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THEEUENGAGEWORKINGPAPERSERIESHoogheL.AndMarksG.CleavageTheoryMeetsEurope’sCrises:Lipset,Rokkan,andtheTransnationalCleavage(2017)
CLEAVAGETHEORYMEETSEUROPE’SCRISES:LIPSET,ROKKAN,ANDTHETRANSNATIONALCLEAVAGE
LiesbetHoogheUniversityofNorthCarolinaatChapelHillGaryMarksUniversityofNorthCarolinaatChapelHill ABSTRACT:ThispapertheorizeshowtheEurocrisisandthemigrationcrisishavereinforcedatransnationalcleavagethathasatitscoreaculturalconflictpittinglibertarian,universalisticvaluesagainstthedefenseofnationalismandparticu-larism. Radical right and green parties take polar positions on Europe and immigration, placemore salience onthem,andexhibitgreater internalunitythanmainstreamparties.Theperforationofnationalstatesby immigra-tion, integration, and trademay signify a critical juncture in thepolitical developmentof Europeno less conse-quential forpartiesandpartysystemsthantheprevious junctures thatLipsetandRokkan (1967)detect in theirclassicarticle. KEYWORDS:cleavage,politicalparties,Eurocrisis,Europeanintegration,elections.
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1.Introduction
HavetheEurocrisisandthemigrationcrisiscongealedadistinctivestructureofconflictinEurope?1In
thispaperweusethebuildingblocksofacleavagetheoryofpartycompetitiontoarguethatEuropehas
been transformedbyanewdivide.Cleavage theory claims that the issues thatdividevotersare con-
nected in durable dimensions, that political partiesmake programmatic commitments on these issue
dimensionswhichareself-reinforcing,andthatasaresultofissuecoherenceandprogrammaticsticki-
ness,changeinpartysystemsisapunctuatedprocessthatarisesfromshocksexternaltothepartysys-
tem.
Summarizinganextensiveliteratureoverthepastdecade,wedescribetheemergenceofatransna-
tionalcleavagewhichhasasitscoreapoliticalreactionagainstEuropeanintegrationandimmigration.
Theperforationofnationalstatesbyimmigration,integration,andtrademaysignifyacriticaljuncturein
the political development of Europe no less decisive for parties and party systems than the previous
juncturesthatLipsetandRokkan(1967)detectintheirclassicarticle.Forchallengingpartiesontheradi-
calrighttheseissuesrelatetothedefenseofnationalcommunityagainsttransnationalshocks.TheEu-
ropeanUnionisitselfsuchashockbecauseitintroducesrulebythosewhoareregardedasforeigners,
diminishes the authority exercisedby national states over their ownpopulations, produces economic
insecurityamongthosewholackmobileassets,andfacilitatesimmigration.Immigrationisperceivedas
athreatbythosewhoresentculturalintermixingandtheerosionofnationalvalues,bythosewhomust
1WewouldliketothankDavidAttewellforresearchassistance.Earlierdraftswerepresentedataworkshop,TheoryMeetsCri-sis,organizedbytheauthorsattheSchumanCentre,EuropeanUniversityInstitute,June30-July12016,attheAmericanPoliti-calScienceAssociation,Philadelphia,1-3September2016,ataconference,“SteinRokkan’sHeritagetoContemporaryPoliticalScience:UnderstandingRepresentational andPolicy-MakingChallenges inMulti-Jurisdictional Polities,”University of Bergen,September20-212016,the26thPhDSummerSchooloftheECPRStandingGrouponPoliticalPartiesattheUniversityofNot-tingham, September 23 2016, and the ComparativeWorkingGroup atUniversity ofNorth Carolina-Chapel Hill, October 18,2016.Wethankparticipantsattheseevents,andespeciallyJanRovnyandFrankSchimmelfennig,forcommentsandsugges-tions.Thisresearchwasco-fundedbytheEUENGAGEHORIZONgrant#649281andbytheCenterforEuropeanStudiesattheUniversityofNorthCarolina,ChapelHill.WealsothanktheRobertSchumanCentre,EuropeanUniversityInstitute,forhostingasFellowsinJune-July2016andforfinancingandhostingtheconference“TheoryMeetsCrisis”inJune2016,whereafirstdraftofthispaperwaspresented.
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competewithimmigrantsforhousingandjobs,and,moregenerally,bythosewhoseekculturaloreco-
nomicshelterintherightsofcitizenship.
Wetermthiscleavageatransnationalcleavagebecauseithasasitsfocalpointthedefenseofnation-
alpolitical,social,andeconomicwaysoflifeagainstexternalactorswhopenetratethestatebymigrat-
ing,exchanginggoods,orexerting rule.Thisconceptionhasmuch incommonwithpriorconceptions,
but because we wish to outline its character, sources, and consequences in ways with which other
scholarsmightdisagree,weadoptadistinctivelabel.
Theemergenceofanewcleavagerevealsthecausalpowerofsocialforcesinthefaceofestablished
institutions.Perhapsthesinglemoststunningconsequenceofthecrisesisthebreakthroughofaradical
rightparty inacountry,Germany,thatwasperceivedtobepractically immune.Forthisreasonalone,
thecrisescanbeconsideredtohaveusheredinanewera.However,virtuallyeverycountrycontainsits
ownsurprises,andwerewetofollowthemwewouldbelostinfascinatingdetail.
Ourfocusinthisarticleisonthegeneralcharacterofconflictsthathavearisen,theirrelationtothe
existingstructureofpartycompetition,andhowtheyhavealreadyreshapedpartysystems.Thecrises
arecriticaljuncturesthatreveal,intheopenairsotospeak,thelatentpressuresthathavebuiltupover
thepasttwodecades.Theysuggestthatpartysystemsaresubjecttodiscontinuitiesratherthantoin-
crementalchange,andthattheresponseofapartysystemtoexogenouschangecomesfromvotersra-
therthanparties.
Inthenextsectionweexplainwhywethinkcleavagetheorycanhelpusunderstandwhathashap-
pened.Wehavenohesitation indroppingthepresumptionthatpoliticalpartiesareexpressionsofal-
readyformed,denselyorganized,andsociallyclosedgroups,whilebuildingonthreefundamentalclaims
ofcleavagetheory:partysystemsaredeterminedinepisodicbreaksfromthepastbyexogenoussocial
forces; political parties are programmatically inflexible; and, in consequence, party system change
comesintheformofrisingparties.
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Theremainderofthisarticleprovidesevidencethatthishasindeedhappened.Thefollowingsection
conceivestheriseofatransnationalcleavageasareactiontoreformsthathaveweakenednationalsov-
ereignty,promotedinternationaleconomicexchange, increasedimmigration,andexacerbatedcultural
andeconomicinsecurity.Weexaminetheeffectoftheeconomicandmigrationcrisesinraisingthesali-
enceofEuropeandimmigration,andthenshowthatthemodalresponseofmainstreampoliticalparties
wastostayputontheseissues.Voterschanged,butmainstreampartiesdidnot.
We thenpresentevidence that competitiononEuropean integrationand immigration is structured
onthenewcleavage.TheTANpoleofthiscleavageisstakedoutbytheradicalright.2Radicalrightpar-
tiestakemoreextremepositionsontheseissues,placemoresalienceonthem,andexhibitgreaterin-
ternalunitythanmainstreamparties.ByvirtueoftheircommitmenttoGALvalues,greenpartiesarelo-
catedatthealter-pole.JustasthereligiouscleavageandtheclasscleavagewereraisedbyCatholicand
socialistpartiesononesideofthedivide,sothetransnationalcleavageismobilizedbyradicalrightpar-
ties at one extreme. As the transnational divide has become salient, mainstream parties have been
compelledtocompeteonissuesthatliefarfromtheirprogrammaticcore.
2.Cleavagetheory—thenandnow
Cleavagetheory,originatinginLipsetandRokkan(1967),conceivesanationalpartysystemastheex-
pressionofunderlyingsocialconflicts.Revealingly,LipsetandRokkanignorestrategicinteractionamong
parties inexplaining thestructureofcontestation. Instead, they focuson thebasiccleavages thatun-
dergirdpartysupportoverthemediumorlong-term:thenationalrevolutionthatproducedacleavage
between the central stateandperipheral communities andbetween the central stateanda suprana-
tional church; and the industrial revolution that produced an urban/rural cleavage, and later awork-
2TANreferstothetradition/authority/nationalpoleofaculturaldimensionwithGAL(green/alternative/libertarian)attheop-positepole.
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er/employer cleavage. In each case, the political parties that were eventually formed were expres-
sions—or, to put itmoredirectly, instruments—of self-conscious, socially closed groups. Conflicts be-
tweenworkersandemployers,betweenthoselivinginperipheralcommunitiesandcentralstatebuild-
ers,andbetweensecularistsanddefendersoftheChurchwererootedincollectiveidentitiesthatwere
expressedingrass-rootsmovementsandhierarchicalorganizations.Thesolidaritythatexistedinthese
groupswasmuchmorethananexpressionofthesocialoroccupationallocationofanysetofindividu-
als.Itwasexperiential,theoutcomeofrepeatedconflictwhichdefinedandsolidifiedthecompositionof
in-groupsandout-groups(Bartolini2000;Marks1989).3Thepoliticalorganizationsthatexpressedtheir
voiceweremuchmorethanconvenientvessels,but“politicalactorsthatgavecoherenceandorganized
political expression towhat otherwise are inchoate and fragmentary beliefs, values and experiences”
(Kriesi2010:673;BartoliniandMair1990).
