CNAS_ProcessOverPlatforms_-Milatary Manufactoring and Superiority in the US -FitzGerald.pdf

8/10/2019 CNAS_ProcessOverPlatforms_-Milatary Manufactoring and Superiority in the US -FitzGerald.pdf

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By Aaron Martin and Ben FitzGerald

Process Over Platforms

A Paradigm Shift in Acquisition Through

Advanced Manufacturing

D E C E M B E R 2 0 1 3

DISRUPTIVE

DEFENSE PAPERS


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Cover ImageA X-47B UCAS sits in a Proof Test Fixture.

(Photo courtesy of Northrop Grumman Corporation)

Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank Chris Bowie, John Stillion, Ravi Hichkad and Dave Young from the Northrop GrummanAnalysis Center for help in developing the ideas described in this paper, along with Lance Bryant, Todd Szallay and EricBarnes from Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems, whose manufacturing experience helped provide an important per-spective on feasibility.

We would also like to thank Shawn Brimley and Liz Fontaine for their excellent reviews, editing and production help.

The authors retained editorial autonomy throughout the publication process. The views expressed here are the authorsand do not represent the official position of CNAS, Northrop Grumman or any government agency.


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Process Over Platforms A Paradigm Shift in Acquisition Through Advanced Manufacturing


D E C E M B E R 2 0 1 3

About the Authors

Dr. Aaron Martin is a Director of Strategic Planning at theNorthrop Grumman Corporation.

Ben FitzGerald is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for aNew American Security.


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I . INTRODUCTION Every year the U.S. Department o De ense (DOD)spends billions o dollars to develop and acquireweapons systems that ensure Americas armed orcesremain the best-equipped in the world. Te system

or doing this is outdated, expensive, inexible andslow. However, a number o emerging technolo-gies mean that the DOD does not have to be boundby this paradigm. Tis paper envisions a uture

or unmanned aircraf systems (UAS) in whichdevelopment cycles are short, production schedulesare accelerated and both overall and unit costs are

reduced to create an environment in which orcescan surge rapidly to meet operational needs.

Current acquisition efforts involve diligent, well-intentioned actions to ensure that capable productsarrive on schedule and at planned costs. Despiteexpectations, however, those objectives are rarelymet in their entirety due to demanding (and ofenchanging) requirements, desire to develop and eldimmature technologies, system complexity anddemanding testing regimes.

Few observers would de end the current systemas cost-efficient or timely. O the 16 major studieson acquisition re orm since 1986, most arrived atmost o the same ndings and made similar rec-ommendations. 1 Tese studies ofen highlightedthe continual growth in both costs and time o newacquisition programs, and although the DOD andits industry partners have worked hard to addressthese challenges, they persist to this day.

Te rapid pace o technological change compounds

the challenges inherent in developing militarycapability. Internationally, the barriers to entryare being lowered or access to advanced militarycapability and technology that has military utility. 2 Tis applies equally to U.S. competitors, which areacquiring capability that a ew years ago was avail-able to only a hand ul o nations, and to violentnon-state actors, which are acquiring a range oadvanced capabilities including UAS, submersiblesand in ormation technologies.


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A Paradigm Shift in Acquisition Through Advanced ManufacturingD E C E M B E R 2 0 1 3

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Te current and uture technological environment,combined with an increasingly constrained scalenvironment, is there ore ushering in an era inwhich the way military capability is developed maybe more important than which specic capabilitiesare developed.

Responding to this trend, Admiral JonathanGreenert, Chie o Naval Operations, argues the value o payloads over plat orms.3 He observesthat while plat orms (ships and aircraf) take a longtime to develop and eld, all while accruing highand rising costs, they cannot easily adapt to uncer-tain and changing security environments duringtheir long service lives. Given the high costs oreplacing plat orms as new needs arise, he argues,the military acquisition system should begin toemphasize payloads, which can adapt technologiesquickly and can be developed and elded at a asterpace than plat orms.

Admiral Greenert makes a valid case, but what ithe process used or plat orm design, productionand elding could capitalize on the same dynamicre resh that applies to payloads?

Discussions about acquisition tend to all primarilyinto three categories: the stratospheric acquisi-tion re orm and the uture o the de ense industrialbase; the tactical how 3D printing might supportdeployed war ghters; and the technical researchin basic science and materials.

