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Closed Systems and Contradiction: The Kachin In and Out of History

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DOI: 10.2307/2801712

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Closed Systems and Contradiction: The Kachin In and Out of HistoryAuthor(s): David NugentSource: Man, New Series, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Sep., 1982), pp. 508-527Published by: Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and IrelandStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2801712 .Accessed: 20/01/2011 21:32

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CLOSED SYSTEMS AND CONTRADICTION: THE KACHIN IN AND OUT OF HISTORY

DAVID NUGENT

Columbia University

When the development of Kachin society is seen in a broad framework of changing macro- level political and economic forces in southeast-east Asia beginning in the eighteenth century, the much discussed notion of a gumsa/gumlao cycle must be rejected on the basis of the historical record. Until circa i88o Kachin society was consistently described as being composed of gumsa domains in which powerful chiefs exercised a control over substantial economic resources that was closely related to the thriving regional economy. With the collapse of the regional economy in the second half of the nineteenth century, Kachin chiefs lost control over the resources that had been the basis of their power. It was only after this that the first historical references to gumlao appeared.

The Kachin of Upper Burma have played an important role in the develop- ment of anthropological theory. The truly fascinating phenomenon of a society in constant movement between opposed conceptions of legitimate political order has stirred the anthropological imagination. Two influential theoretical works have emerged as a result. Edmund Leach's Political systems of highland Burma (I954) presents the original formulation of the gumsa-gumlao oscillation. Leach develops an explanation which relates characteristics of Kachin social organisation to the particulars of macro-level nineteenth-century Burmese power relations in accounting for the hypothesised gumsa-gumlao cycle. System, structure and contradiction in the evolution of 'Asiatic' socialformations, by Jonathan Friedman (I972; also I979), takes the gumsa-gumlao cycle as its point of departure and, springing from an entirely different intellectual tradition, looks to a different set of conditions and relations in accounting for it. My intention here is to offer yet another interpretation of the development of Kachin society. Specifically, I hope to show that gumlao developed for the first time during the last decades of the nineteenth century. Its emergence at this time can be at least partially understood in terms of major disruptions in the economy and polity of Upper Burma, and the specific ways in which the Kachin were affected by these disruptions.

Of the two works, Leach's alone attempts to examine the gumsa-gumlao cycle in the light of historical evidence. Therefore, a brief synopsis of his explanation for the breakdown of gumsa society follows, as well as a critique of the historical evidence he brings to bear in support of his hypothesis. This is

Man (N.S.) 17, 508-27

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followed by an examination of the changing position of the Kachin in the developing regional economy of south Asia-east Asia during the nineteenth century. Large-scale changes in the political stability of Upper Burma during the nineteenth century are also relevant. Friedman's work will be mentioned again only by implication, in the final section. Here I briefly sketch some of the implications of a general trend in anthropology, of which the three analyses of the Kachin are but one example: the continual process by which theoretical systems replace each other through time.

Political systems of highland Burma One unique aspect of a book remarkable for its originality and clarity of thought is Leach's conception of social reality. Unlike other social thinkers of the day, Leach claimed that social reality is caught in contradictions, and that an understanding of these contradictions allows us an understanding of the processes of social change. The contradictions of Kachin gumsa society, as they articulated with the specific character of regional-level political relations in Upper Burma during the nineteenth century, were responsible for the break- down of gumsa society.

Latent in Kachin gumsa society, according to Leach, is the contradiction between two different principles of social organisation: rank and affinity. Kachin society is organised on a segmentary lineage basis, and lineage segments are ranked in a status hierarchy of aristocrats, commoners and slaves. Within this framework of rank, a hierarchy of lineage segments is further established through the system of generalised marriage exchange. By the principle of rank, chiefly lineages possess territorial rights over domains of varying size, from single villages to a number of village clusters. These domains are passed on through generations by the rule of ultimogeniture. All who settle within the domain of a territorial chief owe him certain dues-a kind of feudal rent. The relationship between chief and settlers is thus a landlord-tenant relationship. But lineages are related affinally as well. In the system of generalised exchange wife-givers (mayu) are higher in status than wife-takers (dama). Furthermore, mayu-dama links within a village persist through time, and so reflect the major political status relations between the lineage segments. The mayu-dama relationship also carries its own set of social obligations, that mayu have toward their dama and vice versa. Because of the affinal relationship between lineage segments, there were ordinarily limits on the degree to which the landlord-tenant relationship could be exploited. This is the latent contradiction. But the development of the contradiction was dependent upon the nature of political relations between the Kachin and the valley-dwelling Shan.

In times of normal Shan-Kachin relations the latter were well-controlled by the former, and the gumsa system was stable. But as the power of the Shan States fell during the nineteenth century, relations between Shan and Kachin were reversed; the Kachin became the overlords of the Shan. This resulted in the power and influence of Kachin chiefs expanding greatly as they came to

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command new economic and political resources. In the process of doing so, however, two basic principles of gumsa society were violated. First, influential aristocrats who were denied the status of chief because of an accident of birth (they were not youngest-sons) renounced the principle of ultimogeniture, declaring themselves chiefs. Second, successful Kachin chiefs came to fashion themselves more and more after Shan saopha (princes). The relationship between a Shan saopha and the people in his domain is a strict landlord-tenant relationship. As Kachin chiefs attempted to 'become' Shan princes, they began emphasising the landlord-tenant dimension of their relationship to the people within their domains, ignoring the obligations mayu have toward their dama. In effect, they began treating their relatives as serfs, demanding rent in its various forms, but not reciprocating in the ways that gumsa rules stipulate.

As these fundamental rules of gumsa society were violated, the response on the part of affinal and lineage relatives, according to Leach, was to renounce a third principle of gumsa society, that of hierarchy. Individuals who had no claim to being chiefs were nonetheless taking that status for themselves. Furthermore, the chiefs were not fulfilling their obligations as chiefs-gumlao revolts occurred at that point in time when gumsa chiefs had themselves been led to ignore the formal rules of their systems. They were a natural outgrowth of the contradictions of gumsa society as these developed in the nineteenth century.