Beforewegoanyfurther, it isworthnotingthattheexistenceandsubsequentdeclineofsocialclo-
surearenotallornothing.Socialclosurewasfarfromcompleteevenintheimmediatepost-WorldWar
IIdecades.RecallthataroundoneinthreeBritishmanualworkersvotedLiberalorConservativeinthe
1950sand1960s(Stephens1979:404).Aclassicinvestigationofcleavagevotinginitsgoldenagefinds
that, for fifteenadvanceddemocracies,occupationexplained just4.9percentof thevariance inparty
choiceinthemediancountry,Franceunderthe4thRepublic,andreligionexplainedjust8.0percentin
themedian country, Canada (Rose1974: 17). Franklin (1992: 386)providesextensivedata suggesting
thatthemedianvarianceinleftvotingexplainedbysocialstructureinfourteencountriesdeclinedfrom
around20percentinthe1960stoaround12percentinthe1980s.Recentliteratureexplainingcontem-
poraryradicalrightorgreenvotingattributesaround10to12percentofthevariancetomodelstapping
3ThishasaffinitieswithMarxism.KarlMarxregardedclassconsciousnessastheoutcomeofcollectivestruggleinwhichindi-vidualswouldcometoseetheirfateasboundtothatoftheirclass.Objectiveclasslocationhadtobeactivatedinconflictbe-foreonecouldspeakofclassasapoliticalcategory.
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education, occupation, rural/urban location, sex, and age (Bornschier and Kriesi 2013; Dolezal 2010;
Norris2005;Oesch2008).
Lipset/Rokkan show little interest in the factors that bind individuals into collectivities (Bornschier
2009: 2).Whatmatters in their theory is that fundamental divisions in a society give rise to durable
cleavagesthatstructurepartycompetition.Thequestionstheyputunderthespotlightare1)Whatare
thefundamentaldivisionsinasociety?2)Whichdistinctionsamongapopulationbecomethebasesfor
cleavages? 3)Howdo these cleavages interact to shape voter preferences? 4)How are voter prefer-
encesexpressedinpartyformationandcompetition?5)Howarecleavagesmediatedbytherulesofthe
gameandbypartystrategies?
In coming to grips with these questions, we draw on cleavage theory tomake the following
moves:
! Thestrategicflexibilityofapoliticalpartyonmajorconflictdimensionsisconstrainedtotheex-
tent it hasadurable constituencyof voters, adecentralizeddecision-making structure, a self-
selectedcadreofactivists,aself-replicatingleadership,andadistinctprogrammaticreputation
(Schumacher,deVries,andVis2013).Politicalpartiescanbeflexibleonparticularissues,butef-
fortstoshiftpositionatthelevelofaconflictdimensionarerare.Thatistosay,politicalparties
areinducedtoseeklocalmaximaincompetingforvotes(LaverandSergenti2009).4Inaddition
toshifting its issueposition,apoliticalpartymayseektosubsumean issue intothedominant
dimension,bluritsresponse,orignoretheissue(Rovny2015:913;Lacewell2015).Theproblem
forestablishedpartiesisthatalocal,blurring,orstatusquoresponseismoreeffectiveforasin-
gleissuethanforasetofstronglyrelatedissues.
! Hence,thesourceofdynamisminpartysystemsinresponsetomajorshiftsinvoterpreferences
isthegrowthofnewpoliticalparties.Thebasicpremisesofcleavagetheoryarethatexogenous
4 It issimplynotpossible,onstrictly logicalgrounds,to identifyavotemaximizingstrategyforanyparty inapopulatedtwo-dimensionalspace(LaverandSergenti2009:43).
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forcesshapedemocraticpartysystems;thatchangecomesfromvoters,notestablishedparties;
thatpoliticalpartiesareprogrammaticallyinflexible;andthatasaconsequence,theresponseof
a party system to a serious exogenous shock takes the form of challenging, rather than re-
formed,politicalparties.
! Bythetimemasspoliticalpartiescameonthescene,cleavageswerealready institutionalized.
Nowthe sequence is reversed.Competitiveparty systemsexistprior to theonsetofanynew
cleavage.Hence,itmakesnosensetobelievethatchallengingpoliticalpartieswillberootedin
pre-existing, socially closed, groups. The connection between rising parties and voters has
changedbecausepoliticalpartiesarenow formedalongsideanewcleavage, rather thandec-
adesorcenturiesafter.Politicalpartiesareactors,notsubjects,intheformationofsocialdivi-
sions.
! Cleavagetheoryisabouttheinteractionofcleavagesratherthanthereplacementofonealign-
mentbyanother.So insteadofconceivingpartysystemchangeasaprocessofrealignment in
whichanewdimensionofconflictcomestosupersedeapriordimension,cleavagetheoryasks
how the continued existence of one division affects the party-political expression of a subse-
quentone. Inpartysystemsthat loadthediceagainstnewparties,anewcleavagecanbeex-
pected toproduce intense frictionswithin parties. In low-barriermulti-party systems, by con-
trast,anewcleavagecanbeexpectedtoproducenewchallengingpartiesthatexistalongside,
withoutreplacing,partiesformedonpriorcleavages.
! Lipset/Rokkanwerealert tosocial changes thatwerecorrodingclassconflict,but theyhadno
ideathatthecontainers—nationalstates—weregoingtobetransformedinthedecadesaround
theturnofthetwenty-firstcentury.Territorial identityasamotiveforconflictwasthoughtto
beathingofthepast.Nationalismwasthedead-endresultofinter-warfascism,nevertobere-
peated.Ethnicnationalismwithinstateswasconsideredaninertremnantoflong-pastperipher-
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alresistancetonationbuilding.Intheabsenceofterritorialidentity—perhapsthemostpower-
fulsourceofmasspoliticalmobilization—domesticconflictwascompressedtoleft/rightconflict
aboutwhogetswhat.WhenthepoliticalgorillaofnationalismlefttheroomafterWorldWarII,
domesticdebatewasnarrowedtoeconomicissues,i.e.theroleofthestate,taxes,andwelfare
spending.LipsetandRokkan(1967:13)recognizedthat“Functionaloppositionscanonlydevel-
opaftersome initialconsolidationof thenational territory,”buttheywereunabletoseethat
nationalterritorymightbedeconsolidatedinauthoritativeredesignandthemovementofpeo-
ples.
3.ATransnationalcleavage
Theinstitutionalpointofdepartureforapost-Lipset/Rokkancleavageisaseriesofmajorreformsin
theearly1990sthatdiminishedthecostof internationaltradeandmigrationwhilediffusingauthority
fromcentral states tobodieswithinandamong them.TheMaastrichtTreaty (1993)extendedEUau-
thorityoverwiderangesofpublic life,madeitmucheasierforpeopletowork inanotherEUcountry,
createdacommoncurrency,andturnednationalsintoEuropeanUnioncitizens.Thedissolutionofthe
Sovietempirein1989releasedmorethanonehundredmillionpeopletotradeandcirculatewithinthe
EuropeanUnion.TheWorldTradeOrganization (1994)wasnegotiated in theearly1990s,aswerere-
gional tradeorganizations,nowtotaling thirty-five innumber (Hooghe,Lenz,andMarks forthcoming).
The1990swerethecuspofarapidincreaseininternationaltrade,internationalmigration,andeconom-
icinequalitythathavetheirideologicalrootsintheThatcher-Reaganyears.However,theconsensuson
transnationalismencompassedthemainstreamleftaswellthemainstreamright.
Theintellectualbasisfortransnationalismisbroadanddeep.Thelowerthetransactioncostsofinter-
national economic exchange, the greater the scope for specialization and economies of scale. A core
premise of neoclassical economics is that introducing common standards and diminishing barriers to
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tradeandinvestmentincreaseseconomicgrowth.Fromapublicgoodsperspective,nationalstatesare
bothtoosmallandtoolarge.Manyofthemostintractableproblemsthatconfronthumanity—including
globalwarming, failed states, species loss, andenvironmentaldegradation—requireongoing coopera-
tionamongstatesandtheirpopulations.Nationalsovereigntyanditspoliticalexpression,thenational
veto, are obstacles to problem solving,which iswhymany international organizations pool authority
amongtheirmemberstatesinquasi-majoritariandecisionmaking(HoogheandMarks2015).Functional
efficiencyintheprovisionofpublicgoodscallsforgovernanceatdiversescales,includingregionaland
globallevels.
However, transnationalism proved to be highly contentious, particularly in Europe where in-
creasedtradeandinterminglingofpeopleswenthandinhandwiththecreationofasupranationalpoli-
ty(Hurrelmann,Gora,andWagner2015:55-6).Europeanintegrationraisedfundamentalissuesofrule
and belonging for thosewhowished to “defend national culture, language, community and national
sovereigntyagainsttheinfluxofimmigrants,againstcompetingsourcesofidentitywithinthestate,and
against external pressures from other countries and international organizations” (Marks and Wilson
2000:455;Prosser2016:748-9).Beginningin1999,theChapelHillExpertSurveytappedthepositionsof
politicalpartiesonaGALversusTANdimensionwhichprovedtobestronglyassociatedwithsupportfor
Europe.
