Common Carrier of PassengerContentsANature of Responsibility Definition 1732;1733;17551Ampang v. Guino-o TransitApr 30, 1953 (NF)1Landicho v BTCSep 20, 1956 (NF)1Isaac v. A.L. AmmenAug 23, 19571Laguna v. TiongsonApr 30, 19663La Mallorca v. De JesusMay 14, 19666Anuran v. BuoMay 20, 19667Maranan v. PerezJun 26, 19678BTC v. CaguimbalJan 24, 196810Del Castillo v. JaymalinMar 17, 198211Vasquez v. CASep 13, 198513Mecenas v. CADec 14, 198915Gatchalin v. DelimOct 21, 199120Trans-Asia v. CAMar 4, 199624Negros Navigation v. CANov 17, 199728Cervantes v. CAMar 25, 199934Calalas v. CAMay 31, 200036Jose v. CAJan 18, 200038Baritua v. MercaderJan 23, 200142BPresumption of Negligence 175646Picart v. SmithMar 15, 191846Macawili v. PanayMar 1,1956 (NF)48Sy v. Malate TaxicabNov 29,195748Abeto v. PALJuly 30,198250PAL v. NLRCSep 2,1983 (PDF)52Bachelor Express v. CAJuly 231,199052Mallari v. CAJan 31, 200057CBreach of Contract of Carriage59Singson v. CA Nov 18, 1997, GR 11999559Cathay Pacific v. VazquezMar 14, 2003, GR#15084363Singapore Airlines v. AndionDec 10, 2003, GR14230568Japan Airlines v. AsuncionJan 28, 2005, GR#16173072Northwest v. ChiongJan 31, 2008, GR 15555074Vector Shipping v. MacasaJul 21, 2008, GR 16021979Japan Airlines v. SimanganApr 22, 200883Philippine Airlines v. CASep 22, 200889Northwest v. HashanFeb 3, 2010 (NF-internet)93Spouses Villoria v. ContinentalJan 16, 201293DFortuitous Event as a Defense103Lasam v. Smith45 PHIL 657, Feb 2, 1924103Necesito v. Paras104 SCRA 84, Jun 30, 1958 (NF)105Juntilla v. FontanarMay 31, 1985105Yobido v. CAOct 17, 1997107Gacal v. PAL183 SCRA 189109Pilapil v. CADec 22, 1989112Fortune Express v. CA305 SCRA 14, Mar 18, 1999114JAL v. CAAug 7, 1998118Singapore Airlines v. AndionDec 10, 2003, GR142305120EDuration of Responsibility123Bataclan v. MedinaOct 22, 1957123La Mallorca v. CAJuly 27, 1966125Phil. Rabbit v. IACAug 30, 1990127PAL v. CASep 15, 1993133Trans-Asia Shipping v. CAMar 4, 1996137Baliwag Transit v. CAMay 15, 1996142Negros NavigationCo., v. CANov 7, 1997145JAL v. CAAug 7, 1998152FLimited Liability; Validity of Stipulations 1757; 1758154Lara v. ValenciaJune 30, 1958154Bataclan v. MedinaOct 22,1957156Maranan v. PerezJune 26,1967158Baliwag Transit v. CAMay 5,1996160Fabre v. CAJuly 26,1996163Mallari v. CAJan 31,2000167HContributory Negligence of Pax 1761; 1762170Cangco v. MRROct 14,1918170Del Prado v. MRRMar 7, 1929175Brias v. PeopleNov 25,1983176PNOC v. CAOct 4,1985179Dangwa v. CAOct 7,1991186Fortune Express v. CaMar 18,1999189Isaac v. Al Ammen 101 PHIL 1046193IResponsibility for Acts of Strangers and Co-pax 1763195MRR v. BallesterosApr 29,1966195Bacarro v. CastaoNov 5,1982197Gacal v. PALMar 15,1990199Fortune Express v. CAMar 18,1999202LRT Authority v. Marjorie NavidadFeb 6, 2003206JLiability for Quasi-Delict208China Airlines v. CAMay 18,1990208Calalas v. CAMay 31,2000212Phoenix Construction v. IACMar 10, 1987215PNR v. CAOct 15, 2007219Dy Teban v. Jose Ching, Liberty ForestFeb 4, 2008222KLiability for Injury to Stevedores229Sulpicio Lines v. CA July 14, 1995229

ANature of Responsibility Definition1732;1733;1755Ampang v. Guino-o TransitApr 30, 1953 (NF)Landicho v BTCSep 20, 1956 (NF)Isaac v. A.L. AmmenAug 23, 1957G.R. No. L-9671 August 23, 1957

CESAR L. ISAAC, plaintiff-appellant, vs.A. L. AMMEN TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., defendant-appellee.

Angel S. Gamboa for appellant.Manuel O. Chan for appellee.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

A. L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc., hereinafter referred to as defendant, is a corporation engaged in the business of transporting passengers by land for compensation in the Bicol provinces and one of the lines it operates is the one connecting Legaspi City, Albay with Naga City, Camarines Sur. One of the buses which defendant was operating is Bus No. 31. On May 31, 1951, plaintiff boarded said bus as a passenger paying the required fare from Ligao, Albay bound for Pili, Camarines Sur, but before reaching his destination, the bus collided with a motor vehicle of the pick-up type coming from the opposite direction, as a result of which plaintiff's left arm was completely severed and the severed portion fell inside the bus. Plaintiff was rushed to a hospital in Iriga, Camarines Sur where he was given blood transfusion to save his life. After four days, he was transferred to another hospital in Tabaco, Albay, where he under went treatment for three months. He was moved later to the Orthopedic Hospital where he was operated on and stayed there for another two months. For these services, he incurred expenses amounting to P623.40, excluding medical fees which were paid by defendant.

As an aftermath, plaintiff brought this action against defendants for damages alleging that the collision which resulted in the loss of his left arm was mainly due to the gross incompetence and recklessness of the driver of the bus operated by defendant and that defendant incurred in culpa contractual arising from its non-compliance with its obligation to transport plaintiff safely to his, destination. Plaintiff prays for judgment against defendant as follows: (1) P5,000 as expenses for his medical treatment, and P3,000 as the cost of an artificial arm, or a total of P8,000; (2) P6,000 representing loss of earning; (3) P75,000 for diminution of his earning capacity; (4) P50,000 as moral damages; and (5) P10,000 as attorneys' fees and costs of suit.

Defendant set up as special defense that the injury suffered by plaintiff was due entirely to the fault or negligence of the driver of the pick-up car which collided with the bus driven by its driver and to the contributory negligence of plaintiff himself. Defendant further claims that the accident which resulted in the injury of plaintiff is one which defendant could not foresee or, though foreseen, was inevitable.

The after trial found that the collision occurred due to the negligence of the driver of the pick-up car and not to that of the driver of the bus it appearing that the latter did everything he could to avoid the same but that notwithstanding his efforts, he was not able to avoid it. As a consequence, the court dismissed complaint, with costs against plaintiff. This is an appeal from said decision.

It appears that plaintiff boarded a bus of defendant as paying passenger from Ligao, Albay, bound for Pili, Camarines Sur, but before reaching his destination, the bus collided with a pick-up car which was coming from the opposite direction and, as a, result, his left arm was completely severed and fell inside the back part of the bus. Having this background in view, and considering that plaintiff chose to hold defendant liable on its contractual obligation to carry him safely to his place of destination, it becomes important to determine the nature and extent of the liability of a common carrier to a passenger in the light of the law applicable in this jurisdiction.

In this connection, appellant invokes the rule that, "when an action is based on a contract of carriage, as in this case, all that is necessary to sustain recovery is proof of the existence of the contract of the breach thereof by act or omission", and in support thereof, he cites several Philippine cases.1 With the ruling in mind, appellant seems to imply that once the contract of carriage is established and there is proof that the same was broken by failure of the carrier to transport the passenger safely to his destination, the liability of the former attaches. On the other hand, appellee claims that is a wrong presentation of the rule. It claims that the decisions of this Court in the cases cited do not warrant the construction sought to be placed upon, them by appellant for a mere perusal thereof would show that the liability of the carrier was predicated not upon mere breach of its contract of carriage but upon the finding that its negligence was found to be the direct or proximate cause of the injury complained of. Thus, appellee contends that "if there is no negligence on the part of the common carrier but that the accident resulting in injuries is due to causes which are inevitable and which could not have been avoided or anticipated notwithstanding the exercise of that high degree of care and skill which the carrier is bound to exercise for the safety of his passengers", neither the common carrier nor the driver is liable therefor.

We believe that the law concerning the liability of a common carrier has now suffered a substantial modification in view of the innovations introduced by the new Civil Code. These innovations are the ones embodied in Articles 1733, 1755 and 1756 in so far as the relation between a common carrier and its passengers is concerned, which, for ready reference, we quote hereunder:

ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extra ordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them according to all the circumstances of each case.

Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.

ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.

ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755.