Leach recognises that the 'first intelligible statement published regarding the gumsa/gumlao opposition' appeared in I89I (Leach 1954: I99 n. 4, citing Walker I892: 257), but presents us with a series of short case studies in an attempt to show that gumlao revolts did in fact occur throughout the nineteenth century (I954: 207-9); and that they occurred as successful Kachin chiefs ignored their mayu-dama obligations (1954: 224-6). The former case studies, according to Leach, appear 'to be the best documented examples of gumlao instability through time' (1954: 207).

Leach's two 'best-documented cases'.

Case i. In Kawlu Ma Nawng's account [an account based on myth, published in 19421 the gumlao of the Hukawng Valley area originated in a revolt by the N'Dup-Dumsa ('blacksmith- priest') lineage of the Tsasen clan against their traditional chiefs. The N'Dup-Dumsa lineage today controls a large area in the north east of the Hukawng Valley; they consider themselves gumlao but their leaders have the power and status of chiefs-they do not 'eat thighs,' they do not erect chief's house posts, they do not dig ditches round their graves, but they were treated as chiefs by the Burmese authorities as early as I820 and were consistently referred to as chiefs by the British travellers of the I83os and the British Administrators who finally took control of the area a century later. Kawlu Ma Nawng recording these facts comments that it is very odd that both the Burmese and the British should have issued chiefs' appointment orders to people 'who do not acknowledge the right of even the existence of chiefs' (1954: 207-8).

Throughout the nineteenth century all the British to visit the Hukawng describe Kachin society as if it were gumsa in form. Nowhere is there any mention of gumlao, or anything even slightly resembling it, until close to the end of the century. By this time major political upheavals in western Yunnan and northern Burma had resulted in the destruction of the opium-based

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economy of the valley, thus undercutting the basis of power of gumsa chiefs. By the I940's the northeast of the valley appears to have been gumlao, while the headmen of the area has the status and power of chiefs. But by this time, again due to developments outside the valley proper, opium had begun to reassert itself.

While most Kachin villages in the Huk:iwng at the present [i.e., up to 19421 have some wet paddy and some taungya shifting rice cultivation, their main effort is devoted to opium cultivation. Conditions for opium cultivation in this area are favourable and the market was a very profitable one owing to the increasing restrictions on cultivation imposed by Government in other parts of the Kachin area (Leach 1946: 246).

The N'Dup Dumsa gumlao (those specifically referred to by Leach as being gumlao, but with headmen having the power and status of chiefs) were also apparently cultivating poppy at this time. Thus, the conditions originally responsible for the development of gumlao in the Hukawng had reversed themselves by the I940's. As they changed, the political structure shifted as well.

Case 2. The gumlao area which was regarded as the ,tons et origo of the gumlao movement by the English writers of the I890s was that part of the Triangle which includes the domains of Sagri Bum and N'Gum La. This area was supposed to have become gumlao for the first time around I870 [Walker I892, citing Elliot; Scott & Hardiman i9oo-i: vol. I, part I, 3701, though another authority gives the specific date of I858 [Scott & Hardiman I900-I: 4141.

In 1915 this area was still unadministered. At that date, (a) the headman of N'Gum La, a village of 42 houses, was one Lahpai Li. He was 'overlord of eight villages'. He was a gumlao. (b) The headman of Sagribum, Sumhka Sao Tawng, and his brother, Bumbu Sao Tawng, between them ruled over 24 villages, the two largest of which contained 65 and 32 houses. These men were both gumlao . . .

By I943 (a) the headman of N'Gum La was one Mangala Uri Nawbg . . . (b) the headman of Sagribum was Sumhka Zao. Neither of these individuals seemed to make any pretence at being gumlao. At that date they were reckoned to be two of the most influential and reliable of the chiefs of the Triangle area (Leach 1954: 208-9, original emphasis).

The background to this case is more complex than in the first. Leach identifies the Sagribum-N'Gum La area of the Triangle as that referred to by the English writers of the I8go's as being the point of origin of gumlao, citing Walker (i892) and Scott and Hardiman (i9co-I). Walker's statement (quoting Elliot) is given below in full.

Formerly every Kachin village was ruled by an hereditary official called a Sawbwa: the villages were obliged to cultivate his lands without compensation and were subject to many other imposts. These taxes having become very onerous a revolution was started about 20 years ago and spread very rapidly, chiefly in the tract between the Mali Kha and the 'Nmai Kha rivers [the Triangle], which led to the murder or deposition of a large number of the Sawbwas and the appointment of certain headmen . . . in their places. The villages which are now without Sawbwas are called Kamlao or 'rebel' villages, in contradistinction to the others, which are Kamsa or Sawbwa-owning villages (Walker I892: I64; see also Leach 1954: I98).

Nowhere in his account does Elliot identify a particular locality as being the origin point of the 'revolution'. Interestingly, the journal of an explorer to the Triangle in I879 describes Leach'sfons et origo of gumlao as follows:

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The Kansa [Gumsa?I Kachins stretch as far north as lat. 260, to Marapoon;1 they are a savage race, and each village is under its own swaba, or chief, who is supreme. Beyond Kansas are the Khanloung [Gumlao?J Kachins; these are described as a degree less savage and their swabas appear to be under a King-swaba, called Marangyee; he is more mighty than any other swaba, and has many adherents (Sandeman I882: 26i).2

The account is fascinating for a number of reasons. First, the Sagribum- N'Gum La area of the Triangle is clearly identified as being integrated into a large-scale gumsa domain (the area is north of 260N. latitude). Second, the area south of 260N. latitude (the Kansa-Kachin area) is described as being composed of separate villages, each with its own swaba or chief who is supreme (see fig. i). Does this refer to gumsa or gumlao? Leach claims gumlao. I would argue the opposite. Let us compare this account with the 'first intelligible statement published regarding the gumsa/gumlao opposition', which appeared ten years later.