Transnationalism also has transparent distributional consequences, biasing the gains from trade to
thosewhohavemobileassets.Loserswhofeeltheyareslippingwithnoprospectofupwardmobilityre-
sent thedilutionof therightsandprotectionofcitizenshipbyaglobalelite thatviewsnationalstates
andtheirlawsasconstraintstobefinessedorarbitraged.AsMartinWolf(2016)wroteintheFinancial
Times: “[T]heshareof immigrants inpopulationshas jumpedsharply. It ishard toargue that thishas
brought largeeconomic,socialandculturalbenefits tothemassof thepopulation.But ithasunques-
tionably benefited those at the top, includingbusiness.” Resentment canbe sharp among thosewho
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valuenationalcitizenshipbecausetheyhavefewalternativesourcesofself-worth.Nationalismhaslong
beentherefugeofthosewhoareinsecure,whosensetheyarelosingstatus,andwhoseekstandingby
identifyingwiththegroup.Thepromiseoftransnationalismhasbeengainsforall,buttheexperienceof
thepasttwodecadesisthatithurtsmany.Hence,oppositiontotransnationalismisformanyapopulist
reaction against eliteswho have little sympathy for national borders (Inglehart andNorris 2016; van
Kessel2015).
4.Thesocialbasis
Fromthelate1990s,severalwritersbegantoconsiderEuropeanintegrationfromacleavageperspec-
tive.5ExplainingtheriseofthevotefortheradicalrightinSwitzerland,Kriesi(1998:180)pointedto“the
emergenceofyetanothernewcleavage–thecleavageopposingthenewmiddleclasswinnersofthe
transformationofWesternEuropeansocietiestothegroupoflosersoftheverysameprocess.”Inthese
years,aflowofpublicationssuggestedthatconflictoverEuropecutacrosstheleft-rightdivide,thatEu-
ropewaspartofalargerculturalconflict,andthatthisconflictwassociallystructured.Inachapterti-
tled,“Europe:ANewElectoralCleavage?”Evans(1999:220)madethecasethatEuropehad“thepoten-
tial to cross-cut and restructurepartisandivisions in theBritish electorate.”Marks andWilson (2000:
433)suggestedthatEuropeanintegrationamountstoa“constitutionalrevolution,”whichtheyanalyze
from a cleavage perspective. Hooghe et al. (2002: 979) went on to argue that “Nationalism, anti-
immigration,andtraditionalismgohandinhand”andconstitutedadistinctdimensionofconflictdriven
byradicalrightparties.Andinhisinfluentialbook,Bartolini(2005:395;404)assertedthatEuropeanin-
tegrationwas a process of fundamental territorial re-articulation that could produce a new cleavage
5Inglehart(1971:992)detectedapost-industrialcleavageinwhichayoung,educatedsectionofthemiddleclasswouldrealignonlibertarianvaluesandworkerswouldbepotentialrecruitsforconservativeparties.Inhisearlyformulation,Inglehartmadetheconnectionwithinternationalism:“[T]helibertarianpositionseemslinkedwithinternationalism.Thisfollowsfromthefactthat,accordingtoouranalysis,thepost-bourgeoisgroupshaveattainedsecurity inregardtoboththesafetyandsustenanceneeds;insofarasthenation-stateisseenasabulwarkprotectingtheindividualagainstforeignthreats, it is lessimportanttopost-bourgeoisrespondents”(1971:997).
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“rootedin…lifechancesandmaterialopportunities”thatwould“cutheavilyacross,reshuffle,andre-
shape”nationalpoliticalparties.
Inaseriesofempiricallyrichbooks,Kriesi,Grande,andco-authors(2006;2008;2012)haveexplored
howEuropeanintegrationandimmigrationhavestructuredpreferencesandpoliticalconflictinBritain,
France,Germany,Switzerland,theNetherlands,andAustriabypittingthewinnersofglobalizationwho
favor transnational integration against losers who seek demarcation. Winners and losers have con-
trastingeconomic interestsandculturalpreferences,withthedifferencemostpronouncedonthecul-
tural dimension.Winners and losers have social-structural characteristics that are equally distinctive:
“Twoofthemostimportantgroupsonthewinners’side,highlyeducatedpeopleandsocio-culturalspe-
cialists,arefarmoresupportiveofopeningbordersthanarethosewith lower levelsofeducationand
thosewhoareunskilledworkers”(Kriesietal2012:73).
Themostactivepoleofthiscleavageconnectsnationalandwesternvalues,defenseofnationalsov-
ereignty, opposition to immigration, and trade skepticism. Theseare reinforcing issues for thosewho
feeltheyhavesufferedtransnationalism—thedownandout,theculturally insecure,theunskilled,the
de-skilled,i.e.thosewholacktheeducationneededtocompeteinamobileworld.Educationemerges
asapowerfulstructuringfactorwithadoubleeffect.Itisnecessaryforthosewhorelyontheirowntal-
entstoliveaneconomicallysecurelifeinaworldwithlowbarrierstotrade.Justasimportantly,educa-
tionshapesthewayapersonlooksattheworldandtheirfellowhumans.Educationallowsapersonto
seethingsfromtheotherside,akeytoempathyforthosewhohaveadifferentwayoflife(Bornschier
andKriesi2013).
Educationappearstoshapeattitudesontrade,immigration,andglobalizationbecauseitaffectsboth
values and economic interests (Hainmueller andHopkins 2014;Hainmueller andHiscox 2006, 2007).6
6Accesstohighereducationshapesaperson’slife-longattitudes(Triventi2013:499).Controllingforsocioeconomicstatusandattitudinalvariables,CofféandVoorposte(2010:442)findthat“YoungpeoplewhoseparentsvotefortheSVP[SwissPeople’s
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Thisviewgainedcredibilitywhenpoliticaleconomistsinvestigatingtheeconomicundergirdingoftrade
attitudesfoundapowerfulandunexpectededucationaleffect(MaydaandRodrik2005;O’Rourkeand
Sinnott 2002). Individuals with limited education aremuchmore likely to have an exclusive national
identity(PolyakovaandFligstein2016:Table5),andthereisevidenceofa“wideningeducationalgapin
Euroscepticattitudes”sincetheMaastrichtTreaty(Hakhverdianetal.2013:534).Kuhnetal(2016:38)
find that“peoplewith low levelsofeducationalattainmentaremoresensitive to increasedeconomic
inequality thanarehighlyeducated individuals.”Bechtel,Hainmueller, andMargalit (2014) showhow
culturalvalues,inparticularcosmopolitanbeliefs,drivethepositiveassociationbetweensupportforEu-
rocrisisbailoutsandhighereducation.Card,Dustmann,andPreston(2012)concludethatculturalcon-
cerns aremore decisive than concerns aboutwages and taxes in explaining attitudes to immigration
among less educated respondents. Students of immigration had always considered non-economic
alongside economic factors, but the role of community, identity, and framing appears to be even
strongerthanoriginallythought(ChandlerandTsai2001;SidesandCitrin2007).
5.TheEurocrisisandthemigrationcrisis
In the sameway that theBolshevik revolutionwasa critical juncture in theexpressionof the class
cleavage, the Eurocrisis and themigration crisis can be considered as critical for the emergence of a
transnational cleavage. These criseshave raised the salienceof Europeand immigration inpublic de-
bate,intensifieddivisionswithinmainstreamparties,andhaveledtoanupsurgeofrejectionistpolitical
parties(HoboltandTilley2016;HoboltanddeVries2016).Attheveryleast,itis“tempting”–toadopta
Party]aresignificantlymorelikelytosupporttheSVP.”Longitudinalsurveyresearchsuggeststhatattitudesunderpinningright-wingextremismarerooted inearlychildhood,persistoveraperson’s life,andaretransmitted intergenerationally.AnalyzingnineteenwavesoftheGermanSocio-EconomicPanel(SOEP),AvdeenkoandSiedler(2015)findthatamalewhoseparentsex-pressaffinitytowardaright-wingpartyisthirteenpercentmorelikelytosupportaradicalrightparty,controllingforincome,education,andunemployment.
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wordthatLipsetandRokkan(1967:47)useinasimilarcontext–tosaythatsomethingfundamentalis
takingplace,namelythegenerationofadistinct,rooted,anddurableconflictthatwilloverlayanddis-
rupttheexistingstructureofpartycompetition.
Thecrisesthemselvesprovidesomecluesregardingtheirlargersignificance.Thefirst,economic,crisis
transmuted into a distinctly European crisiswhenChancellorMerkel declared soon after the Lehman
Brotherscollapse thateverycountrymustact separately todefend its financial institutions.Under in-
tensepressurefromGermanpublicopinion,whichwasvehementlyopposedtoEurozonebailouts,Mer-
kel committed her government to preserving Article 125 of the Maastricht Treaty, the anti-bailout
clause prohibiting shared liabilities or financial assistance. Eurozone governments were trapped in a
postfunctionalist dilemma.On theone side theywere impelled by an unrelenting functional logic to-
wardfiscalunion.Ontheothertheywereunnervedbytenaciousdomesticresistance.
