Aruelo v. CA

G.R. No. 107852 October 20, 1993

Quiason, J.

Facts:

                Aruelo claims that in election contests, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure gives the

respondent therein only five days from receipt of summons within which to file his answer to the

petition (Part VI, Rule 35, Sec. 7) and that this five-day period had lapsed when Gatchalian filed his

answer. According to him, the filing of motions to dismiss and motions for bill of particulars is

prohibited by Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure; hence, the filing of

said pleadings did not suspend the running of the five-day period, or give Gatchalian a new five-day

period to file his answer.

Issue:

                whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction when it allowed respondent Gatchalian to file his pleading beyond the five-day period

prescribed in Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure

Held:

                No. Petitioner filed the election protest with the Regional Trial Court, whose proceedings

are governed by the Revised Rules of Court.

Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not applicable to

proceedings before the regular courts. As expressly mandated by Section 2, Rule 1, Part I of the

COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the filing of motions to dismiss and bill of particulars, shall apply only

to proceedings brought before the COMELEC. Section 2, Rule 1, Part I provides:

Sec. 2. Applicability — These rules, except Part VI, shall apply to all actions and proceedings

brought before the Commission. Part VI shall apply to election contests and quo warranto cases

cognizable by courts of general or limited jurisdiction.

It must be noted that nowhere in Part VI of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is it provided

that motions to dismiss and bill of particulars are not allowed in election protests orquo

warranto cases pending before the regular courts.

Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC cannot adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of certain

pleadings in the regular courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice and

procedure in all courts is vested on the Supreme Court (Constitution, Art VIII, Sec. 5 [5]).

ROMEO M. ESTRELLA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al.

429 SCRA 789 (2004), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.)

Nowhere in the COMELEC Rules does it allow a Commissioner to voluntarily inhibit with reservation.

FACTS: Rolando Salvador was proclaimed winner in a mayoralty race in May 14, 2001 elections. His opponent, Romeo Estrella, filed before Regional Trial Court (RTC) an election protest which consequently annulled Salvador‘s proclamation and declared Estrella as the duly elected mayor and eventually issued writ of execution. While Salvador filed a petition for certiorari before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), raffled to the Second Division thereof, Estrella moved for inhibition of Commissioner Ralph Lantion, but a Status Quo Ante Order was issued. However, Commissioner Lantion voluntarily inhibited himself and designated another Commissioner to substitute him. The Second Division, with the new judge, affirmed with modifications the RTC decision and declared Estrella as the duly elected mayor. Salvador filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was elevated to the COMELEC En Banc, in which this time, Commissioner Lantion participated by virtue of Status Quo Ante Order issued by the COMELEC En Banc. He said that as agreed upon, while he may not participate in the Division deliberations, he will vote when the case is elevated to COMELEC En Banc. Hence, Estrella filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether a COMELEC Commissioner who inhibited himself in Division deliberations may participate in its En Banc deliberation

HELD: The Status Quo Ante Order dated November 5, 2003 issued by the COMELEC En Banc is nullified. Commissioner Lantion‘s voluntary piecemeal inhibition cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the COMELEC Rules does it allow a Commissioner to voluntarily inhibit with reservation. To allow him to participate in the En Banc proceedings when he previously inhibited himself in the Division is, absent any satisfactory justification, not only judicially unethical but legally improper and absurd.

Since Commissioner Lantion could not participate and vote in the issuance of the questioned order, thus leaving three (3) members concurring therewith, the necessary votes of four (4) or majority of the members of the COMELEC was not attained. The order thus failed to comply with the number of votes necessary for the pronouncement of a decision or order.

MATEO v CA

August 14, 1995 | Puno, J. | Review on Certiorari | Jurisdiction

SUMMARY: Edgar Sta. Maria, then General Manager of MOWAD, was placed under preventive suspension before being terminated by the BoD of MOWAD. He filed a special civil action for quo warranto and mandamus. The Board moved to dismiss the case, on the ground of the RTC’s lack of jurisdiction over disciplinary actions of government employees. RTC denied the motion. CA dismissed the Board’s petition. The SC granted the petition and set aside the CA decision, saying that the CSC, not the RTC, had jurisdiction to entertain cases involving the dismissal of officers and employees under the Civil Service Law.

