Drysdale, who now foresaw amore limited role for his men as theprospects for further raids dimin-ished, revised the training of theRoyal Marines with an increasedemphasis on conventional warfareskills rather than commando-typeoperations. Hoping to rejoin thefighting, Drysdale initiated arequest through Rear AdmiralArleigh C. Burke, USN, who wasthen Vice Admiral Joy's deputy

chief of staff, that the RoyalMarines be attached to theirAmerican counterparts at the earli-est possible moment. While it wastoo late to add the Commando tothe landings at Wonsan, AdmiralBurke sent the following messageto General Smith: "British 41stRoyal Marine Commandos avail-able and anxious to join in yourdivision earliest. Suggest thisexcellent unit be employed."

9

General Smith eagerly wanted thetroops, although there was noreply for 10 days as GeneralAlmond, miffed at being bypassedin the chain-of-command, with-held final approval. Eventually,after the intervention of AdmiralBurke and the British navalattaché, Commander John "Jock"M. D. Gray, RN, X Corps, gavegrudging approval. Smith was anx-ious to employ Drysdale's Marines

Colonel Douglas Burns Drysdale was horn inHampstead, a suburb of London, on 2 October1916. He spent the majority of his youth in

Argentina, where he developed a life-long passion forhorsemanship, polo playing, and hunting.

Commissioned a subaltern in September 1935 in theRoyal Marines, he was given charge of HMS Renown cMarine detachment. lie remained on hoard the Renownduring the first three years of World War II. During theoccupation of Iceland, Lieutenant Drysdale served as thestaff officer of "Force Fork," the combined force consist-ing of the 2d Battalion, Royal Marines, and a coastal bat-tery. He was promoted to captain in June 1942 andassigned to the staff of the British Admiralty Delegation,Washington, D.C. Here, Captain Drysdale had his first con-tacts with U.S. Marines when he was attached toHeadquarters United States Marine Corps as a liaisonofficer until 1943 when he became brigade major of 3Special Service Brigade. He remained with the brigade forthe rest of World War II.

Tn September 1945, during the Burma campaign, 3Special Service Brigade was assigned to carry outOperation Zipper, an amphibious operation that wascanceled when the war ended. Major Diysdale was toserve as the commanding officer of 44 Commando dur-ing that operation. For outstanding service in that theater,the British government appointed Drysdale a Member ofthe British Empire (MBE). After the war, Major Drysdaleserved on the staff of the British army staff college atCamberley. He then joined the staff of the Officer'sSchool where he was promoted to acting lieutenantcolonel and assigned to cotntnand 41 IndependentRoyal Marine Commando.

His command of 11 Commando in Korea was to he thehighlight of a distinguished career. For his actions at theChosin Reservoir, as well as his leadership of :1 1

Commando, Lieutenant Colonel Drysdale was awardedtwo Silver Stars and a Distinguished Service Order.

Lieutenant Colonel Drysdale led 41 Commando until

INational ArciuVes ?floto (LSN) 8O-O-425j

late 1951, when he was relieved by Lieutenant ColonelFerris N. Grant. He then served as the Royal Marine rep-resentative at the Marine Corps Schools, Quantico,Virginia, from 1952 to 1954. After leaving Quantico,Drysdale was appointed Commandant of the RoyalMarine's Noncommissioned Officers School. He wasthen assigned to the staff of the Commandant General ofRoyal Marines, where he was promoted to colonel in June1961. He was selected to command 3 CommandoBrigade prior to his medical retirement in January 1962.He moved to Norfolk, England, in 1975, where he diedon 22 June 1990 at the age of 73.

Colonel Douglas B. Drysdale, KM

as a reconnaissance force in unisonwith the division's ReconnaissanceCompany to protect the division'sflanks. On 16 November 1950, 41Commando set sail from Yoko-suka, Japan, on board the USSPresident Jackson (T-APA 18) tojoin the 1st Marine Division atHungnam, North Korea. The RoyalMarines and their American coun-terparts were about to participate inone of the fiercest and most mem-orable actions in their respectiveinstitutional histories.

