Clearing Colombia's Fog of War

7/31/2019 Clearing Colombia's Fog of War

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ClearingColombiasFogofWar

AnHistoricalMaterialistAnalysisoftheWaronDrugsinColombia

RobSchuurmans

1803905

Amsterdam,21August2009

MasterThesis

MScPoliticalScienceVUUniversityAmsterdam

Supervisor:dr.E.B.vanApeldoorn

2ndReader:dr.J.Perry


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ABSTRACT

FordecadestheUShasbeenfightingafutilewarondrugsinColombia.AlthoughmanyUS

officials already stipulated the ineffectiveness of thiswar in the early 1990s, the Clinton

Administrations and the succeeding Bush Administrations intensified their military

campaigns and introduced extensive aid packages consisting of neoliberal policies to

counteracttheallegedthreatofnarcotics.Thisstudyarguesthatthisdiscrepancycanonly

beunderstoodinthelargercontextofUSinterestsinColombia.Itadvancesthenotionthat

thewarondrugsisaboveallusedasapretexttolegitimizeacounter-insurgencythataims

tocreateaprofitableeconomicenvironmentforcapitalaccumulationbydominantclasses.

Moreover,itshowsthatthepoliticaltrajectoryofthisprojecthasbeenheavilyinfluencedby

transnationalcorporations.Bytracingthepolicy-makingprocessitexamineshowcorporate

interestshavefoundtheirwayintotheformulationofthewarondrugsandwhattheeffects

of this influence have been on the humanitarian situation in Colombia. Rooted in the

tradition of historical materialism, thisstudy demonstrates how the concept of capitalist

imperialismoffers useful insights incoming to an understanding of the war ondrugs in

Colombia.


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Theresawonderfulphrase:thefogofwar.What"thefogofwar"meansis:warisso

complexit'sbeyondtheabilityofthehumanmindtocomprehendallthevariables.Our

judgments,ourunderstanding,arenotadequateandwekillpeopleunnecessarily.

-RobertMcNamara(2003)in:E.Morris(dir),TheFogofWar:ElevenLessonsfromtheLifeof

RobertS.McNamara ,DVD,SonyPicturesClassics.


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TABLEOFCONTENTS

ListofTablesandFigures v

ListofAbbreviations vi

1.Introduction 1

1.1.ResearchProblem 11.2.StateoftheArt 2

1.2.1. MainstreamConceptions 21.2.2. CriticalScholarship 3

1.3.ResearchAim 51.4.ResearchQuestions 51.5.TheoreticalFramework 6

1.5.1. HistoricalMaterialism 61.5.2. MarxistTheoryandImperialism 7

1.5.2.1.DialecticalLogicsofImperialistPower 81.5.2.2.NeoliberalismandCapitalistImperialism 9

1.6.Operationalization 101.6.1. OnConcepts 101.6.2. IdentifyingCapitalistImperialismintheWaronDrugs 11

1.7.Methodology 121.7.1. ProcessTracingandHistoricalNarratives 121.7.2. GeneralConsiderations 13

1.8.ThesisOutline 13

2.ThePoliticalEconomyoftheWaronDrugs 14

2.1.TheViolentHistoryofColombia'sDemocracy 142.2.USForeignPolicyTowardsColombia 17

2.2.1. HistoricalConnectionsbetweentheUSandColombia 172.2.1.1.LatinAmericaasAmerica'sBackyard 172.2.1.2.FromAdversariestoAllies 19

2.2.2. MilitarizationoftheWaronDrugs 202.2.2.1.PlanColombia 22


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2.2.2.2.RiseoftheTerror-CrimeNexus 232.2.3. TheWaronDrugsasNeoliberalization 24

2.2.3.1.TheEconomicsofPlanColombia 242.2.3.2.TheColombiaFreeTradeAgreement 25

2.3.OntheNatureofDrugValueChains 262.3.1. IllicitTradeintheGlobalEconomy 262.3.2. TheEconomicsofDrugTrafficking 27

2.4.EffectsoftheWaronDrugs 292.4.1. EffectsontheDrugValueChain 292.4.2. HumanitarianandPoliticalImplications 30

3.ThePowerofDominantClassesintheWaronDrugs 33

3.1.TheFormulationofUSForeignPolicy 333.1.1. LegalContext 333.1.2. InfluencingWashington 35

3.2.CorporateInfluenceinPlanColombiaandtheCFTA 363.2.1. TheBusinessLobby 363.2.2. TheMilitary-IndustrialComplex 40

3.3.CorporateInterestsandtheContinuationofViolence 43

4.Conclusion 45

Annex:DataonTNCsLobbyinginLatinAmerica 48

Bibliography 54

LISTOFTABLESANDFIGURES

Figure1: AnnualLobbyingbyUSCBP inUSdollars 37

Figure2: AnnualLobbyingbyCOAinUSdollars 37

Table1: AbstractsofLobbyingDisclosures1996-2000 39

Table2: LobbyingPaybacks 41


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LISTOFABBREVIATIONS

CFTA ColombiaFreeTradeAgreement

CIA CentralIntelligenceAgency

CIP CenterforInternationalPolicy

COA CounciloftheAmericas

CPI CenterforPublicIntegrity

CRP CenterforResponsivePolitics

DEA DrugsEnforcementAgency

ELN EjrcitoLiberacinNacional

NationalLiberationArmy

FARC FuerzasArmadasRevolucionariasdeColombia

ColombianRevolutionaryArmedForces

FDI ForeignDirectInvestment

FDR FranklinDelanoRoosevelt

GAO GovernmentalAccountabilityOffice

GDP GrossDomesticProduct

HRW HumanRightsWatch

IR InternationalRelations

LATC LatinAmericaTradeCoalition

NGO Non-GovernmentalOrganization

OXY OccidentalPetroleum

NSC NationalSecurityCouncil

TNC TransnationalCompany

UN UnitedNations

UNDP UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme

UNHCR UnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees

UNODC UnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime

UNWDR UnitedNationsWorldDrugReport

US UnitedStates(ofAmerica)

USAID UnitedStatesAgencyforInternationalDevelopment

USCBP UnitedStates-ColombiaBusinessPartnership


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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. ResearchProblem

Fordecades,theUnitedStates(US)has been fightinganaggressivewaron drugs inLatin

America.Accordingtoitsofficialdiscourse,illegaldrugsareamajorsecuritythreattothe

USandhenceneedtobedealtwithattheirroots.Therefore,especiallyinColombia,worlds

largest cocaine producing country, the US has been supporting military interventions in

order to eradicate drugs. Domestically, the criminalization of drug use makes for a

comparable aggressive effort of the government to contain the spread of illicit drugs at

home.However,ithasbeenarguedthat,fromcropstoconsumers,theUShasbeenapplying

futilestrategiesalongthesupplychain.Overtheyears,cocaineproductionhasremained

stable and the demand for illicit drugs has not decreased. Throughout the 1990s many

liberalscholarsalready questioned itseffectiveness:ratherthanemphasizingthemilitary

dimension, they argued that the war on drugs could only be won by adhering to the

principlesofdemocracyandmultilateralism.However,inresponsetotheterroristattacks

of 11 September 2001 (9/11) the US re-emphasized their conservative and unilateral

foreignpolicy.Astorejecttheclaimsofalackoflegitimacy,thewarondrugsinColombia

was now portrayed as a war on terror, referring to an alleged terror-crime nexus of

ideologicalinsurgentsbenefitingfromprofitablecocainemarkets.

Nevertheless,whathasremainedunchangedsincethemilitaryinvolvementofthe

US in Colombia is the absence of any structural effects regarding cocaine production,

traffickingandconsumption.Asaresult,manycriticalscholarshavequestionedthemotives

underlyingUSpresenceinColombia.Nevertheless,althoughsuchacriticalapproachmight

provideausefulholisticunderstandingoftheintereststhatunderlietheofficialdiscourse,

thegreaterpartofitcontinuestobebasedonstate-centricpremises.Ingeneral,ithasbeen

argued that sucha realistontologyfallsshortin explainingthe transnational dynamicsof

drug trafficking and the political realm of conflict in Colombia (Bagley and Tokatlin in

Stokes 2005: 9). By the same token, it can be argued that this ontology falls short in

explainingthedomesticrealmofformulatingforeignpolicyonthewarondrugsintheUS.

Therefore, the development of an integral understanding of US presence in Colombia


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remainshindered bythe state-centric premisesof traditionalscholarshipin International

Relations(IR).Thisresearchproblemisthestartingpointofthismasterthesis.

1.2. StateoftheArt

1.2.1. MainstreamConceptions

Within the debate on the significance of the war on drugs, two opposing streams of

literature stand out: the mainstream is generally devoted to justifying US interventions,

whiletheotherstreamismorecriticaltowardsthelegitimacyoftheseinterventions.Inthe

mainstreamonecandistinguishbetweentwosub-streams;theconservativestreamandthe

liberalstream.AsDougStokes(2005:5)argues,themainstreamspansnotonlymostofthe

academicliterature,butisalsotheapplieddiscourseinmostmediaandpolicydocuments.

Conservative scholars argue that drug trafficking in Latin America constitutes a security

threat to the US and has to betackled chiefly with military means (Downes 1999). Itis

argued that US foreign policy witnessed a shift towards even more reliance on military

meansafter9/11,asthewarondrugswasinfusedwithcounter-terrorelements.TheUS

NationalSecurityStrategyof2002mentionedthatinColombia,we[i.e.theUSgovernment]

recognizethelinkbetweenterroristandextremistgroupsthatchallengethesecurityofthe

stateanddrugtraffickingactivitiesthathelpfinancetheoperationsofsuchgroups(NSC

2002:10).AccordingtoStokes(2005:7),by actinguponconservativeideas,theemphasis

has consequentlycontinued to be placed on a militarized solutionto Colombias internal

violence. Without reflecting upon the consequences of such a militarized policy,

conservativescholarsgenerallyarguethataggressivestrategiesbestsafeguardUSinterests

abroad.

The liberal sub-stream opposes this view. That is, without questioning the

objectivesandlegitimacyofUSinterventions,itcriticizestheoverlymilitarizedemphasisof

conservative scholars. Thus, liberals rebut conservatives in their means, but not in their

ends. They acknowledge that solely military interventions have yet not succeeded to

containthelevelofdrugsenteringtheUS,andthatthereforesocialandeconomicsolutions

have to be pursued simultaneously (Ibid: 8). In this respect,Adam Isacson (2005) states

thatthewarondrugsreliesonawrongconceptualizationofthetrueproblem.Accordingto

him,thetrueproblemofdrugsisthatitthreatenssocialhealth,notnationalsecurity.Inthe


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liberalstream,social,economicandinstitutionalsolutionsareintroducedtofacethethreat,

not military ones. Nevertheless, this liberal approach also presumes the need for US

intervention.Inshort,mainstreamconceptionsjustifyUSinvolvementinColombia,whether

itisoutofaneedtocounteractanationalsecuritythreatoroutofresponsibilitytopromotepeace and democracy in the region. It is these premises that are questioned in critical

scholarship.

