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Coercive Diplomacy by the EU: The Iranian Nuclear Weapons CrisisAuthor(s): Tom SauerReviewed work(s):Source: Third World Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 3 (2007), pp. 613-633Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20454949 .

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ThirdWorld Quarterly,

Vol.

28,

No.

3, 2007, pp

613-633 Routledge

R

Taylor

Francis

roup

Coercive Diplomacy by the EU:

the Iranian nuclear weapons crisis

TOM SAUER

ABSTRACT The European Union has been the

main

international ctor trying

to contain

the

ranian

nuclear

programme.

In

2003, for

the

irst

time

ver,

the

EU-3

adopted

a coercive

diplomatic pproach

vis-a'-vis

ran. The

current

rticle

beginswithan analysis of the onceptof coercivediplomacy before applying it

to

the

ranian

case.

In so

doing,

the rticle

aims to

make

an interimssessment

of

the uropean

(EU-3)

effort.

The

EU

has

the

ambition

to

become

a

global player

and

2003 can

be

regarded

as a substantial step

in thatdirection.

Not

only did the U

set

up

its

first ilitary intervention, t also wrote a Security Strategy for the first ime

ever

and,

in a

separate

document,

a

Non-Proliferation

Strategy.1

But

the

event

that

year

which

probably

received

most

media attention

and

which

raisedmost expectationswas thecommon diplomatic demarche to Teheran

by

Dominique

de

Villepin,

Jack Straw

and

Joschka

Fischer,

the

ministers

of

foreign

affairs

of

the

'big Three',

on 21

October

2003.

The

EU-3

made

it

abundantly

clear that

they

would

do

everything hey

could

to

prevent

Iran

becoming

a nuclear

weapons

state.

The

objective

of this

paper

is to

make

an

interim

assessment

of the

European

effort

to

block

the Iranian

attempt

to

'go

nuclear'. Did

theEU

succeed

in

its

coercive

diplomacy

efforts? hat have been

the

difficulties?

What

lessons

can

be drawn?

In the first ection the

concept

of coercive

diplomacy

is

explained.What

are its key characteristics?Which factors determine whether coercive

diplomacy

in

general

succeeds or fails? In the

second

part

the

theory

is

applied

to the Iranian nuclear crisis.After a

chronological

overview of the

major events,

the

following uestions

are

considered: can theEU

attempt

be

regarded

as an

example

of

coercive

diplomacy?

Were the

conditions fulfilled

for

successfulcoercive

diplomacy

in this

specific ase?

Coercive

diplomacy

Diplomacy

is themain instrument f state

interaction.

ven if

thepositions

seem

very

opposed

to

each other and the

conflict

seems

unsolveable, states

Tom

Sauer

is in

the

Department

of

International

Politics, University

of

Antwerp, Belgium.

Email:

[email protected].

ISSN

0143-6597

rint/ISSN

360-2241 nline/07/030613-21 2007 ThirdWorldQuarterly

DOI: 10. 080/01436590701200620 613





THE

IRANIAN

NUCLEAR

WEAPONS

CRISIS

Is

the demand

legitimate?Here a

distinction can

be

made between

the

underlyingobjective

and the

specific

demand.

First, is the underlying objective legitimate?If public opinion in the

threatening tate(s)

believes that the final

goal

is

not

legitimate, hen t

will

be

hard for

decision makers in

the

threatening tate

to

maintain this

policy of

coercive

diplomacy

for

long,

especially

in

democratic states.6

Mutatis

mutandis,

if

public

opinion

in

the

threatened

state

does not

find the

underlying objective

legitimate,

twill

support

its

government

in

resisting

the

external pressure. The

result of the latter will

be that

the threat

ened

government will become

more

self-confident

nd

even

harder to

convince.

Second,

even

if

the


seems

legitimate,

the

specific

demandmay be (perceivedas) excessive. If thedemand isnot inproportion

to the

objective,

itwill not be

refarded

as

legitimate.

emands

should

to

a

certain

extent

always

be limited.

Does the

opponent believe that there

will be

more demands

turning p

in

the

future?

f

the

pponent believes that

more

demands

will

turn

p

in

the

future,

he will

not

be eager

to

give in in

the first

lace. The

threatening

tate

should

make clear

rightfrom the

beginning

what the overall

goals

are

and what

the

definitive olutionwill

look like.

Is the threatcredible?The credibilityof the threat is a major factor that

determines the

success rate

of

coercive

diplomacy.

The

credibility

f

a

threat

depends

in

its turn

on

four factors:

*

Is

the threat

proportional

to

the

demand? If

the

threat is

not

in

proportion to the

demand, than

itwill

not be

perceived as

credible. The

threat

may

eitherbe too

big

or too

small.

It

should be

proportional

to

the

specific emand,

the

underlying bjective

and the

available

means.

Where

military

action is

threatened,

Jakobsen

recommendsnever

excluding

the

use of

ground

troops.8

*

Does public

opinion

support

the threat

nd its

potential

consequences?

Sanctions, for instance,may also hurt the economy of the threatening

state,

which

may prevent

theuse of

coercive

diplomacy

in

the

first

lace.

*

Does

the

threatened

tate fear

some kind of

escalation? If

this is

the

case,

coercive

diplomacy becomes

easier.

*

What

is

the

reputation

of the

threatening

tate?

If

the

threatening

tate

has

a

reputation

of

making

credible

threats,

t

will be

easier

to

persuade

the

opponent.

Is

the

time

ressure

credible?The

demand may be

legitimate nd the

threat

credible,

but if

the time

pressure

is

too

tight r,

in

contrast,not

tight nough,

the odds are that the threatened tatewill not give in.

Which

actor

ismost

motivated to

win

the

negotiationgame?

Which

actor is

most

motivated

in

absolute

terms?

otivation basically

depends on

the size

615



TOM SAUER

of

thenational interests nvolved.

If

there

re vital interests

t stake, theodds

are

that the

country

will be

extremelymotivated towin

the game.

Which actor is most motivated in relative terms?Even if there are

substantial

interests

nvolved forboth states, it is likely

that one of them is

more motivated than the other in relative terms.

Conclusion

To conclude

this

ection,

coercive

diplomacymay seem, and sometimes is, an

attractive alternative for both doing nothing and for going to war. On the

other hand,

as

Robert Art and Patrick

Cronin

state:

'coercive diplomacy is

difficult nd has

a

relatively

ow

success

rate'.9

It is

not

by chance that the

title f Alexander George's book is The Limits ofCoercive Diplomacy.

Regardless

of the final

outcome,

coercive

diplomacy

diminishes the

room

for

manoeuvre

of the

threatening

tate. It

restrains its

freedom of action.

More

fundamentally

the

strategy

f coercive

diplomacy

can

also fail.

In

this

case

there

are two

basic

scenarios left for the

threatening tate.

In

one the

threat

can

be carried

out. This

may

have

negative

consequences for the

threatening

tate as

well,

which

is

why

Art and

Cronin recommend: 'Do not

resort to coercive diplomacy unless,

should it

fail, you

are prepared to go

down the

path

of

war

or

you

have

prepared

a suitable

escape hatch'.10

The

risk exists

that the outcome of a war

may

not be

advantageous

for the

threatening tate.The alternativeapproach consists indoing nothing or in

trying

o

find nother

diplomatic

solution.

In

both cases the

credibility

nd

reputation of

the

threatening

tate is

undermined,

which may have further

negative consequences

if future threats

are

tried.As Jakobsen concludes:

'While

coercive

diplomacy

is a low-cost

strategy

when

it

succeeds,

failure is

unfortunately ery costly

as thecoercer

then faces the

grim

choice of

backing

down or

executing

his

threat'.11

Last, itmay be that

the threatened state

only partially agrees

with the

demand or that it sets

conditions.

In that

case,

the

strategymay

be

regarded

either as a

partial

success or

a

partial failure,depending

on where one sits.

Case-study:

the Iranian nuclear

weapons

crisis

Before

turning

to an assessment of the

EU's

attempt

at

coercive

diplomacy

vis-a-vis

Iran,

let

us

describe

the evolution of the

Iranian

nuclear

pro

gramme

and

the

reaction

of the international

ommunity,

nd

in

particular

the

EU.

EU

policy

vis-a-vis

Iran's

nuclear

programme

For

heuristic

purposes

the

four-year eriod

is

divided

into four sections:

1)

the initialphase starting n the summerof 2002; 2) a second phase that starts

with the first U-Iran

agreement

in

October 2003 until

the

break-up

of the

negotiations

in

August

2005;

3)

the escalation

phase

inside the International

616



THE

IRANIAN NUCLEAR

WEAPONS CRISIS

Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA)

until the

beginning

of

February 2006;

and

4)

the involvement f theUN

Security

Council since

February

2006.