On 20 November 1950,Drysdale's 41 Commando arrived atHungnam and prepared to enterthe lines alongside the 1st MarineDivision at the Chosin Reservoir.After a brief period of cold-weatheracclimation, the Commando joinedthe division as an attached unit. Itsstrength upon arrival was 14 officersand 221 enlisted. On 23 November,the division issued OperationsOrder 23-50, directing the Com-mando to "conduct operations tolocate and destroy enemy forces inthe Hagaru-ri, Samdae-pyong,Koto-ri area," coordinating its activ-ities with the 1st and 7th Marines.Three days later, the order wasmodified to move the Commando toYudam-ni to prepare for operationsin the direction of Sinpo-ri (eightmiles southwest of Yudam-ni) toprotect the division's left flank incoordination with the 7th Marines.The latter order would never becarried out.

After enjoying ThanksgivingDay at Hungnam, 41 Commandomoved out by truck on 28November for Koto-ri, its storesincluding heavy weapons still incrates. Progress was slow as theconvoy climbed the 4,000 feet toFunchilin Pass over the narrow,twisting road cut out of the rockyhillside. Arriving in late afternoon,

each troop was ordered to take updefensive positions on the perime-ter and to dig in. LieutenantColonel Drysdale reported toColonel Lewis B. "Chesty" Puller,the commanding officer of the 1stMarines, who informed Drysdalehis unit would continue its journeyon the morrow and that he wouldtake command of a combat taskforce to open the road to Hagaru-ri.

Even before 41 Commandoarrived at Koto-ri on the afternoonof the 28th, elements of the 79thand 89th CCF Divisions hadslammed into the Marine's perime-ter at Yudam-ni during the night of27 November. Another enemydivision, the 59th, then completedan end sweep to the southeast andmoved against the 14-mile stretch ofroad south to Hagaru-ri. Road-blocks were established betweenYudam-ni and Hagaru-ri, and alsobetween Hagaru-ri and Koto-ri.Bridges were blown along theroute. The enemy now threatenedthe very lifeline of the 1st MarineDivision. What was to have been anadministrative move for 41

Commando now became a combatoperation.

Augmented by U.S. Marine andArmy units, Drysdale's force wasto clear the enemy from the roadand surrounding terrain betweenKoto-ri and Hagaru-ri, and thenreinforce the Marines at Hagaru-ri.The force had three primary objec-tives to seize before the final goalcould be achieved. With 41

Commando in the lead, the firstobjective was to seize the hill eastof the road just outside Koto-ri.The second was to permit CaptainCarl L. Sitter's Company G, 3dBattalion, 1st Marines, withCaptain Charles L. Peckham'sCompany B, 31st Infantry (U.S.Army) following in reserve, topass through and strike out againstHill 1236 further north. The thirdobjective was to seize Hill 1182,

10

which was three miles north ofKoto-ri on the east side of theroad. These three units, togetherwith the subsequent addition of 24tanks equipped with 90mm gunsfrom the division's 1st TankBattalion, and five tanks from theAntitank Company attached to the1st Marines, made up the fightingcomponent of the task force. Inaddition to the combat portion ofthe force, there were detachmentsfrom Headquarters Battalion; 1stSignal Battalion; 7th MotorTransport Battalion; ServiceCompany, 1st Tank Battalion; mil-itary police; and other groups andindividuals from the 1st MarineDivision. Also attached to thissmall but powerful force was aplatoon from the U.S. Army's377th Truck Battalion, commandedby Lieutenant Alfred J. Catania,USA. Named Task Force Drysdale,the composite unit set about tobreak through enemy lines thathad cut the main road leading toHagaru-ri. "It will not be a walk inthe sun," Drysdale said at the endof his pep talk to the Marines ofCompany G.

Fifty years before, U.S. Marinesand Royal Marines had foughttogether during the infamousBoxer Rebellion of 1900. Now theyprepared to do the same against,strangely, the same enemy, theChinese.

At 0930 on the cold and snowymorning of 29 November, TaskForce Drysdale set out from Koto-ri with a 800-man force, of which235 were from 41 Commando, 205from Company G, 3d Battalion, 1stMarines, 190 from Company B,31st Infantry, and more than 150service, headquarters, and miscel-laneous troops. Trucks of the 7thMotor Transport Battalion suppliedtransportation for the Marines ofCompany G, while the Army's377th Transportation Truck Com-pany carried the soldiers of

While waiting to join the 7th Marines at Yudam-ni where theywould conduct reconnaissance patrols on the division's leftflank, the Royal Marines were billeted for afew days with the

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A5320

1st Engineer Battalion at Hamhung. While there, they tookover some of the night security duties.