DOCTRINE: The hiring and firing of employees of GOCCs are governed by the provision of the Civil Service Law and Rules and Regulations. RTCs have no jurisdiction to entertain cases involving dismissal of officers and employees covered by the Civil Service Law. Employees of GOCC with original charter fall under the jurisdiction of the CSC.

FACTS

1. Upon complaint of some Morong Water District (MOWAD) employees, petitioners, all Board Members of MOWAD, conducted an investigation on private respondent Edgar Sta. Maria, then General Manager. He was then placed under preventive suspension, later dismissed on January 7, 1993. Mazimo San Diego was designated in his place.

2. Sta. Maria filed a Special Civil Action for Quo Warranto and Mandamus with Preliminary Injunction before the RTC of Rizal challenging his dismissal by petitioners. He averred that the petitioners unilaterally stopped and prohibited him from exercising his rights and performing his duties as General Manager and conspired to remove him from Office while he was out of office on official travel.

3. Petitioners moved to dismiss the case on the grounds that (1) the court had no jurisdiction over disciplinary actions of government employees which is vested exclusively in the Civil Service Commission; and that (2) quo warranto was not the proper remedy. This was denied. CA likewise dismissed their petition for certiorari.

ISSUE/S: WON RTC of Rizal has jurisdiction over cases involving dismissal of an employee of a quasi-public corporation – NO

RULING: Petition granted. CA decision annulled and set aside.

RATIO:

1. There is no question that MOWAD is a quasi-public corporation created pursuant to PD No. 198, (Water Utilities Act of 1973) as amended. Jurisprudence already ruled that employees of GOCCs with original charter fall under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. The established rule is that the

hiring and firing of employees of GOCCs are governed by the provisions of the Civil Service Law and Rules and Regulations.

2. PD 807, EO 292, and Rule II Section 1 of Memorandum Circular No. 44 series of 1990 of the Civil Service Commission spell out the initial remedy of private respondent against illegal dismissal. The party aggrieved by a decision, ruling, order, or action of an agency of the government involving termination of services may appeal to the Commission within fifteen (15) days. Thereafter, private respondent could go on certiorari to this Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court if he still feels aggrieved by the ruling of the Civil Service Commission.

3. It was held in Mancita v. Barcinas that the Civil Service Commission under the Constitution is the single arbiter of all contests relating to the Civil service and as such, and its judgments are unappealable and subject only to this Court's certiorari judgment. However, this no longer governs for under the present rule, Revised Circular No. 1-91 as amended by Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 which took effect on June 1, 1995, final resolutions of the Civil Service Commission shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals. In any event, whether under the old rule or present rule, Regional Trial Courts have no jurisdiction to entertain cases involving dismissal of officers and employees covered by the Civil Service Law.

VITAL GOZON VS. CA

FACTS: Executive Order No. 119 issued on January 30, 1987 ordered the reorganization of the various offices of the Ministry of Health where Dr. Alejandro S. de la Fuente was demoted to Medical Specialist II from being the Chief of the Clinics of the National Children's Hospital. De la Fuente filed a protest with the DOH Reorganization Board but was ignored and she brought this to Civil Service Commission. While the case was pending, the position of Chief of Clinics were turned over to and were allowed to be exercised byDr. Jose D. Merencilla.Dr. de la Fuente's case was decided and declared that the demotion/transfer of appellant de la Fuente, Jr.from Chief of Clinics to Medical Specialists II as null and void, the resolution became final. De la Fuente thereupon sent two (2) letters to Dr. Vital-Gozon, the Medical Center Chief of National Children's Hospital, demanding the implementation of the Commission's decision but she did not answer Dr. de la Fuente's letters or to take steps to comply or otherwise advise compliance, with the final and executory Resolution of the Civil Service Commission. She instituted in the Court of Appeals an action of "mandamus and damages with preliminary injunction" to compel Vital-Gozon, and the Administrative Officer, Budget Officer and Cashier of the NCH to comply with the final and executory resolution but Vital-Gozon did not respond to the order of the court. Thus CA declared, that the said resolution declared dela Fuente as the lawful and de jure Chief of Respondents, particularly Dr. Isabelita Vital-Gozon, had no discretion or choice on the matter; the resolution had to be complied with. A writ of execution was issued thereafter. On his motion for reconsideration, Vital-Gozon argued that the Appellate Court had no jurisdiction over the question of damages in a mandamus action and referred this to the Office of Solicitor General. Court of Appeals denied the motion and ruled that the Sol.Gen has no authority to appear as counsel for respondent Gozon.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction, in a special civil action of mandamus against a public officer, to take cognizance of the matter of damages sought to be recovered from the defendant officer