1.2.2. CriticalScholarship

CriticalscholarsnotonlyquestionthemeansthattheUSappliesinthewarondrugs,but

alsoits motivesandobjectives.Theybasetheircritiqueon thelargediscrepancybetween

realityanddiscourseandnotethatthewarondrugsisineffective,or,accordingtosome

scholars, counter-productive. Rather, critical scholars tend to argue that US strategies to

fight drugs and terrorism in Latin America are a continuation of aggressive Cold War-

policiesdesignedtopreserveacapitalistsocio-economicorderconducivetoUSinterests

(Stokes2005:11).Followingthislogic,GargiBhattacharyya(2005:93)notesthatthewar

ondrugswasneverdesignedtoeradicatedrugs,butmerelytoexpandUSdominationin

LatinAmerica.Accordingtoheranalysis,thewarondrugsisanendlessandineffectualwar

attempting to renew neo-colonialism by force and to replace the dependency of one era

withanotherthatbetterfitsthedynamicsofaglobalizedworld.Inthisprocess,thedrug

trade is not eradicated, but merely redeployed for other ends (Ibid). These ends are

investigatedbyDavidBewley-TaylorandMartinJelsma(2007).IncitingapassageofPeter

Zirnite(inIbid:284),theyarguethat'thelinkingofdrugstonationalsecurityprovidedthe

rationale(...)tojustifyexpandingtheroleoftheUSarmedforces'.Theyarguethiswhile

observing that after decades of fighting drug cartels and trafficking networks, military

surveillancehasproventobeunabletoreducetheflowofcocainetotheUS(Ibid:286).

Subsequently, they emphasize that it was, however, the only possible post-Cold War

justificationformaintainingUSarmedforcesonthecontinent(Ibid).AccordingtoBewley-

TaylorandJelsma,suchpresenceisrequiredbecauseSouthAmericanoilisofincreasing

importancefortheUS(Ibid:287).Inthatsense,9/11provedtobeausefulcatastrophe,asit

providedanewpretextforUSpresenceinColombiainatimeinwhichthewarondrugshad

become largely discredited. Mara Lemus (et. al.2005) argues that leftistguerrillas were

henceforth purposely framed asnarco-terrorists.Coletta Youngers(2005:355) trivializes


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the legitimacy of such a polarizing discourse by observing that there is no distinct

phenomenon asnarco-terrorismandthat ithashad detrimentaleffects onthestabilityof

Colombiassociety.VariousscholarsthereforearguethatUSpresenceinColombiahasonly

worsenedthemalleabledomesticsituationandthatitislikelytobemoreharmfultotheregionthancocainetradeitself(Guqueta2003:89,Fukumi2008).Inmanycriticalstudies,

acentralfocusisthusontheeffectsofUSmilitarypresence.

Forexample,RachelNield(2005:92)observesthatthewarondrugsprevailsover

efforts to democratize and stabilize Latin America. According to her, counter-narcotics

initiativestendtooverridelong-termandlow-resourcedemocratizationprocessesandshe

notesthatthisisunlikelytoresultinsuccessfulcounter-narcoticspolicies.Fukumi(2008:

174) elaborates on this by stating that instead of supporting democracy and protecting

human rights, US interventions have caused human rights violations through aerial

fumigation, military involvement and the undermining of democratic processes. Julia

Bauder(2008)continuesthislineofreasoningwhenshecontendsthatthewarondrugsis

heavilyviolatinghumanrightsinColombia;indirectlybyfundingmalignviolentgroupsand

directlythroughaerialfumigation.AccordingtoJaimeNietto(2007),theassertedUSright

to intervention in favour of liberal ideals has led to a situation in which the defence of

humanrightsanddemocracyaresubordinatedtoeconomicandstrategicinterests.

An interesting avenue of research concerns the nature of these economic and

strategicinterests.Theextenttowhichsuchinterestscanbeunderstoodasconfigurations

ofthenationalinterestissubjecttoacademicdebate.Variousscholarshavearguedthatthe

geopolitical strategies of the war on drugs concentrate on securing access to natural

resources, but fail to determine the nature of these geopolitical preferences. Although

Colombiaiscurrentlyaminorsupplierofoilto theUS,thedominanceoveritsoilfieldsis

arguedto beofstrategicimportanceinthenearbyfuture.Forexample,Stokes(2007)has

argued that the USintends tosecure its totalenergysupply bymeans ofdiversifying its

dependencyon oil.Thereby,heimpliesa certainnational interestoftheUSthathastobe

met. Onthe otherhand, NazihRachani(2005) argues that the 'war system' inColombia

meetsspecificgroupinterests.Hediscussestheroleoftransnationalcorporations(TNCs)in

theColombianconflictandstatesthatUSmilitaryaidtoColombiahashelpedto'subsidize

andperpetuatethecivilwarbychangingtheincentivestructureofdominantclasses'(Ibid:

138).Inaddition,hearguesthatColombiahasbecomemorevulnerabletothedemandsof


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foreign capital (Ibid: 128). Thereby, he implies that the war on drugs meets specific

interestsofdominantclassesandforeigncapital,ratherthanaunifiednationalinterest.

Insum,after9/11criticalscholarshiphasgainedleverageintheacademicrealmas

itprovidesnewanalyticalfocitounderstandtherealitiesofthewarondrugs.ThesefocivaryfrommoreorlessunifiedconceptionsofthenationalinterestthatleadsUSbehaviour

in Colombia to presumptions that stipulate the influence of specific group interests that

wieldinfluenceonthatnationalinterest.However,thelatterfocusremainsunderdeveloped

andrequiresbroaderacademicattention.

1.3. ResearchAim

Whereas the larger part of academic research on the war on drugs inColombia reflects

state-centric conceptions of the national interest, this dissertation aims to provide a

historicalmaterialistanalysisofitsnatureanddynamics.Moreover,giventhatthegreater

part of the public is largely ignorant of the consequences of this war, it aims to create

awarenessonitshumanitarianimpactontheColombiansociety.

1.4. ResearchQuestions

Thequestionthatguidesthisstudyaddressesthemotivationforthewarondrugsinthe

broadest sense. Primarily, it needs to find out why the US is fighting awar on drugs in

Colombia.Thisgeneralquestioncanbedifferentiatedintoseveralresearchquestions.First,

itisindispensabletounderstandwhobearsthecostsandwhoreapsthebenefitsfromthewar

ondrugs.Next,itisusefultotrackhowthepolicyofthewarondrugshasbeenshapedand

especiallywhichactorshaveinfluencedthispolicy-makingprocess.Answeringtheseresearch

questionsultimatelypermittheansweringoftheguidingquestion.Theforemosthypothesis

is that the war on drugs is to be understood as an imperialist project.However, such a

hypothesis presupposes the definitions of certain concepts. It is therefore important to

operationalize these concepts. Whereas operationalization is the process of making

theoretical concepts measurable, it is thus first necessary to set out a theoretical

framework.


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1.5. TheoreticalFramework

1.5.1. HistoricalMaterialism

Inordertoassessthemotivationsofthewarondrugs,itisnecessarytoexaminetowhatextent its promoted aims serve a genuine national interest, or rather specific group

interests. The Marxist traditionof historical materialism provides a useful frameworkto

analyze the nature of such interests. The ontology of this framework is based on the

premisethatallhistoryistheproductofthematerialconditionsoflife(Marx1845).Karl

Marx elaborated this stance by explaining how 'real individuals, their activity and the

materialconditionsunderwhichtheylive()aretobebutthepragmaticbasisofanysocial

analysisofreality(Ibid:4).Hecallsthispragmaticbasisthepoliticaleconomy(1971:20).It

is argued that this political economy contains a 'basic and fundamental contradiction'

because a small part of society owns the 'means of production' inthe economy and the

majorityhasto'surrendercontrolofitslabourpower()inordertoproducetheirown

means of subsistence'(Baldwin et.al. 2004: 95, Linklater 2005: 113).According to Marx

(1971:20),thispoliticaleconomyformsthematerialbasisofanideologicalsuperstructure

thatfacilitatesformsofsocialconsciousness.Inawell-knownpassagehethenarguesthat

itisnottheconsciousnessofmenthatdeterminestheirexistence,buttheirsocialexistence

thatdeterminestheirconsciousness(Ibid:21).Marxthereforereckonsthedevelopmentof

historytobearesultofmaterialpreconditions,orinotherwords:

Menmaketheirownhistory,buttheydonotmakeitastheyplease;theydonotmakeitunderself-

selectedcircumstances, but undercircumstances existing already,given and transmitted fromthe

past(Marx1852).

Following the logics of this theorem, it is clear that inequalities are inherently

relatedtothematerialbasisofsocietyandthattheseinequalitiesexpressthemselvesinthe

superstructure. Whereas Marx himself never provided a parsimonious definition of this

superstructure, a useful definition is provided by Gerald Cohen (1978: 216) in his

reinterpretationofhistoricalmaterialism.Cohenincludesthelegalsystemandthestatein

hisdefinitionandimpliesthatthesetwoinstitutionalspheresreflectstructuralinequalities

outofthematerialbasis.Theseinequalitiesleadtoastrugglebetweentheaforementioned


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majorityofsocietywithoutcontroloflabourpowerandthesmallpartofsocietythatown

the means of production. In general terms, Marx (1848) labelled these two groups

respectively proletariat and bourgeoisie, but they also go by the label of labour and

capitalorinmorepopulartermsaspublicormassandelite(Doyle1997:321,Harvey2006).

Hence,fundamentalmaterialinequalitiesthatresultfrompropertyrelationsinthe

politicaleconomyarereconstructedinthepoliticalsuperstructure.Toconceiveofthestate

anditspoliciesasanexpressionofthegeneralinterestofitspeopleisthereforeequalto

confirmingtheseinequalities.Onlybyacknowledgingthatthepreferencesofastatearean

expression of the political interests of a dominant class, it becomes possible to critically

scrutinizethewaysinwhichthisexpressionisconfigured.

