4:

. —: :b

Closing In:Marines in the Seizure of Iwo Jimaby Colonel Joseph H. Alexander, USMC (Ret)

unday, 4 March 1945,marked the end of thesecond week of theU.S. invasion of IwoJima. By this point

the assault elements of the 3d, 4th,and 5th Marine Divisions were ex-hausted, their combat efficiencyreduced to dangerously low levels.The thrilling sight of the Americanflag being raised by the 28th Marineson Mount Suribachi had occurred 10days earlier, a lifetime on "SulphurIsland." The landing forces of the VAmphibious Corps (VAC) had al-ready sustained 13,000 casualties, in-cluding 3,000 dead. The "front lines"were a jagged serration across Iwo'sfat northern half, still in the middleof the main Japanese defenses. Aheadthe going seemed all uphill against awell-disciplined, rarely visible enemy.

In the center of the island, the 3dMarine Division units had been upmost of the night repelling a smallbut determined Japanese counterat-tack which had found the seam be-tween the 21st and 9th Marines.Vicious close combat had cost bothsides heavy casualties. The counter-attack spoiled the division's prepara-tions for a morning advance. Bothregiments made marginal gainsagainst very stiff opposition.

To the east the 4th Marine Divi-

On the Cover: Marines of Company E,2d Battalion, 28th Marines, lower thefirst flag raised over Mount Suribachi,while other men raise a second flagwhich became the subject of AssociatedPress photographer Joe Rosenthal'sworld-famous photograph. Departmentof Defense Photo (USMC) 112718At left: A Marine flamethrower opera-tor moves forward to assault a Japanesepillbox on Motoyama Airfield. Depart-ment of Defense Photo (USMC) 111006.

sion had finally captured Hill 382,ending its long exposure in "The Am-phitheater;' but combat efficiencyhad fallen to 50 percent. It woulddrop another five points by nightfall.On this day the 24th Marines, sup-ported by flame tanks, advanced atotal of 100 yards, pausing todetonate more than a ton of explo-sives against enemy cave positions inthat sector. The 23d and 25th Ma-rines entered the most difficult ter-rain yet encountered, broken groundthat limited visibility to only a fewfeet.

Along the western flank, the 5thMarine Division had just seized NishiRidge and Hill 362-B the previousday, suffering more than 500 casual-ties. It too had been up most ofthe night engaging a sizeable force of

1

infiltrators. The Sunday morning at-tacks lacked coordination, reflectingthe division's collective exhaustion.Most rifle companies were at half-strength. The net gain for the day, thedivision reported, was "practicallynil."

But the battle was beginning totake its toll on the Japanese garrisonas well. General TadamichiKuribayashi knew his 109th Divisionhad inflicted heavy casualties on theattacking Marines, yet his own loss-es had been comparable. The Ameri-can capture of the key hills in themain defense sector the day beforedeprived him of his invaluable ar-tillery observation sites. His brilliantchief of artillery, Colonel ChosakuKaido, lay dying. On this dateKuribayashi moved his own com-

pheaded back to its base in Tinian.The Marines cheered.

The battle of Iwo Jima would rageon for another 22 days, claimingeleven thousand more Americancasualties and the lives of virtuallythe entire Japanese garrison. Thiswas a colossal fight between twowell-armed, veteran forces — the big-gest and bloodiest battle in the his-tory of the United States MarineCorps. From the 4th of March on,however, the leaders of both sides en-tertained no doubts as to the ultimateoutcome.

Assault Preparations

mand post from the central highlandsto a large cave on the northwestcoast. The usual blandishments fromImperial General Headquarters inTokyo reached him by radio that af-ternoon, but Kuribayashi was in nomood for heroic rhetoric. "Send meair and naval support and I will holdthe island;' he signalled. "Withoutthem I cannot hold:'

That afternoon the fighting men ofboth sides witnessed a harbinger ofIwo Jima's fate. Through the overcastskies appeared a gigantic silver bom-ber, the largest aircraft anyone hadever seen. It was the Boeing B-29 Su-per Fortress "Dinah Might," crippled

in a raid over Tokyo, seeking anemergency landing on the island'sscruffy main airstrip. As the Ameri-cans in the vicinity held their breaths,the big bomber swooped in from thesouth, landed heavily, clipped a fieldtelephone pole with a wing, andshuddered to a stop less than 50 feetfrom the bitter end of the strip. Pi-lot Lieutenant Fred Malo and his10-man crew were extremely glad tobe alive, but they didn't stay long.Every Japanese gunner within rangewanted to bag this prize. Mechanicsmade field repairs within a half hour.Then the 65-ton Superfort lumberedaloft through a hail of enemy fire and

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Iwo Jima was one of those rareamphibious landings where the as-sault troops could clearly see thevalue of the objective. They were thefirst ground units to approach withina thousand miles of the Japanesehomeland, and they were participat-ing directly in the support of the stra-tegic bombing campaign.

The latter element represented anew wrinkle on an old theme. For 40years the U.S. Marines had been de-veloping the capability for seizing ad-vanced naval bases in support of thefleet. Increasingly in the PacificWar — and most especially at Saipan,Tinian, and now Iwo Jima — theywere seizing advanced airbases to fur-ther the strategic bombing of theJapanese home islands.

American servicemen had await-ed the coming of the B-29s for years.The "very-long-range" bombers,which had become operational toolate for the European War, had beenstriking mainland Japan sinceNovember 1944. Results proved dis-appointing. The problem stemmednot from the pilots or planes butrather from a vexing little spit of vol-canic rock lying halfway along thedirect path from Saipan to Tokyo —Iwo Jima. Iwo's radar gave theJapanese defense authorities twohours advance notice of every B-29strike. Japanese fighters based on Iwoswarmed up to harass the unescort-ed Superforts going in and especial-

Marine Corps Art Collection"Silence in the Gorge," an acrylic painting on masonite by Col Charles H. Water-ho use, USMCR (Ret), who as private first class was wounded during the battle.

iy coming home, picking off thosebombers crippled by antiaircraft(AA) fire. As a result, the B-29s hadto fly higher, along circuitous routes,with a reduced payload. At the sametime, enemy bombers based on Iwooften raided B-29 bases in the Man-anas, causing some damage.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff decidedIwo Jima must be captured and aU.S. airbase built there. This wouldeliminate Japanese bombing raidsand the early warning interceptions,provide fighter escorts throughoutthe most dangerous portion of thelong B-29 missions, and enable great-er payloads at longer ranges. IwoJima in American hands would alsoprovide a welcome emergency fieldfor crippled B-29s returning fromTokyo. It would also protect theflank of the pending invasion ofOkinawa. In October 1944 the JointChiefs directed Fleet Admiral ChesterW. Nimitz, CinCPac, to seize and de-velop Iwo Jima within the ensuingthree months. This launched Oper-ation Detachment.

The first enemy in the campaignwould prove to be the island itself,an ugly, barren, foul-smelling chunkof volcanic sand and rock, barely 10square miles in size. Iwo Jima means"Sulphur Island" in Japanese. Asdescribed by one Imperial Army staffofficer, the place was "an island ofsulphur, no water, no sparrow, noswaIlow' Less poetic Americanofficers saw Iwo's resemblance to apork chop, with the 556-foot dor-mant volcano Mount Suribachidominating the narrow southernend, overlooking the only potentiallanding beaches. To the north, theland rose unevenly onto the Motoya-ma Plateau, falling off sharply alongthe coasts into steep cliffs andcanyons. The terrain in the northrepresented a defender's dream:broken, convoluted, cave-dotted, a"jungle of stone." Wreathed by vol-canic steam, the twisted landscapeappeared ungodly, almost moon-like.More than one surviving Marine

compared the island to somethingout of Dante's Inferno.

Forbidding Iwo Jima had tworedeeming features in 1945: the mili-tary value of its airfields and the psy-chological status of the island as ahistorical possession of Japan. IwoJima lay in Japan's "Inner VitalDefense Zone" and was in fact ad-ministered as part of the TokyoPrefecture. In the words of oneJapanese officer, "Iwo Jima is thedoorkeeper to the Imperial capital."Even by the slowest aircraft, Tokyocould be reached in three flight hoursfrom Iwo. In the battle for Iwo Jima,a total of 28,000 Americans andJapanese would give their lives insavage fighting during the last wintermonths of 1945.

No one on the American side eversuggested that taking Iwo Jimawould be an easy proposition. Ad-miral Nimitz assigned this mission tothe same team which had prevailedso effectively in the earlier amphibi-ous assaults in the Gilberts, Mar-shalls, and Marianas: Admiral Ray-mond A. Spruance, commanding theFifth Fleet; Vice Admiral RichmondKelly Turner, commanding the Ex-peditionary Forces; and Rear Ad-miral Harry W. Hill, commandingthe Attack Force. Spruance added thehighly regarded Rear Admiral Wil-liam H. P. Blandy, a veteran of thePeleliu/Angaur landings, to com-mand the Amphibious SupportForces, responsible for minesweep-ing, underwater demolition teamoperations, and preliminary naval airand gun bombardment.

As usual, "maintaining unremit-ting military pressure on the enemy"meant an accelerated planning sched-ule and an overriding emphasis onspeed of execution. The amphibioustask force preparing to assault IwoJima soon found itself squeezed onboth ends. Hill and Blandy had acritical need for the amphibiousships, landing craft, and shore bom-bardment vessels currently beingused by General Douglas MacArthur

3

in his reconquest of Luzon in thePhilippines. But bad weather andstiff enemy resistance combined todelay completion of that operation.The Joint Chiefs reluctantly post-poned D-day for Iwo Jima from 20January 1945 until 19 February. Thetail end of the schedule provided norelief. D-Day for Okinawa could gono later than 1 April because of theapproach of the monsoon season.The constricted time frame for Iwowould have grave implications for thelanding force.

The experienced V AmphibiousCorps under Major General HarrySchmidt, USMC, would provide thelanding force, an unprecedented as-sembly of three Marine divisions, the3d, 4th, and 5th. Schmidt wouldhave the distinction of commandingthe largest force of U.S. Marines evercommitted in a single battle, a com-bined force which eventually totalledmore than 80,000 men. Well abovehalf of these Marines were veteransof earlier fighting in the Pacific;realistic training had prepared thenewcomers well. The troops assault-ing Iwo Jima were arguably the mostproficient amphibious forces theworld had seen.

Unfortunately, two senior Marinesshared the limelight for the Iwo Jimabattle, and history has often doneboth an injustice. Spruance andTurner prevailed upon LieutenantGeneral Holland M. Smith, thencommanding Fleet Marine Forces, Pa-cific to participate in OperationDetachment as Commanding Gener-al, Expeditionary Troops. This wasa gratuitous billet. Schmidt had therank, experience, staff, and resourcesto execute corps-level responsibilitywithout being second-guessed byanother headquarters. Smith, theamphibious pioneer and veteran oflandings in the Aleutians, Gilberts,Marshalls, and Marianas, admittedto being embarrassed by the assign-ment. "My sun had almost set bythen;' he stated, "1 think they askedme along only in case something

happened to Harry Schmidt." Smithtried to keep out of Schmidt's way,but his subsequent decision to with-hold commitment of the 3d Marines,the Expeditionary Troops reserve, re-mains as controversial today as it wasin 1945.

Holland Smith was an undeniableasset to the Iwo Jima campaign. Dur-ing the top-level planning stage hewas often, as always, a "voice in thewilderness;' predicting severe casual-ties unless greater and more effectivepreliminary naval bombardment wasprovided. He diverted the press andthe visiting dignitaries from Schmidt,always providing realistic counter-points to some of the rosier staff es-timates. "It's a tough proposition;'Smith would say about Iwo, "That'swhy we are here."