The difficulty of a march through the Kachin country is greatly enhanced if the people of the villages passed through have no Sawbwas and are Kamlaos and not Kamsas. With an hereditary Sawbwa, if he is friendly, no trouble need be expected from the villagers, but in a Kamlao village, which is practically a small republic, the headman, however well meaning he may be, is quite unable to control the actions of any badly disposed villager (Walker 1892: 164; also cited in Leach I954: 199).

The difference between the two is pronounced. The latter clearly expresses the fundamental principle of gumlao-an egalitarian society in which there are no chiefs or status differentials. The former account is quite different. Here, the swaba or chief is supreme. The explorer of I879 travelled through the middle of Kansa Kachin territory. Had Kansa Kachin society been egalitarian he should have encountered the same difficulties in travelling that Walker describes above. He did not.

Nonetheless, the description of each village being a separate entity unto itself sounds much like gumlao. Or does it? It was mentioned earlier that the domain of an independent, thigh-eating chief can vary in size from a single village to a number of village clusters. This is critical. Leach says that areas of low population density are important in the Kachin Hills. These are the areas to which eldest sons of chiefly lineages can go with a small group of followers to establish themselves as thigh-eating chiefs. Because they are not youngest sons, and thus do not inherit domains from their fathers, they must make a ritual purchase of independent status from their youngest brothers. They can then establish themselves as chiefs in areas not claimed by other thigh-eating chiefs (Leach I954: I29-30). Much of the area referred to as Kansa Kachin territory in I879 Leach describes as of just such a low population density, in which each separate village is under its own independent, thigh-eating gumsa chief (1954: I7I; see also p. 234).

To return to the example, it would appear that: (a) north of latitude 26 in the Triangle (including the Sagribum-N'Gum La area) Kachin society was com- posed of large gumsa domains; (b) south of latitude 26 Kachin society was composed of very small gumsa domains. These latter are a normal and necess- ary by-product of the process of chiefly-lineage fission in gumsa society (1954: 260, I29-I30).

DAVID NUGENT 513

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By 91i5 the Sagribum-N'Gum La area was gumlao, but, as in the Hukawng Valley case, the headmen had the power and status of chiefs; by 1943 the formerly gumlao headmen of the area were considered 'two of the most influential and reliable of the chiefs of the Triangle'. But, as will become clear later, the conditions originally responsible for the development of gumlao in the closing decades of the nineteenth century had changed drastically by i9i5, resulting in major changes in the political structure of the Triangle. It is difficult to evaluate Kachin society of i9i5, or even I943. Yet regardless of how Kachin society developed subsequently, there is no evidence for the existence of gumlao prior to circa i88o.

These are the two 'best documented examples of gumlao instability' Leach has to offer. The following are cases he uses to illustrate the point that, in turning himself into a Shan saohpa, a Kachin chief violates the principles of gumsa, isolates himself from the support of his relatives, and brings on a gumlao revolt.

Repudiations of gumsa obligations.

Case a. Pyisa. When the British took over eastern Assam in i824, they found that the most influential Kachin (Singhpo) chief was one Pyisa Gam. He held a title from the Burmese King and during the Burmese regime in Assam had acquired, along with his fellow chiefs, vast numbers of Assamese slaves. His fellow chiefs were, like himself, mostly members of the Tangai lineage of the Tsasen clan but belonged to different sublineages . . . As soon as the Burmese withdrew from Assam, feuding broke out among these allied Tangai chiefs. Bitterness was intensified when the British deprived them of their slaves and later purloined all their best land for tea growing. The Pyisa Gam was treated as paramount chief by the British and thereby forfeited the allegiance of his fellow Kachins. But by I 840 the British had come to the conclusion that it was unnecessary to patronize the Kachins any longer and withdrew their support of the Pyisa chief as paramount. In the upshot he died in an Assam jail, having been imprisoned for life for attempted insurrection.

Case b. Daihpa. Daihpa Gam was a distant lineage brother ofthe Pyisa Gam above. The two were feud enemies. When the British supported Pyisa Gam as paramount in Assam, the rest of the Tangai lineage transferred their support to Daihpa. He was extremely successful. By I837 he had visited Ava, been loaded with presents and titles from the Burmese king, and negotiated on frontier problems with British emissaries. But at home in the Hukawng Valley he had to fight his own relatives in a gumlao revolt. He maintained his power for a while with the aid of Burmese troops but as soon as these were withdrawn, sometime around I 842, he ceased to be of any significance (Leach I954: 224).

Familiarity with the changing political relations between Burma and Great Britain in the Assam-Hukawng Valley border area, and the role the Kachin played in these relations, is necessary background to these examples.

From the middle of the eighteenth century the kingdom of Burma was engaged in a process of territorial expansion. In the first decades of the nineteenth century Burma began to expand into Manipur, and to a lesser extent, Assam. By I 8 I 8 they were challenging the British East India Company's control over parts of eastern Bengal. They occupied Assam in the early I820'S. Burmese forces were threatening all of eastern Bengal by I 824, and in March of that year Britain declared war on the Burmese. Later that year the British were

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in control of eastern Assam; the Treaty of Yandabo officially ceded Assam to Britain in I826 (Cady I958: 72-4).

The British in Assam at this time appear to have been afraid that the Burmese would attempt to retake Assam, while the Burmese feared the British in Assam would invade Burma. The only feasible route by which either army could mount an attack was via the Hukawng Valley. The Hukawng-Assam border area was therefore of great strategic importance to both. Political instability among the Kachin during this period, described briefly by Leach in the examples above, can be understood largely in terms of the actions of the British and the Burmese vis-d-vis the Kachin. There is no evidence the Pyisa Gam and Kaihpa Gam attempted to turn themselves into Shan princes, and in so doing violated fundamental principles of gumsa society. Rather, their rise and fall were a function of their changing relation to the expanding and contracting state systems in the area.

