Combang WMD A9acks in Mul3-Layer Mesh Networks: From ...networks.cs.ucdavis.edu/presentation2015/Rafael-12-04-2015.pdfDec 04, 2015 · § Explosively Pumped Coaxial Flux Compression

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High-Al(tudeElectromagne(cPulse(HEMP)andSatelliteNetworks

December4th,2015

PI:BiswanathMukherjeeDis$nguishedProfessor

Preparedby:RafaelLourençoPhDStudent

DepartmentofComputerScienceUniversityofCalifornia,Davis

Comba3ngWMDA9acksinMul3-LayerMeshNetworks:FromAnaly3calStudiestoPrototype

ACK:DefenseThreatReduc3onAgency(DTRA)GrantNo:HDTRA1-14-1-0047(6.2,FundamentalResearch)

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Outline

•  EMPBasicsandWeapons•  NuclearHEMPProper3esandEffects•  SatelliteNetworksBasics•  HEMP’sImpactonSatellites•  ProposedResearch:Post-HEMPRestora3onwithSatelliteAssistance

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EMPWeaponTypes

•  NuclearHigh-Al(tudeElectromagne(cPulse(HEMP):Nucleardetona3onathighal3tudeprovokesComptonSca9eringwhichcombinedwithEarthMagne3cFieldgeneratescoherentpulse[1];

•  High-PowerMicrowaves(HPM):High-frequencypulsefromnon-nucleardevice.Mightdestroyelectricalequipment.Suitcase-sizeddevicecoulddisruptequipmentamileaway[2];

•  Electromagne(cBombs:Explosivesdestroyspecialelectriccircuit;

§  ExplosivelyPumpedCoaxialFluxCompressionGenerator(FCG):Oldeste-bomb,lowfrequencies(<1MHz),mostmicroelectronicsinvulnerable;

§  VirtualCathodeOscillator(VirCatOr):Morecomplex,provideshigherfrequencies.

ComptonSca+ering:Gammarays+air=>high-energyfreeelectronsat0.9Cspeed.

[1]Miller,ColinR."Electromagne3cpulsethreatsin2010."(2005)[2]Wilson,Clay."High-al3tudeelectromagne3cpulse(HEMP)andhighpowermicrowave(HPM)devices:Threatassessments."(2008)

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EMPWeapons’Proper3es

Weapon[1]

ProbabilityofUse[1]

LethalRange[1] VulnerableTargets[1] Poten(alAVackers[1] Shape[2]

NuclearHEMP Moderate

Upto1,500mileradius(Texassizedamagesaremoreprobable)

Electronics,computerchips,sensors,communica3ons,vehicles,powertransmissionsystems,civilianinfrastructure

Nuclearpowerswithballis3cmissiletechnology,RoguestatesHPMLowSeenoteIntegratedcircuits,circuitcards,relayswitchesUS,UK,Australia,Russia,Sweden

Semiisotropic,roundedU-shaped"smile"

FCG High 175meters

Unprotectedsystemsconnectedtolong-runwireslongerthan250feet,possiblypeople

ModernmilitariesDependentoncoil/structure,non-isotropic

VirCatOr Moderate 150meters

Integratedcircuits,circuitcards,relayswitch,possiblypeople

Anyinforma3onageadversaryDependentoncoil/structure,non-isotropic

CurrentHPMsystemsdon’tgenerateenoughpowertoguaranteedestruc3onofintegratedcircuitsonalargescale.

Dependentonantenna

[1]Miller,ColinR."Electromagne3cpulsethreatsin2010."(2005)[2]Wilson,Clay."High-al3tudeelectromagne3cpulse(HEMP)andhighpowermicrowave(HPM)devices:Threatassessments."(2008)

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NuclearHEMPProper3es

"Inthepast,thethreatofmutuallyassureddestruc;onprovidedalas;ngdeterrentagainsttheexchangeofmul;plehigh-yieldnuclear

warheads.However,nowevenasingle,low-yieldnuclearexplosionhighabovetheUnitedStates,oroveraba+lefield,canproducealarge-scaleEMPeffectthatcouldresultinawidespreadlossofelectronics,butnodirectfatali;es,andmaynotnecessarilyevokealargenuclearretaliatorystrike

bytheU.S.military."[2]