General Schmidt, whose few pub-lic pronouncements left him saddledwith the unfortunate prediction of a10-day conquest of Iwo Jima, cameto resent the perceived role HollandSmith played in post-war accounts.As he would forcibly state:

I was the commander of alltroops on Iwo Jima at all times.Holland Smith never had acommand post ashore, never is-sued a single order ashore,never spent a single nightashore . . . . Isn't it importantfrom an historical standpointthat I commanded the greatestnumber of Marines ever to beengaged in a single action in the

entire history of the MarineCorps?

General Smith would not disagreewith those points. Smith provided auseful role, but Schmidt and his ex-ceptional staff deserve maximumcredit for planning and executing thedifficult and bloody battle of IwoJima.

The V Amphibious Corps achieve-ment was made even more memora-ble by the enormously difficultopposition provided by the islandand the enemy. In Lieutenant GeneralTadamichi Kuribayashi [see sidebar],the Americans faced one of the mostformidable opponents of the war. Afifth-generation samurai, hand-picked and personally extolled by theEmperor, Kuribayashi combinedcombat experience with an innova-tive mind and an iron will. Althoughthis would be his only combatagainst American forces, he hadlearned much about his prospectiveopponents from earlier service in theUnited States. More significantly, hecould appraise with an unblinkingeye the results of previous Japaneseattempts to repel American invasionsof Japanese-held garrisons. Heroicrhetoric aside, Kuribayashi saw littleto commend the "defend-at-the-water's-edge" tactics and "all-or-nothing" Banzai attacks which hadcharacterized Japan's failures fromTarawa to Tinian. Kuribayashi, arealist, also knew not to expect muchhelp from Japan's depleted fleet andair forces. His best chances, he con-

4

cluded, would be to maximize Iwo'sforbidding terrain with a defense indepth, along the pattern of the recentBiak and Peleliu defensive efforts. Hewould eschew coast defense, anti-landing, and Banzai tactics and in-stead conduct a prolonged battle ofattrition, a war of nerves, patience,and time. Possibly the Americanswould lose heart and abandon thecampaign.

Such a seemingly passive policy,even that late in the war, seemedrevolutionary to senior JapaneseArmy and Navy leaders. It ran coun-ter to the deeply ingrained warriorcode, which viewed the defensive asonly an unpleasant interim pendingresumption of the glorious offensivein which one could destroy the ene-my with sword and bayonet. EvenImperial General Headquarters grewnervous. There is some evidence ofa top-level request for guidance indefending against American "stormlandings" from Nazi Germany, whosesad experience in trying to defendNormandy at the water's edge hadproven disastrous. The Japanese re-mained unconvinced. Kuribayashineeded every bit of his top connec-tions with the Emperor to keep frombeing summarily relieved for his rad-ical proposals. His was not a com-plete organizational victory — theNavy insisted on building gun case-mates and blockhouses along the ob-vious landing beaches on Iwo — butin general he prevailed.

Kuribayashi demanded the as-sistance of the finest mining engineersand fortifications specialists in theEmpire. Here again, the island fa-vored the defender. Iwo's volcanicsand mixed readily with cement toproduce superior concrete for instal-lations; the soft rock lent itself torapid digging. Half the garrison layaside their weapons to labor withpick and spade. When Americanheavy bombers from the Seventh AirForce commenced a daily poundingof the island in early December 1944,Kuribayashi simply moved every-

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 109649Burdened with heavy packs and equipment, Marine communicators dash for coverwhile advancing under heavy fire during the drive inland from the beaches.

thing — weapons, command posts,barracks, aid stations—under-ground. These engineering achieve-ments were remarkable. Masked gunpositions provided interlocking fieldsof fire, miles of tunnels linked keydefensive positions, every cave fea-tured multiple outlets and ventilationtubes. One installation inside MountSuribachi ran seven stories deep. TheAmericans would rarely see a liveJapanese on Iwo Jima until the bit-ter end.

American intelligence experts, aid-ed by documents captured in Saipanand by an almost daily flow of aeri-al photography (and periscope-levelpictures from the submarineSpearfish), puzzled over the "disap-pearing act" of the Japanese garrison.

Trained photo interpreters, usingstereoscopic lenses, listed nearly 700potential targets, but all werehardened, covered, masked. The in-telligence staffs knew there was nofresh water available on the island.They could see the rainwater cisternsand they knew what the averagemonthly rainfall would deliver. Theyconcluded the garrison could notpossibly survive under those condi-tions in numbers greater than 12,000or 13,000. But Kuribayashi's forcewas twice that size. The men existedon half-rations of water for monthsbefore the battle began.

Unlike earlier amphibious assaultsat Guadalcanal and Tarawa, theAmericans would not enjoy eitherstrategic or tactical surprise at Iwo

E.L. Wilson

5

Jima. Japanese strategists concludedIwo Jima would be invaded soon af-ter the loss of the Marianas. Sixmonths before the battle,Kuribayashi wrote his wife, "TheAmericans will surely invade this IwoJima.. . do not look for my return."He worked his men ruthlessly tocomplete all defensive and trainingpreparations by 11 February1945—and met the objective. Hiswas a mixed force of veterans andrecruits, soldiers and sailors. His ar-tillerymen and mortar crews wereamong the best in the Empire.Regardless, he trained and disciplinedthem all. As the Americans soon dis-covered, each fighting position con-tained the commander's "CourageousBattle Vows" prominently postedabove the firing apertures. Troopswere admonished to maintain theirpositions and exact 10 American livesfor every Japanese death.

General Schmidt issued VACOperation Plan 5-44 on 23 Decem-ber 1944. The plan offered nothingfancy. Mount Suribachi dominatedboth potential beaches, but the 3,000yards of black sand along thesoutheastern coast appeared moresheltered from the prevailing winds.Here the V Amphibious Corps wouldland on D-day, the 4th Marine Di-vision on the right, the 5th on theleft, the 3d in reserve. The initial ob-jectives included the lower airfield,the west coast, and Suribachi. Thenthe force would swing into line andattack north, shoulder to shoulder.

Anticipation of a major Japanesecounterattack the first night in-fluenced the landing plan. "We wel-come a counterattack," said HollandSmith, "That's generally when webreak their backs" Both Schmidt and4th Marine Division commanderMajor General Clifton B. Cates knewfrom recent experience at Tinian howcapable the Japanese were at assem-bling large reserves at potential softpoints along a fresh beachhead. Theassault divisions would plan to landtheir artillery regiments before darkon D-day in that contingency.

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IWO JIMA

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The Japanese Commander

Jn the estimation of Lieutenant Colonel Justice M.Chambers, USMC, a battalion commander (3/25)whose four days ashore resulted in the Purple Heart

and the Medal of Honor: "On Iwo Jima, one of their smar-test generals commanded, a man who did not believe inthe Banzai business; each Jap was to kill ten Marines — forawhile they were beating their quotas." Chambers wasdescribing Lieutenant General Tadamichi Kuribayashi, Im-perial Japanese Army, Commanding General, 109th Divi-sion and Commander, Ogasciwara Army Group. The U.S.Marines have rarely faced a tougher opponent.

Kuribayashi, 53, a native of Nagano Prefecture, hadserved the Emperor as a cavalry officer since graduatingfrom the Military Academy in 1914. He spent several yearsas a junior officer posted to the Japanese Embassies inAmerica and Canada. With the advent of war in Asia,Kuribayashi commanded a cavalry regiment in combat inManchuria and a brigade in northern China. Later, heserved as chief of staff of the Twenty-third Army duringthe capture of Hong Kong. Favored by the Emperor, hereturned from China to command the Imperial Guards Di-vision in Tokyo. After the fall of Saipan in June 1944, hewas assigned to command the defensive fortress of IwoJima.

Kuribayashi was a realist. He saw Iwo Jimas crude air-strips as a net liability to the Empire, at best providingnuisance raids against the B-29s, certain to draw the atten-tion of American strategic planners. Iwo Jima's airfields inAmerican hands would pose an enormous threat to Japan.Kuribayashi saw only two options: either blow up the en-tire island, which proved infeasible, or defend it to thedeath. To do the latter effectively he adapted a radicaldefensive policy, foregoing the water's-edge linear tacticsand suicidal Banzai attacks of previous island battles. Thisstirred controversy at the highest levels — Imperial Head-quarters even asked the Nazis for advice on repellingAmerican invasions — as well as among Kuribayashi's ownofficers. Kuribayashi made some compromises with thesemi-independent naval forces on the island, but sacked 18senior army officers, including his own chief of staff. Thosewho remained would implement their commander's poli-cy to the letter.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 152108LtGen Tadamichi Kuribayashi, Imperial Japanese Army.

Doomed without naval or air support, Kuribayashinevertheless proved to be a resolute and resourceful fieldcommander. His only tactical error was to authorize thesector commander to engage the U.S. task force coveringunderwater demolitions team operations on D-2. This be-came a gift to the attackers, for it revealed to American gun-ners the previously masked batteries which otherwisewould have slaughtered the assault waves on D-day.

Japanese accounts indicate Kuribayashi committed hara-kari, the Japanese ritual suicide, in his cave near KitanoPoint on 23 March 1945, the 33d day of the battle. "Of allour adversaries in the Pacific;' said General Holland M.Smith, USMC, "Kuribayashi was the most redoubtable:'Said another Marine, "Let's hope the Japs don't have anymore like him:'

The physical separation of thethree divisions, from Guam toHawaii, had no adverse effect onpreparatory training. Where it count-ed most — the proficiency of smallunits in amphibious landings andcombined-arms assaults on fortifiedpositions — each division was wellprepared for the forthcoming inva-sion. The 3d Marine Division hadjust completed its participation in the

successful recapture of Guam; fieldtraining often extended to activecombat patrols to root out die-hardJapanese survivors. In Maui, the 4thMarine Division prepared for itsfourth major assault landing in 13months with quiet confidence.Recalled Major Frederick J. Karch,operations officer for the lAth Ma-rines, "we had a continuity there ofveterans that was just unbeatable:' In

6

neighboring Hawaii, the 5th MarineDivision calmly prepared for its firstcombat experience. The unit's new-ness would prove misleading. Wellabove half of the officers and menwere veterans, including a number offormer Marine parachutists and afew Raiders who had first fought inthe Solomons. Lieutenant ColonelDonn J. Robertson took command ofthe 3d Battalion, 27th Marines, bare-

14flatIre

ly two weeks before embarkationand immediately ordered it into thefield for a sustained live-firing exer-cise. Its competence and confidenceimpressed him. "These were profes-sionals;' he concluded.

Among the veterans preparing forIwo Jima were two Medal of Honorrecipients from the Guadalcanal cam-paign, Gunnery Sergeant John"Manila John" Basilone and Lieu-tenant Colonel Robert E. Galer.Headquarters Marine Corpspreferred to keep such distinguishedveterans in the states for morale pur-poses, but both men wrangled theirway back overseas — Basilone leadinga machine gun platoon, Galerdelivering a new radar unit for em-ployment with the Landing Force AirSupport Control Unit.

