UNITEDSTATES ARMr IN WORLDWARII TheEuropeanTheaterof Operations CROSS-CHANNELATTACK by GordonA.Harrison CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON,D.C.,1993 Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 51-61669 First Printed 1951-CMH Pub 7-4-1 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.Government Printing Office Washington, D.C.20402 UNITEDSTATESARMYINWORLDWARII KentRoberts Greenfield,GeneralEditor AdvisoryCommittee JamesP.Baxter President,WilliamsCollege Henry S.Commager Columbia University Douglas S.Freeman RichmondNewsLeader Pendleton Herring SocialScienceResearchCouncil John D.Hicks UniversityofCalifornia WilliamT.Hutchinson UniversityofChicago S.L. A.Marshall DetroitNews E.Dwight Salmon Amherst College Col. Thomas D.Stamps UnitedStatesMilitaryAcademy CharlesH.Taylor Harvard University Historical Division) SSUSA "" Maj. Gen. Orlando Ward, Chief Chief Historian Chief, World War II Group Editor-in-Chief Chief Cartographer Kent Roberts Greenfield Col. Allison R. Hartman"" Hugh Corbett W sevolodAglaimoff Redesignated Officeofthe Chief of MilitaryHistory.28March1950. SucceededbyCol.ThomasJ.Sands.3March ,1950. iii . .toThoseWhoServed Foreword Cross-Channel A ttackisone of approximately ahundred volumes which theDepartment ofthe Armyintends topublish regarding itspart inWorld War II. This particular volume deals with the planning and the difficulties en-counteredincidenttothemountingofthelargestamphibiousassaultever undertaken in military history.Much ofthe information it containshasnot heretoforebeen amatter ofpublic knowledge.For example,light isforthe firsttimethrownupontheenemy'sconflictingtheoriesofdefenseagainst Allied air superiority and upon his pauCity of first-classtroops. This informa-tionisderivedfromtheofficialrecordsoftheWehrmacht andfromsigned statements of German participants. Many of the difficulties encountered in the planning, as well asin the execution stage of the operation, are here described to the public forthe firsttime. Where this history deals with the struggle ashore, it clearly illustratesthe necessityforcommandersto adjusttheir thinking tothe meansat hand,the terrain, and the influence of new weapons. It reiterates the indispensability of constanttraining in howto get orderout oftheconfusionwhichisforever present upon thebattlefield. It bringsto mind in thisconnectionthemeans used by a football team for meeting the problems of overcoming opposition on the playing field.The plays devised and the techniques used to attain its ends must be practiced again and again.Frequently it isthe lossof effective direc-tion of small units, incident tothe battle's toll, which makes for failure rather than success. Whether the reader approachesthebook withthe justified pridethat he was a member or supporter of the winning team, or whether he reads to learn, is amatter for him to decide. The victor tends to prepare to win the next war with the same means and methods with which he wonthe last.He forgetsthe difficultyof reaching decisions,theplanning problems,hisfaltering,hisun-preparedness.Thevanquishediswonttosearchfarafieldfornewandim-proved methods, means, and equipment. The accomplishments ofthosewho fought in this period wereindeed great, as werethe sacrifices.But fromthe national viewpoint it would seem desirable to read thisvolume with the self-critical eyeof thevanquished aswell aswiththeprideofthevictor,anap-proach which the thoughtful reader will not find difficult. Washington,D.C. 1October1950 vii ORLANDOWARD Maj.Gen.,U.S.A. Chief ofMilitary History IntroductoryNoteontheHistoryof theEuropeanTheaterofOperations Chronologicallythisvolumeisfirstintheseriesnarratingtheeventsof '","orId War II in the European Theater ofOperations.It hasbeen preceded in publication by The Lorraine Campaign) which covers the operations of the Third Army during the autumn of1944 and which begins sometwo months after the close of the present volume. Aco-operative history of the type repre-sented in this series has distinct advantages but does not lend itself readily to theproductionandpublicationofvolumesinproperchronologicalorder. For this reason each volume willbe designated only bytitle and will remain unnumbered. Cross-Channel Attack has been planned and written as.the introduction to the history of those campaigns in 1944 and 1945which led to the destruction of theGerman armiesin thewest.It providesnecessarybackgroundforthe study of allthe campaigns in the European Theater ofOperations.The nar-rative ofoperations ends onIJuly 1944, with the Alliesfirmlyestablished in Normandy. The concluding chapters show the successful fruition of plans and preparations reaching back asfar as January 1942;but the seizure. of the Nor-man beaches and the establishment of a lodgment area are only a beginning, a point of departure forthe drive tothe Elbe andthe Baltic. AlthoughCross-Channel Attack includes discussion of certain problems of high command and logistics, a more complete treatment is accorded these subjects in two volumes now under preparation in this series:The Supreme Command and Logistical SupportoftheArmies. The author of Cross-Channel Attack) Gordon A.Harrison, a former news-paper reporter and instructor at Harvard University, holds the Doctor of Phil-osophy degree from that institution. During the war he served asahistorical officer with the Third Army, taking part in fivecampaigns. He joined the His-toricalDivision,Department ofthe Army,in1946. Washington,D.C. 1 October 1950 viii HUGHM.COLE Chief,European Section Preface This volume, introductory to a series on the European Theater of Opera-tions,deals with the development of strategy and planning forthe attack on northwest Europe in 1944 and with the firstmonth of operations establishing AlliedarmiesinFrance.Thefirstsevenchapters(abouttwo-thirds)ofthe book are concerned with the prelude tothe 6 June assault:the preparations and discussions of strategy on both the Allied and German sides from1941to 1944.The remainingthreechaptersdescribethecombatoperationsofthe First U.S.Army in Normandy from6June to1 July1944.This apportion-ment of spacewasdeliberately madewithreferencetothewholeEuropean Theater Series,and much ofthematerialonplans,the state ofGermande-fense,preparatory operations, has strict relevance only when viewed fromthe larger perspective. While attempting to set operations in northwest Europe in the framework of world-wide strategy,Cross-Channel A ttack makes no pretense of telling the fullstory of that strategy. Other volumes under preparation by the Historical Division willfocuson the Mediterranean and Pacific and discussvariousas-pects of the higher direction of the war. It should be pointed out further that this is an American story of an Allied operation.It isbasedlargelyonDepartmentoftheArmyrecords,andal-though these include a large number of British and Combined it has not been possible, nor was it intended, to develop in full the narrative of British participation. Every effort has been made to avoid a partisan viewpoint andtopresentfairlysomeofthecriticalproblemsoftheAnglo-American allianceastheycameintoandwererevealedbythecross-Channelproject. Beyondthatthereisnoattempttoachievean"Allied"perspectiveorto weighandbalanceAmericanandBritishcontributions.Intheoperational chaptersBritishactionhasbeensummarizedonlywhenit occurredonthe flankof FirstU. S.Army and materiallyaffectedAmericanoperations. Inthenarrativeof AmericanoperationsinChaptersVIII-X,thebasic unit treated is the division, although in recording the fragmented battles typi-caloffightingintheEuropeantheaterit often becomesnecessarytofollow battalionsandevencompaniesand platoonsonquasi-independentmissions in order to describe fully what the division asaunit did. The actions are de-scribed in somewhat less detail than in other volumes of the series chiefly be-cause the Department of the Army has already published monographs cover-ing the period. The reader interested in greater detail will findit in[Charles H. Taylor]Omaha Beachhead(Washington,1945)and[R.G.Ruppenthal] UtahBeachtoCherbourg(Washington,1947).Cross-ChannelAttacksum-marizes these two accounts with occasional corrections, additions, and reinter-pretations,and withentirelynewGermanmaterial. ix In a work based o.nthousands of cables, memoranda, plans, journal entries, etc., to have cited the source for every fact would have unduly burdened every page with redundant footnotes.Documentation istherefore selective,aimed first at citing authorities for all important or disputed facts and opinions, and secondat providingthosecurioustoknowmore with an adequate guideto the primary and secondary source material. As isthe uniform practice throughout this series,German units and head-quarters are italicized. Exception ismade for OKW and OKH which, though militaryheadquarters,werealsoconstitutionalorgansoftheGermanstate. Germanunits aretranslated wheneverexact Englishequivalentsexist.The terms panzer, panzer grenadier, Luftwaffe, and Kampfgruppe, however, have been retainedbecausetheyareofsuchcommonoccurrencethattheyhave been virtually assimilated at least into military English. Cross-Channel Attack isin areal sensethe product of co-operativeenter-prise.It depends heavilyon information collectedby armyhistoriansinthe field during combat, on preliminary draft narratives by other historians after combat, on specific assistance given me during the writing and research,and perhaps most important of all on the privilege(which Ihave always enjoyed) oftappingthecollectiveknowledgeofcolleaguesworkinginrelatedfields. Whenthefirstdraftwascompleted IhadtoleavetheDivisiontemporarily and the whole burden of editing devolvedforsometimeupon others.Iam particularlygratefultoAssociateEditorJosephR.FriedmanandtoCapt. FrankMahin,Capt.JamesScoggin,andMr.DetmarFinkeoftheForeign Studies Section for undertaking much of the onerous burden of checking facts andfootnotesin myabsence,andforperforminganediting taskthatoften amounted to collaboration. It isapleasure to acknowledgeindebtedness toCol.S.L. A.Marshall for hisindispensable seriesof interviews and manuscript studies of the airborne operations in Normandy and forhisinterviews withofficersandmenofth(" 1st and 29th Divisions. Other combat interviews to which Iam indebted were conductedbyLt.Col.W.T.GayleandCapt.R.G.Ruppenthal.Special thanks are due Captain Ruppenthal and Colonel Taylor for the excellent pre-liminary studieson UTAHand OMAHAbeach mentionedabovewhichIhave usedfreely.Interviews conductedbyDr.ForrestC.Poguewithsomeforty Britishplanners and commandersinthesummer of1946immeasurablyen-riched the record available to me. In exploringGermansources,besidesassistancebytheForeignStudies SectionIreceivedspecialhelp fromCapt.Benjamin Schwartz.The bulk of theresearchinairforcerecordsonwhichthesectionontheCombined Bomber OffensiveisbasedwasveryablyperformedbyLt.Col.CharlesA. Warner. The task of locating relevant documents and running down some of the more elusive facts was made easier and more pleasant by the willing efforts of manyspecialresearchassistantsandarchivistswhocannotallbenamed here. Iappreciate the co-operation of members of the JCS Historical Section, the Air ForcesHistorical Section,and the Officeof NavalHistory.Iam