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Comments on the paper of Arnold L. Horelick (1)

HANNESADOMEIT Stiftung Wissenschaft ll/ld Politik Ebenhausen (near Munich), FRG

Introduction

Three major developments in Gorbachev's foreign policy since his accession to power in March 1985 have aptly been stressed by Arnold HoreIick: - The restructuring of the foreign policy apparatus including the concentra­

tion of authority in the Central Committee and a reduction, relative to the pre-Gromyko period, of the role of the foreign ministry.

- Deemphasis of the importance of the Third World at the verbal level and avoidance of new 'adventures' at the practical level; yet consolidation of the position won in the 1970s.'

- Rise in conciliatory rhetoric and expressions of interest in an improvement of relations with Western Europe and Japan (as well as China, one might add) yet in practice concentration of the main effort in foreign affairs on a perestroika of Soviet-American relations with arms control providing the major driving force behind this effort.

Since this discussant is in agreement with the main line of argument of the paper, the comments will merely add on to or. at best. modify its theses.

Two sets of problems in particular are worth pursuing. The first includes the following questions: What are the indications for a priority development of Soviet-American relations? Has the Soviet effort extended to substantive concessions or has it been limited to rhetoric and propaganda? Assuming that foreign policy is the result of an interaction process, in what way has American policy contributed to the evolution of Gorbachev's policy toward the Western countries? Has it been an incentive or disincentive for the continuation of current policies?

The second deals with the main reasons behind the approach which Gor­bachev has pursued. It asks what factors in particular have shaped it and whether the strength of these factors is likely to last. The main focus will be Gorbachev's policy toward the West.

M. Feshbach (ed.), National Security Issues of the USSR© Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht 1987

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Building blocks of Gorbachev's Westpolitik

The evolution of Gorbachev's foreign policy has shown once again that there is no separate Soviet-West European policy. There is only one overall approach vis-a-vis the West - a Soviet Westpolitik - in which policies both toward the United States and Western Europe (and, to a lesser extent, Japan) form a unified whole.

It is quite possible that a more pronounced European profile was indeed one of Gorbachev's foreign policy priorities when he came to power. Shortly prior to that, his visit to Britain in December 1984, the then frequently expressed expert Soviet opinion concerning an alleged 'sharpening of contradictions among the three main power centres of imperialism,' and his own view, which he formulated in a basic statement on ideological matters in December 1984, that the 'United States has experienced an ever more apparent loss of its previous economic and political preponderance and an erosion of its positions in relation to the new power centers, notably the Western European region and Japan,' may have convinced him that such a 'Europe first' approach might be fruitful.

If such ideas did playa role in the evolution of Gorbachev's policies, they very quickly showed themselves to be unworkable. 'Europe', i.e. Western Europe, was far from being able or willing to respond to ill-defined Soviet overtures with one single, coherent voice. The fragmentation of the Western European political will, often so exasperating to American policy makers, may have been equally frustrating for Gorbachev. The close cooperation between the conservative and liberal coalition government in Bonn and the even more conservative administration in Washington apparently made it appear prob­lematic to include West Germany in his 'the world is not limited to the United States' approach.

The Soviet offer to negotiate separately with Britain and France on nuclear weapons (which may have been conceived in Moscow as a clever ploy to support inclinations for greater independence in the two countries) was quickly - almost rudely - brushed aside by both governments. And his visit to France in October 1985, if anything, underlined the limitations inherent in the 'Europe, our common house' theme.

Perhaps as a result of this and less than promising future lines of develop­ment, Gorbachev did not follow up this theme with any of the substantive concessions which might have induced Western Europeans to loosen their Atlantic links.

Policy toward the United States, in contrast, has received top priority, and has been characterized by astounding persistence. It has included some con­cessions and several reversals of positions which Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko had tenanciously clung to.

