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COMISSÃO NACIONAL DE ENERGIA NUCLEAR
SAFETY CULTURE IN THE PRE-OPERATIONAL PHASES OF NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES – THE BRAZILIAN POINT OF VIEW
Eduardo Motta
Technical meeting on Safety culture during pre-operational phases — Practical working methods to increase safety
(26-30 November 2012)
Introduction Brazilian Nuclear Facilities
Licensing Process Summary
Safety Culture
Main Licensing Documents Site Report Scope
PSAR and FSAR Scope
Management System and Dissemination of Information
Additional Safety Information CIPA
Safety - Best Practices
SIG
Practical Examples
Conclusions
Summary
2 /17
Brazilian Nuclear Facilities Mining
Caetité – operating
Santa Quitéria – site licensing started
Poços de Caldas – in decommissioning process
Resende city site Enrichment, UO2 conversion, pellets fabrication, fuel components fabrication and fuel assembly
Planned U3O8 to UF6 conversion
Research institutes and reactors U3O8 to UF6 conversion (pilot scale)
NPP, Angra city Angra 1 – 640 MW, WH design
Angra 2 – 1350 MW, SIEMENS design
Angra 3 – 1350 MW, SIEMENS/AREVA design, under construction
Introduction
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Licensing Process Summary
Introduction
4 /17
Site Report
FSAR
PSAR
Site Approval
Initial / Permanent Operation License
Contruction License
Nuclear Material Use License Nuclear Material Use Request
Safety Culture
Assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, protection and safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance.
Pre-operational relevance
Safety culture phases
A - Fire fighter;
B – Compliance-driven;
C - Risk management;
D - Continuous improvement.
Introduction
5 /17
Site Report
A summary of the installation’s objective, capacity, product characteristics and inventory characteristics related to the probability or consequences of nuclear material release and features of the safety systems;
Population characteristics and distribution, present and proposed access routes, regional land use and distance to the population centers;
Site physical characteristics, including, meteorology, hydrology, geology and seismology;
A preliminary analysis of the potential environmental impact of the installation’s normal operation and in case of accidents; plus
A pre-operational radiological environmental monitoring programme.
Main Licensing Documents
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FSAR
Factory general description ;
Safety analysis abstract ;
Site characteristics;
Main design requirements ;
Factory design ;
Process system;
Waste containment and management ;
Main Licensing Documents
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FSAR
Radiological safety ;
Accident analysis;
Factory operation;
Technical specifications;
Management system.
Main Licensing Documents
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Focus on safety;
Begins before the Site Report;
Based on:
Resource promotion;
Work properly performed;
Compliance verification .
Management System and Dissemination of
Information
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Procedures;
Controlled documents;
Training process;
Continuous improvement;
Grading, based on:
Accident analysis;
Item design and fabrication complexity, compliance detectability, quality history and maintenance difficulty.
10 /17
Management System and Dissemination of
Information
A well defined and documented organizational structure to support :
Responsibilities ;
Authorities;
Communication channels
Internal between areas and employees;
External between the organization and its subcontractors.
All stakeholders.
11 /17
Management System and Dissemination of
Information
Internal Commission for Accident Prevention (CIPA);
Safety International Best Practices;
UPSAT and SEDO missions;
IAEA training courses, workshops, meetings, projects, etc.;
SIG
CNEN.NE-1.16, ISO 9001, ISO 14001 and OHSAS 18001.
Additional Safety information
12 /17
General Comments
According to best international practices (IAEA)
Safety culture level C definition: Risk management
Identifying and controlling hazards
Safety tasks and responsibilities are communicated
Safety culture level C implementation
Accident analysis factory design safety characteristics
Factory operation organizational structure and local emergency plan
Management System organizational guidelines and responsibilities to ensure installation safety are defined
Practical Examples
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General Comments
Safety culture level D: Continuous improvement motivation and leadership
Identifying and controlling hazards FSAR reflecting an accurate description of the installation, consideration of regional cultural characteristics, use of standards as minimum requirements and interaction with installations considered as safety worldwide references, etc.
Safety tasks and responsibilities are communicated development of periodical meetings (regulatory body and operator management staff), pre-operational surveillance on safety related items and Safety Management System
Practical Examples
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General Comments
Safety culture level D:
Continuous improvement
with IAEA support
Practical Examples
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Insufficient HR trained on safety of present and
planned NCFC
HR safety training is not up to date to NFCF
current technology
Lack of trained HR in the near future due to
retirement
New employees lack experience in NFCF safety
Most standards/technical protocols/safety guides
available were not developed for NFCF (originally developed
for NPP)
Some NFCF safety issues are not up to date in standards/technical
protocols/safety guides
Transparency and public engagement on NFCF
safety issues do not meet civil society expectations
NFCF are not fully aligned to the new international best
practices in some safety issues
Suboptimal operation of
NFCF
Specific NFCF safety issues do not meet international
best practices in NCFC standards/technical
protocols/safety guides
Lengthy licensing process
Public opposition to nuclear field
caused by misinformation
Coreproblem
EFFECT
Lack of accredited labs, high-tech measuring
equipment and safety assessment software
Delays in the nuclear fuel fabrication
Problems in the electric energy
generation
Gap of investment in the
last 20 years
Growth of other energy fields
Chernobyl and TMI accidents
Public opposition of the nuclear
field
Strength of green parties
Unclear nuclear policy
Cold warReduction of nuclear energy
demand
Coalitions between CNEN and other
institutions are not fully developed
Licensing process not developed in an
integrated manner
Competences conflict among regulatory
bodies
Competences gaps among regulatory
bodies
Excess of bureaucracy Insufficient infrastructure in all involved institutions
CAUSE
Difficult to transfer
information of NFCF due
industrial secrets
Specific installations
Mining
Caetité – Underground Mining
Interaction with other similar installations (national and international) to ensure the safety
Strong Safety Management System continuous risk analysis for safety barriers implementation
Santa Quitéria – Phosphate Associated
Interaction with other similar installations IAEA training course (Amman, Jordan, 2012 December)
Strong Safety Management System new stakeholders
U3O8 to UF6 Conversion
Interaction with other similar installations and experts to ensure the safety
Strong Safety Management System non nuclear hazard
Practical Examples
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Conclusions The safety related issues of NFCF in Brazil are analyzed and understood before the facility operation;
The Site Report and FSAR are the main licensing documents;
A formal structured MS focused on the installation safety is required in the entire facility life cycle;
The MS maintain a channel to disseminate all safety information to the stakeholders;
Brazilian NFCF safety culture is consolidated in level “C” and a large effort to reach the level “D” is being performed;
CNEN is constantly sharing information of the international good safety practices with IAEA support, ensuring a working environment with a high level of safety culture in all phases of the installation.
Conclusions
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www.cnen.gov.br
Thank you for your Attention!
e-mail: [email protected]
Technical meeting on Safety culture during pre-operational phases — Practical working methods to increase safety
(26-30 November 2012)