The Code Commission, in justifying this extraordinary diligence required of a common carrier, says the following:

A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost deligence of very cautions persons, with due regard for all circumstances. This extraordinary diligence required of common carriers is calculated to protect the passengers from the tragic mishaps that frequently occur in connection with rapid modern transportation. This high standard of care is imperatively demanded by the precariousness of human life and by the consideration that every person must in every way be safeguarded against all injury. (Report of the Code Commission, pp. 35-36)" (Padilla, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. IV, 1956 ed., p. 197).

From the above legal provisions, we can make the following restatement of the principles governing the liability of a common carrier: (1) the liability of a carrier is contractual and arises upon breach of its obligation. There is breach if it fails to exert extraordinary diligence according to all circumstances of each case; (2) a carrier is obliged to carry its passenger with the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, having due regard for all the circumstances; (3) a carrier is presumed to be at fault or to have acted negligently in case of death of, or injury to, passengers, it being its duty to prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence; and (4) the carrier is not an insurer against all risks of travel.

The question that now arises is: Has defendant observed extraordinary diligence or the utmost diligence of every cautious person, having due regard for all circumstances, in avoiding the collision which resulted in the injury caused to the plaintiff?

After examining the evidence in connection with how the collision occurred, the lower court made the following finding:

Hemos examinado muy detenidamente las pruebas presentadas en la vista, principalmente, las declaraciones que hemos acotado arriba, y hernos Ilegado a la conclusion de que el demandado ha hecho, todo cuanto estuviere de su parte para evitar el accidente, pero sin embargo, no ha podido evitarlo.

EI hecho de que el demandado, antes del choque, tuvo que hacer pasar su truck encima de los montones de grava que estaban depositados en la orilla del camino, sin que haya ido mas alla, por el grave riesgo que corrian las vidas de sus pasajeros, es prueba concluyente de lo que tenemos dicho, a saber: que el cuanto esuba de su parte, para evitar el accidente, sin que haya podidoevitardo, por estar fuera de su control.

The evidence would appear to support the above finding. Thus, it appears that Bus No. 31, immediately prior to the collision, was running at a moderate speed because it had just stopped at the school zone of Matacong, Polangui, Albay. The pick-up car was at full speed and was running outside of its proper lane. The driver of the bus, upon seeing the manner in which the pick-up was then running, swerved the bus to the very extreme right of the road until its front and rear wheels have gone over the pile of stones or gravel situated on the rampart of the road. Said driver could not move the bus farther right and run over a greater portion of the pile, the peak of which was about 3 feet high, without endangering the safety of his passengers. And notwithstanding all these efforts, the rear left side of the bus was hit by the pick-up car.

Of course, this finding is disputed by appellant who cannot see eye to eye with the evidence for the appellee and insists that the collision took place because the driver of the bus was going at a fast speed. He contends that, having seen that a car was coming from the opposite direction at a distance which allows the use of moderate care and prudence to avoid an accident, and knowing that on the side of the road along which he was going there was a pile of gravel, the driver of the bus should have stopped and waited for the vehicle from the opposite direction to pass, and should have proceeded only after the other vehicle had passed. In other words, according to appellant, the act of the driver of the bus in squeezing his way through of the bus in squeezing his way through between the oncoming pick-up and the pile of gravel under the circumstances was considered negligent.

But this matter is one of credibility and evaluation of the evidence. This is evidence. This is the function of the trial court. The trial court has already spoken on this matter as we have pointed out above. This is also a matter of appreciation of the situation on the part of the driver. While the position taken by appellant appeals more to the sense of caution that one should observe in a given situation to avoid an accident or mishap, such however can not always be expected from one who is placed suddenly in a predicament where he is not given enough time to take the course of action as he should under ordinary circumstances. One who is placed in such a predicament cannot exercise such coolness or accuracy of judgment as is required of him under ordinary circumstances and he cannot therefore be expected to observe the same judgment, care and precaution as in the latter. For this reason, authorities abound where failure to observe the same degree of care that as ordinary prudent man would exercise under ordinary circumstances when confronted with a sadden emergency was held to be warranted and a justification to exempt the carrier from liability. Thus, it was held that "where a carrier's employee is confronted with a sudden emergency, the fact that he is obliged to act quickly and without a chance for deliberation must be taken into account, and he is held to the some degree of care that he would otherwise be required to exercise in the absence of such emergency but must exercise only such care as any ordinary prudent person would exercise under like circumstances and conditions, and the failure on his part to exercise the best judgement the case renders possible does not establish lack of care and skill on his part which renders the company, liable. . . . (13 C. J. S., 1412; 10 C. J.,970). Considering all the circumstances, we are persuaded to conclude that the driver of the bus has done what a prudent man could have done to avoid the collision and in our opinion this relieves appellee from legibility under our law.

A circumstances which miliates against the stand of appellant is the fact borne out by the evidence that when he boarded the bus in question, he seated himself on the left side thereof resting his left arm on the window sill but with his left elbow outside the window, this being his position in the bus when the collision took place. It is for this reason that the collision resulted in the severance of said left arm from the body of appellant thus doing him a great damage. It is therefore apparent that appellant is guilty of contributory negligence. Had he not placed his left arm on the window sill with a portion thereof protruding outside, perhaps the injury would have been avoided as is the case with the other passenger. It is to be noted that appellant was the only victim of the collision.

It is true that such contributory negligence cannot relieve appellee of its liability but will only entitle it to a reduction of the amount of damage caused (Article 1762, new Civil Code), but this is a circumstance which further militates against the position taken by appellant in this case.

It is the prevailing rule that it is negligence per se for a passenger on a railroad voluntarily or inadvertently to protrude his arm, hand, elbow, or any other part of his body through the window of a moving car beyond the outer edge of the window or outer surface of the car, so as to come in contact with objects or obstacles near the track, and that no recovery can be had for an injury which but for such negligence would not have been sustained. (10 C. J. 1139)

Plaintiff, (passenger) while riding on an interurban car, to flick the ashes, from his cigar, thrust his hand over the guard rail a sufficient distance beyond the side line of the car to bring it in contact with the trunk of a tree standing beside the track; the force of the blow breaking his wrist. Held, that he was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. (Malakia vs. Rhode Island Co., 89 A., 337.)

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with cost against appellant.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.Laguna v. TiongsonApr 30, 1966G.R. No. L-22143 April 30, 1966

LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS CO., petitioner, vs.ANTONIO TIONGSON and FELICITAS J. TIONGSON, respondents.

Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta and D. E. de Lara and Associates for petitioner.Ejercito, Velilla and Balonkita for respondents.

DIZON, J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari taken by Laguna Tayabas Bus Co., a common carrier engaged in the land transportation business in the southern Tagalog provinces, to review the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in Civil Case No. 1760 entitled "Antonio Tiongson, Paz C. Tiongson and Felicitas J. Tiongson, plaintiffs, vs. Laguna Tayabas Bus Company, defendant" sentencing the latter to pay the former the sum of P50,000.00 by way of actual, compensatory and moral damages, and the further sum of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs.

On June 3, 1958, about two kilometers past the poblacion of Bay, Laguna, petitioner's LTB Bus No. 204, coming from San Pablo City towards Manila, collided with a 7-Up delivery truck coming from the opposite direction. As a consequence the bus fell on its right side on the shoulder of the road resulting in injuries to many of its passengers and the death of Ricardo C. Tiongson and a woman passenger. Both drivers were prosecuted for double homicide, multiple serious physical injuries and damage to property, thru reckless imprudence, in the Court of First Instance of Laguna, but a separate action for damages for breach of contract of carriage was filed in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan (Civil Case No. 1760) by respondents herein, as heirs of the deceased Ricardo C. Tiongson, against petitioner.

In its answer to the complaint, petitioner alleged that it had observed utmost diligence in operating Bus No. 204 on June 3, 1958; that its driver could not have prevented or avoided the accident which was fortuitous insofar as it was concerned; and that the proximate cause of the death of passenger Tiongson "as the negligence and imprudence of one Porvenir Aralar Barretto and his employer Santiago Syjuco, Inc. and/or Seven-Up Bottling Company of the Philippines, or, in the alternative, the gross negligence of the highway authorities in failing to keep and maintain the national roads in good repair at all times and safe condition for all motorists".

Finding petitioner's driver to blame for the accident, the trial court, on December 28, 1959, rendered judgment as follows:

Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered sentencing defendant to pay to plaintiffs the sum of P50,000.00 by way of actual, compensatory and moral damages, and the further sum of P5,000.00 as counsel fees, with costs against defendant.

Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals petitioner from the portion thereof holding it liable for damages for breach of contract, and respondents from the portion determining the amount of damages awarded to them.

Meanwhile, on July 31, 1961, the Court of First Instance of Laguna, in Criminal Case No. B-3311, acquitted Claro Samonte, petitioner's driver, of the offense charged mentioned heretofore, on the ground of reasonable doubt. Upon the other hand, on October 28, 1963, the Court of Appeals rendered the decision appealed from.

In its first assignment of error, petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming instead of reversing the findings made by the trial court to the effect that the driver of the LTB bus and not the driver of the 7-Up truck was to blame for the accident in question.