spe-x cially grateful to Mr.Israel Wice and his assistants,to Mr. Royce L. Thomp son, and to Miss Alice Miller. The problems of dealing with an Allied operation largely from American records were greatly reduced by the generous help of the British Cabinet His-toricalSectionunder BrigadierH.B.Latham.Imust particularlyacknowl-edge the contributions of Lt. Col. H. A.Pollock and Lt. Col. A.E.Warhurst. Colonel Warhurst, author of the British Historical Section's preliminary nar-rativeof operationsinnorthwestEurope,hassentmecopiesofimportant documentsmissingfromthefileshereandhassuppliedcarefulbriefsof British action. Useful information was also supplied by the British Admiralty andtheAirMinistry.Col.C.P.StaceyoftheCanadianHistoricalSection gave me the benefit of his special knowledge.It should be pointed out, how-ever,that the British and Canadian historians do not concur in many of the judgments in this book and that they are in no way responsible forthe han-dling of the material, or for errors of factor presentation. For making available personal papers and other data Iam indebted to the kindness of Gen. Dwight D.Eisenhower,Maj.Gen.Ray W.Barker,and Lt. Gen. Sir Frederick E. Morgan. Other commanders have helped clarify obscure points and have criticized portions of the manuscript. Footnotes acknowledge their contributions only in part. The warning must be repeated that their help in no way implies an endorsement of the usethat has been made of it. Mr. Wsevolod Aglaimoff in the course of planning and laying out the maps provided me with new fruitful perspectives out of his knowledge and experi-enceasamilitary cartographer.PictureswereselectedandpreparedbyLt. Col.JohnHatlem;aerialphotogTaphsweremadebyhim speciallyforthis volumethroughtheco-operationofthe45thReconnaissanceSquadron, USAF.Miss Michael Burdett edited the footnotes and, with Mrs. Frances T. Fritz,copy-editedtheentiremanuscript.Thetremendousjobofpreparing the index was carried out by Mr.David Jaffe.MissMildred Bucan typed the manuscript forthe printer. Cross-ChannelAttackhasbeenpreparedunderthe generaldirectionof Dr. Hugh M. Cole, Chief of the European Section, Historical Division. It has beenahappyandrewardingexperiencetohavehadDr.Cole'sdiscerning counselthroughout the period of researchand writing. Washington, D.C. 1 October 1950 xi GORDON A.HARRISON Contents Chapter I.THE ROOTSOF STRATEGY. Page 1 1 13 21 32 38 TheCommonGround GeneralMarshall'sProject. "Actionin1942-Not 1943" .. The Period of Indecision (July-December 1942) TheCasablancaConference. II.OUTLINEOVERLORD(JANUARY-JULY1943) OrganizationforPlanning. Size and Shape of the Attack. LandingCraftRequirements Allotment of Resources) May 1943 TheCOSSACPlans. 46 46 54 59 63 70 III.OVERLORDINTHE BALANCE(AUGUST-DECEMBER1943)83 StrategyReviewed:TheQuebecConference83 Landing CraftAgain.100 Questions of Command.105 TheCairo-TehranConferences.117 IV.THE GERMAN ARMY IN FRANCE,1940-1943.128 Organizationof theWest128 Impact of the Russian and MediterraneanFronts.140 Rebuilding theWesternDefenses148 V.OVERLORDREVISED.158 U.S.OrganizationandTrainingtortheAssault,January1944158 The ANVIL-OVERLORD Debate.164 TheNEPTUNEPlans.173 VI.PRELIMINARYOPERATIONS198 The FrenchResistance198 TheCombined Bomber Offensive207 TheBombing of FrenchRailroads.217 VII.GERMANDEFENSEMEASURES,1944231 OKW Policyin 1944.231 OrganizationforCombat236 CommandandTactics242 The Defense onthe Eveof Invasion258 xiii Chapter VIII.THE SIXTHOF JUNE TheInvasionisLaunched TheAirborneAssault HittingtheBeaches. TheD-DayBeachhead IX.THE VCORPS LODGMENT(7-18 JUNE) SecuringtheBeachheads. JunctionBetweenVandVIICorps TheCaumontGap Toward St.La. X.THE CAPTURE OF CHERBOURG(8JUNE-IJULY) SecuringtheNorthFlank. Appendix AttacktoCutthePeninsula. HitlerIntervenes. A dvancetotheC herbourg Landfront The Fall of Cherbourg Endof aPhase Page 269 269 278 300 321 336 336 351 366 376 386 386 396 408 416 422 438 A.DIGESTOFOPERATIONOVERLORD450 B.DIRECTIVETOSUPREMECOMMANDER,ALLIEDEXPE DITIONARYFORCE457 C.HITLERDIRECTIVENO.40459 D.HITLERDIRECTIVENO.51464 E.CHRONOLOGYOFMAINPLANNINGPAPERSFROM JANUARY1944468 F.COMPARATIVEFIREPOWER OF THE U.S.ANDGERMAN 1944-TYPEINFANTRYDIVISIONS.470 G.DIVISIONSAVAILABLETOGERMANYON6JUNE1944471 H.TABLEOFEQUIVALENTRANKS472 1.RECIPIENTSOFTHEDISTINGUISHEDSERVICECROSS473 J.BASICMILITARYMAPSYMBOLS477 GLOSSAR Y479 CODENAMES485 BIBLIOGRAPHICALNOTE487 INDEX.495 xiv Charts }io.Page 1.SimplifiedCommandandPlanningOrganizationforEuropean Opera-tions asof May1942.S 2.GermanChain of Commandin theWest,May1944.244 3.LuftwaffeCommandintheWest245 4.German Naval Command in the West.245 Maps 1.Situation in Europe, 6 june 1944. 2.German Counterattack inthe Cotentin. S.4thInfantry Division,6june 1944. 4.German Counterattack on Carentan,13june 1944 5.CaumontGap,Morning10june1944 6.The laFiereBridgehead,9june 1944. Maps I-XXIV are in accompanying map envelope I.Overlord Area. II.TheFinalOverlordPlan. III.Development oftheLodgment. IV.SealingOfftheBattlefield. V.Order of BattleOBWEST,6june1944. VI.Allied AssaultRoutes,6june1944. VII.TheAirborneAssault,6june1944. VIII.lOlstAirborneDivisionDropPattern,6June1944. IX.82dAirborneDivisionDropPattern,6June1944. X.VCorps D-DayObjectives. XI.OmahaBeachAssault. XII.The Second British Army on DDay. XIII.GermanCountermeasures,6June1944. XIV.VCorps,7-8 June1944. XV.VII Corps on D+ 1. 268 296 305 S66 370 397 XVI.BattleforCarentanandJunctionoftheBeachheads,8-12June1944. XVII.VCorpsAdvance,9-13June1944. XVIII.KampfgruppeHeintz,6-11June1944. XIX_TowardSt.L6,14-18June1944. XX.SecuringtheNorthFlank,8-14June1944. XXI.AttacktoCutthePeninsula,10-18 June1944. XXII.TheAdvanceNorth,19-21June1944. XXIII.The Attack onCherbourg,22-26June1944. XXIV.TheAdvanceInland,6June-lJuly1944. xv Illustrations President Roosevelt and PrimeMinister Churchill GeneralMarshall. U.S.Soldiersin Ireland CasablancaConference GeneralMorgan British Landing Craft onBeachat Dieppe German SubmarineUnder AerialAttack QuebecConference GeneralMontgomery. TehranConference Field Marshal von Rundstedt and General JodI GermanHighCommand Enemy CoastArtillery. FieldMarshalRommel GeneralEisenhower InvasionTraininginEngland AssaultTraining VauvilleBeach,Spring1944. PreinvasionBombing. Hitler LeavingRailway CarriageatCompiegne V-BombOverLondon,June1944 Bombardment ofMarshaling Yards Results of Air Attacks. Antilanding Obstacles. GermanMobileInfantry CapturedGermanArmor PreinvasionScenes. Allied Invasion Chiefs. GermanFieldCommanders ParachuteTroops. Hedgerow Country. MerderetRiverCrossing CrossingtheChannel. TroopsonUtah Beach Aerial View of Utah Beach on D-DayMorning. Aerial Viewof Omaha Beachon DPlus1 TerrainonOmahaBeach Assault Landings,Omaha Beach. FirstAid ontheBeach RangersScalingthe Cliffsat Pointe du Hoe Ninth Air Force B-26 Over British Beachhead. TroopsonUtahBeachUnder ArtilleryFire Planes and Gliders Circling LesForges. xvi Page 7 14 20 39 50 55 85 89 118 124 132 134 139 150 159 161 163 178 195 199 216 226 229 251 255 256 271 273 277 279 285 294 299 303 306 310 312 314 316 323 331 343 346 U.S.Commanders. St.Come-du-MontArea CarentanCauseway... Carentan and Hill 30Area Tank Equipped with Hedgerow Cutter. CrisbecqFortification AzevilleForts Quineville La Fiere Causeway. Tank Entering St.Sauveur-le Vicomte Ste.Colombe-Nehou Area. Seine River Bridge at Mantes-Gassicourt Under Bombardment Utah Beach During the Build-up. Omaha Beach During the Build-up. Artificial Port at Omaha Beach. American Artillery in Action Against Cherbourg Fort du Roule House-to-HouseSearch in Cherbourg American Infantry Captain with Cherbourg Prisoners. Illustrations arefromthefollowingsources: Page 352 354 358 362 385 389 391 394 399 405 407 409 424 425 427 433 435 437 439 u.s. ArmyPhotos, pages:7,14,20,39,50,89,ll8,124,132,159,163,178,216,251,256,271,273,277, .285,303,310,316,343,352,385,405,424,425,427,433, 437,439 U.S. Air ForcePhotos,pages:85,195,226,229, 279,285,294,306.312,331,346,354,358,362,389, 391,394,399,407,409,424,427,435 U.S. Navy Photos, pages:161,323 U.S.Coast Guard Photos, pages:161,299,303,314,425 Captured German Photos, pages:55,134,139,150,255 National Archives Photo, page:199 xvii The U.S. Army Center of Military History TheCenter of Military History prepares and publisheshistoriesasrequiredby the U.S.Army.It coordinates Army historical matters,including historical proper-ties,and supervises the Army museum system.It alsomaintains liaison with public andprivateagenciesand individualstostimulateinterest and study inthefield of militaryhistory.TheCenter islocatedat109914thStreet,N.W.,Washington, D.G20005-3402. xviii CHAPTERI TheRootsofStrategy TheCommonGround OVERLORD,thecross-Channelattack whichhittheGerman-occupiedcoastof Normandyon6 June1944,wasoneofthe lastandbyfarthebiggestoftheseriesof amphibiousoperationsbywhichthe UnitedStatesandtheBritishEmpire cametogripswiththeGerman-Italian- JapaneseAxisinthecourseofWorldWar II.Butitwasmorethanjustanotherat- tack.Itwasthesupremeeffortofthe WesternAlliesinEurope-theconsum- mationofthegranddesigntodefeatGer- manybystrikingdirectlyattheheartof HitlersReich.Oneofthelastattacks,it wasthefruitionofsomeofthefirststra- tegicideas. Theprinciplesthateventuallyshaped OVERLORDweredevelopedearlybuttheir applicationwasdiscontinuous,inter- ruptedbydiffuseexperimentationand improvisation.Neitherideasnorplan- ningcanbetracedalongasingleline froma clearbeginningtotheultimateac- tion.OVERLORDwasanAlliedproject. BritishandAmericanplannersworked together,buttheyalsoworkedseparately, particularlyintheearlyyearsofthewar. Sometimestheireffortsparalleledeach other;sometimestheywereatcross-pur- poses.WithinboththeAmericanandthe Britishmilitaryestablishments,further- more,divergentopinionsstruggledforac- ceptance.Thewholestoryofplanning andpreparingthecross-Channelattackis thusmanystorieswhichcanbetoldonly intermsoftheplannersanddirectors concerned,andthepragmaticorganiza- tionswithinwhichtheyworked. Atleastayearandahalfbeforethe UnitedStateswasdrawnintothewar,the groundworkforpossibleAnglo-American militarycollaborationagainsttheAxis wasbeinglaid.TheNavyDepartment tooktheleadinthesummerof1940ines- tablishingapermanentobserverinLon- don(RearAdm.RobertL.Ghormley) whosejobwasspecificallytodiscussar- rangementsfornavalco-operationincase theUnitedStatescameintothewar,and generallytoprovideachannelforthe interchangeofnavalinformationbe- tweenthetwocountries.1Armyobservers alsotraveledtoLondonduring1940on specialmissions,buttheWarDepart- mentdidnotsetupapermanentliaison bodyuntilthespringof1941.Atthat timeMaj.Gen.JamesE.Chaney,avet- eranoftwenty-fouryearsexperiencein theAirCorps,wassenttoLondonasa SpecialArmyObserverdirectlyrespon- sibletoGen.GeorgeC.Marshall,the U.S.ArmyChiefofStaff.General Chaneysheadquartersbecameknownas SPOBS(SpecialObservers).Admiral Ghormleysgroupatthesametimewas reconstitutedandhewasdesignatedSpe- cialNavalObserver,reportingdirectly 1AdministrativeHistoryofU.S.NavalForcesin Europe,1940-1946,MS,pp.2ff.HistDivfiles.See BibliographicalNote. 