COLLEGE OF NAVAL WARFARE,MUMBAI - 400 001

  15th Naval Higher Command Course

  

December 2nd 2002

 CHINA’S STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION :

AN ANALYSIS OF ITS GLOBAL STRATEGIC IMPACT

 Dr. W.LAWRENCE S.PRABHAKAR, Ph.D.,

ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

MADRAS CHRISTIAN COLLEGECHENNAI.

Influences of SunZi, Confucius, Menicus on Chinese Strategic Thought:

Strategic Culture – The most viable method to understand Chinese Strategic Thought.

- Civilizational Antiquity

- Unique Historical Dynamics

- Unique Geo-Strategic Location

- Unique Lingual Cultural Heritage

Sustenance of Strategic Culture over 5000 years

- SunZi, The Art of War

- Confucius, The Analects

- Predominant Strategic Paradigm of China: Confucius – Menicus Pragamatism Concept of Absolute FlexibilityConcept of The Three HeavensConcept of The Middle Kingdom

Salient Principles of Chinese Strategic Thought:

- Deception – The Essence of all WarfareSubtlety, Sophistication, Maneuver, Covert Operations and the Indirect Approach

- Centrality of Armed ForcesPolitical and Praetorian PurposesPolitical Power Flows from the Barrel of the Gun

- Human Dimensions of ConflictPrimacy of Man Over Material Primacy of Spirit and Life Energy Over Matter

- Essence of Counter StrategySignificance of Winning Over the Adversary by negation of his StrategyPrimacy of Spirit and Life Energy Over Matter

- People’s War – Total War (MaoTseTung)People’s War Under Hi-Tech Conditions (Limited War: Conventional and Nuclear Forces)

- Primacy of Human Force Over TechnologyMotivation, Resilience, Élan Vital

China’s Changing Strategic Doctrines

- Dominant Elite in the Post 1949 Era: MaoTseTung; DengXiaoPing; Jiang ZeminMaoTseTung – Revolutionary & Radical Militarism; People’s War; Nuclear Weapons – Paper TigersDengXiaoPing: Pragmatic Flexibility; Four Modernizations; Primacy of Economy and Technology

Five Changing Paradigms:

- Debate of Ideologue Vs the Technocrat (MaoTseTung)

- Integration of Defence and Development (DengXiaoPing)

- Struggle against Nuclear Hegemony (US and Soviet/Russian Domination)

- Shift from Disarmament to Nonproliferation

- New Paradigms of Chinese Nuclear Activism

Strategic Determinants of Chinese Behaviour in the Modernization Period

- Pursuit of Comprehensive National Power Economic Technological Strength: Basis for Strategic Power

- Sovereignty ConcernsTaiwan Reunification; Disputes in the South China Sea; Conflict over Resources in the RegionZealous preservation of vital National Interest

- Regime Maintenance: Preservation of Political Power; Monopoly of Communist Party: Consolidation of Economic Strength under Authoritarian Regimes

- Dissatisfaction with Current International OrderChina – Dissatisfied Power; Penchant for Power Expansion; Anti-Hegemonic Defiance of US Hegemonic Power Quest for Multi-Polarity or Align with US as peer Partner - Sino – US condonmium

Factors Affecting Chinese Strategic Behaviour

- Acculturation to International Order Assumption that China would reform to International Order; Induction of China into WTO would “soften” their aggressive behaviour

- Democratization: Spread of Liberal Democracy – Hub for Political Reform; Rule of Law, Economic Liberalization, Free Markets, Structural Reform

- Future of the PLA – Vanguard of the Regime; Bolster the Regime in event of Crisis of Governance

Dynamics of PLA Modernization

- PLA Strategic StrengthsSizeable Conventional Forces 2.8 million compared to 1.4 million US; 1.2 million RussiaMan power Reduction and Technological modernizationInduction of New Weapon Systems: Technology intensive drive