[2]Wilson,Clay."High-al3tudeelectromagne3cpulse(HEMP)andhighpowermicrowave(HPM)devices:Threatassessments."(2008)

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NuclearHEMPProper3es

Al3tudes>30km(22g/cm3air),line-of-sight,toofasttoharmhumans,composedofcumula3veconsecu3vepulses[4]:§  E1:nanoseconds,coherent,inducesextremelyhighvoltages

burningelectro/electronics,toofastforsurgeprotectors:Ø  Mid-stratosphereioniza3onconvertregionintoelectrical

conductor;Ø  1.44MTat0.1%gammaefficiency=>2MeVgammarays

=>Peaking50MV/matfloorlevel;Ø  10kTbombsmightget40%efficiency[4];

§  E2:microsecondstoseconds,lessthan1saperE1,similartolightning;

§  E3(SolarEMP):temporarydistor3onofGeomagne3cfield,laststenstohundredsofseconds,similartoGeomagne3cStorm,inducecurrentsinlongconductors(powerlines).

Downward;ltofEarth'smagne;cfieldathighla;tudesshapesareaofpeakstrengthintoasmilepoin;ngtotheEquator[3,5].

[3] Min, Gyung Chan, et al. "Development of the HEMP Propagation Analysis and Optimal Shelter Design, Simulation Tool." (2013) [4] Longmire, Conrad L. "Justification and Verification of High-Altitude EMP Theory, Part I." (1987) [5] "The Late-Time (E3) High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) and Its Impact on the U.S. Power Grid." (2010)

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NuclearHEMPTestCases

•  USA,JohnstonAtoll,1962(codenameStarfish):1.4MTnucleartest,400kmal3tude,effectsinHawaii(1450kmaway):1-3%streetlightsfailed,circuitbreakerstripped,burglaralarmstriggered,andtelecommunica3onsrelaydamaged[6];

•  Russia,1962(SovietProjectK):300kTnucleartest,al3tudes300km,150km,and60kmincluded:damagetoundergroundcables600kmfarburied90cmdeep;abovegroundtelecomlines;surgearrestorburnout;spark-gapbreakdown;blownfuses;anddamagedMilitarygeneratorsandsubsta3ons.Earth’smagne3cfieldthereisgreaterthanatJohnstonAtoll[7];Ø  Sovietscien3st(A)interviewedbyAmericanscien3st(Q)aperendofUSSR[7]:

"Q:WouldyoumakeajudgmentonwhetherearlyorlateEMPcausedthedamage? A:TheairlinewasdamagedbyearlyEMPandthecablebylate-arrivingEMP.(…) Q:WerethemilitarygeneratorsdamagedbyearlyorlateEMP? A:Early.(…) Q:Isthenorth-southandeast-westorienta3onoflinesimportant? A:Definitelyyes.Theyareunambiguously3edtothegeomagne3cfield."

[6] Foster Jr, John S., et al. "Report of the commission to assess the threat to the united states from electromagnetic pulse (emp) attack." (2004) [7] US-Russian meeting "HEMP effects on national power grid & telecommunications." (1995)

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HEMP’sEffectsonDevices

•  Integratedcircuitswithshort-signalpaths=>high-frequencyEMP;•  Largeelectricalsystems=>lowfrequencyEMP;•  Pulseshigherthan10kV/msufficienttocausewidespreaddamage[8];•  Wiresrunningthroughaffectedareaserveasantennae[9];•  Hardening:protec3vemetallicshielding,specialsurgeprotectors,wire

termina3onprocedures,screenedisolatedtransformers,sparkgaps,etc.;•  HardeningincreaseelectronicresistancetoEMP[7].

[7]US-Russianmee3ng"HEMPeffectsonna3onalpowergrid&telecommunica3ons."(1995)[8]HouseMilitaryResearch&DevelopmentSubcommi9ee,"ThreatsPosedbyElectromagne3cPulsetoU.S.MilitarySystems"(1997)[9]CarloKopp,"TheElectromagne3cBomb:AWeaponofElectricalMassDestruc3on."(1996)

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PossibleHEMPEffectontheConnec3vity

x

Internet2Topology[10].

(A)Texasisfullycompromised.

(B)Texasispar3allycompromised.(C)S3llsomeconnec3vityinTexas.