Theresultwasaseriesofincrementalreformsthatstavedoffdisasterwhileprolongingtheagonyof
austerity. Fearing opendebate, parliamentary votes, andpopular participation, national governments
revertedtoconventionaldiplomacywhichhadthe intendedeffectofempoweringnationalexecutives
and,atleasttemporarily,avoidingEUinstitutions(Jones,Kelemen,andMeunier2015).7TheEuropean
StabilityMechanismwasbasedonatreatymodificationwhich,ingeniously,avoidedreferendumsbyre-
quiringonlyatwo-lineamendmenttotheTreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUnion.Since2012,
the European Central Bank, a technocratic institution insulated from popular pressures, has been in-
strumental in providingmuch needed liquidity. Piecemeal reforms, alongside banking union and up-
gradedfinancialsurveillance,didjustenoughtosavetheEurozoneandavertthedefaultofheavily in-
debted countries.National governmentshave taken thepathof leastpolitical resistance, keeping the 7InJune2010,thesegovernmentssetupalimitedliabilitycompanyunderLuxembourglawwithseventeen(national)share-holderstoprovideemergencyloanstoGreece,Ireland,andPortugal.InSeptember2012,theysetupanintergovernmentalor-ganization,theEuropeanStabilityMechanism,againinLuxembourg,thistimeunderinternational(notEuropean)lawtopro-videa financial firewall fordistressedcountries.AsSchimmelfennignotes,“asymmetrical interdependenceresulted inabur-den-sharing and institutional design that reflectedGermanpreferences and its allies predominantly” (Schimmelfennig 2015:179).
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Euroafloatwithregulatorymeasures,whileavoidingpopulistpressuresthatwouldariseinmajortreaty
reform(cfBörzelandRisse,forthcoming).
The outcome was a North-South rift between creditor and debtor nations (Laffan 2016; Tsoukalis
2014).Discursiveanalysisrevealsthatthisrifthassharpnationaledgesandfeedsonsimplisticnational
stereotypes(Mylonas2012).Redistributionwasperceivedasanissuewithprofoundconstitutionalim-
plicationsfornationalcommunities(OtjesandvanDerVeer2016).Thenetresultwastoraisethesali-
enceofEuropeanintegrationindomesticdebate,particularlyamonggroupsandpartiestakingextreme
positions(Hutter,Grande,andKriesi2016;Risse2014).
Expert estimates summarized in Figure 1a show that the salience of European integration has in-
creasedmarkedlysince2006,fromameanof4.60inthatyearto5.93in2014,adifferencethatishighly
significant(p=.000).TheFigurealsorevealsthatsalienceisskewedtoEuroskepticparties,whichiswhat
onemightexpectonanissuethathasbecomepolarized.Northernimpositionofordo-liberalismandfis-
calausteritybackedbyasystemofsanctionsprolongedtheEurocrisiswhileitfailedtocontaintherise
ofnationalistpoliticalparties.Ironically,radicalrightpartiesgainedintheverycountrieswherenational
interest shaped government policy. In the South, by contrast, austerity and currency inflexibility pro-
ducedeconomicmiseryandresentmentwhichwasmobilizedchieflybytheradicalleft.
Figure1a:SalienceofEuropeanintegration
0
2
4
6
8
10
Sal
ienc
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Eur
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atio
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Note: Salience isestimatedonan11-point scale ranging from“not importanceatall” (0) to“ofgreat importance” (10).Thecontinuouslineisthefitlinefor2014(N=208);thedashedlineisthefitlinefor2006(N=158).Source:2006and2014datafromtheCHEStrendfile.
Figure1b:Salienceofimmigration
0
2
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10
Sal
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imm
igra
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0 2 4 6 8 10Position on immigration
Note:Salienceisestimatedonan11-pointscalerangingfrom“noimportantatall”(0)to“extremelyimportant”N=157.(10).Thecontinuouslineisthefitlinefor2014(N=208);thedashedlineisthefitlinefor2006(N=158).Source:Source:2010datafromtheCHEStrendfile.
Figure1brevealsthatthesalienceaccordedtoimmigrationissimilartothatforEuropeanintegration.
Politicalpartiestakingextremepositionsonimmigrationtendtoemphasizetheissuemorethanthose
takingmoderatepositions.And,similartopartysalienceonEurope,theU-curveistiltedupforparties
thattakestrongrejectionistpositions.Partysalienceonimmigrationin2010(Figure1b)isconsiderably
higherinthenorthwesternandsoutherncountries(6.63and6.23,respectively,onazerototenscale)
thanincentralandeasternEurope(4.09).WhereascountriesintheNorthwestandSouthwererecipi-
entsintheflowofpopulationwithinEurope,thoseintheEastweredonors.Aregionalbreakdownof
thesaliencedatasuggeststhatevenbeforethemigrationcrisisof2015,immigrationwasperceivedto
beamajorissueintheNorthwestandSouth.Thesalienceofimmigrationin2010exceedsthesalience
ofEuropeanintegrationateverywaveoftheCHESdata.
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Thepartysaliencequestionon immigrationwasaskedtoexpertsonly in2010,sowecannotassess
change. However, mass surveys suggest that the migration crisis, which became acute from August
2015,ratchetedupconcernwithimmigrationinthegeneralpublic.InSpring2014,priortothecrisis,15
percentofthosesurveyedbyEurobarometerselectedimmigrationas“oneofthetwomost important
issuesfacing[ourcountry]atthemoment.”InnoEasterncountrywasimmigrationflaggedasimportant
by tenpercentof the respondents,whileninecountries in theNorthorSouth registereddouble-digit
figures.InSpring2016,theoverallfigurehadincreasedto28percent,alevelofconcernsecondonlyto
unemployment (33percent)andgreater than for theeconomicsituation (19percent),health (16per-
cent),orterrorism(16percent).CentralandeasternEuropeancountrieswerenolongerinsulated.Im-
migrationwasatop-twoissueinallEasterncountriesexceptRomania.
6.StickyPoliticalParties
Cleavage theory is a theoryofdiscontinuity in the responseofparty systems to seriousexogenous
shocks. Change comes chiefly in the formof newpolitical parties that challenge existingparties on a
newcleavage(deVriesandHobolt2012;Rovny2012).Thepositionalmaneuverabilityofpoliticalparties
establishedonpriorcleavagesisconstrainedbyself-selectedactivists,self-replicatingleaders,andem-
beddedreputations.Far fromrationalactorsmakingoptimaldecisions,politicalpartiescanbeconsid-
eredtobesatisficerswith“theirown‘boundedrationality’thatshapesthewayinwhich[they]cometo
termswithnewchallengesanduncertainties”(MarksandWilson2000:434;DaltonandMcAllister2015;
Kitscheltetal1999;MarksanddeVries2012).Complexorganizations,ingeneral,adaptwelltogradual
change,butarechallengedtorespondtomajorchangeintheirenvironment(Aldrich2007).
Theevidenceisinlinewiththis.PoliticalpartiesinEuropeappeartobesticky,asacleavageperspec-
tivewould leadonetoexpect.PartysystemshaverespondedtoconcernsaboutEuropean integration
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andimmigration,butthishasnothappenedbecausepoliticalpartieshaveshiftedposition.Figure2dis-
playskerneldensityestimations(KDE)usingChapelHillExpertSurvey(CHES)dataonpartypositioning
onEuropeanintegrationfor215nationalpoliticalpartiesintwenty-fourEuropeancountries(Bakkeret
al.2015).Eachcurverepresentstheprobabilitydistributionforachange inpartypositioningbetween
successivewavesacrossfiveconsecutivesurveys:1999,2002,2006,2010,and2014.Negativenumbers
ontheX-axisdenoteadecline insupportonaseven-pointscale,andpositivenumbersan increase in
support.8Theprobabilitydistribution isstronglypeaked:90.1percentof thepoliticalpartiessurveyed
movelessthanonepointineitherdirectionacrossconsecutivesurveys.Thereisabitmoremovement
acrosslongertimespans,butnotmuch.Just17.2percentofthepartiesshiftmorethanonepointover
threeCHESwaves,and20.0percentshiftmorethanonepointoverfourCHESwaves.Thisisconsistent
withRohrschneiderandWhitefield (2016:145) finding,basedon theirexpert survey, thatparties “do
notchangetheirintegrationstancetoanygreatdegree.”
8Kerneldensityestimationisanon-parametricmethodinwhichthedataaretreatedasarandomizedsampleandthedistribu-tionissmoothened.WeuseStata’sdefault,theEpanechnikovestimator,whichselectsasmoothingbandwidthof0.123forthetwo-wavekernelfunctionandabandwidthof0.171forthethree-wavefunction.
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Figure2:KernelDensityCurveforChangeinPartyPositiononEuropeanIntegration,1999-2014
Note:ChangeinsupportforEuropeanintegrationonaseven-pointscalefrom1(stronglyopposed)to7(stronglyinfavor)overtwowaves(N=566);threewaves(N=388);fourwaves(N=230);andfivewaves(N=98).Source=1999,2002,2006,2010,and2014datafromtheCHEStrendfile.