1.5.2. MarxistTheoryandImperialism

Historicalmaterialismprovidesanoriginalbutdebatedperspectivetoanalyzeinternational

politics.Especiallywithintheframeworkofthisstudy,aninterestingavenueofcontinuing

Marxist debate worthy to discuss is the role of the state in world politics. As historical

materialistanalysisfocusesonclassesratherthanstates,MichealDoyle(1997:321)notes

thatthepoliticsofwarandpeace()takeplacetransnationally;acrossborders,notmerely

betweenorwithinthem(Ibid).Therealityofaninternationalstate-systemis,accordingto

Andrew Linklater (2005: 117), a confirmation of this stratification because it divides

humanity into nationalities whilst at the same putting control of state structures in the

handsofdominantclasses,whoallegedlypromotenationalinterests.Hence,alsoinaworld

societyperceivedasdividedintoclasses,statesplayasignificantpart.Aswillbeshownin

this section, recent scholarship on imperialism provides a useful theoretical account for

analyzingthewarondrugs.

1.5.2.1.DialecticalLogicsofImperialistPower

AsGiovanniArrighi(2005:23)argues,criticalthinkers,includingmanyMarxists,foundthe

conceptsofempireandimperialismoflittleanalyticaluseto describeUSglobalpowerin

the 1990s. However, since 9/11 and the US response to it, the dreaded concept of

imperialism has regainedleverage, both in academia andpublic discourse.David Harvey

(2003:26)warnsthatithassuchdifferentmeaningsthatitis difficulttouse() without


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clarificationasananalyticalratherthanapolemicalterm.TheconvergingworksofArrighi

and Harvey provide a useful analytical clarification of imperialism along the lines of

historicalmaterialism.

WhereasArrighi(2005:27)mentionsthatthemainstreamdefinitionofimperialismgenerallyemphasizestheextensionorimpositionof()power,authorityorinfluenceofa

stateoverotherstates,bothauthorsagreethatwithinthecapitalistmodeofproduction,

imperialism denotes not only this territorial logic of political power, but also a distinct

capitalistlogicofpower.Thiscapitalistlogicdescribesthepursuitofpowerasadriveto

commandovereconomiccapital(Ibid:28).Theselogicsof powerareno antagonisms,but

interconnectedcounterparts;onelogicgeneratescontradictionsthathavetobecontained

bytheother(Fay1996:224).Inthissense,imperialismistobeunderstoodasadialectical

fusionbetween thestrategicpolitics ofterritorialcontrol andthemolecularprocesses of

capitalaccumulationoverspaceandtime(Harvey2003:26).Intheliterature,thisfusionis

called capitalist imperialism and reflects the aforementioned need of capital for state

structures.HannahArendt(inArrighi2005:29)clarifiesthenatureofthisneedbystating

thattheprocessofcapitalaccumulationrequirespoliticalaccumulationofpowertoprotect

the growing property of capital. Joseph Schumpeter (in Ibid: 36) continues this line of

reasoning by emphasizing that these processes are based on the progressive capitalist

ideology of perpetual thirst for endless capital accumulation. Arrighi clarifies this by

stating that capital recurrently accumulates above what can be profitably reinvested in

existing territorial systems,which createsa tendency that Marx called thefalling rate of

profit(Ibid).Thistendencyidentifiesthedecliningrateofreturnoncapitalinvestmentasa

resultofcapitalbecomingmoreabundantthroughitsaccumulation,therebydecreasingthe

incentivetoinvest(Gilpin1987:36).

Imperialist behaviour is thus necessary to counteract this so-called crisis of

overaccumulation by creating spatial fixes: the incorporation of new spaces into the

systemof capitalaccumulationto absorbthesurpluscapitalandavertsuchcrises(Jessop

2006). Arrighi (2005: 36) and Harvey (2003: 88) subsequently argue that the global

capitalist system led by the US has been in such a crisis of overaccumulation since the

1970s.Therefore,theUShasappliedbothcovertandovertimperialiststrategiestoescape

thefallingrateofprofit.Notably,ithasdonesobymeansofintroducingneoliberalismin

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1.5.2.2.NeoliberalismandCapitalistImperialism

Harvey(2006)convincinglyshowshowneoliberalismhaseffectivelyrestoredthepowerof

dominantclassessincethe1980s.Byrelyingonappealingvaluessuchasindividuallibertyandvariouseconomicfreedoms,neoliberalismwas initiallywelcomedbymany countries.

Nevertheless,Harvey(Ibid: 145)argues thatneoliberalization has in effect swept across

theworldlikeavasttidalwaveofinstitutionalreformanddiscursiveadjustment,thereby

destructing institutional frameworks (), divisions of labour, social relations, welfare

provisions and so on. He continuesto explain that the crisis of overaccumulation in the

1970striggeredariseofsocialistandcommunistideaswithinthecapitalistworldeconomy

thatstartedtoposeaseverepoliticalandeconomicthreattotherulingelite(Ibid:148).In

ordertosecureitsinterests,theeliteintroducedneoliberalismasaneconomicandpolitical

toolkit that should revitalize global capital accumulation and, subsequently, restore class

power(Ibid:149).Harveycallsthemechanismthatredistributedwealthandincomefrom

the mass to the elite 'accumulation by dispossession' (Ibid: 153). He emphasizes that

deliberate manipulation and management of economic crises, state redistributions of

wealth,privatizationprocessesandincreasedfinancializationaretheprimaryexpressions

of capitalist imperialism (Ibid: 155). He then argues that the US has supported various

militarycoupsin LatinAmericathroughoutthe20thcenturyinordertoimposeneoliberal

economicreforms(Ibid:147).Recently,ithasdonesomoreovertlyafterthewarinIraq

(Harvey2003).Hence,libertyand freedom,thebasicvaluesof neoliberalism,arequickly

abandonedwhenevertheyconflictwiththisclassproject(Harvey2006:149).

1.6. Operationalization

1.6.1. OnConcepts

The operationalization of concepts is required to make the research questions more

manageable.Itis,however,impossibletodosoinaneutralway.JohnGerring(2001:35)

noted thatall social sciences arelinguistic expressions of thesocial world and that their

toolkitsmainlyrelyontheinterpretationoflanguage.Conceptformationcanthusbeseen

as the basis of social sciences and because this is an interpretative endeavour, it is

necessary to be explicit about the definitions used. This way, one can limit semantic


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confusion and promote scientific progress (Ibid). Moreover, due to the interpretative

nature,acrucialquestionin socialanalysisdealswiththeindicatorsof concepts: howcan

onemeasuretheoreticalconceptsinreality,or,howdoweknowitwhenweseeit(Ibid:

43)?Acentralconceptofthisstudyisthetermimperialism,whichisoperationalizedas

capitalist imperialism, ashasbeensetoutin the previoussection. Hence, itrefersto the

historical materialist proposition that the dominant class exerts geopolitical pressures

because it needs a spatial fix as a solution to the capitalist crisis of overacummulation.

Within the scope of thisthesis, these pressures express themselves both in military and

economic policies. Together, these policies are the foremost instruments of the war on

drugs.

The term war on drugs itself was first coined by former US President Richard

Nixon in 1971 and quickly made narcotics public enemy number one because its

connotationreflectedaggressivemeasurestocounteractanexternalthreat(NationalPublic

Radio2007).Thewar ondrugsisthusa metaphoricalconstructaimedatgainingsupport

forasetofUScounter-narcoticspoliciesamongthepublic.Asapartofthismetaphor,it

refers to the actual militarization of counter-narcotics policies in Colombia. Though,

because various economic measures have been taken simultaneously under the same

pretext,thewarondrugsisbothawarofhardandsoftpower.Therefore,thetermwaron

drugsisoperationalizedasametaphoricalconstructaimedatlegitimizingasetofmilitary

andeconomicpoliciesinColombia.

Ascanbegatheredfromthetheoreticalframework,theeconomicpoliciesofthewar

on drugs are based on the principles of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism is the economic

doctrinethatproposestheliberalizationoftheeconomyinordertoadvancehumanwell-

being (Harvey 2006: 145). However, in Colombia the ideology of neoliberalism conflicts

with itsreality. The practiceof neoliberalism in the war ondrugscan therefore best be

operationalized as the specific processes of privatization, financialization and crisis

manipulationthatredistributewealthfromthemajoritytothedominantclass,i.e.asthe

mechanismsofaccumulationbydispossession.

Thedominantclassisnotdefinedinatomistictermsofhumanbeings,butratherin

theholisticsenseoftransnationalcorporations(TNCs).Inmoderncapitalism,TNCsarethe

mainagentsofcapitalaccumulationandthusthemostimportantactorstoanalyzeinan


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assessmentofthemotivationsandinterestsinthewarondrugs.Finally,anothercentral

actoristheUS,whichisagenerictermfortheofficialstateapparatusofallgovernmental

departments and affiliated agencies within the US and which can be referred to in

theoreticaltermsasthepoliticalsuperstructure.

1.6.2 IdentifyingCapitalistImperialismintheWaronDrugs

As the discussed concepts are embedded in a historical materialist framework, they are

related in such a way that a distinct pattern or mechanism can be identified. In this

mechanism,theneedforcapitalaccumulationbythedominantclasscanbeunderstoodas

aninherentpartofthecapitalistmodeofproduction.ThismeansthattheinterestsofTNCs

are to be conceived of as an independent variable, which subsequently implies that the

eventual policies on the war on drugs are dependent of these interests. In order to

understandthislogic,itisnecessaryto understandthewaysin whichUS foreignpolicyis

shaped. According to historical materialism, this process takes place in the political

superstructureandthereforereflectsskewerproductionrelationsoutofthematerialbasis.

Asa result, the policy-making process has tobe seen as a product that is influenced by

TNCs.Onlyby examiningtheextentof thisinfluenceitbecomespossibletoshowwhythe

USisfightingawarondrugsinColombia.

1.7. Methodology

1.7.1. ProcessTracingBecausethewarondrugsinColombiaisdeeplyrootedinhistoricalconditions,anin-depth

case-studyis themostsuitedapproachto analyzeitsnatureanddynamicswithacademic

rigour.Inthisanalysis,themethodofprocesstracingisspecificallyuseful.Processtracingis

the method of following the process between an independent and a dependent variable,

whichis inthis casethe process betweenthe interests ofthedominant classon the one

handandactualUSforeignpolicyonthewarondrugsontheother.Accordingtorecent

appraisalof thismethodbyJeffreyCheckel(2005:5),a majorbenefitof processtracingis

thatitprovidesthemethodologicalbasisforanaccountofsocialchangebecauseofitsfocus

on identifyingmechanisms. Thisis a merit in current research areas of political science,

especiallybecausemanytheoriesthusfaronproblemsofinterestininternationalrelations


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() and US politics are probabilistic statements that do not specify the causal process

(BennettandGeorge2005:209).Thebestwaytomeasurethiscausalprocessistorelyon

harddata. The relative transparent nature of US politicsmakes it possibleto investigate

how the dominant class influenced the policy-making process of the war on drugs bytrackinglobbyingactivitiesfromTNCsinthepoliticalrealm.