The initial

hase (summer 002- October

2003).While

Iran is a

signatory

f

the

Nuclear

Non-Proliferation

Treaty (NPT)

and is therefore

egally

bound

not to acquire nuclear

weapons,

rumours

circulated in

the

summer

of

2002

that it

was

working

on a

nuclear

weapons programme.

That

information

reportedly

came from the

National Council of

Resistance,

an

Iranian

opposition

movement

which,

surprisingly,

lso

figures

n

the terrorist

ist

of

the

US State Department.

It is

more

than

likely

that

Western

intelligence

agencies already had

access

to the

same

kind of

information.

Core

elementsof these

rumourswere

confirmed

hen the

IAEA

visited

Iran

in the second half of February 2003.12Most observers believe that Iran is

trying

o

acquire

nuclear

weapons

in

secret,

r at

least

trying

o

build

up

the

capabilities

that

are

needed

to

build

nuclear

weapons.13

While

Iran

has the

right

nder the

NPT

to

build

a

nuclear

programme

for

civilian

purposes,

it also

has

the

obligation

to

declaremost

of its

ctivities

to

the IAEA.The

problem is that

Iran

had

not

declared

everything

hat should

have been declared.

For

instance,Teheran admitted in

the

summer

of

2003

that it

had

experimented

in

the

past

with

uranium conversion.

The

difference etween

a

civilian and

a

military

programme

is that the

former ims

at

generating

electricity

while the

latter is

meant to

produce

nuclearweapons. An inherent ifficultynpreventing the spread of nuclear

weapons

is

that the

technology

sed for

building

civilian

reactors

can

also be

used for

military purposes.

While

in

the

past

the EU

may

have reacted

by making

a

non-binding

statement or

may

not

have

reacted at all

because

of internal

divisions,

it

now

reacted

promptly.

A

couple

of weeks

after IAEA

Director-General

Mohammed

El

Baradei

visited

Iran

and

confirmed the

existing

rumours

in

February 2003,

the Swedish

Minister of

Foreign

Affairs,

the

late Anna

Lindh, proposed

the establishment

of a new

EU

non-proliferation olicy in

the

EU General Affairs and

External Relations

Council

(GAERC)

in

March.

Most

observers

link

this

initiative,

which

was

later

complemented by

the

European Security Strategy, to the conflict in Iraq, and inparticular the

divisions

within the

EU and the absence of a

constructive

alternative to

the

belligerent plans

of the

neo-conservative

administration in

the

USA.

However,

it

cannot be denied that the

Iranian and

North Korean

nuclear

programmes

also

played

a

crucial

role.14

The

same

day

that the

Iraqi

war

started,

the EU

Political and

Security

Committee

(PsC)

held

a

seminar

about

weapons

of mass

destruction

in co

operation

with the

Swedish InternationalPeace

Research

Institute

SIPRI).

In

mid-April

the

GAERC

formally

aunched the

Non-Proliferation of

Weapons

of

Mass

Destruction initiative.

The draft

text

of this firstEU non

proliferation trategy ad already been approved at theThessaloniki Summit

in June

2003,

while the finaldraftwas

agreed upon

in

December 2003, in

parallel

with the overall

EU

security trategy.

617



TOM SAUER

In

themeantime Iran had

secretly

proposed

a

deal

to

theUSA

in

May

2003. While

the

State Department showed

some interest, eo-conservatives

inside theWhite House immediately rejected the proposal.'5 Since the

Iranian revolution and

the

subsequent

hostage crisis in 1979, theUSA has

refused to have diplomatic contacts, let

alone negotiations,with Iran. Itwas

still

not

ready

to

change its policy. As

a

result, the EU had a clear

opportunity

to

step

in

as

themain negotiatorwith

Iran.

The EU was already negotiatingwith Iran on other issues. In December

2002 it had initiated negotiations with Iran for a trade and association

agreement.

Because

of the latter's

nuclear

programme, voices were raised in

the

EU to

halt these

negotiations.16

At the

same

time

states likeFrance (and

earlier the

USA)

had asked

Iran to

sign

theAdditional

Protocol

of the

IAEA.

The latter,which had been introduced in the 1990s on a voluntary basis,

provides the

IAEA

with more rightsto find ndeclaredmaterials and possible

violations. However,

Iran

declined the offer

to

sign theAdditional Protocol,

and the

EU

(despite

some

protests

inside the

European Commission)

took

action

against

Iran

by suspending

the

bilateral

negotiations

on a

trade and

association

agreement

in

June 2003.

The

IAEA

Board

Statement

of 19 June

2003 confirmed that

ran had failed

to

report

ertainnuclear

materials and

activities,

ut

did not

declare that

ran

was

in

non-compliance

with the

IAEA

Statute or the

NPT.17

The Board

also

asked

Iran to

sign

the

Additional Protocol.

In

August,

and

in

contrast

to

earlier

statements,

ran admitted

having

received

technological support

from

abroad. The IAEABoard Resolution of 12

September

2003 set another

ultimatum:

Iran had

to

provide

full

information bout its

programme

before

the

end of October

2003.18

The second

phase:

EU- Iranian

negotiations

nd

agreements

(October

2003

August 2005).

On

21

October

2003,

theMinisters of

Foreign

Affairs

of the

EU-3

France,

theUK

and Germany

flew toTeheran to

negotiate directly

with the

regime

inTeheran.

Dominique

de

Villepin,

Jack

Straw

and

Joschka

Fisher succeeded

in

signing

n

agreement

with Iran.

In

exchange

for further

negotiations

Iran

agreed

to

suspend

its enrichment

programme,

to

sign

the

Additional Protocol and to adhere to theProtocol in themeantime.' This

was

perceived

as a

major breakthrough.

Not

only

did the

EU-3 act

in

unity

(in

contrast to

the

Iraq

crisis),

their

ction was at

least

publicly

backed

by

theother

EU

member

states.Most

fundamentally

the

EU-3

succeeded

in

signing

n

agreement

with Teheran.

A

couple

of

days

later

Iran

submitted

a

'full'declaration about

its nuclear

programme

to

the

IAEA.

As

a

result,

the

IAEA resolution of

26 November

2003,

though

strongly deploring

Iran's

past

failures and

breaches,

did

not

declare that

Iran was

'in

non

compliance'.20

This

outcome was

basically

the result of

European diplo

macy,

which had to find

compromise

between the

positions

of Iran and the

USA. This bridge-building xercisewould be repeatedover and over again in

the

coming years.

In

December

2003

the

High Representative

for

common

foreign

and

security olicy (CFSP),

Javier

olana,

was

added

to

the

uropean

negotiating

618



THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS

CRISIS

team.The

other

EU member

states

felt

ut of the

loop

to

a certain extent nd

had asked

Solana

to

play

the role

of

go-between.21

The first etback fortheEU happened at thebeginningof 2004.After the

USA had

made

clear that

ranwas

violating

theOctober

2003

agreement,

n

IAEA

report also

warned

in

March

2004

that

therewere

partsmissing

in

the

Iranian

declarations.22 Iran

in

its turn

felt

unhappy

with

the

'carrots'

obtained

from the

EU

and threatened to resumeuranium conversion

and to

build

a

heavy water plant.

El

Baradei,

the

Director-General

of

the

IAEA,

visited Teheran

at

the

beginning

of

April

and was able

to

convince

the

Iranians

to hand over a second 'full'

declaration on 20 May 2004.

Another

IAEA

report

a

couple

of weeks

later,

however,

talked

again

about

contradictory

information

provided

by

Iran.

The IAEA

Board Resolution

deplored the fact 'that Iran's cooperation has not been as full, timely nd

proactive as it should have

been'.2.

In

reaction Iran announced that it

would

start to

produce centrifuges

gain.

At the beginning of September

2004 Iran

started

to

convert

uranium

into

uranium gas. The EU raised the stakes:

Iranmust

co-operate

with

the IAEA

before the end

of

October 2004.

It

appears

that this

ultimatum had

an

effect.

Four

days later,

Iran

agreed

to

continue the

suspension

for

a

couple

of

months.