Te concept presented here explores an end-to-endconsideration o a particular capability seg-ment, combat aircraf. Tis particular capabilityis well-suited to the concept based on technicalcomplexity, associated high system and trainingcosts and their associated processes. Additionally,the current strategic decision to invest in smallernumbers o technologically superior aircraf maynot hold valid in uture scenarios where advancedenemies could eld sophisticated UAS swarms orlarge numbers o manned aircraf. 4

Paradigmatic shifs can only occur when conceptsand technology align in time to address relevantchallenges.5 o that end, this paper considers cur-rent challenges and emerging technologies, linkedto operational capabilities that can enable a ast,exible and efficient acquisition process as well asthe operational advantages o a new approach.

Increasing Costs of Maintaining MilitarySuperiorityA comparison o the DODs most recently com-pleted air superiority ghter acquisition program,

or the F-22 Raptor, to that o the F-4 Phantom II,a ghter developed and acquired in the 1950s and1960s, summarizes the growing costs and time-lines associated with combat aircraf acquisition.

Development times and costs or these two air-craf systems varied signicantly. 6 It took threetimes longer to develop the F-22 than the F-4.Formal development o the F-4 began when theNavy awarded McDonnell Aircraf a developmentcontract in 1955, and a limited production contract

ollowed in 1958. Te Navy equipped its rst F-4squadron, VF-74, in 1961, just six years into ormaldevelopment o the program. 7 Te Air Force recog-nized the need or a new air superiority ghter in1983 and awarded demonstration and validationcontracts in 1986 or the Advanced actical Fighter(later F-22) program to Lockheed and Northrop.Te Air Force subsequently awarded a low-rateproduction contract to Lockheed Martin in 2001,and the F-22 reached initial operating capacity(IOC) in 2005, 22 years afer development began. 8

Te increasing time required to develop and eldaircraf systems has important operational andstrategic implications. It raises the likelihood thatnew technologies will emerge and potentially leadto changes in requirements. A DOD presentationnoted that computers at IOC or the F-22 were 512times aster and held 65,000 times more in orma-tion than they did early in development. 9 Further,geopolitical changes during development can


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FIGURE 1: F 4 TO F 22 COMPARISON IN FISCAL YEAR 2013 DOLLARS

22 Years

6 Years

$39.3B

$2.2B

41 Months

14 Months

$174.5M

$21.4M

187

2,078*

DEVELOPMENT CYCLE

DEVELOPMENT COSTS

PRODUCTION TIME ORDER TO DELIVERY

UNIT COSTS

NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT PROCURED

Sources: F-4 production reported in the gure includes only those procured by the U.S. Air Force. Total F-4 production including the U.S. Navy, Marine CEstimates in charts derived using Ren J Francillon, McDonnell Douglas Aircraft since 1920: Volume II (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,1979), Geoand the F-14 (Gaithersburg, MD:Columbia Research Corporation, 1973), Torsten Anft, VF-74 Be-Devilers, July 1, 2013, http://www.anft.net/f-14/f14-sqEncyclopedia of US Air Force Aircraft and Missile Systems: Volume 1, U.S. Department of Defense, Selected Acquisition Report: F-22, RCS:DD-A&T(http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/logistics_material_readiness/acq_bud_n/SARs/DEC%202010%20SAR/F-22%20-%20SAR%20-%2025%20DEC%202010Data System, U.S. Air Force, Air Force Accepts Final F-22 Raptor, May 7,2012, .http://www.jber.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123301143, and FY2011 U.S.

F-4

F-22


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reshape operational requirements and decrease theoverall utility o a weapon system. For example,the F-22 was designed to operate in the airlyconstrained region o the central ront in Europe,but the shif in ocus to the Asia-Pacic regionnow places a greater premium on range. Longerdevelopment times also provide opponents moreopportunities to react to system development bycountering the system or through espionage. Forall these reasons, DOD leaders recently indicatedthat they are very concerned about lengthening

development cycles, and they announced thatreducing development cycles is one o their priori-ties in the Better Buying Power initiatives. 10

Development o the F-22 cost the DOD about $39billion, nearly 20 times more than estimated F-4development costs o about $2.2 billion.11 For somecontext, the Congressional Research Service esti-mated that the Manhattan Project to develop theatomic bomb cost the equivalent o about $24 bil-lion rom 1942 to 1946.12 When development costs

or a single weapon system require such a largenational investment, the number o new aircrafprograms that the Air Force and Navy can pursueis severely limited. In the past 20 years, the ser- vices have pursued relatively ew new developmentprograms. Tis has not always been the case; rom1945 to 1960, the U.S. military initiated 88 develop-ment programs, about six per year. 13

Afer the transition to production, the time tobuild new systems also continues to grow, nearlytripling rom the F-4 to the F-22. Te delivery time

or the Air Forces rst F-4 was about 14 months.14 In comparison, the contract or the nal F-22s wassigned in November 2008 with delivery in May2012, three and a hal years afer order. 15 Whiledelivery times could be improved in extremecircumstances, the long times required to buildhighly complex modern combat aircraf mean thatthe DOD could not eld large numbers o highlycapable aircraf quickly in a crisis.

