasonable latitude tovary techniques depending on the detainees culture, strengths, weaknesses,environment, extent of training in resistance techniques as well as theurgency of obtaining information that the detainee is believed to have.

    (U) While techniques are considered individually within this analysis,it must be understood that in practice, techniques are usually used in

    combination. The cumulative effect of all techniques to be employed mustbe considered before any decisions are made regarding approval forparticular situations. The title of a particular technique is not always fullydescriptive of a particular technique. 205th MI BDE Commander isresponsible for oversight of all techniques involving physical contact

    UNCLASSIFIED

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    UNCLASSIFIED

    HEADQUARTERSCOMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN

    BAGHDAD, IRAQAPO AE 09335

    CJTF7-CG 12 OCT 2003

    MEMORANDUM FORC2, Combined Joint Task Force Seven, Baghdad, Iraq 09335C3, Combined Joint Task Force Seven, Baghdad, Iraq 09335Commander, 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, Baghdad, Iraq 09335

    SUBJECT CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy

    1. (U) This memorandum establishes the interrogation and counter-resistance policy for security internees under the control of CJTF-7.Security internees are civilians who are detained pursuant to Articles5 and 78 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection ofCivilian Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949 (hereinafter,Geneva Convention).

    2. (U) I approve the use of specified interrogation and counter-resistance

    approaches A-Q, as described in Enclosure 1, relating to securityinternees, subject to the following:a. (U) Use of these approaches is limited to interrogations of security

    internees under the control of CJTF-7.b. (U) These approaches must be used in combination with the

    safeguards described in Enclosure 2.c. (U) Segregation of security internees will be required in many

    instances to ensure the success of interrogations and to preventthe sharing of interrogation methods among internees. Segrega-

    tion may also be necessary to protect sources from other detaineesor otherwise provide for their security. Additionally, the GenevaConvention provides that security internees under definite suspi-cion of activity hostile to the security of Coalition forces shall,

    where absolute military necessity requires, be regarded as havingforfeited rights of communication. Accordingly, these securityinternees may be segregated. I must approve segregation in allcases where such segregation will exceed 30 days in duration,

    whether consecutive or nonconsecutive. Submit written requestswith supporting rationale to me through the CJTF-7 C2. A legal

    review from the CJTF-7 SJA must accompany each request.d. (U) In employing each of the authorized approaches, the

    interrogator must maintain control of the interrogation: The

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    interrogator should appear to be the one who controls allaspects of the interrogation, to include the lighting, heatingand configuration of the interrogation room, as well as thefood, clothing and shelter given to the security internee.

    3. (U) Requests for use of approaches not listed in Enclosure 1 will besubmitted to me through CJTF-7 C2, and will include a description of

    the proposed approach and recommended safeguards. A legal reviewfrom the CJTF-7 SJA will accompany each request.

    4. (U) Nothing in this policy limits existing authority for maintenanceof good order and discipline among persons under Coalition control.

    5. (U) This policy supersedes the CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy signed on 14 September 2003.

    6. (U) POC is DNVT DSN

    2Encls RICARDO S. SANCHEZ1. Interrogation Approaches (SI) Lieutenant General, USA2. General Safeguards Commanding

    CF: Commander, US Central Command

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    Enclosure 1

    INTERROGATION APPROACHES

    (Security Internees)

    (U) Use of the following approaches is subject to the application of the

    general safeguards provided in enclosure (2). Specific implementationguidance with respect to approaches A-Q is provided in U.S. ArmyField Manual 3452. Brigade Commanders may provide additionalimplementation guidance.

    A. (U) Direct: Asking straightforward questions. The most effectiveof all approaches, it is the most simple and efficient approach toutilize.

    B. (U) Incentive Removal of Incentive: Proviging a reward or remov-ing a privilege, above and beyond those required by the GenevaConvention. Possible incentives may include favorite food items,changes in environmental quality, or other traditional or regionalcomforts not required by the Geneva Convention.

    C. (U) Emotional Love: Playing on the love a security internee has foran individual or group. May involve an incentive, such as allowingcommunication with the individual or group.

    D. (U) Emotional Hate: Playing on the genuine hatred or desire forrevenge a security internee has for an individual or group.