The following are the pertinent facts found established by the trial court:

About two kilometers past the poblacion of Bay, Laguna, defendant's LTB Bus No. 204 collided with the 7-Up delivery truck which came from the opposite direction, that is, from Manila towards San Pablo City. As a result of the collision, defendant's bus fell on the right side on the shoulder of the road, which resulted in injuries to many passengers, and the death of Ricardo C. Tiongson and a woman passenger. ... Having been notified of the collision, Gerardo Dilla, chief of police of Bay, Laguna, immediately proceeded to the scene thereof. The Bay Chief of Police made an on-the-spot investigation and prepared a sketch of the spot where the collision occurred. From the findings of the chief of police, it appears that the road had an asphalted pavement, 5-1/2 meters wide, and shoulders on both sides, the shoulder going towards the poblacion of Bay being 65 cm. wide and the one on the opposite side having a width of 70 cm. The chief of police also saw on the asphalted pavement a somewhat rectangular depression, 3 meters long, 2 meters wide, and 12 cm. deep, on the left side of the road going north, that is, going towards Manila . . . . .

Perhaps of most value to plaintiffs is the testimony of Rufo Reao, a farmer and a barrio lieutenant of Tabon, Bay, Laguna. The substance of Rufo's testimony is that ... he saw two LTB trucks, following each other, from south to north at a distance of about 30 meters from each other; that he also saw a 7-Up truck going from north to south; that the leading LTB bus (presumably Bus No. 204) was travelling faster than the 7-Up truck; that suddenly, he heard the impact of a collision between the leading LTB bus and the 7-Up truck; that as a result of the collision, the LTB bus fell on its side while the 7-Up truck turned crosswise on the road; . . . .

Samonte testified that ... while he was in barrio Tabon, Bay, Laguna, at about 5:45 that same afternoon, he first saw the 7-Up truck from a distance of about 150 meters; that he was then running at about 30 kilometers per hour; that upon sighting the 7-Up truck, he slackened his speed and placed his bus on the right side of the road; that when the distance between his bus and the 7-Up truck had been reduced to about ten (10) meters and foreseeing that he could not avoid being hit by the truck which had swerved to the left, he applied his brakes and maneuvered his bus towards the right side of the road so much so that the right wheels were already on the shoulder of the road; but that before he could come to a complete stop, at a speed then of only 10 kilometers per hour, the left front mudguard of his bus was hit by the 7-Up truck.

After thus evaluating the prosecution evidence and the testimony of petitioner's witnesses, namely, Claro Samonte, its driver, Ernesto Alcantara, its conductor, and Teotimo de Mesa, its Chief Clerk, the trial court said:

In moving forward to a conclusion in this case, certain general principles must be borne in mind, namely: (1) the liability of a carrier is contractual and arises upon its breach of the obligation, and there is a breach if it fails to exercise extraordinary diligence according to all the circumstances of each case; (2) a carrier is obliged to carry its passengers with the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, having due regard for all the circumstances; (3) a carrier is presumed to be at fault or to have acted negligently in case of death of, or injury to its passengers, it being its duty to prove that it exercised extra-ordinary diligence; (4) a carrier is not an insurer against all risks of travel (Isaac vs. A.L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-9671, August 28, 1957); and (5) that a carrier shall not be responsible for events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable (Alfaro vs. Ayson, 54 O.G. 7922).

In the light of the foregoing principles and the evidence of record, the main questions for determination are whether defendant has successfully discharged its burden of disproving its presumptive negligence because of its failure to transport safely to his destination the deceased Ricardo C. Tiongson, and whether defendant has sufficiently established its defense of fortuitous event.

After a review of the record, the court believes that defendant has not successfully discharged its burden. Defendant's driver, Samonte, wanted to impress the court that he was entirely free from fault or negligence in the collision between his bus and the 7-Up truck. This he testified that when he first sighted the 7-Up truck, 150 meters away from his bus, the said truck was then running between 50 and 60 kilometers per hour, while he, for his part, was then going only at about 30 kilometers per hour. This testimony of Samonte is to be seriously doubted. In the first place, he and his conductor, Alcantara, must be necessarily biased witnesses for they are both employed by the defendant. In the second place, it is of common knowledge that a delivery truck fully loaded with cases of soft drinks is a slower-moving vehicle than a passenger bus. A passenger bus is necessarily designed for speed because travellers usually want to arrive at their destinations within the shortest possible time, whereas soft drinks delivery trucks are built for the safety of its bottled cargo than for speed. In the third place, Samonte's claim that when he applied the brakes of his bus when it was then about 10 meters away from the 7-Up truck, the speed of his bus was only about 10 kilometers per hour cannot be given full credence. He stated that after applying the brakes, his bus still moved less than 5 meters before being hit by the 7-Up truck. If his speed had only been 10 kilometers per hour, upon the application of the brakes, he would have stopped the bus within a much shorter distance.

But even assuming that defendant's bus was then running only at approximately 10 kilometers per hour when the driver Samonte first applied the brakes, it would seem that he applied the brakes too late. Samonte testified that upon sighting the 7-Up truck at a distance of approximately 150 meters, he slackened his speed by first reducing it to 20 and then to 10 kilometers per hour, and brought his bus towards the right side of the road; and that it was only when the distance between the two vehicles was only about 10 meters that he first stepped on the brakes. The court feels that it was not enough for Samonte to slacken his speed gradually until he came down to 10 kilometers per hour. He should have stopped his bus immediately upon seeing the 7-Up truck veer towards his lane after jumping out of the big depression on the asphalted pavement. He was not unaware of such depression, and the location thereof for he had been travelling on the same route for a considerable length of time prior to 3 June 1958.1wph1.t

It will not do for defendant's driver to claim that he could not avoid the 7-Up truck because if he did he would have fallen into the ditch on his side of the highway. If he was placed in the position claimed by him, it was entirely his fault, for he could have easily avoided the 7-Up truck if he had applied his brakes on time, while the 7-Up truck was still more than 10 meters away from him. Besides, instead of applying the brakes while the 7-Up truck was still some distance away from him, he could have veered to the left side of the road, going north, where there was sufficient space for him, taking into account that the asphalted pavement of the road was 5-1/2 meters wide with a shoulder of 65 cm. wide. In such posture, he could have avoided collision with the 7-Up truck which, on the other hand, would have also been free to right its direction after it came out from the big depression.

An examination of the sketch prepared by the chief of police of Bay, Laguna (Exhibit 1) shows that the collision between defendant's bus and the 7-Up truck occurred only 8 meters away from the big depression. This short distance would seem to indicate that defendant's driver, Samonte, knowing exactly the location of the depression, and anticipating that the 7-Up truck coming the opposite direction would veer to the left of the said depression in order to avoid the same, raced with the 7-Up truck in order that he could first pass through the space between the depression and what was left of the asphalted pavement of the lane on which he was then travelling, obviously for the purpose of avoiding delay. Because of this, the 7-Up truck driver who must have intended to pass on the said space in order to avoid going through the depression, was suddenly forced into the depression, in order to avoid a head-on collision with defendant's bus. But unfortunately, after bumping out of the depression, the truck veered to the left and hit defendant's bus on the left front side, thereby causing the bus to overturn on its right side.

The Court of Appeals agreed with the above being of the opinion that the testimony of Rufo Reao, a barrio lieutenant and a disinterested eye-witness of the accident, was credible; that, to the contrary, the testimony of Claro Samonte and Ernesto Alcantara, driver and conductor respectively of petitioner's bus, was improbable and biased; that Samonte actually applied the brakes on his bus too late to avoid the accident because at that time the distance between the two vehicles was only ten meters; that Samonte was well aware of the condition of the road, particularly of the existence of a depression near the place where the two vehicles collided, because he had been driving through and along the same route for a considerable period of time prior to the accident; that on May 16, 1958 or only two weeks before the fatal collission, Samonte had been apprehended for overspeeding, and finally, that certain admissions made on the witness stand by Teotimo de Mesa, petitioner's chief clerk since 1948, sufficiently showed that the company had not exercised due care and diligence in connection with the hiring of Samonte. The Court of Appeals therefore expressly found that petitioner not only failed to disprove the presumption of negligence arising against it (Articles 1733, 1755, and 1756 of the New Civil Code) but that, on the contrary, its negligence had been established by more than mere preponderance of evidence.

A thorough review of the record by Us has not disclosed any material fact or circumstance showing that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in the respects covered by the issue under consideration.

The remaining assignment of errors refer to the correctness of the decision appealed from in so far as it grants moral damages to respondents, the amount of the award for loss of earnings, and the additional award of P5,000 for attorney's fees.

Petitioner's liability for moral damages can not now be seriously questioned in view of the provisions of Articles 1764 and 2206, Nos. 1 and 3 of the New Civil Code and the ruling in Necesito, et al. vs. Paras, et al., G.R. Nos. L-10605-06, Resolution on motion to reconsider, September 11, 1958 where, speaking through, Mr. Justice Jose B.L. Reyes, We said:

In awarding to the heirs of the deceased Severino Garces an indemnity for the loss of "her guidance, protection and company," although it is but moral damages, the Court took into account that the case of a passenger who dies in the course of an accident, due to the carrier's negligence, constitutes an exception to the general rule. While, as pointed out in the main decision, under Article 2220 of the new Civil Code there can be no recovery of moral damages for a breach of contract in the absence of fraud (malice) or bad faith, the case of a violation of the contract or carrier leading to a passenger's death escapes this general rule, in view of Article 1764 in connection with Article 2206, No. 3 of the new Civil Code.