The Guadalcanal veterans wouldonly shake their heads at the abun-dance of amphibious shipping avail-able for Operation Detachment.Admiral Turner would command 495ships, of which fully 140 were am-phibiously configured, the whole ar-ray 10 times the size of Guadalcanal'stask force. Still there were problems.So many of the ships and crews werenew that each rehearsal featured em-barrassing collisions and other acci-dents. The new TD-18 bulldozerswere found to be an inch too widefor the medium landing craft(LCMs). The newly modified M4A3Sherman tanks proved so heavy thatthe LCMs rode with dangerously low

freeboards. Likewise, 105mm howit-zers overloaded the amphibioustrucks (DUKWs) to the point of near-unseaworthiness. These factorswould prove costly in Iwo's unpredic-table surf zone.

These problems notwithstanding,the huge force embarked and beganthe familiar move to westward. SaidColonel Robert E. Hogaboom, Chiefof Staff, 3d Marine Division, "wewere in good shape, well trained,well equipped and thoroughly sup-ported."

On Iwo Jima, General Kuribayashi

had benefitted from the Americanpostponements of Operation Detach-ment because of delays in the Philip-pines campaign. He, too, felt as readyand prepared as possible. When theAmerican armada sailed from theMarianas on 13 February, he wasforewarned. He deployed one infan-try battalion in the vicinity of thebeaches and lower airfield, orderedthe bulk of his garrison into its as-signed fighting holes, and settleddown to await the inevitable storm.

Two contentious issues divided theNavy-Marine team as D-day at IwoJima loomed closer. The first in-volved Admiral Spruance's decisionto detach Task Force 58, the fast car-riers under Admiral Marc Mitscher,to attack strategic targets on Honshusimultaneously with the onset of Ad-miral Blandy's preliminary bombard-ment of Iwo. The Marines suspectedNavy-Air Force rivalry at workhere — most of Mitscher's targets wereaircraft factories which the B-29s hadmissed badly a few days earlier.What the Marines really begrudgedwas Mitscher taking all eight MarineCorps fighter squadrons, assigned to

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 112392"Dinah Might," the first crippled B-29 to make an emergency landing on Iwo Jimaduring the fighting, is surrounded by Marines and Seabees on 4 March 1945.

An aerial view of Iwo Jima before the landing clearly shows "pork chop" shape.Mount Suribachi, in the right foreground, is at the southern end of the island.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 413529

7

5.,_t_v i.t

9,

—

of heavily fortified enemy targetstook deliberate, pinpoint firing fromclose ranges, assessed and adjustedby aerial observers. Iwo Jima's 700"hard" targets would require time toknock out, a lot of time.

Neither Spruance nor Turner hadtime to give, for strategic, tactical,and logistical reasons. Three days offiring by Admiral Blandy's sizeablebombardment force would deliverfour times the amount of shells Tara-wa received, and one and a half timesthat delivered against larger Saipan.It would have to do.

Col William P. McCahill CollectionA Marine inspects a Japanese coastal defense gun which, although protected by In effect, Iwo's notorious foulsteel-reinforced concrete, was destroyed in prelanding naval gunfire bombardments, weather, the imperviousness of manythe fast carriers, plus the new fastbattleships with their 16-inch guns.Task Force 58 returned to Iwo in timeto render sparkling support withthese assets on D-day, but two dayslater it was off again, this time forgood.

The other issue was related and itconcerned the continuing argumentbetween senior Navy and Marineofficers over the extent of preliminarynaval gunfire. The Marines looked atthe intelligence reports on Iwo andrequested 10 days of preliminary fire.The Navy said it had neither the timenor the ammo to spare; three dayswould have to suffice. Holland Smithand Harry Schmidt continued toplead, finally offering to compromiseto four days. Turner deferred to Spru-ance who ruled that three days prepfires, in conjunction with the dailypounding being administered by theSeventh Air Force, would do the job.

Lieutenant Colonel Donald M.Weller, USMC, served as theFMFPAC/Task Force 51 naval gun-fire officer, and no one in either seaservice knew the business morethoroughly. Weller had absorbed thelessons of the Pacific War well, es-pecially those of the conspicuousfailures at Tarawa. The issue,he ar-gued forcibly to Admiral Turner, wasnot the weight of shells nor theircaliber but rather time. Destruction

_________________

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JAPANESE DEFENSESECTORS

Main cross—island defenses

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of the Japanese fortifications, andother distractions dissipated even thethree days' bombardment. "We gotabout thirteen hours' worth of firesupport during the thirty-four hoursof available daylight;' complainedBrigadier General William W.Rogers, chief of staff to GeneralSchmidt.

The Americans received an unex-pected bonus when GeneralKuribayashi committed his onlyknown tactical error during the bat-tle. This occurred on D-minus-2, asa force of 100 Navy and Marine un-derwater demolition team (UDT)frogmen bravely approached theeastern beaches escorted by a dozenLCI landing craft firing their gunsand rockets. Kuribayashi evidentlybelieved this to be the main landingand authorized the coastal batteriesto open fire. The exchange was hotand heavy, with the LCIs getting theworst of it, but U.S. battleships and

cruisers hurried in to blast the case-mate guns suddenly revealed on theslopes of Suribachi and along therock quarry on the right flank.

That night, gravely concernedabout the hundreds of Japanese tar-gets still untouched by two days offiring, Admiral Blandy conducted a"council of war" on board his flag-ship. At Weller's suggestion, Blandyjunked the original plan and direct-ed his gunships to concentrate exclu-sively on the beach areas. This wasdone with considerable effect on D-minus-i and D-day morning itself.Kuribayashi noted that most of thepositions the Imperial Navy insistedon building along the beach ap-proaches had in fact been destroyed,as he had predicted. Yet his maindefensive belts criss-crossing theMotoyama Plateau remained intact."I pray for a heroic fight;' he told hisstaff.

On board Admiral Turner's flag-

ship, the press briefing held the nightbefore D-day was uncommonly som-ber. General Holland Smith predict-ed heavy casualties, possibly as manyas 15,000, which shocked all hands.A man clad in khakis without rankinsignia then stood up to address theroom. It was James V. Forrestal,Secretary of the Navy. "Iwo Jima, likeTarawa, leaves very little choice;' hesaid quietly, "except to take it by forceof arms, by character and courage."

D-Dciy

Weather conditions around IwoJima on D-day morning, 19 Febru-ary 1945, were almost ideal. At 0645Admiral Turner signalled "Land thelanding force!"

Shore bombardment ships did nothesitate to engage the enemy islandat near point-blank range. Battleshipsand cruisers steamed as close as 2,000yards to level their guns against is-land targets. Many of the "Old Bat-

From the Japanese position overlooking the landingbeaches and Airfield No. 1, the enemy observers had an

unobstructed view of the entire beachhead. From a field sketchby Cpl Daniel L. Winsor, Jr., USMCR, 5-2, 25th Marines.

Marine Corps Historical Collection

9

(I

The Assault Commanders at Iwo Jima

Four veteran Marine major gen-erals led the sustained assaulton Iwo Jima: Harry Schmidt,

Commanding General, V AmphibiousCorps; Graves B. Erskine, CC, 3d Ma-rine Division; Clifton B. Cates, CG, 4thMarine Division; and Keller E. Rock-ey, CG, 5th Marine Division. Eachwould receive the Distinguished Serv-ice Medal for inspired combat leader-ship in this epic battle.

General Schmidt was 58 at Iwo Jimaand had served the Corps for 36 years.He was a native of Holdrege, Nebras-ka, and attended Nebraska NormalCollege. Expeditionary assignmentskept him from service in World War I,but Schmidt saw considerable smallunit action in Guam, China, the Philip-pines, Mexico, Cuba, and Nicaragua,plus four years at sea. He attended theArmy Command and General StaffCollege and the Marine Corps FieldOfficers' Course. In World War II,General Schmidt commanded the 4thMarine Division in the Roi-Narnur andSaipan operations, then assumed com-mand of V Amphibious Corps for theTinian landing. At Iwo Jima he wouldcommand the largest force of Marinesever committed to a single battle. "Itwas the highest honor of my life:' hesaid.

General Erskine was 47 at Iwo Jima,one of the youngest major generals inthe Corps. He had served 28 years onactive duty by that time. A native ofColumbia, Louisiana, he graduated

from Louisiana State University,received a Marine Corps commission,and immediately deployed overseas forduty in World War I. As a platooncommander in the 6th Marines, Erskinesaw combat at Belleau Wood, Chateau-Thierry, Soissons, and St. Mihiel, dur-ing which he was twice wounded andawarded the Silver Star. In the inter-war years he served in Haiti, SantoDomingo, Nicaragua, Cuba, and Chi-na. He attended the Army InfantrySchool and the Army Command andGeneral Staff College. In World War II,Erskine was chief of staff to GeneralHolland M. Smith during campaigns inthe Aleutians, Gilberts, Marshalls, andMarianas. He assumed command ofthe 3d Marine Division in October1944.

General Cates, 51 at Iwo, had alsoserved the Corps during the previous28 years. He was one of the few Ma-rine Corps general officers who heldcombat command at the platoon, com-pany, battalion, regiment, and divisionlevels in his career. Cates was born inTiptonville, Tennessee, and attendedthe University of Tennessee. In WorldWar I, he served as a junior officer inthe 6th Marines at Belleau Wood, Sois-sons, St. Mihiel, and Blanc Mont, andwas awarded the Navy Cross, two Sil-ver Stars, and two Purple Hearts forhis service and his wounds. Betweenwars, he served at sea and twice in Chi-na. He attended the Army IndustrialCollege, the Senior Course at MarineCorps Schools, and the Army War Col-

lege. In World War II he commandedthe 1st Marines at Guadalcanal and the4th Marine Division at Tinian. Threeyears after Iwo Jima, General Cates be-came the 19th Commandant of the Ma-rine Corps.

General Rockey was 56 at Iwo Jimaand a veteran of 31 years of service tothe Corps. He was born in ColumbiaCity, Indiana, graduated from Gettys-burg College, and studied at Yale. Likehis fellow division commanders, Rock-ey served in France in World War I. Hewas awarded the Navy Cross as ajunior officer in the 5th Marines atChateau-Thierry. A second Navy Crosscame later for heroic service inNicaragua. He also served in Haiti andtwo years at sea. He attended the FieldOfficers' Course at Quantico and theArmy Command and General StaffCourse. He spent the first years ofWorld War II at Headquarters MarineCorps in Washington, first as Director,Division of Plans and Policies, then asAssistant Commandant. In February1944 General Rockey assumed com-mand of the 5th Marine Division andbegan preparing the new organizationfor its first, and last, great battle of thewar.

Three Marine brigadier generals alsoplayed significant roles in the amphibi-ous seizure of Iwo Jima: William W.Rogers, corps chief of staff; Franklin A.Hart, assistant division commander,4th Marine Division; and Leo D.Hermle, assistant division commander,5th Marine Division.

MajGen Harry Schmidt, USMC MajGen Graves B. Erskine, USMC MajGen Clifton B. Cates, USMC MajGen Keller E. Rockey, USMCDepartment of Defense Photo (USMC) 11180 Marine Corps Historical Collection Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 38595 Department of Delense Photo (USMC) A32295

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ious to get their first glimpse of theobjective. Correspondent John P.Marquand, the Pulitzer Prize-winning writer, recorded his own firstimpressions of Iwo: "Its silhouettewas like a sea monster, with the lit-tle dead volcano for the head, andthe beach area for the neck, and allthe rest of it, with its scrubby browncliffs for the body." Lieutenant DavidN. Susskind, USNR, wrote down hisinitial thoughts from the bridge ofthe troopship Mellette: "Iwo Jima wasa rude, ugly sight. . . . Only a geol-ogist could look at it and not berepelled." As described in a subse-quent letter home by Navy Lieu-tenant Michael F. Keleher, a surgeonin the 25th Marines:

tieships" had performed thisdangerous mission in all theaters ofthe war. Marines came to recognizeand appreciate their contributions. Itseemed fitting that the old Nevada,raised from the muck and ruin ofPearl Harbor, should lead the bom-bardment force close ashore. Marinesalso admired the battleship Arkan-sas, built in 1912, and recentlyreturned from the Atlantic where shehad battered German positions atPoint du Hoc at Normandy duringthe epic Allied landing on 6 June1944.

