Climate change after bali.pdf

7/29/2019 Climate change after bali.pdf

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Peter M. HaasClimate Change Governance after Bali

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Climate Change Governance after Bali

Peter M. Haas*

It is a long and winding road from Bali to a meaningful climate change regime.The Bali Roadmap is singularly indistinct in its details. Because the stakes areextremely high, we are unlikely to see any diplomatic breakthroughs in the ne-gotiations until the very last minute. Consequently, I argue in this piece that thenext year or so can be fruitfully used to help build the political support forachieving a genuine breakthrough at that fateful point. Relying on multilateraldiplomacy, based on the general model which has been successfully pursued tocreate international regimes in other substantive domains of global environ-mental politics, is not likely to be effective for climate change in the short to me-dium term. I offer some suggestions to improve the prospects for multilateral-ism through an effort to fortify the foundations for meaningful multilateraldiplomacy while we still have time.

The issue of climate change now seems rmly planted on the internationalagenda. Yet the political will for meaningful action is not yet apparent.

The facts of the matter are now fairly clear. Scientic consensus is ex-pressed in the most recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)Working Group (WG) I report, which calls anthropogenic climate change un-equivocal.1 Between the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, the Stern Review, andnow the recent award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Al Gore and the IPCC, it iswidely agreed that severe consequences will occur if global concentrations ofcarbon are allowed to exceed 450550 ppm by 2050. Keeping emissions belowthis level will entail 5085 percent reductions in carbon dioxide emissions by2050 from current levels.2

A standard list of policy responses was also endorsed by the IPCC WG III,many of which hearken back to 1970s efciency framing of the energy policy

* Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Yale University Working Group on GlobalGovernance 15 May 2007, and at the Human Dimensions of Global Environmental ChangeConference 24 May 2007, Amsterdam, Netherlands. I am grateful to Nat Keohane for clarifyingthe operation of carbon markets for me, and for editorial comments by M.J. Peterson, Steinar

Andresen, Andreas Kraemer, and to 2 GEPanonymous referees.1. IPCC 2007, 2.2 Ibid 20


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debates. These responses include: increased energy efciency, fuel switching,more renewables, nuclear power, conservation, appliance efciency, emissioncontrol, carbon sequestration, aforestation, and international cooperation.3

Some mitigation responses call for changes in production, and others forchanges in lifestyle and consumption. Adaptive responses can help the majorityof the worlds population, but dont receive as much policy attention in terms ofimmediate actions.

Estimates show that these goals are demanding, but attainable. The an-nual costs are something on the order of 1 percent of current world GDP, and1 percent of world gross xed capital consumption.

However, these consensual goals are well beyond the less demandingtargets of Kyoto, which have not been achieved. Thus focusing on a more de-

manding global aspiration seems unlikely to succeed. This is not to reject multi-lateral environmental diplomacy which has worked well in dealing with suchissues as stratospheric ozone depletion, European acid rain, and marine pollu-tion in many of the worlds oceans. Climate change is the limiting case, though,for the multilateral diplomacy approach. Climate change is economically andpolitically more difcult than other issues yet addressed, so it is not surprisingthat the diplomatic efforts to date have been disappointing.

Why Collective Action on Climate Change is Politically Challenging

The core political reality is that the likely short to medium term victims fromclimate change are primarily those in the countries of the Global South, whichlack meaningful political clout at the international level, whereas those who areasked to make meaningful short to medium term (and possibly highly expen-sive) policy changes are the more inuential countries of the Global North.Thus those with the most political capacity for dealing with climate change aresome of the most reluctant to make meaningful short term commitments.While the EU talks a good game, its emissions are still projected to increase.

Without the votes in the UN General Assembly of the small Pacic Island states,Egypt and Bangladesh, it seems unlikely that discussions would have ever be-gun.

While recent public opinion surveys show that climate change is a widelyshared concern worldwide, the intensity with which environmental values areexpressed still tends to be rather shallow. Few people are willing to make corre-sponding economic sacrices, and most people make electoral decisions basedon local and economic factors rather than global environmental ones.

Governments perceptions of economic consequences also inhibit their

willingness to actively cooperate. Climate change is not seen as a pressing prob-lem in the short term by major economic actors because the costs of acting are

t t d hil th b t diff Whil th l b l i t l

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market is valued at approximately 700 billion dollars, most companies produc-ing clean up products also sell polluting ones, and thus are unlikely to make fora strong green-friendly lobby.

In the absence of strong domestic pressures for action, governments havebeen reluctant to organize international institutions and knowledge-applicationin a way that would exercise any degree of inuence over the states themselves.So far, governments have lacked the political will to resort to stronger institu-tions, or to strengthen existing institutions. Political will in this regard comesfrom the perceptions of interest from salient political participantselites andmass electoratesand from economic actorsrms.