Additionally, this lobbying data is backed by extensive historical analysis of the

dynamicsofthewarondrugsinColombiathroughtheperspectiveofhistoricalmaterialism.

Moreover, this historical analysis contributes to the aim of creating awareness of the

humanitarianimpactofthewarontheColombianpeople.

1.7.2. GeneralConsiderations

Inadoptingahistoricalmaterialistperspective,thefocusofthisstudyisonthepowerof

dominant classes in the war on drugs and enables a profound analysis of the specific

intereststhatitmeets.Thelargerpartofcurrentresearchlackssuchananalysisanditis

thereforeausefulcontributiontotheliteratureonthistopic.Nevertheless,duetothein-

depthanalysisofmaterialinterests,theroleofideologyinthewarondrugsisconsequently

reducedtoafunctionofmaterialpowerrelations,whichisalimitationtothereachofthis

study.Itishoweverimpossibletocomprehendallthevariablesofawarandtheoriginality

ofthisperspectivemightclearsomeofthefogthatcoversthewarondrugs.

1.8. ThesisOutline

After having set out the framework of the dissertation in this chapter, chapter two

continueswithadiscussionofthenature,historyanddynamicsofthewarondrugs.Herein,

awidearrayofdataconcerningtheferocityoftheongoingconflictinColombiaispresented,

as well as data on the ineffectiveness of US counter-narcotics policies. These data are

supportivetotheargumentthatthewarondrugsisnotprimarilymeanttoeradicatedrugs,

butthatithasaboveallbeenusedasapretexttojustifyalowintensitycounter-insurgency

onsocialforcesthatchallengethepowerofthestatus-quo.

InchapterthreeitisfurtherexaminedwhytheUSisfightingthisineffective,unjust

andviolentwarondrugs.FocusingondomesticprocessesinUSpolitics,itisdemonstrated

that the nature of its policy-making process is highly susceptible to corporate influence


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throughlobbying.Itisarguedthatthebusinesslobbyingeneralandthemilitary-industrial

complex in specific have pushed Congress extensively to pass the legislation on Plan

Colombia,alarge-scaleaidpackageconsistingchieflyofneoliberalandmilitarypolicies.

In a concluding chapter the findings are recapitulated and used to answer theresearchquestionsandelaborateontheprospectsforthefutureofColombia.


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2. THEPOLITICALECONOMYOFTHEWARONDRUGS

TheUS-ledwarondrugsinColombiaisfoughtinthecontextofanongoingviolentdomestic

conflict.Overtime,thiswarandconflicthavebeenentangledanditisthereforeimpossibletoisolateonefromanother,evenwereittobeforanalyticalpurposesonly.Bythesame

token,thewarondrugscanneitherbeunderstoodasauniqueexpressionofUSforeign

policy.Thischapterthereforefirstexplainshow thewarondrugsissituatedin thelarger

contextofUSinterventionsinLatinAmericaand,subsequently,itshowswhythewaron

drugsisafarceandhowitaffectsthehumanitariansituationinColombia.

2.1. TheViolentHistoryofColombiasDemocracy

Thehistoricalrootsofthedomesticconflictcanbetracedbacktotheearly19 th century,

when the colonial era left a legacy of land-owning elites and a poor, often non-white,

majority in the area now known as Colombia (Livingstone 2003: 59). Due to diverging

interestsofdifferentregionalelites,theprocessofstate-buildinghadbeentroublingfrom

the outset. In 1848 and 1849, these elites organized themselves in respectively the

ConservativeandtheLiberalparty,allegedlytopromoteanationalinterest(Ibid:61).This

marked the beginning of the bipartisan politics that characterize Colombias history.

Although both parties were essentially vehicles of the dominant class, the bipartisan

structuremobilizedmassesofpeopleandhencepolarizedsocietyintoaConservativeanda

Liberalcamp.Thissubsequentlyresultedineightcivilwars,togetherclaimingover250,000

lives(MazzucaandRobinson285,296).AsWilliamAvils(2006:25)correctlyargues,these

wars already emphasized the elitist andexclusionary character of Colombias democracy

throughout the 20th century, because both parties were led by the elite and employed

violenttacticstoexcludeorco-optpopularoppositiontotheircontrol.Inaddition,Russel

Crandall (2002: 54) stipulates that since one of the two parties was always in power,

violence increasingly began to resemble a battle between the government and its

opponents.

Inthefirsthalfofthe20thcentury,economicdevelopmenthelpedColombiatoenter

theworldeconomywithacompetitivepositioninthecoffeemarket.Livingstone(2003:63)

clarifies that this development madeColombiabetteraccessibleforforeigncapital,which


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consequently triggered more economic development, thereby facilitating urbanization,

industrializationand,hence,theriseofnewclasses.Inthemidstofthesedevelopments,a

radicalfractionledbyJorgeGaitnsplitfromtheLiberalpartyasitpromotedmorestate

controlontheeconomy,inordertodistributetheincreasingbenefitsofinternationaltrademoreequally.Heaccusedbothpartiesofservingonlytheinterestsoftheoligarchyand

opposedthecontinuingviolenceofthestateagainsttheopposition(Crandall2002:55).He

managed to mobilizemasses of people in his 1946presidentialcampaign, butultimately

failedto wintheelections.Gaitnnonethelesscontinuedhisrallyingagainst theoligarchy

andwasassassinatedin1948,whichledtoamassoutrageinBogotthatisreferredtoas

theBogotazo(Ibid).

TheBogotazosubsequentlyledtooneofthemostferociousperiodsinColombian

history,knownas LaViolencia.Thebipartisanconflicthadbecomeaconduitforahostof

otherconflictsandincreasinglydevelopedintoaviolentaccumulationofsocial,economic,

localandpersonalconflicts(Ibid:67).Itclaimedover200,000livesinmerelytenyearsof

virtualanarchy(Stokes2005:68).In1953thesocialupheavalwassilencedaggressivelyby

a militarycoup (Livingstone 2003: 68). As a result, the traditional parties cooperated to

regainpowerin1958.TheydidsobysigningagentlemensagreementcalledtheNational

Front,therebyconsentingonthesharingofleadershipinfour-yearterms(Ibid).Thisway,

traditionalelitescontinuedtodominatethepoliticalsystem.

The regainingof powerby the traditional partiesstrengthened the power of the

eliteandputintooperationmoreeconomicmodernization.Inordertoeasetherelations

with the army and to secure theirextended economic power, the army was given more

autonomy.Consequently,thearmycontinuedtheirrepressiveactions,butasanunintended

consequencepopularoppositionbegantotakeonstructuralforms.Mainlyinruralareas,

where the economic consequences of political exclusion were experienced most heavily,

insurgent movements easily gained support in the population and this resulted in the

establishment of the guerrilla movementsFuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia

(FARC) andEjrcito de Liberacin Nacional (ELN) in 1964 (Molano 2000: 26). Although

triggeredbythesameinjusticeandsuppression,theFARCstartedoutasapeasantarmy

with a pragmatic vision, often oriented more locally than nationally, while the ELN was

founded by leftist intellectuals with a more idealist Marxist aim inspired by Ernesto

Guevarasrevolutionaryideasonguerrillawarfare(Livingstone2003:72).


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Theseguerrillamovementsdevelopedintowell-organizedgroupsduringthe1970s.

BoththeFARCandtheELNgainedmoreterritoryandsupportinruralareasandimposeda

taxonbigland-ownersin orderto financetheiractivities(Crandall2002:84).As aresult,

big land-owners established self-defence groups that were also institutionalized by thegovernmenttoprotecttheinterestsoftheelite.Mostimportantly,thelate1970smarked

the beginning of the intertwining of the drug trade with the political conflict, when

displacedpeasantsfromguerrillamovementsstartedtogrowcoca.Althoughtheguerrillas

initiallytriedtoresistthistendency,bothfromamoralperspectiveandbecausetheywere

afraid that it would create a class of wealthy farmers that would no longer support its

politicalaims,extremepovertywithintheirpeasantsupportleftthemwithnochoicebutto

allowit,ascocaisaneasybutprofitablecroptogrow(Livingstone2003:76,Molano2000:

27).AstheFARCwasapragmaticmovement,itmanagedtoturnthecocaboomtotheirown

advantage and started to tax the trade, managed to co-exist with drug traffickers, but

restrained from trafficking itself (Livingstone 2003: 76). Trafficking was the domain of

notoriousdrugcartelsthatalsocameintobeinginthe1970s.TheMeddeln-cartelledby

Pablo Escobar became a monopolist in the trade and its profits started to corrupt all

sectionsofsociety(Livingstone2003:82).

Most intertwining of drug traffickingandpoliticalviolence occurred in the1980s

whenlarge-scaledrugtraffickersbecameawealthyclassthemselvesduetothehighprofits

returnedontheirbusiness.Theygraduallystartedtosharethesamehatredofguerrillas

withthebigland-ownersand,asaresult,analliancegrewupbetweenthetraditionalland-

owners, the narco-bourgeoisie and the military (Ibid: 78). The self-defence groups, or

paramilitaries, now also started to operate by order of the narco-bourgeoisie. As these

paramilitaries sophisticatedtheirmutualorganizationover timeandextended their cruel

andviolentmethods,theydeliberatelybegantolivealifeoftheirown(Crandall2002:86).

Atragicexampleofthisistheirkillingof3,000membersoftheUninPatriotica ,aleft-wing

politicalpartyinitiatedby theFARC(Livingstone2009:116).Thisway,the politicalcrisis

that had been apparent since Colombias independence began to transform into a

complicated and violent conflict between the government, the guerrillas and the

paramilitaries.Inthisconflict,theambiguousrelationbetweenthenarco-bourgeoisieand

theguerrillasisunclear.Onetheonehand,theyrelieduponeachotherinthedrugvalue


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chain,butinideologicaltermstheywereopponents.However,itisclearthattheentranceof

drugmoneyintheconflictappearedtobeoilonthefire.

ThehistoricalrootsofColombiasdomesticconflictaretobefoundinmajorclass

conflict,politicalexclusionandlarge-scaleviolence-by-reprisal.Nevertheless,historyalonecannotaccountforthebrutalityandseverityofthiscrisis,because'ifthecrisisstillhasits

rootsin history,it seemsto have taken ona lifeof its own, feeding onitself, enveloping

societyintoaviciouscircleofviolencewithnoendinsight'(Bergquistet.al.2001:vii).