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He consented to the summit meeting in Geneva in November 1985 despite the stand he had taken previously, namely, that he would only attend such a conference if it were not just going to be a 'getting to know each other' affair but a serious and well prepared matter and if it were clear beforehand that agreements in one or two important areas of arms control would be signed.

The Soviet approach of maintaining the dialogue with the United States continued despite the fact that the summit was held according to an American agenda, and despite a number of subsequent American policies which any impartial observer might call uncompromising and unyielding, and which a domestic opposition in the Soviet Union could easily characterize as provo­cative. A list of such policies could include the following: - Continuation of strategic modernization programs in the United States

with the Reagan administration announcing. in Mav 1986, that it felt no longer bound by the SALT II treaty and that the US . :mld exceed the treaty limits by the end of the year in response to Wh~lt 1rlministration officials have called Soviet treaty violations.

- The apparently unshakable adherence by Reagan and othe. : 'ading admin­istration officials not just to research, development and testing as part of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SOl) but also ultimately to the deployment of space-based defensive weapons.

- The refusal, connected also with SOl, to agree to a comprehensive nuclear weapons test ban.

- Procrastination or disinterest in the conclusion of an agreement concerning limitation of anti-satellite systems.

- Adoption of a more assertive, militarily oriented policy of countering Soviet advances in the Third World as manifest. for instance, in the at­tempts at channelling money and weapons to the Contras in Nicaragua and UNIT A in Angola, as well as the equipment of the Afghan resistance fighters with Stinger antiaircraft missiles.

- The dispatch, in March 1986, of US naval vessels into the 12-mile zone off the Soviet Union's Black Sea coast.

- The air attacks against Libya in April 1986. - Continued adherence to the policy of restrictions on West-East technology

transfer, pressure on Western allies to curtail their credit relations with Eastern European countries, opposition to most-favored nation status for the USSR (while granting it to China) and refusal to support Soviet membership in the GAIT (while agreeing to support the Chinese appli­cation).

- Persistent demands for the curtailment of Soviet embassy. consular and United Nations personnel resulting in the departure of 25 Soviet UN employees, and 55 members of the Soviet embassy in Washington and the consulate in San Francisco.

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It is in the light of these and other negative American responses that some of the Soviet overtures and concessions must appear as particularly surprising. Moves of this kind in the arms control sphere include the Soviet preparedness to agree to the 'deep cuts' in offensive strategic missiles which Carter had proposed in 1977 and which Reagan had demanded in START; agreement to count - at least for the time being - neither the US forward based systems (FBS) nor the French and British missiles and bombers against the total American strategic arsenal; acceptance of counting rules for strategic bombers and cruise missiles advantgageous to the US; consent to the setting of sub­limits on heavy ICBMs.

As for medium-range nuclear systems, the Soviet Union gave up, on the one hand, its demands for the inclusion of elements of the US Poseidon force, FBS and French and British systems in the overall tally as well as qualitative restrictions on the French and British force. It consented to a zero-zero solution limited to US and Soviet medium-range missiles (including disman­tling of the corresponding launch sites and apparently under inspection) and drastic cuts in its Asian force.

The Soviet Union also, at the Stockholm conference on confidence building and disarmament in Europe (CDE), for the first time ever in any forum, abandoned one of its most deeply engrained principles: objection to on-site inspection of military moves and manoeuvres by foreign observers on Soviet territory.

On other matters, too, Gorbachev showed himself conciliatory. Concerning human rights issues and the increase of East-West contacts and communica­tions, Moscow discontinued jamming of Voice of America broadcasting to the Soviet Union. And after the resolution of the Daniloff-Zakharov controversy, it granted exit visas to dissident-refuseniks Yuri Orlov, David Goldfarb, Viktor Flerov and Irina Ratushinskaya.