2 toAdmiralHaroldR.Stark,theU.S. Chief ofNavalOperations.2 TheestablishmentofChaney'sand Ghormley'sgroups stemmed fromagree-ments with the British in early 1941to ex-changemilitarymissionsinordertoin-surecontinuousco-ordinationofideas andtechniques.TheBritish,asaresult oftheseagreements,setupinWashing-tonthe Joint StaffMission,representing theBritishChiefsof Staff.Headsofthe J oint StaffMission wereco-ordinaterep-resentativesofeachofthethreeservice chiefs. Jointly the mission was responsible totheBritishChiefsof StaffCommittee asawhole.OriginallytheUnitedStates intended toestablish asimilar joint mis-sion.ButinthefirstplacetheUnited States had at that time no system of joint directioncomparabletotheBritish Chiefs of Staff.In the second place it was consideredthataformallyconstituted militarymissionmightleadtopolitical commitmentswhich,inviewofU.S. neutrality,the government could not ac-cept.a The co-ordinationprovidedbytheIn-terchangeofinformationthroughU.S. observers and the British mission was sup-plementedduring1941bytwoformal Anglo-Americanmilitaryconferences. ThefirstwasheldinWashingtonbe-tweenJanuaryandMarch;thesecond took place in August on shipboard in the Atlantic.Atbothconferencesprinciples of combined strategy in Europe were dis-cussedandtentativeagreementsreached onthepolicythatwouldgoverncom-bined conduct of the war when and if the 2Ibid.;[HenryG.Elliott],The PredecessorCom mands:SPOBSandUSAFBI(TheAdministrative and LogisticalHistory of theETO:Part I) ,MS,pp. 23-24.Hist Divfiles. 3Elliott,ThePredecessorCommands,pp.2,25. CROSS-CHANNELATTACK United States became Great Britain's ally. The agreementknownasABC-I,which was arrived at in the course of the first of these meetings, wasespeciallyimportant. Althoughitsdecisionswerenotbinding oneithernationandwerenotofficially recognizedbyPresidentRoosevelt,they wereneverthelessacceptedbytheWar and Navy Departments as a basis for plan-ning in the event of U. S.participation in the war.4 Theobserverandmilitarymission period came to an abrupt end in Decem-ber 1941after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor and Germany declared war on the UnitedStates.InJanuary1942Anglo-American alliancebecame afactand the BritishChiefsof StaffcametoWashing-tontoreaffirmearlierinformalagree-mentson combined strategyandtoplan thecombined conduct ofthe war.Their mostimportant achievementwasthees-tablishment of permanent machinery for collaboration:theCombinedChiefsof Staff.(Chart 1) The Combined Chiefs of Staffweredefinedasconsistingofthe British Chiefs of Staff or their representa-tivesin Washington(the Joint Staff Mis-sion)andtheUnitedStatesopposite numbers.5Theirdutiesasfinallyap-provedweretoformulateandexecute, underthedirectionoftheheadsofthe UnitedNations,policiesandplanscon-cerningthe strategic conduct ofthe war, thebroad program of war requirements, theallocationofmunitions,andthere" quirements fortransportation.6 4BriefofABc-IConversations.Pre-Invfile308. SeeBibliographicalNote. 5U.S.ABC-4/CS-4,14Jan 42.OPDfiles,ARCADIA ConfBk. 6CCS9/1, War CollaborationBetweenUnited Na-tions.Approved at CCS4th Mtg, 10 Feb 42. See Bibli-ographical Note for location and nature of CCS docu ments. THEROOTSOFSTRATEGY3 I PRESIDENTn n PRIMEI MINISTER COMBINED CHIEFSOF STAFF' CHIEFSOF ARMYNAVYAIR JOINT BRITISH CHIEFSOF ____ J L ____ CHIEFSOF STAFFSTAFFt CHIEFSOF ARMY 1NAVY I AIR III IIIII OPDt NAVYAIR PLANSPLANS JOINT JOINT PLANNING ----,r----PLANNERS STAFF COMBINED COMMANDERS ARMY I NAVY IAIR COMBINED STAFF Commandchannels ____ PLANNERS Compositionl i n ~ ................ .. -----------*AdmiralLeahy(beginningin July1942)representedCommanderinChiefRoose\elt.andFieldMarshalDillrepresented MinisterofDefenceChurchillintheComhinedChiefsofStaff. tThe JointStaffMissionmetinWashingtonwith(he JointChiefsofStaffasrepresentatj1,esof[heBritishChiefsofStaff. Inmajorconferences.suchasCairo.Tehran.Yalta.etc..(heBritishChiefsofStaffattendedthemselves. tTheOperationsOi"lsionwas(heagencymostconcernedwithplanningforEuropeanoperations. CHARTI.-SIMPLIFIEDCOMMANDANDPLANNINGORGANIZATION FOREUROPEANOPERATIONSASOFMAY1942 ThecuriousdefinitionoftheCom-binedChiefswascompelledbythefact thatthere wasno organization of United States Chiefs of Staff at that time equiva-lenttotheBritishChiefsofStaffCom-mittee.It wasprimarilytoprovide"op-positenumbers"tothe British formem-bershipinthecombinedorganization thattheU.S.Joint ChiefsofStaffcame intobeing.7 Initiallytheyconsistedof Gen.GeorgeC.Marshall,Chiefof Staff 7Theonlyinterservicedirectoratepreviouslyex-isting wasthe Joint Board founded 17July 1903.The JointBoard,chargedwithco-ordinatingallmatters ofjointinteresttotheservices,consistedin1942of fourNavyandfourArmymembers:fortheArmy, theChiefofStaff,theDeputyChiefofStaff,the Deputy Chief of Staff for Air, and the Director of the War Plans Division;forthe Navy,the Chief of Naval Operations,the AssistantChiefofNavalOperations, theChiefoftheBureauofNavalAeronautics,and the Director of theWar PlansDivisionoftheOffice ofthe Army,Lt.Gen.Henry H. Arnold, CommandingGeneraloftheArmyAir Forces and Deputy Chief of Staff forAir, Admiral Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, and Admiral Ernest J.King, CommanderinChiefoftheU.S.Fleet. InMarch1942,theofficesheld by Stark andKingwerecombinedunderKing;8 Stark wassent to London asCommander ofU.S.NavalForcesinEurope.The threeJointChiefsthencorrespondedto ofNavalOperations. The JointBoard wasprimarily concernedwithadministrativemattersand doctrine. It continuedtoexistaftertheestablishmentofthe JointChiefsalthoughitsdutiesandimportance dwindled.Itwasfinallyabolishedbyexecutiveor-der inAugust1947. 8Admiral King, Annapolis graduate of 1901, served during World War IasAssistant Chief of Staff tothe CommanderinChief,U.S.AtlanticFleet,winning theNavyCross.In1937hemovedintothegroup controllingbroadnavaloperationsandwas,suc-4 theBritishorganization,whichin1942 included Gen.Sir Alan Brooke,Chief of theImperialGeneralStaff,AdmiralSir DudleyPound,FirstSeaLord,andAir ChiefMarshalSirCharlesPortal,Chief ofthe Air Staff.The British Chiefs,how-ever,metwiththeAmericansonlyat periodic military-political conferences. In the interim they were represented on the permanentcombinedbodyinWashing-ton by the Joint Staff Mission, the original members of which were Lt. Gen. Sir Col-ville Wemyss, Admiral Sir Charles Little, and AirMarshalA.T.Harris.9 Inaddi-tiontothethreeservicemembersofthe mission, Field Marshal Sir John Di11l0 sat asamember oftheCombinedChiefsof cessively,amemberoftheGeneralBoardofthe Navy,CommanderoftheU.S.FleetPatrolForce, and,withtherank ofadmiral,Commander in Chief oftheAtlanticFleet.Heassumedcommandofthe U.S.FleetinDecember1941.AdmiralStark,An napolis graduate of 1903, had commanded a destroyer squadronin activeserviceagainstsubmarinesinthe MediterraneanandtheAtlanticinWorldWarI, laterservingonthestaffoftheCommander,U.S. NavalForcesOperatinginEuropeanWaters.He wasmadeChiefoftheBureauofOrdnancein1934 andfouryearslaterbecameCommander,Cruisers, BattleForce.The followingyear,1939,hewaspro-motedtofulladmiraland assumed hispostof Chief ofNavalOperations. 9TheJointStaffMissionsupersededtheearlier BritishMilitaryMissioninMay1941.Changesin personnel upto1944 were:Chief of the British Army Staff-Lt. Gen. Sir Colville Wemyss(toMarch1942) , Maj.Gen.R.H.Dewing(March-JuneI 94Z),Lt. Gen.G.N.Macready;Chief of the British Admiralty Delegation-AdmiralSirCharlesLittle(toJune 1942),AdmiralSirAndrewCunningham(June-December1942), AdmiralSirPercyNoble;Chiefof theBritishAirStaff-AirMarshalA.T.Harris(to February1942),AirMarshalD.C.S.Evill(Febru-ary 1942-June 1943), Air Marshal Sir William Walsh. 10 Field Marshal Dill, Sandhurst graduate and Boer Warveteran,wasFieldMarshalHaig'sBrigadier General,Operations,duringthelastHundredDays beforethe1918Armistice.He servedontheGeneral StaffinIndia,wasDirectorofMilitaryOperations and IntelligenceintheWarOffice,commandedtwo divisionsinPalestine duringthe Arab rebellion,and CROSS-CHANNELATTACK StaffrepresentingthePrimeMinister, WinstonS.Churchill,inhiscapacityas MinisterofDefence.InJuly1942,the J oint Chiefs of Staff also acquired a fourth memberinAdmiralWilliamD.Leahy, appointedChiefofStafftoPresident Rooseveltinhiscapacity asCommander inChief ofthe ArmyandNavyY The mechanics of joint and combined directionoftheAlliedwareffortde-veloped very slowly although most of the machinery wasestablishedin early1942. Just as the Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves were formedto parallel the existing Brit-ish organization, sothey established their principalsubordinateagency,theJoint Planning Staff,alongthelines developed wasCommanderin-ChiefatAldershot.AsChiefof theImperialGeneralStafffromMay1940through 1941,he was responsible forthe reinforcement of the British armiesin Egypt andthe MiddleEast and for thedecisiontosendBritishtroopstoG r,eece.Pro-motedtofieldmarshalinDecember1941,hewas senttoWashingtonasHeadoftheBritishJoint StaffMission and seniorBritish member of the Com binedChiefsofStaff. 11LongaftertheJointChiefsof Staffhadbecome an accepted functioning organization an attempt was madetogivethemawrittencharter.But it wasdis-coveredthatdefinitionsofauthorityatsuchhigh levelstendedtoconfuseratherthan clarifythe posi-tionsof responsibilityandtrustestablishedbyinti-mate personal relationships. The attempted definition wasrejectedbyPresidentRoosevelt,andthecorpo-rateexistenceoftheJointChiefsofStaffcontinued to stem fromthe Combined Chiefs of Staff charter. AdmiralLeahy, Annapolisgraduate in the classof 1897, sawactive war service againstthe Spanish Fleet inSantiagoHarbor,inthePhilippineInsurrection, and intbeBoxer Uprising.During World War I, he served aboardships ofthelineandalsocommanded atrooptransport,winningtheNavyCross.Heas-sumedcommandoftheNewMexicoin1926andin 1933wasmadeChiefoftheBureauofNavigation. Four years later(then an admiral) , he became Chief ofNavalOperations.In1939,retiredfromtheserv-ice,he wasappointedgovernorofPuertoRico.The following year he went to France asU.S.Ambassador. It wasfromthispostthathewasrecalledtoactive dutybythe President in1942. THEROOTSOFSTRATEGY bythe British.The U.S.Joint Planning StafftogetherwiththeBritishJoint Planners constituted the Combined Staff Planners,responsibletotheCombined ChiefsofStaff.12Intheory,plansand studiesofU.S.policyand strategywere tocomeupthroughjoint committeesto be co-ordinated by the Joint Planners and then submitted for approvaltothe Joint Chiefs.If approved,theybecametheof-ficialU.S.viewtobeplacedbeforethe Combined Chiefs for acceptance as Allied policy.Britishstudieswoulddevelop along parallel lines.In case of important discrepanciesbetweenAmericanand Britishviews,theproblemmightbere-ferredbytheCombinedChiefstotheir planning staff for adjustment. The Com-binedPlanners,beingmoreofaco-or-dinatingthanaworkingbody,seldom initiated planning papers. By1943the practice of joint and com-bined planning closely approximated the theory.Butinearly1942mostactual planning on the U. S. side was done in the WarandNavyDepartmentsandco-or-dination between the services was effected largelyoutsidetheformallyestablished joint channels.13 AsfarastheEuropean war was concerned,the War Department and particularly the Operations Division tooktheinitiativein planning andGen-eral Marshall assumedpersonal res pons i-12 Combined Planners named inthe original Com-binedChiefs'charterwere:fortheU.S.,RearAdm. R.K.Turner(USN),Brig.Gen.LeonardT.Gerow (USA),Capt.R.E.Davison(USN),Col.E.L. Naiden(AC);fortheBritish,Capt.C.E.Lambe (RN) ,Lt.Col.G.K.Bourne,GroupCapt.S.C. Strafford(RAF). 