Procurement cost growth continues to acceler-ate, as well. Te procurement cost o F-22s in theFY2009 budget was about $174.5 million per air-craf, while the procurement cost o each F-4E wasabout $21.4 million. 16 With such signicant costgrowth, the Air Force spent less to develop andbuild a eet o more than 2,000 F-4s than it did ora nal eet o 187 F-22s.

While there is really no comparison in terms oaircraf quality between the F-22 and F-4, numbersdo matter. Te small F-22 eet size increases theinherent value o each system. In some operationalcontexts, the loss o even one aircraf in combatcould turn into a public relations or strategic victory or an adversary even i the enemy can-not match U.S. orces tactically. Getting out othis seemingly inexorable cost and schedule deathspiral is vital to the United States ability to main-tain deterrence and eld an effective war-ghtingcapability.


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I I . MANUFACTURING FUTURESYSTEMS

Tis paper explores an entirely new approach tothe development and acquisition o uture combataircraf. Te concept envisions much shorter devel-opment cycles, accelerated production schedules,reduced costs and more exible orce structuresthat can be expanded rapidly to meet operationalrequirements. Tis approach ocuses on integrat-ing several emerging technologies, beginning withadvanced manu acturing methods and roboticassembly to produce combat UAS. 17

Historically, advances in manu acturing tech-niques have provided new ways to improvemilitary capability. In the 1800s, the applicationo replaceable parts, as envisioned by Eli Whitneyand Samuel Colt, greatly improved the productiono rearms; during World War II, the applicationo Henry Fords assembly line allowed the U.S.military to mass produce weapon systems; and theintegration o automated manu acturing processesbeginning in the 1950s allowed the military todevelop signicantly more complex systems thatensured technological superiority throughout theCold War.

Additive ManufacturingTe concept begins with the application o additivemanu acturing (AM) to acilitate exible produc-tion and optimization o system components.Exciting new technologies ofen make great newsheadlines, and AM is not an exception. In the

past ew years, periodicals romTe Economist toForeign Affairs included articles about the com-ing additive manu acturing revolution. 18 PresidentBarack Obama has called or signicant ederalinvestment in AM and other advanced manu ac-turing technologies with the establishment o 15innovative manu acturing hubs, and signs pointto AM generating a major impact on the U.S. andglobal manu acturing base.19

Te rubric o additive manu acturing encompassesa number o different manu acturing technolo-gies that share a ew common attributes. Teprocesses each abricate components by addingmaterials layer by layer rom digital data, such ascomputer-aided design (CAD) models. Tis differssignicantly rom traditional methods o mak-ing parts and structures, which typically ocus onremoving material through machining, as shownin Figure 2. AM technologies emerged in the1980s; at that time the processes ocused on plastic

parts and were used primarily or prototyping.AM processes offer the de ense industry sev-eral important advantages over traditionalmanu acturing.

Part consolidation. Using AM technologies,many parts that traditionally required assem-bly o subcomponents can be built as a singlecomponent.

Topology optimization. AM offers a newopportunity to reconsider the eatures o a givencomponent. Sofware allows engineers to reducethe amount o materials used to build a compo-nent while also offering opportunities to selectand vary material properties throughout a part.

Tooling reduction. AM processes permit rapidand exible abrication o parts rom a commonproduction machine that could allow or signi-cant reduction o tooling to build and assembleparts.

Recently the numbers o materials and material prop-erties o AM products have dramatically expanded,and many o the processes are now capable o makingproduction parts. Many U.S. aerospace contractorsalready employ AM to abricate prototypes; manu ac-turing tools and many aircraf already have a numbero polymer components, such as the aircraf duct inFigure 3. An aircraf duct highlights the ability toconsolidate parts through AM, as ducts built usingtraditional processes require multiple parts that are

astened together.


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AM processes are improving to the extentthat metal parts can be produced. Te X-47Bunmanned carrier-based aircraf includes a tita-nium warm air mixer built using AM processes.Based on the types o parts produced, manu ac-turing teams have realized up to 50 percent costreductions and signicant reductions in abricationtimes when using AM.