It

would

not be

the last

time

that

Iran

had tried

to

please the

IAEA

rightbefore theBoard of

Governor's

meeting. The Board agreed that

Iran

must provide

all the

necessary

information efore the

next

meeting

at the

nd

of November 2004, but without an automatic trigger o send the fileto the

UN

Security

Council

in

case

of

non-compliance.24

The

EU-3

proposed

a new

overall

deal

with

Iran on 21 October 2004

that

would include

the start of

broader

negotiations,

economic

benefits

and

the

delivery

of

light

water reactors.25This

second

EU-Iran

agreement

was

formally igned

in

Paris

on

14

November

2004,

and

included

a

renewal

of the

suspension of

the

Iranian

programme.26

Under

pressure fromRussia and

China,

10

days

later the IAEABoard even

agreed

that Iran's

suspensionwas

voluntarily

instead of

legally

binding.27

In

December

2004

three

EU-Iran

working groups

were

established

for

negotiating

the

following

tems:

1)

the

transfer

f

nuclear

technology; ) trade

and co-operation; and 3) security.Already in January 2005, however,

differences

merged

with

respect

to the

timing.

While Iran

expected

the

conclusion

of the

negotiations

withinweeks or

months,

the U did not

expect

these

talks to be

finished or

ne or two

years.

Teheran

evenwarned in

February

that the talks

had

to

be

concluded

by

mid-March

2005.

At the

nd

of

February

the

EU

succeeded

in

convincing

theUSA

to

come

up

with

new

'carrots':

membership

of

the

World

Trade

Organization

and

spare

parts

for

eroplanes.

But it

failed

to

convince the

USA

to

offer

ecurity

uarantees.

In

the

meantime

Iran

launcheddifferent

roposals

in the

working groups.

The

Iranian

leadership

became frustrated

because

of

a

lack of

co-operation

on

the

EU's side.

Consequently it threatenedtohalt its suspension again. In response theEU

threatened

o

halt

the

negotiationprocess

if

ran

restarted

ranium conversion.

The

shadow of the Iranian

presidential elections

in

June also

had

a

major

influence

n

the

negotiations. The EU and theUSA

expected that former

619



TOM

SAUER

President Rafsjanjani, who

was regarded as a strongerfigurethan President

Khatami, would win the

elections and be able to take a more moderate view

on the nuclear issue. The EU promised to launch a new proposal at the

beginning of August 2005.

Instead of Rafsjanjani, and to the surpriseof the

restof theworld,

it

was the conservativeMahmoud

Ahmadinejad who won

the elections. Right from

the beginning he made it clear that Iran had the

right to have its own nuclear fuel cycle, including

enrichment and

reprocessing. twas therefore

ot surprisingthat Iran rejected theEuropean

proposal of

5

August 2004. Iran also started to convert

uranium. The EU

consequently broke off the negotiations.

The third hase.

escalation

within the

IAEA

(August 2005-February 2006).

The recommencement f uranium conversion by Iranwas regarded by the

EU

as

a transgression f

a

'red line'.

For

the first ime

ver

the

U

succeeded

in

convincing Russia and China not

to

use

their

veto

against

an

IAEA

resolution thatwould formally state that Iran was

in

non-compliance with

the

IAEA Statute.

The

24

September

2005

IAEA

Board

Resolution

was

supported by

the

EU,

the

USA

and

most

other

members;

Russia

and China

abstained; only

Venezuela voted

against.

The resolution also warned

Iran

that,

f t

did

not

comply

before thenext

meeting,

its file

ould be sent

to

the

UN

Security

Council.2

The EU made

it clear

that

itwould

only negotiate again

if ran

suspended

its enrichmentprogramme. Such a demand showed implicitacceptance of

Iran's uranium conversion,

something the EU had never accepted before.

Thanks to new documents provided by Iran to

the IAEA nOctober 2005, and

despite

the

extremist

eclarations

of President

Ahmadinejad

with

respect

to

Israel around

the same

time,

the

IAEA

Board of Governors did not

yet

send

the Iranian

file to the

Security

Council

in

November

2005.29

Again

theEU

member states

found

a

compromise between

the

American position

on

the

one

hand and the

Russian and Chinese views

on the

other.

InDecember 2005

a new round of

negotiations

between

the

U-3

and Iran

made

no

progress.

Iran

even threatened to resume uranium

enrichment.

When Iran

actually

carried out its threat n

9

January2006,

a new 'red line'

was crossed in the eyes of the EU and the USA. This time theywere

determined

to

send the Iranian

file

to

the

UN

Security

Council.

In reaction

Iran threatened

to

halt its voluntary co-operation

with

the IAEA and

to

accelerate

its

programme

from

the

level

of R&D

to an

industrial scale.

The fourthphase.

UN

Security

Council

engagement (since February 2006).

After three

years

the IAEA

sent

the

Iran

file

to

the

UN

Security

Council

during

a

specialmeeting

of theBoard

on

2-

3

February

2006.30

Itwas

again

the

EU

that

had drafted the resolution.

This time

not

only Venezuela,

but

also

Syria

and

Cuba

voted

against.

Russia and China

voted in

favour.

The

actual discussions inside the Security Council would only start at the

beginning

of

March

2006.

Nevertheless,

Iran

did

execute

what it

had

threatened

o do: it

suspended

its

voluntary

co-operation

with

the

IAEA

nd it

accelerated

its

enrichment

rogramme.

620



THE

IRANIAN

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

CRISIS

On 29 March

2006,

after

weeks

of

negotiations,

the

Security Council

adopted

a so-called Declaration of the

Chairman,

which is not

legally

binding.This unanimously adopted document gave Iran anothermonth to

come

clean.31

But Iranwas not

impressed.

n

the

ontrary,

n

11

April

2006

Iran

proudly

announced that

it

had succeeded

in

enriching

uranium

up

to

3.5%

thanks to a cascade of

164

centrifuges.

The

next

IAEA

report

recommended that

the Security Council

agree on a formal

resolution

in

order

to

increase the

pressure

on

the

governmentof Iran.32

On

8

May

President

Ahmadinejad

made a

significant

ove

by

writing

a

letter

o

President

Bush,

which

was

later

published

in

the

media. While its

content can

easily

be

criticised,

the lack of

a

direct

response

from the

USA

further

ncouraged internal frictions nside theEU.

This

criticism, owever,

faded away thanksto two successesby theEU-3.34 First, at theend ofMay,

they ucceeded

in

convincing

the SA

to

negotiate

with

Iran,

something

thad

always

refused

to

do since

1979.

However,

the

USA,

set as a

condition for

multilateral talks that

Iran

first

ad

to

suspend

its

enrichment

rogramme.

Second,

the

U-3

also succeeded in

convincing

the

USA,

Russia and

China

to

agree

on a new common

package for

ran,

which was

offered

y Solana

to

the

decisionmakers

in

Teheran

on 5 June2006.

Orally

he also

explained

what

the

consequences

would be

if Iran

did

not

agree.

They

would include a UN

Security

Council Resolution that

would

open

the

door

to

sanctions.

While

therewas no

formal

deadline,

the

international

ommunityhoped

to

get

an

answer from ran before theG-8 summit inSt Petersburg inmid-July2006.

However,

Iran

immediately

ade it lear that

t

would

only respond

in

August.

At the

end of

June

Germany

appeared again

to

be

in

favour

of

a

proposal

thatwould

allow limited

nrichment. he

USA

immediately locked further

attempts

in that

direction.35When

it became

clear that Iran was not

interested n the

latest

proposal by the

international

community, theUN

Security

Council

started

to

draft

a

resolution.

After

two

weeks

of

negotiations,

the first

formal)

UN

Security

Council

resolutionwas

agreed

upon

on 31

July

2006.36

It

required

under

Chapter

7 of theUN

Charter

that

ran

suspended its

nrichment

rogramme

before

31

August 2006. It

also

threatened

to vote

through

a new

resolution that

would

open

the

door

to

'appropriatemeasures' read sanctions if ran did not comply.Only Qatar

voted

against.

Iran

immediatelyrejected

the

resolution

as

'illegitimate'.

On

22

August

Iran

also sent a

21-page

answer

to the

proposal made by

Solana at

the

beginning

of

June.37

As

everybody expected,

Iran

now

strengthened

y

theoutcome

of the

Lebanon war

did

not

complywith the

UN

Security

Council

Resolution's

deadline.

New

talks

between Solana

and

Larijani

on

10 September

raised the

possibility

of

a new

deal. Iran

would be

prepared

to

suspend

its

programme

on a

voluntary

basis forone or two

months,

as

it

had earlier

suggested

in

its

written answer on

22

August.38

French President

Chirac

even

went as

far

as

sayingthat formalnegotiationscould be setup, and that ran could thentake

a

reciprocal step

by suspending

its

enrichment

rogramme.39

But this

effort

y Solana also

failed.