Company B, and the vehicles ofthe 1st Tank Battalion's ServiceCompany hauled 41 Commando.

As Drysdale's task force movedout, a massive artillery barragebegan while Marine and Navy air-craft plastered enemy troop con-centrations in the hills surroundingthe road north of Koto-ri with frag-mentary bombs and napalm. TheRoyal Marines seized the firstobjective with relative ease. ButCaptain Sitter's company metheavier resistance in its attempt toseize Hill 1236, about one-and-a-half miles north of Koto-ri. There,the defending Chinese forces hadprepared elaborate defenses alongthe ridgeline. Fighting his way tothe top of the summit, MasterSergeant Rocco A. Zullo maneu-vered to within 200 yards and fired

several 3.5-inch rocket rounds intothe entrenched Chinese forces,forcing them out of their positionswhere Sitter's Marines proceededto decimate their ranks with smallarms fire. The assault on Hill 1236cost Sitter's company 14 casualties.The commandos and Company Gthen moved about a mile up theroad toward Hill 1182, the thirdobjective. There the enemy put upa stout defense with mortars andwell-placed machine gun fire fromfortified positions on the highground. As Company G assaultedthe Chinese positions, LieutenantColonel Drysdale ordered CaptainSitter to break off the attack, with-draw to the road below, and waitfor new instructions. Prior to themove, Drysdale had received amessage from Colonel Puller

11

advising him that tanks fromCompany D, 1st Tank Battalion,would be available at approxi-mately 1300 that afternoon.Drysdale decided to wait for theadditional support to minimizefurther casualties before settingout again. With less than two milescovered, the impetus of the attackwas now stopped.

Two platoons of tanks fromCompany D, reinforced by thetank platoon of the AntitankCompany from Regimental Com-bat Team 5, reached Koto-ri atnoon after moving Out fromMajon-dong. Meanwhile, the tanksfrom Company B, 1st TankBattalion, less the 2d Platoon,which was attached to 2dBattalion, 1st Marines, departedTongjong-ni and arrived at Koto-ri

On the left rear, they camedown the mountain to theculvert and the rice paddyarea.

Lieutenant Colonel Arthur A.Chidester, the assistant divisionlogistics officer and the seniorMarine officer caught in the cut offcolumn, ordered the vehiclesunable to proceed to turn aroundand head back to Koto-ri. Before hisorders could be carried out, aChinese attack severed this con-voy about 200 yards to the north ofhim. Other enemy attacks cut theroad to the south. In the ensuingattack, Chidester was woundedand eventually captured as theChinese troops poured fire intothe exposed Marine column.

One of the problems encoun-tered by the task force as itmarched through Hell Fire Valleywas the lack of communications.As X Corps' assistant operationsofficer, Major John N. McLaughlin,recalled: "There were really nointernal communications in thecolumn. Drysdale had no commu-nication with the Marine companyor the Army company or the tankcompany. And the tanks were toldto move out and continue tomove." Despite the lack of internalcommunications with his attachedunits and external communica-tions with higher headquarters andcircling aircraft, Drysdale planned tocontinue moving forward, fightingall the way if necessary, to reachHagaru-ri.

While portions of Task ForceDrysdale moved forward andChidester's Marines fought off theattacking enemy, the commandosand soldiers left in Hell Fire Valley,with the assistance of Marine airstrikes, continued to fend off prob-ing attacks by the Chinese, whoseonslaughts began to subside asdarkness set in. With the arrival ofsunset, however, the commandos,

Marines, and soldiers of the 31stInfantry waited for the inevitableChinese night assaults.

Strengthening their positions,the commandos and soldiersestablished three defensiveperimeters over a distance of 1,200yards from north to south. Thenorthern end of the defensiveperimeter was centered on the vil-lage of Pusdong-ni and was thelargest of the three positions. Led byMajor McLaughlin, it contained a

13

hodgepodge of troops caughtnorth of the second fracture inTask Force Drysdale's lines.McLaughlin's group comprisedapproximately 130 to 140 men andincluded the soldiers from the 31stInfantry, commanded by CaptainCharles Peckham, Chief WarrantOfficer Loyd V. Dirst and a group ofU.S. Marine military policemen,some Royal Marines, various U.S.Marine service and headquarterspersonnel, and Associated Press

.Sañgpyong-ni \,

(.&

Ambush ofTask Force Drysdale

November 19500

'—-'I

GGF Attacks0 50 100 200

Yards 1L_J I

photographer Frank Noel.McLaughlin said his immediateconcern was to organize a defenseto prevent a Chinese breakthroughto the main column.