As the Burmese expanded into Assam during the early 1820'S they put their support behind Pyisa Gam, one of the more important chiefs, in order to facilitate control over the area. The power and status he enjoyed during this period were undoubtedly a function of his support by the Burmese state. When the British assumed control over Assam several years later, they appear to have supported him for the same reason. Thus, he continued to benefit from a degree of power and influence far beyond what he would have commanded had the British not been present (Leach I946: 438). By I840, after twenty years of backing by first one and then a second extremely powerful state system, Pyisa Gam was simply dismissed. Another Kachin chief was chosen to 'rule' in his place (Leach I946: 438-40).

Both the British and the Burmese attempted to use the Kachin of the border area for surveillance purposes. In an effort to keep track of possible Burmese military activity, and to create a kind of 'buffer zone', the British began providing important chiefs in the border area with arms and money (Pemberton 1835: 7I; Leach I946: 408). The Burmese kept a garrison of 2000 men at Mogaung, just to the east of the Hukawng Valley, at this time, and were supporting important Kachin chiefs in the valley proper. The most important was Daihpa Gam. Like Pyisa Gam, Daihpa Gam attained a position out of all proportion to what was 'normal' as a result of his strategic importance, but to the Burmese instead of the British. But when his support from the Burmese evaporated so did his position of power. This was followed by a struggle among the leading chiefs of the Hukawng. Power relations may have been upset further because the British had given arms to important chiefs to the west and north of the valley. Nowhere is there any indication of a gumlao movement.

Leach's other examples of this hypothesised tendency of powerful Kachin chiefs to turn themselves into Shan saohpas and thus violate fundamental principles of gumsa society, bringing on gumlao revolt, do not in fact document this tendency. Rather, with one exception, they demonstrate how powerful Kachin chiefs lost their positions of authority late in the nineteenth century due either to major disruptions in the economy of Upper Burma or to large-scale changes in the relationship between Kachin chiefs and the dominant

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state system in the area. The one exception is interesting as well. Here Leach provides us with the example of the powerful Kansi chiefs, who controlled the important jade mines area west of Kamaing. Because the jade trade was never seriously disrupted throughout the economic and political vicissitudes of the late nineteenth century, the Kansi chiefs, unlike most other Kachin chiefs, were able to retain their positions of power. Not only did they intermarry with Shans and style themselves after Shan saohpas, they also managed to live up to their mayu-dama obligations with local Kachin chiefs. In other words, the Kansi chiefs were able to 'become Shan soahpas' without bringing on gumlao revolt.

I have reviewed Leach's evidence for the existence of gumlao during the nineteenth century and found it lacking. Historical material relating to the Kachin during this period reveals not a single mention of anything resembling gumlao political organisation. This is true despite the fact that we have information on much of Upper Burma during the nineteenth century. Nor would there appear to be any evidence that successful Kachin chiefs tended to ignore kinship obligations, to stress landlord-tenant relationships, and thus to bring on gumlao revolts. In short, there would seem to be no evidence to support this admittedly clever argument. The historical data do reveal power- ful Kachin chiefs controlling large territorial domains throughout most of the nineteenth century who, because of macro-level changes in economic and political relations, lost the bases of their power. Following these changes we begin to find the first references to gumlao.

The Kachin in the south Asian-east Asian regional economy The northern reaches of Burma played a very important role in the south Asian- east Asian regional economy from an early date, and became increasingly integrated into the expanding world economy of the nineteenth century. But developments of the late nineteenth century ultimately resulted in the break- down of the economic and political systems. By the i88o's, normal economic activity had come to a standstill, and most established forms of legitimate political relations had been disrupted. It was amidst these chaotic conditions that gumlao first emerged in a remote corner of Upper Burma. Let us examine briefly the historical development of the major economic and political di- mensions of pre-British Upper Burma, as well as the position of the Kachin within this political-economic field. In this way we may see how seriously the existing economic and political orders were disrupted, as well as the effect this had on local-level political organisation.

Opium: production and trade. Opium use has a fairly long history in the China- Upper Burma area. The first Chinese Imperial prohibition on opium was issued in I 729, when foreign importation amounted to 200 chests a year (Morse 1908: 37I). Foreign opium probably did not reach many of the inland provinces in quantity, and much of the domestic need was filled by native production. It

DAVID NUGENT 5 I7

seems likely that at this early date domestic production was greater than foreign importation, and continued to be so into the nineteenth century as foreign imports increased (I908: 37I-2). Yunnan, the province in the south- west of China bordering on northern Burma, was always an important producer for domestic need.

In the history of that province [Yunnan], published in I736 it is stated that opium was then a common product of the department of Yung-ch'ang-fu, in the western part of that province, where it borders on Burma (FRROC I894: Appendix II, I56).

The capital of this department was at latitude 25007', longitude 99026', or due east of Myitkina, just across what is now the China-Burma border, and adjacent to the heart of the Kachin Hills (Playfair I910: 576). The citation is particularly interesting when it is kept in mind that the Yunnan-Burma border of 1736 was not that of the I980's. At this earlier date the border was well to the west, and most of what is now the Kachin Hills was part of western Yunnan, precisely the area that was producing opium. It was not until after I750 that the Burmese wrested the northern Shan states of Bhamo, Mongmit, Hsenwe, Mohnyin and Zimme from the Chinese, and in so doing gained control over the Kachin Hills (Luce I925: I 19).

Yunnan and Upper Burma continued to be important opium producers in the nineteenth century. Although the Kachin Hills were politically part of Burma from the middle of the eighteenth century, the political boundary was not an economic boundary and the hill tribes straddling the border between northeast Burma and Yunnan continued to be oriented economically toward China. In I836 the annual opium production of Yunnan was estimated to be 'many thousand piculs' (Morse I908: 377; I picul = I33 lb), while Bayfield, travelling in Upper Burma in I837, observed that poppy cultivation was universal among the Kachin as far west as the Hukawng Valley:

the cultivation of the poppy is now universal; every village has its plantation carefully fenced around, and with the exception of sufficient rice for their own consumption, some cotton and a coarse kind of pumpkin, it seems to be the only cultivation of the country (Bayfield 1873: 200-I).