Expertevaluationsofpartypositioningonimmigrationgobackto2006.Overtheperiod2006to2014
wedetectsimilarstability (seeTable1).Of140parties thatwetrackover theperiod,only threeshift
morethantwopointsinanyonedirectiononimmigration.Theaverageabsolutechangeoverthisperi-
odis0.59onimmigrationand0.55onEuropeanintegration,bothonaseven-pointscale.9Partiestend
9Positioningonimmigrationisestimatedonaneleven-pointscalerangingfrom“stronglyopposestoughpolicyonimmigration”(0)to“stronglyfavorstoughpolicyonimmigration”(10).Forcomparability,werescalethevariablezerotoseven,andreversethescalesothatahighervalueindicatesapro-immigrationstance.
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to switch back and forth over time. The average raw change over this eight-year period is just –0.02
pointsonimmigrationand+0.05pointsonEuropeanintegration.
Table1.ChangeinPartyPositioningonImmigrationandEuropeanIntegration,2006to2014Changeoverthreewaves
Absolutechange Directionalchange
Immigration Europeanintegration Immigration EuropeanintegrationMeanvalue 0.59 0.55 -0.02 0.05Medianvalue 0.49 0.35 0.05 0.07Min;maxchange 0;2.30 0;2.79 -2.30;+1.80 -2.79;+2.41#partiesmoving+/-2points
3 6 3morerestrictive 3moreoppositional,3moresupportive
StandardDeviation 0.50 0.53 0.78 0.76Numberofparties 140 143 140 143
Source:ChapelHillExpertSurvey(Bakkeretal.2015).Europeanintegrationisscaledfromstronglyopposed(1)tostronglyin
favor(7).Forcomparabilitywerescaletheoriginaleleven-pointscalefor immigrationtoaseven-pointscalerangingfromre-
strictive(1)toliberal(7).
Beforewemoveon,weneedtoassessthevalidityofthisfinding.Partymanifestos,ingeneral,reveal
greater change thanexpert judgments (DaltonandMcAllister2015:767ff).Thereare severalpossible
reasonsforthis.Oneisthatcodingofpartymanifestosatthelevelofanindividualissuemightproduce
greaterchangethanexpertevaluationatamoregeneraldimensionallevel.Thiswouldbethecaseifpo-
liticalpartieswereabletomaneuveronspecificissues,butweremoreconstrainedonbundlesofissues.
Asecondpossibilityisthatexpertsthinkalongcleavagelinesin“recordingthelongstandingcoreprinci-
pledpositionsofparties,”whichmightleadthemtodowngradeeffortsbypartiestoshifttheirpositions
(McDonaldetal.2007).Thiswouldhappenifmanifestosrecordattemptsbypartiestoshapehowthey
areperceived,whileexpertsevaluatehowpoliticalpartiesareactuallyperceived. Ifso,onewouldex-
pectexpertstousemanifestosasonesourceamongotherstoestimatepartypositioning.Expertscan
plausibly be regarded as Bayesians who use party manifestos alongside other indicators, such as
speechesmadebypartyleaders,toupdatetheirjudgments.
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OnemightexpectvoterstobeBayesianstoo.Giventhetimeandcognitiveconstraintsontheirpoliti-
cal attention, voters tend to rely on generalized conceptions of party identity (Green, Palmquist, and
Schickler2002).These tend tobestableover time.TheEuropeanElectionSurvey (EES)asksvoters to
placepoliticalpartiesonEuropeanintegration,andtheresultsaresimilartothoseusingCHESdata(see
appendix).DaltonandMcAllister(2015:768)findstrikingconsistencyacrosstimefortheleft/rightposi-
tioningofparties,withassociationsfromelectiontoelectionaround0.96.Remarkably,theconsistency
inpartypositioningappears todecay little across threeoreven fourelections.On this evidence,one
mustlookbeyondpartypositioningtoexplainhowpartysystemsrespondtoexogenousshocks.
This is a scenario for disruption. If existing parties cannot radically shift their issue positions, one
wouldanticipate1)sharptensionswithinmainstreampartiesonanewdimension,particularly inhigh
barrier systems,and2) thegrowthof challengingparties,particularly in lowbarrier systems.Theevi-
dencewehaveisinlinewiththis.Figure3revealsthatseriousinternaldissentishighestamongpolitical
parties that takeamiddlingpositiononEuropean integration in2014. Inresponsetoanewcleavage,
moderationdoesnotproduceconsensus.Dissentisloweramongpartiesthattakepolarpositionsonthe
keyissues.
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Figure3:DissentonEuropeanintegration
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Dis
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7Position on European integration
Note:N=208politicalparties.Dissentisestimatedonan11-pointscalerangingfrom0(partywascompletelyunited)to10(partywasextremelydivided)inresponseto“WhataboutconflictordissentwithinpartiesoverEuropeanintegrationoverthecourseof2014?”Source:Datafor2014fromtheCHEStrendfile.
Conservativepartiesmaybeparticularlyprone to internaldissentbecause theycombineneoliberal
support for transnationalismandnationalistdefenseof sovereignty (MarksandWilson2000). Fourof
the sixpartieswithadissent scorehigher than5.5 in2014areConservative: theBritishConservative
Party(dissent=7.3),Lithuania’sOrderandJustice(6.0),Italy’sForzaItalia(5.9),andFrance’sUMP(5.8).
Institutionalrulesplayarolehere.BritainandFrance,theEuropeandemocracieswiththehighestbarri-
erstopartyentry,havehadexceptionallevelsofintra-partydissentin2014andoverthe1999to2014
periodasawhole.TheBritishConservativepartyhasbeenmoredeeplyriventhananyotherparty,and
inthewakeoftheBrexitreferendumismorebitterlydividedthanever(Hobolt2016;Tzelgov2014).
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7.Theriseofpartiesonthetransnationalcleavage
Moderate political parties based in the cleavages described by Lipset and Rokkan have declined
acrossEurope.Onaverage,thevoteshareforsocialdemocratic,Christiandemocratic,conservative,and
liberalpartiesfellfrom75percentinthefirstnationalelectionafter2000to64percentinthenational
electionpriortoNovember2016.Withfewexceptions,thesepartieshavecontinuedtosupportEurope-
anintegrationatatimeof increasingskepticism.In2014, justsevenof112mainstreampartiestooka
positiononthenegativesideofourEuropeanintegrationscale.
ConsensusonEuropeamongmainstreampartiesdidnotmattermuchwhentheissuewasmarginal.
Mainstreampartiessoughttode-emphasizethe issueto“retainthecurrentdimensionalcompetition”
(DeVriesandHobolt2012:263;Green-Pedersen2012:126-7).PriortotheEurocrisis,PeterMair(2007:
12)couldwritethatthefamedEuropeangiantdescribedbyFranklinandvanderEijk(1995)“isnotonly
sleeping,buthasbeendeliberatelysedated,sothatJack–intheshapeofthemainstreamparties–can
runupanddowntheEuropeanbeanstalkatwill.”Nolonger.Thegianthasawakenedinaneraofcon-
strainingdissensuswhenattitudesoverEuropeareexpressedinnationalelections,Europeanelections,
and,aboveall,innationalreferendumcampaignswhichescapemainstreampartycontrol(Hoogheand
Marks2009;GrandeandHutter2016:40;Treib2014).
InmuchofEuropethecriseshavereinforcedanewtransnationalcleavagethathasatitscoreacul-
turalconflictpitting libertarian,universalisticvaluesagainst thedefenseofnationalismandparticular-
ism (BornschierandKriesi2012;Golder2016:488;Höglinger2016).Recent literaturehasproduceda
seriesofconvergentconceptstodescribethis:demarcationvs. integration(Kriesi,Grande,etal.2006;
2012);libertarian-universalisticvs.traditionalist-communitarian(Bornschier2010);universalismvs.par-
ticularism(HäusermannandKriesi2015;Beramendietal.2015);cosmopolitanvs.communitarian(Ten-
ey,Lacewell,andDeWilde2013);GALvs.TAN(Hooghe,Marks,andWilson2002).
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Europe and immigration—issues that have risen sharply in salience as a result of the crises—are
flashpoints in thegenerationof this cleavage.These issuesareperceived fromdiametricallyopposing
standpoints by TAN and GAL political parties.Whereas social democratic, Christian democratic, con-
servative,andliberalpartiesaresimilarlypositionedontheseissues,TANpartiesandGALpartiestake
distinctpositions thatplace themat thepolarextremes.Thecoefficient forvariationamongTANand
GALpartiesis0.53onEuropeanintegrationand0.96onimmigration.Formainstreampartiesitis0.19
and0.38,respectively(CHES2014).
Whereaspoliticalparties formedonprior cleavages conceiveofEuropeand immigrationas loosely
connectedissues,TANandGALpartiesconceivethemasintimatelyconnected(MarchandRommerskir-
chen2015).TheassociationbetweenthepositionsthatmainstreampartiestakeonEuropeandimmi-
grationis0.33;forradicalrightandgreenpartiesitis0.82(CHES,2014).Transnationalismintheformof
supportforEuropeancooperationandfreemovementisstronglyconsistentwiththesociallibertarian,
cosmopolitan,anduniversalist valuesofgreenparties.Equally,but in theopposite camp, rejectionof
EuropeanintegrationandimmigrationlieatthecoreofTANdefenseofthenationagainstexternalforc-
es(Tillman2013). TANandGALpartiestakemoreextremepositionsonEuropeandimmigrationthan
mainstream political parties. They tie these issues into a tightly coherent world view. They consider
themasintrinsictotheirprograms.And,correspondingly,theygivetheseissuesgreatsalience.