[10]Internet2NetworkInfrastructureTopology(2015)

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RestoringConnec3vityviaOtherMeans

LEO

MEO

GEO

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SatellitesSatelliteQuickFacts[11]:i.   Opera(ngSatellitesbyCountry

ii.   AmericanSatellitesbyOwner/Operator

iii.   SatellitesbyTypeofOrbit

USA Russia China Other Total

549 131 142 483 1305

LEO(160-2000km) MEO(2000-35000km) HEO(HighlyEllip(cal) GEO(35786km)

696 87 41 481

Civil Commercial Government Military

21 250 126 152

[11]UnionofConcernedScien3sts(2015)

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SatelliteConstella3onExample:Iridium

•  EachIRIDIUMsatellitemaintainsuptofourInterSatLinkseach(exceptforplanes1and6)[12];

•  6orbits,11satellitesperorbit,each4400kmapart,100.3minutesperiod[12].

(D)Averageend-to-enddelays.

(A)Orbits(planes)seenfromPole. (B)FootprintofeachSatellite. (C)Iridium’sorbitalmo3on[15].

[12]Pra9,StephenR.,etal."Anopera3onalandperformanceoverviewoftheIRIDIUMlowearthorbitsatellitesystem."(1999)[15]GlobalTelesatCommunica3ons,"IridiumSatelliteConstella3on."(2012)

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HEMP’sImpactonSatellites2DviewofHEMPatgroundlevel

3DviewofHEMP

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HEMP’sImpactonSatellites

•  Immediatedirect,line-of-sightexposuretonuclearradia3onpulses:•  X-ray,ultraviolet,gamma-ray,andneutron

pulses;

•  Sizeofhazardzonedependsonweaponyield,detona3onal3tude,andthedegreeofsatellitehardeningagainstdisrup3onorharm[13];

•  Damage:•  Structuresandcoa(ng:solarpanelsand

sensorop3csifX-rayandUVfluxestoohigh;•  Electronics:X-rayandGammaradia3on

inducedestruc3vecurrents.

[13]FosterJr,JohnS.,etal."Reportofthecommissiontoassessthethreattotheunitedstatesfromelectromagne3cpulse(emp)a9ack:Cri3calna3onalinfrastructures."(2008)

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•  Earthhasnaturallyoccurringradia3onbelts;

•  EMPbeltsarecausedbyfreeelectronsreleasedindetona3on;

•  Impactdependsonrepeatedpassagesthroughbeltcumula3vely;

•  Characteriza3onofspa3alandtemporalproper3esiscomplex;

•  Intensi3esofradia3onbeltsdependstronglyonburstla3tude[13].


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HEMP’sImpactonSatellites:Beltexposureeffects

EventTime-to-failure(days)

NOAA(LEO800km)

TERRA(LEO700km)

ISS(LEO322km)

5MT@200km 0.1 0.1 0.1

0.8MT@368km 1 1 0.5

0.8MT@491km 1 1 1

4.5MT@102km 0.1 0.2 0.2

4.5MT@248km 0.1 0.2 0.2

0.03MT@500km 40 100 150

0.1MT@200km 10 17 20

•  NOAA,TERRAandISSareallhardened,specificallybuiltsatellites(whichmaynotbethecaseforcommercialsatellites)

Time-to-failuresofsatellitesduetodifferentsimulatedHEMPevents[13]:


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HEMP’sImpactonSatellites:Line-of-sighteffects

Satellite EventProbabilityofDamage(%)

Thermo-mechanical SGEMP/burnout Latch-up/burnout

ISS(LEO322km)

4.5MT@248km 1.7 4 4.2

1MT@300km 0 5 5

0.1MT@120km 0 3 4

5MT@200km 1.7 5 5

NOAA(LEO800km)

1MT@300km 0.2 19 20

0.1MT@120km 0 3 5

5MT@200km 1 7 8

TERRA(LEO700km)

1MT@300km 0.3 18 18

0.1MT@120km 0 2 5

5MT@200km 1.2 7 7

*Thelikelihoodthatonespecificsatellitewillbeinline-of-sightoftheexplosionrangesfrom5to20%,reducingalottheprobabili3esabove.Infact,anysatellitethatisindirectline-of-sightandrela3velyclose(LEO)willalmostcertainlyfailimmediately[13].