Lieutenant Colonels Weller andWilliam W. "Bucky" Buchanan, bothartillery officers, had devised a modi-fied form of the "rolling barrage" foruse by the bombarding gunshipsagainst beachfront targets just beforeH-Hour. This concentration of navalgunfire would advance progressive-ly as the troops landed, always re-maining 400 yards to their front. Airspotters would help regulate the pace.Such an innovation appealed to thethree division commanders, eachhaving served in France during WorldWar I. In those days, a good rollingbarrage was often the only way tobreak a stalemate.

The shelling was terrific. AdmiralHill would later boast that "therewere no proper targets for shorebombardment remaining on Dog-Day morning:' This proved to be anoverstatement, yet no one could denythe unprecedented intensity of fire-power Hill delivered against the areassurrounding the landing beaches. AsGeneral Kuribayashi would ruefullyadmit in an assessment report to Im-perial General Headquarters, "weneed to reconsider the power of bom-bardment from ships; the violence ofthe enemy's bombardments is far be-yond description"

The amphibious task force ap-peared from over the horizon, therails of the troopships crowded withcombat-equipped Marines watchingthe spectacular fireworks. TheGuadalcanal veterans among themrealized a grim satisfaction watchingAmerican battleships leisurelypounding the island from just off-shore. The war had come full cyclefrom the dark days of October 1942when the 1st Marine Division andthe Cactus Air Force endured simi-lar shelling from Japanese bat-tleships.

The Marines and sailors were anx-

11

The naval bombardment hadalready begun and I could seethe orange-yellow flashes as thebattleships, cruisers, and des-troyers blasted away at the is-land broadside. Yes, there wasIwo — surprisingly close, justlike the pictures and models wehad been studying for sixweeks. The volcano was to ourleft, then the long, flat blackbeaches where we were going toland, and the rough rockyplateau to our right.

The commanders of the 4th and5th Marine Divisions, Major Gener-als Clifton B. Cates and Keller E.Rockey, respectively, studied the is-land through binoculars from theirrespective ships. Each division wouldland two reinforced regimentsabreast. From left to right, thebeaches were designated Green, Red,Yellow, and Blue. The 5th Divisionwould land the 28th Marines on theleft flank, over Green Beach, the 27thMarines over Red. The 4th Divisionwould land the 23d Marines over Yel-low Beach and the 25th Marines overBlue Beach on the right flank. Gener-al Schmidt reviewed the latest intel-ligence reports with growinguneasiness and requested a reassign-ment of reserve forces with General

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 14284Members of the 4th Marine Division receive a last-minute briefing before D-day.

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Smith. The 3d Marine Division's 21stMarines would replace the 26th Ma-rines as corps reserve, thus releasingthe latter regiment to the 5th Di-vision.

Schmidt's landing plan envisionedthe 28th Marines cutting the islandin half, then turning to capture Sur-ibachi, while the 25th Marines wouldscale the Rock Quarry and then serveas the hinge for the entire corps toswing around to the north. The 23dMarines and 27th Marines wouldcapture the first airfield and pivotnorth within their assigned zones.

General Cates was already con-cerned about the right flank. BlueBeach Two lay directly under the ob-servation and fire of suspectedJapanese positions in the Rock Quar-ry, whose steep cliffs overshadowedthe right flank like Suribachi domi-nated the left. The 4th Marine Divi-sion figured that the 25th Marineswould have the hardest objective totake on D-day. Said Gates, "If I knewthe name of the man on the extremeright of the right-hand squad I'drecommend him for a medal beforewe go in:'

The choreography of the landingcontinued to develop. Iwo Jimawould represent the pinnacle of for-cible amphibious assault against a

heavily fortified shore, a complex artmastered painstakingly by the FifthFleet over many campaigns. SeventhAir Force Martin B-24 Liberatorbombers flew in from the Marianasto strike the smoking island. Rocketships moved in to saturate nearshoretargets. Then it was time for thefighter and attack squadrons fromMitscher's Task Force 58 to contrib-ute. The Navy pilots showed theirskills at bombing and strafing, butthe troops naturally cheered the mostat the appearance of F4U Corsairsflown by Marine Fighter Squadrons124 and 213 led by LieutenantColonel William A. Millington fromthe fleet carrier Essex. Colonel Ver-non E. Megee, in his shipboard ca-pacity as air officer for GeneralSmith's Expeditionary Troops staff,had urged Millington to put on a spe-cial show for the troops in the assaultwaves. "Drag your bellies on thebeach," he told Millington. The Ma-rine fighters made an impressive ap-proach parallel to the island, thenvirtually did Megee's bidding, streak-ing low over the beaches, strafing f u-riously. The geography of the PacificWar since Bougainville had keptmany of the ground Marines separat-ed from their own air support, whichhad been operating in areas other

than where they had been fighting,most notably the Central Pacific. "Itwas the first time a lot of them hadever seen a Marine fighter plane:' saidMegee. The troops were not disap-pointed.

The planes had barely disappearedwhen naval gunfire resumed, carpet-ing the beach areas with a buildingcrescendo of high-explosive shells.The ship-to-shore movement waswell underway, an easy 30-minuterun for the tracked landing vehicles(LVTs). This time there were enoughLVTs to do the job: 68 LVT(A)4 ar-mored amtracs mounting snub-nosed75mm cannon leading the way, fol-lowed by 380 troop-laden LVT 4s andLVI 2s. The waves crossed the lineof departure on time and chuggedconfidently towards the smokingbeaches, all the while under theclimactic bombardment from theships. Here there was no coral reef,no killer neap tides to be concernedwith. The Navy and Marine frogmenhad reported the approaches free ofmines or tetrahedrons. There was nopremature cessation of fire. The "roll-ing barrage" plan took effect. Hard-ly a vehicle was lost to the desultoryenemy fire.

The massive assault waves hit thebeach within two minutes of H-hour.A Japanese observer watching thedrama unfold from a cave on theslopes of Suribachi reported, "At nineo'clock in the morning severalhundred landing craft with amphibi-ous tanks in the lead rushed ashorelike an enormous tidal wave:' Lieu-tenant Colonel Robert H. Williams,executive officer of the 28th Marines,recalled that "the landing was a mag-nificent sight to see — two divisionslanding abreast; you could see thewhole show from the deck of a ship:'To this point, so far, so good.

The first obstacle came not fromthe Japanese but the beach and theparallel terraces. Iwo Jima was anemerging volcano; its steep beachesdropped off sharply, producing anarrow but violent surf zone. The

Laden with battle-ready V Amphibious Corps Marines, LSMs (landing ship, medi-urn) head for Iwo's beaches. Landing craft of this type were capable of carryingfive Sherman tanks. In the left background lies smoke-covered Mount Suribachi.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 109598

12

soft black sand immobilized allwheeled vehicles and caused some ofthe tracked amphibians to bellydown. The boat waves that closelyfollowed the LVTs had more trouble.Ramps would drop, a truck or jeepwould attempt to drive out, only toget stuck. In short order a successionof plunging waves hit the stalled craftbefore they could completely unload,filling their sterns with water andsand, broaching them broadside. Thebeach quickly resembled a salvageyard.

The infantry, heavily laden, foundits own "foot-mobility" severely res-tricted. In the words of Corporal Ed-ward Hartman, a rifleman with the4th Marine Division: "the sand wasso soft it was like trying to run inloose coffee grounds:' From the 28th

E. 1. Wilson

Marines came this early, laconicreport: "Resistance moderate, terrainawful:'

The rolling barrage and carefullyexecuted landing produced thedesired effect, suppressing direct ene-my fire, providing enough shock anddistraction to enable the first assaultwaves to clear the beach and beginadvancing inward. Within minutes6,000 Marines were ashore. Manybecame thwarted by increasing fireover the terraces or down from thehighlands, but hundreds leapt for-ward to maintain assault momen-tum. The 28th Marines on the leftflank had rehearsed on similar vol-canic terrain on the island of Hawaii.Now, despite increasing casualtiesamong their company commandersand the usual disorganization of

13

landing, elements of the regimentused their initiative to strike acrossthe narrow neck of the peninsula.The going became progressively cost-ly as more and more Japanese strong-points along the base of Suribachiseemed to spring to life. Within 90minutes of the landing, however, ele-ments of the 1st Battalion, 28th Ma-rines, had reached the western shore,700 yards across from Green Beach.Iwo Jima had been severed —"like cut-ting off a snake's head;' in the wordsof one Marine. It would represent thedeepest penetration of what was be-coming a very long and costly day.

The other three regiments ex-perienced difficulty leaving the blacksand terraces and wheeling acrosstowards the first airfield. The terrainwas an open bowl, a shooting galleryin full view from Suribachi on the leftand the rising tableland to the right.Any thoughts of a "cakewalk" quicklyvanished as well-directed machine-gun fire whistled across the openground and mortar rounds begandropping along the terraces. Despitethese difficulties, the 27th Marinesmade good initial gains, reaching thesouthern and western edges of thefirst airfield before noon. The 23dMarines landed over Yellow Beachand sustained the brunt of the firstround of Japanese combined armsfire. These troops crossed the secondterrace only to be confronted by twohuge concrete pillboxes, still lethaldespite all the pounding. Overcom-ing these positions proved costly incasualties and time. More fortifiedpositions appeared in the brokenground beyond. Colonel Walter W.Wensinger's call for tank supportcould not be immediately honoredbecause of trafficability and conges-tion problems on the beach. Theregiment clawed its way severalhundred yards towards the easternedge of the airstrip.

No assault units found it easy go-ing to move inland, but the 25th Ma-rines almost immediately ran into abuzz-saw trying to move across Blue

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Beach. General Cates had been rightin his appraisal. "That right flank wasa bitch if there ever was one;' hewould later say. Lieutenant ColonelHollis W. Mustain's 1st Battalion,25th Marines, managed to scratchforward 300 yards under heavy firein the first half hour, but LieutenantColonel Chambers' 3d Battalion,25th Marines, took the heaviest beat-ing of the day on the extreme righttrying to scale the cliffs leading to theRock Quarry. Chambers landed 15minutes after H-hour. "Crossing thatsecond terrace;' he recalled, "the firefrom automatic weapons was com-ing from all over. You could've heldup a cigarette and lit it on the stuffgoing by. I knew immediately wewere in for one hell of a time:'

This was simply the beginning.While the assault forces tried to over-come the infantry weapons of the lo-cal defenders, they were naturallyblind to an almost imperceptible stir-ring taking place among the rocks

and crevices of the interior highlands.With grim anticipation, GeneralKuribayashi's gunners began un-masking the big guns — the heavy ar-tillery, giant mortars, rockets, andanti-tank weapons held under tight-est discipline for this precise moment.Kuribayashi had patiently waited un-til the beaches were clogged with

H-hour at Iwo Jima,

troops and material. Gun crews knewthe range and deflection to each land-ing beach by heart; all weapons hadbeen preregistered on these targetslong ago. At Kuribayashi's signal,these hundreds of weapons began toopen fire. It was shortly after 1000.