The North

Korean nuclear

teston 9

October

2006 moved

the

spotlight,especially

in

the

UN

Security

Council,

621



TOM

SAUER

from Iran toNorth Korea, but

only temporarily. he EU-25 ministers of

foreign ffairs greed

on 16

October

2006 to

continue talks inside theUN

Security Council about sanctions against Iran. Nevertheless, these talks

appeared

more

difficult than expected.

Not

only did Russia and China

continue to

oppose (large-scale) economic

sanctions, let lone military action,

therewas also friction etween the

USA and theEU with respect toRussian

support

for the

Iranian

Bushehr

reactor,

with

theUSA taking the hardest

position.40Again

theEU

found

itself n the

difficult osition of having to

mediate

not

only

between

Iran

and the

USA,

but

also

between

theUSA and

Russia.

At

the end ofNovember 2006 theBoard of the IAEA rejected Iran's

request for support

in

development of a heavy-waternuclear reactor atArak.

Despite

the

victory

of the

emocrats in

the

US

elections in

November and

thevictoryof themoderates in the Iranian elections inDecember 2006, and

despite

the recommendationof the

Iraqi Study Group

to

negotiatewith

Iran

(about Iraq),

there

are no

indications

at

least for the moment

that

President Bush is

willing

to

change

his

policy

vis-a-vis

ran.

On

the

contrary,

theUSA

sent a

second aircraft arrier

to

the

Persian

Gulf

in

January2007.41

Exactly twomonths after

the

UK,

France and

Germany

had

introduced

a draft

resolution,

the

UN

Security

Council was

finally able

to

agree

unanimously

on a

(second)

resolution

against

Iran on

23

December

2006.

For

the

first ime t

contained limited

conomic

sanctions, including ban on

the

import

and

export

of

nuclear-related

material,

and the

assets

of

10

Iranian companies and 12 individuals were frozen.The draft had been

watered down under

pressure

from Russia and China.

Iran

immediately

rejected the resolution.

Coercive

diplomacy by

the U

in

ran

This section will

make an

interim ssessment

of the

European attempt

to

convince

Iran, using

the instrument f coercive

diplomacy.

Our

hypothesis

is

that the U was not

completely

aware of thedifficulties f such an

approach,

and that

itwas

not

ready

to use this

diplomatic

instrument

uccessfully.

o

verify

hether this

hypothesis

is

correct,

the theoretical onditionsmentioned

above should be compared with the actual situation at the start of the

attempt

in

2003.

As the

attempt

could

in

theory

have been cancelled

at

any

given time,

and

as

it is

a

moving target,

one can in

principle

repeat

this

exercise for each

moment

during

the conflict.

A

legitimate nderlying bjective.

Is

preventing

ran

from

becoming

a

nuclear

weapons

state a

legitimate bjective?

At

first

ight,

this

seems a

reasonable

and

legitimate bjective.

The

spread

of nuclear

weapons

tomore

countries

should indeed

be

prevented.

There is however

a caveat.

The

cornerstone

of

thenuclear

non-proliferation

regime,

the

NPT,

consisted of a deal between the

nuclearweapons states and thenon-nuclearweapons states.The former ere

defined as those states that had

exploded

a nuclear device before

1

January

1967.42

All

other

signatory

states

agreed

to remain

non-nuclear

weapon

states.

The

IAEA is

responsible

for

verifying

ivilian

nuclear installations

622



THE

IRANIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS

CRISIS

inside

thenon-nuclearweapon

states.Two

things,

owever,

were

promised

in

return

for non-nuclear weapons states' compliance.

First,

the

non-nuclear

weapon stateswould get support inestablishing civiliannuclearprogramme

(Article

4); second,

the

discriminatory

ature

of

the

regime

was

only

meant to

be

a

temporarymeasure,

as

thenuclear

weapons

states had

promised

to

get

rid of

theirnuclear weapons over time Article 6).

Iran

signed

the

IAEA

in

1970. It

therefore

romised

never to

acquire

nuclear

weapons.

If

Iran

is

now

trying

o

acquire

nuclear

weapons

in

secret,

which the

IAEA

has

stillnot been

able

to

confirm,

that

would be

illegal.

For

many

observers

preventing

Iran

from

becoming

a

nuclear

weapons

state

would

therefore e legitimate.

A

counter-argument that

cannot

easily

be

dismissed, however,

is that each

signatory

state

of the

NPT

should

fulfil

ts

obligations. Ifnot, the regimecan easily be criticised for double standards,

which would

rapidly

undermine thewhole

treaty.43

The

question

that is

immediately

raised is the

following:

are

the nuclear

weapons

states

in

compliance

with the

NPT

and,

more

particularly,

with

respect to nuclear disarmament

(Article 6)? Is itnormal that there re still

27

000

nuclear

weapons

on

earth

36

years

after the

treaty'sentry

into

force?

More

fundamentally,

re

thenuclear

weapons

states

willing

to

get

ridof their

nuclear

weapons?

If

that

is not

the

case,

which

seems to

correspond

with

reality,44 ne can question

how

legitimate t is

to

pressure

the

non-nuclear

weapons

states

to fulfil their

obligations.

If

France

believes that nuclear

weapons are vital to protect its national interests and apparentlymore

importantthan the legal obligation

to

get ridof

them),

how

can one credibly

convince

a

state

like

Iran

which is situated

in a

much

more

volatile

region,

surrounded by

the

USA

in

the

West (Iraq,

Turkey),

East

(Afghanistan,

Pakistan)

and South

(Persian

Gulf,

Gulf

states),

and

situated between

two

de

facto

nuclear

weapon

states

(Israel

and

Pakistan)

that

re

apparently

allowed

to

keep

theirnuclear

weapons

not to

acquire

nuclear

weapons?45

This 'double-standards'

critique

was

already

well

understood

by

2003.

The

fact

that

the

U

talks

with Iran

were

primarily resented by

nuclear

weapons

states France

and

the

UK may explain

the low

level

of

sensitivity o

this

kind of

criticism. ne can even

argue

that the

demands on

Iran

became even

more illegitimate ver time.As a result f the ranian crisis, in2004 theBush

administration

proposed

denying

access

to

a

complete

nuclear fuel

cycle

for

non-nuclearweapons states that

did not

yetpossess such far-reaching

ivilian

programmes. As

it is

quite

easy

for

states

with extensive civilian

nuclear

programmes

to convert

them

to

military programmes, such proposals

make

sense.

Indeed,

the

NPT

contains

a

loophole

in

this

regard.

On the

other

hand,

while this

proposal may

seem

opportune from

a

non-proliferationpoint

of

view, it

is in

contradiction of

Article

4

of

theNPT, which

states

that

non

nuclear weapons

states

have the

right to obtain support for their

civilian

nuclear

programmes. The adoption of thisUS

proposal would therefore

mean a fundamental limitation of the rightsof thenon-nuclearweapons

states

underArticle

4.

Countries

likeBrazil therefore

ppose

these

proposals

and link itwith

the

obligations

on the

nuclear

weapons

states to disarm. In

short, it

would not be

legitimate to strengthen

Article

4

in the absence

623



TOM

SAUER

of

similarmeasures

with respect to

nuclear disarmament.

Nuclear prolifera

tion

and nuclear disarmament

are both

sides of the

same coin. It is

not by

chance that the NPT is both a nuclear non-proliferationand a nuclear

disarmament treaty.

The counter-argument

s that Iran

is not in good

standingwith the

NPT.

This argument

is correct, but

it is neutralised

by the fact that

the nuclear

weapons

states are

not in good standing

either (as

discussed

above). Worse,

India,

which has never signed

the

NPT

and

therefore

n

theory

has no rightto

receive support

for itscivilian

nuclear programme

is now being

helped by the

USA.46

This

is turning ogic

upside

down. It

further ighlights

the double

standards of

the nuclear

non-proliferation regime.

While this criticism

was

not problematic

in

the

first tages of escalation

with Iran, itwill probably be of crucial importance in the future, hen the

rest

of theworld may

be asked to

impose sanctions

or to use military

force

against

Iran.

While many

states

in theworld would

prefer to

see a

nuclear

weapons-free Iran,

they

lso

regard

the

existence

of two standards as

highly

problematic.

Many

of them

have criticised

the nuclear

weapons states

in

thepast,

in

particular

within

the framework

f the

NPT Review

Conferences.

The latest

NPT

Review Conference

in

2005

was a

fiasco

as

a

result of the

opposition

of the

non-nuclear weapons

states (with

Egypt as their

spokes

person)

vis-a-vis

the

nuclearweapons

states.

The creation of

theNew Agenda

Coalition

in 1998

should

also be

regarded

in this

light.47

t

is therefore

ighly

unlikely thatmany of thenon-nuclearweapons stateswill be able to support

the

nuclear weapons

states in their demand for

harsh measures

against

countries

like

Iran.