"Art. 1764. Damages in cases comprised in this section shall be awarded in accordance with Title XVIII of this Book, concerning Damages. Article 2206 shall also apply to the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract by a common carrier.

"Art. 2206. x x x x x x x x x

"(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased."

Being a special rule limited to cases of fatal injuries, these articles prevail over the general rule of Article 2220. Special provisions control general ones (Lichauco & Co. vs. Apostol, 44 Phil. 138; Sancho vs. Lizarrage, 55 Phil. 601).

It thus appears that under the new Civil Code, in case of accident due to a carrier's negligence, the heirs of a deceased passenger may recover moral damages, even though a passenger who is injured, but manages to survive, is not entitled to them. There is, therefore, no conflict between our main decision in the instant case and that of Cachero vs. Manila Taxicab Co., G.R. No. 8721, May 23, 1957, where the passenger suffered injuries, but did not lose his life.

The above ruling was followed and applied in Cariaga vs. L.T.B., G.R. No. L-11037, December 29, 1960; Bernardo vs. Luna, G.R. Nos. L-13328-29, September 29, 1961; and Martinez vs. Gonzales, G.R. No. L-17570, October 30, 1962.

Petitioner contends that the compensatory and moral damages awarded are excessive. We do not find them to be so, considering the pertinent facts of record. The deceased Ricardo C. Tiongson, at the time of his death on June 3, 1958, was only thirty-two years old. He was a Bachelor of Science in Commerce (Far Eastern University - 1949) and obtained employment with the San Pablo City Branch of the People's Bank in 1954 with a starting monthly salary of P150.00 which, after six months in the service, was increased to P175.00. While thus employed with the People's Bank, he was also administering his mother's farm in Calamba, Laguna. He was the only son of respondent spouses Antonio Tiongson and Paz Cailles Tiongson, and had been married hardly three years when he died. The foregoing circumstances, in our opinion, fully justify the damages awarded in the appealed decision which are substantially in accord with the rules of law contained in Articles 1764 and 2206, Nos. 1 and 3 of the New Civil Code.

Lastly, it is contended that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's award for attorney's fees. This contention is likewise untenable.

Considering the provisions of Article No. 2208, Nos. 2 and 11 of the New Civil Code, and the proven fact that petitioner ignored respondents' demand for an amicable settlement of their claim, the award of attorney's fees in this case seems to be completely justified (Rex Taxicab Co., Inc. vs. Bautista, G.R. No. L-15392, September 30, 1960; Necesito vs. Paras, supra).

Wherefore, the decision appealed, from is affirmed, with costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Sanchez, JJ., concur.Zaldivar, J., took no part.La Mallorca v. De JesusMay 14, 1966G.R. No. L-21486 May 14, 1966

LA MALLORCA and PAMPANGA BUS COMPANY, petitioner, vs.VALENTIN DE JESUS, MANOLO TOLENTINO and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Manuel O. Chan for petitioners.Sixto T. Antonio for respondents.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

La Mallorca and Pampanga Bus Company, Inc., commonly known as La Mallorca-Pambusco, filed this appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed that rendered by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in its civil case No. 2100, entitled "Valentin de Jesus and Manolo Tolentino vs. La Mallorca-Pambusco." The court a quo sentenced the defendant, now petitioner, "to pay to plaintiffs the amount of P2,132.50 for actual damages; P14,400.00 as compensatory damages; P10,000.00 to each plaintiff by way of moral damages; and P3,000.00 as counsel fees."

Two errors are attributed to the appellate Court: (1) "in sustaining the decision (of the court a quo) holding that the petitioners were liable for the accident which was caused by a blow-out of one of the tires of the bus and in not considering the same as caso fortuito," and (2) in holding petitioners liable for moral damages.

The suit arose by reason of the death of Lolita de Jesus, 20-year old daughter of Valentin de Jesus and wife of Manolo Tolentino, in a head-on collision between petitioner's bus, on which she was a passenger, and a freight truck traveling in the opposite direction, in a barrio in Marilao Bulacan, in the morning of October 8, 1959. The immediate cause of the collision was the fact that the driver of the bus lost control of the wheel when its left front tire suddenly exploded.

Petitioner maintains that a tire blow-out is a fortuitous event and gives rise to no liability for negligence, citing the rulings of the Court of Appeals in Rodriguez vs. Red Line Transportation Co., CA-G.R. No. 8136, December 29, 1954, and People vs. Palapad, CA-G.R. No. 18480, June 27, 1958. These rulings, however, not only are not not binding on this Court but were based on considerations quite different from those that obtain in the at bar. The appellate Court there made no findings of any specified acts of negligence on the part of the defendants and confined itself to the question of whether or not a tire blow-out, by itself alone and without a showing as to the causative factors, would generate liability. In the present case, the cause of the blow-out was known. The inner tube of the left front tire, according to petitioner's own evidence and as found by the Court of Appeals "was pressed between the inner circle of the left wheel and the rim which had slipped out of the wheel." This was, said Court correctly held, a mechanical defect of the conveyance or a fault in its equipment which was easily discoverable if the bus had been subjected to a more thorough, or rigid check-up before it took to the road that morning.

Then again both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found as a fact that the bus was running quite fast immediately before the accident. Considering that the tire which exploded was not new petitioner describes it as "hindi masyadong kalbo," or not so very worn out the plea of caso fortuito cannot be entertained.1wph1.t

The second issue raised by petitioner is already a settled one. In this jurisdiction moral damages are recoverable by reason of the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract of a common carrier, as provided in Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206, of the Civil Code. These articles have been applied by this Court in a number of cases, among them Necesito, etc. vs. Paras, et al., L-10605-06, June 30, 1958; Mercado vs. Lira, L-13328-29, Sept. 29, 1961; Villa-Rey Transit vs. Bello, L-18957, April 23, 1963.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against petitioners.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.Anuran v. BuoMay 20, 1966G.R. Nos. L-21353 and L-21354 May 20, 1966

GREGORIO ANURAN, MARIA MALIGAYA, LAPAZ LARO, ET AL., petitioners, vs.PEPITO BUO, PEDRO GAHOL, LUISA ALCANTARA, GUILLERMO RAZON, ANSELMO MALIGAYA and CEFERINA ARO, respondents.

Victoriano A. Endaya for petitioners.Trinidad and Borromeo for respondents Buo, et al.Contreras and Adapon for respondents Razon, et al.

BENGZON, C.J.:

At noon of January 12, 1958, a passenger jeepney was parked on the road to Taal, Batangas. A motor truck speeding along, negligently bumped it from behind, with such violence that three of its passengers died, even as two others (passengers too) suffered injuries that required their confinement at the Provincial Hospital for many days.

So, in February 1958 these suits were instituted by the representatives of the dead and of the injured, to recover consequently damages against the driver and the owners of the truck and also against the driver and the owners of the jeepney.

The Batangas Court of First Instance, after trial, rendered judgment absolving the driver of the jeepney and its owners, but it required the truck driver and the owners thereof to make compensation.

The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals insisting that the driver and the owners of the jeepney should also be made liable for damages.

The last mentioned court, upon reviewing the record, declared that:

It is admitted that at about noontime on January 13, 1958, the passenger jeepney owned by defendants spouses Pedro Gahol and Luisa Alcantara, bearing plate No. TPU-13548, then being driven by their regular driver, defendant Pepito Buo was on its regular route travelling from Mahabang Ludlud, Taal, Batangas, towards the poblacion of the said municipality. When said passenger jeepney crossed the bridge separating Barrios Mahabang Ludlud and Balisong, Taal, Batangas, it had fourteen passengers, excluding the driver, according to the testimony of defendant Buo (pp. 12 and 18, t.s.n. July 17, 1958), or sixteen passengers according to the testimony of plaintiff Edita de Sagun, (pp. 9, 12 and 13, t.s.n. June 26, 1958). However, the fact remains that the vehicle was overloaded with passengers at the time, because according to the partial stipulation of facts "the maximum capacity of the jeepney bearing plate No. TPU-13548 of said defendants was eleven (11) passengers including the driver. (Printed Record on Appeal, pp. 35, 37.)

After crossing the bridge, defendant Buo stopped his vehicle in order to allow one of his passengers to alight. But he so parked his jeepney in such a way that one-half of its width (the left wheels) was on the asphalted pavement of the road and the other half, on the right shoulder of said road (pp. 21-22, t.s.n. May 26, 1958; p. 12 t.s.n. July 17, 1958). Approximately five minutes later and before Buo could start his vehicle, a speeding water truck, which bore plate No. T-17526 and owned by defendants-spouses Anselmo Maligaya and Ceferina Aro, then being driven by Guillermo Razon from the direction of Mahabang Ludlud, Taal, Batangas, towards the poblacion of that municipality, violently smashed against the parked jeepney from behind, causing it to turn turtle into a nearby ditch.