2.2. USForeignPolicytowardsColombia

2.2.1. HistoricalConnectionsbetweentheUSandColombiaWhereasitisimportanttoincludethehistoricalrootsofColombia'sdomesticconflictinthe

analysisofthewarondrugs,bythesametokenitisindispensabletoplacetheroleofUS

foreign policy towards Colombia in a broader perspective. Therefore, this paragraph

discussesboththegeneralhistoryofUSinterestsinLatinAmerica,aswellasthemeansby

whichtheseinterestshavebeenpromotedinColombiathroughouttheyears.

2.2.1.1.LatinAmericaasAmericasBackyard

In1823theUSyetexpresseditsinterestinLatinAmericabymeansoftheMonroe-doctrine,

in which former President James Monroe warned that the US would not tolerate any

Europeanattempttorestoreitscolonialholdonthecontinent(LaFeber2008:48).Ittook

untiltheendofthe19 thcenturybeforetheUSstartedtoshowimperialbehaviouritself.In

fact,asMikeMarqusee(2007:98)argues,itwasoneoftherareperiodsinwhichtheUShas

spokenopenlyofitselfasanempire.PresidentTheodoreRooseveltevenarguedin1904

thatchronicwrong-doingandincompetencemightforcetheUStoactasaninternational

police agent in thehemisphere, therebyoffering an idealistbasis for US expansion (Ibid:

100).AccordingtoGregGandin(2006:20),theUSinvadedLatinAmericaatleastthirty-four

timesduringthefirstthreedecadesofthe20 thcentury.Thiseracoincidedwithabigwave

of capitalist expansion and a burst of US investment in Latin America (Bergquist in

Marqusee2007: 99). Gandin (2006: 27) emphasizes that itshaped the USconception of

capitalistimperialism,asthegoalsofnationalsecurity,overseascapitalistdevelopmentand

democraticreformsjointlyenteredtheideologicalrealm.Hecriticallystatesthatasofthat


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moment, Washington has intervened in Latin America to conform to the standards of

internationalcapitalism(Ibid).

However,theovert imperialist moment came toa halt duringthe presidency of

Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR). Facing the severe economic crisis of the 1930s and heavyresistancetoimperialiststrategiesinMexicoandNicaragua,FDRfavouredaninwardlook

ratherthananexpansionistfocusandimplementedtheso-calledGoodNeighbourpolicy.

Based on the premise of non-intervention, this incentive withdrew US troops from the

region and resulted in an increased goodwill in Latin American countries (Ibid). This

subsequently opened the way for a decade of unparalleled hemispheric cooperation, in

whichmultipleeconomic,politicalandmilitarytreatiesweresignedbetweentheUSand

variousLatinAmerican countries (Ibid:34). Insteadof unilateraldomination,multilateral

institutions became thecontrollingforces of their ties. As it unleashed a variety of trade

agreements,theUSwasabletousetheGoodNeighbourpolicyasaprojecttorecoverfrom

the Great Depression (Ibid: 35). FDRs shift from hard power to soft power was thus a

successfulstrategy.

Nevertheless, at its heydaythesoftpower-approach beganto turn againstitself.

Inspiredby promises of democratic autonomy, Latin American countries started to form

andreformdemocraciesinthe1940s,withinitialsupportoftheUS.However,Gandin(Ibid:

41) argues that the Cold War triggered the USto favour anti-Communist regimes in the

regionratherthandemocraticregimes defacto andeventuallydemocratizationstarted to

endangerUS investmentsinLatinAmerica,asitinvokedmassstrikesthatcalledformore

equaldistributionsofwealth.BoththeeconomicthreattoUScorporateinvestmentsandthe

politicalthreatoftheColdWarlefttheUSwithnochoicebuttoabandontheirsoftpower-

approachinthelongrun.

Recently, the distressing effects of the need for pro-Washington and pro-capital

regimes in Latin America have widely been documented by various scholars and official

truthcommissions.SincetheCIA-backedcoupinGuatemalain1954,inwhichademocratic

governmentwasremovedinfavourofaviolentdictatorship,theUShasrepeatedlybeen

accusedofcovertlysupportingstateterrorisminLatinAmericathroughoutthe20thcentury

(Gareau2004:44).HundredsofthousandsofpeoplesufferedtheconsequencesoftheseUS

sponsoreddictatorships.InGuatemala,aUNtruthcommissionreported42,275victimsand

found that the US-backed government was responsible for 93% of these killings and


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desaparacidos (Ibid: 45). In El Salvador, a UN truth commission reported over 75,000

victimsandstatedthattheUS-backedSalvadorangovernmentwasresponsibleforatleast

95%oftheviolence(Ibid:41).Thestartlingimageofatrocitiesissimilarinothercountries:

brutal violence in Latin America haslargelybeen committedby US-backed governments,not by guerrillas, and the victims have significantly been more often civilians than

guerrillas.

What can be gatheredfrom these examplesis that US interestsin LatinAmerica

have barely changed over time. With a record of more than eighty covert and overt

interventions in Latin America ever since, the US has been promoting democracy where

possible, but counter-insurgency where needed in order to protect its investments

(Livingstone2003:171).Ithaspromotedfreedomandsecurity,notforthelargerpartof

theLatinAmericanpeople,butforthedominantclasses.SinceTheodoreRoosevelt,theUS

hasconceivedofLatinAmericaasitsownbackyard(Livingstone2009).

2.2.1.2.FromAdversariestoAllies

In the light ofthishistory, itis fruitfulto shed a lighton the political relations between

Colombia and the US before the war on drugs. These relations find their origins in the

quarrelontheconstructionofthePanamaCanalattheturnof the20thcentury.Thefailed

negotiationsbetweentheUSandColombialedtheUStosearchforotherwaystopushfor

theirdesiredcanalroute.BybackingthesecessionistleadersofthePanamanianelitewith

militarysupportintheirstruggleforindependence,theUSwasawardedwithacontractby

Panamanianofficialsontheconstructionofa canalthroughtheirterritoryassoonasthey

gained independence (Ibid: 20). This angered the Colombian government and the

problematictieswithColombiawerenotrestoreduntilthe1920s,whentheUSaimedto

benefitfromtherapideconomicdevelopmentofColombia.Asnoticedbefore,thiseconomic

development attracted foreign capital and, henceforth, US investors were an important

actorinrepairingtheharmedrelationshipwithColombia(Ibid).TheGoodNeighbourpolicy

subsequently eased the relation even more, which on its turn resulted in additional

investments.

TheriseofGaitnandthe1948BogotazotendedtoaltertheviewsoftheUS.Living

in the Cold War-era, these developments were easily perceived as disturbing signs of

susceptibility to communist ideas (Ibid: 23). However, the US found that the Colombian


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governmentwasavigorousallyinthefightagainstcommunismanditmadeColombiaa

showcaseforcapitalistdevelopmentandmodernizationinthe1960s(Crandall2002:24).

Meanwhile, to counteract the threat of communism the US simultaneously enhanced its

militaryrelationswithColombia.In1952,amilitaryagreementwassignedthatenabledtheUSto supportthe Colombian armyinits fight againstvariousinternalsecurityproblems

(Ibid: 24). Livingstone (2003: 179) shows that an average of 300 Colombian officers

receivedtheirmilitarytrainingintheUSannuallybetween1952and1980;morethanany

other Latin American country. Moreover, in the 1980s this number rose over the 700;

roughly twice as much as any other Latin American country (Ibid: 181). In a profound

assessmentof USmilitarymanualsthatwereusedbytheColombianarmythroughoutthe

1960s, Stokes (2005: 60-67) concludes that the US exclusively instructed counter-

insurgencywarfare.ItindicatesthattheColombianarmyhasincreasinglyreliedontraining

andaidfromtheUSinitsrepressionofpeasantsinruralareasand,hence,thatbotharmies

shareahistorythatgoesfarbeyondthewarondrugs.

2.2.2. MilitarizationoftheWaronDrugs

Takingintoaccounttheaforementionedhistory,itisevidentthatthewarondrugscannot

be understood in a vacuum. Rather, it has to be viewed in light of the continuity of US

interestsandmilitarysupportinColombia.Notwithstanding,PresidentNixondeclaredthe

war on drugs in 1971 allegedly in response to the domestic threat of a growing drug

endemicandnotasaninterventioninColombia(Bewley-TaylorandJelsma2007:284).In

thisrespect,theuseoftheword'war'ismetaphoricalandisappliedinordertolinkthe

issueofdrugstonationalsecurity.Unfortunately,duetothesecuritizationofthedrugissue

little timeand debate havebeen spent on thequestion whether thesolution to thedrug

endemicwastobefoundonthesupply-sideatall.

Whereasthe1980switnessedtheintertwiningofdrugtraffickingandthepolitical

conflictinColombia,theinitialtrainingofUStroopsinColombiawasaimedatcopingwith

narco-guerrillas and thus has equated drug traffickers with guerrillas from the outset

(Ibid).Bothwereperceivedasdangerousrepresentativesofthecommunistthreatanditis

argued that the war on drugs was welcomed by the Colombian government because it

providedsupportforitscounter-insurgency,inwhichnotonlyinsurgentsweretargeted,

butvirtuallyanyonethatthegovernmentlabelledsubversive(Avils2006:49).Quotingan


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anonymousUSofficer,Avilsnotesthatthereislittledifferencebetweencounter-narcotics

andcounter-insurgency;thechangeinvocabularyisonlyduetothefactthatthelatterword

is 'politically too sensitive' (Ibid: 47). According to official US discourse, the case of

Colombiaisa low intensityconflict,butithasbeenarguedthatthisis onlyanothertermfor counter-insurgency warfare outsourced to the local army and paramilitaries

(Livingstone2003:175).

Meanwhile,theColombiangovernmentwasinanambiguousposition.Traditionally

itsmainprioritywaskeepingitspeopleincheckwhilstdefendingtheinterestsofdominant

classes.Thedrug-bourgeoisiehadgraduallybecomesuchaclassduetothevastamountsof

capitalthatitgenerated.Intheearly1990sitlaunchedaviolentoffensiveagainstthestate

andthejudicialsysteminordertoensurethatnoonewoulddaretospeakoutagainsttheir

dominance (Ibid:83).Consequently,thegovernmentwas reluctantto complywiththe US

demandsofextradition.Ontheotherhand,becausetheUShadyetproventobea reliable

partner in its counter-insurgency objectives, the Colombian government was eager to

attract more US aid. This aid was provided by the Andean Initiative; a $2,2 billion

investmentintheAndeancountries,therebyincorporatingthesignificantpreconditionfor

Colombia that ithad to open its economy more to the penetration of US capital (Stokes

2005:85).Inthefollowingyears,USmilitaryaidwouldincreaseabouttenfold(Livingstone

2003:181).Sincethe1980stheUShasbeenmilitarizingthewarondrugs,whilstatthe

same time pushing for the liberalization of the Colombian economy. The most extensive

initiative by which it has done so is Plan Colombia. The contents of this versatile aid-

packagearediscussedinthenextalinea.