It

is also

not

by

chance thatGermany,

the only

non

nuclear

weapons state

in theEU-3, takes the

softest pproach.

The criticism

that theEU's

demand

is

not

legitimate

s

of

course used or

misused

by

Iran. President

Ahmadinejad

stated

in

an

interviewwith Der

Spiegel

in

May

2006:

'The

IAEA

was also

established

to

promote

the

disarmament

of those

powers

that

already possessed

nuclear

weapons'.48

And

in his

speech

at

the UN

General

Assembly

in

September 2006,

Ahmadinejad

wondered: 'Some

powers proudly

announce

the

production

of

second and third

generations

of nuclear

weapons.

What do

they

need these

weapons for?'.49 ut even ifthisdiscourse ismisused by Iran, there s a lot of

truth

n the

reasoning,

which makes

it

very

hard

for the

rest

of

theworld

to

enforce counter-proliferation,

ot

only

in

Iran

but also

in

general.50

A

legitimate

emand.

Iran has

never

disputed

the fact that

it is

not

allowed

to

have

nuclear weapons.

What

Iran

disputes

is the fact that

it is

not

allowed

to

enrich

uranium.

The latter

is the

right

of each

non-nuclear

weapons

state.

Moreover,

Iran is allowed

to

get technological

support

for

these activities

according

to

Article

4

of the

NPT.

One could

therefore

uestion

whether

it is a

reasonable

demand

to ask

Iran not to

enrichuranium.

The

counter-argument

is thattheNPT leavesa dangerous loophole thatmay be exploitedbymalicious

states.

States

that have

the

intention

f

secretly roducing

nuclear

weapons

may

try

o

acquire

a

very

sophisticated

civilian

programme

under

the

guise

of

Article

4

of

the

NPT,

and

at a certain

time

simply

withdraw from the

treaty,

624



THE

IRANIAN NUCLEAR

WEAPONS

CRISIS

something that

is allowed

under

said

treaty.

his

scenario has

been

followed

byNorth

Korea.

Pyongyang

withdrew

from

the

NPT in

2003

and announced

twoyears later that tpossessed nuclearweapons. Iranmay inprincipledo the

same as

North

Korea.

The crucial

problem

in

this

regard

is to

understand

Iranian intentions. ased

on

the

apabilities

that the

IAEAhas

seen,

it an

still

not determine

whether Iran

is

building nuclear weapons. Even theUS inte

lligence gencies shrink from

making

such

statements.51

n the other hand,

the

AEA

did confirm hat

ran has not

always complied

with

the

IAEA

tatute.

In

addition,

the

same

criticism

as

before

pops up again.

Do

the nuclear

weapons

states

intend

to

get

rid of their

uclear weapons,

as

they

re

legally

supposed

to

do?

If

that is

not

the

case,

how

reasonable

or

legitimate s it

to

demand

that

Iran

not

enrich uranium? Of

course,

Iran

(mis)uses these

contradictions to defend itsposition. Iranian chiefnegotiator Larijani, for

instance,

stated at the

beginning

of May

2006:

'There

must

be

a

balance

between the

rights

nd the

obligations stemming

from the

NPT. It

is not

fair

that

we should have

all

the

obligations

but

not

enjoy

the

rights'.52 resident

Ahmadinejad pointed

out in

August

2006: 'How can

the

Iranian nation give

up

its

obvious

right

to

peaceful

nuclear

technology, hen America and some

other

countries test

new

atomic bombs each

year?'53

A

further

istinction

can be

made

with

respect

to

the

size

of the

civilian

nuclear

programme

that ran

should

be

allowed

to

possess.

On

this

oint there

exists

much debate.

The

USA

takes the

most

extreme

position: no enrichment

at all. Remarkably theUSA has been able to convince the European

negotiators

to

follow this

line

since

November

2004.54

In

theory,

ne

could

envisage

Iran

being

allowed

to

have

a

limited

(and delayed)

enrichment

programme, as this

would

not

allow

Iran

to

produce

nuclear weapons. This

was

proposed by

the International Crisis

Group, among others,

at

the

beginning

f

2006.55

The

idea

has

been

repeated

byRussia,

and

Germany

also

considered

the

roposal

at

the

beginning

ofMarch

2006.

But, again,

the

SA,

UK and France were

able

to

persuade Germany

and Russia to

withdraw

the

proposal.

One of theAmerican

counter-arguments

s

that

'you cannot

be a

little

it

pregnant'.

In

theend itwill be a

political

decision,

based on

trust

n

Iran, which allows

this

proposal to be further

onsidered or

not. The same

applies to anotherproposal by scientists,this time from theMassachusetts

Institute f

Technology (MIT),

to

build a

multinational

or

even supranational

enterprise

n

Iran

that

would allow

it to

build

quite

a

large-scale

enrichment

programme,

on

the condition that this

would

be

surveyedby international

monitors

24

hours

a

day.

The

enterprisewould consist both of

Iranian

and

international

ngineers

nd

employees.

Self-destruction

echanisms would

be

installed

to

prevent

break-out

in case Iran

cheated.56

When

Iran initiated

similar

roposal

at the

beginning

ofOctober

2006,

it

was

immediately ejected

by

the

international

ommunity, ncluding

Russia

and

France.

The

point

is

that

twill be hard to

maintain thedemand of

'no enrichment

t

all' forever. uch a demand seems excessive and is therefore ot altogether

legitimate.

t

is

normal thatthe

SA

and

possibly

others should

adopt it

s their

opening position

in the

negotiations,

but it should

also be normal to

relax

this

condition

over

time.

The

EU

and

theUSA

have

alreadymade

similar

moves

625



TOM SAUER

before. At the beginning

of

the

negotiations,

theWestern

view

was 'no

conversion'.

However, when

Iran

did

convert

n2005, the U

and the SA had

to come back to their arlierposition. Inprinciple the ame could happen again

with respect to

enrichment. s

a

diplomat

in

Vienna stated:

'TheUS will push

veryhard until

the

ast

minute in thehope

of gettingthe

ranians to give

in

but

at

theend of theday they

will accept some form f enrichment ctivity'.57

Iranianfear of the lippery lope.

It

is very

likelythat ran is afraid that,once

it

agrees

with thedemands

of

the

U

(and

theUSA),

demands

with respect

to

other domains

will

follow, including

in the

domain

of

human rights, upport

for

terrorist

roups, recognition

f

Israel,

and

possibly regime hange.

If

that

fear

is

reallypresent,

it

may have

a

negative effect

n

the negotiations with

regardto thenuclear programme.More particularly ranwill try opostpone

possible

concessions

in

the nuclear domain

as

long

as

possible.

President

Ahmadinejad told his people:

'If

you

give

in

on the nuclear weapons

program, they'll ask about human

rights.

f

you give

in

on human rights,

they'll

ask about animal

rights.'58

possible

solution

to

prevent that logic

dominating

inside

Iran

is

to start

negotiations

on

all

these topics, except

of

course on

regime

change.

The

latter

will

also

have

to

include some sort

of

securityguarantees

from the

USA.59

Yet

security uarantees

were explicitly

rejected by

Under Secretary of

State

Nicholas Burns

at

the beginning of

October

2006.60

As the

USA

had

even

refused

to

talk

to

Iran

until

May 2006,

theEU was (and still is) basically hostage to theAmerican unwillingness to

talk,

let alone

to

provide security uarantees.

A

proportional

threat. he

problem

is

that the threat thatwill

impress

the

Iranian

decision

makers

most

is a

military

strike

y

the

USA.61

The

real effect

on the

ground, however,may

be

limited,

s not all the 'secret' facilities re

known and as

Iran

would

easily

be able to start

up

the

programme

again

later

on.

At

the same time

such attacks are

generally regarded

as

disproportionate

and therefore ot credible. This

is

because

the


is not

regarded

as

legitimateby

most

people

around

the

world, especially

in

the

Middle East.

A

military

action

by

theUSA

against

Iran

will

provoke

violent

reactions by Iran and Muslims in theMiddle East.62 Iran could retaliate in

different

ays.

It

possesses

intermediate allistic

missiles, possibly

laden

with

chemical

weapons,

which could be fired

against

Israel.

It

could further

destabilise

the

situation in

Iraq.

It

could ask

organisations

like

Hamas

and

Hezbollah

to

react. It

could also destabilise the

export

of

oil

from thePersian

Gulf

to

the

rest

f

the

world

by trying

o

close the trait

ofHormuz.

Muslim

terrorists

round

theworld

might

react as well.

These risks

do

not seem

proportional

to

the

possible

threat of

a nuclear Iran.