    E. (U) Fear Up Harsh: Significantly increasing the fear level in a secu-

    rity internee. F. (S/NF) Fear Up Mild: Moderately increasing thefear level in a security internee.

    G. (U) Reduced Fear: Reducing the fear level in a security internee orcalming him by convincing him that he will be properly andhumanely treated.

    H. (U) Pride and Ego Up: Flattering or boosting the ego of a securityinternee.

    I. (U) Pride and Ego Down: Attacking or insulting the pride or egoof a security internee.

    J. (U) Futility: Invoking the feeling in a security internee that it isuseless to resist by playing on the doubts that already exist in hismind.

    K. (U) We Know All: Convincing the security internee that the inter-rogator already knows the answers to questions being asked.

    L. (U) Establish Your Identity: Convincing the security internee thatthe interrogator has mistaken the security internee for someoneelse. The security internee is encouraged to clear his name.

    M. (U) Repetition: Continuously repeating the same question to thesecurity internee during an interrogation to encourage full and

    candid answers to questions.

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    N. (U) File and Dossier: Convincing security internee that the interro-gator has a voluminous, damning and inaccurate file, which must becorrected by the security internee.

    O. (U) Mutt and Jeff: An interrogation team consisting of a friendlyand a harsh interrogator. This approach is designed to cause thesecurity internee to have a feeling of hostility toward one interroga-

    tor and a feeling of gratitude toward the other. P. (U) Rapid Fire: Questioning in rapid succession without allowing

    security internee to answer questions fully. Q. (U) Silence: Staring at the security internee to encourage

    discomfort.

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    Enclosure 2

    GENERAL SAFEGUARDS

    (U) Application of these interrogation approaches is subject to the followinggeneral safeguards:

    (i) limited to use by trained interrogation personnel; (ii) there is a reason-able basis to believe that the security internee possesses information ofintelligence value; (iii) the security internee is medically evaluated as asuitable candidate for interrogation (considering all approaches to be usedin combination); (iv) interrogators are specifically trained for theapproaches; (v) a specific interrogation plan, including reasonable safe-guards, limits on duration, intervals between applications, terminationcriteria and the presence or availability of qualified medical personnel hasbeen developed; and (vi) there is appropriate supervision.

    (U) The purpose of all interviews and interrogations is to get the mostinformation from a security internee with the least intrusive methodapplied in a humane and lawful manner with sufficient oversight bytrained investigators or interrogators. Interrogators and supervisory per-sonnel will ensure uniform, careful, and safe conduct of interrogations.

    (U) Interrogations must always be planned, deliberate actions that takeinto account factors such as a security internees current and past perfor-mance in both detention and interrogation; a security internees emotionaland physical strengths and weaknesses; assessment of approaches and indi-vidual techniques that may be effective; strengths and weaknesses of interro-

    gators; and factors which may necessitate the augmentation of personnel.(U) Interrogation approaches are designed to manipulate the security

    internees emotions and weaknesses to gain his willing cooperation. Inter-rogation operations are never conducted in a vacuum; they are conductedin close cooperation with the detaining units. Detention regulations andpolicies established by detaining units should be harmonized to ensureconsistency with the interrogation policies of the intelligence collectionunit. Such consistency will help to maximize the credibility of the interro-gation team and the effectiveness of the interrogation. Strict adherence to

    such regulations, policies and standard operating procedures is essential.(U) Interrogators must appear to completely control the interrogationenvironment. It is important that interrogators be provided reasonablelatitude to vary approaches depending on the security internees culturalbackground, strengths, weaknesses, environment, extent of resistancetraining, as well as the urgency with which information believed in thepossession of the security internee must be obtained.

    (U) Interrogators must ensure the safety of security internees, andapproaches must in no way endanger them. Interrogators will ensure thatsecurity internees are allowed adequate sleep and that diets provide ade-

    quate food and water and cause no adverse medical or cultural effects.Where segregation is necessary, security internees must be monitored foradverse medical or psychological reactions. Should military working dogs

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    be present during interrogations, they will be muzzled and under controlof a handler at all times to ensure safety.

    (U) While approaches are considered individually within this analysis,it must be understood that in practice, approaches are usually used incombination. The title of a particular approach is not always fully descrip-tive of a particular approach. The cumulative effect of all approaches to be

    employed must be considered before any decision is made regardingapproval of a particular interrogation plan.