While signicant efficiencies or part or toolingabrication have already been achieved, a broader

application o AM could dramatically change theproduction o de ense weapon systems. Such achange would leverage the advantages o AM in thesystem design phase while broadening the appli-cation o AM to produce monolithic structuresas well as aircraf subassembly and components.Currently, aircraf structures are produced usingmultiple materials and processes, which are verytime-consuming to abricate using highly skilledworkers. Te construction o monolithic aircrafstructures using AM would allow new designswith integrated skins, structure and subsystems,leading to reduced costs and lead time or aircrafconstruction.

Further, since CAD drives AM, the developmentprocess would benet rom the ability to prototypeand change part design rapidly. ransitions rom

development to production would not requiresignicant investment in tooling or a new produc-tion line and thus would go more smoothly. Tebroader application o AM would introduce otherchanges in military aircraf production, as well:

Sofware-driven production, reducing touchlabor

Reduction or elimination o whole subassem-blies, tooling and engineering drawings

Design eatures to allow rapid assembly o whole

systems Improved sustainment, printing replacement

parts at orward locations, reducing bulk ship-ping or logistics

Automated AssemblyTe broader application o integrated roboticassembly can enable ast and exible production omilitary aircraf systems. While neither new norunique to aircraf manu acturing, the integrationo robotic assembly with automated productionprocesses would be a signicant innovation thatcould provide a more efficient sofware-drivenassembly process.

A survey o the literature on robotics in manu-acturing highlights industries that use robotic

assembly along with the application across theworld. Te automotive and electronics industriesapply robotics to a greater degree than most otherindustries. Manu acturing application o robot-ics also varies widely by country. Manu acturers

in Korea and Japan are the largest users o robots;there, manu acturing industries apply nearly 350multipurpose industrial robots per 10,000 manu ac-turing employees. U.S. manu acturers are seventh inthe world and are well above the average. 20

In recent years, the automotive industry hasachieved signicant breakthroughs in rapid, ex-ible assembly through robotic processes. Japaneseautomotive rms have nearly one robot installed

Graphic courtesy of Fabrisonic LLC, http://www.fabrisonic.com/

FIGURE 2: MANUFACTURING PROCESSES


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or every ve workers, allowing some companiesin Japan to operate lights out actories, whererobots per orm manu acturing around the clock. 21 Furthermore, the industrys investment in robot-ics has provided a means o building multipleclasses o vehicles on the same manu acturingline. As early as 2008, Honda was able to transi-tion between Civic and CR-V models in about veminutes at its plant in East Liberty, Ohio. 22

Te military aircraf industry applies roboticsto build modern military systems, but not to thesame extent as automotive manu acturers. Telarge investments required or automation mixedwith the low production quantities demanded oradvanced military aircraf restrain greater invest-ment in automated assembly.

An airduct duct (top) vs. an X-47B warm air mixer (bot tom).

(Photos courtesy of Northrop Grumman Corporation)

Investment in the integration o AM with roboticassembly would create a uture or aircraf produc-tion that is both ast and exible. Te goal wouldbe to go rom order to delivery o aircraf withindays and weeks instead o several years. Roboticswould also provide a cost-efficient way to developa latent capacity to expand production rates ineeded. Additionally, integration o these tech-nologies could provide an opportunity to producemultiple types and potentially multiple classes oaircraf using the same manu acturing line.


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I I I . L INKI NG ACQUISITION ANDOPER ATIONS WHAT TO BUILD

Innovative use o emerging manu acturing tech-nologies, whose integration would enable astand exible production, has wide application andbenet across many DOD capabilities. Perhaps thehighest impact utilization o these technologies ormilitary aircraf systems would be in the produc-tion o unmanned systems, which would presentmilitary planners new opportunities in terms o

systems, orce structure and surge capacity.Most importantly, aster production o militaryaircraf would allow the U.S. military to eldnew systems as replacements or current aircrafmore quickly or to expand orce structure rapidly.Most major conicts in the past led to growth inU.S. military orces along with rapid changes inthe size and shape o the orce. Te most recentexample o this occurred in the past decade in Iraqand A ghanistan, which led to about 18 percentgrowth in active-duty ground orces and rapidelding o a new class o armor-protected MineResistant Ambush Protected wheeled vehicles toreplace tactical vehicles that were more vulnerableto improvised explosive devices. 23 Te types oaircraf used during these operations also changedsignicantly as U.S. orces applied long enduranceunmanned systems capable o armed reconnais-sance and surveillance missions in large numbers.Future conicts are likely to lead again to rapiddemand or additional capacity and new systems.