HELD: The Solicitor General's Office evidently searched said Section 9 for an explicit and specific statement regarding "actions for moral and exemplary damages," and finding none, concluded that the Court of Appeals had not been granted competence to assume cognizance of claims for such damages. The conclusion is incorrect. Section 19, governing the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts in civil cases, contains no reference whatever to claims "for moral and exemplary damages," and indeed does not use the word "damages" at all; yet it is indisputable that said courts have power to try and decide claims for moral, exemplary and other classes of damages accompanying any of the types or kinds of cases falling within their specified jurisdiction. The Solicitor General's theory that the rule in question is a mere procedure alone allowing joinder of an action of mandamus and another for damages, is untenable, for it implies that a claim for damages arising from the omission or failure to do an act subject of a mandamus suit may be litigated separately from the latter, the matter of damages not being inextricably linked to the cause of action for mandamus

, which is certainly not the case.It being quite evident that Dr. Vital-Gozon is not here charged with a crime, or civilly prosecuted for damagesarising from a crime, there is no legal obstacle to her being

represented by the Office of the Solicitor General.The petition was DENIED and the resolution was affimed.

Acena v Civil Service Commission 193 SCRA 623 (1991)FACTS:This is a petition for certiorari to annul the resolution of the Civil Service Commission which set aside the order of the Merit Systems Protection Board declaring the herein petitioner as the legitimate Administrative Officer of Rizal Technological Colleges. Acena was assigned as Admin. Officer by then President of Rizal Technological Colleges and was subsequently promoted as Associate Professor on temporary status pending his compliance to obtain a Master’s Degree while assuming the position of Acting Admin Officer at the same time. The Board of Trustees designated Ricardo Salvador as Acting Admin Officer and pursuant to the same, the new College President Dr. Estolas revoked the designation of the petitioner as acting Admin Officer. Petitioner sent a letter to the CSC stating his desire to keep hisappointment as Admin Officer instead of Associate Professor. Thus the latter’s appointment was withdrawn. He also filed a complaint forinjunction of damages to Dr. Estolas assailing the validity of his dismissal from his position as violation of security of tenure. He filed another complaint for illegal termination against Dr. Estolas before the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). The CSC opined that Acena is still the Admin Officer since his appointment as Asso. Prof. was withdrawn. Dr. Estolas filed petition for review to the Office of the President. The Presidential Staff Director referred the complaint back to the CSC. In the dispositive portion of its resolution, the CSC finds the action of Dr. Estolas valid and set aside the previous opinion made by the CSC and the order of the MSPB. The petitioner files a petition for certiorari against the CSC decision on jurisdictional issue. ISSUE: WON the CSC acted in grave abuse of discretion.

RULING: The court held that respondent Estolas filed a petition for review beyond the prescriptive period of 15 days where the decision of the MSPB can be made appealable with the CSC. Beyond this reglementary period, the decision of the MSPB renders to be final and executory. The petition was also filed at the wrong forum (to the office of the Pres.) The court finds the CSC to have an excess of jurisdiction of entertaining the petition and made

a reversible error of setting aside the MSPB order which has long become final and executory. The court granted the petition of the petitioner while setting aside the decision of the CSC. 

Cua v. Commission on Elections | 156 SCRA 582FACTS:

The first division of Comelec rendered a 2-1decision favoring the petitioner but nevertheless suspended his proclamation as winner in the lone congressional district of Quirino due to the lack of the unanimous vote required by the procedural rules in Comelec Resolution no 1669 .

Section 5 of the said resolution states that a case being heard by it shall be decided with the unanimous concurrence of all three Commissioners and its decision shall be considered a decision of the Commission f this required number is not obtained& as when there is a dissenting opinion& the case may be appealed to the Commission En Banc & in which case the vote of the majority thereof shall be the decision of the Commission. Petitioner contends that the 2-1 decision of the first division was a valid decision despite the resolution stated above because of (rt! ) -(& $ection . of the Constitution! /e argues that this applies to the voting of the Comelec both indivision and 0n anc Responden t& on the other hand& insists that no decision was reached by the first division because the required unanimous vote was not obtained! )t was also argued that no valid decision was reached by the Comelec En Banc because only three votes were cast in favor of the petitioner and these did not constitute the majority of the body!