Yunnan was exporting opium to other provinces in China by the I86o's (and probably much earlier), and Yunnanese opium was competing with expensive British monopoly imports in coastal Canton, and was present in Chinkiang, in I863 (Morse 1908: 378). By I875 it is estimated that one-third of the arable land of Yunnan was devoted to poppy (Morse I908: 378; McCoy I972: 370). In the same year Anderson (I876: I35), travelling through northern Burma into China, noted that poppy cultivation and use was universal 'from the Burmese plain to Momien' (this includes the Kachin Hills). In I879 Yunnan produced an estimated 3,325,000 pounds of opium, while Sandeman, also in I879, reports that

the extensive cultivation of the poppy as reported to exist in the neighbouring Chinese provinces of Szechuan and Yunnan, extends to the valley of the Irawadi (I882: 263).

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In i88i, Yunnan yielded approximately 5,320,000 pounds of opium, and, by I9OI, it was harvesting three thousand tons annually (McCoy I972: 64). The province was harvesting so much opium that it began exporting to southeast Asia in the last decades of the century. State-regulated opium monopolies charging exhorbitant prices had been established throughout southeast Asia and blackmarket Yunnanese opium, by undercutting the monopoly opium, 'became the staple of southeast Asia's addict population' (I972: 64). The entire economy of Yunnan became intimately tied to, and dependent on, opium production (Morse I908: 378; McCoy I972: 370). By I903, ?I.2 million of ?1.7 million total Yunnanese exports were derived from the sale of opium (McCoy I972: 370). But during the closing decades of the nineteenth century, opium production fell dramatically in Upper Burma. Because of political upheavals in western Yunnan and northern Burma the political frontier between the two countries became an economic frontier as well, and the economic ties that had united Yunnan and Burma were severed. Up until this time trading caravans representing powerful Chinese trading syndicates had plied their way through the hills of western Yunnan and northern Burma, providing the mechanism by which the various hill tribes could integrate themselves into the opium market.3 The power of the Chinese traders was substantial. Taking advantage of constant feuding in Kachin society they selectively supported Kachin chiefs of their choosing, effectively driving out competing chiefs. This expanded their own influence, and made the continuing authority of Kachin chiefs dependent upon their support (Walker I892: I67-8).

It was not until about I890 that conditions along the border had stabilised somewhat, affording the Kachin the opportunity to re-integrate themselves into the Yunnan opium market; historical documents show that at this time Kachin close to the border were indeed growing opium (for sale) in quantity, which was being transported into Yunnan for re-sale (ROC I894, Appendix 41: 5oi), while Kachin further west were still growing small quantities for local use. However, the continued spread and re-establishment of commercial opium production in the Kachin Hills this time was prevented by the British. For with the beginning of British administration came the suppression of large-scale poppy production among the Kachin. If we are to understand how these changes affected Kachin society, it is necessary to consider the inter- relationships between characteristics of poppy cultivation, the ecology of the area, and certain elements of Kachin social organisation.

The Kachin Hills are well suited to the production of opium. Generally, in order to produce successfully in this part of southeast Asia, opium poppies must be grown at elevations of over 3,000 ft above sea level (Feingold, pers. comm.; Mangrai I965: 7), although opium can be grown at much lower elevations in certain parts of the Kachin Hills. At the same time there is a great deal of micro-ecological differentiation in the Yunnan-Burma border area. Because poppy production has specific ecological requirements not all areas will produce opium (Feingold, pers. comm.). This connects with Kachin land tenure in an interesting manner. In Kachin society permanent usufructory rights to particular plots of land belong to the lineage that first cleared that land from virgin jungle or forest (Leach I954: II5, ISS). Because of micro-

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ecological differentiation and the fact that not all land will produce opium, certain lineages would have enjoyed permanent access to opium-producing land while others were permanently denied such access. In addition, because entire geographical areas are unable to produce poppy, those Kachin in such areas would have been at a permanent disadvantage in relation to Kachin living in areas where poppy could be grown. The implications this has for creating power differentials between different geographical areas of the Kachin Hills, as well as between lineages-thus legitimising the status hierarchy of aristocrats, commoners and slaves-should be apparent.

The institution of 'slavery' fed further into power differentials. Three aspects of Kachin slavery are of interest. First, slaves were 'owned' almost exclusively by chiefs, village headmen and wealthy individuals (Sandeman I882: 264; Leach I954: i6o). Second, slaves made up a large proportion of the total population-in places nearly half (Leach I954: I60). Third, although the institution of slavery in Kachin society was unlike chattel slavery, it is nonethe- less true that slaves were bound to provide their masters with heavy dues in labour services and in kind (1954: 299, citing Green 1934: 86-7). In addition, slave owners had access to a supply of labour that reproduced itself through time; the children of slaves remained slaves, and belonged to the owner that paid the bride price. This was true even if a slave man married a free woman (Leach 1954: i6o-i). When one considers that opium production is very labour intensive-8o per cent. more so than hill-rice (Feingold, pers. comm.)-and that chiefs and village headmen owned most slaves, the importance of slavery to the opium-based economy of the Kachin, and to the power of the chiefs and headmen, likewise becomes apparent.4

The importance of opium in Kachin society can further be gauged by the fact that it served, and continues to serve, several of the functions of money. The references are few, but are enough to indicate that opium was serving as a means of payment, as a medium of exchange and as a standard of value (Marx I977 [I867]: I90, I92, 2II-4, 233, 238-40; Polanyi I958: 243-70).5 In Sandeman's account of Alaga's journey to find the sources of the Irrawaddy in 1878 we find the following:

When a swaba, or chief, assembles a band of men for a plundering expedition, he does not pay them in coin, but gives them a certain weight in opium, and thus causes large numbers to follow him to attack and to destroy. Coin does not appear to be curren,, but opium is used instead; for this reason the explorers exchanged their money at Kacho for two lumps of opium (Sandeman I 882: 264).