The ensuing bombardment was asdeadly and terrifying as any of the19 February 1945.Department of Defense Photo (USN) NH65311

Tracked landing vehicles (LVTs), jam-packed with 4th Ma-rine Division troops, approach the Line of Departure at H-

Department of Defense Photo (USMC)110128

hour on D-day. In the center rear can be seen the control yes-se/s which attempted to maintain order in the landing.

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Marines had ever experienced. Therewas hardly any cover. Japanese ar-tillery and mortar rounds blanketedevery corner of the 3,000-yard-widebeach. Large-caliber coast defense

guns and dual-purpose antiaircraftguns firing horizontally added adeadly scissors of direct fire from thehigh ground on both flanks. Marinesstumbling over the terraces to escape

the rain of projectiles encountered thesame disciplined machine-gun fireand mine fields which had slowed theinitial advance. Casualties mountedappallingly.

Two Marine combat veterans ob-serving this expressed a grudging ad-miration for the Japanese gunners. "Itwas one of the worst blood-lettingsof the war," said Major Karch of the14th Marines. "They rolled those ar-tillery barrages up and down thebeach — I just didn't see how anybodycould live through such heavy firebarrages:' Said Lieutenant ColonelJoseph L. Stewart, "The Japanesewere superb artillerymen . . . . Some-body was getting hit every time theyfired." At sea, Lieutenant ColonelWeller tried desperately to delivernaval gunfire against the Japanesegun positions shooting down at 3dBattalion, 25th Marines, from theRock Quarry. It would take longerto coordinate this fire: the firstJapanese barrages had wiped out the

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 110109Marines of the 4th Division pour ashore from their landing craft on Yellow andBlue Beaches on D-day. Enemy fire had not hit this assault wave yet as it landed.

As soon as it hit the beach on the right side of the V Am- accurate and heavy enemy fire. Meanwhile, landing craft, sup-phibious Corps line, the 25th Marines was pinned down by plies, and vehicles pile up in the surf behind Marines.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 110108

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5th Division Marines land on Red and Green Beaches at the my positions overlooking the black sand terraces. The 28thfoot of Mount Suribachi under heavy fire coming from ene- Marines had not yet wheeled to the left towards Suribachi.

• With bullets and artillery shells screaming overhead, Marines for cover from the deadly fire. Note the geyser of water ascrawl along the beaches and dig into the soft volcanic ash a shell lands close to a landing craft headed into the beach.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 1O961

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3d Battalion, 25th Marines' entireShore Fire Control Party.

As the Japanese firing reached ageneral crescendo, the four assaultregiments issued dire reports to theflagship. Within a 10-minute period,these messages crackled over thecommand net:

1036: (From 25th Marines) "Catch-ing all hell from the quarry. Heavymortar and machine gun fire:'

1039: (From 23d Marines) "Takingheavy casualties and can't move forthe moment. Mortars killing us."

1042: (From 27th Marines) "Allunits pinned down by artillery andmortars. Casualties heavy. Need tanksupport fast to move anywhere:'

1046: (From 28th Marines) "Tak-ing heavy fire and forward move-ment stopped. Machine gun andartillery fire heaviest ever seen:'

The landing force suffered andbled but did not panic. The profusionof combat veterans throughout therank and file of each regiment helpedthe rookies focus on the objective.Communications remained effective.Keen-eyed aerial observers spottedsome of the now-exposed gun posi-tions and directed naval gunfire ef-fectively. Carrier planes screeched inlow to drop napalm canisters. Theheavy Japanese fire would continue

to take an awful toll throughout thefirst day and night, but it wouldnever again be so murderous as thatfirst unholy hour.

Marine Sherman tanks played hellgetting into action on D-day. Laterin the battle these combat vehicleswould be the most valuable weaponson the battlefield for the Marines;this day was a nightmare. The assault

divisions embarked many of theirtanks on board medium landingships (LSMs), sturdy little craft thatcould deliver five Shermans at atime. But it was tough disembarkingthem on Iwo's steep beaches. Thestern anchors could not hold in theloose sand; bow cables run forwardto "deadmen" LVTs parted under thestrain. On one occasion the lead tankstalled at the top of the ramp, block-ing the other vehicles and leaving theLSM at the mercy of the rising surf.Other tanks bogged down or threwtracks in the loose sand. Many ofthose that made it over the terraceswere destroyed by huge hornedmines or disabled by deadly accurate47mm anti-tank fire from Suribachi.Other tankers kept coming. Theirrelative mobility, armored protec-tion, and 75mm gunfire were mostwelcome to the infantry scatteredamong Iwo's lunar-looking, shell-pocked landscape.

Both division commanders com-mitted their reserves early. GeneralRockey called in the 26th Marinesshortly after noon. General Cates or-

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 111115Marines pull their ammunition cart onto the beach from their broached landingcraft on D-day, all the while under heavy enemy fire. Some troops did not make it.

Shore party Marines man steadying lines while others unload combat cargo fromboats broached in the surf. Note the jeep, one of the first to come ashore, boggeddown axle-deep in the soft black volcanic ash, not to be moved till later.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 110593

17

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dered two battalions of the 24th Ma-rines to land at 1400; the 3dBattalion, 24th Marines, followedseveral hours later. Many of thereserve battalions suffered heaviercasualties crossing the beach than theassault units, a result of Kuribayashi'spunishing bombardment from allpoints on the island.

Mindful of the likely Japanesecounterattack in the night to come —and despite the fire and confusionalong the beaches —both divisionsalso ordered their artillery regimentsashore. This process, frustrating andcostly, took much of the afternoon.The wind and surf began to pick upas the day wore on, causing morethan one low-riding DUKW toswamp with its precious 105mmhowitzer cargo. Getting the gunsashore was one thing; getting themup off the sand was quite another.The 75mm pack howitzers fared bet-ter than the heavier 105s. EnoughMarines could readily hustle them upover the terraces, albeit at great risk.The 105s seemed to have a mind oftheir own in the black sand. The ef-fort to get each single weapon off thebeach was a saga in its own right.Somehow, despite the fire and unfor-giving terrain, both Colonel Louis G.DeHaven, commanding the 14th Ma-rines, and Colonel James D. Wailer,commanding the 13th Marines,managed to get batteries in place,registered, and rendering close firesupport well before dark, a singularaccomplishment.

Japanese fire and the plunging surfcontinued to make a shambles out ofthe beachhead. Late in the afternoon,Lieutenant Michael F. Keleher,USNR, the battalion surgeon, wasordered ashore to take over the 3dBattalion, 25th Marines aid stationfrom its gravely wounded surgeon.Keleher, a veteran of three previousassault landings, was appalled by thecarnage on Blue Beach as he ap-proached: "Such a sight on thatbeach Wrecked boats, bogged-downjeeps, tractors and tanks; burning ye-

Marine Corps Combat Art CollectionIn "Flotsam and Jetsam," an acrylic painting on masonite by Col Charles H. Water-house, he portrays the loss of his sergeant to mortar fire on the beach on D-day.

hides; casualties scattered all over." the airfield, the legendary "ManilaOn the left center of the action, John" Basilone fell mortally wound-

leading his machine gun platoon in ed by a Japanese mortar shell, a iossthe 1st Battalion, 27th Marines' at- keenly felt by all Marines on the is-tack against the southern portion of land. Farther east, Lieutenant

18

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Colonel Robert Galer, the otherGuadalcanal Medal of Honor Marine(and one of the Pacific War's earli-est fighter aces), survived the after-noon's fusillade along the beachesand began reassembling his scatteredradar unit in a deep shell hole nearthe base of Suribachi.

Late in the afternoon, LieutenantColonel Donn J. Robertson led his 3dBattalion, 27th Marines, ashore overBlue Beach, disturbed at the intensi-ty of fire still being directed on thereserve forces this late on D-day."They were really ready for us," herecalled. He watched with pride andwonderment as his Marines landed.under fire, took casualties, stumbledforward to clear the beach. "Whatimpels a young guy landing on abeach in the face of fire?" he askedhimself. Then it was Robertson'sturn. His boat hit the beach too hard;the ramp wouldn't drop. Robertsonand his command group had to rollover the gunwales into the churningsurf and crawl ashore, an inauspi-cious start.

The bitter battle to capture theRock Quarry cliffs on the right flankraged all day. The beachhead re-mained completely vulnerable to ene-my direct-fire weapons from theseheights; the Marines had to storm

them before many more troops orsupplies could be landed. In the end,it was the strength of character ofCaptain James Headley and Lieu-tenant Colonel "Jumping Joe" Cham-bers who led the survivors of the 3dBattalion, 25th Marines, onto the topof the cliffs. The battalion paid an ex-orbitant price for this achievement,losing 22 officers and 500 troops bynightfall.

The two assistant division com-manders, Brigadier Generals Frank-lin A. Hart and Leo D. Hermle, ofthe 4th and 5th Marine Divisionsrespectively, spent much of D-day onboard the control vessels markingboth ends of the Line of Departure,4,000 yards off shore. This reflectedyet another lesson in amphibioustechniques learned from Tarawa.Having senior officers that close tothe ship-to-shore movement provid-ed landing force decision-makingfrom the most forward vantagepoint. By dusk General Hermie opt-ed to come ashore. At Tarawa he hadspent the night of D-day essentiallyout of contact at the fire-swept pier-head. This time he intended to be onthe ground. Hermle had the largeroperational picture in mind, know-ing the corps commander's desire toforce the reserves and artillery units

19

on shore despite the carnage in ord-er to build credible combat power.Hermie knew that whatever the nightmight bring, the Americans now hadmore troops on the island thanKuribayashi could ever muster. Hispresence helped his division forgetabout the day's disasters and focus onpreparations for the expected coun-terattacks.

Japanese artillery and mortar firecontinued to rake the beachhead. Theenormous spigot mortar shells (called"flying ashcans" by the troops) androcket-boosted aerial bombs wereparticularly scary — loud, whistlingprojectiles, tumbling end over end.Many sailed completely over the is-land; those that hit along the beachesor the south runways invariablycaused dozens of casualties with eachimpact. Few Marines could dig aproper foxhole in the granular sand("like trying to dig a hole in a barrelof wheat"). Among urgent calls to thecontrol ship for plasma, stretchers,and mortar shells came repeated criesfor sand bags.

Veteran Marine combat correspon-dent Lieutenant Cyril P. Zurlinden,soon to become a casualty himself,described that first night ashore:

At Tarawa, Saipan, and Tin-ian, I saw Marines killed andwounded in a shocking manner,but I saw nothing like the ghast-liness that hung over the Iwobeachhead. Nothing any of ushad ever known could comparewith the utter anguish, frustra-tion, and constant inner battleto maintain some semblance ofsanity.

Personnel accounting was a night-mare under those conditions, but theassault divisions eventually report-ed the combined loss of 2,420 mento General Schmidt (501 killed, 1,755wounded, 47 dead of wounds, 18missing, and 99 combat fatigue).These were sobering statistics, butSchmidt now had 30,000 Marines

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 109601As D-day on Iwo Jima conies to a close, the landing beaches are scenes ofdeath and destruction with LVTs and landing craft wallowing in the wavesand tracked and wheeled vehicles kept out of action, unable to go forward.

a....'

ashore. The casualty rate of eightpercent left the landing force in rela-tively better condition than at thefirst days at Tarawa or Saipan. Themiracle was that the casualties hadnot been twice as high. GeneralKuribayashi had possibly waited alittle too long to open up with his bigguns.