Increasing the number o systems is use ul or theU.S. military only inso ar as orces can operatethe added systems. Te capability to manu actureUAS in a matter o weeks would outpace the abil-ity o the Air Force and Navy to train new pilots.Te increasing use o semiautonomous unmannedsystems own by digital pilots as part o the orcewould allow or aster growth during wartime.First o all, operator training on UAS is very di -

erent to manned aircraf. Human operators need

ar ewer training hours to learn to operate UAS,and common mission management systems wouldcreate easy transition between different classeso aircraf. Furthermore, it is possible to increasethe number o UAS that a human operator cany. Future UAS may be designed to allow a singleoperator to y an entire swarm ormation. In thiscase, the operator would make key operationaldecisions such as determining the ight location orweapons usage while relying on sofware to y theaircraf.

Increased reliance on UAS could also provide otheropportunities to reduce overall costs o the aircrafsystems elded. For example, the use o swarm

ormations may allow military planners to con-sider distributing mission capability across manysingle-mission plat orms rather than ensuring thatall plat orms are multi-mission. Tis could reducethe overall numbers o payloads required to outta eet.

Te DOD may also consider changing the testingregime or unmanned systems relative to mannedaircraf, ocusing on operational tests and reducingindividual aircraf sa ety requirements, since thereis no onboard crew to protect. Te use and reuseo some aircraf design eatures and sofware mayalso allow or accelerating test schedules, creatinga more rapid transition into operational ight testsand aircraf deployment.

Finally, the use o UAS as a portion o the eetmay provide more operational exibility or com-

manders as they weigh the risks o combat lossesor some operations. Te small numbers and high

costs o manned combat aircraf increase theoverall operational costs o any combat losses.However, the DOD may be willing to accept moreattrition in a eet o UAS that is quickly replace-able and does not risk the lives o pilots.

Te integration o AM and robotic assemblyto produce UAS portends a uture in which


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development o new aircraf would eed seamlesslyinto production and production time would bediminished on a exible, scalable manu acturingline. Manu acturing processes begin with the pro-duction o components and structures; AM wouldbe applied or much o this work. Tere wouldremain parts and assemblies, such as engines andsensors, or which AM processes are either less effi-cient or incapable o production; these would needto be procured using more traditional methods.As parts are produced or delivered, the assem-bly process would be highly automated. Sofwarethat choreographs both production and assemblywould acilitate the overall manu acturing processin this environment. Te graphics above high-light how this actory could potentially work withthe integration o both AM and robotic assemblycapabilities.

Te exibility o the production process wouldenable a uture in which the output is multipleclasses and variants o UAS, ranging rom verysmall, low-capability aircraf to larger ones withsignicantly more combat potential.

Notional representation of a future assembly line.

(Photos courtesy of Northrop Grumman Corporation)


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IV. ACQUISITION COMPARISONTe emerging capability to produce UAS in alow-cost, agile manner offers an opportunity toreshape not just the U.S. militarys approach toacquisition but also how the military generates andemploys operational orces. A comparison o thecurrent approach with that afforded by a shif toan AM-centered process highlights the risks thatcould be mitigated and the opportunities achievedusing a new approach.

In the past 30 years, based on the strategic logicand dictates o the prevailing acquisition process,the DOD has begun relatively ew new major air-craf development programs. Force planners mustanticipate ying systems or many years afer theyreach operational capability to manage returns oninvestment or production plat orms and the time-lines associated with new plat orm development.Given that, the process typically results in manynew capability requirements that necessitate signi -icant advances in aircraf system and subsystemstechnologies during development. Te high barsset in the requirements play a key role in increasingthe time needed to develop and test a system.

Under the current process, the development phaseo a program begins afer requirements have beensettled and, or recent aircraf, lasted or about 20years rom start to nish. For the F-22, the time

rom the governments recognition o the require-ment or a new aircraf to IOC was about 22 years(1983 to 2005); the F-35 will be similar (1996 to

2015-2017 currently expected). 24 During this longdevelopment cycle, most programs experiencechallenges associated with schedule delays and costgrowth. Meeting the initial requirements is typi-cally very challenging. Aircraf development alsotakes place in the context o changing technologi-cal and operating environments, both o which canlead to changes rom initial requirements. Afera pain ully slow development cycle, programstransition into production to provide operational

capability to the DOD. During this entire process,programs receive scrutiny rom Congress, whichcan inject additional uncertainty into the undingstream needed to execute the program.

Because o the signicant investment needed toeld modern military aircraf, the DOD ofenplans to continue operating them or 20 to 50 yearsafer they reach IOC. Current plans call or F-22retirement as late as 2049, nearly 45 years aferreaching IOC and 66 years afer the initial request

or proposals. I such plans had been in place atthe end o World War II, the United States wouldhave retired the F-86 Sabre around 2011. 25 Systemcapability cannot remain static or such a longperiod, so the DOD continues to invest in researchand development and modications or aircrafprograms to improve postproduction capability.