EverycountryinEuropehasbeendeeplyaffectedbythepoliticalfalloutofthecrises,butthewayin
whichpartysystemshaverespondedvarieswidely.Cleavagetheorysuggeststhatthisreflectstheparty-
political expression of prior cleavages and the character of the crises.Whatmatters from a cleavage
perspectiveishowissuesthatmightotherwisebeunconnectedformacoherentprogram,howpolitical
partiesgainareputationaroundsuchprograms,howthoseprogramsaredifferentiatedfromthoseof
existingpartiesonpriorcleavages,andhowpartiesonanewcleavagearepolarizedinresponsetothose
issues.
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InmostwesternEuropeancountries,theconflictovertransnationalismhasbeentakenupasanew
cleavagebyTANandGALpartiesandasanextensionoftheprioreconomicleft/rightcleavagebyradical
leftparties.ThecircleatthecenterofFigure4encompasseseightcountrieswithsuchpartysystems.In
contrast to radical rightandgreenparties, radical leftparties conceive transnationalismasadistribu-
tional issuearisingfromtheeffectsof internationaleconomicexchange(HoboltanddeVries:2016:7;
BrigevichandEdwards2016;VanElsas,Hakhverdian,andvanderBrug2016).TheyrejectEuropeanin-
tegrationon theground that ithurts thosewhocannot takeadvantageof transnationalmobility,but
they retain a conventional leftist commitment to working-class internationalism and do not take a
strongpositionagainstimmigration.
Figure4:Green,TAN,andradicalleftvote,2014
Note:Votetotalsforgreen/radicalrightandradicalleftpartyfamiliesinthenationalelectionpriortoNovember2016.Seeap-pendixfordetails.
InthecountriesofeasternEurope,mostofwhichareencompassedinthelongnarrowellipseinFig-
ure4,theGALsideofthetransnationalcleavageisweakorabsent.Thechiefresponsetothecriseshas
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beenthegrowthofthevoteforradicalrightparties.Thisisfilteredthroughpre-existingcleavages(Casal
Bèrtoa2014).Insomecountries,CommunistruleforgedanaffinitybetweeneconomicleftandTANval-
ues. Thiswasopposedby thosewho favoredmarket reformsand cultural openness (Coman2015:3;
Marksetal.2006).Here,Left-TANversusright-GALconflictwasreinforcedbytheprospectofEUmem-
bership which required market-oriented reform and liberal democratic institutions (Vachudova and
Hooghe2009:188).Incountrieswheresizeableethnicminoritieshadbeenatthecoreofacommunist
federation(Estonia,Croatia,Latvia,Slovenia),formercommunistpartiessupportedmulticulturalismand
leaned GAL, while the anti-communist right defended the ethnicmajority and espoused TAN values.
Hence,inthesesocieties,anaffinitybetweenLeft-GALandRight-TANdeveloped(Rovny2014a,b).
Inresponsetothecrises,bothgroupsofeastEuropeancountrieshaveseentheriseofradicalright
parties.However,theresponsecamelaterthanintheWest.AllbutSloveniaandSlovakiawereoutside
theEurozoneattheonsetofthecrisis,andsowereshieldedfromthebitterdistributionalbattlesthat
markedsouthernEurope.10 Further, immigrationbecameahot issueacrosseasternEuropeonly from
May2015followingtheEuropeanCommission’smigrantdistributionscheme.Prior tothat time,most
wereemigrantsocieties(Allen:2015:8-10;BustikovaandKitschelt2009;Koev2015;Rovny2014a).11
InFigure4theUnitedKingdomislocatedamongthecountriesofEasternEuropewitharadicalTAN
partyandnoradicalleftparty.ThereasonforthislieschieflyintheUK’spluralityelectoralsystemwhich
exaccerbates conflictwithin themajorparties andpunishesminorparties lacking territorially concen-
trated support. The transnational cleavagehasbeenexpressedoutside theparty system in theBrexit
referendumandbytheflashriseoftheIndependenceparty.TheConservativepartyisrivenbyconflict
10RohrschneiderandWhitefield(2016:142)notethatinCentralandEasternEurope“partyreputationsarelessstronglyem-beddedintheelectorate.”Crossnationalvariationintheideologicalspaceisalsogreater(Savage2014;RovnyandPolk2016)andthereisalargerrolefornon-ideologicalissuesconcerningcorruption,goodgovernance,andpopulism.Thishasproducedpoliticalpartiescombiningmoderateagendasoneconomicandsocio-culturalissueswitharadicalanti-establishmentrhetoric(e.g.ResPublica inEstonia,NewEra in Latvia, SMER inSlovakia,andTOP09 in theCzechRepublic).Thephenomenon isde-scribedas“centristpopulism”(Pop-Eleches2010)and“mainstreamreformism”(HanleyandSikk2016:523).11The salienceof immigration for radical rightparties inEasternEurope is6.56ona zero to ten scale, compared to9.40 inwesternEurope.
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betweenitsnationalistandneoliberalfactions,andintheabsenceofaradicalleftparty,theLabourpar-
tyhasshiftedtotheleft.
SouthernEuropeancountrieshaveseentheriseofradicalleftpartiesinresponsetothecrises.Large-
ly as a consequence of austerity, the Eurocrisis reinforced rather than challenged economic left-right
conflictcenteredondistributionandwelfare.ThishassharpenedtheeconomiccaseagainstEuropean
integration(OtjesandKatsanidou2016).WhereasTANpartiesintheNorthstrivefortheethnichomo-
geneity of the nation, radical left parties, predominant in the South, emphasize civic nationalismand
territorialcontrol (Halikiopoulou,NanouandVasilopoulou2012).Thedistributional framingof theEu-
rocrisisexplainsalsowhy,intheSouth,radicalrightpartieshavesofarnotbeenthechiefbeneficiaries
ofmainstreamdisaffection.InPortugal,Spain,andIreland,radicalrightpartiesstartedfromaverylow
supportbase.TheyhavehadtocontendwithconservativepartieswithastrongTANinclination,which
havesofarbeeneffective inaccommodatingculturaloppositiontotransnationalism(AlonsoandKalt-
wasser2014).OnlyinItalyandGreecedidradicalrightpartieshavemorethantwopercentofthevote
priortothecrisis(Ignazi2003).InItaly,radicalTANsupporthasremainedjustabovetenpercent,while
inGreece it increased from3.7percent in 2007 to10.7percent in the2015national election (Ellinas
2014;LamprianouandEllinas2016).However,inbothcountries,theradicallefthasbeenthemajortar-
getfortheexpressionofdiscontent.
8.Conclusion
Theexperienceofthepasttenyearsfollowingtheeconomiccrisisandmigrationcrisisleadsustore-
considertheresearchprograminitiatedbyLipsetandRokkan.Thereasonsfortherejectionofthepro-
gramfromthe1980sareseveral,andtheyremainpersuasive.Partysystemshaveunfrozenasnewpolit-
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icalpartieshave risenandoldpartieshavedeclined.More fundamentally, theorganizations that tied
voters to parties—including churches for confessional parties and unions for socialist parties—
encompassasmallershareofthepopulationandhavelessinfluenceonthosetheydoencompass.Final-
ly, the life-long attributes that structured political preference—chiefly social class and religion—have
losttheirpredictivepower.
However,webelievethatthesedevelopmentsdonotexhaustcleavagetheory.Cleavagetheoryhy-
pothesizesthattheresponseofapoliticalpartytoanewsocialdivisionisconstrainedbyitslocationon
apriorsocialdivision.Justasitwasdifficultforapartybasedonreligiousconflicttosubsumeclasscon-
flict,soit isdifficultforapoliticalpartybasedonclassconflicttosubsumeconflictovertransnational-
ism.Hence,cleavagetheoryexplainspartysystemchangeasadisruptiveprocessratherthananincre-
mentalprocess.Extantpoliticalpartiesare inconstantmotionastheyseektoadapttheirpositionsto
thepreferencesofvoters,buttheyareabletosustaintheirsupportonlyinnormaltimes.Theirefforts
toadaptareconstrainedbythepolicycommitmentsofself-selectedactivistsandleaders,bybrandrep-
utationsembeddedintheexpectationsofvoters,andbytheinterestsandvaluesoftheirsocialbase.
Hence, thedynamicsof long-termandshort-termchangeappeartobedifferent.Upclose,onecan
detect almost continuous adjustment by political parties to the preferences of voters. Over longer
reachesof time, theyappear tobemoving inquicksand.The crises reveal this starkly, andprovokea
theoreticalchallengeforfutureresearch:Howcanoneputshort-termstrategicresponseandlong-term
cleavageconstraintsonthesamepage?
Cleavage theory implies thatpartysystemchange isdiscontinuous. It is characterizedbyperiodsof
relativestabilityaspoliticalpartiesjostletogainsupportandbyperiodsofabruptchangewhennewpo-
liticalparties riseup in response toacritical juncture.Theevidencepresentedheresuggests that the
crisesofthepastdecademaybesuchacriticaljunctureforEurope.InaDownsianmodelofissuecom-
petition,onewouldexpectexistingpoliticalpartiestorespondtovoterpreferencesbysupplyingappro-
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priatepolicies.However,ascleavagetheorypredicts,thepositionalflexibilityofpoliticalpartiesisheavi-
ly constrained. Change has come not becausemainstream parties have shifted in response to voter
preferences, butbecause votershave turned topartieswithdistinctiveprofiles on thenew cleavage.