The first night on Iwo was ghost-ly. Sulfuric mists spiraled out of theearth. The Marines, used to thetropics, shivered in the cold, waitingfor Kuribayashi's warriors to comescreaming down from the hills. Theywould learn that this Japanese com-mander was different. There wouldbe no wasteful, vainglorious Banzaiattack, this night or any other. In-stead, small teams of infiltrators,which Kuribayashi termed 'ProwlingWolves," probed the lines, gatheringintelligence. A barge-full of JapaneseSpecial Landing Forces tried a smallcounterlanding on the westernbeaches and died to the man underthe alert guns of the 28th Marinesand its supporting LVT crews. Other-wise the night was one of continu-ing waves of indirect fire from thehighlands. One high velocity roundlanded directly in the hole occupiedby the 1st Battalion, 23d Marines'commander, Lieutenant ColonelRalph Haas, killing him instantly.The Marines took casualties through-out the night. But with the firststreaks of dawn, the veteran landingforce stirred. Five infantry regimentslooked north; a sixth turned to thebusiness at hand in the south: MountSuribachi.

SuribachiThe Japanese called the dormant

volcano Suribachi-yama; the Marinesdubbed it "Hotrocks." From the startthe Marines knew their drive northwould never succeed without firstseizing that hulking rock dominatingthe southern plain. "Suribachiseemed to take on a life of its own,to be watching these men, loomingover them;' recalled one observer, ad-

ding "the mountain represented tothese Marines a thing more evil thanthe Japanese."

Colonel Kanehiko Atsuchi com-manded the 2,000 soldiers and sailorsof the Suribachi garrison. TheJapanese had honeycombed themountain with gun positions,machine-gun nests, observation sites,and tunnels, but Atsuchi had lostmany of his large-caliber guns in thedirect naval bombardment of thepreceding three days. GeneralKuribayashi considered Atsuchi'scommand to be semiautonomous,realizing the invaders would soon cutcommunications across the island'snarrow southern tip. Kuribayashinevertheless hoped Suribachi couldhold out for 10 days, maybe twoweeks.

Some of Suribachi's stoutestdefenses existed down low, aroundthe rubble-strewn base. Here nearly70 camouflaged concrete blockhousesprotected the approaches to themountain; another 50 bulged fromthe slopes within the first hundredfeet of elevation. Then came the

caves, the first of hundreds the Ma-rines would face on Iwo Jima.

The 28th Marines had sufferednearly 400 casualties in cutting acrossthe neck of the island on D-day. OnD + 1, in a cold rain, they preparedto assault the mountain. LieutenantColonel Chandler Johnson, com-manding the 2d Battalion, 28th Ma-rines, set the tone for the morning ashe deployed his tired troops forward:"It's going to be a hell of a day in ahell of a place to fight the damnedwar!" Some of the 105mm batteriesof the 13th Marines opened up insupport, firing directly overhead.Gun crews fired from positions hasti-ly dug in the black sand directly nextto the 28th Marines command post.Regimental Executive Officer Lieu-tenant Colonel Robert H. Williamswatched the cannoneers fire at Sur-ibachi'eight hundred yards awayover open sights."

As the Marines would learn dur-ing their drive north, even 105mmhowitzers would hardly shiver theconcrete pillboxes of the enemy. Asthe prep fire lifted, the infantry leaptforward, only to run immediately

A dug-in Marine 81mm mortar crew places continuous fire on Japanese positionsaround the slopes of Mount Suribachi preparatory to the attack of the 28th Marines.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 109861

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into very heavy machine-gun andmortar fire. Colonel Harry B. "Har-ry the Horse" Liversedge bellowed forhis tanks. But the 5th Tank Battal-ion was already having a frustratingmorning. The tankers sought adefilade spot in which to rearm andrefuel for the day's assault. Such a lo-cation did not exist on Iwo Jimathose first days. Every time the tankscongregated to service their vehiclesthey were hit hard by Japanese mor-tar and artillery fire from virtuallythe entire island. Getting sufficientvehicles serviced to join the assaulttook most of the morning. Hereafterthe tankers would maintain and re-equip their vehicles at night.

This day's slow start led to moresetbacks for the tankers; Japanese an-titank gunners hiding in the jumbled

boulders knocked out the first ap-proaching Shermans. Assaultmomentum slowed further. The 28thMarines overran 40 strongpoints andgained roughly 200 yards all day.They lost a Marine for every yardgained. The tankers unknowinglyredeemed themselves when one oftheir final 75mm rounds caughtColonel Atsuchi as he peered out ofa cave entrance, killing him instantly.

Elsewhere, the morning light onD +1 revealed the discouraging sightsof the chaos created along thebeaches by the combination of IwoJima's wicked surf and Kuribayashi'sunrelenting barrages. In the words ofone dismayed observer:

The wreckage was indescrib-able. For two miles the debriswas so thick that there were

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only a few places where land-ing craft could still get in. Thewrecked hulls of scores of land-ing boats testified to one pricewe had to pay to put our troopsashore. Tanks and half-trackslay crippled where they hadbogged down in the coarsesand. Amphibian tractors, vic-tims of mines and well-aimedshells, lay flopped on theirbacks. Cranes, brought ashoreto unload cargo, tilted at insaneangles, and bulldozers weresmashed in their ownroadways.

Bad weather set in, further com-pounding the problems of generalunloading. Strong winds whippedsea swells into a nasty chop; the surfturned uglier. These were the condi-

The crew of the Sherman tank "Cairo" awaits a repair crewto replace its tread after it hit a Japanese mine. Note wooden

Colonel William P. McCahill Colleclionsheathing on sides of vehicle to protect against magneticmines. Damaged vehicles became prime enemy targets.

tions faced by Lieutenant ColonelCarl A. Youngdale in trying to landthe 105mm-howitzer batteries of his4th Battalion, 14th Marines. All 12of these guns were preloaded inDUKWs, one to a vehicle. Added tothe amphibious trucks' problems ofmarginal seaworthiness with thatpayload was contaminated fuel. AsYoungdale watched in horror, eightDUKWs suffered engine failures,swamped, and sank with great lossof life. Two more DUKWs broachedin the surf zone, spilling their invalu-able guns into deep water. At lengthYoungdale managed to get his re-maining two guns ashore and intofiring position.

General Schmidt also committedone battery of 155mm howitzers ofthe corps artillery to the narrowbeachhead on D + 1. Somehow theseweapons managed to reach the beachintact, but it then took hours to gettractors to drag the heavy guns upover the terraces. These, too, com-menced firing before dark, their deepbark a welcome sound to the in-fantry.

Concern with the heavy casualtiesin the first 24 hours led Schmidt tocommit the 21st Marines from corpsreserve. The seas proved to be toorough. The troops had harrowing ex-

periences trying to debark down car-go nets into the small boats bobbingviolently alongside the transports;several fell into the water. The boat-ing process took hours. Once afloat,the troops circled endlessly in theirsmall Higgins boats, waiting for thecall to land. Wiser heads prevailed.After six hours of awful seasickness,the 21st Marines returned to its shipsfor the night.

Even the larger landing craft, theLCTs and LSMs, had great difficultybeaching. Sea anchors needed to

maintain the craft perpendicular tothe breakers rarely held fast in thesteep, soft bottom. "Dropping thosestern anchors was like dropping aspoon in a bowl of mush," said Ad-miral Hill.

Hill contributed significantly to thedevelopment of amphibious expertisein the Pacific War. For Iwo Jima, heand his staff developed armored bull-dozers to land in the assault waves.They also experimented with hingedMarston matting, used for expedi-tionary airfields, as a temporaryroadway to get wheeled vehicles oversoft sand. On the beach at Iwo, thebulldozers proved to be worth theirweights in gold. The Marston mat-ting was only partially successful —LVTs kept chewing it up in pass-age—but all hands could see itspotential.

Admiral Hill also worked with theNaval Construction Battalion (NCB)personnel, Seabees, as they werecalled, in the attempt to bring supply-laden causeways and pontoon bargesashore. Again the surf prevailed,broaching the craft, spilling the car-go. In desperation, Hill's beach-masters turned to round-the-clockuse of DUKWs and LVTs to keepcombat cargo flowing. Once the

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 110319Like some recently killed prehistoric monsters, these LVTs lie on their sides, com-pletely destroyed on the beach by Japanese mines and heavy artillery fire.

Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man," acrylic on masonite, is by Col CharlesH. Waterhouse, wounded in his arm on D+2 and evacuated from Iwo Jima.

Marine corps Combat Art Collection

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DUKWs got free of the crippling loadof 105mm howitzers they did fine.LVTs were probably better, becausethey could cross the soft beachwithout assistance and conductresupply or medevac missions direct-ly along the front lines. Both vehi-cles suffered from inexperienced LSTcrews in the transport area who toooften would not lower their bowramps to accommodate LVTs orDUKWs approaching after dark. Intoo many cases, vehicles loaded withwounded Marines thus rejected be-came lost in the darkness, ran out ofgas and sank. The amphibian trac-tor battalions lost 145 LVTs at IwoJima. Unlike Tarawa, Japanese gun-fire and mines accounted for less than20 percent of this total. Thirty-fourLVTs fell victim to Iwo's crushingsurf; 88 sank in deep water, mostlyat night.

Once ashore and clear of the loosesand along the beaches, the tanks,half-tracks, and armored bulldozersof the landing force ran into thestrongest minefield defenses yet en-countered in the Pacific War. UnderGeneral Kuribayashi's direction,Japanese engineers had planted ir-regular rows of antitank mines andthe now-familiar horned antiboatmines along all possible exits fromboth beaches. The Japanese sup-plemented these weapons by riggingenormous makeshift explosives from500-pound aerial bombs, depthcharges, and torpedo heads, eachtriggered by an accompanying pres-sure mine. Worse, Iwo's loose soil re-tained enough metallic characteristicsto render the standard mine detectorsunreliable. The Marines werereduced to using their own engineerson their hands and knees out in frontof the tanks, probing for mines withbayonets and wooden sticks.

While the 28th Marines fought toencircle Suribachi and the beach-masters and shore party attempted toclear the wreckage from the beaches,the remaining assault units of theVAC resumed their collective assault

against Airfield No. 1. In the 5th Ma-rine Division's zone, the relativelyfresh troops of the 1st Battalion, 26thMarines, and the 3d Battalion, 27thMarines, quickly became bloodied inforcing their way across the westernrunways, taking heavy casualtiesfrom time-fuzed air bursts fired byJapanese dual-purpose antiaircraftguns zeroed along the exposedground. In the adjacent 4th Divisionzone, the 23d Marines completed thecapture of the airstrip, advancing 800yards but sustaining high losses.

Some of the bitterest fighting in theinitial phase of the landing continuedto occur along the high ground abovethe Rock Quarry on the right flank.Here the 25th Marines, reinforced bythe 1st Battalion, 24th Marines, en-gaged in literally the fight of its life.The Marines found the landscape,and the Japanese embedded in it,unreal:

There was no cover from ene-my fire. Japs dug in reinforcedconcrete piliboxes laid down in-terlocking bands of fire that cutwhole companies to ribbons.Camouflage hid all enemy po-sitions. The high ground oneither side was honeycombedwith layer after layer of Jap em-placements . . . . Their obser-vation was perfect; whenever aMarine made a move, the Japs

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would smother the area in amurderous blanket of fire.