As Chinese soldiers resumedtheir attack on the night of 29November, the Marines, soldiers,and commandos put up a spiriteddefense. McLaughlin said the fight-ing lasted all night "till about 5o'clock in the morning when we'drun out of ammunition." Despitethe hopelessness of their situation,McLaughlin's group boughtDrysdale's main force precioustime. What saved the other ele-ments of Task Force Drysdale thatfollowed behind McLaughlin'sforce was the quick thinking ofMcLaughlin and Chief WarrantOfficer Dirst, the other Marine offi-cer present. This made all the dif-ference that night, as TechnicalSergeant Charles L. Harrisonrecalled:

Well, at the start, just afterwe were pinned down, it wasrather confused. It was quitemixture and a jumble oftroops. There were British,U.S. Army, and Marines. Asfar as I know, there weren'tover forty or fifty Marines; butas we were pinned down andthe fire got pretty intense,and everybody bailed out oftheir trucks, there was a cer-tain amount of confusion.Now, I'm speaking about theparticular area I was in. I

think the organization of thewhole outfit into a fightingteam could be accredited toMarine officers—Major Mc-Laughlin and Warrant OfficerDirst—that is from my ownviewpoint. There may havebeen others, but I thoughtthat Warrant Officer Dirst andMajor McLaughlin were avery good steadying factor.

They calmed the troopsdown and ordered them tothe proper places where theycould give the most firepow-er. During the entire fight,they both exposed them-selves; walking up and downthat road directing the fireand moving troops from onepoint to another. WarrantOfficer Dirst was seriouslywounded during the fightthere—it must have beenabout three-thirty in themorning, I suppose. Therewas heavy fire from bothsides all night; casualtieswere high on both sides;there were several attemptedrushes by the enemy—andthat's just about the size of it.It went on that way untilalmost dawn when ourammunition was practicallygone, and then the negotia-tions for surrender camethrough.

As for the performance of thecommandos trapped with Mc-Laughlin's force, the U.S. Marinesthat served with them had nothingbut praise for their fighting abilities.Sergeant Dickerson said the BritishMarines "did their job very well.On the night of our capture, theyfought just as well as any of theother men, and it was good tohave them around." SergeantMorris L. Estess added that despitesome problems in communica-tions procedures between theunits, everything went smoothly.

By dawn on the morning of 30November, the situation had dete-riorated as the Chinese pressedtheir attacks against the remnants ofMcLaughlin's cut-off force. Mc-Laughlin called a meeting of hissurviving officers and staff non-commissioned officers to discussthe remaining options. As SergeantHarrison recalled, there had been

14

an earlier attempt to break throughenemy lines to gather more ammu-nition, although it became apparentto all that the situation was,indeed, desperate. Turned back bya Chinese roadblock, the twoMarines sent to get ammunitionbrought back surrender termsinstead, which had been issued bya Chinese officer. Major Mc-Laughlin countered with a few ofhis own terms, as SergeantHarrison later remembered:

The Major [McLaughlin] cir-culated amongst all of us andasked us how we felt about it.We were practically out ofammunition and casualtieshad been very high, and itlooked pretty evident thatwe'd be completely annihilat-ed when daylight came. I

firmly believe that we wouldhave. Well, the majority of themen, I believe, wanted to sur-render. They thought thatwas about the only thing left.And so, the Major himselfwent back this time to theChinese, hut he didn't agree tojust unconditional surrender.He told them that we wouldstay and fight unless theyagreed to take care of ourwounded—that is, give themmedical attention and returnthem to the nearest AmericanCP. They agreed to do this.And then the Major cameback and gave us the wordthat we were going to surren-der.

During the ensuing negotiationswith the Chinese, McLaughlin,accompanied by a Royal Marine,delayed the actual surrender toallow more men to either slip out ofthe perimeter undetected or for arelief force to batter its waythrough. His prolonged negotia-tions allowed more men to steal

away while the enemy relaxed itsvigilance. The largest of thesegroups came from the survivors ofthe three defensive perimetersestablished earlier on the after-noon of the 29th. They includedsoldiers from the 31st Infantry,U.S. Marines, and BritishCommando. Those unable toescape included 26 members of 41Commando, who were taken pris-oner.