13 U.S.planningorganizationandtechniquesare consideredatlengthinRayS.Cline,Washington CommandPost:The OperationsDivision,avolume now under preparation in this series. 5 bility forestablishing and defendingthe U. S.view. OntheBritishside,thejointsystem had been worked out and was fully opera-tivein1942.The British Joint Planners directly responsibletotheBritishChiefs of Staff were throughout the war the chief planningbodyconcernedwithdevelop-ingBritishstrategy.Muchoftheo p e r ~tionalplanning,however,wasdoneby variousfieldcommands.Especiallyim-portantwastheCombinedOperations Headquarters,whichwasheadedafter September1941byCommodoreLord LouisMountbatten.14 Atthetimethat Mountbattenbecamechief,Combined Operationswaschargedwithresponsi-bilityforplanningandexecutingraids againsttheContinent.It wasalsopri-marilyconcernedwithallthetechnical problemsof amphibious operations,and inparticularwiththedevelopmentof landing craft.I5 In January1942Gen. Sir Bernard Paget, commander of the British Home Forces(the highest army field com-mand in England),wasbrought intothe planning picture byadirectivefromthe Chiefs of Staff to study a cross-Channel at-tackplanwrittenbytheBritishJoint Planners.16Paget wasaskedtostudythis 14Mountbatten,whoenteredtheRoyalNavyin 1913,servedatseaduringWorld War I,forthelast two years as a midshipman. After specializing in com-munications, he wasassignedasMediterranean Fleet WirelessOfficerin1931.Thenfollowedassignments ascommanderoftheDaring,theJVishart,and,in 1939,theKellyandthe5thDestroyerFlotillain Mediterraneanoperations.HecametoCombined OperationsHeadquartersaftercommandingtheIl-lustrious. 15Paper byLt. Col.Paddy Corbett, The Evolution and Development of Amphibious Technique and Ma-terial,readbeforeBritishStaffCollege,Camberly, England,May45.Hist Divfiles. 16 General Paget, winner ofthe Distinguished Serv-iceOrderandMilitaryCrossinWorldWarI,en-tered the British Army in 1907.Ascommander of the 6 planinconsultationwiththedesignate NavalandAirForceCommanders-in-Chief(Admiral SirBertramH.Ramsay andAirMarshalSholtoDouglasrespec-tively).Beginningtheirassociationin-formally these three became in the course of the first six months of 1942 the nucleus of a formal planning body, the Combined Commanders. Later Mountbatten was of ficiallyaddedtotheirnumberandthe Commanding GeneralofU.S.Forcesin the European Theater was informally in-cludedamongthem.TheCombined Commandersheldtheirfirstmeetingin May1942 and thereafter until early1943 acted asthe chief British planning agency concerned with the development of plans for a cross-Channel attack.17 To sum up,theinformalmilitaryrap-prochementbetweentheUnitedStates andGreatBritainwhichbeganin1940 culminated in January 1942with the for-mationoftheCombinedChiefsofStaff. The Combined Chiefs were a co-ordinat-ingagencyataveryhighlevel.The de-tailedwork,not only of drawinguptac-ticalplansbutofoutliningstrategy, studyingrequirements,andtestingprin-ciplesagainstresources,wasdonevery largelybyseparateU.S.andBritish bodies. At the strategy level,the most im-portant in1942werethe Joint Planning Staff and the Joint Planners for the Amer-icans and the British respectively.On the 18thDivisionin1939inoperationsinNorway,he successfullyengineereditsevacuation.Hewaspro-motedtolieutenantgeneralandin1940wasap-pointedChiefofGeneralStaff,HomeForces.hold-ingthispositionuntilheassumedcommandofthe Home Forcesin1942. 1721A Gp. Note on the History of Planning for Op-er;ttionsinNorthwestEurope.30Dec43.HistDiv files. CROSS-CHANNELATTACK otherhand,theagenciesmostdirectly concerned with drawing up plans for Eu-ropeanoperationsin1942were,inthe United States, the Operations Division of theWarDepartment,and,inEngland, the Combined Commanders. Finally, over andabovealltheseformallyconstituted planninganddirectingbodiesstood PresidentFranklinD.Rooseveltand Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill, the ultimatelyresponsiblepersonsforall militarydecisions,whoexertedadirect and vitalinfluenceonplanningthat cut athwart allthe formalchannelsof co-op-eration. In the period before theUnited States entered the war, the planning of offensive operations against Germany was naturally desultoryandinconclusive.Inviewof Britishweaknessandalonenessonthe edgeofHitler'sEurope,andinviewof America'sjealouslypreservedisolation, the interesting thing isthat planning took place at all. The notion of a British attack acrosstheChannelcouldhavehadlittle realityandnourgencyduringthedays whentheGermanarmieswereinthe floodtideof their initial victories onthe Continent. Yet the British] oint Planners beforethe end of1941had drawnup an invasionplan. They calledit ROUNDUP}a name suitably reflecting the concept of an operationinthefinalphaseofthewar againstonlytokenresistance.ROUNDUP wasaplanforanoperationwithvery small resources and bore little relation to theattackagainstNormandyin1944. Nevertheless it was a beginning and some of its ideas persisted far into the OVERLORD planning period. ROUNDUPwasplannedtoexploitGer-man deterioration. Asa condition forthe PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT ANDPRIMEMINISTER CHURCHILL 8 invasion, it was assumed that the Germans had abandoned hope for victory, and were withdrawingtheiroccupationforcesto concentrate on the defense of theReich. The purposeof ROUNDUPwastodisrupt thatorderlywithdrawal.Britishforces would assaultwestand eastof LeHavre onbeachesfromDeauvilletoDieppe. Theobjectwouldbeinitiallyto dominateanareabeiweenCalaisand theSeine75to100milesdeep.Thein-vasion forces would then push north, take AntwerpandproceedintoGermany acrosstheMeuseRivernorthofLiege. Total forcestobe used were 6Yainfantry divisions,6armoreddivisions,6army tankbrigades,andsupportingtroops. Preliminarybombardmenttosoftenthe coast defenseswould requirethree naval vessels,includingonecapitalship.The diffuse,small-scalelandingsandthetiny dimensionsofthetotalforceatonce underlined thebasiccondition of enemy weaknesssetfortheoperations,andre-flectedthe military poverty of the British at the time.IS The 1941ROUNDUPwasnot taken very seriouslyandwasneverintr.oducedoffi-cially into combined discussions. The im-mediateconcernofbothAmericansand British was necessarily with basic strategic principlesinthelightofwhichlong-range planning and production could be undertaken.ThefirstAllieddiscussions ofstrategytookplacewhenthewarwas stillconfinedtoEurope.Itwasclear, however,thatJapanmightatanytime 18 JP(41)1028,24Dec4l.CCSfiles,CCS381(3-23-42) , par. I. This wasthe finalversion of the plan. An earlier version, JP(41)823(0)Draft, was dated 9Oct41;nocopyhasbeenlocatedamongDept.of the Army records. CROSS-CHANNELATTACK entertheconflict.Inthatevent,ifthe UnitedStateswasdrawnintowarwith allthreeAxismembersAlliedmilitary resourceswouldbescatteredandAllied strategyimmenselycomplicated.Ade-cision wasurgentlyrequired asto where U. S. and Bri tish forces should first be con-centrated. That decision wastaken at the conferenceinearly1941whentheU.S. War and Navy Departments agreed with the British to defeatGermany firstwhile remainingonthestrategicdefensivein the Pacific.19 For Great Britain geography madethechoiceobligatory.American concurrence wasdictatedby reasonsless obvious but scarcely less compelling. Ger-many wasconsideredthedominant Axis memberwhosedefeatwouldgreatly weakenthe war-makingpowerof Japan. Only against Germany could the offensive power of both the United States and Great Britain be concentrated without uncover-ingtheBritishIsles.Finally,theUnited States,desperatelyshortofshipping, could not at first afford long lines of com-munication."Timeandspacefactors," wrote General Marshallin reviewing the earlyyearsofthewar,"dictatedour strategy to a considerable degree. To land andmaintainAmericanforcesinAus-tralia requiredmorethantwicethe ship tonnageforsimilarAmericanforcesin Europe or North Africa." 20The decision to take the offensive first against Germany was reaffirmed at the ARCADIA Conference inWashingtonon31December1941 after the United States entered the war. It wasreaffirmedwithoutquestiondespite the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. 19 BriefofABC-IConv.Seen.4. 20George C.Marshall, Biennial Report of the Chief ofStaffoftheUnitedStatesArmy,July1,1941,to June30, 1943(Washington,1943) ,p. 10. THEROOTSOFSTRATEGY In the very broadest sense,the ground-workforOVERLORDwasthuslaid.The earlycombineddiscussionstriedfurther toexplorewaysandmeansof gettingat Germany.But offensiveplans necessarily remainedvaguesolongastheneedsfor defense of the United Kingdom and, after PearlHarbor,ofAmericanbasesinthe Pacific absorbed not only all resources on hand but the bulk of those immediately in prospect. Theconclusionwasthatdirectoffen-sive action against Germany was unlikely atleastuntil1943.AttheARCADIACon-ference,thefollowingagreementwas reached: In1942,themethodsofwearingdown Germany'sresistancewillbe... everin-creasingairbombardmentbyBritishand Americanforces... assistancetoRussia's offensivebyallavailablemeans...[and operations]the main object[of which]will begainingpossessionofthewholeNorth Africancoast....It doesnotseemlikely thatin1942anylargescalelandoffensive againstGermany,exceptontheRussian front,willbepossible...[but]in1943, thewaymaybeclearforareturntothe continentacrosstheMediterranean,from TurkeyintotheBalkans,orbylandingsin Western Europe. Such operations will bethe preludetothefinalassaultonGermanyit-self.21 The program thus outlined wasto a re-markabledegreecarriedout.Butit was notcarriedoutwithoutprolongedand searching re-examination ofeach stepof theprelude.Inthecourseofthat re-ex-aminationtheAmericanandBritish ChiefsofStaffdiscoveredanimportant difference of bpinion in their approach to theproblemof defeatingGermany.The differencewasadumbratedinanex-21U.S.ABC-4jCS-l,31Dec41.ARCADIAConfBk. 9 change of viewsinthe fallof1941called forthbyaReviewof Strategysubmitted bytheBritishChiefsof StaffforAmeri-canconsideration.Inreply,American jointplannerscriticizedtheindirection oftheBritishapproachtooffensiveac-tion. They noted "only minor attention" in the Review to possible land operations and expressed the opinion that although navalandairpower"maypreventwars from being lost, and by weakening enemy strength,maygreatlycontributetovic-tory, ... dependence cannot be placed on winning important wars by naval and air forcesalone.It shouldberecognizedas analmostinvariablerule,"theyadded, "that wars cannot be finally won without theuseofland armies." 22 That point, of course, had not escaped theBritish.ThefirstBritishROUNDUP plan was in itself a recognition of the need forground actionontheContinent and specifically admittedthat"operations on theContinentwillinsomeformbein-evitable." 23Further,inreplytoAmeri-can objectionstotheirReview,theBrit-ishChiefsof Staffexplainedthatthein-direct offensivemethodswhichtheyhad listed, including blockade,bombing, and theencouragementofsubversiveactivi-tiesinGerman-occupiedcountries,did not preclude an eventual large-scale land-ing on the Continent whenthetime was ripe.24 If therewas,atthistime,anyrealdis-agreement,it wasover aquestionofem-phasis. Neither operations, nor plans, nor 22 Joint Planning Committee Rpt, General Strategy -ReviewbytheBritishChiefsofStaff,25Sep41, JB325,ser729.OPDfiles. 