- Strategic Nuclear Capability: ICBMs DF-31 (10-20) IRBMs & MRBMs (DF-4, DF-5, DF-3)

- MIRV capability – GPS/GLONASS/Twin Star

Nuclear Naval Arsenal

- Xia Class SSBNs; Han Class; Ming Class; Song Class Nuclear SSNsJulang Class SLBMs; JL-1; JL-2, Modified Xia Class tipped with JL-2

- Chemical & Biological Weapons China signatory of 1972 Chemical & Biological Conventions; Clandestine C&B Warfare CapabilitiesCreation of Anti-C&B Warfare Units

- Surface to Surface Missiles Substantial Chinese Inventory of SSMs: Missiles – Weapons of Quick Resort; Intimidation Tactics; Icons of Chinese Commercial Military SalesMissile Modernization; Improved Payloads; Increased Accuracy; GPS Guidance; Variable NBC Payloads

Geographical Terrain

- China’s Geographical Terrain suited for Guerilla Warfare – People’s WarHigh Levels of Attrition against Invading force

- Causality Tolerance; Willingness to absorb High Causality; Korean War – 300,000 to 1 million

PLA – Strategic Weakness

- Obsolete Equipment; Ex-Soviet Vintage Mig19’s (J-6), Mig21’s (J-7), T-54,T-55, Ex-Soviet MBT – Chinese Type 59, Type 62 MBTsPLA Navy Warships, Ex-Soviet Riga Type frigate - Jianghu Class Frigate: Ex-Soviet Whiskey, Romeo Class SS adapted in Chinese Models

- Poor LogisticsObsolescent Air and Naval Logistical Capabilities; Defensive Nature of Military Campaign; Improvements in the anvil; Procurement and Buildup of Logistical Air

& Naval Craft

- Command, Control & Communications Deficiencies Lack of Hi-speed, Hi-bandwidth redundant communication system; Geographical Spread – Infrastructure weakness, Obsolescent EquipmentAdvancement in C4I2SR Capabilities as a result of

RMA Chinese RMA – Quantum Leap in this Sector

- Poor Quality of Personnel & Training: Less Premium on Personnel training, Less Time on Simulated Combat Operations; Lack of Joint Service Training

Pathways in China’s Military Modernization

- Two Pathways of Military Modernizations – Procurement from Foreign sources – Various Technologies; Limited Means; Divergent Operating Platforms Operational Difficulties; Problems of Maintenance & Training; Complications of Hardware Induction; Problems in License Production – Attempts to Reverse Engineering

- Home Grown Technologies – Mass Production of Licensed Technologies, Mixed Results, Problems of Quality Control; Technological Lag; Attempts to Hybridize Technology

- Nuclear Weapons: Initial Soviet Assistance; Self-reliance & Indigenous Technological Innovation

- Ballistic Missiles: Range of Chinese Ballistic Missiles; Chinese Specialization in IRBM & MRBM production and Mass Export DF-11 (SRBM) to DF-51(ICBM); Development of Solid propellants; MIRV Capabilities;

- Cruise Missiles primarily antiship variety Ex-Soviet

- HY-1 First Chinese Cruise Missile based on SS-N2A STYX YJ-1 or C-801 Solid Propellant Booster, 40 Km Range based on French Exocet – Similar Design YJ-2 or C-802 Solid Propellant Sustainer, 120 Km RangeYJ-2 Land Attack Version/GPS equipped 180 Km with TERCOM capabilities; Induction of SS-N-22/23 M80 SUNBURN/MOSKIT equipped on Russian supplied Sovremenny Class destroyers

- Nuclear Submarines: 5 Han-Class SSNs; 1 Xia-Class SSBN; Type 093 SSN modeled after Ex-Soviet Victor III SSN & Type 094 SSN