Riskofimmediatedamageofsatellitesduetodifferentsimulatedevents[13]:


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•  SatellitesinLEOaremuchmoresuscep3bletodamagefrombothdirectandpersistentradia3on;

•  SatellitesatGEOaretypicallyhardenedtoagreaterextentthanLEO;•  Line-of-sightexposureofLEOtoexplosion=>immediatelossofmany

opera3onalcapabili3es,aswellaslossofpowergenera3ngcapacity;•  Weaponsfrom10kTto100kT:EMPa9acksovertheNortherncon3nentalUS

orCanadaindicateslesserrisktoLEOsatellites[13];•  Satellitesinorbitalreadydepletedapor3onoftheiran3cipatedservicelife;•  1962,StarfishPrime:21satellitesinorbit(orlaunchedinthefollowingweeks,

consis3ngof20LEO+1MEO),8weredamagedandcompromisedorterminatedtheirmissions[14];Ø  Informa3onabouttheother13isnotpubliclyavailable.


[13]FosterJr,JohnS.,etal."Reportofthecommissiontoassessthethreattotheunitedstatesfromelectromagne3cpulse(emp)a9ack:Cri3calna3onalinfrastructures."(2008)[14]Brown,W.L.etal,"CollectedPapersontheAr3ficialRadia3onBeltFromtheJuly9,1962,NuclearDetona3on."(1963)

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PossibleHEMPeffectonIridiumconstella3on[12]includeimpairment/destruc3onofsatellites:

Post-HEMPRestora3onwithSatelliteAssistance

[12]Pra9,StephenR.,etal."Anopera3onalandperformanceoverviewoftheIRIDIUMlowearthorbitsatellitesystem."(1999)

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t=0minIni(ally,LEOsatellitecoveragewouldbelost:


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t=15minAsorbitsrotate,LEOcoveragewouldberegainedahersome(mefroms(llfunc(oningsatellites:


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t=30minCompleteLEOcoveragewouldbeachievedahersomemore(me:


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t=1h30minWiththeorbitalmovement,defec(veLEOsatelliteswouldperiodicallycomeback:


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Challenges

Determiningexactimpactonsatellitesconstella3oniscomplex

Be9erhardenedconstella3ons(likelysurvivors)aremilitary/governmentandwillprobablybeoverflowedbymilitary/high-prioritytraffic

GEOimposesahighdelay,limi3ngsometypesof2-waycommunica3ons

SinceGEOsatelliteswouldlikesurvive,themajorityoftrafficwouldberoutedthroughthemwheneverpossible(possiblebo9leneck)

CommercialLEOconstella3ons(providesmallerdelays)arelikelytosufferbig"holes"incoverage


[16]Amos,Jonathan,"ViasatBroadband'super-satellite'Launches."(2011)[17]O3bNetworks,"O3bTechnology-O3bNetworks."(2015)

Opportuni(es

Satelliteorbitsareknown,periodic,andwelldefined

Trafficschedulingcanbeusedtosendtrafficflowsthroughconnectedpartsoftheconstella3on,intermi9ently

DelayTolerantNetworksmighthelpensurethatpacketsarriveattheirdes3na3onsinbadlydisruptednetworksthroughseveralLand-Satellite-Landhops

StateoftheartHighThroughputSatellites(HTS)offerupto134GBpsinGEO(ViaSat1[16])andmorethan10Gbpspersatellitewithguaranteedlatencybelow150msinLEO(O3b[17],launchedin2014)

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t=15min

ProposedSolu3on:Post-HEMPRestora3onwithSatelliteAssistance

SurvivednodesbufferthetraffictobesentoutsideofthedamagedareaoncethereisLEOsatelliteconnec(on:

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t=30minAscoverageisslowlyregained,buffernodesbeginevacua(ngqueuestonearest(minimum

delay)LEOsatellitelandsta(onofmainnetwork:


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t=35minWhilehavingLEOsatelliteconnec(on,queuesareevacuatedbasedonthepriorityof

emergencycommunica(on:


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t=1h10minAsLEOconstella(on"hole"approaches,mainnetworkisinformedandschedulingstarts

again:


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t=1h25minDuringlackofLEOcoverageperiod,flowsarebufferedaccordingtoanpre-determined

emergencypreferencetrafficpolicy:


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Objec(veMaximizethecon3nuityofmission-cri3calservicesconsideringtheirQoSrequirements(delay-tolerant,degraded-servicetolerant)withundamagedterrestrialandnon-terrestrialcommunica3oninfrastructureaperaHEMPa9ack;•  Given

§  Networktopologies(originalandpost-HEMPsub-network)§  Bufferingcapabili3esofnetworknodes;§  Knowledgeofunaffectedsatellitesandtheirorbits/posi3ons/speed/throughput;§  Trafficpriority(Telecommunica3onServicePriorityTSP[18],emergencydata,and

otherhighlyimportanttraffic,asSCADAdata)•  Constraints

§  Throughputanddelaysofsatellitenetwork;§  Degraded-servicetoleranceandlatencysensi3vityoftrafficbeingqueued;§  Bufferingcapabilityofnodes;

ExpectedOutputIntelligentQoS-awaretrafficschedulingmethodtomaximizethroughputwhileprovidingmission-cri3calservicesatleasttheirminimumrequirementintermsofdelayandthroughput.


[18]HomelandSecurity,"Telecommunica3onsServicePriority(TSP)."(2013)

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Delay/DisruptTolerantNetworks(DTN)

•  ChallengedInternetworks:latency,bandwidthlimita3ons,systemconnec3vity,errorprobability,nodelongevity,and/orpathstabilitysubstan3allyworsethantypicalnetworks(Internet);

•  BundleProtocol,“overlay”architecture:operatesaboveexis3ngprotocolstack,providingstoreandforwardgatewayfunc3onbetween“bundleforwarders”;

•  Opportunis3corpredictablecontacts,parameterizedby:start/end3mes,capacity,latency,endpoints,direc3on;

Isolatednetworkfragment

Mainnetwork

RegionA RegionCRegionBandB’DTNGateways

DTNGateway

[19]Fall,Kevin."Adelay-tolerantnetworkarchitectureforchallengedinternets."Proceedingsofthe2003conferenceonApplica3ons,technologies,architectures,andprotocolsforcomputercommunica3ons.ACM,2003.


GEO

LEO

RegionA’

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Delay/DisruptTolerantNetworks(DTN)

•  TrafficvsData:whateverhashigherpriorityandcancopewiththelatency,transmissiondelays,intermi9entbehaviormaygetqueued(simplifica3on);

•  BPkeyunitoftransferisthebundle:canbestoredinmul3plenodesandfragmented;

•  Rou3ng:rangesfromzeroknowledgeofnetwork(onlyonopportunis3ccontacts)tototalknowledgeofnetwork(onlydeterminis3ccontacts);

[20]Arani3,Giuseppe,etal."Contactgraphrou3nginDTNspacenetworks:overview,enhancementsandperformance."Communica3onsMagazine,IEEE53.3(2015):38-46.

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ContactGraphRou3ng•  Dynamicrou3ngparadigmthatcomputesroutesthrough3me-varyingtopologyof

scheduledcommunica3oncontactsinaDTNarchitecture(onlyplanned/scheduledtopologychanges);

•  EachnodeexchangeswitheveryothernodeContactPlanMessages,twotypes:§  Contactmessage:beginningandendof3meintervalforthemessage;

transmi�ngandreceivingnodes;plannedtxrate;§  Rangemessage:beginningandendof3meintervalforthemessage;

transmi�ngandreceivingnodes;an3cipateddistancebetweenthenodesduringtheinterval;

•  WiththeContactPlan,eachnodebuildsarou3ngtablelis3ngallroutesfromittoallothernodes(eachdes3na3onnodecontainingpossiblymul3pleroutes,oneforeachlocalneighbor).Also,eachrouteentryshows:§  Allothernodesoftheroute;§  Latencyoftheroute;§  Thelatest3metherouteisavailable;

•  Toperformtheabove,aContactGraphisgenerated.Thisgraphneedstobeupdatedasnodesgooutofrangeandtransmitstop3mesarereached.

[20]Arani3,Giuseppe,etal."Contactgraphrou3nginDTNspacenetworks:overview,enhancementsandperformance."Communica3onsMagazine,IEEE53.3(2015):38-46.[21]Seguí,S.,andEstherH.Jennings."ContactGraphRou3ng."NASATechBriefs(2011):15.