Finally, it was Gorbachev who suggested the Reykjavik meeting and who, despite the failure to reach a comprehensive agreement on the three main areas of arms control negotiations, put a rosy gloss on its results. Although in his radio and television addresses of 14 and 22 October 1986, he did decry American intransigence, he also called the Reykjavik meeting an 'important stage' in the arms control process that had created a 'qualitatively new situa­tion'. The summit had deepened mutual understanding and shown that 'on the matter itself, agreements are possible'.

Obviously, some of Gorbachev's verbal openings and practical policies do not change the main features of Soviet foreign policy; they are too utopian and blatantly propagandist to be taken seriously; and they reduce only slightly the significant margin of superiority which the USSR has managed to build up vis­a-vis the West over the past two decades in conventional, theater nuclear and medium range weapons. Yet other verbal approaches and practical steps, even

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if they do not solve Western security problems, are meaningful departures from past policies and open for Western and other countries promising lines of development. But can these lines be extrapolated into the future? The answer to this question depends very much on the probable reasons behind Gor­bachev's moves toward the West.

The rationale of Gorbachev's Westpolitik

The first and most simple rationale for the priority of Soviet-American rela­tions in Gorbachev's foreign policy lies in Moscow's claim to superpower status and political equality with the United States. Negotiations with lesser powers at the periphery of the USSR may be useful for a variety of reasons. But only by being seen internationally as being engaged in negotiation with the opposed world power does the Soviet Union's assertion as being 'coequal' with the United States appear credible. Since the claim to equal political status is derived from military parity, this very fact, too, helps to explain why military issues and arms control have become the driving edge of Soviet policy toward the West.

A second reason for the policy of real or apparent compromise and con­tinuation of the dialogue with the United States despite the apparent inflex­ibility of the Reagan administration probably has much to do with the signifi­cant international isolation which the Soviet Union experienced in the period between fall 1983 and summer 1984. This was the time in which Andropov and Chernenko adopted the attitude of 'insulted giant' and 'bear in hibernation', apparently proceeding from the assumption that. in response to the implemen­tation of NATO's dualtrack decision, they now had to live up to their threats of political and military 'countermeasures'.

They embarked on the further deployment of SS-20 missiles, the stationing of 'operational-tactical missiles' in the GDR and Czechoslovakia and the forward positioning of nuclear-armed submarines 'in ocean areas' close to the US coast. They broke off the arms control negotiations on strategic and medium range nuclear weapons, and for a time also those on conventional arms. And they abandoned the policy of what one could have called 'selective detente' toward the Western European countries, including them now in the verbal onslaught against American 'adventurism' and 'militarism', and charg­ing in addition the West German government with support of 'revanchist' and 'neo-Nazi'tendencies.

As a resuit, all lines of communication were blocked. The Soviet leaders for all practical purposes ceased to be active participants in international politics and were voluntarily relegating themselves to a role of bystander. At some point, something had to be done to change this disadvantageous state of affairs.

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The third possible reason for the new opening toward the West may be connected with a reevaluation of the apparent strength of 'antagonist contra­dictions' in the West. It may have something to do with the experience that it proved impossible to separate the United States from Western Europe and Japan, and that the 'objective forces' which bind together the three main 'power centers of imperialism' are stronger than those which put them at odds with each other.

In fact, many of the issues which had been particularly divisive in the Western alliance - East-West sanctions over Afghanistan and Poland, the gas, credit and pipeline deal with the USSR, the West-West sanctions over the same issue, the very feasibility of stationing medium-range missiles in Europe, and doubts about the reliability and loyalty of various allies - had either disappeared altogether or receded in importance.

Fourth, Soviet policy makers and analysts in late 1983 and 1984 had in all likelihood become more conscious of the erosion of the effectiveness of their traditional instruments in their policy toward the West. Foremost, the strength of the 'peace movement' had waned. In Western Europe, the Soviet leader­ship saw itself faced with governments of varying composition, conservative in West Germany and Britain, socialist in France and Italy, yet all of them strongly supporting the stationing of US missiles in Europe, improvement of conventional defense, and the strengthening of Atlantic ties. Conversely, the opposition parties in these countries, at least for the time being, seemed to be far removed from winning power and changing course.