23ROUNDUPPlan cited n.18. 24 American Liaison(41)8th Mtg, 21Nov 41.Navy Deptfiles,GhormleyPapers. 10 evenstrategicprincipleswereimmedi-ately at issue. The ARCADIAformula, cited above,outlined aprogram to which both BritishandAmericanmilitaryleaders could subscribe without reservation,and it didnotcontradictanythingineither the British Review or the American reply to it. The American protest was neverthe-lesssignificantforthefuture.Itfore-shadowed an American impatience to get on with direct offensive action as well as a belief,heldquitegenerallyintheU.S. War Department, that the war could most efficientlybewonbyhusbandingre-sourcesforan all-outattackdeliberately planned for a fixed future date. American impatience was opposed by aBritish note of caution; American faith in an offensive offixeddatewasincontrasttoBritish willingnesstoproceed one stepat atime molding a course of action to the turns of military fortune.This opposition wasby no means clear in 1941. It is sketched here inordertoprovideavantagepointfor theunderstandingofAnglo-American strategy,and asaguidethroughaneces-sarily condensed and selective account of the debate on how to fight the war against Germany. The complexbasesforAmericanand British strategic viewswillappear in the course of the narrative. At the risk of over-simplification,however,it maybe useful heretogeneralizethattheprimediffer-encebetweenthoseviewsderivedfrom the fact that the British, close to the scene ofthewar,tendedtofocusonthediffi-cultiesofassault,andthetacticaland logisticalproblemsinvolved,whilethe Americans, some 3,000 miles away, found it easier to start with the large view of the strategicproblem.Britishplannerswere deeplyandcontinuouslyconsciousthat CROSS-CHANNELATTACK toattacknorthwestEuropearmieshad to get across an ugly piece of water called the Channel, that this crossing took boats andspecialequipment,thatwhenthe troops landed they had to storm fortifica-tions and fightaGerman Armythat had ali Europe by the throat. Americans were awareoftheseproblemsonlyatsecond hand and at a distance. They worked from maps.Eachperspective,itshouldbe noted,hadadistinctcontributionto make. If the British saw the tactical prob-lemsmoreclearly,theAmericanswere enabledto give freerreintotheir imagi-nationandtoarriveatbolderoffensive concepts. These viewsneed not necessarilyhave been opposed. They were opposed largely becausethestrategicproblemasitde-veloped in early combined discussion was notoneofdevelopingandcarryingout theideallybestplanfordefeatingGer-many.It wasrather aproblem oftailor-ing an ideal strategy to the changing polit-icaland military shape of awar in which the enemy at first had the initiative.The difference of opinion asto how the tailor-ingshouldbedonewascalledforthpri-marily by the cry forimmediate action. That cry wastakenup by many voices foranumber of different reasons.In the firstplace,itwasrecognizedthatthe sooner the Allies could wrest the initiative fromthe Axisthe soonerthey could stop dissipating resourcestoplug holesin the defense and start concentrating them for thedefeatoftheenemy.The combined ChiefsofStaffdiscussedattheARCADIA Conferenceoneplanforimmediateac-tion,calledGYMNAST>whichlookedas thoughit might haveachanceofsuccess evenwhencarriedoutbytherelatively tinyforcesthenavailabletotheUnited THEROOTSOFSTRATEGY StatesandGreatBritain.25 GYMNAST,a plan for the invasion of North Africa, was a highly speculative operation. For success it gambled on the nonresistance of the co-lonial French, and even if successful it was doubtfulwhetheritwouldmaterially contributetotheoffensiveagainstGer-manyexceptinstrategicallytightening theringaroundher.Whatitclearly would do, however, would be to put U. S. ground troopsin actionagainsttheGer-mans.Thisconsiderationwasparticu-larlyimportanttoPresidentRoosevelt, whothoughtthatimmediateaction would stiffenAmericanmorale andhave thereverseeffectontheGermans.26 StronglychampionedbyboththePresi-dentandthePrimeMinister,GYMNAST wasaccepted bythe Combined Chiefsof StaffinJanuary1942.Butthemore pressingneedtosendimmediaterein-forcementstotheSouthwestPacificto checkJapaneseexpansiontowardAus-traliaforcedpostponementandatlast in March drew from the Combined Plan-nersadeclarationthattheprojecthad become academic.27 In the meantime, both U. S. and British plannerswereindependentlyinvestigat-ingthepossibilityofbeingforcedinto action in 1942 in order to assist the Soviet Union.When Hitler attacked the USSR in June 1941, many observers felt that the RussianswouldfallbeforetheGerman blitz asquickly ashad most of the rest of 25FulltreatmentoftheGYMNAST-TORCHproject willbefoundinGeorgeF.Howe,Operationsin NorthwestAfrica,avolumenowunderpreparation inthisseries. 26(Marshall)Notes of Meeting at the White House withthePresidentandtheBritishPrimeMinister Presiding-5:00P.M.(Dictatedfromroughnotes), 23Dec41.CISfile384(Mtgsand Confs) . SeeBibli ographical Note. 27CCS11th Mtg, 10Mar 42. II Europe.Then theRed Armytightened andheldinfrontofMoscowand,when the snows came, struck back.Despite this success,however,neitherAmericannor Britishmilitaryleadersweresanguine about the ability ofthe Russians to with-standanewGermanoffensivein1942. U. S.planners wrote:"Although Russia's strengthwasgreatlyunderestimatedby militaryauthorities,includingtheGer-mans,atruetestofRussia'scapacityto resisttheenemywillcomethissum-mer. "28Theoutcomeofthattest,they believed,wasthekeytotheEuropean and possiblytotheworldsituation.De-featoftheUSSRwouldenabletheGer-manstodominatethewholeofEurope, completetheblockadeofEngland,and probably forceEnglandto capitulate.If so,thenitfollowedthateverypossible effortshouldbemadebytheWestern Powerstoinsurethat Russiawasnot de-feated. At the end of February 1942, Brig. Gen. DwightD.Eisenhower,AssistantChief of Staff, War Plans Division, wrote:"The taskofkeepingRussiainthewarin-involves... immediateanddefiniteac-tion.It isnot sufficientto urge upon the Russians the indirect advantages that will accrue tothem from Allied operations in distantpartsoftheworld.... Russia's problemistosustainhe1'selfduringthe coming summer, and she must not be per-mitted to reach such a precarious position thatshewillacceptanegotiatedpeace, nomatter how unfavorableto herself,in preferencetocontinuationofthefight." The two ways of assisting Russia, General 28 JCS23,Annex C,14Mar 42.This paper isactu ally acomposite of directives and deployment studies datingbackto30January1942.SeeBibliographical Note forlocation and nature of JCS documents. 12 Eisenhowernoted,wereLend-Leaseaid and early operationsinthe westtodraw off fromthe Russian front large portions of the German Army and Air Force.He wasdubiouswhetherasizableground attackfromEnglandcouldbemounted soon,but at least,hethought,airopera-tionscould be initiated.29 TheU.S.JointPlanning Staff,study-ing the whole question of U. S.troop de-ployment,went muchfurther.They be-lievedthataconsiderablelandattack couldbelaunchedacrosstheEnglish Channelin1942.Althoughitwould havetobe done at firstlargely by British forces,Americanparticipationwould build up rapidly, and the prospect of such reinforcementshouldenabletheBritish to mount the attack on a slimmer margin thanwouldotherwisebepossible.On this basis, the planners outlined what they thought would be apossible operation to takeplaceinthe summer of1942witha D Day between 15 July and I August. The operationwastoopenwithafifteen-day air attack,the strategic purpose of which would be to divert the German Air Force fromtheeast.Theimmediatetactical objectives were to establish control of the air overtheChanneland at leastahun-dredkilometersinlandbetweenDun-kerque~ n Abbeville,andtoinflictthe maximumdamageonGermanmilitary installations and lines of communication. During the air offensive, commandos were to raid the coasts of the Netherlands, Bel-gium,andNormandy.Inphasetwo,be-ginningaboutDplus30,majorland forceswere to crossthe Channel with the mission of securing the high ground north 29MemoforCofS,28Feb42.(Italicsintheorigi-nal.)OPD files,exec 4 .. env 35. CROSS-CHANNELATTACK oftheSeineandOiseRivers,andofde-stroying enemy ground and air forcesin thegeneralareaCalais-Arras-St.Quen-tin-Soissons-Paris-Deauville.Theplan didnot gointooperationaldetail.The critical problem of landing craft received littleattentionbeyondalistingofthe bargerequirementsandanotationthat bothAmericansandBritishwouldhave toconstruct specialcraft.30 The British Joint Planners had come to the same conclusion asthe U. S.War De-partment-that the approaching summer campaign of 1942 in Russia waslikely to be critical and might require support by diversions in the west if Russia wastobe kept in the war.Ontheother hand,the British were much more pessimistic about what could be done.The maximum feas-ible operation,they thought, would be a limited-objectiveattack-somethinglike alarge-scaleraid-themainpurposeof which would be to tempt the German Air Force into a battle of destruction with the RoyalAirForceunder conditions favor-abletothelatter.3!Forthatconcept, Prime Minister Churchill coined the code name SLEDGEHAMMER,and the Combined Commanders were directedto study and report on it.They found at once that the namewasfarmoreaggressivethanthe plan could be.They faced a tactical para-dox.Theywereaskedtostrikewhere RAF fighters could engagetheLuftwaffe on favorableterms.There wasonly one sucharea,sinceeffectivefightercover fromBritish basesextended at thattime onlyoverthebeachesbetweenDun-kerque and the Somme.This area, called 80 JCS23,App.II, JPS2/6, 5Mar 42 . . 81Capt M.McLaren, secytoCombinedCommand-ers,NotesontheHistoryof SLEDGEHAMMER,Sep42. HistDivfiles. THEROOTSOFSTRATEGY thePas-de-Calais,32hadthestrongest Germandefensesofanyportionofthe French coast.It also had flatbeaches un-suitableforBritishlandingcraft.The beaches furthermore had too fewexitsto passtherequired number of vehiclesin-landtomaintaintheforceslanded.Fi-nally the ports in the area were too small to supply aforcelarge enoughtohold a bridgeheadagainsttheprobablescaleof German counterattack.In short,the one area where the RAF could supply fighter support and achieve the main purpose of defeating the Luftwaffe wasprecisely the one area which, from every other point of view,wasunsuitable for assault.33 The problem seemed insoluble and the plannersfirstconcludedthatnocross-Channeloperationwaspossiblein1942 unlesstheGermansshowedsignsofcol-lapse.Thisconclusion,however,was modifiedbyasecondreportsubmitted bytheCombinedCommandersearlyin April.Assumingthenthattheymight disregardrequirementsforthesecurity oftheBritishIslesandthat"themain-tenance problem"34 could be "successfully overcome,"theycalculatedthat aninva-sion of the Pas-de-Calais could be carried out.But,theyadded,iftheGermans counteredinforce,thebeachheadprob-ably could not be held and,if lost, it was doubtfulwhetherthebulkofthemen and equipment could be evacuated.The 82 The Pas-de-Calais actually wasthe name of a de-partment in the center of the coast considered forin-vasion.Butthe namewasusedbytheplanners,and will here be used, in the looser sense of the coast line washedbytheStraitofDoverbetweenDunkerque andtheSomme. ssMemo,BrigC.V.McNabb,SLEDGEHAMMER,17 Jul42.SHAEFG-3files,RefLibGpD.SeeBibli-ographical Note. 84 TheBritishterm"maintenance"isgenerally equivalent toU.S."supply." 