Thesepartiesraise issuesrelatedtoEuropeand immigrationthatmainstreampartieswouldrather ig-
nore.RadicalTANpartiessettheframeofcompetitiononthesetransnationalissues,andgreenparties
takediametricallyoppositepositions.Bothpartiesgivethese issuesmuchgreatersalience intheirap-
pealstovotersthanmainstreamparties,andtheyarelesshandicappedbyinternaldivisions.
Theresult,accordingtocleavagetheoryisnotrealignment,butaccretion.Theshapingpowerofprior
cleavagesdiminishesovertime,butfewdiecompletely.Theterritorialcleavage,thereligiouscleavage,
andtheclasscleavagehaveeachlostbite,butnonehasbeenextinguished.Cleavagetheoryconceives
layersofpartisanattachmentratherthanthereplacementofonedimensionofcontestationbyanother.
Thepartysystemofacountryreflectsitshistoryofpriorstrugglesaswellasitscurrentdivides.
Becausetheexpressionofacleavagedependsontheinstitutionalizationofpriorconflicts,auniform
response toanewcleavage isunusual. Theoneexception in LipsetandRokkan’saccount is theclass
cleavage,rootedintheindustrialrevolution,whichproducedmajorsocialistpartiesacrosstheboard.12
ThetransnationalcleavagehashaddistinctlydifferentexpressionsacrossEurope.Themajorcontrastis
betweentheSouth,where thecrisishaswidenedtheclassdivide,andtheNorth,whereculturalcon-
cernsaboutcommunityandimmigrationhavepulledlesseducatedvotersawayfromleftpartiestorad-
icalrightparties.
LipsetandRokkanwouldnotbesurprisedtofindthataperiodoftransformativetransnationalismhas
given rise to an intensepolitical reaction.Viewed from thepresent, the cleavage structureof Europe
beginswithonesweepingjurisdictionalreform,theriseofthenationalstate,andfinisheswithanother,
12ThoughnotintheUnitedStatesforreasonsexploredinLipsetandMarks(2000).
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29
the internationalizationofeconomicexchange,migration,andpolitical authority.Thecleavagearising
fromnationalstateformationisstillverymuchinevidenceinminoritycommunitiesthatcontinuetore-
sistnationalassimilation(HoogheandMarks2016).Thecleavagearisingfromtransnationalismmayalso
endure.Itisgroundedineducationalopportunitiesthathavepersistenteffectsoveraperson’slife,and
whichareconveyedtooffspring.However,thefunctionalpressuresthathavegivenrisetotransnation-
alismareperhapsevenmoredurable.Transnationalexchangeandsupranationalgovernancereflectthe
benefitsofscaleinhumanaffairs.EveniftheEuropeanUnionweretofail,immigrationstop,andtrade
decline,theforcesthathaveledtotransnationalismarelikelytopersist.
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30
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AppendixTableA.1:Partyposition,dissent,andsalienceonEuropeanintegrationandimmigrationPositiononEuropeaninte-gration
“HowwouldyoudescribethegeneralpositiononEuropeanintegrationthattheparty’sleadershiptookoverthecourseof[year]?Onaseven-pointscale:1=stronglyopposed2=opposed3=somewhatopposed4=neutral5=somewhatinfavor6=infavor7=stronglyinfavor[Don’tknow]
SalienceofEuropeanintegra-tion
“WewouldlikeyoutothinkaboutthesalienceofEuropeanintegrationforaparty.Overthecourseof[year],howimportantwastheEUtothepartiesintheirpublicstance?”Onaneleven-pointscale:0=noimportance,nevermentioned10=greatimportance,themostimportantissue
DissentonEuropeanintegra-tion
“WhataboutconflictordissentwithinpartiesoverEuropeanintegrationoverthecourseof[year]?”Onaneleven-pointscale:0=Partywascompletelyunited10=Partywasextremelydivided[Don’tknow]
Positiononimmigration “Positiononimmigrationpolicy.”Eleven-pointscale:0=fullyopposedtoarestrictivepolicyonimmigration10=fullyinfavorofarestrictivepolicyonimmigration[Don’tknow]Note:scaleisreversedinanalysis,andforTable1,recalibratedtoaseven-pointscale.
Salienceofimmigration “Importance/salienceofimmigrationpolicyforeachofthefollowingparties”Onaneleven-pointscale:0=notimportantatall10=extremelyimportant[Don’tknow]
Source:ChapelHillexpertsurveytrendfile,whichcombinesfivewaves(1999,2002,2006,2010,2014)for14NorthwesternandSouthernEUmemberstatesandfourwaves(2002,2006,2010,2014)for10Central-andEastEuropeancountries.Cy-prus,LuxembourgandMaltaarenotincluded.Estimatesareaverageplacementsbypartyexperts,aggregatedbypartyandcountry.Foradiscussionofthereliabilityandvalidityofthedata,seeBakkeretal.2015;Hoogheetal.2010;Marksetal.2007;SteenbergenandMarks2007.
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TableA.2:Categorizationsbygeographicalregion,partyfamily,timepoint
Region North=Austria,Belgium,Denmark,Finland,France,Germany,Netherlands,Sweden,UK;South=Greece,Ireland,Italy,Portugal,Spain;East=Bulgaria,CzechRepublic,Estonia,Hungary,Latvia,Lithuania,Poland,Romania,Slovakia,Slovenia.
Partyfamily “Mainstreamparties”arepoliticalpartiesthatLipsetandRokkanrecognizedinthemajorpartyfamiliesthatexpressedthehistoricalreligiousorclasscleavage,i.e.theChristiandemocratic,socialdemocratic,lib-eral,andconservativepartyfamilies.Wecategorizeapoliticalpartyasmainstreamifitisamember(orap-pliedtobeamember)oftheEuropeanPeople'sParty(EPP),thePartyofEuropeanSocialists(PES),theAlli-anceofLiberalsandDemocratsforEurope(ALDE),ortheEuropeanConservativesandReformists(ECR),orifnotrepresentedinthecurrentorpreviousEuropeanParliament,itisaffiliatedwithacorrespondingmainstreampan-Europeanpoliticalparty:EuropeanPeople'sParty(EPP),thePartyofEuropeanSocialists(PES),theAllianceofLiberalsandDemocratsforEurope(ALDE),theAllianceofEuropeanConservativesandReformists(AECR),theEuropeanDemocraticParty(EDP),EuropeanChristianPoliticalMovement(ECPM).
“Newcleavageparties”arepoliticalpartiesthatidentifywiththeGreenorradicalrightpartyfamily.
Wecategorizeapartyasgreenifitisamember(orappliedtobeamember)oftheGreens–EuropeanFreeAlliance(Greens/EFA),orifnotrepresentedinthecurrentorpreviousEuropeanParliament,itisaffiliatedwiththeEuropeanGreenParty(EGP).WeexcluderegionalistpoliticalpartiesintheEuropeanFreeAlliance(EFA).
Wecategorizeapartyasradicalrightifitisamember(orappliedtobeamember)oftheEuropeofFree-domandDirectDemocracy(EFDD/EFD),orEuropeofNationsandFreedom(ENL),orifnotrepresentedinthecurrentorpreviousEuropeanParliament,itisaffiliatedwithacorrespondingpan-Europeanpoliticalparty:theAllianceforDirectDemocracyinEurope(ADDE),theAllianceforPeaceandFreedom(APF),theEuropeanAllianceforFreedom(EAF),theAllianceofEuropeanNationalMovements(AENM),theEUDemo-crats(EUD),MovementforaEuropeofLibertiesandDemocracy(MELD),ortheMovementforaEuropeofNationsandFreedom(MENF/MELD).
“Radicalleft”partiesarethosethataremember(orappliedtobemember)oftheEuropeanUnitedLeft/NordicGreenLeft(GUE/NGL)intheEuropeanparliament,orifnotrepresentedinthecurrentorpre-viousEuropeanParliament,affiliatedwiththeNordicGreenLeftAlliance(NGLA),thePartyoftheEuropeanLeft(PEL),theEuropeanAnti-CapitalistLeft(EACL),ortheInternationalMeetingofCommunistandWork-ersParties(IMCWP).
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Post-crisiselection
(Figure4)Votetotalsforgreen,radicalright,andradicalLeftpartiesinthenationalelectionpriortoNo-vember2016.InthethreecountriesthathadnotyetconductedasecondnationalelectionsincethecrisiswesubstitutevotetotalsbyvotesharesprojectedbythreeormoreopinionpollsfromSummer-Fall2016.Thevotepercentagesarefortheelections(orpollaverage)inBelgium(2014),Denmark(2015),Germany(2013),Greece(2015),Spain(2016),France(2012),Ireland(2016),Italy(pollaverage),theNetherlands(2012),UK(2015),Portugal(2015),Austria(pollaverage),Finland(2015),Sweden(2014),Bulgaria(2014),CzechRepublic(2013),Estonia(2015),Hungary(2014),Latvia(2014),Lithuania(2016),Poland(2015),Ro-mania(pollaverage),Slovakia(2016),Slovenia(2014).