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ContactGraphRou3ng•  Well-formedroutes:sequenceofcontacts,noloops;•  Expira(on(me:crea3on3me+TTLofbundle;•  OneWayLightTimemargin:maxdistancevaria3onduringtransmission;•  Lastmoment:deadlinetoreceive–(OWLT+OWLTmargin)[ifcontactmomentis

smallerthanlastmoment,notransmission];•  Contactcapacity:txrate*dura3on;•  Es(matedcapacityconsump(onforabundle:includesoverhead;•  Residualcapacityofacontact:(totalcontactcapacity)–(ECCofhigherpriority

bundles);•  Plausibleopportunity:contactwhoseresidualcapacitygreaterthanbundle’sECC;•  Plausibleroute:sendertodes3na3onseriesofplausibleopportuni3es;•  Forfeit(me:momentabundlehastobesentinordertofollowaplausibleroute;•  Excludednodes:listofnodesthroughwhichbundlewon’tgothrough;•  Cri(calbundle:highestprioritybundle.


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ContactGraphRou3ng:TheAlgorithm

Ini(aliza(on:Setdes3na3onDtobundle'sfinaldes3na3onnode;setdeadlineXtobundle'sexpira3on3me;createemptyRou3ngTable;setforfeit3metoinfinityforeverydes3na3on;andcreatealistofExcludedNodes.

ContactReviewProcedure:Inthisstep,eachnodecreates/updatesaDAG“ContactGraph”.Itsrootisavirtualself-to-selfcontactandtheotherver3cesareallothercontactsthatmightcontributetoreachsomeothernode.Virtualendingver3cesrepresen3ngcontactfromnodeA-to-nodeAarealsoincluded.Foreachdes3na3onD,Dijkstraisrunitera3vely(each3meremovingtheini3alcontact)un3lnomoreroutesarefound.EachbestrouteforeachcontactisaddedtotheRou3ngtableintheentryoftherespec3vedes3na3onnode.Eachoftheseroutesneednotbecon3nuousateveryinstant(allnodesarecapableofstoring).

ForwardingDecision:Amongtheavailableroutes,choosetheonewiththelowestcostandqueuethebundlefortransmissioninthatroute’sentrynode.Ifanyrouteforfeit3meisreachedandthere’ss3llbundlesinitsqueue,lookforanewrouteforthosebundles.


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ContactGraphRou3ng:Pros&Cons

PROs

Highconfidenceduetoaccurateinforma3on

Eventhoughthecurrenttopologydoesn’tnecessarilyreflecttheroutesbeingcalculated,iteventuallywill.

Changestotopologycanbemul3castedsothatallnodescanupdatetheirDAGs

Delayofotherbundlesintheoutboundbuffer:ContactGraphRou3ng-EarliestTransmissionOpportunity[20]

CONs

Considerallnodesabletostoreandforward

Considernodesonlyhaveonecontactata3me(nooneP2Mdownlink,norM2Muplink)

Noopportunis3ccontactsconsidered

Noadvantagesofperiodicityofcontacts

Noestablishedini3aliza3onprotocoltoexchangeContactmessages

Rou3ngdecisionsonlybasedonlocalknowledgemightnotmaximizetraffic


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Objec(veMaximizethebundletrafficsentfrom/totheisolatednetworkstothemainnetwork;Given

§  Networktopologies(originalandpost-HEMPsub-network);§  Ini3allysingleisolatednetwork;§  Bufferingcapabili3esofnetworknodes(unlimitedontheground,zeroonsatellites);§  Knowledgeofunaffectedsatellitesandtheirorbits/posi3ons/speed/throughput;§  Bundlepriority(Telecommunica3onServicePriorityTSP[18],emergencydata,and

otherhighlyimportanttraffic,asSCADAdata);§  Singlesatellitegroundsta3onsperisolatednetwork;

•  Constraints§  Throughput,delays,contact3mesofsatellitenetwork;§  Degraded-servicetoleranceandlatencysensi3vityoftrafficbeingqueued;

ExpectedOutputTrafficschedulingmethodtominimizethetotalunusedcapacityoftheEarthtosatellite,satellitetosatellite,andsatellitetoEarthlinkswhilerespec3ngbundlepriori3es.