MacGregor journeyed to the Putao-Hkamti Long area in I885. He found that

the Kamptis are not such inveterate consumers of the juice of the poppy as the Singphos [Kachins]. We found that the drug answered very well in the place of money when we bought rice for our party (MacGregor I887: 32).

Leach also suggests that opium was serving as a form of money during his stay in the Kachin Hills. In discussing a bride price transaction of the chiefly family of the Layawng of the Kadaw branch of the Lahtaw clan, the bride price is said to have been: 2 cattle, i viss of silver, i viss of opium and 2 guns. But

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rather than these goods themselves being given, the entire transaction was carried out in opium (Leach I954: I50-I). Finally, Feingold (pers. comm.) reports that, as of the early I970's, opium served as a general currency throughout the hill-tribes area.

General trade. As mentioned above, the economic orientation of Upper Burma during the nineteenth century was towards China rather than Lower Burma. This was formally recognised by the Burmese government. Hannay, in Upper Burma in I835, noted

the trade to the north of Ava (inear Maindalay) is entirely in the hands of the Chinese, and the individuals of that nation residing at Ava have always been vigilant in trying to prevent any interferencc with their nmonopoly (Peniberton i837: 248).

The Chinese were successful in preventing outside interference, for only Chinese were allowed above a point 70 miles north of Ava on the Irrawaddy. 'Tsampaynago is the northernmost point on the Irrawaddy that natives [of Burma] may proceed without an express order from the government' (I837: 250). Most of the Burma-China trade was routed through Bhamo (in the Kachin Hills), on the Irrawaddy. The volume of the trade was huge.

Of imported raw silk alone, Crawford estimated that the value, on infornmation obtained from the Chinese mnerchants engaged in the trade, at i8 ,ooo sterling, and the cotton exported by the same class of men, at ?228,000. The total amount of the export and import trade had been variously stated to him at from ?400,000 to ?700,000 sterling, of which the two articles of cotton and silk alone would constitute a proportion of ?309,000; and though we may suppose these estimates to be in excess, it is sufficiently evident, that the trade is of such value, as to be an object of great nationial importance (Pemberton I835: 556).

In i855, the value of the China-Burma trade going through Bhamo was estimated at i5oo,ooo sterling (Leach I946: 556).

Jade was among the most important of the goods leaving Upper Burma for China. The traditional source of Chinese jade was Chinese Turkestan, but in the seventeenth century this supply was almost exhausted (I946: 556). After the beginning of the eighteenth century, the jade deposits in Upper Burma to the west of Kamaing became the main source of jade for all China, and continued to be so for two centuries (I946: 290). In I83 I, it was estimated that at least 8oo Chinese and 6oo Shans were working in the jade trade in the area near Kamaing (I946: 29I). In I874, the Burmese crown collected more than Rs 6o,ooo from jade, and under the British the annual revenue frequently exceeded Rs I,000,000 (I946: 556, citing RNEF I920-I923).

Amber and serpentine were other important products sought after by the Chinese. South and east of the Hukawng Valley were important deposits of amber. Although there are no figures on the volume of the amber trade, it is apparent from historical documents that it was of considerable importance (for example, Pemberton I837). Serpentine occurred in the area around Mogaung. In I83S, it was estimated that at peak seasons of the year as many as I,000 men were digging for serpentine (I837: 277).

But the same political upheavals that were responsible for the fall in opium production in Upper Burma had equally disastrous effects on the China-

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Burma trade. By the i86o's this formerly voluminous trade had shrunk to practically nothing, and did not recover for decades (Cady I958: I06-7). To understand the effect of this change on the Kachin Hills, we must consider the relationship between the trans-border trade and the political structure of Kachin society.

Goods travelling between China and Upper Burma went overland through the Kachin Hills by means of several habitually-used trade routes. From north to south, the most important of these crossed the Kachin Hills near Hpimaw- Htawgaw, Sadon-Waingmaw and Sinlum-Bhamo (Leach I946: 552; I954: 28). Kachin whose territory the trade routes passed through collected tolls from the passing caravans.

On all trade routes passing through hill areas-and owing to the nature of the country it was impossible for trade caravans to avoid the hills-tolls were levied by those who claimed the right to maintain the roads and 'protect' the passersby (Leach I946: 303).

Tolls from passing caravans were strictly the property of thigh-eating chiefs, and not of village headmen (Leach I954: i88). The power and influence of these chiefs, and they were the most powerful in their respective areas, was largely dependent upon trade revenue (Leach I946: 536-64). 'Income from tolls from transit caravans was in the past an important element in the economy of the whole zone. It was the major source of power of the leading gumsa chiefs in the igth century' (Leach I954: 237). Leach also notes that in every case where this outside tribute had become available the Kachin chief had turned himself into a petty Shan saohpa. The political structure of this section of the Kachin Hills was heavily influenced by the presence of and control over the trade routes.

Political instability: western Yunnan and Upper Burma During most of the nineteenth century the political structure of Kachin society was closely tied to the thriving regional economy of southeast-east Asia. Most aspects of the regional economy underwent collapse during the second half of the nineteenth century. Responsible were the Panthay Rebellion in Yunnan, i855-i873, and the political instability throughout Upper Burma and the Shan states circa I879-I889.6

In I855, a small Sunni Moslem sect in Yunnan known to the British as the Panthays rebelled against the Manchu Chinese (Cady I958: I06). The rebellion in western Yunnan was headed by TuWen-hsiu who, from his capital at Tali, controlled all of western Yunnan as far as the Burmese border (Feuerwerker I975: 43). Peking's response to the rebellion was 'to encourage freebooters, mainly Chinese and Shans, to harass the fledgling Panthay state' (Cady I958: I06). One of the casualties of the resulting instability was the China-Burma trade: 'only to the extent that Chinese merchants at Bhamo or Mandalay were able to bribe the freebooters did a trickle of trace continue to come through' (I958: I06). With the end of the Panthay Rebellion in I873, the British hoped that trade would redevelop to its former level. But western Yunnan had been

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devastated by nearly twenty years of fighting. This, combined with the fact that conditions along the border continued to be unstable, meant that the area could not recover its former place in the regional economy.