13 British Chiefs of Staff did not whollyen-dorsethisanalysis,buttheydidtacitly accepttheconclusionthatestablishment ofapermament bridgehead on theCon-tinentwouldprobablybeimpossiblein 1942.35 General Marshall's Project Thefirstlookatthecross-Channel projectdiscoveredonlyahostofdiffi-cultiesthatseemedallbutinsuperable. Solongasattention' wasfocusedonan attackin1942allplanswerepervaded withthesensethattodoanything atall would be to act in desperation,to accept abnormalmilitaryrisksforthesakeof avoidingultimatedisaster.If theview in Londonwasmorepessimisticthanin Washington,thatwasinlargepartbe-causethemajorrisksofactionin1942 wouldhavetobe borne bytheBritish.36 In additiontheBritish,whosemobiliza-tionwasalreadyfaradvanced,werein-clined to see operations through the glass ofcurrentresourceswhich,ingeneral, could be increased in one category only by reduction in another. The United States, on the other hand, even while struggling desperately to build up the stocks needed fordefenseinthePacific,wasstillcon-tinuouslyawareofitshugepotential resources.Althoughitwasrecognized thatin1942Americanmilitarypower wouldonlybegintomakeitselffelt, plansevenforthatyearreflectedthe Americans'basicoptimismandrecom-mended risks far greater thanthe British considered accepting. S5McLaren, Notes on SLEDGEHAMMER,cited n. 31. 86 ThiswasfreelyadmittedbyGeneralMarshall. DraftMemo,MarshallforRoosevelt,ThePacific Theater versusBOLERO,undtd(senttothePresident 6May) .OPDfile381gensec.2,case62.SeeBibli-ographicalNote.Cf.below,p.30. GENERAL MARSHALL,Chiefof Staff,UnitedStatesArmy. THEROOTSOFSTRATEGY It wasinlookingfurtherahead,how-ever,thattheAmericanoptimisticview madeitschiefcontributiontostrategy. Until mid-March, plans for 1942 had been consideredwithoutspecificreferenceto long-range objectives.Except forthe de-terminationtoattackinEurope,there werenospecificlong-rangeobjectives. Thegeneralprinciplesagreedtoat ARCADIAdidnotformaconcertedplan ofaction. InMarch1942,theOperationsDivi-sion of the War Department(OPD)be-ganworkonanoutlineplanforafull-scale invasion of the European continent in 1943.It was to be projected asthe basis forthedeploymentofforcesandasa guideforstrategy.Theneedforsucha guide had become increasingly urgent as, despitetheshelvingofGYMNAST,Presi-dent Roosevelt continued to press forim-mediate action.37 On 25 March, the Presi-dent calledthe JointChiefsofStaffand SecretaryofWarHenryL.Stimsonto the White House to ask adviceon future offensiveoperations.Specificallyhe wantedtoknowwhetherU.S.troops might profitably beusedin Syria,Libya, and northwest Africa, aswell asin north-westEurope.On2 April,GeneralMar-shall gavethe President the War Depart-ment's answer embodying OPD's outline plan for across-Channel attack in 1943.38 37Cbl,RoosevelttoChurchill,9Mar42.OPD fileABC311.5(1-30-42). 88ThefirstmemorandumwassubmittedbyOPD on27March.The lastdraftbearingadatewaspre-pared on 2April. This was revisedbyGeneralEisen-hower and the revision constituted the memorandum asfinallypresentedtotheBritish.Thisfinalversion isundated andtitled simply "Operationsin Western Europe." Additional studies were made after 2April, an analysis of U.S.troop buildup being dated as late as6April.Forthefinalversionandvariousdrafts and appendixes see Pre-Invasion file308.Copy of the 15 TheWarDepartmentandGeneral Marshallwereconvincedthatthemain U.S.-British ground offensive shouldbe undertakenagainstnorthwestEurope. TheyrejectedtheMediterraneanareas suggestedbyRooseveltbecausecommit-mentofU.S.troopstherewouldbe strategically defensive.Although the con-quest ofNorth Africawouldbreak Axis control of the Mediterranean and prevent anAxismovethroughWestAfrica,the victory would not in itself be decisive and couldnotbeexploitedforfurtherde-cisive action against Germany. The body of General Marshall's memo-randumtherefore,wasconcernedwith exploring theconcept of across-Channel invasionofFrance.Theoperationwas conceivedinthreephases:apreparatory phase,thecross-Channelmovementand seizure of bridgeheads between Le Havre and Boulogne, and, finally,consolidation and expansion ofthebridgehead.Logis-ticssettheearliestpossibledateforthe beginningofphasetwoat1April1943, exceptunderemergencyconditions.39 Thepreparatoryphasewouldbeginat oncewiththeorganization,arming,and overseasmovementofthenecessary forces.During the summer of 1942 small taskforceswouldraidalongtheentire accessibleenemycoastline.General Marshallattachedgreatvaluetothese preparatory raiding operations whichhe definedasthe"establishmentofapre-originalOPDmemoisinAAFfile381,WarPlans Sec.G.SeeBibliographicalNote.Discussionfollow-ingisbasedonthememorandumplananditsap-pendixes. 39 Actuallyit wasnotedthat, if only_ U.S.shipping was available forU.S.troop and supply build-up, the invasiondatewouldbedelayeduntillatesummer. By1April,itwasestimated,U.S.shippingcould transportonly 40percent oftheforcesrequired. 16 liminary active front."Hethought they might serve to draw German troops from theeastandso"beofsomehelpto Russia."Theymightalsobeusefulfor deceptioneitherinpersuadingtheGer-mansthatnoall-outoffensivewouldbe attempted or else in keeping them on ten-terhooks for fear that anyone of the raids mightdevelopintoafull-scaleinvasion. Thinking of national morale, a considera-tionalwaysimportanttoboth thePresi-dentandthePrimeMinister,henoted that raiding together with air operations wouldbe"ofimmediatesatisfactionto the public."But, he added, "what is most important" isthat the raids would "make experiencedveteransoftheairand ground units,and ... offset the tendency towarddeteriorationinmoralewhich threatensthelatter dUetoprolongedin-activity."40 The main attackinthe spring of1943 wasplannedtoemploy48divisionssup-portedby5,800combataircraft.Land-ingswouldtakeplacebetweenEtretat north of Le Havre and Cap Gris Nez with theobjectofseizingthelowervalleyof the Somme and the high ground forming the watersheds of the Seine-Somme river system.Two main assaults were planned, on either side of the mouth of the Somme. Thebridgeheadswouldbeexpandedto the southwest in order to seizeLeHavre and the line of the Seine River.Although U. S.planners made use of some detailed dataonterrainandestimatesofthe enemy,theydid not attempttoexamine tacticalproblems eventothe extentthat Britishplannershadstudiedthemin workingonSLEDGEHAMMER.Themain purposeoftheMarshallMemorandum 40Memo,OperationsinWesternEurope,citedn. 38. CROSS-CHANNELATTACK wastopindownastrategicideasuffi-cientlysothatproduction,training,and troop allocations and movement could be "coordinated to a single end."There was time forplanning, but none for delaying thebasicdecision.Forexample,itwas pointedoutthatundercurrentproduc-tion schedules only 10percent of the tank landingcraftrequiredtocarryU.S. troopsintheassaultwouldbeavailable. Only adecisionnow could insure the re-quiredresourcesintime. TheMa:rshallMemorandumshifted emphasis from1942 to1943while retain-ingfor1942someactivitywhichmight satisfypoliticalrequirements.Inthe eventthatanoperationshouldbere-quiredin1942tosavetheRussiansor takeadvantageofsuddenGermande-terioration, preparations were to be made topermitacross-Channelassaulton greatlyreducedscalein~ n fallofthe year.The maximumU.S.forceswhich could be on hand for such an assault were three and ahalf divisions,and the opera-tion would be justified only byprospects ofmarkeddeteriorationoftheGerman armyin the west. InthesecondweekinAprilGeneral Marshall and Mr. Harry Hopkins, special emissaryofPresidentRoosevelt,wentto Londontoseekafirmdecisionfromthe BritishChiefsofStaffontheform,loca-tion,and timing of the British-American maineffort.Asitturnedout,thatdeci-sionwasquicklyreachedwithgeneral agreement on the project outlined in the MarshallMemorandumYDiscussion thenshiftedtowhatcouldbedonein 1942.General Marshall reported that by 41BritishChiefsofStaff,CommentsonGeneral Marshall'sMemorandum,13Apr42,COS(42)97 (0).CIS file381. THEROOTSOFSTRATEGY theendofAugustU.S.reinforcement of the Pacific,Iceland, and Northern Ire-land garrisons should be complete and the United States could concentrate on pour-ingtroops and suppliesinto England for offensiveaction.Hethoughttwoanda half infantry divisions, one armored divi-sion,and900U.S.aircraftcouldbein theUnitedKingdom by15September.42 General Brooke, Chief of the Imperial GeneralStaff,saidhisplannerscounted onlandingseveninfantryandtwoar-moreddivisionsifforcedtoattackthe Continent in 1942, but he frankly did not like the prospect. Such a small forCe could notholdagainstGermancounterattacks and itslosswould seriously weaken Eng-land'sdefenses.Also,hewasworried about IndiaandtheMiddleEast,where theJapaneseandGermansmightjoin forcesandcapturetheoilfieldsinIran andIraqonwhich,hethought,"the wholeofoureffortinboththeatersde-pended." 43 Brooke and AirMarshalPortal,Chief ofAir Staff,alsoraisedobjectionstothe Septemberdate.44 Brookebelievedthat 42COS(42)23dMtg(0), 9Apr 42.OPDfileABC 381BOLERO(3-16-42)sec.5. 43 Ibid.GeneralBrooke,agraduateoftheRoyal MilitaryAcademy,Woolwich,hadby1941acquired thereputationofbeingBritain'sgreatestexperton mechanization.ForhisserviceinFranceduring WorldWar. I,hereceivedtheDistinguishedService OrderwithBar,theBelgianCroixdeGuerre,and six mentions in dispatches. In the early part of World WarII,hecommandedtheBritishSecondArmy Corps,hisdefensiveactionmakingpossiblethe evacuationofDunkerque.Hethenorganized"and trainedtheBritishHomeForcesinpreparationfor theexpectedNaziinvasion.HewasmadeChiefof theImperialGeneralStaffin1941,succeedingField MarshalDill. 44 Portal,anobserverandfighterpilotinWorld War I, entered the RAF College in 1922. In the 1930's hecommandedtheBritishforcesinAdenandwas DirectorofOrganization,AirMinistry.Earlyin 17 the operation would have to take place in August at the latest in order to capture a port before the third week in September, whenbadweatherwaslikelytoprevail overtheChannel.Portalthoughtthat during the summer the German Air Force mightwinacompletevictoryoverthe Russiansandsobyautumnbecomea formidable enemy forthe RAF.General Marshallagreedthatanearliertarget date would be advisable but felt he could noturgeit sinceU.S.troopswouldnot thenbeavailable.Hedearlyindicated that his main interest in a1942 operation wastoprovidebattleexperienceforthe Americansinpreparationfor1943.He wasalsoconcernedthat,ifsomething wereattemptedin1942,itbe anopera-tion acrossthe Channel in order to avoid dispersion of forces.He did not want the mainproject-operationsontheConti-nent- reduced to the position of a "resid-uary legatee" for whom nothing was left.45 Againstthisview,Brookecontinuedto stressthe danger in theMiddle East.He then reversed the American concept that SLEDGEHAMMERwasadevicetosavethe Russians.Operationsin1942,hesaid, dependedonwhatsuccesstheGermans hadagainsttheRussians."If they[the Germans]weresuccessful,"hebelieved, "we could dearly act less boldly.If, how-ever,theRussiansheldtheGermansor hadanevengreatermeasureof success, our object should be to detachair forces from the Russian front."46 In short, he re-WorldWar II, he served on the Air Council and was AirOfficerCommanding-in-ChiefoftheBomber Command.Hebecame Chief of AirStaffinOctober 1940. 