The

major point,

however,

is

that

ranian decisionmakers

are

also

making

this alculation and

therefore

o not seem afraid

of

such an attack. The end result

is a self

confident ran thatwill notmake (big) concessions at thenegotiating table.

A

threat

upportedbypublic opinion.

Another

threat

that

would

be

regarded

as

effective

by

Iranian decision

makers would

be

large-scale

economic

626



THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS

CRISIS

sanctions.

The

problem, however,

with such sanctions is not so much

that

theywill

be

regarded

as

disproportionate by

world

public opinion,

but

that theywill not be considered credible because of the simple fact that

large-scale economic

sanctions

will hurt

the

rest

of

theworld

as well. As

Iran

produces

4.2 million

barrels

oil

a

day (out

of

84

million

world-wide),

it

is

highly likely

that theworld

oil

price

will further ncrease and reach

much higher than

it

already

is.63 his

may

have substantial

negative

effects

on

the world economy.

In

addition,

some

regional powers

like China

depend

a

great

deal

on

oil

and

gas

imports

from

ran.

China

imports

14%

of

its oil from

Iran, Italy

9%

and France

6%.

Most

major states, except

the USA, also have substantial non-energy trade

relations with

Iran.

Exporters

in

states

like

Italy,Germany and Austria would be substantially

hurt by a sanctions regime. It is thereforenot surprisingthat Italy, for

instance, has been very reluctant

to

back

sanctions. Russia, on the other

hand,

has been

promised

a

lot

of

money by Iran

to

construct nuclear

power

reactors

(like theBushehr

reactor

near the

Persian

Gulf)

and sells

a

lot of conventional weapons

to

Teheran.

In

short, public opinion

in

the

developed

world

is

not

eager

to

see their

governments impose large-scale

economic sanctions

on Iran. The main

point, however,

is

that Iranian

politicians

are

very

much aware

of

the

weaknesses

in the Western

approach.

Advocates

of

large-scale

economic sanctions argue

that

there

is a

chance

thatthebenefitswill outweigh thecosts,

in

thesense that the Iranian people

will

start to

grumble

before

public opinion

in

the

rest

of

theworld is fed

up

with the

negative consequences

of sanctions. While the latter is

highly

debatable,

an

additional

problem

is that

Iran

is

not a

country

with

a

good

reputationwith respect

to

human rights nd respect forpolitical opposition.

As

a

result,grumbling by

the Iranian

public

at

least

in

the early stages

could easily

be

suppressed by

the Iranian securityforces.The chances that

massive

protests

will

lead

to

regimechange

are not

regarded

as

particularl6y

likelyby

most

experts (although

one cannot rule it out

completely either).

5

The

cases of China

and Belarus are

probably

more relevant

than those of

Georgia

and

Ukraine. The former an be

regarded

as

'stronger'

tates

than

the latter. ran also belongs to the former ategory.

To

conclude

this

section,

both

large-scaleeconomic sanctions and military

action

are not

regarded

as

credible

threats nTeheran.

Small-scale economic

sanctions,

in

contrast,

are not

effective.

n

short,

t

is

unclear how

Iran can be

threatened n both

an

effective nd credible

way.

Fear

of

escalation.

As

explained

above,

Iran

does

not

fear

escalation.

Mutatis

mutandis,

the fear of

escalation

will

certainly

exist

in Iran's

neigh

bours. This

may

act as a

further restraint

on

possible military

actions

against

Iran.

Reputation.

The

EU

basically

has

no

reputation

of threatening anctions, let

alone

military

action. And the

only

international

actor

that has

such

a

reputation,

the

USA,

is

already

stretched

o its

imits y the

wars in

Iraq and

627



TOM SAUER

Afghanistan. This is an additional reason why Iran does not

have much to

fear from theUSA.

Credible

time

ressure.

The

international

community has

set several

dead

lines, uch as the nd ofOctober 2003, theend ofOctober 2004, thebeginning

ofMarch

2006,

the

end

of

April 2006, mid-July 2006, and the end ofAugust

2006. It

has therefore

iven

Iran

enough

time

to

change itsposition if ithad

wanted

to do so.

Absolute motivation. The odds are that Iran's motivation for acquiring

nuclearweapons

is

very high.

In

general, there re threereasonswhy nations

obtain

nuclear

weapons: security, restige

and domestic

interests.66

or

Iran

thesecurity ituation iscertainlypart of the calculation. Iran is located in a

geostrategically mportant region thanks

to

scarce resources like oil and gas.

If it

wants

to limit

pressure from xternal states,nuclear

weapons may help,

or

at

least that

may

be

the

perception.

To

blackmail a nuclear

weapons state

may be more difficult than to blackmail a non-nuclear weapon state.

Ayatollah

Khomeini

only

revived

the

nuclear

programme

in the

second

half

of

the

1980s, very

much influenced

y

the

Iraqi

attack

against

Iran

in

1980

and

by

the lack of international condemnation

of

the

latter.

It was

also

common

knowledge

that

Israel

has

possessed nuclear weapons

since

the

end

of

the 1960s

and that

raq

was

involved

in a

similar

programme

in the 1970s

and 1980s.The pre-emptive ttack by Israel against the IraqiOsiraq reactor

in 1981

further ccelerated the

programme,

under

Saddam Hussein.67

The

1991

Gulf

war

in

turn increased the

US

military presence

in

the

region,

including

in

Saudi

Arabia. After

9/11

Iran was

categorised by

the Bush

administration as

part

of the 'axis of

evil',

which

further

eepened

Iranian

suspicions

of the

USA.

All

these factors

stimulated

Iran

in

its

quest

for

nuclear weapons.

One

could,

in

theory, rgue

that theUSA

has

released

Iran

from twomalicious

neighbours, namely

the

Taliban and

Saddam

Hussein.

While this is

true,

itmisses the

point

that Iran has felt

venmore encircled

by

the

USA

thereafter.

n

short,

f

ne

state

feels

insecure,

t

is

Iran. Last but

not

least,

the

Iranian

government

has

noticed

that

Iraq (without

nuclear

weapons) was attacked by theUSA, while North Korea (with nuclear

weapons)

was not.

This

may

have further

trengthened

the

position

of the

advocates

of a

nuclear

weapons programme

in

the

country.

Second,

Iran also

has

the ambition

to

become

a

regional power

in

the

Middle

East,

even more

than

it

already

is

today.

Iran

is

one of

the

biggest

countries

in

the

region,

with

nearly

70

million

inhabitants,

nd

is

proud

of

its

rich

culture.

Being

the

only

nuclear

weapons

state in

the

region

beside

Israel-will further

trengthen

ts

power

base.

Internally,

as

in

India,

the

nuclear

programme

is

regarded

as a

prestigious project by

the

public.

This is

true to

such an extent

that,

ven

if

ran becomes

a

democratic

state,

theodds

are that itwill continue itsnuclear programme.Third, as inPakistan (cfDr

Khan),

there

re also

groups

and individuals inside

ran

who

have

a

special

parochial

interest

n

acquiring

nuclear

weapons:

scientists,

niversities nd

the

military.

To

conclude,

Iran

is

highly

motivated

to

obtain nuclear

weapons.

628



THE

IRANIAN NUCLEAR

WEAPONS CRISIS

Relative

motivation.While the

EU

and theUSA

are

also

very

determined

to

prevent Iran from cquiring nuclear weapons, it is unlikely that they re as

determinedas Iran is to acquire them. Iran iswilling to takemany risks in

this regard.

The

international ommunity,

n

contrast,

does not like the idea

of

a

nuclear Iran,

but it is

probably

unable to

pressure

Iran

very

hard to

give

up its programme.

This is a classic

example

of

asymmetrical

motivation.

History shows that smaller players

can

win when there is

a case

of

asymmetricalmotivation,

as

theVietnam

war

and the

recent

Lebanon

war

show.68 With respect

to 'hard'

proliferation cases,

the

international

community (including

the

USA)

does

not

have

a

very good reputation

either. Israel, India,

Pakistan and North Korea have become nuclear

weapons states,

while

the

West

made

every

effort

o

prevent

it.

Israel and

Pakistan have evenbecome close allies of theUSA. As mentioned above, the

USA is currently lso proposing

a new

agreement

with

India,

which not

only

goes against the spirit ut also the

letter

f the rules of theNuclear Suppliers

Group

and the

nuclear

non-proliferationregime

n

general.

The

message

for

Iran

is clear:

once

nuclear

weapons

have been

acquired,

the

situation

will

sooner

or

later

be

accepted,

and

perhaps

even

rewarded.

That,

at

least,

is

what

proponents

of

such

a

programme

inside

Iran

may

use as

arguments

to

convince

more

sceptical

voices.