A.3:ChangeinpartypositioningonEuropeanintegrationreportedbyvoters(EES)andexperts(CHES)TheEuropeanElectionSurvey(EES)asksvoterstoplacepoliticalpartiesonEuropeanintegration,andtheCHESexpertsurveyasksexpertstoplacepoliticalpartiesonEuropeanintegration.Bycomparingcomparewave-to-wavepartyshiftscalculatedbyAdams,Ezrow,andWlezien(2016)foreightcountriesinthe1999,2004,and2009EESsurveyswithwave-to-wavepartyshiftsinthe1999-2002,2002-2006,2006-2010CHESexpertsurveys,itispossibletocomparehowvotersandexpertsviewchangeinpartypositioning.Acrossconsecutivewaves,themeanabsolutechangeinpartypositiononEuropeanintegrationis0.52ona10-pointscalecomparedto0.59forCHES,convertedtothesamescale.Soonaverage,votersandexpertsperceiveaboutthesameamountofchangeinpartypositioning.
Voters(Adamsetal.) Experts(owncalculations)mean 0.14 0.10absolutemean 0.52 0.59minimum;maximum -1.35;1.41 -1.48;2.71
Adamsetal.concludethatcitizens’perceptionsofpartyshifttrackexperts’perceptions,albeitwithamodestbivariatecorrela-tion(r=0.26),whileestimatesofpartypositionsusingEuromanifestosdonottrackcitizens’perceptions.
THEEUENGAGEWORKINGPAPERSERIESHoogheL.AndMarksG.CleavageTheoryMeetsEurope’sCrises:Lipset,Rokkan,andtheTransnationalCleavage(2017)
THEEUENGAGEWORKINGPAPERSERIES,ISSN:-----------Copyright©2016-Universityof……..
TableA.4:GREENPARTYFAMILYCountry Elec-
tionyear
CHESpartyabbre-
viation
PartynameinEnglish
CHESpartyid
Voteinpost-crisiselection/
poll
CHESGAL/TANposi-
tion(2014)
CHESeco-nomic
left/rightposition(2014)
CHESEUposition(2014)
Familyaffilia-tioninEuro-peanParlia-ment(most
recent)
European/internationalfamilyaffilia-tion(mostre-
cent)
Austria Polls GRUNE AustrianGreenParty 1304 12.0 1.7 2.8 6.5 Greens/EFA EGP
Belgium 2014 ECOLO Ecolo 104 3.3 1.2 2.2 6.3 Greens/EFA EGP
Belgium 2014 Groen! Groen! 105 5.3 1.2 2.0 6.2 Greens/EFA EGP
CzechR. 2013 SZ GreenParty 2107 3.2 1.3 3.7 6.6 noMEP EGP
Denmark 2015 SF SocialistPeo-ple’sParty 206 4.2 3.1 2.3 4.6 EFA EGP
Estonia 2015 EER EstonianGreens 2207 0.9 4.3 6.0 6.0 noMEP EGP
Finland 2015 VIHR GreenLeague 1408 8.5 0.8 4.4 5.9 Greens/EFA EGP
France 2012 VERTS GreenParty 605 5.5 1.4 3.3 6.2 Greens/EFA EGP
Germany 2013 Grüne GermanGreens 304 8.4 2.2 3.5 6.2 Greens/EFA EGP
Hungary 2014 LMP PoliticscanbeDifferent 2309 5.3 2.9 3.6 5.3 Greens/EFA EGP
Hungary 2014 E14 Together2014 2310 2.1 2.4 4.9 6.6 Greens/EFA EGPIreland 2016 GP GreenParty 705 2.7 2.6 3.8 4.4 noMEP EGP
Latvia 2014 LKS LatvianRus-sianUnion 2402 1.6 8.3 2.9 2.9 Greens/EFA EGP
Latvia 2014 ZZSUnionof
GreensandFarmers
2405 19.5 7.2 5.7 5.0 Greens/EFA EGP
Lithuania 2014 LVZSLithuanianPeasant&
GreenUnion2507 22.5 6.2 3.4 4.7 Greens/EFA EGP
Lithuania 2016 LZP LithuanianGreenParty 2521 2.0 NA NA NA noMEP EGP
Nether-lands 2012 GL Green-Left 1005 2.3 1.0 2.7 6.5 Greens/EFA EGP
Romania Polls USRUnionfortheSalvationof
Romania2713 9.1 NA NA NA noMEP EGP
Spain 2016 ICV InitiativeforCatalonia 518 1.3 0.9 2.0 4.8 Greens/EFA EGP
Sweden 2014 MPEnvironment
Party-TheGreens
1607 6.9 1.6 3.5 4.4 Greens/EFA EGP
UK 2015 GREEN GreenParty 1107 3.8 1.0 2.0 5.2 Greens/EFA EGP
Legend:Greens/EFA=Greens–EuropeanFreeAlliance;EGP=EuropeanGreenParty
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TABLEA.5:RADICALRIGHTPARTYFAMILYCountry Election
yearCHES
partyabbre-viation
PartynameinEnglish
CHESpartyid
Voteinpost-crisiselection/
poll
CHESGAL/TANposition(2014)
CHESeconomicleft/rightposition(2014)
CHESEUposition(2014)
Familyaffilia-tioninEuro-peanParlia-ment(most
recent)
European/internationalfamilyaffilia-
tion(mostrecent)
Austria Polls FPO FreedomParty 1303 34.0 8.8 5.5 1.9 ENF MENL
Belgium 2014 VB VlaamsBelang 112 3.7 9.0 5.5 2.6 ENF MENF
Belgium 2014 PP People’sParty 120 1.5 7.5 8.5 2.5 noMEP ADDE
Bulgaria 2014 VMRO-BND BulgarianNation-alMovement 2005 3.1 8.6 3.7 3.3 ECR none
Bulgaria 2014 ATAKA NationalUnionAttak 2007 4.5 9.6 1.4 1.5 noMEP none
Bulgaria 2014 NFSBNationalFrontfortheSalvationof
Bulgaria2014 4.2 8.0 4.3 3.0 EFD MELD
CzechR. 2013 USVIT DawnofDirectDemocracy 2112 6.9 7.7 5.3 2.3 ENF MENF
Denmark 2015 DF DanishPeople’sParty 215 21.1 8.4 4.5 1.9 EFD/ECR MELD
Finland 2015 PS TrueFinns 1405 17.7 9.1 4.1 1.6 EFD/ECR ACRE
France 2012 FN NationalFront 610 13.6 8.9 5.9 1.2 ENF MENF
France 2012 MPF MovementforFrance 612 0.2 8.9 8.0 1.2 EFD MELD
Germany 2013 NPDNationalDemo-craticPartyfor
Germany309 1.3 9.8 5.3 1.7 non-inscrit APF
Germany 2013 AfD AlternativeforGermany 310 4.7 8.7 8.3 1.6 EFD,ENF none
Greece 2015 LAOSPopularOrthodoxRally 410 0.0 8.3 5.3 3.3 noMEP MELD
Greece 2015 ANEL IndependentGreeks 412 3.7 8.6 5.1 2.2 noMEP none
Greece 2015 XA GoldenDawn 415 7.0 10 2.9 1.1 non-inscrit APF
Hungary 2014 JOBBIK MovementforaBetterHungary 2308 20.2 9.5 4.0 1.2 non-inscrit AENM
Italy Polls LN NorthernLeague 811 13.3 9.1 7.3 1.1 ENF MENF
Italy Polls Fdl BrothersofItaly 844 3.3 9.3 5.6 2.2ANsuccessor,
cooperateswithFN
none
Latvia 2014 NA NationalAlliance 2406 16.6 8.1 5.9 5.7 ENF/ECR ACRENether-lands 2012 PVV FreedomParty 1017 10.1 7.8 4.6 1.1 ENF EAF
Poland 2015 PiS LawandOrder 2605 37.6 8.5 3.1 3.8 ENF/ECR ACRE
Poland 2015 KNP CongressoftheNewRight 2614 4.8 8.8 9.6 1.1 ENF none
Poland 2015 SP UnitedPoland 2616 NA 8.6 3.4 3.0 EFD MELD
Poland 2015 KUKIZ15 Kukiz’15 2617 8.8 NA NA NA noMEP none
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Slovakia 2016 SNS SlovakNationalParty 2809 16.7 9.4 4.8 2.3 EFD MELD
Sweden 2014 SD SwedishDemo-crats 1610 12.9 9.2 5.4 1.3 EFDD ADDE
UK 2015 UKIPUKIndependenceParty 1108 12.7 9.3 8.6 1.1 EFD ADDE
Legend:ECR=EuropeanConservativesandReformers;ENF=EuropeofNationsandFreedom:EFD=EuropeofFreedomandDirectDemocracy;ACRE=AllianceofConservativesandReformistsinEurope;UEN=UnionforEuropeoftheNations;ADDE=AllianceforDirectDemocracyinEurope;AENM=AllianceofEuropeanNationalMovements;APF=AllianceforPeaceandFreedom;EAF=EuropeanAllianceforFreedom;MELD=MovementforaEuropeofLib-ertiesandDemocracy;MENF=MovementforaEuropeofNationsandFreedom.
TableA.6:RADICALLEFTPARTYFAMILYCountry Elec-
tionyear
CHESparty
abbrevi-ation
PartynameinEnglish
CHES
par-tyid
Votein
post-crisiselec-tion/