Then said Appellate Court went on to affirm the exoneration of the jeepney driver and of its owners. It explained that although "the driver of the ill-starred vehicle was not free from fault, for he was guilty of an antecedent negligence in parking his vehicle with a portion thereof occupying the asphalted road", it considered the truck driver guilty of greater negligence which was the efficient cause of the collision; and applying the doctrine of the "last clear chance"1 said Court ordered the owners of the truck to pay, solidarily with its driver, damages as follows:

x x x the sum of P6,000.00 for the death of their daughter Emelita, another sum of P5,000.00 as moral damages and the sum of P500.00 as actual damages, and to plaintiffs Simplicio, Alberto, Avelina and Alfredo, all surnamed Arriola, and represented by their guardian ad litem Agustin Arriola, the sum of P6,000.00 for the death of their natural mother, Leonor Masongsong, another sum of P5,000.00 as moral damages the sum of P3,600.00 for loss of earning capacity of said deceased and the sum of P850.00 as actual damages.

The plaintiffs brought the matter to this Supreme Court insisting that the driver and the owners of the jeepney should also be made liable.

We gave due course to the petition for review, because we thought the decision meant exoneration of the carrier from liability to its passengers, notwithstanding the negligence of its driver.

Upon further and more extended consideration of the matter, we have become convinced that error of law was committed in releasing the jeepney from liability. It must be remembered that the obligation of the carrier to transport its passengers safely is such that the New Civil Code requires "utmost diligence" from the carriers (Art. 1755) who are "presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they have observed extraordinary diligence" (Art. 1756). In this instance, this legal presumption of negligence is confirmed by the Court of Appeals' finding that the driver of the jeepney in question was at fault in parking the vehicle improperly. It must follow that the driver and the owners of the jeepney must answer for injuries to its passengers.

The principle about the "last clear chance" would call for application in a suit between the owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence.

Now as to damages. The driver and the owners of the truck have not appealed from the Court of Appeals' assessment. The plaintiffs (petitioners) have not asked here for a greater amount of indemnity. They merely pray for a declaration that Pepito Buo, Pedro Gahol and Luisa Alcantara (the driver and the owners of the jeepney, respectively) be declared jointly and severally liable with the other defendants.1wph1.t

Wherefore, affirming the decision under review, we hereby modify it in the sense prayed for by plaintiffs-petitioners. The three defendants last mentioned are required to pay solidarily with the other defendants-respondents the amounts fixed by the appealed decision. Costs of both appeals against said three defendants. So ordered.

Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, J.B.L. Reyes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal and Bengzon, J.P., JJ., concur.Barrera, Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., took no part.Maranan v. PerezJun 26, 1967G.R. No. L-22272 June 26, 1967

ANTONIA MARANAN, plaintiff-appellant, vs.PASCUAL PEREZ, ET AL., defendants. PASCUAL PEREZ, defendant appellant.

Pedro Panganiban for plaintiff-appellant.Magno T. Bueser for defendant-appellant.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

Rogelio Corachea, on October 18, 1960, was a passenger in a taxicab owned and operated by Pascual Perez when he was stabbed and killed by the driver, Simeon Valenzuela.

Valenzuela was prosecuted for homicide in the Court of First Instance of Batangas. Found guilty, he was sentenced to suffer imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P6,000. Appeal from said conviction was taken to the Court of Appeals.1wph1.t

On December 6 1961, while appeal was pending in the Court of Appeals, Antonia Maranan, Rogelio's mother, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Batangas to recover damages from Perez and Valenzuela for the death of her son. Defendants asserted that the deceased was killed in self-defense, since he first assaulted the driver by stabbing him from behind. Defendant Perez further claimed that the death was a caso fortuito for which the carrier was not liable.

The court a quo, after trial, found for the plaintiff and awarded her P3,000 as damages against defendant Perez. The claim against defendant Valenzuela was dismissed. From this ruling, both plaintiff and defendant Perez appealed to this Court, the former asking for more damages and the latter insisting on non-liability. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction earlier mentioned, during the pendency of the herein appeal, and on May 19, 1964, final judgment was entered therein. (Rollo, p. 33).

Defendant-appellant relies solely on the ruling enunciated in Gillaco v. Manila Railroad Co., 97 Phil. 884, that the carrier is under no absolute liability for assaults of its employees upon the passengers. The attendant facts and controlling law of that case and the one at bar are very different however. In the Gillaco case, the passenger was killed outside the scope and the course of duty of the guilty employee. As this Court there found:

x x x when the crime took place, the guard Devesa had no duties to discharge in connection with the transportation of the deceased from Calamba to Manila. The stipulation of facts is clear that when Devesa shot and killed Gillaco, Devesa was assigned to guard the Manila-San Fernando (La Union) trains, and he was at Paco Station awaiting transportation to Tutuban, the starting point of the train that he was engaged to guard. In fact, his tour of duty was to start at 9:00 two hours after the commission of the crime. Devesa was therefore under no obligation to safeguard the passengers of the Calamba-Manila train, where the deceased was riding; and the killing of Gillaco was not done in line of duty. The position of Devesa at the time was that of another would be passenger, a stranger also awaiting transportation, and not that of an employee assigned to discharge any of the duties that the Railroad had assumed by its contract with the deceased. As a result, Devesa's assault can not be deemed in law a breach of Gillaco's contract of transportation by a servant or employee of the carrier. . . . (Emphasis supplied)

Now here, the killing was perpetrated by the driver of the very cab transporting the passenger, in whose hands the carrier had entrusted the duty of executing the contract of carriage. In other words, unlike the Gillaco case, the killing of the passenger here took place in the course of duty of the guilty employee and when the employee was acting within the scope of his duties.

Moreover, the Gillaco case was decided under the provisions of the Civil Code of 1889 which, unlike the present Civil Code, did not impose upon common carriers absolute liability for the safety of passengers against wilful assaults or negligent acts committed by their employees. The death of the passenger in the Gillaco case was truly a fortuitous event which exempted the carrier from liability. It is true that Art. 1105 of the old Civil Code on fortuitous events has been substantially reproduced in Art. 1174 of the Civil Code of the Philippines but both articles clearly remove from their exempting effect the case where the law expressly provides for liability in spite of the occurrence of force majeure. And herein significantly lies the statutory difference between the old and present Civil Codes, in the backdrop of the factual situation before Us, which further accounts for a different result in the Gillaco case. Unlike the old Civil Code, the new Civil Code of the Philippines expressly makes the common carrier liable for intentional assaults committed by its employees upon its passengers, by the wording of Art. 1759 which categorically states that

Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the former's employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers.

The Civil Code provisions on the subject of Common Carriers1 are new and were taken from Anglo-American Law.2 There, the basis of the carrier's liability for assaults on passengers committed by its drivers rests either on (1) the doctrine of respondeat superior or (2) the principle that it is the carrier's implied duty to transport the passenger safely.3

Under the first, which is the minority view, the carrier is liable only when the act of the employee is within the scope of his authority and duty. It is not sufficient that the act be within the course of employment only.4

Under the second view, upheld by the majority and also by the later cases, it is enough that the assault happens within the course of the employee's duty. It is no defense for the carrier that the act was done in excess of authority or in disobedience of the carrier's orders.5 The carrier's liability here is absolute in the sense that it practically secures the passengers from assaults committed by its own employees.6

As can be gleaned from Art. 1759, the Civil Code of the Philippines evidently follows the rule based on the second view. At least three very cogent reasons underlie this rule. As explained in Texas Midland R.R. v. Monroe, 110 Tex. 97, 216 S.W. 388, 389-390, and Haver v. Central Railroad Co., 43 LRA 84, 85: (1) the special undertaking of the carrier requires that it furnish its passenger that full measure of protection afforded by the exercise of the high degree of care prescribed by the law, inter alia from violence and insults at the hands of strangers and other passengers, but above all, from the acts of the carrier's own servants charged with the passenger's safety; (2) said liability of the carrier for the servant's violation of duty to passengers, is the result of the formers confiding in the servant's hands the performance of his contract to safely transport the passenger, delegating therewith the duty of protecting the passenger with the utmost care prescribed by law; and (3) as between the carrier and the passenger, the former must bear the risk of wrongful acts or negligence of the carrier's employees against passengers, since it, and not the passengers, has power to select and remove them.

Accordingly, it is the carrier's strict obligation to select its drivers and similar employees with due regard not only to their technical competence and physical ability, but also, no less important, to their total personality, including their patterns of behavior, moral fibers, and social attitude.

Applying this stringent norm to the facts in this case, therefore, the lower court rightly adjudged the defendant carrier liable pursuant to Art. 1759 of the Civil Code. The dismissal of the claim against the defendant driver was also correct. Plaintiff's action was predicated on breach of contract of carriage7 and the cab driver was not a party thereto. His civil liability is covered in the criminal case wherein he was convicted by final judgment.