The option of

coercive

diplomacy

revisited nno 2007

If

we

carefully

consider all the factors that

are

necessary

for

coercive

diplomacy

to

succeed,

one

could have

suggested lready

in

2003 that twould

be

extremelydifficult

o

convince

Iran. None

of the

factors, except one

credible

time

pressure-was

useful for effective oercive

diplomacy.

Last

but

not

least,

the nternational

ommunity

id

not

offer

ran a

substantial

package

of 'carrots',

including

some

kind of

security

uarantees

by

theUSA.

Critics

may argue

that

positive

incentives

will also not convince Iran to

give up

its

programme.That may be. But unless one tries, ne does not know for sure.

It is

difficult

ot to

conclude

that the EU took the

initiative

in

2003

unaware of thedifficulties.

he

political

circumstances in 2003

may

also

have

blinded it to a certain extent. First of all, since theTreaty of Maastricht

(1991)

and

especially

since

the

ummit

of

Saint

Malo

(1998),

the

U

has been

wanting

to

increase

its

profile

in the

realm of

foreign, security

and

even

defence

policy.

Second,

in

the

run-up

to the

Iraq

crisis in

2002-03, the

EU

was

perceived

as

divided and

without

much influence.

hird,

there

was

a

consensus in

the

EU

that itwould

not

be

too

difficult

o

provide

a more

constructive alternative

to

major problems

in

the

world than

the neo

conservative solutions

envisaged

in

theUSA since the

arrival

of

the

Bush

administration

in

2001.69

After the

Iraq

war

the

EU

really

tried

to

counterbalance its formerbehaviour.70

In

2003, for the first ime ever,

EU

member states had not only agreed towrite a Security Strategybut also a

Non-proliferation Strategy.

As

already

mentioned

above, they

lso succeeded

in

agreeing

and

editing

these

in

ust

a

few

months.

The

decision

to

'fight'

ran

was

taken

on

thebasis of thecombination of

a

kind

of

euphoria,

and

of

rash

629



TOM SAUER

and naive

ambition

in

capitals

likeLondon,

Paris

and

Berlin.When

Libya

agreed

to

halt

itsweapons

of mass

destruction

programmes

in December

2003, theEU was evenmore convinced that itwas on the right track. In

short,

it seems that

theEU

has overestimated

its capabilities.

At the

same time,

and for

partially

the same

reasons,

the EU under

estimated

Iran's

motivation

and willingness

to

maintain

its

nuclear

programme.

The

EU stilldoes

not have

a very good

understanding

of

what

is going

on

inside

the

elite circles

in

Iran

with

respect to

thenuclear

weapons

issue.

In

addition,

the

few decision

makers and

EU

officials

nvolved

were

probably

unaware

of the

theoretical

ifficulties

f coercive

diplomacy.

A final

criticism

is that

the European

approach

was

probably

too

Eurocentric

as

well. The

EU

thought,

nd still

thinks, hat

itcould easily

persuade

Iranwith

'reasonable' arguments,and, ifnecessary, some 'carrotsand sticks'. In this

regard,

theEU

looks very

much like

the

USA.

There

seems

to

be a lack

of

empathy

for

the

feelings of prestige,

respect

and other

non-quantifiable

values

that

exist

in

other

parts

of theworld.7'

Once

the

negotiations

tarted,

he

U had the

dditional problem

of

being the

spokesperson

for

the rest

of the

world,

including the

USA, and

sometimes

Russia and

China

as well.

To

keep

this lliance

together

as,

and still

s,

very

difficult

ask.72

he

EU

had

to

make

too

many compromises

with

theUSA,

which

complicated

its

negotiations

with

Iran.The best

example

is the

ovember

2004 agreement

when

theUSA required

that

ran

not

be allowed any

levelof

enrichment,hile the uropeanswould have preferred obemore flexible.

Conclusion

Most

observers

believe

that

Iran is

trying

to

acquire

nuclear

weapons

in

secret,

r

is at least

trying

o

build

up

the

capabilities

that re

needed to build

nuclear

weapons.

For

more than

three

years

theEU has

taken the lead

in

trying

o convince

Iran

to

give up

its

efforts o

acquire

a

large-scale

civilian

nuclear programme.

It

did

not

succeed.

While

theEU could

in

theory

still

convince

Iran

to

give

up

thebulk

of itsnuclear

programme,

theodds are

that

Iran

will not

concede.

While Iran

may suspend

its nrichment rogramme

for

another (short) period, it is unlikely that itwill give up its rightto enrich

uranium.

The

most

likely

scenario

therefore

onsists

of

'muddling through'

until

Iran reaches

its

technological objectives.

The

world will

thenhave to

get

used

to

living

with

another

nuclear

weapons

state

in theMiddle

East. Some

observers

are

already

saying

that

the

latter

does

not

automatically

correspond

to

a

doomsday

scenario.73

Another

scenario

is a

military

action

by

the

US or Israel

to

prevent

Iran

acquiring

the

necessary

technology,

r at

least

to

buy

time.While

most

observers

regard

this

as the

least

likely

scenario,

it

cannot be

completely

dismissed

either,

taking

into

account

the

nature

of

the

current US

administration.The argument, spoused by the likesofUS SenatorMcCain,

is

that

everything

s better

than

a

nuclear Iran.74

The Iranian

case

supports

the theoretical

evidence

that

making

threats

does

not

always help.

Coercive

diplomacy

in

practice

is

more

complicated

630



THE

IRANIAN NUCLEAR

WEAPONS CRISIS

than it seems.On thebasis of our analysis

we come to the onclusion that the

EU took the initiative

n

2003 without being fully ware

of the

fact

that its

efforts ould also fail, nd ofwhat theconsequences of such a failurewould

be for theEU's reputation.

On

the other

hand,

the

European

efforts

annot be dismissed as

having

been a complete failure. First

of

all,

the EU

took

a

lead.

It

acted

in

accordance with theUSA,

and tried to accommodate

thewishes of Russia

and China as well. It

is

very unlikely that any

other

regional power could

have played this role.This certainly nhanced

its

global prestige.Second, the

EU

acted

in a

more-or-less

united

fashion,

which also enhanced its

image

in

the rest f theworld. Internally

new

kind of decision-makingmodel saw the

light,with the EU-3 taking the lead and

Javier

Solana

as

the interlocutor

between theEU-3 and theotherEU member states.

On

the ther

hand,

theEU-3 also took a

major gamble.

The

longer

it takes

to

succeed, the

more

internal

riticism ithin the

EU

will

occur, as

is

already

happening today.

The

longer

t

takes,

themore thechance that theEU-3 will

try

to

blame theUSA for its lack

of

flexibility.

f

its

efforts

otally fail,

the

EU's reputationwill be damaged.

Notes

1

Basic

Principles

for

an

EU

Strategy

Against Proliferation of Weapons of

Mass

Destruction,

Brussels,

June

2003,

at

http://ue.eu.int/pressdata/EN/reports/76328.pdf;

Strategy Against Proliferation of

Weapons of

Mass

Destruction, Brussels,

December

2003,

at

http://ue.eu.int/pressData/en/misc/

78340.pdf;

and

European Security

Strategy:

A

Secure

Europe

in

a

Better

World, Brussels,

December

2003,

at

http://www.iss-eu.org/solana/solanae.pdf.

2

Alexander

George, Forceful

Persuasion: Coercive

Diplomacy

as

an

Alternative

to

War,

Washington

DC,

US Institute of

Peace, 1997;

Thomas

Schelling,

Arms and

Influence,

Newhaven,

CT: Yale

University

Press, 1966;

Peter

Jakobsen,

Western

Use

of

Coercive

Diplomacy

after

the Cold

War: A

Challenge

for

Theory

and

Practice,

London:

Macmillan,

1998;

and Bruce Jentleson &

Christopher

Whytock,

'Who

won

Libya?

The

force-diplomacy

debate and

its

implications

for

theory

and

policy',

International

Security,

30

(3),

2005-06,

pp

47-86.

3

George, Forecful

Persuasion,

p

7.

4

Ibid,

p

4.

5

Jakobsen,

Western Use

of

Coercive

Diplomacy

after

the Cold

War,

p

29.

6

Kenneth

Schultz,

Democracy

and

Coercive

Diplomacy, Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press,

2001.

For

a

broader

theory

that

emphasises

the role of domestic

politics,

see

Andrew

Moravscik,

'Taking

preferences seriously: a liberal theory of international polities', International Organization, 51 (4), 1997,

pp

513-553.