By the second half of the nineteenth century the kingdom of Burma was experiencing great difficulties. The British annexed Lower Burma in I852, which quickly led to the economic and political disintegration of what remained of independent Upper Burma. The Shan states, which had only recently been brought into the orbit of the Burmese state (since about 1750), perceived the weakness at the centre, and began asserting their independence in the late I870's. Singly, and in groups of allied states, the Shan began to move against the Burmese. In addition, conflicts between Shan states began to develop in the i88o's. The Burmese attempted to retain control, but, faced with widespread insurrection and civil strife close to the capital, were not able to devote the necessary troops to the Shan states (including the Kachin Hills area).

In Upper Burma generally, the breakdown of state control resulted in increasing lawlessness and disorder.

Bands of armed brigands, some of considerable strength under active leaders, sprang up every- where. Formed in the first instance as a protest against state extortion, they soon began to live on the country and to terrorize the peasantry (Crosthwaite I9I2: 6-7).

As a result of the fighting and generally unstable conditions, normal economic activity ceased; large areas of paddy plain were uncultivated, and trade ceased almost entirely. The British annexed Upper Burma in i886, and between i886 and I889 took to 'pacifying' the area. By I889, they had turned their attention to the Kachin. In a series of punitive expeditions stretched out over several years, the British unquestionably demonstrated their dominance in the Kachin Hills. Their practice was to destroy all villages that did not recognise the British as the paramount power of the area, and submit to the requirements of British colonial administrative policy. In I889 alone, 46 villages containing 639 houses were burned by four British punitive columns; i8,ooo lb of paddy were destroyed in one village alone. Punitive expeditions continued in I890 and I89I, until most chiefs had submitted to the British.

With the advent of British administration, disruptions of the Kachin economic and political orders continued, but took new forms. British ad- ministrative policy generally was to treat every village as a separate political entity, and to treat the headman of each village as a gumsa chief. Thus, the remaining large gumsa domains were broken up, but the principle of gumsa was actively encouraged. In addition all Kachin 'slaves' were released; chiefs and headmen were forbidden to exact the 'protection' tax from neighbouring Shan communities that they had been accustomed to collecting; Kachin chiefs were permanently denied the right to collect tolls from passing trade caravans; chiefs and headmen were forbidden to raid neighbouring Shan communities for more slaves; large-scale opium production was suppressed. British ad- ministrative policy continued what thirty years of political instability had begun, but in a much more thorough manner: the destruction of the Kachin economy. For without the revenue from trading caravans the most important

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Kachin chiefs in the border area lost the basis of their power. And with the suppression of large-scale poppy production, and a significantly reduced labour supply (slaves), producing opium commercially became very difficult and costly.

This is not true, however, of the Triangle area, which remained un- administered until the late 1920'S. Although the Triangle was adversely affected by the Panthay Rebellion and the political instability in Upper Burma in the i88os, British-Chinese relations were normalised by the I890's. As the trans-border trade revived Triangle chiefs continued to collect tolls from trading caravans, while chiefs in administered areas did not; continuing slavery in the Triangle provided chiefs and headmen with an abundant supply of labour for opium production (slavery was forbidden in administered areas); in areas administered by the British, large-scale opium production was sup- pressed whereas in the Triangle it was not. Thus, although the conditions originally responsible for the development of gumlao affected the Burma- China border area of the Kachin Hills more or less equally, the beginning of British administration changed this. Chiefs and headmen in administered areas found themselves faced with the same problems they had experienced for three decades, while Triangle chiefs and headmen found that these conditions no longer existed. The subsequent development of Kachin society in the Triangle is therefore very different from its development in administered areas-hence the difficulty of evaluating Triangle political relations in 1915 (see above).

Historical data reveal, then, that during the nineteenth century the Kachin Hills were dominated by powerful gumsa chiefs who exercised control over large territorial domains. The power of these chiefs was dependent upon their ability to control real economic resources (Leach 1954: 232-3), the most important of which were opium, slaves and tolls from the trans-frontier trade. During the second half of the nineteenth century, political upheavals in Yunnan and Upper Burma resulted in the destruction of the regional economy; the economic resources which had provided the basis of power of Kachin chiefs virtually disappeared. Only after these major disruptions had occurred do we find references to gumlao in the historical record.

Closed systems and contradiction As I was reading the historical and ethnographic material on which Leach based his analysis, and the additional material that my re-analysis is based on, I was struck by several things. First, it is obvious that one chooses to stress certain aspects of the totality of the documentary record and to ignore others. It was fascinating for me to see just what Leach had stressed, and what he had been forced to ignore, in order to 'create' his Kachin reality. I have created mine in much the same manner. This is not meant as a criticism of either, in that such selection and manipulation is a necessary part of the process of creation. Second, once my own analysis began to take shape I found it equally fascinating that, with some major exceptions, virtually all the data I had chosen to use could be found in Leach's work. The data that he has used and the data

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that I have used interpenetrate each other. They are part of a totality. What changes from one analysis to the next is which dimensions of this totality are brought out, and which are made to recede into the background. In this final section I want to draw out in general terms what these observations suggest from the perspective of Leach's-and Friedman's-and my analysis as a whole.

It is seldom difficult to develop a new interpretation of an old problem with the passing of time. Indeed, as new theories add fresh intellectual life to the discipline, it seems inevitable. This process emerges as a much more significant fact than any of the analyses themselves; the most constant feature of 'science' in its many varieties is the continual replacement of one theory by another. This is a 'fact' which needs to be addressed, and accorded the significance it deserves.

