Colombo, Sri Lanka, 7-10 April 2009 Security & Regulatory Issues in NGN NK Goyal President, Communications & Manufacturing Association of India (CMAI)

Colombo, Sri Lanka, 7-10 April 2009

Security & Regulatory Issues in NGN

NK GoyalPresident, Communications & Manufacturing

Association of India (CMAI)Chairman Emeritus, Telecom Equipment Manufacturers

Association of India (TEMA)Director, National Fertilizers Ltd. NFL ( Govt. of India

Undertaking)7-10th April, 2009 Sri Lanka

[email protected] [email protected]

+91 98 111 29879www.nkgoyals.com

FORUM ON NEXT GENERATION STANDARDIZATION

(Colombo, Sri Lanka, 7-10 April 2009)

mailto:[email protected]

mailto:[email protected]


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Indian Telecom Sector

281 Access service licensees. Of these, 121 UAS licenses were awarded in January, 2008. The total number of telephone connections stood at 400.05 million at the end of January, 2009. Second largest in world.Monthly additions 10-15 MillionsThe overall tele-density is 40.50% and the rural tele-density is only 13.13%.


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Next Generation Networks

An ITU-T defined telecommunications Network architectures & Technologies NGN is a broadband Network where service layer, transport layer & application layers have an independent function of each other An Internet with an IMS architecture is NGNAn evolutionary approach from PSTN/ISDN networks to advanced network called NGNMove from current H.323 protocol to Session based Session Initiation Protocol


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Short term issues

NumberingNumbering

Regulation of “Plain Old Telephone

Service (POTS)”

Regulation of “Plain Old Telephone

Service (POTS)”

Quality of Service

Quality of Service

“Next Generation”Longer term issues

Emergency Access

Emergency Access

PrivacyPrivacy

SecuritySecurity

CompetitionCompetition

Consumer protectionConsumer protection

InterconnectionInterconnection

Core policy areas:•Competition (level-playing field), Interconnection•Consumer (QOS, privacy, emergency access)•Security & legal interceptionScope for self-regulation

Regulatory implications of NGNSource: ASTAP05_WS.IP&NGN-09


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Typical attacks in SIP

Malformed Message Attacks Buffer Overflow Attacks Denial-of Service attacks RTP session hijacking Injection of unauthentic RTP packets into existing RTP flowsRe-use of compromised SIP credentialsHostile SIP network elements


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Session Border Controller

An insecure network cannot charge for its use or provide a guaranteed QoS service, because unauthorized users cannot be prevented from overusing limited network resources.SBCs can provide security and protection against

unauthorized access into the trusted networkinvalid or malicious calls, including Denial of Service (DoS) attacksbandwidth theft by authorized usersunusual network conditions, for example a major emergency.


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NGN Security

Security requirements for TransportHome Network domainCore NetworkInterfaces

Security requirements for ServiceIMS domainTransport stratum to IMS domainIMS to Application domain securityApplication domain securityHome Network to Application domain securityHome Network-to-IMS domain securityOpen service platform to valued-added service provider security


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LI Challenges

Majority of mass telecommunication traffic today doesn’t traverse any part of the well-controlled Circuit Switched network:

IP multimedia traffic between GPRS/UMTS mobile phonesThe traffic to and from Internet exchanged on high bandwitdhISPs (ADSL, FTTH, cable…)Telephone traffic between two VoIP terminals, maybe connected to different VoIP operators.

Encrypted traffic without proper mechanismsDecentralized Peer to Peer networks


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Challenges for NGN security

• Network Address Translation (NAT): Calls may not materialized in due to NAT implementation in some router & firewall.

• SIP: Message are sent in plain, uuencoded text although encryption option is available but there is no standard.

• RTP: Vulnerable to interception & alteration• Code & script attacks: SIP phone are potentially vulnerable to

attack from executable code or scripts. It may results in denial of service.

• No standard Spam detection solutions


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Cyber Security

With the growing number of applications to exploit on the converged Mobile IP Networks, a plethora of online avenues and revenues to pilfer, and many more corporate networks to hack, cyber-criminals appear to have no shortage of targets to pursue.The heightened interest and response from law enforcement worldwide in bringing cyber criminals to justice may well result in malicious hackers being increasingly aggressive and creative in their efforts. The threat of Malware, Trojans and lots others and it’s impact to operators is also big challenge.


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Summary of Next Gen Security & Other aspects

3G/NGN/4G/IMS security issues seems to remain a threat for a good amount of time in near future. Technical security of NGN systems well designed but likely to suffer implementation problemsIncreased connectivity means the security exposure will become more serious and harder to manageProtocols such as SIP (e.g. in IMS model) likely to be abused by NGP (next generation phreakers)Open and distributed natureLack of inherent security mechanismsIncreasingly complicated network conceptRunning of mission critical ApplicationsDeployed before fully matured likely to cause operational problems Few expert solutions for effective managementRequire time and Cost consumingIntegration and configuration


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Where is my cell phone mama..

I want to SMS to God that I have reached safely!

Documents

Colombo, Sri Lanka, 7-10 April 2009 Security & Regulatory Issues in NGN NK Goyal President, Communications & Manufacturing Association of India (CMAI)