7 Thomas

Schelling,

The

Strategy

of

Conflict,

Cambridge,

MA: Harvard

University

Press, 1960;

and

Morton

Halperin,

Limited

War in

theNuclear

Age,

New

York: John

Wiley,

1963.

8

Jakobsen,

Western Use

of

Coercive

Diplomacy after

the Cold

War.

9

Robert

Art

& Patrick

Cronin,

The United States and Coercive

Diplomacy,

Washington,

DC: US

Institute

of

Peace

Press, 2003,

pp

402-405.

10

Ibid,

pp

408-410.

11

Jakobsen,

Western

Use

of

Coercive

Diplomacy after

the Cold

War, p

1.

12

http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-40.pdf.

13 Mark

Fitzpatrick,

'Assessing

Iran's nuclear

programme',

Survival,

48

(3),

2006,

pp

5-26.

14

Clara

P?rtela,

'The role of the EU in the

non-proliferation

of

nuclear

weapons',

prif

Report,

65, 2003;

Tom

Sauer,

'The

Americanization of

EU

nuclear

non-proliferation

policy',

Defense

and

Security

Analysis,

20

(2),

2004,

pp 113-131;

Eileen

Denza,

'Non-proliferation

of nuclear

weapons:

the EU and

Iran', European Foreign Affairs Review, 10, 2005, pp 289-311; and Milagros Alvarez-Verdugo,

'Mixing

tools

against

proliferation:

the EU's

strategy

for

dealing

with

weapons

of

mass

destruction',

European Foreign Affairs

Review,

11, 2006,

pp

417-438.

15

Gareth

Porter,

'Neo-con cabal

blocked 2003 nuclear

talks',

Asia Times

online,

30 March

2006,

at

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_east/HC30Ak01.html;

and

Porter,

'Iranian crisis

in

the

631



TOM SAUER

wilderness',

Asia Times

online,

2

May

2006,

at

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/

HE02Ak04.html.

16

Steven

Everts,

'Iran

will be the

test

for

European foreign policy',

Financial

Times,

1

June 2003.

17

http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/MediaAdvisory/2003/medadvise200372.html.

18


19 Iran

signed

the Additional Protocol of the

IAEA

on

18 December 2003.

20

http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-81 .pdf.

21

Interview with EU official.

22

http://www.iaea.Org/NewsCenter/Statements/2004/ebsp2004n002.html#iran.

23


24


25

Light

water reactors

are

more

proliferation-resistant

than

heavily-enriched

uranium

reactors.

26

http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2004/infcirc637.pdf.

27


28


29


30 http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-14.pdf.

31

http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8679.doc.htm.

32


33

http://edition.cnn.com/interactive/world/0605/transcript.lemonde.letter/.

34 Interview with

EU official.

35

'EU,

Iran

to

meet

on

nuclear

offer

next

week',

NTI

Global

Security

Newswire,

29 June 2006.

36

http://www.un.Org/News/Press/docs//2006/sc8792.doc.htm.

37

http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/iranresponse.pdf.

38 Ian

Traynor,

'Iran offers

to

freeze uranium enrichment

for

eight

weeks',

Guardian,

11

September

2006.

39 Elaine

Sciolino,

'Iran's freeze

on

enrichment

could

wait,

France

suggests',

New

York

Times,

19

September

2006;

and

Seymour

Hersh,

'The

next

act',

The New

Yorker,

20 November 2006.

40 Colum

Lynch

& Glenn

Kessler, 'US,

European

allies

at

odds

on

terms

of

Iran

resolution',

Washington

Post,

26

October

2006.

41

'Report:

US

to

boost

Persian

Gulf

force',

Jerusalem

Post,

19

December 2006.

42 The USA, the former USSR, theUK, France and China are the formal nuclear weapons states.

43 Mohamed El

Baradei,

Nobel

Lecture,

10 December

2005,

at

http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/

laureates/2005/elbaradei-lecture-en.html;

and

Tom

Sauer,

'The nuclear

non-proliferation

regime

in

crisis',

Peace

Review,

18

(3),

2006,

at

http://soc.kuleuven.be/iieb/docs/06-TS-peacereview.pdf.

44 For

the

case

of

the

USA,

see

Tom

Sauer,

Nuclear

Inertia:

US Nuclear

Weapons

Policy after

the Cold

War,

London: IB

Tauris,

2005.

45

While neither Israel

nor

Pakistan has

ever

signed

the

NPT,

they

acquired

nuclear

weapons

in

an

obscure

and

probably illegal

way.

46 'America's nuclear deal

with

India:

from bad

to

worse',

The

Economist,

20

July

2006,

at

http://

www.

economist.

com/opinion/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story_id=7193934.

47 Celso

Amorim

et

al,

'What does

not

exist

cannot

proliferate',

International Herald

Tribune,

2

May

2005.

48 Stefan

Aust

et

al,

' We

are

determined' ,

Der

Spiegel,

30

May

2006,

at

http://service.spiegel.de/cache/

international/spiegel/0,1518,418660,00.html.

49 'Bush, Ahmadinejad spar at UN', NTI Global Security Newswire, 20 September 2006.

50

Selig

Harrison,

'It

is

time

to

put

security

issues

on

the table with

Iran',

Financial

Times,

18

January

2006.

51 Dafna

Linzer,

'US

spy

agencies

criticized

on

Iran',

Washington

Post,

24

August

2006,

A01.

52 'Iran

to

remain

in

nuclear

treaty,

chief

negotiator

says',

NTI

Global

Security

Newswire,

9

May

2006.

53

'Iran

says

ready

to

discuss

suspending

enrichment',

NTI

Global

Security

Newswire,

17

August

2006.

54 Interview with

EU official.

55 International Crisis

Group

(ICG),

'Iran: is there

a

way

out

of the nuclear

impasse?',

ICG

Middle

East

Report,

51,

23

February

2006.

56

Geoffrey

F?rden

& John

Thomson,

'Iran

as

a

pioneer

case

formultilateral nuclear

arrangements',

MIT

Science,

Technology

and Global

Security Working Group,

16

June

2006.

57 Michael

Adler,

'IAEA

studies

enrichment

compromise

but

US

remains

unimpressed', Agence

France

Presse,

25

June

2006,

at

http://news.yahoo.eom/s/afp/20060625.

58

Quoted

by

Ray

Takeyh,

interviewed

by

Bernard

Gwertzman,

Council

on

Foreign

Relations,

31

January

2006,

at

http://www.cfr.org/publication/9718.

59

Harrison,

'It is time

to

put

security

issues

on

the table with

Iran';

and

Scott

Sagan,

'How

to

keep

the

bomb from

Iran',

Foreign

Affairs,

85

(5),

2006, pp

45-59.

60 'Iran

offers

new

nuclear

plan',

NTI

Global

Security

Newswire,

3 October 2006.

632



THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS CRISIS

61 Joshua

Muravchik,

'Bomb

Iran',

Los

Angeles

Times,

19November

2006.

62 Paul

Rogers,

'Iran:

consequences

of

war',

Oxford

Research

Group

Briefing

Paper,

February

2006.

63 Charles

Krauthammer,

'The Iran charade: Part

II',

Washington

Post,

18

January

2006,

A17.

64 Dafna

Linzer,

'Europe trying

to

grease

wheels for US talks with

Iran',

Washington

Post,

18

September

2006.

65

Sam

Gardiner,

The

End

of

the 'Summer

of Diplomacy':

Assessing

US

Military

Options

on

Iran,

New

York:

Century

Foundation,

2006.

66 Scott

Sagan,

'Why

do

states

build nuclear

weapons?',

International

Security,

21, 1996-97,

pp

54-86.

67 Richard

Betts,

'The Osirak

fallacy',

The National

Interest,

Spring

2006,

pp

22-25.

68 Ivan

Arreguin-Toft,

How

the

Weak Win Wars:

A

Theory

of

Asymmetric

Conflict, Cambridge:

Cambridge University

Press,

2005.

69

Judy

Dempsey,

'EU

foreign

ministers

agree

WMD

policy',

Financial

Times,

17

June

2003,

p

9.

70 Interviews

with EU officials.

71

For the role

of

anthropology

in

strategy,

see

Ken

Booth,

Strategy

and

Ethnocentrism,

Teaneck,

NJ:

Holmes and

Meier,

1979.

72

Interview with EU officials.

73 William Pfaff, 'Iran's nukes

are

a

non-issue', International Herald Tribune, 27 January 2006; and Barry

Posen,

'We

can

live with

a

nuclear

Iran',

New York

Times,

27

February

2006.

74

Quoted

by

Jackson

Diehl,

'Bush's choice

on

Iran',

Washington

Post,

30

January

2006.

633