The second day of the battle hadproven unsatisfactory on virtuallyevery front. To cap off the frustra-tion, when the 1st Battalion, 24thMarines, finally managed a break-through along the cliffs late in theday their only reward was two back-to-back cases of "friendly fire." AnAmerican air strike inflicted 11casualties; misguided salvos from anunidentified gunfire support shiptook down 90 more. Nothing seemedto be going right.

The morning of the third day,D +2, seemed to promise more of thesame frustrations. Marines shiveredin the cold wind and rain; AdmiralHill twice had to close the beach dueto high surf and dangerous under-tows. But during one of the graceperiods, the 3d Division's 21st Ma-rines managed to come ashore, all ofit extremely glad to be free of theheaving small boats. GeneralSchmidt assigned it to the 4th Ma-rine Division at first.

The 28th Marines resumed its as-sault on the base of Suribachi, moreslow, bloody fighting, seeminglyboulder by boulder. On the westcoast, the 1st Battalion, 28th Ma-rines, made the most of field artilleryand naval gunfire support to reachthe shoulder of the mountain. Else-where, murderous Japanese fire res-

Marine Corps Historical CollectionMarines advance warily on Airfield No. 1 towards wrecked Japanese planes inwhich enemy snipers are suspected of hiding. The assault quickly moved on.

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jLU

tricted any progress to a matter ofyards. Enemy mortar fire from allover the volcano rained down on the2d Battalion, 28th Marines, trying toadvance along the eastern shore.Recalled rifleman Richard Wheeler ofthe experience, "It was terrible, theworst I can remember us taking. TheJap mortarmen seemed to be playingcheckers and using us as squares:'The Marines used Weasels, handy lit-tle tracked vehicles making their firstfield appearance in this battle, to hus-tle forward flame-thrower canistersand evacuate some of the manywounded.

That night the amphibious taskforce experienced the only significantair attack of the battle. Fiftykamikaze pilots from the 22d MitateSpecial Attack Unit left Katori Air-base near Yokosuka and flung them-selves against the ships on the outerperimeter of Iwo Jima. In desperateaction that would serve as a preludeto Okinawa's fiery engagements, thekamikazes sank the escort carrier Bis-marck Sea with heavy loss of life anddamaged several other ships, includ-ing the veteran Saratoga, finallyknocked out of the war. All 50Japanese planes were expended.

It rained even harder on the fourthmorning, D + 3. Marines scamperingforward under fire would hit the

deck, roll, attempt to return fire —only to discover that the loose vol-canic grit had combined with the rainto jam their weapons. The 21st Ma-rines, as the vanguard of the 3d Ma-rine Division, hoped for goodfortune in its initial commitment af-ter relieving the 23d Marines. Theregiment instead ran headlong intoan intricate series of Japanese em-placements which marked thesoutheastern end of the mainJapanese defenses. The newcomers

fought hard all day to scratch andclaw an advance of 200 net yards.Casualties were disproportionate.

On the right flank, LieutenantColonel Chambers continued to ral-ly the 3d Battalion, 25th Marines,through the rough pinnacles abovethe Rock Quarry. As he strode aboutdirecting the advance of his decimat-ed companies that afternoon, aJapanese gunner shot him throughthe chest. Chambers went downhard, thinking it was all over:

I started fading in and out. IIdon't remember too muchabout it except the frothy bloodgushing out of my mouth.Then somebody started kickingthe hell out of my feet. It was[Captain James] Headley say-ing, "Get up, you were hurtworse on Tulagi!"

Captain Headley knew Chambers'sucking chest wound portended agrave injury; he sought to reduce hiscommander's shock until they couldget him out of the line of fire. Thistook doing. Lieutenant Michael F.Keleher, USNR, now the battalionsurgeon, crawled forward with oneof his corpsmen. Willing hands hf t-ed Chambers on a stretcher. Keleher

Colonel William P. McCahill CollectionFlamethrower teams look like futuristic fighters as they leave their assembly areaheading for the frontlines. The casualty rate for flamethrower operators was high,since they were prime targets for Japanese fire because of the profile they had withthe flamethrowers strapped to their backs. When they fell, others took their places.

In the attack of the 28th Marines on the dominating height, a 37mm guncrew firesat caves at the foot of Suribachi suspected of holding Japanese gun positions.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 110139

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and several others, bent doubleagainst the fire, carried him down thecliffs to the aid station and eventu-ally on board a DUKW making theevening's last run out to the hospitalships. All three battalion com-manders in the 25th Marines hadnow become casualties. Chamberswould survive to receive the Medalof Honor; Captain Headley wouldcommand the shot-up 3d Battalion,25th Marines, for the duration of thebattle.

By contrast, the 28th Marines onD +3 made commendable progress

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 110177 against Suribachi, reaching theFrom the time of the landing on Iwo Jima, attacking Marines seemed to be moving shoulder at all points. Late in the dayuphill constantly. This scene is located between Purple Beach and Airfield No. 2. combat patrols from the 1st Battal-A lone Marine covers the left flank of a patrol as it works vantage point on the enemy-held height that Japanese gun-its way up the slopes of Mount Suribachi. it was from this ners and observers had a clear view of the landing beaches.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A419744

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a - —

Rosenthal's Photograph of Iwo Jima Flag-RaisingQuickly Became One of the War's Most Famous

T here were two flags raised over Mount Suribachion Iwo Jima, but not at the same time. Despitethe beliefs of many, and contrary to the supposed

evidence, none of the photographs of the two flag-raisingswas posed. To begin with, early on the morning of 23February 1945, four days after the initial landings, Cap-tain Dave E. Severance, the commander of Company E, 2dBattalion, 28th Marines, ordered Lieutenant Harold G.Schrier to take a patrol and an American flag to the topof Suribachi. Staff Sergeant Louis R. Lowery, a Leather-neck magazine photographer, accompanied the patol. Af-ter a short fire fight, the 54by-28" flag was attached to along piece of pipe, found at the crest of the mountain, andraised. This is the flag-raising which Lowery photographed.As the flag was thought to be too small to be seen fromthe beach below, another Marine from the battalion wenton board LST 779 to obtain a larger flag. A second patrolthen took this flag up to Suribachi's top and Joe Rosenthal,an Associated Press photographer, who had just comeashore, accompanied it.

As Rosenthal noted in his oral history interview, ".my stumbling on that picture was, in all respects, acciden-tal." When he got to the top of the mountain, he stood ina decline just below the crest of the hill with Marine Ser-geant William Genaust, a movie cameraman who was killedlater in the campaign, watching while a group of five Ma-rines and a Navy corpsman fastened the new flag to anotherpiece of pipe. Rosenthal said that he turned from Genaustand out of the corner of his eye saw the second flag beingraised. He said, "Hey, Bill. There it goes:" He continued:"1 swung my camera around and held it until I could guessthat this was the peak of the action, and shot:'

Some people learned that Rosenthal's photograph wasof a second flag-raising and made the accusation that it wasposed. Joe Rosenthal: "Had I posed that shot, I would, ofcourse, have ruined it. . . . I would have also made themturn their heads so that they could be identified for [As-sociated Press] members throughout the country, and noth-ing like the existing picture would have resulted:'

Later in the interview, he said: "This picture, what itmeans to me — and it has a meaning to me — that has to bepeculiar only to me . . . I see all that blood running downthe sand. I see those awful, impossible positions to takein a frontal attack on such an island, where the batteriesopposing you are not only staggered up in front of you,but also standing around at the sides as you're coming onshore. The awesome situation, before they ever reach thatpeak. Now, that a photograph can serve to remind us ofthe contribution of those boys — that was what made it im-portant, not who took it:'

Rosenthal took 18 photographs that day, went down to

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the beach to write captions for his undeveloped film packs,and, as the other photographers on the island, sent his filmsout to the command vessel offshore. From there they wereflown to Guam, where the headquarters of Admiral ChesterW. Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet/Commanderin Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, was situated, and where thephotos were processed and censored. Rosenthal's picturesarrived at Guam before Lowery's, were processed, sent tothe States for distribution, and his flag-raising picture be-came one of the most famous photographs ever taken inthe war, or in any war.—Benis M. Frank

The six men who participated in the second or "famous"flagraising on Mount Suribachi were Marines, joined bya medical corpsman. They were Sgt Michael Strank; Phar-macist's Mate 2/c John H. Bradley, USN; Cpl Harlon H.Block; and PFCs Ira H. Hayes, Franklin R. Sousley, andRene A. Gagnon. AP photographer Joe Rosenthal recallsstumbling on the picture accidentally: "1 swung my cameraaround and held it until I could guess that this was the peakof the action, and shot. . . . Had I posed that shot, I would,of course, have ruined it . . . . I would have also madethem turn their heads so that they could be identified.and nothing like the existing picture would have resulted."

Associated Press

ion, 28th Marines, and the 2d Bat-talion, 28th Marines, linked up atTobiishi Point at the southern tip ofthe island. Recon patrols returned totell Lieutenant Colonel Johnson thatthey found few signs of live Japanesealong the mountain's upper slopes onthe northside.

At sundown Admiral Spruanceauthorized Task Force 58 to strikeHonshu and Okinawa, then retire toUlithi to prepare for the Ryukyuancampaign. All eight Marine Corpsfighter squadrons thus left the IwoJima area for good. Navy pilots fly-ing off the 10 remaining escort car-riers would pick up the slack.Without slighting the skill and valorof these pilots, the quality of closeair support to the troops fightingashore dropped off after this date.The escort carriers, for one thing,had too many competing missions,namely combat air patrols, anti-submarine sweeps, searches fordowned aviators, harassing strikesagainst neighboring Chichi Jima.Marines on Iwo Jima complained ofslow response time to air support re-quests, light payloads (rarely great-er than 100-pound bombs), and highdelivery altitudes (rarely below 1,500feet). The Navy pilots did deliver anumber of napalm bombs. Many ofthese failed to detonate, although thiswas not the fault of the aviators; theearly napalm "bombs" were simplyold wing-tanks filled with the mix-ture, activated by unreliable detona-tors. The Marines also grewconcerned about these notoriouslyinaccurate area weapons beingdropped from high altitudes.

By Friday, 23 February (D + 4), the28th Marines stood poised to com-plete the capture of Mount Suribachi.The honor went to the 3d Platoon(reinforced), Company E, 2d Battal-ion, 28th Marines, under the com-mand of First Lieutenant Harold C.Schrier, the company executiveofficer. Lieutenant Colonel Johnsonordered Schrier to scale the summit,secure the crater, and raise a 54"x28"

American flag for all to see. Schrierled his 40-man patrol forward at0800. The regiment had done its job,blasting the dozens of piliboxes withflame and demolitions, rooting outsnipers, knocking out the maskedbatteries. The combined-armspounding by planes, field pieces, andnaval guns the past week had like-wise taken its toll on the defenders.Those who remained popped out ofholes and caves to resist Schrier's ad-vance only to be cut down. The Ma-rines worked warily up the steepnorthern slope, sometimes resortingto crawling on hands and knees.

Part of the enduring drama of theSuribachi flag-raising was the factthat it was observed by so many peo-ple. Marines all over the island couldtrack the progress of the tiny columnof troops during its ascent ("thoseguys oughta be getting flight pay;'said one wag). Likewise, hundreds ofbinoculars from the ships offshorewatched Schrier's Marines climbingever upward. Finally they reached thetop and momentarily disappearedfrom view. Those closest to the vol-cano could hear distant gunfire.Then, at 1020, there was movementon the summit; suddenly the Starsand Stripes fluttered bravely.