- SAMS: HQ-2 Medium to High Altitude, Radar Guided Ex-Soviet SA-2; HQ-7 Low to Medium Altitude Radar Guided; Ex-French Crotale; HN-5 Shoulder Portable Infra-Red Ex-Soviet SA-7; QW1 Advanced Shoulder Portable Infra Red Ex-US FIM-92 Stinger; HQ-61 Low to Medium Altitude; LY-60 Low to Medium Altitude; HQ-9 Advanced All Altitude – SA-10; PAC Patriot

- New Fighter Attack Air Craft: Current PLAAF J-10 High Performance Single Engine FGA produced with Israeli & Russian Assistance; High-Low Mix Preference

- Future Generation FGA-XXJ of SU27 and F-15 Class IOY – 2015

Others Strategic Programs

- Chinese Space Launch Capabilities: Wide Variety of Space Payloads: Meteorological, Communications, Surveillance; New Generation of Photo Reconnaissance FSW-3 Series with 1 m Resolution; Linkages with US Landsat; French SPOT; Israeli EROS and Russian Remote Sensing Satellites; Chinese Participation in Iridium, Globalstar Satellite Communication Systems; Partnership in US GPS/ Russian GLONASS System

- Directed Energy Weapons: New R&D into High-Powered Micro Wave Weapons and Lasers; Advance Research into Electronic Counter Measures

- Information Warfare: Secret Chinese Efforts in Offensive & Defensive Strategies in IW

SEA POWER PERSPECTIVES OF CHINA: SPECIFIC CONTEXT TO IOR, INDIA AND SOUTH ASIA

• PLA Naval Modernization and expansion:• Brown water to Green water capability: Future Projections to Blue Water

Capability: Offshore Defense Concept.• Sino-South Asian Maritime links : Provides China’s link to East Africa and

Straits of Hormuz • Port Calls; Karachi, Colombo, Chittagong.• Economic aid, technical assistance,military hardware supplies for low budget

South Asian States/allies on concessional terms• Sustained covert transfer of WMD technologies to Pakistan• Pakistan Myanmar anchors for China in the South Asian Region - striving to

neutralize India• Karachi, Gawadar in Pakistan ; Hainggyi Katan islands Great Cocos in

Myanmar.• Role of COSCO in PLAN activities• Future potential to base PLAN nuclear subs in the Arabian Sea SSN/SSGN

access to Pakistan

PLA NAVAL STRATEGY: SPECIFIC CONTEXTS TO IOR, INDIA & SOUTH ASIA

• Naval diplomacy: Port calls, joint naval exercises in the region• Naval basing facilities: Access to Gawadar in Pakistan, Yangon Hainggyi Akyab

Mergui, Great Coco islands off Andaman Sea. SIGINT/ELINT facilities.• Chinese arms transfers : Massive military hardware supplies to Myanmar and Pakistan. • China is comfortable with the authoritarian regimes in Pakistan and Myanmar:

– Bolsters them with arms transfers for political security reasons – Objective: Tilt regional balance against India with tactical alliances and gain naval access in

the region / Regional Naval alliance

• Control of Seagates: Beijing’s objective is to control the critical sea straits: Taiwan straits, Straits of Malacca, Singapore Straits and possibly uninterrupted access to the Straits of Hormuz.

• Apparent intent; Rapid surge into the Indian Ocean via Straits of Malacca access to Myanmar and Pakistan.

• Integrated Sea Control Strategy Offshore Defense Concept: Limited Sea control and Sea Denial capability through assortment of limited numbers of high performance surface combatants and submarines.

• Possible deployment of SSNs and SSGNs in the region.