ISSUE:

whether the 2-1 decision of the first division was valid!

RULI !:

yes! The Court held that the 2-1 decision rendered by the first 4ivision was a valid decision under article IX- A $ection 7 of the Constitution. Furthermore& the three members who voted to affirm the 5irst 4ivision constituted a majority of the five members who deliberated and voted thereon

En Banc

and their decision is also valid under the aforecited constitutional provision hence& the proclamation of Cua on the basis of the two aforecited decisions was a valid act that entitles him now to assume his seat in the house of Representatitves.

FILIPINAS ENGINEERING AND MACHINE SHOP vs. HON. JAIME N. FERRER

G.R. No. L-31455 February 28, 1985

COMELEC awarded the contract to Acme for the manufacture and supply of voting booths. However, the losing bidder, petitioner in the instant case, Filipinas Engineering filed an Injunction suit against COMELEC and Acme. The lower court denied the writ prayed for.

Thereafter, ACME filed a motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the lower court has no jurisdiction over the case which the court granted. Filipinas' motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this appeal for certiorari.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the lower court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a suit involving an order of the COMELEC dealing with an award of contract arising from its invitation to bid; and

2. Whether or not Filipinas, the losing bidder, has a cause of action under the premises against the COMELEC and Acme, the winning bidder, to enjoin them from complying with their contract.

RULING:

It has been consistently held that it is the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction to review on certiorari; final decisions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC relative to the conduct of elections and enforcement of election laws.

The COMELEC resolution awarding the contract in favor of Acme was not issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct of elections, and hence, the said resolution may not be deemed as a "final order" reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court. Being non-judicial in character, no contempt may be imposed by the COMELEC from said order, and no direct and exclusive appeal by certiorari to this Tribunal lie from such order. Any question arising from said order may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts.

What is contemplated by the term "final orders, rulings and decisions" of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.

Province of Camarines Sur vs CA

May 17, 1993

FACTS: Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) of Cam Sur passed Res. 129 authorizing the Prov. Gov. To purchase/expropriate property to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-agricultural crops and housing project for the government employees. By virtue of the resolution, Cam Sur filed 2 cases for expropriation against private respondents (San Joaquins).

RTC: denied motion to dismiss on the ground of inadequacy of price of San Joaquins.

CA: San Joaquins raised issue of a) declaring the resolution null and void, b) complaint for expropriation de dismissed. CA asked Sol Gen to give comment.

SolGen: under the LGC, no need for approval by the OP of the exercise of the SP of the right to eminent domin. However, approval of DAR must first be secured (since this involves appropriation of agricultural lands).

CA: set aside order of RTC (without however disposing of the issues raised. The SC said that the CA assumed that the resolution is valid and the expropriation is for a public use).

Issues:

1) WON the resolution is null and void. Corollary to this issue is WON the expropriation is for a public use.

2) WON the exercise of the power of eminent domain in this case is restricted by the CAR Law?

3) WON the complaint for expropriation may be dismissed on the ground of inadequacy of the compensation offered?

Held/ratio:

1) The expropriation is for a public purpose, hence the resolution is authorized and valid.

SC explained that there had been a shift from the old to the new concept of “public purpose:. Old concept is that the property must actually be used by the general public. The new concept, on the other hand, means public advantage, convenience or benefit, which tends to contribute to the general welfare and the prosperity of the whole community.

In this case, the proposed pilot development center would inure to the direct benefit and advantage of the CamSur peeps. (How?) invaluable info and tech on agriculture, fishery, and cottage industry, enhance livelihood of farmers and fishermen, etc.

2) No, (citing Ardana vs Reyes, SC here said that the implication of the Ardana case is that) the power of expropriation is superior to the power to distribute lands under the land reform program.

Old LGC does not intimate in the least that LGUs must first secure approval of the Dept of Land Reform for conversion of agri to non-agri use. Likewise, no provision in the CAR Law subjecting expropriation by LGUs to the control of DAR.