Lusty cheers rang out from all overthe southern end of the island. Theships sounded their sirens and whis-tles. Wounded men propped them-selves up on their litters to glimpsethe sight. Strong men wept un-ashamedly. Navy Secretary Forrestal,thrilled by the sight, turned to Hol-land Smith and said, "the raising ofthat flag means a Marine Corps foranother five hundred years."

Three hours later an even largerflag went up to more cheers. Fewwould know that Associated Pressphotographer Joe Rosenthal had justcaptured the embodiment of theAmerican warfighting spirit on film.Leatherneck magazine photographerStaff Sergeant Lou Lowery had takena picture of the first flag-raising andalmost immediately got in a firefight

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with a couple of enraged Japanese.His photograph would become avalued collector's item. But Rosen-thal's would enthrall the free world.

Captain Thomas M. Fields, com-manding Company D, 1st Battalion,26th Marines, heard his men yell"Look up there!" and turned in timeto see the first flag go up. His firstthought dealt with the battle still athand: "Thank God the Japs won't beshooting us down from behind anymore:' Meanwhile, the 14th Marinesrushed their echo and flash-rangingequipment up to the summit. Thelanding force sorely needed enhancedcounterbattery fire againstKuribayashi's big guns to the north.

The Marines who raised the firstflag were Lieutenant Schrier; PlatoonSergeant Ernest T. Thomas, Jr.; Ser-geant Henry 0. Hansen; CorporalCharles W. Lindberg; and PrivatesFirst Class Louis C. Charlo andJames Michels. The six men immor-talized by Joe Rosenthal's photographof the second flag-raising were Ser-geant Michael Strank, Pharmacist'sMate 2/c John H. Bradley, CorporalHarlon H. Block, and Privates FirstClass Ira H. Hayes, Franklin R. Sous-ley, and Rene A. Gagnon.

The 28th Marines took Suribachiin three days at the cost of more than500 troops (added to its D-day loss-es of 400 men). Colonel Liversedgebegan to reorient his regiment foroperations in the opposite direction,northward. Unknown to all, the bat-tle still had another month to run itsbloody course.

The Drive NorthThe landing force still had much

to learn about its opponent. Seniorintelligence officers did not realize un-til 27 February, the ninth day of thebattle, that General Kuribayashi wasin fact on Iwo Jima, or that his fight-ers actually numbered half again theoriginal estimate of 13,000.

For Kuribayashi, the unexpected-ly early loss of the Suribachi garri-son represented a setback, yet heoccupied a position of great strength.

ViSA.

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He still had the equivalent of eightinfantry battalions, a tank regiment,two artillery and three heavy mor-tar battalions, plus the 5,000 gunnersand naval infantry under his coun-terpart, Rear Admiral ToshinosukeIchimaru. Unlike other besieged gar-risons in the Central Pacific, the twoJapanese services on Iwo Jima func-tioned well together.

Kuribayashi was particularlypleased with the quality of his ar-tillery and engineering troops.Colonel Chosaku Kaido served asChief of Artillery from his seeming-ly impregnable concrete blockhouseon a promontory on the east centralsector of the Motoyama Plateau, alethal landmark the Marines soondubbed "Turkey Knob." Major Gener-al Sadasue Senda, a former artilleryofficer with combat experience inChina and Manchuria, commandedthe 2d Independent Mixed Brigade,whose main units would soon belocked into a 25-day death strugglewith the 4th Marine Division.Kuribayashi knew that the 204thNaval Construction Battalion hadbuilt some of the most dauntingdefensive systems on the island inthat sector. One cave had a tunnel800 feet long with 14 separate exits;it was one of hundreds designed tobe defended in depth.

The Japanese defenders waiting forthe advance of the V AmphibiousCorps were well armed and confi-dent. Occasionally Kuribayashiauthorized company-sized spoiling

attacks to recapture lost terrain ordisrupt enemy assault preparations.These were not suicidal or sacrificial.Most were preceded by stinging ar-tillery and mortar fires and aimed atlimited objectives. Kuribayashi's ironwill kept his troops from large-scale,wasteful Banzai attacks until the lastdays. One exception occurred thenight of 8 March when General Sen-da grew so frustrated at the tighten-ing noose being applied by the 4thMarine Division that he led 800 ofhis surviving troops in a ferociouscounterattack. Finally given a mul-titude of open targets, the Marinescut them down in a lingering melee.

For the first week of the drivenorth, the Japanese on Iwo Jima ac-tually had the attacking Marines out-gunned. Japanese 150mm howitzersand 120mm mortars were superior to

most of the weapons of the landingforce. The Marines found the enemydirect fire weapons to be equallydeadly, especially the dual-purposeantiaircraft guns and the 47mm tankguns, buried and camouflaged up totheir turrets. "The Japs could snipewith those big guns;' said retiredLieutenant General Donn J. Robert-son. The defenders also had the ad-vantage of knowing the ground.

Not surprisingly, most casualties inthe first three weeks of the battleresulted from high explosives: mor-tars, artillery, mines, grenades, andthe hellacious rocket bombs. Timecorrespondent Robert Sherrodreported that the dead at Iwo Jima,both Japanese and American, hadone thing in common: "They all diedwith the greatest possible violence.Nowhere in the Pacific War had Iseen such badly mangled bodies.Many were cut squarely in half:'

Close combat was rough enough;on Iwo Jima the stress seemed end-less because for a long time the Ma-rines had no secure "rear area" inwhich to give shot-up troop units arespite. Kuribayashi's gunnersthroughout the Motoyama Plateaucould still bracket the beaches andairfields. The enormous spigot mor-tar shells and rocket bombs still cametumbling out of the sky. Japanese in-filtrators were drawn to "softer tar-

Marine Corps Historical CollectionMarine half-track scores a hit on a Japanese strongpoint with its 75mm gun.

The drive north by the 3d Battalion, 28th Marines, enters rugged terrain. Underheavy Japanese fire, this attack netted only 200 yards despite supporting fires.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 111988

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A.—

The Japanese 320mm Spigot Mortar

Q ne of the unique Japanese weapons that Marinesencountered on Iwo Jima was the 320mm spigotmortar. These enormous defensive weapons

were emplaced and operated by the Japanese Army's 20thIndependent Mortar Battalion.

The mortar tube, which had a small cavity at the muz-zle, rested on a steel baseplate which, in turn, was supportedby a wooden platform. Unlike a conventional mortar, thefive-foot long projectile was placed over the tube insteadof being dropped down the barrel. The mortar shell hada diameter of nearly 13 inches, while the mortar tube waslittle more than 10 inches wide. The weapon could hurla 675-pound shell a maximum of 1,440 yards. The rangewas adjusted by varying the powder charge, while changesin deflection were accomplished by brute force: shoving andpushing the base platform.

Although the tubes only held out for five or six rounds,enough shells were lobbed onto Marine positions to makea lasting impression on those who suffered through thatcampaign. According to a platoon leader who served withthe 28th Marines, the spigot mortar (referred to as "thescreaming Jesus" in his unit) was always afforded a healthyrespect and, along with the eight-inch Japanese naval rock-et, remains one of his most vivid memories of Iwo Jima.General Robert E. Cushman, Jr., who commanded the 2dBattalion, 9th Marines, at Iwo Jima and went on to becomethe 25th Commandant of the Marine Corps, recalled thatthe tumbling projectile's inaccuracy made it that much moreterrifying. "You could see it coming," he said, "but you neverknew where the hell it was going to come down:'

Kenneth L. Smith-Christmas

gets" in the rear. Anti-personnelmines and booby traps, encounteredhere on a large scale for the first timein the Pacific, seemed everywhere.Exhausted troop units would stum-ble out of the front lines seekingnothing more than a helmet-full ofwater in which to bathe and a deephole in which to sleep. Too often themen had to spend their rare rest peri-ods repairing weapons, humpingammo, dodging major-caliber incom-ing, or having to repel yet anothernocturnal Japanese probe.

General Schmidt planned to attackthe Japanese positions in the northwith three divisions abreast, the 5thon the left, the 3d (less the 3d Ma-rines) in the center, and the 4th onthe right, along the east coast. Thedrive north officially began on D + 5,

the day after the capture of Sur-ibachi. Prep fires along the highground immediately north of the se-cond airfield extended for a full hour.Then three regimental combat teamsmoved out abreast, the 26th Marineson the left, the 24th Marines on theright, and the 21st Marines again inthe middle. For this attack, GeneralSchmidt consolidated the Shermantanks of all three divisions into onearmored task force commanded byLieutenant Colonel William R. "Rip"Collins. It would be the largest con-centration of Marine tanks in thewar, virtually an armored regiment.The attack plan seemed solid.

The Marines soon realized theywere now trying to force passagethrough Kuribayashi's main defensivebelt. The well-coordinated attack de-

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generated into desperate, small-unitactions all along the front. The 26thMarines on the left, aided by thetanks, gained the most yardage, butit was all relative. The airfield run-ways proved to be lethal killingzones. Marine tanks were bedeviledby mines and high-velocity direct fireweapons all along the front. On theright flank, Lieutenant Colonel Alex-ander A. Vandegrift, Jr., son of theCommandant, became a casualty.Major Doyle A. Stout took com-mand of the 3d Battalion, 24thMarines.

During the fighting on D + 5,

General Schmidt took leave of Ad-miral Hill and moved his commandpost ashore from the amphibiousforce flagship Auburn (AGC 10).Colonel Howard N. Kenyon led his

9th Marines ashore and into a stag-ing area. With that, General Erskinemoved the command post of the 3dMarine Division ashore; the 21st Ma-rines reverted to its parent command.Erskine's artillery regiment, the 12thMarines under Lieutenant ColonelRaymond F. Crist, Jr., continued toland for the next several days.Schmidt now had eight infantry regi-ments committed. Holland Smith stillretained the 3d Marines in Expedi-tionary Troops reserve. Schmidtmade the first of several requests toSmith for release of this seasonedoutfit. The V Amphibious Corps hadalready suffered 6,845 casualties.

The next day, D +6, 25 February,provided little relief in terms ofJapanese resistance. Small groups ofMarines, accompanied by tanks,somehow made it across the runway,

each man harboring the inescapablefeeling he was alone in the middle ofa gigantic bowling alley. Sometimesholding newly gained positionsacross the runway proved moredeadly than the process of gettingthere. Resupply became nearly im-possible. Tanks were invaluable;many were lost.

Schmidt this day managed to geton shore the rest of his corps artillerytwo battalions of 155mm howitzersunder Colonel John S. Letcher. Well-directed fire from these heavier fieldpieces eased some of the pressure. Sodid call fire from the cruisers and des-troyers assigned to each maneuverunit. But the Marines expressed dis-appointment in their air support.The 3d Marine Division complainedthat the Navy's assignment of eightfighters and eight bombers on station

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was "entirely inadequate." By noonon this date General Cates sent amessage to Schmidt requesting that"the Strategic Air Force in the Man-anas replace Navy air support im-mediately:' Colonel Vernon E. Megee,now ashore as Air Commander IwoJima and taking some of the heatfrom frustrated division com-manders, blamed "those little spit-kitNavy fighters up there, trying tohelp, never enough, never where theyshould be"

In fairness, it is doubtful whetherany service could have provided ef-fective air support during the open-ing days of the drive north. The AirLiaison Parties with each regimentplayed hell trying to identify andmark targets, the Japanese main-tained masterful camouflage, front-line units were often "eyeball-to-

Expended shells and open ammunition boxes testify to theheavy supporting fire this water-cooled, .30-caliber Brown-

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 110604ing machine gun poured on the enemy as Marines advancedIn the furious and difficult battle for the heights of Suribachi.