In connection with the award of damages, the court a quo granted only P3,000 to plaintiff-appellant. This is the minimum compensatory damages amount recoverable under Art. 1764 in connection with Art. 2206 of the Civil Code when a breach of contract results in the passenger's death. As has been the policy followed by this Court, this minimal award should be increased to P6,000. As to other alleged actual damages, the lower court's finding that plaintiff's evidence thereon was not convincing,8 should not be disturbed. Still, Arts. 2206 and 1764 award moral damages in addition to compensatory damages, to the parents of the passenger killed to compensate for the mental anguish they suffered. A claim therefor, having been properly made, it becomes the court's duty to award moral damages.9 Plaintiff demands P5,000 as moral damages; however, in the circumstances, We consider P3,000 moral damages, in addition to the P6,000 damages afore-stated, as sufficient. Interest upon such damages are also due to plaintiff-appellant. 10

Wherefore, with the modification increasing the award of actual damages in plaintiff's favor to P6,000, plus P3,000.00 moral damages, with legal interest on both from the filing of the complaint on December 6, 1961 until the whole amount is paid, the judgment appealed from is affirmed in all other respects. No costs. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.BTC v. CaguimbalJan 24, 1968G.R. No. L-22985 January 24, 1968

BATANGAS TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, petitioner, vs.GREGORIO CAGUIMBAL, PANCRACIO CAGUIMBAL, MARIA MARANAN DE CAGUIMBAL, BIAN TRANSPORTATION COMPANY and MARCIANO ILAGAN, respondents.

Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta and Domingo E. de Lara for petitioner. Victoriano H. Endaya for respondents.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The main facts are set forth in said decision from which we quote:

There is no dispute at all that the deceased Pedro Caguimbal, Barrio Lieutenant of Barrio Calansayan, San Jose, Batangas, was a paying passenger of BTCO bus, with plate TPU-507, going south on its regular route from Calamba, Laguna, to Batangas, Batangas, driven by Tomas Perez, its regular driver, at about 5:30 o'clock on the early morning of April 25, 1954. The deceased's destination was his residence at Calansayan, San Jose, Batangas. The bus of the Bian Transportation Company, bearing plate TPU-820, driven by Marciano Ilagan, was coming from the opposite direction (north-bound). Along the national highway at Barrio Daraza, Tanauan, Batangas, on the date and hour above indicated, a horse-driven rig (calesa) managed by Benito Makahiya, which was then ahead of the Bian bus, was also coming from the opposite direction, meaning proceeding towards the north. As to what transpired thereafter, the lower court chose to give more credence to defendant Batangas Transportation Company's version which, in the words of the Court a quo, is as follows: "As the BTCO bus was nearing a house, a passenger requested the conductor to stop as he was going to alight, and when he heard the signal of the conductor, the driver Tomas Perez slowed down his bus swerving it farther to the right in order to stop; at this juncture, a calesa, then driven by Benito Makahiya was at a distance of several meters facing the BTCO bus coming from the opposite direction; that at the same time the Bian bus was about 100 meters away likewise going northward and following the direction of the calesa; that upon seeing the Bian bus the driver of the BTCO bus dimmed his light as established by Magno Ilaw, the very conductor of the Bian bus at the time of the accident; that as the calesa and the BTCO bus were passing each other from the opposite directions, the Bian bus following the calesa swerved to its left in an attempt to pass between the BTCO bus and the calesa; that without diminishing its speed of about seventy (70) kilometers an hour, the Bian bus passed through the space between the BTCO bus and the calesa hitting first the left side of the BTCO bus with the left front corner of its body and then bumped and struck the calesa which was completely wrecked; that the driver was seriously injured and the horse was killed; that the second and all other posts supporting the top of the left side of the BTCO bus were completely smashed and half of the back wall to the left was ripped open. (Exhibits 1 and 2). The BTCO bus suffered damages for the repair of its damaged portion.

As a consequence of this occurrence, two (2) passengers of BTCO died, namely, Pedro Caguimbal and Guillermo Tolentino, apart from others who were injured. The widow and children of Caguimbal instituted the present action, which was tried jointly with a similar action of the Tolentinos, to recover damages from the Batangas Transportation Company, hereinafter referred to as BTCO. The latter, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against the Bian Transportation Company hereinafter referred to as Bian and its driver, Marciano Ilagan. Subsequently, the Caguimbals amended their complaint, to include therein, as defendants, said Bian and Ilagan.

After appropriate proceedings, the Court of First Instance of Batangas rendered a decision dismissing the complaint insofar as the BTCO is concerned, without prejudice to plaintiff's right to sue Bian which had stopped participating in the proceedings herein, owing apparently, to a case in the Court of First Instance of Laguna for the insolvency of said enterprise and Ilagan, and without pronouncement as to costs.

On appeal taken by the Caguimbals, the Court of Appeals reversed said decision and rendered judgment for them, sentencing the BTCO, Bian and Ilagan to, jointly and severally, pay to the plaintiffs the aggregate sum of P10,500.00 1 and the costs in both instances. Hence, this appeal by BTCO, upon the ground that the Court of Appeals erred: 1) in finding said appellant liable for damages; and 2) in awarding attorney's fees.

In connection with the first assignment of error, we note that the recklessness of defendant was, manifestly, a major factor in the occurrence of the accident which resulted, inter alia, in the death of Pedro Caguimbal. Indeed, as driver of the Bian bus, he overtook Benito Makahiya's horse-driven rig or calesa and passed between the same and the BTCO bus despite the fact that the space available was not big enough therefor, in view of which the Bian bus hit the left side of the BTCO bus and then the calesa. This notwithstanding, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment against the BTCO upon the ground that its driver, Tomas Perez, had failed to exercise the "extraordinary diligence," required in Article 1733 of the new Civil Code, "in the vigilance for the safety" of his passengers. 2

The record shows that, in order to permit one of them to disembark, Perez drove his BTCO bus partly to the right shoulder of the road and partly on the asphalted portion thereof. Yet, he could have and should have seen to it had he exercised "extraordinary diligence" that his bus was completely outside the asphalted portion of the road, and fully within the shoulder thereof, the width of which being more than sufficient to accommodate the bus. He could have and should have done this, because, when the aforementioned passenger expressed his wish to alight from the bus, Ilagan had seen the aforementioned "calesa", driven by Makahiya, a few meters away, coming from the opposite direction, with the Bian bus about 100 meters behind the rig cruising at a good speed. 3 When Perez slowed down his BTCO bus to permit said passenger to disembark, he must have known, therefore, that the Bian bus would overtake the calesa at about the time when the latter and BTCO bus would probably be on the same line, on opposite sides of the asphalted portions of the road, and that the space between the BTCO bus and the "calesa" would not be enough to allow the Bian bus to go through. It is true that the driver of the Bian bus should have slowed down or stopped, and, hence, was reckless in not doing so; but, he had no especial obligations toward the passengers of the BTCO unlike Perez whose duty was to exercise "utmost" or "extraordinary" diligence for their safety. Perez was thus under obligation to avoid a situation which would be hazardous for his passengers, and, make their safety dependent upon the diligence of the Bian driver. Such obligation becomes more patent when we considered the fact of which the Court may take judicial cognizance that our motor vehicle drivers, particularly those of public service utilities, have not distinguished themselves for their concern over the safety, the comfort or the convenience of others. Besides, as correctly stated in the syllabus to Brito Sy vs. Malate Taxicab & Garage, Inc., 4

In an action based on a contract of carriage, the court need not make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible to pay the damages sought for by the passenger. By the contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the express obligation to transport the passenger to his destination safely and to observe extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by the passenger is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier (Article 1756, new Civil Code). This is an exception to the general rule that negligence must be proved, and it is therefore incumbent upon the carrier to prove that it has exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the new Civil Code.

In the case at bar, BTCO has not proven the exercise of extraordinary diligence on its part. For this reason, the case of Isaac vs. A. L. Ammen Trans. Co., Inc. 5 relied upon by BTCO, is not in point, for, in said case, the public utility driver had done everything he could to avoid the accident, and could not have possibly avoided it, for he "swerved the bus to the very extreme right of the road," which the driver, in the present case, had failed to do.

As regards the second assignment of error, appellant argues that the award of attorney's fees is not authorized by law, because, of the eleven (11) cases specified in Article 1208 of the new Civil Code, only the fifth and the last are relevant to the one under consideration; but the fifth case requires bad faith, which does not exist in the case at bar. As regards the last case, which permits the award, "where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees . . . should be recovered," it is urged that the evidence on record does not show the existence of such just and equitable grounds.

We, however, believe otherwise, for: (1) the accident in question took place on April 25, 1954, and the Caguimbals have been constrained to litigate for over thirteen (13) years to vindicate their rights; and (2) it is high time to impress effectively upon public utility operators the nature and extent of their responsibility in respect of the safety of their passengers and their duty to exercise greater care in the selection of drivers and conductor and in supervising the performance of their duties, in accordance, not only with Article 1733 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, but, also, with Articles 1755 and 1756 thereof 6 and the spirit of these provisions, as disclosed by the letter thereof, and elucidated by the Commission that drafted the same. 7

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from, should be, as it is hereby, affirmed, with the costs of this instance against appellant Batangas Transportation Company.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.Bengzon, J.P., J., took no part.Del Castillo v. JaymalinMar 17, 1982G.R. No. L-28256March 17, 1982

SEVERO DEL CASTILLO, plaintiff-appellant, vs.LORENZO JAYMALIN MANUEL SABIT and BITRANCO and A. L. AMMEN TRANS. CO., INC., defendants-appellees.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

A direct appeal from the Decision, dated January 25, 1967, of the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, Branch 1, dismissing this case for Damages (Civil Case No. 1784 below) by reason of plaintiff Severo del Castillo's death.