Ini3alApproach

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1.   Immediatelybefore/duringtheEMPaVack(verysmallwindow):trytoevacuatedataaccordingtoSifat/Carlosproposals;

2.   AhertheEMPaVack:1.   Ini(alize:CommunicateallaffectednodesthroughwhateverGEOsatellites

availableinordertoexchangetheirloca3ons,priori3es,andgettoknowwherearethepossibletrafficevacua3onpointsinthemainnetwork;

2.  WithknowledgeofLEO/MEO/GEOorbitsandwhatpor3onofthemweredestroyed(alsotheirthroughputcapaci3esandlatency):1.  Sendhighpriority/highlatencyelas3citytoGEO2.  Sendmedium/lowpriorityandmedium/highlatencyelas3citytoMEO,usingspecific

rou3ngapproach3.  Sendlowlatencyelas3citytrafficwhenwithLEOcoverageandinfiniteelas3citytraffic

always(tobequeuedwhenwithoutLEOcoverage)

OverallApproach

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Rou3ngApproach1:ModifyCGRtoaccountfortheobjec3vesandspecificscenario.(S3llalocalknowledge

situa3on).Rou3ngApproach2(Possibly):

Implementvaria3onofMax-Flowalgorithmincarefullyelaboratedgraphwhereedgesencompasscontactstart/end3mes,capaci3es,andlatencies.

Ini3alApproach


Mainnetwork

SatelliteGroundSta(ons

SatelliteGroundSta(on

Satellites


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References1/2[1]Miller,ColinR.Electromagne3cpulsethreatsin2010.AIRWARCOLLMAXWELLAFBAL

CENTERFORSTRATEGYANDTECHNOLOGY,2005.[2]Wilson,Clay."High-al3tudeelectromagne3cpulse(HEMP)andhighpowermicrowave(HPM)

devices:Threatassessments."LIBRARYOFCONGRESSWASHINGTONDCCONGRESSIONALRESEARCHSERVICE,2008.

[3]Min,GyungChan,YeongKwanJung,andJeong-JinKang."DevelopmentoftheHEMPPropaga3onAnalysisandOp3malShelterDesign,Simula3onTool"KTIHEMPCORD"."(2013).

[4]Longmire,ConradL."Jus3fica3onandVerifica3onofHigh-Al3tudeEMPTheory,PartI."LawrenceLivermoreNa3onalLaboratory,Livermore,CA,UCRL-15938(1987).

[5]ReportMeta-R-321:"TheLate-Time(E3)High-Al3tudeElectromagne3cPulse(HEMP)andItsImpactontheU.S.PowerGrid"January2010.Wri9enbyMetatechCorpora3onforOakRidgeNa3onalLaboratory.

[6]FosterJr,JohnS.,etal."Reportofthecommissiontoassessthethreattotheunitedstatesfromelectromagne3cpulse(emp)a9ack."Cri3calNa3onalInfrastructuresReport1(2004).

[7]SUBJECT:US-Russianmee3ng–HEMPeffectsonna3onalpowergrid&telecommunica3onsFrom:HowardSeguine,17Feb.1995MEMORANDUMFORRECORD

[8]HouseMilitaryResearch&DevelopmentSubcommi9ee,ThreatsPosedbyElectromagne3cPulsetoU.S.MilitarySystemsandCivilianInfrastructure,StatementofDr.LowellWood,July16,1997,63.Availablefromh9p://commdocs.house.gove/commi9ees/security/has197010.000/has197010_Of.htm

[9]CarloKopp,"TheElectromagne3cBomb:AWeaponofElectricalMassDestruc3on,"(Fairbairn,Australia:RAAFAirPowerStudiesCentre,1996),2.Availablefromh9p://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/kopp/apjemp.html.

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References2/2[10]Internet2,"Internet2NetworkInfrastructureTopology".1June2015.Web.Availablefrom:h9ps://

www.internet2.edu/media/medialibrary/2015/08/04/NetworkMap_all.pdf[11]UnionofConcernedScien3sts,"UCSSatelliteDatabase."31Aug.2015.Web.Availablefrom:h9p://

www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-weapons/space-weapons/satellite-database.html[12]Pra9,StephenR.,etal."Anopera3onalandperformanceoverviewoftheIRIDIUMlowearthorbitsatellite

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