As McLaughlin's men delayedthe attacking Chinese, the rem-nants of Lieutenant ColonelDrysdale's column continued tofight its way through what CaptainSitter later estimated to be a regi-ment attached to the 60th CCFDivision. Due to the heavy enemyattacks, Drysdale was unaware theChinese had cut off a major portion

of the convoy since there hadalways been gaps during therepeated stops and starts. Heassumed the remainder of the col-umn was not far behind the mainbody.

With the M-26 Pershing tanks ofCompany D and Antitank Com-pany leading the way, Sitter andthe rest of Company G, about aquarter of 41 Commando and ele-ments of Company B, 31stInfantry, continued to blast theirway toward Hagaru-ri under slack-ening enemy fire. A little morethan a mile south of Hagaru-ri, theChinese once again engaged thecolumn with grenades and intensesmall arms and mortar fire fromboth sides of the road. In the bat-tle that ensued, a satchel chargewounded Drysdale, who had

15

remained in the thick of the fight-ing. Sitter immediately took com-mand of the force, reorganized itinto a more defensible formation,and ordered the Marines, soldiers,and commandos to resume theadvance.

As Task Force Drysdale ad-vanced toward Hagaru-ri, whichwas now in view, the Chinese con-tinued their attacks. In one of thelast of these attacks, the assaultingenemy forces destroyed two trucksand inflicted several more casualtiesbefore the formation safelyentered Hagaru-ri's defensiveperimeter. At 1915, Sitter reported toLieutenant Colonel Thomas L.

Ridge, his commanding officer,who directed that Company G and41 Commando spend the night inperimeter reserve. Although

In the breakout from Hargaru-ri to Koto-ri, Marines passdestroyed and abandoned equipment that littered Hell Fire

Department of Defense Photo (UsMc) A5435

Valley, the site of the ambush of Task Force Drysdale's col-umn on 29 November.

—

.-'-

S

-.— iA.

__i.4 .

S

• •. 4-

severely wounded, Drysdale alsowalked into the command tentand, after rendering a smart salute,reported to Ridge that "all Marineswere present and accounted for."

Out of a force of 235 RoyalMarine commandos that reported toKorea on 20 November 1950, therewere initially no more than 63 pre-sent, although an additional force of55 commandos that had been cutoff in the rear along the route intoHell Fire Valley later enteredHagaru-ri in the early morninghours of 30 November. Led byCorporal Ernest Cruse of theCommando's heavy weaponsgroup, the seperated RoyalMarines successfully fought theirway through a host of Chinese sol-diers to rejoin Drysdale's force.Another portion of the group,commanded by Lieutenant Peter R.Thomas, arrived later at Hagaru-riwith a 2 1/2 ton truck loaded withU.S. Marines, soldiers, and wound-ed commandos. Of the 900 menand 29 tanks attached to TaskForce Drysdale that had set outfrom Koto-ri on the morning of 29November, only about 400 troopsand 16 tanks arrived at their objec-tive the next morning. As for mostof the troops, tanks, and trucks, inthe rear of the column that hadbeen cut off, they made it back toKoto-ri where they took part inthat position's defense. Half of thetask force's vehicles weredestroyed by Chinese fire and lit-tered the road from Koto-ri toHagaru-ri.

The Royal Marines suffered 18killed or missing and 43 wounded.Included among the dead were Btroop commander Captain M. C.Parkinson-Cumine, medical offi-cer/surgeon Lieutenant Douglas A.Knock, RN, and Petty Officer JohnA. Tate, RN, section commander ofthe fleet volunteers. Captain LeslieG. Marsh, D Troop commander,and the intelligence signals officer,

Lieutenant D. L. Goodchild, wereboth seriously wounded. Less than100 of the original force of com-mandos made to Hagaru-ri with-out becoming a casualty. For 41Commando, this was the end ofthe line as major land operationswere concerned, as their rankshad been decimated in the drive toHagaru-ri.

Despite the casualties, thearrival of additional combat troopsat Hagaru-ri "represented atremendous reinforcement" for thetrapped U.S. Marines. GeneralSmith was even more blunt in hiscomments:

The casualties of TaskForce Drysdale were heavy,but by its partial success theTask Force made a significantcontribution to the holding ofHagaru, which was vital tothe Division. To the slenderinfantry garrison of Hagaruwere added a tank companyof about 100 men and someseasoned infantrymen. Theapproximately 300 troops,which returned to Koto-ri,participated thereafter in thedefense of that perimeter.