Fifth, costs, benefits and risks of expansionism in the Third World may have appeared in a different light to the Soviet leadership in the 1980s than they had in the 1970s. Whereas in the previous period, the dispatch of military advisers and arms, as well as the cooperation with 'proxies', such as Cuba and Vietnam, seemed to have brought about substantial gains at little risk of confrontation with the United States, the subsequent years began to look different. The adversary superpower gave the impression as if it had overcome the Vietnam and Watergate syndromes and that it is ready more vigorously to oppose the USSR worldwide. The success of Soviet and Cuban intervention in Angola and Ethiopia turned out to be less than straightforward; continued Soviet support and Cuban military involvement were required to prevent deteriorat­ing conditions from leading to a collapse. Vietnam's victory in the south of the country and its occupation of Cambodia, too, brought about costs, not just of an economic but also of a political nature, e.g. 'complicating' Sino-Soviet relations and the relationship between the USSR and ASEAN. Finally, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan did not, as some Soviet political and military leaders may originally have thought, lead to a rapid decrease in guerilla activity. The war has, as Gorbachev acknowledged at the XXV lIth Party Congress, remained an 'open wound'.

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Thus, in order to reduce the economic 'costs of empire', contain the political repercussions on relations with the adversary superpower and other countries, and lessen the risk of counterintervention initiated by the Reagan administra­tion or counterrevolution supported by it, the Soviet leaders may increasingly have considered it appropriate to reduce the Soviet military involvement and adopt a less strident stance vis-a-vis the United States.

A sixth factor is connected with likely changes in the appraisal of socio­economic and political forces in the United States. Whereas at the beginning of the first Reagan administration, the majority view of Soviet experts on Amer­ican affairs had favored the interpretation that the 'conservative wave' in the United States was essentially shortlived and would soon subside, such views came to be less frequently expressed. As the Republicans headed for a resounding electoral victory in 1984, Soviet Amerikanisty and other interna­tional relations experts increasingly came to adhere to the view that the conservatism in the United States was a more lasting phenomenon and that it was therefore expedient to come to some arrangement with the Reagan administration rather than wait for a different one.

A seventh element in Gorbachev's emerging policy toward the West most likely derives from a reassessment of the utility of the arms competition. In the 1970s, it may have appeared to Soviet political leaders and analysts that NATO was no longer able successfully to compete with the Warsaw Pact in the arms competition; that contrary to the preceding three decades, the Western coun­tries were primarily and - from the vantage point of their military - inade­quately reacting to Soviet initiatives; and that they were increasingly putting faith in arms control negotiations to redress a deteriorating military balance. The Soviet Union thus, through its arms control proposals, became an active participant in Western security debates. The weight of its arguments in these debates seemed to be increasing. Its political leverage appeared to be rising.

But starting from the late 1970s and beginning of the 1980s, these trends could no longer be regarded as unbroken and unbreakable. Defense outlays in the United States began to rise sharply. New challenges were issued to the Warsaw Pact, one in the form of ever more sophisticated conventional weap­ons, the other in the shape of Reagan's strategic defense initiative. Thus, in conjunction with the deployment of intermediate-range weapons and the resulting capability for NATO to strike at Soviet territory from Western Europe as well as the on-going US strategic modernization programs, it was now the Soviet Union which was put into a position to respond - and to do so in the area of high technology in which it could compete less easily and effec­tively.

A final factor lies in Gorbachev's often and emphatically expressed neces­sity of giving top priority to the development of the Soviet economy. As Andropov before him, the current Soviet leader has shown himself keenly

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aware of the severe shortcomings in this sphere. He has repeatedly emhasized the need finally to achieve the, since Khrushchev, often demanded transition from mobilization to modernization, from extensive to intensive growth, and from coercion to persuasion.