2.2.2.1.PlanColombia

InitiallypromotedbyColombianPresidentPastranain1999asacomprehensivesocialand

economic plan to restore security and peace through a $7,5 billion aid package, Plan

ColombiawastakenonbytheUSasameanstoextenditsinfluenceinthecountry.Initially,

theplandidnotspeakaboutmilitaryaidatall,butduetoColombiasneedforUSfinancial

backing,policymakersoftheClinton-administrationwereabletotransformPastranasidea

into a large-scale militarized plan that involved the US army and private contractors

(Livingstone 2003: 147). In first instance, Colombia planned to contribute $4 billion and

expected the international community to finance the remaining part. As a result of the


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transformation, however, the funding became problematic as most European countries

refused to contribute because they rejected the military emphasis of the aid package

(Stokes2005:93).Eventually,asdatafromtheCenterforInternationalPolicy(CIP)shows,

whentheUScontributed$1,3billionoverthefiscalyears2000and2001with75%ofthisbudget reserved for military aid, Pastranas original idea of social and economic

development remained nowhere to be found (CIP 2005). The Plan Colombia that was

implementedwasthusessentiallyaplanforwarratherthanaplanforpeace.

The military aid package of the plan has been substantial. In an extensive

assessmentbytheUSGovernmentalAccountabilityOffice(GAO)itisstatedthat,sincethe

comingintoforceofPlanColombia,theUShasprovided$4,9billioninmilitaryaidtothe

Colombian military and police, compared to only $1 billion in social and economic

developmentinthesameperiod(GAO2008:15, 28).Inmaterialterms,thelargestpartof

thismilitaryaidwasinvestedinhelicopters:theUSprovidedColombiawith72helicopters,

withanetworthofover$1,3billion(Ibid:28).Additionally,over$103millionhasbeen

spentonthetrainingandequippingofColombiangroundforcesandtheestablishmentofa

new counter-narcotics brigade (Ibid: 33). Under the label of infrastructure security, an

additional$115millionhasbeenspentonthetrainingof amilitarydivisionthathasbeen

chargedwithsecuringtheimportantCaoLimn-ConveasoilpipelineinEasternColombia

(Ibid: 35). In addition to these military investments, Plan Colombia promoted biological

warfare through aerial fumigation as a means to destroy drug crops (Livingstone 2009:

119).Thispracticehadyetbeencarriedoutsincethe1990s,buthasincreaseddramatically

inscopeafter2000(Jelsma2000,Livingstone2003:160).

2.2.2.2.RiseoftheTerror-CrimeNexus

Shortlyaftertheimplementationof Plan Colombia, theterroristattacksof 9/11fractured

theUSsenseofinvincibility.Often,9/11isinIRconceptualizedasacrucialturningpointin

international politics. However, as regards the war on drugs it is difficult to expose a

fundamental shift in US policy towards Colombia as US military presence in the region

continuedunhindered.Though,whathaschangedsignificantlyistheofficialdiscoursethat

legitimizedtheseactions.Whereasthewarondrugswasformerlyformallyseparatedfrom

the domestic political struggle and the counter-insurgency of the government, the Bush-

administrationcouldnowopenlyadmitthatitwasalsofightingawaragainstinsurgents


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(Stokes2005:105).ThisisexactlywhatSenatorJohnMcCain(2002)didwhenhenoted

that American policy has dispensed with the illusion that the Colombian government is

fightingtwoseparatewarsandAmericanpolicynowrecognizesthatreality,andabandons

anyfictional distinctionsbetweencounter-narcotics andcounter-insurgency. Inaddition,UScoordinatorforcounterterrorismFrancisTaylor(2001)portrayedtheFARCasthemost

dangerousinternational terrorist group basedin thishemisphere.After9/11,ithas been

openlyadmittedthatthewarondrugswasnolongersolelyaboutdrugs.Legallyspeaking,

the result of the terrorization of the war on drugs made it easier for US troops to get

involved in the counter-insurgency. They could now carry out special operations

themselves,insteadofhavingtorelyonlocalsoldiers(Livingstone2009:159).

Theriseoftheterror-crimenexusintheofficialdiscoursedoesnotrefertoanactual

change in the organizational structure of the guerrillas, but is chiefly a new pretext to

legitimize the continuing counter-insurgency of the US and the Colombian government

againstallegedsubversiveforces.InordertounderstandwhytheBush-administrationdid

notsticktothetraditionalpretextofcounter-narcoticsafter9/11,oneneedstotakeinto

account the lack of effects of the war on drugs. However, prior to this discussion it is

necessary to show why the war on drugs is simultaneously a continuation of economic

policiestowardsColombia.

2.2.3. TheWaronDrugsasNeoliberalization

Theaforementioneddiscussionon thehistoryof USinterestsin LatinAmericashowsthat

theUShasyetlongbeenpromotingliberaleconomicprinciplesinColombiatoensurethat

itscompaniescouldflourish.Sincethe militaryagreementof1952,the USgotinvolved in

thedomesticconflictandithasbeenarguedthatthisinvolvementhasonlybeenaimedat

destroyingaperceivedthreattotheexistingstructureofsocio-economicprivilege'andat

the 'integration of Colombia into the global system on the terms that the US demands'

(Chomsky 2000: 68, 73). The terms that Noam Chomsky mentions are the terms of

neoliberalism.


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2.2.3.1.TheEconomicsofPlanColombia

ThetermsofneoliberalismarewellintegratedinPlanColombia.Itis typicalthatthefirst

chapteroftheplanconcernstherestructuringoftheeconomy,whereassubjectsasdrug

demandreduction,the peace process,democratizationandsocialdevelopmentonlycomeupfordiscussioninlaterchapters(PlanColombia1999).Indeed,aconsiderableefforthas

beentakentoensurethattheplanpushesforneoliberalreforms.Itadvocatesa'fiscaland

financial strategy that includes though austerity and adjustment measures', partly to

'recover the historically excellent prestige of Colombia in the international financial

markets'(Ibid). Thehistorically excellent prestigedoes howevernot refer toits domestic

market,whichishistoricallycharacterizedbyextremeunequaldivisionsofwealth(Stokes

2005: 4). The general lack of attention for socio-economic development that should

distributewealthmoreequallyisreflectedinthebudgetoftheplan.Asarguedbefore,with

75% of the budget reserved for military purposes, the possibilities for socio-economic

developmentareratherlimited.

The US nonetheless contends that alternative development programmes are a

centralelementofPlanColombia.A GAO-report(2004:9)showsthatuntil2004only$84

millionhadbeenspentontheseefforts.Comparedtothe$2.7billionthathadbeenspenton

militaryissuesduringthesamelengthoftime,thisamountissignificantlylow.TheGAO-

reportadditionally shows that theoriginalalternative developmentprogrammeof theUS

Agency for International Development (USAID) had an estimated cost of $4 billion. This

amount equals the total reservation for the military programme and would have had

profound effects on socio-economic development (Ibid: 11). However, the policy makers

drastically adjustedthe amount, which is a clear indicator of themarginal importance of

socio-economicdevelopmentinthefinalPlanColombia.

In the first chapter of the plan, the need to stabilize the economy is emphasized.

According to the plan, a stable economy can be achieved through privatizationof public

companies and 'rationalization' of public finance (Plan Colombia 1999). Together with

though austerity, these measures fall remarkably well in line with general neoliberal

strategies.TakingintoaccountthetransformationoftheplanbyUSpolicymakersandthe

subsequentcompelledacceptanceofitbytheColombiangovernment,itcanthereforebe

argued that the plan resembles another neoliberal tidal wave of institutional reform and

discursiveadjustment.


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2.2.3.2.US-ColombiaFreeTradeAgreement

The mostrecent attempt to liberalize the Colombian economy is the proposal of the US-

Colombia Trade Promotion Act, better known as the Colombia Free Trade Agreement

(CFTA),a bilateraltreatythatshouldeliminatevirtuallyalltradebarriersbetweentheUSandColombia(Villareal2008).ItissaidthattheCFTAwillbebeneficialtobothcountriesas

itislikelytoincreasemutualtrade(Ibid:2).Moreover,proponentsoftheCFTAarguethatit

willtriggereconomicdevelopmentasithasstabilizingeffectsontheeconomyduetoarise

in foreign direct investment (FDI) and improved investor confidence (Ibid: 3). Not

surprisingly, the CFTA proposal has raised many criticisms. The bottom line of these

criticismsisthatapossibleimplementationwouldimplicitlylegitimizeagovernmentthatis

failing on its basic principles of democracy and human rights (Cardona et. al. 2008: 4).

Additionally,itisclaimedthattheCFTAisinextricablylinkedtotheongoingconflictand

will only secure the economicinterests of TNCs,not thoseof the majorityof the people

(Ibid:13).GaryLeech(2006)elaboratesonthisbynotingthattheCFTA'dramaticallyopens

theColombianmarkettoUSproducers',but'onlyallowsaslightincreaseinaccesstotheUS

marketsforColombians'.

Most importantly, the measures that areused in estimationsthatemphasize the

positiveeffectsof theCFTA lookat shifts in overalleconomicdevelopment:a rise of the

grossdomesticproduct(GDP),animprovedtradebalanceandincreasedFDI.However,all

thesemacro-economicmeasures saylittleaboutthe distributionof additionalwealththat

might be generated through the CFTA. Taking into account Colombias highly unequal

income distribution that lies at the roots of the conflict, the CFTA will not be able to

influence the distribution of this wealth. Instead, it is likely to invoke ever increasing

inequalities in the income distribution (Ibid). In line with the neoliberal policies of Plan

Colombia,theCFTAcanthereforebestbeperceivedasanothervehicleforneoliberalization.

2.3. OntheNatureofDrugValueChains

2.3.1. IllicitTradeintheGlobalEconomy

Theallegedtargetsofthewarondrugsarenotthatdifferentfromitsbeneficiaries.Whereas

TNCsaimtoaccumulatewealthinthelegaleconomy,thedrug-bourgeoisieaimstodo the

sameintheilliciteconomy.Asaresultofeconomicglobalization,thesetwoeconomieshave


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becomepervasivelyintegrated.Globalizationmadeiteasierforcapitaltoflowandfixitself

inthemostprofitableenvironment,butitsimultaneouslycreatednewpossibilitiesforillicit

activitiestoexpandandincreaseprofits.MosesNam(2006:19)arguesthatillicittradein

fact benefited more from globalization, 'for there remained plenty of rules for legitimatetradetoobeywhilemarkets()keptgrowing'.Nam'sbasiccontentionholdsthatmarkets

have integrated muchfaster than political systems and that illicittradershave benefited

fromthisrealitybecause'governmentssimplyhavelesslatitudetoact,enforce,andspend'

thanillegalnetworks(Ibid:20).Thecontinuingsuccessofdrugtraffickingnetworksisthus

partlyfacilitatedbythepushtowardsaneoliberaleconomy.