So far, few countries have achieved the limited aspirations laid out inKyoto. Governments have not made major inroads on their emissions. The

OECD countries greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have increased since thebaseline years 1990/1992 and are likely to continue to grow.4 Strong economicgrowth means Chinese emissions are going through the roof, and China has al-ready become the largest national GHG emitter earlier than projections antici-pated.

There is little evidence of policy change occurring as a consequence ofthe Kyoto Protocol or the UN Framework Convention on Climate change(UNFCCC) regime. The reductions from expected emissions trajectories thathave occurred seem to be the result of structural economic changes such as pri-

vatization, fuel switching, more expensive energy, the emergence of the serviceeconomy, and recessions.

The nearly 20 years of persistent negotiations on the climate change re-gime have had signicant second order displacement effects on environmentalgovernance more generally. They have diverted attention away from other possi-bly pressing problems, crowding out such issues as ecosystem decay, or ThirdWorld water quality. They have unnecessarily elevated cooperation to thestatus of an end rather than a means to environmental protection. Scarce politi-cal capital has been channeled into trying to build a constituency for climate

change policies and domestic enforcement.The institutional backdrop against which negotiations occur is weak by

comparison to other international regimes.There is a medium-sized secretariat. The UNFCCC has only 12 senior staff,

but with a large number of consultants and other staff. It has a modest budgetof US$ 26 million per year. Few synergies or horizontal linkages to other re-gimes operate. Other international organizations and regimes try to piggybackon climate change, but dont get many resources.

Financial resources are relatively tight. Little money is yet available

through the Global Environment Facility (GEF), World Bank, Clean Develop-ment Mechanism or Joint Implementation. Carbon trading markets in Europe

till t th i t l t d l h lf f th j t Th

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relatively low price of carbon permits at present suggests that many participantsremain leery about the extensive transaction costs and enforcement mecha-nisms for the trading scheme. Emission permit trading schemes provide efci-

ent mechanisms for achieving previously stipulated goals, but may distract at-tention from clearly identifying and achieving those goals.

There is no meaningful issue-nesting in either the normative or framingsense. It isnt clear if environmental protection, market liberalization, or sover-eignty is the common principle applied by states for addressing climate change,leaving diplomats no conceptual compass with which to navigate. Similarly,talks have pursued a norm of fairness that has been applied at the expense ofefciency. But fairness itself has multiple applications: in terms of universal par-ticipation, and also in terms of uniform but differentiated obligations. Frames

providing a map for substantive linkages between issues are contested by gov-ernments. China says sustainable development is the appropriate frame, whilethe UK says it should be security.

Gaps exist in making effective use of consensual knowledge for addressingthe problem. The knowledge base isnt useful for two reasons.5 First, the for-mal organization responsible for providing science to policy makers, the IPCC,remains politically suspect, and thus only partially legitimate. This is due toconcerns about government involvement in selecting scientists and in draftingthe summary reports of the working groups. Second, the science is not cast in

ways that directly addresses individuals experiences, so it remains difcult tomobilize public opinion through direct reference to it. The IPCC reports are si-lent on sensitivities between emissions, concentrations, and the timing of con-sequences. Many effects are presented within estimates of 2040 years, a 2 gen-eration timeframe which is too long for meaningful planning by governments,rms or individuals. Likely impacts are presented at the scope of continents,which arent politically meaningful for most decision-makers or citizens.

The weak diplomatic context has been one of choice. A historical recon-struction of regime negotiations since 1988 and a tracing of the process demon-

strates that the weak institutionalization on this issue is deliberate. Surely,governments could have created or deferred to stronger institutions in thisdomain, but preferred not to. For instance, negotiations could have beenlaunched within the OECD, with the addition of India and China, thus creatinga k-group, avoiding the difculties of negotiating with large numbers. Such anapproach could also have focused on advanced technology-based agreements.Moving outside the UN is still an option. The choice is due in part to strategicefforts to prevent binding commitments, and in part to the reexive applicationof UN procedural norms. The social construction of climate change governance

occurred as diplomats identied climate change as a global problem requiring aglobal solution through institutions with global membershipthe UNandth h d f l b l i 6 Th h



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slowed deliberations, and introduced voting principles that lead to least com-mon denominator type outcomes.7

Climate Change was consigned to the UN in the late 1980s to avoid expo-

sure to other political forces which may have led to stronger outcomes. The USand other states tried to keep climate change out of the hands of NGOs, scien-tists and UNEP, following experiences with UNEP and at the nonstate organized1988 Toronto Conference which had surprisingly called for 20 percent cuts inGHG emissions.8

Improving Prospects for Dealing with Climate Change

What can we do to better decarbonize the international political economy?

How can the requisite political will be developed? Arguably, the internationalcommunity has ve to ten years grace period to develop the political will tocommit to a massive technological push along the lines already outlined by theIPCC. A new generation of efcient green technology must be developed whichcan be implemented without requiring the unnecessary and inefcient cost ofcontinually upgrading investments as the technology improves.