It is, of course, questionable whether further decreases in the growth of defense spending, say, to zero, or even negative growth rates, would by themselves lead to a significant improvement in economic performance. It is equally doubtful whether foreign trade will provide much impetus for such improvement. Structural reforms of the economy will always be required. But there can be no doubt that substantial improvement of economic performance would be difficult if the arms competition were to accelerate, particularly in the high technology area.

It is, therefore, the combination of structural reform, exposure of the economy to competition with the Western industrialized countries, access to Western technology, know-how and credit, and a reduction in the pace of the arms which provides the best chances for success. For this combination of factors to become effective, however, it is - as Gorbachev has repeatedly stated - necessary to create the right political climate.

Perspectives

Where, then, do these seven factors leave Gorbachev? What options are available to him in the next few years?

One conceivable option would be for him not just to flash the 'European card', as Soviet political leaders and propagandists have done in previous years, but actually to play it. This could entail abandonment of efforts at utilizing differences among the West European countries and fragmenting the Alliance. It could consist instead of active encouragement of Western Euro­pean integration, including on matters of defense. It certainly would necessi­tate inclusion of West Germany in the overall approach, and Soviet consent to more extensive contact between the two Germanies. Lastly, it could make necessary a substantial reduction of the Soviet threat profile with far-reaching, assymmetrical reductions both in short-range nuclear and conventional weap­ons.

There is, however, no guarantee for Moscow that the Western European countries, as a result, would loosen their links with the United States and become more amenable to Soviet influence. There is instead a risk that processes could be set in motion, particularly in the relations between East and West Europe and in Eastern Europe itself, which the Soviet Union would find difficult to control. It is, for these and the other reasons mentioned above, highly unlikely that Gorbachev will pursue this option.

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A second option could be the adoption of a tough stance. Gorbachev could forget about the smiles and show his 'iron teeth'. He could cancel the summit process; continue, or even speed up, Soviet offensive strategic programs (whereby the United States might well fall behind, since there is much untap­ped capacity for expansion in the Soviet Union's military infrastructure); expand the anti-ballistic missile programs already in existence; speed up research and development in antisatellite weapons and strategic defense; 'cash in' to the extent possible on the military advantages built up in the 1970s along the periphery of the USSR; and conduct a more activist, militant policy in the Third World.

This course of action, too, is unlikely to be chosen. Its probable results could be a repetition of the profound international isolation in which Andropov and Chernenko found themselves in 1983-84. It could entail significant costs and risks in Soviet-American relations, resurrect East European recalcitrance and obstructionism, and jeopardize the chances for the economic modernization of the USSR.

A third option, therefore, is likely to be selected. In essence, it would consist in the continuation of the current approach. Its central focus is likely to remain the United States, and its main feature the reduction in external competitive pressures. It could continue to include attempts at slowing down the arms competition, particularly in the strategic nuclear sphere and in space. It would entail further efforts at broadening, to the extent possible under current adverse conditions, trade and economic cooperation with Western indus­trialized countries. It also would mean avoidance of confrontation in the Third World. And it would make it advisable, both for domestic and foreign policy reasons, to do away with some of the worst features of rigidity and repression in the human rights sphere.

What is, on the other hand, ruled out by such an approach is the abandon­ment of the claim persistently advanced by the Soviet leaders since the end of the Second World War to the status of a world power. It therefore precludes, Reykjavik notwithstanding, any dismantling of strategic parity with the United States and does not render invalid the aim of political equality with that country. It also does not mean voluntary withdrawal from those positions in the Third World, including Afghanistan, where Moscow and its allies have made gains through military advisers, hardware and intervention.

Thus, despite Gorbachev's possible personal inclinations and all the indica­tions of his 'new political thinking', the Soviet Union is 'objectively' not yet prepared to embark on a shift in the global competition from the military sphere to political, economic, technological, and cultural areas. For such a shift to occur, more time and success in the restructuring of Soviet society and the Soviet economy are still required.