45COS(42)118thMtg,14Apr42.OPDfileABC 381BOLERO(3-16-42)sec.5. 46WarCabinetDefenceCom,DC(42)10thMtg, 14Apr 42.CIS file381.On quotation of indirect dis-course,seen.138. 18 jectedtheemergencyoperationandac-ceptedonlytheoperationofopportun-ity.47Theopinionwasinnotablecon-trasttotheU.S.Armyviewthat a1942 operation would be justified bythe need forhelping Russia in the war sothat "an opportunity wouldbepresentedtous of defeatingGermanynextspring."48The point,however,wasnot argued,andthe wholeproblemofa1942operationwas returnedtotheplannersforfurther study. General Marshall's scheme for invasion in1943,on the other hand,wasreceived with enthusiasm, qualified only by anote ofcautionfromBritishplanners.The planners observed again the two deficien-cies which had already crippled plans for areturntotheContinent:thelackof landingcraft(particularlycraftcapable oflandingontheflat-gradientFrench beaches)andthelackoflong-range fighter aircraft.They did not imply, how-ever,that thesedeficienciescouldnot be made up during the coming year.49 For the rest,theBritish Chiefs of Staff andthePrimeMinisterfoundnothing intheplantoquarrelwith.TheU.S. commitment to deliver one million troops 47Churchill alsomadethis reversal more explicitly alittlelaterwhenhewrote:"Thelaunchingof SLEDGEHAMMERshould be dependent not on aRussian failurebutonRussiansuccessandconsequent provedGermandemoralizationintheWest."PM, MinuteforGen IsmayforCofSCom,10Jun 42,An-nextoCOS(42)175thMtg.CopyinHistDivfiles. 48RemarkbyCol 1- E.Hull, U.S.(P)4th Mtg,12 Apr 42.Pre-Inv file287(CombinedOperations Con-ferences).Aseriesofmeetingswasheldbetween U.S.andBritishplannersinthecourseoftheApril conferencesinLondon. 49Memo,BritishStaffPlanners,MainConsidera-tionsAffectingTheEmploymentontheContinent in1943oftheAnglO-AmericanForcesenvisagedin GeneralMarshall's Paper,undtd.OPDfileABC381 BOLERO(3-16-42)sec.5. CROSS-CHANNELATTACK totheUnitedKingdomduringthenext yearaltered,intheopinionofLord Mountbatten, "the whole picture of com-binedoperationsagainsttheContinent. The plans, which we had been at present evolving,allfellshortinonewayor anotherforlackofessentialresources. This would be all changed when the great flowofAmericanforcesbegan,andwe should be enabled to plan that real return to the Continent, without which we could not hopeto bring the warto asuccessful conclusion." 50 ThemeetingatwhichMountbatten soexpressedhimself wastheconcluding sessionoftheconferencewithGeneral Marshall.Thetoneofoptimismwas echoed by all those present and the whole meetingwasinformedwithanextra-ordinaryenthusiasm.Mr.Hopkinssaid thatalthoughAmericanpublicopinion would have preferred an offensive against Japan,"theAmericannationwaseager to join in the fight alongside the British." Mr.AnthonyEden,BritishForeign Sec-retary,repliedinkind."Theplan,"he considered,"hadmuchmorethana purelymilitarysignificance.It was,in fact,thegreatpictureoftWQEnglish-speaking countries setting out forthe re-demption of Europe."Forgotten forthe. momentwastheopinionexpresseda month before that the Allies in 1942 were onthe verge of defeat.51 Instead of antic-ipatingtheneedfora"sacrifice"opera-tion in order to save achance to strike in 1943,theconfereeslookedforwardto sharing in a victory not far off.Churchill closedthemeetingbysummingupthe completeunanimityofopinionandad-dingapredictionthatnow"thetwo 50War Cabinet Mtg,14Apr 42,cited n.46. 51JCS23,citedn. 28. THEROOTSOFSTRATEGY nations would march ahead togetherin a noble brotherhood of arms." Themorrowbroughtsoberersecond thoughts,butthestrategicdecision,des-tined tolast lessthan two months, at least laidsomegroundworkforthefuture. Oneimmediateoutcomewastheestab-lishmentofmachinerytoconcentrate U.S.troopsinEngland.Thebuild-up operation, called BOLERO> 52 was to provide aforceofaboutonemillionmenspe-cificallyequippedtocarryoutanair offensive in 1942, amajor invasion ofthe Continentin1943,andifagreedon, acontinentaloperationinconjunction with the British in 1942. Special planning staffs,BOLEROCombinedCommittees, weresetup inWashingtonandLondon tofunctionunderthedirectionofthe CombinedPlanningStaff.Thecommit-tees were not responsible for tactical plan-ning but weretoproceed on the assump-tionthat theinvasionwouldconformto the outlines drawn in General Marshall's memorandum.53 The establishment of BOLEROplanning formalizedandintensifiedtheprocessof preparingUnitedKingdombasesfor 52Therewasconsiderableconfusionintheearly useofthiscodename, especiallyinthe 'WarDepart ment whereitwastakenatfirsttoindicatenotonly thebuild-upbutthecross-Channeloperationfor whichthebuild-upprepared.Intheearlydaysthe confusionwassymptomaticofarealconceptual identitybetweentheoperations.Decisionsonthe BOLERObuild-upreflectedattitudestowardthe ROUNDUPattack.Cf.RobertE.Sherwood,Roosevelt andHopkins:AnIntimateHistory(NewYork, 1948),p.569. 53IngeneraltheWashingtonCommitteedealt withbasicproblems of policy;theLondonCommit-tee,madeupofrepresentativesofvariousBritish supplyministriesandrepresentatiyesoftheU.S. Army, handled the more technical details of the plan. See[Herbert French]SupplyandTroopBuildupin theUK(TheAdministrativeandLogisticalHistory of the ETO:Part III) , MS.Hist Divfiles. 19 Americantroops,but the process had be-gun long before. As a result of the ABC-l decisionsofearly1941theWarDepart-ment had drawnup deployment plansto beputintoeffectifandwhenAmerica came into the war.One of the provisions wastheMAGNETplantomoveU.S. troopsintoIcelandinordertorelieve British garrisons there and to send troops toNorthernIrelandtoestablishand de-fendairandnavalbasesfortheuseof U.S.forces.InJanuary1942thefirst contingentoftroopsundertheMAGNET planwasshippedtoNorthernIreland, although, asaresult of the emergency re-inforcement of the Southwest Pacific area, theshipment.hadtobecutfroma planned17,300to4,000.Threemore shipmentsarrivedinIrelandbeforethe endofMay,bringingU.S.ground strengththeretomorethan32,000,in-cludingthe34thDivision,the1st ArmoredDivision,andVCorpshead-quarters.54 AtthesametimetheU.S.AirForce wasbeginningtosetuphouseinthe BritishIsles.On26January1942,Gen-eralArnoldsubmittedtoGeneralMar-shallaplantobase4,648American planes in the United Kingdom, including 54groupsofheavybombers,10groiJps ofmediumbombers,and10groupsof pursuitplanes.55 Thebuild-upwasbe-gun at once.Brig. Gen. Ira C. Eaker, with aportion of his staff,was ordered to Eng-landinJanuaryandbytheendofFeb-54Elliott,ThePredecessorCommands,pp.15,85-95.Seen.2. 55GeneralArnold,whohadbecomeChiefofthe AirCorpsin1938,wasdirectlyresponsible ,forthe expansionof theAmericanaircraftindustryandthe inceptionofthe programforciviliantraining of fly-ingcadets.In1940hewasmadeDeputyChiefof StaffforAirandthefollowing 'yearwasgiventhe additionalduty of Chief,Army Air Forces. 20 CROSS-CHANNELATTACK u.s. SOLDIERS INIRELAND ruary he had established the VIII Bomber Command.InJunehiscommandwas subordinated to the newly arrived Eighth Air Force under Brig. Gen. Carl 56General Spaatz, a graduate of West Point in 1914 and of AviationSchool in 1916, served' withtheFirst Aero Squadron of the Punitive Expedition into Mex-ico.During World War I, he flewin combatover St. Mihie1andMeuse-Argonne,receivingtheDSC.In 1940 he wasan officialobserver of the Battle of Brit-ainandreturnedtotheUnitedStatestotakecom-mand,firstoftheAirCorpsMaterielDivisionand, later, of the AAFCombat Command. BeforeGeneralEakerundertooktheassignment of establishing VIIIBomber Command, he had been The air build-up schedule in the mean-time was altered in a series of conferences inLondoninAprilbetweenGeneral ArnoldandAirChiefMarshalPortal. Thenewbasicplan,approvedinJune, drasticallyreducedtheheavybomber commitment:instead of54groupsthere wouldbe17.Theforcewouldinclude 10groupsofmediumbombersand6of light,12groups ofpursuitplanes,and8 onspecialdutywiththeRAFinEnglandin1941, observingandflyingnewtypesoffightersandob-servingBritishfightercontrol methods. THEROOTSOFSTRATEGY groups oftransports,atotalof3,262air-craft.57 On4JulyAmericanaircrewsinsix bombersborrowedfromtheRAFpar-ticipated in adaylight attack on German airfieldsintheNetherlands.It wasnot until 17 August, however, that the Eighth Air Force carried out itsfirstbombing in itsown aircraft.Bythattimethewhole Europeanstrategyhadbeenprofoundly alteredandthebuild-upofairand groundforcesintheUnitedKingdom abruptly ceased to be a first-priority task.58 "Action in 1942-Not 1943" Theeventsbetween15Aprilandthe endof1uly1942produced,fromthe pointofviewoftheU.S.WarDepart-ment, a disturbing shift in AIIied strategy. TheAprildecisiontoconcentrateona build-upintheUnitedKingdomfora cross-Channelinvasionin1943wassup-planted in July bythe agreement to ship U.S.andBritishforcesintotheMedi-terraneantoinvadeNorthAfrica.The 1943ROUNDUP)approvedby acclamation inAprilasthefirstobjectofcombined strategy in Europe, in July waslaid aside infavorofextendedpreparatoryand peripheral operations designed as prelude toacross-Channelinvasionofuncertain date.InGeneralMarshall'sview,this meantthedissolutionofthestrategy whichhadseemedsofirmlyestablished when he and Harry Hopkins left London inApril.59 51Elliott,ThePredecessorCommands,pp.Il10ft. See n.2. 58SeeWesleyF.CravenandJamesL.Cate,eds., The ArmyAir ForcesinWorldWarII:I,Plans and EarlyOperations January1939toAugust 1942(Chi-cago,1948),pp.654,655ff. 59 See,forinstance,hislettertoDill,17Aug42, statinghisbeliefthatthe Julydecisionshadaltered 21 Ofthemanycircumstancesthatcom-binedtooverturnthe Aprilagreements, oneoftheweightiestwasthecontinued inabilityofplannerstoseeanywayout ofthedifficultiesposedbySLEDGEHAM-MER.Adraftplanfortheoperationwas submittedattheendofApriltonewly appointed British force commanders, Ad-miralRamsay,AirMarshalSirTrafford Leigh-Mallory,andLt.Gen.Edmond Schreiber.Theirreporton4Maywas thatwithcurrentresourcesoflanding craftSLEDGEHAMMERwasnotasound operationof war.The BritishChiefsof Staff accepted the conclusion but directed thatthe plan be kept in readinessin case Germancollapseshouldmakeitfeas-ible.60 Inviewofthenewprinciplethat SLEDGEHAMMERwouldtakeplaceonly under conditions of markedGerman de-terioration,plannersnowturnedaway fromthe uninviting prospect of aPas-de-Calaisassault.Aircover,theyargued, wouldbelessessentialiftheGermans were on the point of collapse and it there-foremightpaytolookfartherafieldfor anassaultareacontainingamajorport. TheyselectedtheCherbourgandLe Havre areas,preferring the latter because it contained more airfields. Butproblemsmultipliedfasterthan solutions.It was discovered that it would take twenty-one daysto land the six divi-sionswithavailableshipping.When notonlythestrategyagreeduponinAprilbutalso thefundamentalstrategicagreementsmadeat ARCADIA.CISfileTORCHI;d.CbltoEisenhower,6 Aug42,draftinMemo,HandyforClassifiedMC. OPDfile381,ETO,sec.2.Marshallwrote:"Torch operationisofnecessityaforRoundup andnotapostponementofthesameexceptforun expecteddevelopments."Seebelow,pp.29--30. 