By contrast, the convergence o AM, robotics andunmanned systems provides an opportunity todisrupt this paradigm. Te new paradigm would becharacterized by shorter, more requent acquisitioncycles based on an iterative development processthat could quickly develop many different aircrafsystems, thus allowing planners to ocus on nearer-term, and there ore better understood, threats.

Each development cycle would conclude in a ewyears, and the product o each cycle would be adifferent type o aircraf to be built rom a com-mon assembly line that integrates AM with roboticassembly. Planned quantities o any one aircraftype would likely be low, but the common assem-

bly line would be designed to increase productiono any developed aircraf rapidly, as needed. Teunmanned systems could be own by digitalpilots guided by human battle managers. Sincethe operational value o the system would be short,requirements could be more modest and orientedtoward the short term. Te short operationalli e span and reduced training hours requiredby unmanned systems would also cut aircraf

atigue li e requirements to lower unit cost.


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While the development o aircraf subsystems hastypically paced and been a part o modern aircrafprograms, the proposed approach would seek todecouple subsystem and weapon development

rom the plat orm. Instead, each version would bedesigned to accommodate existing subsystems, andthe production o a new system, sensor or weaponwould be incorporated into uture models.

Tis new approach, where production is ast, ex-ible and capable o being rapidly scaled up, couldalso create a new construct or sizing aircrafeets. Currently, the DOD sizes eets to meet thepotential demand o its most challenging scenariosand must procure more aircraf than needed todeal with anticipated attrition and training needs.Accordingly, as new aircraf programs begin thedesired eet size is typically very large. Tereare ew opportunities to grow orce size rapidlybecause it takes so long to build aircraf and trainpilots, leaving U.S. military orces with a limitedability to surge.

In a new paradigm, rapid production and theability to reproduce previous aircraf designswould allow or the elimination o an attritionreserve, which constitutes up to 20 percent o aeet. Since the aircraf would be unmanned, thetraining eet could be much smaller because mosttraining could be completed using simulators.Further, instead o acquiring a eet to meet allpotential demands, the DOD could procure a eetthat is large enough to meet operational testingand orward presence requirements. As potentialoperations become more likely, the DOD couldthen increase production o the types o aircraf itanticipates needing during the operation (provid-ing just-in-time operational capability).

Te concept could allow the DOD to build a newmix o aircraf in the uture, one in which rap-idly produced unmanned systems complementa higher-end orce composed o F-22 and F-35aircraf. Tis would allow U.S. orces to develop a

signicant and cost-effective surge capacity, givingthose orces more options during a protracted con-ict and placing an adaptation and capacity burdenon potential adversaries.

Te overall concept as presented has huge impli-cations or costs associated with acquisition,operations and orce structure. Te annual costs

or aircraf acquisition would be signicantlyreduced relative to the current model, under whichthe DOD must buy more aircraf than needed

or operations since eets must account or attri-tion and training and the eet is sized or themost challenging anticipated scenarios. Once themanu acturing line is established and the aircrafproven, the government currently seeks to ll outits orce requirements as quickly as possible, whichrequires signicant unding. Under the proposedconcept, the DOD could use operational undingto bring eets up to the desired size when risks ocon rontation increase and could keep acquisitioncosts relatively low when the risks o con rontationare down.

Te ocus on use o UAS also carries signicantcost implications. According to a 2011 analy-sis by the Center or Strategic and BudgetaryAssessments, the total li ecycle cost o theunmanned system is less than hal the cost o themanned system. 26 Tese savings accrue rom thereduced training ying hours, smaller procure-ment requirements and ewer personnel neededto sustain the aircraf throughout its li etime. Tegreater use o autonomy in UAS offers the oppor-tunity to scale up the number o aircraf and gainsignicant personnel efficiencies.

Tere would be additional costs associated withcapital in rastructure or new production capabili-ties. However, these costs would be offset based onthe exibility and multiuse nature o their capabili-ties. New acilities would only need to be built ormajor changes to capability or production volume,unlike the current process, which requires a new


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acility or each new plat orm. Other savings wouldbe derived rom the lower work orce costs required

or aircraf production. Additionally, the in ra-structure could serve multiple purposes, ensuringhigh levels o utilization and offering the ability togenerate other revenue i not ocused on aircrafproduction.

While the technologies required to enable this newparadigm have not yet reached ull productionmaturity, they already exist in limited applications,as described earlier, and are maturing rapidly. Tetechnology to make the current process opera-tionally easible in the uture can most easily bedescribed as unobtainium.