The next day, LieutenantColonel Ridge ordered CompanyG to retake the crest of East Hill,holding the remaining members of41 Commando in reserve.Drysdale and his officers spentmuch of 30 November reconnoi-tering possible counterattackroutes and devising a defensivefire plan. The company-sized forceof Royal Marines gave Ridge apotent, highly maneuverable ele-ment he could use in the defense ofHagaru-ri. When elements of the20th CCF Army bent back theflanks of Company G on East Hill,one platoon of B Troop, consistingof 32 Royal Marines and com-manded by Lieutenant Gerald F. D.

16

Roberts, was sent out to counterat-tack. After a furious small armsfirefight, the commandos dis-lodged the Chinese forces andeventually secured the flank.Captain Sitter earned theCongressional Medal of Honorduring this engagement for hisinspirational leadership and tacticalabilities in repulsing the attackingChinese forces. As his citationnoted, Sitter, "at great risk to hisown safety, visited every foxholeand gun position of Company Gand its reinforcements, this despitethe fact that he had been severelywounded in the face, arms, andchest by grenade fragments."Despite repeated attempts to evac-uate him, Sitter insisted on remain-ing with his men throughout thenight of 30 November.

While the rest of the RoyalMarines remained in reserve, theattacking Chinese continued toharass the British and U.S. Marineson East Hill with sniper and smallarms fire. The Marines replied witha heavy volume of return fire thatsoon silenced the enemy. Lostground was eventually regained,and when Marine air came on sta-tion at 0900, the situation wasunder control. Sitter's skillfuldefense throughout 36 hours ofcontinuous action assisted in tem-porarily breaking the back of theChinese attacks around Hagaru-ri.The Chinese again attempted toseize the hill in the first week ofDecember, but were beaten back ina major defeat.

In reaction to the massiveChinese intervention, U.N. forcesnow faced what GeneralMacArthur told Washington was"an entirely new war. Our presentstrength of force is not sufficient tomeet this undeclared war by the

A Fighting Withdrawal and

Reorganization

Chinese." With the move to thedefensive, General Smith's onlyoption was to fight his way out.The 5th and 7th Marines, then atYudam-ni, were ordered south toHagaru-ri.

It was cold and the wind wasvicious on the morning of 6

December as the units at Hagaru-riprepared to breakout southward.The 7th Marines took the lead, fol-lowed by the 5th Marines, with 41Command and 3d Battalion, 1stMarines, attached. Before movingout on 7 December, LieutenantColonel Drysdale ordered a unitinspection. The officers moved upand down the rigid lines and rep-rimanded the men whose appear-ance and gear were not in the bestpossible shape. As LieutenantThomas later noted: "The RoyalMarines custom of shaving dailydespite the freezing weather had

been greeted initially with deri-sion, but eventually the USMCconceded there was something insuch outward signs of self disci-pline."

The road was jammed withtrucks, jeeps, and tanks; destroyedvehicles and battle debris wereeverywhere. The fighting intensi-fied throughout the withdrawal,and as always, the Commandosput forth a valiant effort. Enroute,they retrieved the bodies of theirslain comrades killed during thefighting in Hell Fire Valley, all ofwhom were buried in a massgrave at Koto-ri on 8 December.They were reunited along the waywith Captain Patrick J. Ovens, 41Commando's assault engineer,who, along with 25 commandosattached to headquarters section,had managed to slip away duringthe surrender negotiations.

Despite repeated attacks fromelements of an estimated sevenChinese divisions, it took the U.S.Marines, U.S. Army, and BritishCommando only 38 hours to move10,000 troops and more than 1,000vehicles the 10 miles to Koto-ri.There, General Smith assigned theCommando the task of holding thehigh ground overlooking the mainsupply route during the night toguard against infiltration byChinese troops. On 9 December,in preparation for the withdrawal ofthe 1st Marines, the Commandorelieved elements of the 3dBattalion, 1st Marines, on theKoto-ri perimeter. After beatingback further CCF attacks, theCommando, along with theremaining elements of the divi-sion, set out for Hungnam, whichthey reached after marchinganother 23 miles in sub-zero

and small enemy groups who attempted to block the road byfire from both flanks.

Department of Defense Photo (USMc) A5409

US. and British Marines move down the mountain road fromKoto-ri to Chinhung-ni, impeded only by icy conditions

17