60McLaren,Notes on SLEDGEHAMMER,cited n.lIi. 22 Churchillwasinformedofthisobstacle hereplied,asoneplannerobserved,in themannerofKingCanute:hedid not accept it.61 Investigation should be made, hecontinued,intotheuseoffloating piers and other devices to speed the land-ings.This observation, important for the future,hadnoimmediateissue,forthe Prime Minister had also put forward and securedWar Cabinet approvalof aprin-ciplethat,ineffect,threw out the whole SLEDGEHAMMERidea.Theprinciplewas that "there should be no substantial land-inginFranceunlessweintendedtore-main."62Allplanningtodatehadcon-cludedthat,whatevermightbedonein 1942,theestablishmentofapermanent bridgehead on the Continent was beyond British resources. Whileplanningfor1942struggled vainlytosolvetheunbalancedequation betweenendsandmeans,simultaneous study of a1943 cross-Channelassault was turning up its share of discouraging diffi-culties,anddrawingconclusionsthat drasticallymodifiedtheaggressivenessof theMarshallMemorandum.Planning forROUNDUPwasrenewedforthefirst time on an organized combined basis even though arrangements remained informal. Col.Ray W.Barker,whohadarrivedin Londonabout1April,wasassigned shortlyafterwardtoheadtheplanning divisionofGeneralChaney'sheadquar-ters,whichhadbeenconvertedfrom SPOBStoUnited StatesArmyForcesin theBritishIsles(USAFBI).Barkerset upshopinGrosvenorSquare.British plannersunderBrig.ColinMcNabb 61Ibid. 62COS(42),51stMtg,8Jun 42(0).SHAEFSGS files;d. McLaren, Notes on SLEDGEHAMMER.The War CabinetapprovedthenewprincipleonIIJun1942. CROSS-CHANNELATTACK workednearby.ColonelBarker'sgroup received copies of all the planning papers which had been developed up to that time bytheBritish.Almostdailyconferences were held between Americans and British and, about once a week, agreed-on papers weresubmittedtotheCombinedCom-manders.63 BythemiddleofJune1942theplan-nershaddevelopedanewappreciation andoutlineplanforROUNDUPtobe mounted in the spring of 1943.The plan wasacceptedbytheCombinedCom-mandersandsubmittedtotheBritish Chiefs of Staff.It did not go into tactical detailsandwaslimitedinscopetothe establishmentofbridgeheadsincluding necessaryairfieldsandportareas.The approachwascautiousandthetactical idea quite different fromthat which pro-ducedOVERLORD."If ourinvasionisto succeed,"theplannerswrote,"wemust endeavortodispersetheenemy'smobile reservesonlandandintheair.Atthe sametimewemustavoidsuchactionas willallowtheenemytodestroyisolated partsof ourlandforcesindetail.It fol-lows,therefore,thatwhilewemusten-deavortolaunchassaultsonaswidea frontaspossible,thesizeofeachassault andtherateofsubsequentdevelopment must, if possible,be sufficienttomeet the anticipatedrateofenemyreinforcement ineacharea...."Howtodissipatethe enemy'sdefensebyadiffuseattackand at the same timebe strong at each widely separated point was not fully explained.64 The plan to make three "almost" simul-taneousassaultsinthePas-de-Calaisand 63 Interv with Gen ~ a r k e r WD, 4 Oct 46.SeeBibli-ographicalNote.t 64 JointMemo,CombinedCommandersforBr COS,17Jun42_Pre-Invfile281,CombinedCom-mandersJ;'apers. THEROOTSOFSTRATEGY onbothsidesoftheSeinewouldleavea gap of some 150 miles between the north-ernandsouthernbridgeheads.Inaddi-tion,subsidiaryassaultsweretobede-visedto lead tothe early capture of Cher-bourg and the Channel Islands. The plan-nersdidnotgointothisproblembut merelynotedthatit wassubjecttofur-therinvestigation.Thefirstlandings would require at least six divisions. "After the initial assaultsthe forcesin each area arebuilt up... asapreliminarytofur-theroffensiveoperations."Noattempt was made at the time to foresee these. The CombinedCommanders,inforwarding theplan,toldtheBritishChiefsofStaff that they believed it was the only possible wayofeffectingare-entryintoFrance, but eventhat wouldnot be feasible"un-lessthe German morale wasdeteriorated bythespringof1943owingtoanother failureto defeatthe Russians." 65 Churchillwasdissatisfiedwiththe planners'caution.Heretortedwitha memorandumofhisownsketchingan operationwith"qualitiesofmagnitude, simultaneity and violence," and involving sixlandingsbyatleasttenarmored brigadesinthefirstwave,andthede-barkationof400,000meninthefirst week.Ifinfourteendays,hewrote, "700,000 men are ashore, if air supremacy hasbeengained,iftheenemyisincon-siderable confusion, and if we held at least fourworkableports,weshallhavegot our claws well into the job."66Churchill's objectinsketchinghisimpressionof ROUNDUP in such terms was to give an idea ofthe"scaleandspirit"whichhefelt ~ Ibid. 86Memo, Churchill forMarshall, Operation ROUND-UP,15Jun42.HistDivfiles. 23 necessaryiftheundertaking wastohave "goodprospectsofsuccess."Inreality, however,hisconceptrequiredresources whichseemedsofarbeyondreachthat plannerscouldnotregarditseriously. They did not alter their view that ROUND-UPcouldgoinonlyagainstaweakened enemy. Furthermore, even Churchill's concept, for all its vigor, remained academic in the absenceofbroad,formativedecisions. Planners,withoutallottedresources, without atarget date, and without a com-mandorganization,workedinaschool-room,trapped in circular arguments and unable tomake real progress toward pre-paringadefiniteoperationofwar.Re-commendationsbytheJointPlanning Staff that commanders be selected at once tocarry out theoperation andthat steps betakentosecuretheappointmentof a SupremeAlliedCommanderproduced no results.67 The truth was that the general approval of the ROUNDUPidea which General Mar-shallhadwonin April1942didnotre-flectany general conviction that the1943 cross-Channelattackwasreallythebest wayofcarryingoutAlliedstrategyin Europe.Skepticismremainedonboth sidesoftheAtlantic.InWashington PresidentRooseveltwaswavering,and the U. S.Navy was lukewarm.Roosevelt, earlyinMay,wonderedwhethermore troopsshouldnotbesentouttothe PacifictoreinforceAustralia.Admiral King thought they should, and wrote that themountingofBOLEROshouldnotbe allowedtointerferewithPacificplans. HecalledholdingtheJapanese"our basicstrategicplaninthePacificThea-67McLaren.NotesonSLEDGEHAMMER. 24 ter."68 It was perhaps only a turn of phrase but GeneralMarshallfeltit necessaryto remindthePresidentthatsustaining Russia, not holding the Japanese, was the basic strategy.The proposals to reinforce Australia would mean cutting in half the number of divisions that could be shipped toEnglandforaSLEDGEHAMMERopera tion.Operations in1942fromEngland, hepointedout,alreadydependedpri-marilyontheBritish,whowouldbe accepting risks far graver than any run by theAmericans.TheBritishhadagreed toBOLEROontheunderstandingthatit was the prime U. S.project.If it was not, BOLEROshouldbeabandonedandthe Britishnotified.69 PresidentRoosevelt retreated.He told General Marshall that he hadonly askedifthe Australianrein-forcementcouldbedoneandhenow agreedwithhim"andAdmiralKing" thatitcouldnot.Headded:"Idonot want'BOLERO'sloweddown."7oOnthe sameday,however,heexpressedhisim-patiencewithcontinuedinaction.The Atlantictheater,hebelieved,calledfor "verygreatspeedindevelopingactual operations.Ihavebeendisturbed,"he wrote,"byAmericanandBritishnaval objections to operations in the European Theaterpriorto1943.Iregarditas essentialthatactiveoperationsbecon-ductedin1942."Herealizedthediffi-culties, but ideal conditions could hardly be expected.Expedients must be impro-68Memo,The PacificTheater versusBOLERO,cited n.36.Proposalsto reinforce Australia would have in creasedgroundforcesby25,000troops,airforcesby 100planes.Another 215planes weretobe senttothe Sou thPacific. 69Ibid. 10Memo,RooseveltforMarshall,6May42,OPD file381,gensec.2,case62. CROSS-CHANNELATTACK vised."The necessities of the case call for actionin1942-not1943."71 ThePresident'simpatiencemayhave beenreinforcedbyavisitoftheSoviet Foreign Minister, Vyacheslav Molotov, to Washington at theend ofMay.Molotov came at the President's request primarily todiscusstheM urmanskconvoysof Lend-Lease war materials, but it was clear that he was still more vitally interested in theopening of a"second front."On his wayhehad stoppedoffat Londontosee Churchill,fromwhomhereceivedonly deliberatelyvaguepromisesconcerning thepossibilityofSLEDGEHAMMER.72 In WashingtonhetriedtopintheAmer-icansdowntoamoredefinitecommit-ment.WhattheSovietswantedwasan operation in 1942 on alarge enough scale toforcetheGermanstowithdrawforty divisions from the Russian front.Such an operationevidentlycouldnotbeprom-ised.ThemostthatGeneralMarshall would saywasthat a second front wasin preparation, that the Western Allies were tryingtocreateasituationinwhicha secondfrontwouldbepossible.The President,however,significantlyex-tendedMarshall'sanswerandsentword throughMolotovtoStalintoexpecta second frontin1942.Rooseveltdidnot saywhereoronwhatscale.73 Precisely what weightthispromise carriedin sub-sequentdiscussionisdifficulttoassess. Probablythepromisewasofmoresig-nificanceasasymptomthanasacon-tributingcauseofRoosevelt'seagerness 71Memo,RooseveltforSecyofWar,CofS,Gen Arnold,SecyofNavy,AdmKing.andHopkins,6 May 42.CIS file38l. 12McLaren.Noteson SLEDGEHAMMER. 73NotesonWhiteHouseMtg,citedinSherwood, RooseveltandHopkins,p.563.TheMolotovvisitis treatedatlength by Sherwood, pp.544-68. THEROOTSOFSTRATEGY forimmediateaction.In any case,other pressuresbuiltupafterMolotovleft Washington. June1942markedthelowebbof Britishmilitaryfortunes.Onthe13th, GeneralfeldmarschallErwinRommelat KnightsbridgeinLibyadefeatedBritish armoredforcesinthelastofaseriesof battleswhichhadstarted27May.The British army retreated across the Egyptian bordertoEl'Alamein.OnSunday,21 June,BritishandDominiontroops,iso-lated in Tobruk by the withdrawal,were forced to surrender.The rest of the army dug in at El'Alameinforthedefenseof Alexandria. That monthalsomarkedtheopening of the expected new German offensive on theRussianfront.Expectedornot,the event wasdisheartening.The prevailing opinion among military leaders in Amer-icaandBritain wasstillthattheywould be lucky if Russia managed to stayin the war through1942.In London the official estimatesoftheRussiansituationin-cludedonlytwohypotheses:thatRussia hadbeen defeatedbyOctober1942(hy-pothesis"A"),orthatRussiawasstillin the, war in 1943 "but had suffered heavily in manpower and materiel. ..."74 The pressurewasvery great on Allied leaders to act at once wherever such action promised any fair chance of.success.The pressure to act,moreover, coincided with animprovedopportunity.Two decisive navalvictoriesoverthe JapaneseinMay andJune(CoralSeaandMidway)had relievedtheimmediatethreattoAus-tralia,and defensive requirements in the Pacificwerethusnolongeraswordof 74 JIC(92)193(Final), Gennan Strength and Dis-positionsin1943underCertainHypotheses,21May 42_SHAEF SGSfiles,Combined Commanders Papers. 25 DamocleshangingoverplansforEuro-pean operations. BetweenthetwoNorthAfricandisas-ters,on 18June,the PrimeMinister and theBritish Chiefs of Staff cametoWash-ingtontodiscussthedesirabilityofre-orientingstrategy.Churchillcamebe-cause he had been greatly alarmed by re-ports from Admiral Mountbatten that the Presidentwaspressingfora1942opera-tion.75 It wascleartotheWarDepart-mentthat Churchill'svisitforebodedan eloquent attack on the April commitment toBOLERO.SecretaryStimsonprepared forthePresident astrongdefenseofthe BOLEROidea.He pointed out that allthe reasonsforadoptingBOLEROwerestill validandthatnootheroperationcould achievethesameend.Nootheropera-tion,furthermore,shouldbeallowedto interfere withit.It wasof prime impor-tance, he believed, to press unremittingly forwardwith BOLERO)not only because it wasthebest plan but becauseanydevia-tion from it would be