On June 29, 1960, Mario del Castillo, a deaf-mute, son of plaintiff Severo del Castillo, and a paying passenger of defendant Bicol Transportation Company (Bitranco), operated by A.L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc. (ALATCO) at Casiguran, Sorsogon, fell upon alighting from Bus No. 624 of said companies and died as a result.

On September 5, 1962, an action for the recovery of damages for Mario's death was filed by his father, Severo, plaintiff herein, against the driver and conductor of the bus, and the transportation companies. The Complaint alleged that Severo, a widower, was the sole heir.

Defendant transportation companies traversed the complaint by stating that the passenger bus involved was owned by Bicol Transportation Co. alone; that the two companies had always exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees; and that the proximate cause of Mario's death was his recklessness and gross negligence in jumping out of the bus while in motion.

Trial ensued with plaintiff having been able to present his evidence and rest his case. Defendants proceeded with the presentation of their witnesses until July 9, 1966 when they filed a "Motion for Annulment of Proceedings after February 1, 1965", having learned that plaintiff Severo had died on February 1, 1965, at which time plaintiff had not yet rested his case having done so only on January 28, 1966. the Court a quo directed plaintiff's counsel to verify the existence of heirs and whether they were willing to be substituted as parties-plaintiffs."

On August 6, 1966, plaintiff's counsel filed a "Motion to Admit Amended Complaint" substituting Severo's son-in-law, one Wenceslao Haloc, as party plaintiff. This was in virtue of a "Deed of Assignment" dated August 13, 1960, thumbmarked by Severo, and reading as follows:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

That I, SEVERO DEL CASTILLO, of age, a widower and a resident of Casiguran, Sorsogon, Philippines, for reasons of my health and old age, do hereby transfer and assigned (sic) and by these presents do hereby assign and transfer unto the said WENCESLAO (sic) HALOC, my son in-law, of Barrio Storom Casiguran, Sorsogon, Philippines, my rights, privileges and all its accessory rights as such an heir to me (sic) for and in my behalf (sic) the case I originally instituted for indemnity for the death of my son the late Mario Castillo, who died while a passenger in an Alatco Bus No. 624, June 29, 1960 at about 7:00 P.M. more or less at Barrio Storom, Casiguran, Sorsogon.

That I hereby declare that from this date August 13, 1960 on, my son-in-law Wenceslao Haloc, of legal age will be my assignee as aforesaid.

(Sgd.) Thumb mark SEVERO DEL CASTILLO Res. Cert. No. A2920570Issued on July 5, 1960at Casiguran. Sorsogon

The Amended Complaint was admitted by the trial Court for lack of objection thereto on August 20, 1966.

Trial proceeded with defendants closing their evidence on November 25, 1966.

On January 26, 1967, the trial Court rendered judgment in defendants' favor dismissing the original and the amended Complaints upon the following ratiocination

... Since Severo del Castillo died before the conclusion of this case, this action died with him. Wenceslao Haloc is without personality to continue this case. He is not even an heir of Severo del Castillo.

Wenceslao Haloc appealed as a pauper directly to this Court contending that the Decision is "contrary to law."

Before this instance, it is urged that the trial Court erred:

1)In construing the Deed of Assignment as not a deed that transfers any benefit to the transferee.

2)In dismissing the case in virtue of the death of Severo del Castillo after the deed of assignment was executed and further still after the evidence testimonial and documentary were already presented.

We find merit in the foregoing contentions.

This is not a case where the provisions of Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court on "death of a party" are applicable. Rather, it is a situation where plaintiff, while alive, had assigned his rights to another, in which case, the proper procedure would have been for the transferee to have been substituted for the transferor as plaintiff. 1 The rights of Severo to claim damages for his son were transferable. Severo had transferred his rights as plaintiff to Wenceslao Haloc but after the assignment the case continued in Severo's name and there was no immediate and formal substitution of party plaintiff. This is but a formality, however, and the fact remains that, after the assignment, the substantial plaintiff and real party in interest became Haloc, with Severo as a sort of trustee of whatever fruits the litigation would bring

It was reversible error, therefore, for the trial Court to have dismissed the case by virtue of Severo's death. The action did not die with him. In point is the following ruling of this Court:

... where an assignable right has been transferred before action brought, the proceeding ought to be instituted in the name of the assignee; and where an assignment is effect pendente lite, it is proper to have the assignee substituted for the original plaintiff. If such substitution should not be effected and the transfer of the right of action should not be brought to the attention of the court, the original plaintiff, if successful in the litigation, would hold the fruits of the action as a sort of trustee for the use and benefit of his assignee. ... 2

Relative to the aspect of damages, the trial Court ruled:

Common carriers are responsible for the death of their passengers (Articles 1764 and 2206 of the Civil Code). This liability includes the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased. It appears proven that the defendant corporations failed to exercise the diligence that was their duty to observe according to Articles 1733 and 1755. The conductor was apprised of the fact that Mario del Castillo was deaf and dumb. With this knowledge the conductor should have taken extra-ordinary care for the safety of the said passenger. In this he failed.

The trial Court then concluded that "under the circumstances obtaining in the case, the plaintiff Severo del Castillo would be entitled to actual and moral damages but did not determine the amount of damages because it dismissed the case.

Technicality would require a remand of this case to the Court a quo, for a determination of the amount of damages [the total amount of P41,000.00 (P6,000.00 as damages for death, and P35,000.00 for loss of earning capacity), and attorney's fees of P5,000.00, were claimed]. Considering, however, the pendency of this case for 13 years and in order to put an end to the controversy, we determine the damages at P12,000.00 for the death of the victim, without interest, and P2,000.00 for attorney's fees. Loss of earning capacity in the amount of P35,000.00 has not been proven specially considering that the victim was a deaf-mute.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and defendants hereby ordered jointly and severally, to pay Wenceslao Haloc, the amount of P12,000.00 as damages for death, without interest, and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.Vasquez v. CASep 13, 1985G.R. No. L-42926September 13, 1985

PEDRO VASQUEZ, SOLEDAD ORTEGA, CLETO B. BAGAIPO, AGUSTINA VIRTUDES, ROMEO VASQUEZ and MAXIMINA CAINAY, petitioners, vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS and FILIPINAS PIONEER LINES, INC., respondents.

Emilio D. Castellanes for petitioners.

Apolinario A. Abantao for private respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

This litigation involves a claim for damages for the loss at sea of petitioners' respective children after the shipwreck of MV Pioneer Cebu due to typhoon "Klaring" in May of 1966.

The factual antecedents, as summarized by the trial Court and adopted by respondent Court, and which we find supported by the record, read as follows:

When the inter-island vessel MV "Pioneer Cebu" left the Port of Manila in the early morning of May 15, 1966 bound for Cebu, it had on board the spouses Alfonso Vasquez and Filipinas Bagaipo and a four-year old boy, Mario Marlon Vasquez, among her passengers. The MV "Pioneer Cebu" encountered typhoon "Klaring" and struck a reef on the southern part of Malapascua Island, located somewhere north of the island of Cebu and subsequently sunk. The aforementioned passengers were unheard from since then.

Plaintiffs Pedro Vasquez and Soledad Ortega are the parents of Alfonso Vasquez; plaintiffs Cleto Bagaipo and Agustina Virtudes are the parents of Filipinas Bagaipo; and plaintiffs Romeo Vasquez and Maxima Cainay are the parents of the child, Mario Marlon Vasquez. They seek the recovery of damages due to the loss of Alfonso Vasquez, Filipinas Bagaipo and Mario Marlon Vasquez during said voyage.

At the pre-trial, the defendant admitted its contract of carriage with Alfonso Vasquez, Filipinas Bagaipo and Mario Marlon Vasquez, and the fact of the sinking of the MV "Pioneer Cebu". The issues of the case were limited to the defenses alleged by the defendant that the sinking of the vessel was caused by force majeure, and that the defendant's liability had been extinguished by the total loss of the vessel.

The evidence on record as to the circumstances of the last voyage of the MV "Pioneer Cebu" came mainly, if not exclusively, from the defendant. The MV "Pioneer Cebu" was owned and operated by the defendant and used in the transportation of goods and passengers in the inter-island shipping. Scheduled to leave the Port of Manila at 9:00 p.m. on May 14, 1966, it actually left port at 5:00 a.m. the following day, May 15, 1966. It had a passenger capacity of three hundred twenty-two (322) including the crew. It undertook the said voyage on a special permit issued by the Collector of Customs inasmuch as, upon inspection, it was found to be without an emergency electrical power system. The special permit authorized the vessel to carry only two hundred sixty (260) passengers due to the said deficiency and for lack of safety devices for 322 passengers (Exh. 2). A headcount was made of the passengers on board, resulting on the tallying of 168 adults and 20 minors, although the passengers manifest only listed 106 passengers. It has been admitted, however, that the headcount is not reliable inasmuch as it was only done by one man on board the vessel.