The genesis of theoretical systems necessarily contains contradictions which ultimately result in the systems becoming obsolete and replaced. Based on a series of assumptions about relationships between phenomena, a theoretical system attempts to delimit a universe of data within which to operate. In the course of this, certain ranges of phenomena and sets of relationships are consciously excluded from consideration-are considered not relevant-and others are explicitly included. Put simply, theories define data and non-data, relevant and non-relevant realms, in the act of their creation. They create the very specific conditions under which they will operate, and exclude those under which they will not. Theories are constructed as closed systems of thought. For whatever problem is encountered will almost inevitably be approached from the perspective of the original assumptions of the theory. And the kind of problem approached is itself defined and limited by these same assumptions.

There is an attempt, then, to define a finite 'object' for study and analysis. But this object is a socially defined entity, subject to change as the social context from which it emerges changes (as the specific history of the treatment of the Kachin, and the general history of the discipline as a whole suggest). Not only is the object of analysis continually redefined, but the attempt of all such definitions to isolate and segment, to create a closed, finite object further complicates the matter. For as the social object is redefined, so too are the segments and boundaries, the data then appear to have new dimensions, and what were formerly carefully delimited spheres of data and non-data blur; it is seen that the non-data are contained within the data. Thus, although such closed systems 'work' because they are constructed so as to have to work, the discovery that they do not work is also inevitable.

This process has often been seen as resulting from a constant and necessary dialectic between reality and its social construction (Simmel I968; Murphy 1971). However, one of the lessons of anthropology is that there are societies which do not experience such qualitative shifts, and which do not have such a strict 'object-relation' with their surroundings. Rather than a necessary dialectic, in our own society the process would seem to result from a socially-created dialectic in which a particular way of constructing reality (our own, as closed and static) attempts to 'make sense of' what is perceived to be an external, objectifiable world.

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Leach's, Friedman's and my analyses are, in effect, distinct paradigmatic statements (Kuhn I962). And as closed systems of thought, each necessarily implying its own problems and approach, its own field of data and non-data, and containing its own contradictions, each is a manifestation of group consciousness in the context of 'modern' Western social science. Placing the three on an equal footing at this level-is not meant to call into question the validity of the preceding analysis. Nor should it be construed as a plea for relativism. Rather, it is meant to redirect some of our attention towards examining the social context which makes the production of such changing theoretical systems not only possible but inevitable-to the sociological con- ditions which make a 'fact' of relativism within our own society as well as to those which have increasingly made a 'fact' of global political-economic processes in others. And finally, regardless of the accuracy or not of the re-analysis attempted in this article, that it reproduces at its core the same socially-created relation between the anthropological community and an externalised 'object' should give us pause. For although we may lay bare the actual structures and dynamics of modern social processes, if we continue to ground our understandings on the epistemological and ontological foundations of these same social processes then our analyses will remain caught within the same limitations and contradictions through which our society is reproduced. In academia this manifests itself in the following manner: the closed systems of academic thought which form the substance of academic debate have almost no effect upon, nor almost anything to do with, the 'lived reality' of the lives of academics or of the people they study. It is this lack of inter-penetration which appears to be responsible for the fact of relativism in our field. That is, closed systems must remain ideological not because they are not true, but because whether or not they are true does not matter. As symbol systems disarticulated from any living reality, but still forced to perform the social functions all symbol systems must perform, they become fetishised within the closed social system of academia. And because such reified symbols cannot possibly lend consistent meaning to our lives, groups coalesce around almost any re-definition of a problem which appears for a time to have any kind of freshness, any kind of reality. But these eventually stagnate and die. And die they must, for they have limited potential to penetrate into any 'lived reality'.7

This, then, is the effect of the socially-created dialectic of the modern world within the confines of academia. And yet, at a very basic level, this same socially-created dialectic is at the basis of global economic and political processes. It is important to understand the manner in which the world is being transformed before our eyes, but largely outside of our volition and conscious- ness. This, like the focus on relativism, however, remains caught on only one side of the dialectic; and in this way it mirrors the split at the basis of modern social processes. That is, it is the 'fact' of the socially-created dialectic referred to above which allows relativism and political economy to be 'true' simul- taneously, with no necessary contradiction existing between them.

Rather than remaining caught on either side of the dialectic, however, it is urged that we go beyond such relative and 'positive' formulations to question the underlying relation between the anthropological subject and its object.

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Only by including the anthropologist and the anthropological community in our understanding of society can we avoid the 'intellectual imperialism' which currently marks our profession by implicitly separating us from social pro- cesses generally. That is, a viable 'theory of practice' cannot emerge until anthropologists 'rethink' the epistemological and ontological underpinnings of their own work. Only in this way will we come to understand ourselves well enough to begin to understand others.

NOTES

I am indebted to DrJoan Vincent, Dr Eric Wolf, Dr Morton Fried, Dr Marvin Harris, Dr David Feingold, Ashraf Ghani, Colin Marshall Gorman, Tom Biolsi, Jessica Scheer, Brian Burkhalter, Lina Brock, Constantine Hriskos and the DLO for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. (In particular, Brian Burkhalter carefully read the manuscript, and applied his considerable editorial capabilities towards its clarification. Whatever mistakes remain exist only because I unwisely chose not to follow his suggestions at times.) Finally I must thank Professor Edmund Leach. Political systems of highland Burma is truly a landmark work in our field, anticipating by decades any number of theoretical and substantive matters now at the foundation of anthropology.

1 Marapoon is actually located at lat. 25050', long. 97?45'. 2 Also cited in Leach (I954: I99n). 3 The Kachin could also dispose of their opium in local Shan villages, which in turn were

connected with wider trade networks. 4 Local Shan villages, which were raided, were the main source of slaves after about I 824. In the

years of the Burmese expansion into Assam large numbers of slaves were acquired by the Kachin there as well. Green I934 refers to an unpublished typescript, 'The tribes of Upper Burma'.

5 I am indebted to Ashraf Ghani for pointing out the similarity between Marx's and Polanyi's views on the different functions of money. See Ghani (n.d.). 6 This is not meant to imply that there were no disruptions in Upper Burma before the second half of the nineteenth century-only that the main dimensions of the regional economy outlined above were not seriously affected by them.

7 This should not be construed to imply progressive improvement of closed systems through time, as is also evidenced by the Kachin case.

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