SOUTH ASIAN REGIONAL NAVAL DEVELOPMENTS: IN BEIJING’S INTEREST

• April 2001 Pakistan-Bangladesh joint naval exercises followed by a Pakistan naval squadron visiting Yangon

• Pakistan’s naval flotilla the first ever foreign naval flotilla to visit Yangon precedes Gen.Pervez Musharaff’s visit to Yangon

• Implications of the new Pakistan - Bangladesh naval ties:• Recent sour in India-Bangladesh relations/ Border skirmishes. Bangladesh

military’s traditional hostility to India.• Future possibilities: Pakistan’s naval ships could dock in Myanmar waters

during a possible conflict with India.• Pakistani naval surveillance of Indian Naval activities in the Eastern / Far

Eastern Naval Command• Sino-Pakistani monitoring of telemetry data of Indian missile tests from

Balasore Chandipur Missile test ranges.

Source: Reported Chinese Arms Purchases: RAND Research Report MR-1082-AF

THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: THE FUTURE SUPER POWER

- Multi-Dimensional Regional Competitor - Regional Aerospace Dominance - Regional and Off-Shore Naval Power Projection- Increased Defense Spending- Emphasis on Quality Vs Quantity- Mature Defense Industrial Base

Rationalization of Defense - Industrial ProductionSelective Integration of Foreign High Technology

Development of Technology Work ForceLong Range Strategic R&D Vision

- Regional Hegemony; Enhanced Global Status - Enhanced Chinese WMD Warfare Capabilities- Ambitious Space Faring Power- Determined Long Range Power Projection

CHINA’S GRAND STRATEGIES:

CHINA AND US:

>Chinese perceptions of its emergent power status.

>Emphasis on the development of Comprehensive National Power(CNP)

>Emphasis on development of RMA technologies.

>Chinese strategies of Cooptation and Prevention: Dual policies vis-à-vis US.

>Economic engagement with US: China’s constant endeavor to weaken US Bilateral relations

>China’s entry to WTO: facilitation by US

>Post 9/11 developments: US-China convergence.

>New US Strategic perceptions of China in post-Quadrennial Review Report 2001

CHINA and INDIA:

Sino-Indian relations: A contest of the Asian Balance of Power.

China’s Strategic domain has overwhelming influence on India: domestic & external realms.

Strategies of Engagement: CSBMs; Trade;Counter terrorism.

Indian Deterrence & Power: Response to Chinese renewed aggrandizement.Nuclear and Missile postures.:Limitations are inherent.

Multilateral Grand Strategic Alliances: US, EU, Russia, Japan.

India‘ Expanded ties with ASEAN: Counter balance PRC’s influence.

China & Russia:

Bilateral Issues: Contentious, overspill could aggravate tensions.

Military-Technological Cooperation: Positive signs; Sino-Russian Strategic alliance counter to US NMD, unilateralism.

Scenarios of Change:

I China succeeds Reforms; Transforms into hegemonistic power.Russian interests affected.

II.China’s reforms collapse: instability/ local wars.

III Sino-Russian alliance against a hegemonistic US.

Sino-Russian Strategic Understanding 2001.

China & ASEAN:

Economics & Security:forces of unity and divergence.

Pragmatism and Realism: Hallmarks of ASEAN-PRC relations

ASEAN concerns of PLA Modernization and Regional security.

Local wars and Strategic Symbolism of PLA force postures: Missile reality

ASEAN Engagement of PRC in regional peace stakes

Good Regional Atmospherics.

ASEAN & PRC Multilateral security framework.

China & ASEAN:

Economics & Security:forces of unity and divergence.

Pragmatism and Realism: Hallmarks of ASEAN-PRC relations

ASEAN concerns of PLA Modernization and Regional security.

Local wars and Strategic Symbolism of PLA force postures: Missile reality

ASEAN Engagement of PRC in regional peace stakes

Good Regional Atmospherics.

ASEAN & PRC Multilateral security framework.

CHINA & RMA.

Asymmetric Warfare;CNP, Economic-Technological quantum leaps;

New Technologies and Weapons systems: smart weaponry and nano-technology

Space combat;Radiational combat;Paralysis combat; Cyber warfare;Robot combat

Intelligent warfare: Assassins Mace