When the vessel left Manila, its officers were already aware of the typhoon Klaring building up somewhere in Mindanao. There being no typhoon signals on the route from Manila to Cebu, and the vessel having been cleared by the Customs authorities, the MV "Pioneer Cebu" left on its voyage to Cebu despite the typhoon. When it reached Romblon Island, it was decided not to seek shelter thereat, inasmuch as the weather condition was still good. After passing Romblon and while near Jintotolo island, the barometer still indicated the existence of good weather condition continued until the vessel approached Tanguingui island. Upon passing the latter island, however, the weather suddenly changed and heavy rains felt Fearing that due to zero visibility, the vessel might hit Chocolate island group, the captain ordered a reversal of the course so that the vessel could 'weather out' the typhoon by facing the winds and the waves in the open. Unfortunately, at about noontime on May 16, 1966, the vessel struck a reef near Malapascua island, sustained leaks and eventually sunk, bringing with her Captain Floro Yap who was in command of the vessel.

Due to the loss of their children, petitioners sued for damages before the Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case No. 67139). Respondent defended on the plea of force majeure, and the extinction of its liability by the actual total loss of the vessel.

After proper proceedings, the trial Court awarded damages, thus:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant to pay:

(a)Plaintiffs Pedro Vasquez and Soledad Ortega the sums of P15,000.00 for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased Alfonso Vasquez, P2,100.00 for support, and P10,000.00 for moral damages;

(b)Plaintiffs Cleto B. Bagaipo and Agustina Virtudes the sum of P17,000.00 for loss of earning capacity of deceased Filipinas Bagaipo, and P10,000.00 for moral damages; and

(c)Plaintiffs Romeo Vasquez and Maximina Cainay the sum of P10,000.00 by way of moral damages by reason of the death of Mario Marlon Vasquez.

On appeal, respondent Court reversed the aforementioned judgment and absolved private respondent from any and all liability.

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari, the basic issue being the liability for damages of private respondent for the presumptive death of petitioners' children.

The trial Court found the defense of caso fortuito untenable due to various decisive factors, thus:

... It is an admitted fact that even before the vessel left on its last voyage, its officers and crew were already aware of the typhoon brewing somewhere in the same general direction to which the vessel was going. The crew of the vessel took a calculated risk when it proceeded despite the typhoon advisory. This is quite evident from the fact that the officers of the vessel had to conduct conferences amongst themselves to decide whether or not to proceed. The crew assumed a greater risk when, instead of seeking shelter in Romblon and other islands the vessel passed en route, they decided to take a change on the expected continuation of the good weather the vessel was encountering, and the possibility that the typhoon would veer to some other directions. The eagerness of the crew of the vessel to proceed on its voyage and to arrive at its destination is readily understandable. It is undeniably lamentable, however, that they did so at the risk of the lives of the passengers on board.

Contrariwise, respondent Appellate Court believed that the calamity was caused solely and proximately by fortuitous event which not even extraordinary diligence of the highest degree could have guarded against; and that there was no negligence on the part of the common carrier in the discharge of its duties.

Upon the evidence and the applicable law, we sustain the trial Court. "To constitute a caso fortuito that would exempt a person from responsibility, it is necessary that (1) the event must be independent of the human will; (2) the occurrence must render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill the obligation in a normal manner; and that (3) the obligor must be free of participation in, or aggravation of, the injury to the creditor." 1 In the language of the law, the event must have been impossible to foresee, or if it could be foreseen, must have been impossible to avoid. 2 There must be an entire exclusion of human agency from the cause of injury or loss. 3

Turning to this case, before they sailed from the port of Manila, the officers and crew were aware of typhoon "Klaring" that was reported building up at 260 kms. east of Surigao. In fact, they had lashed all the cargo in the hold before sailing in anticipation of strong winds and rough waters. 4 They proceeded on their way, as did other vessels that day. Upon reaching Romblon, they received the weather report that the typhoon was 154 kms. east southeast of Tacloban and was moving west northwest. 5 Since they were still not within the radius of the typhoon and the weather was clear, they deliberated and decided to proceed with the course. At Jintotolo Island, the typhoon was already reported to be reaching the mainland of Samar. 6 They still decided to proceed noting that the weather was still "good" although, according to the Chief Forecaster of the Weather Bureau, they were already within the typhoon zone. 7 At Tanguingui Island, about 2:00 A.M. of May 16, 1966, the typhoon was in an area quite close to Catbalogan, placing Tanguingui also within the typhoon zone. Despite knowledge of that fact, they again decided to proceed relying on the forecast that the typhoon would weaken upon crossing the mainland of Samar. 8 After about half an hour of navigation towards Chocolate Island, there was a sudden fall of the barometer accompanied by heavy downpour, big waves, and zero visibility. The Captain of the vessel decided to reverse course and face the waves in the open sea but because the visibility did not improve they were in total darkness and, as a consequence, the vessel ran aground a reef and sank on May 16, 1966 around 12:45 P.M. near Malapascua Island somewhere north of the island of Cebu.

Under the circumstances, while, indeed, the typhoon was an inevitable occurrence, yet, having been kept posted on the course of the typhoon by weather bulletins at intervals of six hours, the captain and crew were well aware of the risk they were taking as they hopped from island to island from Romblon up to Tanguingui. They held frequent conferences, and oblivious of the utmost diligence required of very cautious persons, 9 they decided to take a calculated risk. In so doing, they failed to observe that extraordinary diligence required of them explicitly by law for the safety of the passengers transported by them with due regard for an circumstances 10 and unnecessarily exposed the vessel and passengers to the tragic mishap. They failed to overcome that presumption of fault or negligence that arises in cases of death or injuries to passengers. 11

While the Board of Marine Inquiry, which investigated the disaster, exonerated the captain from any negligence, it was because it had considered the question of negligence as "moot and academic," the captain having "lived up to the true tradition of the profession." While we are bound by the Board's factual findings, we disagree with its conclusion since it obviously had not taken into account the legal responsibility of a common carrier towards the safety of the passengers involved.

With respect to private respondent's submission that the total loss of the vessel extinguished its liability pursuant to Article 587 of the Code of Commerce 12 as construed in Yangco vs. Laserna, 73 Phil. 330 [1941], suffice it to state that even in the cited case, it was held that the liability of a shipowner is limited to the value of the vessel or to the insurance thereon. Despite the total loss of the vessel therefore, its insurance answers for the damages that a shipowner or agent may be held liable for by reason of the death of its passengers.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby REVERSED and the judgment of the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch V, in Civil Case No. 67139, is hereby reinstated. No costs.

SO ORDERED.Mecenas v. CADec 14, 1989G.R. No. 88052 December 14, 1989

JOSE P. MECENAS, ROMEO P. MECENAS, LILIA P. MECENAS, ORLANDO P. MECENAS, VIOLETA M. ACERVO, LUZVIMINDA P. MECENAS; and OFELIA M. JAVIER, petitioners, vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, CAPT. ROGER SANTISTEBAN and NEGROS NAVIGATION CO., INC., respondents.

Benito P. Favie and Jose Dario Magno for petitioners.

Hernandez, Velicaria, Vibar & Santiago for private respondents.

FELICIANO, J.:

At 6:20 o'clock in the morning of 22 April 1980, the M/T "Tacloban City," a barge-type oil tanker of Philippine registry, with a gross tonnage of 1,241,68 tons, owned by the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) and operated by the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation (PNOC Shipping), having unloaded its cargo of petroleum products, left Amlan, Negros Occidental, and headed towards Bataan. At about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that same day, the M/V "Don Juan," an interisland vessel, also of Philippine registry, of 2,391.31 tons gross weight, owned and operated by the Negros Navigation Co., Inc. (Negros Navigation) left Manila bound for Bacolod with seven hundred fifty (750) passengers listed in its manifest, and a complete set of officers and crew members.

On the evening of that same day, 22 April 1980, at about 10:30 o'clock, the "Tacloban City" and the "Don Juan" collided at the Talbas Strait near Maestra de Ocampo Island in the vicinity of the island of Mindoro. When the collision occurred, the sea was calm, the weather fair and visibility good. As a result of this collision, the M/V "Don Juan" sank and hundreds of its passengers perished. Among the ill-fated passengers were the parents of petitioners, the spouses Perfecto Mecenas and Sofia Mecenas, whose bodies were never found despite intensive search by petitioners.

On 29 December 1980, petitioners filed a complaint in the then Court- of First Instance of Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-31525, against private respondents Negros Navigation and Capt. Roger Santisteban, the captain of the "Don Juan" without, however, impleading either PNOC or PNOC Shipping. In their complaint, petitioners alleged that they were the seven (7) surviving legitimate children of Perfecto Mecenas and