TABLE 1: COMPARISON OF ATTRIBUTES: CURRENT PROCESS VS. FUTURE CONCEPT

ATTRIBUTES CURRENT PROCESS FUTURE CONCEPT

Platform Relevance 40-70 years 5-10 years

Capability Requirements 2+ times current Limited

Mission Set Multimission Single mission

Survivability Cutting edge Medium/high: Adapt with version

Technology Development Unobtainium Modest

Software Development Highly complex pacing item Reuse, single mission emphasis

Production Tooling Specialized Reduced & regenerativeProduction Labor High Lower: Shift toward design

Production Output Single system Multiple aircraft classes

Cost of Production Capacity High, no excess Moderate, excess capacity

Technology Insertion/Upgrades Redesign Add to new versions

Unit Cost High Variable: Low-moderate

Baseline Quantity High Low

Quantity Fielded Less than baseline Per emerging needs

Scalable Very limited Yes

Life Cycle Operations High: 8,000-16,000 hours Low: 2,000 hours

Day to Day Peacetime Costs High: Test, train, operate Low: Test, operate


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V. CONCLUSIONTe concept outlined in this paper represents oneslice o one capability segment in one operationaldomain, highlighting the enormity o both thechallenges and opportunities associated withdeveloping new approaches and paradigms. Tisconcept may not apply, or may have to be instanti-ated differently, or other capability segments inthe air or other war-ghting domains. However,the current paradigm is clearly unsustainableacross all operational domains and critically so,given the strategic and economic trends acingthe United States. Modest improvements to theexisting paradigm will only slow the rate at whichthe nation loses its long-standing and signicantcapability advantage. Despite this, an approachsuch as the one proposed would likely ace signi-cant resistance, as new technologies and conceptsundermine existing nancial and institutionaldrivers in both government and industry.

Te structural challenges associated with the cur-rent acquisition process can be seen as the naturalbyproduct o changes to the strategic, technologi-cal and economic circumstances o the UnitedStates, combined with the inherent issues o changein large, risk-averse organizations. Re orm, whileclearly needed, is unlikely to be achieved by ur-ther reviews, and top-down re orm, in particular,appears unlikely given the myriad challenges ac-ing the DOD in the years ahead. Change is pain ul,especially or large organizations building highlycomplex systems worth billions o dollars that arematters o li e and death. But the current systemis already beset with signicant challenges thatwill become increasingly untenable and, withouta change in approach, will lead to a diminished

uture orce.

Te rise o new technologies and methodologiesaffords the opportunity or paradigm-shifinginnovation in ways that increase U.S. capabilitywhile managing costs and risk more effectively.

Bold solutions do not require ormal or top-downre orms. DOD can support such efforts throughexperimentation, capability demonstrations,requirements denition, contract structure andevaluation. Concomitantly, the de ense industryhas power ul incentives to innovate or competi-tive differentiation in a time o shrinking budgets.Focusing innovation on how to acquire capability(process) in addition to payloads and plat ormswill be critical to maintain capability superior-ity in a technologically sophisticated geostrategic

environment.Future U.S. technological superiority is ar romguaranteed, and other actors will soon have similaraccess to the technologies explored in this paper.Te United States has a rich tradition o innova-tion and leadership in de ense and technologydevelopment and possesses the ability to developthe concepts and technology required to addressthese challenges at the right time. But i the DODand U.S. de ense industry do not innovate boldly,others will.


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ENDNOTES

1. J. Ronald Fox,Defense Acquisition Reform, 1960-2009: An Elusive Goal (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military His tory, 2011).

2. Paul K. Davis and Peter A. Wilson, Looming Discontinuities in U.S. MilitaryStrategy and Defense Planning (RAND Corporation, 2011).

3. Jonathan W. Greenert, Payloads over Platforms: Charting a New Course,Proceedings Magazine (July 2012).

4. See Andrew Davies, Geek of the Week: Frederick Lanchester andwhy quantity has a quality all of its own, The Strategist blog onASPIstrategist.org, September 20, 2013, http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/geek-of-the-week-frederick-lanchester-and-why-quantity-is-a-quality/.

5. See Shawn Brimley, Ben FitzGerald and Kelley Sayler, Game Changers:Disruptive Technology and U.S. Defense Strategy (Center for a New AmericanSecurity, September 2013).

6. All costs reported in this paper are in constant FY2013 dollars.

7. Here we compare the initial development of the F-4 for the Navy to thedevelopment of the Air Force F-22. See Torsten Anft, VF-74 Be-Devilers, July1, 2013, http://www.anft.net/f-14/f14-squadron-vf074.htm. This would besimilar to initial operating capability for modern aircraft systems.