A concerted push for national-level research and development on energyalternatives across a wide portfolio of technologies could help build the politi-cal will for stronger international cooperation. Such a push is likely to be sus-

tained in most of the major industrial and industrializing countries because itserves several policy goals: reducing dependence on high priced energy sources,reducing vulnerability to fuel supply interruptions, and stimulating niches innew green markets. By supporting national technological breakthroughs, betterpolicy alternatives will become commercially viable and economic constituentsfor international action will be mobilized. Prior examples of priming the tech-nological pump can be drawn from the Defense Advance Research ProjectsAgency (DARPA) and the internet, the Ministry of International Trade and In-dustry (MITI) and the Japanese economic miracle of the 1970s-1990s, and the

replacement of CFCs with ozone-friendly alternatives. Private sector demandsfor regulation to force them beyond the limited market incentives have beenechoed from a wide array of sectors.9

A reasonable institutional venue for achieving cooperation on technologi-cal development is the G8 plus China and India, or the International EnergyAgency. Relying on voluntary commitments from the major economies or theAsia Pacic Partnership on Clean Development and Climate lacks the nancialresources to adequately drive technological change. Such efforts outside the UNwould still have to be coordinated closely with the Bali Roadmap in order to

maintain the legitimacy of the entire enterprise.Public education efforts by international institutions and civil society can

l h l i d t t t k t iti i t ti ll A

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shift from an interest-based policy discourse to a norm-based discourse wouldhelp overcome domestic focus on potential free riding. Al Gores powerfulPowerPoint presentation won an academy award in the US, and has helped to

encourage or at least dene a shift in the policy discourse from self-interest toethics. Gro Harlem Brundtland was appointed as a climate change ambassadorto serve as a high prole global normative advocate by the UN Secretary Gen-eral.

Imaginative uses of scale can also help promote protection at the globallevel. Two experiments merit attention.

Economic regulation of important markets at the sub-national scale canhave a strong snowball effect. The US state of California recently set ambitioustechnology standards to cut GHG emissions by 20 percent from the 1990 level

by 2050. As a sub-national unit in the US with a sufciently large economy, Cal-ifornias regulations can have signicant snowball effects for producers else-where, as well as a high prole demonstration effect. Two regional initiatives inthe US are now underway: the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in New Eng-land and the Western Climate Initiative on the West coast. The latter effort alsoincludes three Canadian provinces, thus providing a mechanism by which localconcern in the US and Canada may percolate up to inuence foreign environ-mental policies.

A second scale initiative has to do with better presentation of knowledge

at politically meaningful scales of resolution. Talking about the environmentaleffects of climate change at the national or continental levels has little politicalmeaning for citizens. The Union of Concerned Scientists has cleverly started toissue climate change analyses crafted at the most sensitive political scales, iden-tifying high costs for potentially politically inuential constituencies, such asCalifornia and New England.

A very real problem is China, which has already become the largest emit-ter of greenhouse gases. It is very hard to exercise economic leverage over China,because the US and Europe are more dependent on the Chinese market than

vice-versa. Pushing for market liberalization within China will promote foreigninvestment, and NGOs and international institutions can seek to ensure thatforeign companies will apply the environmental standards they follow in theirhome markets.

Conclusion

Architects of institutional design have been reexively applying a dysfunctionalblueprint to dealing with global climate change. The political foundation for

meaningful movement to build an effective postKyoto multilateral environ-mental agreement is still weak. Yet the very thinness of the social constructions

f th i d l d th h th UN th b l d ith th



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to work on building the political and economic support before further under-mining the credibility of collective diplomacy. We should delay hard bargainingon a post-Kyoto agreement for a year or two while seeking to build stronger

foundations for a better treaty and for achieving short term policy gains.

References

Haas, Peter M. 2004. When Does Power Listen to Truth? Journal of European Public Policy11 (4): 569592.

Haas, Peter M. and David McCabe. 2001. Ampliers or Dampeners: International Institu-tions and Social Learning in the Management of Global Environmental Risks. InLearning to Manage Global Environmental Risks, volume 1, edited by the SocialLearning Group, 323348. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.

Hoffmann, Matthew J. 2005. Whats Global about Global Governance? A ConstructivistAccount. In Contending Perspectives on Global Governance: Coherence, Contestationand World Order, edited by Alice D. Ba and Matthew J. Hoffmann, 110128.Routledge: New York.

IPCC. 2007. Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report. Summary for Policymakers. Geneva: In-tergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.

OECD. 2007. Key Environmental Indicators. Paris: OECD.Socolow, Robert, et al. 2004. Solving the Climate Problem. Environment46: 10 Decem-

ber.Victor, David. 2006. Toward Effective International Cooperation on Climate Change:

Numbers, Interests and Institutions. Global Environmental Politics 6 (3): 90103.

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Climate change after bali.pdf