Nam(Ibid:8)goesevenfurtherbystatingthatillicitnetworksarenotonly'tightly

intertwined with licit private sector activities, but [that] they are also deeply embedded

within the public sector and the political system'. In Colombia, the integration of drug

traffickingnetworksintotheinstitutionalenvironmentoccurredbecausethestatehadlost

itslegitimacyduetoitsinabilitytostopthedownwardspiralofviolence.Inthe1980s,drug

moneystartedto entersocietyon an enormousscale and flooded the country with new

investments,contractsandbusinessopportunities(Livingstone2003:82).Soon,thewhole

economygotinfectedwithdrugmoneyandattheheydayofthebigcartelsofMedellnand

Cali, drug traffickers were often even seen as benefactors in their cities because of the

charitableinvestmentstheymadewiththeirdrugmoney(Castells2000:204).

Mauricio Reina (2001: 92), however, argues that the overall effects of drug

trafficking have had negative effects on the licit economy. Although it has facilitated an

influx of foreign money, the additional wealth has significantly concentrated itself in the

handsofthedrug-bourgeoisie.Furthermore,ithasdistortedlegaldomesticmarketsdueto

the abundance of illegal resources that make licit business less profitable (Ibid: 87).

Moreover,Reinanotesthattheincreasedofferingofforeignexchangehasputpressureon

theexchangeratesandhascausedanovervaluedColombianpeso,whichhasresultedina

riseofimportsandadeclineofexports(Ibid:82).Theseresultspointoutthattheeffectsof

drugtraffickingareharmfulto thenationaleconomy,thoughnotdefactoincontrastwith

neoliberalpolicies.


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2.3.2. TheEconomicsofDrugTrafficking

Today, drug trafficking has become a highly diffuse activity. Whereas it was initially

controlledbylargecartelsinthe1980s,fromthe1990sonwardstheseverticallyorganized

cartelstransformedintodecentralizednetworksasaconsequenceoftheintensificationofthe war on drugs. Again, this successful transformation can partly be ascribed to the

introductionofneoliberalpoliciesinColombiabecausethesepoliciesbenefitedillicittrade

significantlymorethanlicittrade.Inthislight,itisdisputablewhetherliberalpolicieshave

thedesiredeffectsinthewarondrugs.Theunderlyinglogicissimple:thelessercontrolon

theeconomy,thebiggertheopportunitiesarefordrugtraffickers.Anapproachtostopdrug

traffickingbasedonimprovingtradehollowsouttheColombianeconomyevenfurtherand

willlikelyhavecounter-productiveeffects.

Besidesthedubious effects of neoliberal policiesin thewaron drugs, itcan be

advancedthatmilitarypoliciesarelikewisefutile.Inordertounderstandthefutilityofthe

militarizedapproach,itisnecessarytofocusonthenatureofnarco-terrorists.Byfightinga

warondrugsattherootsofthesupply-side,theprimarytargetsarethegrowersofcoca.As

hasbeenexplainedbefore,cocawasinitiallygrowninruralareasbypoorpeasantsthathad

beenforcefullydisplacedinthedomesticconflict.Becausecocaisaneasycroptogrowand

canbeyieldeduptofourtimesayear,itwastheonlypossibilityformanypeasantstomake

alivelihood.Drivenbythisreality,cocaleroshavegoodreasonstocultivatetheircrops.It

makes aerial fumigation somewhat a doubtful strategy, because it drives cocaleros into

further despair and leaves them with no choice but to restart their coca-cultivation

somewhere else. In this sense, aerial fumigation only invokes the narco-industry to find

morecreativemethodsto continuethe cultivationofcoca.Consequently,Nam(2006:70)

arguesthattraffickershaveyetdevelopeda cocaplantthatisresistanttofumigation.Itis

estimatedthatonly0.1%to0.3%ofthestreetpriceofcocaineintheUSisgeneratedinthis

firststageofthedrugvaluechain(Livingstone2003:128).Aerialfumigationisthusmainly

anattackonpoorpeasants.Inhigherstagesofthechain,Nam(2006:65-67)continuesto

demystify the image of narco-terrorists as he shows that most traffickers are not that

differentfromthecocaleros.Often,traffickersarealsomerelytryingtomakealivinginan

economyshatteredby decadesof violentconflictandrisinginequalities.Moreover,as the

legaleconomyis massivelyinfusedwithdrugmoney,aggressivelyfightinga warondrugs


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willnotonlyaffecttheilliciteconomy,butalsotheliciteconomyandallthepeopleworking

init.

Moreover,bymilitarizingthewarondrugs extrapressureshavebeenputon the

valuechain.Itisamatterofsimpleeconomicstoarguethatextrapressuresincreasethevalueofaproduct.Themoreeffortshavetobetakentoensureasafepassageofdrugstoits

markets,thehigherthepriceandthemoreprofitablethetradegets.InNamslogic,the

'addedvalueisgreatestwheretheriskishighest'(Ibid:82).Duetoitsaddictiveness,the

demandtodrugsisinelasticandwillnotbehighlyaffectedbyextrapressures.Whatever

strategies mightbe pursued todeal with the supply ofdrugs, aslong asthereremainsa

steadydemand,drugtraffickerswillfindawaytobringtheirhighlyprofitableproductson

themarket.

These logics show thatthewar on drugs isineffective. Thishasyetbeen widely

acknowledged before the making of Plan Colombia by US officials in the 1990s. A GAO-

report stated that 'military surveillance has not demonstrated that it can make a

contribution()thatiscommensuratewithitscost'(GAO1993).Thus,inthe1990sitwas

alreadyofficiallyacknowledgedthattherewasnovaliddrivetocontinuethewarondrugs

inColombia.SincetheBush-administrationhasaccordinglyacknowledgedthatitisfighting

a war against insurgents rather than against drug traffickers, it becomes untenable to

legitimizeUSpresenceinColombiasolelyatthehandofthewarondrugs.Hence,thereare

additionalcovertmotivationsfortheUStofightinColombia.

2.4. EffectsoftheWaronDrugs

2.4.1. EffectsontheDrugValueChain

Theprevioussectionhasshownhowthepoliciesofthewarondrugsarebasedon'lousy

economics'(Nam2006:82).ThemostrecentUNWorldDrugReport(WDR)confirmsthis

notion. The UN (2009: 66) states that aerial fumigation has destroyed about 130,000

hectaresofcocacropsannuallysincetheimplementationofPlanColombia,andthatmanual

eradication rose enormously from 1,745 hectares in 2000 to 95,634 hectares in 2008.

However, the WDR shows that global cocaine production has not changed significantly

duringtheseyears(Ibid:65).Onthecontrary,itshowsthatitequalled879metrictonsin

2000,andincreasedto1,000metrictonsinthefollowingyears(Ibid:76).Thisisastrong


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indicatorfortheideathatfumigationanderadicationdonotdiscouragecocalerostorestart

theircropcultivationafterfumigationandfortheideathattraffickersfindmorecreative

waystogetroundtheintensified'hunting'.Ithastobesaidthoughthatthishunting,i.e.

interception, has had some positive effects. It is estimated that the interception rate ofcocainerosefromabout25%toabout40%inthelastdecade(Ibid:76).However,when

lookingatthetotalamountofcocaineavailableforconsumptiononthemarket,itisnot

possibletoidentifyasignificantdecreaseduetothisimprovedinterception.Moreover,the

interceptionrateofcocainehasonlyincreasedinEurope,whileitremainsstableintheUS

and Colombia (Ibid: 79). Interestingly, the report states that transport hubs in Central

America andAfricaare increasing in importance. Althoughthe records of drugflows are

based on these interceptionrates which makeit difficult to assess thefull scopeof such

flows,itindicatesthattraffickingnetworksarechanging,butthatthischangeisarguably

onlyarestructuringofthenetwork.

Lookingattheothersideofthevaluechain,itisnotsurprisingtoseethattheprice

ofcocainehasincreasedontheUSmarketovertheyears.Adjustedtothepurityofcocaine,

the street pricehasmore thandoubled; from$89pergramin2006to$200pergramin

2008,basedonadecreaseinpurityof33%(Ibid:72).Regardingitsofficialobjectives,the

warondrugsisthusunsuccessful.Ithasnotalteredproduction,ithashadnosignificant

effects ontrafficking and the rise indilution and prices implya rise in profitabilityand,

hence,provideanincentivefordrugtrafficking.

2.4.2. HumanitarianImpactandPoliticalImplications

Whereasthewarondrugsisfailingtomeetitsexplicitobjectives,itisfailingevenmoreon

therecordofhumanrights.Mostimportantly,accordingtoHumanRightsWatch(HRW),

thereis abundant andpersuasiveevidenceofclosetiesbetween theColombianarmyand

the paramilitary forces (HRW 2001). These ties comprise shared communication, shared

intelligenceandextensivecoordinationbetweenthearmyandparamilitaryforcesinjoint

operations. By supporting the Colombian army in its counter-insuirgency, the US is thus

imperatively linked to the paramilitaries. In response to the atrocities committed by

paramilitaries, US Congress has therefore introduced the Leahy-law, a provision that

restricts any assistance to parts of the Colombian army that have proven ties with

paramilitary forces (Stokes 2005: 97). However, Stokes argues that this provision is too


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weak inblocking illegitimate assistance,because it is unable to trackthe ways inwhich

assistanceisdistributedandpassedonwithintheColombianarmy(Ibid:97-98).Moreover,

asregardsPlanColombia,PresidentClintonsignedawaivertopassitwithoutanyhuman

right provisions, becausehe argued that drugtrafficking wasa threatto national securityandrequiredquickaction(Ibid:99).Inotherwords,forthesakeofnationalsecuritytheUS

openlyrefusedtocomplywiththestandardsofhumanrights.

ThelinkageoftheUStotheparamilitariesisremarkable,inparticularbecausethese

paramilitaries traditionally aimed tosecuretheinterestsof thenarco-bourgeoisie.Infact,

theparamilitariesnowrelyheavilyondrugtraffickingthemselvesinordertofinancetheir

activities.According toformer leaderof theparamilitariesCarlosCastao (inLivingstone

2003:133),drug traffickingfinances70%of their activities.At thesametime,thewaron

drugsfocusesonnarco-terroristsandleft-winginsurgentsoftheFARC,whilethereisno

evidencethattheyareinvolvedindrugtraffickingatall.Althoughtheyareknowntousea

taxation system for coca growers, James Milford (1997), agent of the Drug Enforcement

Administration(DEA),arguesthat'thereislittletoindicate[that]theinsurgentgroupsare

trafficking in cocaine themselves'. Because these notions were already widely accepted

beforePlanColombia,itisstrikingtoseethatthewarondrugsisnowfoughtbytheUS-

backedColombianarmyagainstleft-wingguerrillaswiththehelpofparamilitaries,whilstit

isevidentthattheseparamilitariesarethelargestdrugtraffickers.