8. U.S. Department of Defense, Selected Acquisition Report: F-22, RCS:DD-A&T(Q&A)823-265 (December 31, 2010), http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/logistics_material_readiness/acq_bud_n/SARs/DEC%202010%20SAR/F-22%20-%20SAR%20-%2025%20DEC%202010.pdf.

9. Al Shaffer, keynote address (NDIA Science and Engineering Conference,National Harbor, MD, April 24, 2013). //

10. Frank Kendall, Memorandum Better Buying Power 2.0: Continuing thePursuit for Greater Efficiency and Productivity in Defense Spending (November13, 2012).

11. F-4 development costs estimated using Ren J Francillon, McDonnellDouglas Aircraft since 1920: Volume II , (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,1979) and George C. Sponsler, et al.,The F-4 and the F-14 (Gaithersburg, MD:Columbia Research Corporation, 1973); F-22 development cost estimated using

U.S. Department of Defense, Selected Acquisition Report: F-22.12. Deborah D. Stine, The Manhattan Project, the Apollo Program, andFederal Energy Technology R&D Programs: A Comparative Analysis, RL-34645(Congressional Research Service, June 30, 2009).

13. Data collected using Mark Lorell and Hugh P. Levaux,The Cutting Edge: AHalf Century of U.S. Fighter Aircraft R&D (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation,1998).

14. Marcelle Size Knaack,Encyclopedia of US Air Force Aircraft and Missile Systems: Volume 1(Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1978).

15. Estimate based on contracts data available at the Federal ProcurementData System and U.S. Air Force, Air Force Accepts Final F-22 Raptor, M2012. http://www.jber.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123301143.

16. Data collected from the FY2011 U.S. Air Force Budget Submission; Fcosts calculated using Knaack,Encyclopedia of US Air Force Aircraft and Missile Systems: Volume 1.

17. While this approach could be applied more generally across differenttypes of systems, we focus on aircraft systems in this paper because aircradevelopment challenges are more problematic than in some other classesof systems and the manufacturing technologies are well-suited for aircraftsystems.

18. The printed world, The Economist (February 10, 2011), http://www.economist.com/node/18114221; 3D printing scales up,TheEconomist (September 7, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/technology-quarterly/21584447-digital-manufacturing-there-lot-hype-around-3d-printing-it-fast; and Neil Gershenfeld, How to Make AlmostAnything: The Digital Fabrication Revolution,Foreign Affairs (November/December 2012), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138154/neil-gershenfeld/how-to-make-almost-anything.

19. In 2012, the president proposed that the federal government provide $billion for the foundation of a National Network for Manufacturing InnovSee http://manufacturing.gov/nnmi.html.

20. International Federation of Robotics, Presentation: IFR Press Confer30 August 2012, http://www.worldrobotics.org/uploads/tx_zeifr/Charts_IFR__30_August_2012.pdf.

21. Nir Barkan, et al., Final Report: Robotics and Autonomous SystemsIndustry (Industrial College of the Armed Forces, spring 2011), http://wwndu.edu/icaf/programs/academic/industry/reports/2011/pdf/icaf-is-report-robotics-autonomous-systems-2011.pdf.

22. Kate Linebaugh, Hondas Flexible Plants Provide Edge,The Wall Street Journal,September 23, 2008, ht tp://online.wsj.com/article/SB122211673953564349.html.

23. Data collected from U.S. Department of Defense, Office of theUndersecretary of Defense (Comptroller),National Defense Budget Estimates forFY2013; the U.S. Army act ive force grew by 17.6 percent (from about 481,0566,000 soldiers) from 2001 to 2010, while the U.S. Marine Corps grew bypercent (from 173,000 to 206,000 Marines) from 2001 to 2012.

24. U.S. Department of Defense, Selected Acquisition Report: F-22; and U.S.Department of Defense, Selected Acquisition Report: F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Aircraf t, RCS: DD-A&T(Q&A)823-198 (December 31, 2012), http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/logistics_material_readiness/acq_bud_n/SARs/2012-sars/13-F-0884_SARs_as_of_Dec_2012/DoD/F-35_December_2012_SARpdf.


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25. The development of the F-86 Sabre began in 1945, with rst ight in 1947.Aviation History Online Museum, North American F-86 Sabre, http://www.aviation-history.com/north-american/f86.html.

26. Todd Harrison and Evan Montgomery, Changing the Business of Defense(Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Oc tober 2011), http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/2011/10/changing-the-business-of-defense/.


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