Asregardsthehumanitarianconsequencesofthewar,itisestimatedthatmorethan

70,000peoplehavebeenkilledintheconflictoverthepast20years,ofwhichthemajority

was civilian (Amnesty International 2008). It is argued that 'the greatest number of

casualtiesofthecivilwarhasbeeninflictedbythearmyandtheright-wingparamilitary

groups,notbytheleftistguerrillagroups'(Gareau2006:21).About85%ofthedeathsin

theColombianwarcanbeascribedtotheparamilitaries,10%tothearmyand5%tothe

guerrillas (Ibid). These data are disturbing, but awkwardly in accordance with the

numericalbreakdownofUSsponsoredstateterrorisminotherLatinAmericancountries

throughoutthecentury.HRW(2009:174)reportsthatColombiahasthehighestmurder

rate of trade unionists inthe world; more than 2,600 since1986.The majority of these

killingscanbe ascribedtotheparamilitaries(Ibid).Theheavyviolenceisalsoreflectedin

thereportofthenon-governmentalColombiantruthcommissionMemoriaHistrica(2008:

13). According to their data, there have been as much as 2,505 massacres with 14,660


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victims in the period 1982-2007. Furthermore, Amnesty International (2008) estimates

that 30,000 people have forcefully been disappeared and that 20,000 people have been

kidnapped (Ibid).Additionally, theUN HighCommissioner forRefugees (UNHCR)reports

that Colombiahasnow thelargest population ofinternallydisplacedpeoplein theworld,thereby exceeding war-torn Iraq, Afghanistan and Sudan (UN 2008: 29). More than

3,000,000people haveabandoned their homesand over350,000 people live as refugees

acrossthe borders.Moreover,thereportnotesthatthere isan alarmingriseinthreats to

civilsocietyingeneralandinpublicaccusationsbygovernmentofficialsofhumanrights

defendersforcollaboratingwithguerrillas(Ibid:175).Adistinctpatternarisesoutofthese

data,pointingoutthatlarge-scaleviolenceandoppressionbyright-wingparamilitariesand

thearmyhasfocusedonanypossiblethreattotheinterestsofthedominantclass,whether

thisallegedthreatcomesfromguerrillas,humanrightsdefenders,unionists,orcourageous

civilians.

As regards the economic consequences, the inequality that has characterized

Colombia is ever increasing. The UN Development Programme (UNDP) notes that the

richest10%ofColombiaisresponsiblefor46.9%of theincome,whilethepoorest10%is

only responsible for 0.7%(UNDP 2007:281). Witha Gini-coefficientof 0.59Colombia is

among the top ten countries with the most unequal income distribution (Ibid). This

supportstheargumentthatthe liberalizationof theColombianeconomybenefitsonlythe

dominantclassesandthatmacro-economicmeasuresofdevelopmentareinherentlybiased

at thecost of thelower income groups. Additionally, an analysisby theColombian labor

organizationSINTRAMINERCOLnotesthatcurrently1,8%ofthepopulationstillowns53%

of the land (Ramirez Cuellar 2005: 83). Moreover, the analysis reports that 65% of the

Colombianpeoplearelivingbelowthepovertyline(Ibid:82).

ArecenttrendintheconflictistheincreasinginvolvementofTNCsintheviolence.

Currently,therearevariouslawsuitsagainstlargeTNCsthatareaccusedofhavingcloseties

with paramilitary forces and have ordered the killing of their own employees. Ramirez

Cuellar (Ibid: 73-80) shows that the mining company Drummond Coal and oil company

Occidental Petroleum (OXY) signed 'security contracts' with paramilitaries to ensure that

any opposition in the workforce was silenced. These cases are no particular exceptions.

AnotherstrikingexampleisCocaCola,alsoaccusedoforderingthemurderingofseveral

unionists by paramilitaries, which resulted in a growing ban on its products on US


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universities (Business Week 2006). Carlos Castao never denied close relationships

betweentheparamilitariesandTNCs.Heevenproudlywonderedwhycompaniesshould

notsupporthimwhentheyseetheirinvestmentslimitedbytheterrorismandbarbarityof

theguerrillas(Reuters2000). InthischapterithasbecomeclearthatthewarondrugsinColombiahaslargely

beenacontinuationofolderUSforeignpolicyobjectives.Toalargeextent,ithasbeenused

asapretexttoopenupColombiaseconomyforcapitalofitsdominantclassesbymeansof

neoliberalpolicies,and,additionally,ithasbeenusedtofightacounter-insurgencyagainst

alleged threats to this capital. In doing so, the US has been an accessory in sponsoring

terrorism and violence aimed at social forces that challenge the status-quo. By violently

repressing these voices, democratic principles have been undermined in favour of the

preservingofasocio-economicorderthatisconducivetoUSinterests.Thenatureofthese

interestsiselaboratedinthenextchapter.


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3. THEPOWEROFDOMINANTCLASSESINTHEWARONDRUGS

WhereasthepreviouschaptershowedthatthewarondrugsinColombiaistobeperceived

as an aggressive effort to stabilize Colombias political and economic realm in order tocreateabeneficialenvironmentforcapitalaccumulationbydominantclassesatthecostof

the Colombian people, this chapter explains how TNCs have wielded their power in the

domesticprocess of formulating US foreign policy onthe war ondrugs. In a democratic

society with formal separation of powers, transparent politics and an institutional

distinctionbetweenthemarket-economyandpoliticalinstitutions,itisoftenbelievedthat

thedominanceofadominantclassisconfinedbydemocraticmechanisms.However,this

chapter argues instead that democratic mechanisms have allowed them to reflect their

materialpowerinthepoliticalrealm.ItfirstshowshowtheprocessofUSforeignpolicy-

makingisinitsrootssusceptibletocorporateinfluence.SeconditshowshowTNCsactually

influenced policy-making in the war on drugs and, third, it focuses on the motivations

behindthisinfluence,i.e.theinterestsoftheseTNCsinColombia.

3.1. TheFormulationofUSForeignPolicy

3.1.1. LegalContextLegally,thepowertomakeforeignpolicycannotbeclaimedsolelybya singleactorinthe

politicalprocess.TheUSConstitutionisnotclearwherethelocusofpowershouldbeas

regardsforeignpolicy.AlthoughArticleIallocatesvariousresponsibilitiestothelegislative

branch,i.e.Congress,ArticleIIallocatesrelatedresponsibilitiestotheexecutivebranch,i.e.

thePresidentandhisAdministration.Whereas,forexample,Congresshasthesolerightto

declare war, the President is ordained as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and

takes up a central role in war-planning (Olson 2001: 548). Consequently, both the

legislativeandtheexecutivebranchclaimtheirpowerinforeignpolicy-makingonthebasis

ofdifferentprovisionsintheConstitution.Hence,theConstitutiondividespowersinforeign

policy-making,butnotina definitivemanner(Grimmett1999).Overtime,thishasledto

changingrolesforCongressandtheAdministrationintheprocess.

Foreignpolicyisself-evidentlysomewhatundemocratic.Thatis,becauseitaimsto

secure the alleged national interest internationally in an anarchical system, a level of


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secrecy and exclusion is often needed to ensure effective policies (Foley 2008: 112).

Historically, the locus of power in foreign policy has therefore concentrated itself at the

executiveendof thepoliticalprocess.However,inresponseto actualeventsCongresshas

claimed more powerin the domain offoreignpolicyovertime. Most tellingmight beitseffortsinresponsetothepoliticalexcessesoftheVietnamWarandtheWatergate-scandal

in the 1970s, through which the executive power lost part of its prerogative (Peterson

1994:8).Ratherthancontinuingtobeamodelofcompliance,Congressbegantocritically

challengetheexecutivepowersandgraduallytransformedintoamodelofassertionwith

increasedcontrolandbudgetarypressuresuponfederalexpenditures(Foley2008:117).As

aresult,themostbasicfunctionofCongresstodayisliterallytopaythebillsforUSforeign

involvement(Olson2001:550).AnotherreasonfortheincreasedinfluenceofCongressis

to be found in its decentralization. As technical expertise of Congress has increasingly

becomefragmentedoverspecificcommitteesandsubcommittees,possibilitiesforextensive

monitoring, judging, and recommending have improved (Ibid: 553). As a result of the

increased powers of Congress, William Olson argues that foreign affairs has long since

ceasedtobetheexclusivepreserveofaneliteprotectedfromthedemocraticprocess(Ibid:

563). Richard Grimmet (1999) arrives at a similar conclusion when he states that the

executive branch still has the principal responsibility for taking action to advance US

foreign policy interests, but that Congress () can affect the course of policy through

enactmentoflegislation()andthroughtheappropriationordenialoffunds.

ApartfromCongressandtheexecutivebranch,theformulationofforeignpolicyis

subjecttotheinfluenceofathirdbranch.Dueto thedemocraticrighttopetition,civilians

areallowedtointerferewiththepolicy-makingprocessbyexertinginfluenceoverpolicy

makers.Thisprovisionhasledtotheriseofindependentorganizationsandindividualsthat

representtheinterestsofspecificgroupsinsociety.Themakingofforeignpolicyisthus

legallysusceptibletonon-governmentalinfluenceaswell.

3.1.2. InfluencingWashingtonSinceforeignpolicyisincreasinglysubjecttodemocraticaccountabilityinCongress,many

efforts have been taken by a wide array of actors to ensure that Congresss interests

converge with their specific interests. Lobbying firms are a necessary mediator of these

interests and as the powers of Congress increased, so did the lobbying industry in


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Washington.TheCenterforResponsivePolitics(CRP),anon-partisanwatchdogofmoneys

influenceinpolitics,reportsthatin2008morethan$3,2billionwasspentonlobbying(CRP

2009a).Thisboilsdownto$17.4millionforeverydayCongresswasinsessionandmakesit

one of the most lucrative businesses in Washington (Ibid). The gold-rush on K-Street,indicatesthatinfluencecanbeboughtand,hence,thatthosewithresourcesarebetterable

to promote their interests than those without (Birnbaum 2005). In this light, material

preconditions constitute an important factor in influencing politics. It gives dominant

classesasubstantialadvantagevis--visothergroupsinsociety.

Although the practice of lobbying is f

Documents

Clearing Colombia's Fog of War