Moreover, Sec 65 of CAR Law is not in point because it is applicable only to lands previously placed under the agrarian reform program. This is limited only to applications for reclassification submitted by land owners or tenant beneficiaries.

Statutes conferring power of eminent domain to political subdivisions cannot be broadened or constricted by implication.

3) Fears of private respondents that they will be paid on the basis of the valuation decalred in the tax declarations of their property, are unfounded.

It is unconstitutional to fix just compensation in expropriation cases based on the value given either by the owners or the assessor. Rules for determining just compensation are those laid down in Rule 67 ROC, evidence must be submitted to justify what they consider is the just compensation.

TRADE UNIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ALLIED SERVICES, petitioner,

vs.

NATIONAL HOUSING CORPORATION and ATTY. VIRGILIO SY, as Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Labor Relations, respondents.

Facts:

On July 13, 1977, TUPAS filed a petition for the conduct of a certification election with Regional Office No. IV of the Department of Labor in order to determine the exclusive bargaining representative of the workers in NHC. It was claimed that its members comprised the majority of the employees of the corporation. The petition was dismissed by med-arbiter Eusebio M. Jimenez in an order, dated November 7, 1977, holding that NHC "being a government-owned and/or controlled corporation its employees/workers are prohibited to form, join or assist any labor organization for purposes of collective bargaining pursuant to Section 1, Rule II, Book V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code."

From this order of dismissal, TUPAS appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations where, acting thereon in BLR Case No. A-984-77 (RO4-MED-1090-77), Director Carmelo C. Noriel reversed the order of dismissal and ordered the holding of a certification election. This order was, however, set aside by Officer-in-Charge Virgilio S.J. Sy in his resolution of November 21, 1978 6 upon a motion for reconsideration of respondent NHC.

In the instant petition for certiorari, TUPAS seeks the reversal of the said resolution and prays that a certification election be held among the rank and file employees of NHC.

Issue:

Whether or not the employees of NHC have the right to form union?

Ruling:

With respect to other civil servants, that is, employees of all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the government including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters and who are, therefore, covered by the civil service laws, the guidelines for the exercise of their right to organize is provided for under Executive Order No. 180. Chapter IV thereof, consisting of Sections 9 to 12, regulates the determination of the "sole and exclusive employees representative"; Under Section 12, "where there are two or more duly registered employees'

organizations in the appropriate organization unit, the Bureau of Labor Relations shall, upon petition order the conduct of certification election and shall certify the winner as the exclusive representative of the rank-and-file employees in said organizational unit."

Parenthetically, note should be taken of the specific qualification in the Constitution that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law" and that they shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law."

ON THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the assailed resolution of the Bureau of Labor Relations, dated November 21, 1978, is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the conduct of a certification election among the affected employees of respondent National Housing Corporation in accordance with the rules therefor is hereby GRANTED.

Luego vs CSC, 143 SCRA 327

Posted by Pius Morados on November 7, 2011

(Public Officer, Appointments, CSC)

Facts: Petitioner was appointed Admin Officer II, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor Solon. The appointment was described as “permanent” but the CSC approved it as “temporary,” subject to the final action taken in the protest filed by the private respondent and another employee.

Subsequently, the CSC found the private respondent better qualified than the petitioner for the contested position and, accordingly directed that the latter be appointed to said position in place of the petitioner whose appointment is revoked. Hence, the private respondent was so appointed to the position by Mayor Duterte, the new mayor.

The petitioner, invoking his earlier permanent appointment, questions the order and the validity of the respondent’s appointment.

Issue: WON the CSC is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement.

Held: No. The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent and was therefore protected by Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had the right to do so, and it was not for the respondent CSC to reverse him and call it temporary.

Section 9(h), Art V of the Civil Service Decree provides that the Commission shall have inter alia the power to “…approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil service… ….and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess appropriate eligibility or required qualifications.”

The CSC is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the CSC Law. When the appointee is qualified and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the CSC Laws.

CSC is without authority to revoke an appointment because of its belief that another person was better qualified, which is an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the city mayor.

Social Security System (SSS) Employees Association

vs.

Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 85279, July 28, 1989

Facts:

The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the union’sdemands concerning the implementation of their CBA. SSS filed before the courtaction for damages with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners for staging an illegal strike. The court issued a temporary restrainingorder pending the resolution of the application for preliminary injunction while petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Petitioners contend that the court made reversible error in taking cognizance on the subject matter since the jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the National Labor Relations Commission as the case involves a labor dispute. The Social Security System contends on one hand that the petitioners are covered by the Civil Servicelaws, rules and regulation thus have no right to strike. They are not covered by the NLRC or DOLE therefore the court may enjoin the petitioners from striking.

Issue:

Whether or not Social Security System employers have the right to strike.

Ruling:

The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice provides guarantee among workers with the right to organize and conduct peacefulconcerted activities such as strikes. On one hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides that “the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed, subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress” referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission which states that “prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by government employees enjoinsunder pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and employeesfrom staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service.” Therefore in the absence of any legislation allowing government employees tostrike they are prohibited from doing so.- RIGHT TO INFORMATION

Salazar Vs Mathay

G.R. No. L-44061, September 20, 1976The Civil Service Commission: Appointments

Facts:

On January 20, 1960, petitioner Melania C. Salazar was appointed by the Auditor General “confidential agent” in the Office of the Auditor General, Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). Her appointment was noted by the Commissioner of Civil Service. On March 28, 1962 and on February 12, 1965 she was extended another appointment by way of promotion, as “confidential agent” in the same office.On March 18, 1966, petitioner received a notice from the Auditor General that her services as “confidential agent” have been terminated as of the close of office hours on March 31, 1966. On March 31, 1966, the Auditor General upon favorable recommendation of Mr. Pedro Encabo, Auditor of the GSIS issued an appointment to petitioner as Junior Examiner in his office which was approved by the Commission of Civil Service. On the same day, petitioner assumed the position. On December 27, 1966, petitioner wrote the Commissioner of Civil Service requesting that she be reinstated to her former position as “confidential agent”. However, no action was taken on said letter. Petitioner filed a petition for mandamus with the Supreme Court to compel the Auditor General to reinstate her to her former position but the Supreme Court dismissed the petition without prejudice to her filing the proper action to the Court of First Instance.

Issue:

(1) Whether or not the position held by the petitioner is primarily confidential or not.

(2) Whether or not the services of petitioner as “confidential agent” was validly terminated on the alleged ground of loss of confidence, and if not, whether or not she could still be reinstated to said position after accepting theposition of Junior Examiner in the same office.

Held:(1) The position held by the petitioner is primarily confidential. There are two instances when a position may be considered primarily confidential: (1) When the President upon recommendation of the Commissioner of Civil Service (now Civil Service Commission) has declared the position to be primarily confidential; or

(2) In the absence of such declaration when by the nature of the functions of the office, there exists “close intimacy between the appointee and appointing power which insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgiving or betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state.” In the case before us, the provision of Executive Order No. 265, declaring “...confidential agents in the several department and offices of the Government, unless otherwise directed by the President, to be primarily confidential” brings within the fold of the aforementioned executive order the position of confidential agent in the Office of the Auditor, GSIS, as among those positions which are primarily confidential.(2) Yes. Her position being primarily confidential, petitioner cannot complain that the termination of her services as confidential agent is in violation of her security of tenure, primarily confidential positions are excluded from the merit system, and dismissal at pleasure of officers or employees therein is allowed by the Constitution. This should not be misunderstood as denying that the incumbent of a primarily confidential position holds office at the pleasure only of the appointing power. It should be noted, however, that when such pleasure turns into displeasure, the incumbent is not “removed” or “dismissed” from office — his term merely “expires,” in much the the same way as officer, whose right thereto ceases upon expiration of the fixed term for which he had been appointed or elected, is not and cannot be deemed “removed” or “dismissed” therefrom, upon the expiration of said term. The main difference between the former — the primarily confidential officer — and the latter is that the latter's term is fixed of definite, whereas that of the former is not pre-fixed, but indefinite, atthe time of his appointment or election, and becomes fixed and determined when the appointing power expresses its decision to put an end to the services of the incumbent. When this even takes place, the latter is not “removed” or “dismissed” from office — his term has merely “expired.”

But even granting for the sake of argument, that petitioner's position was not primarily confidential and that therefore her removal from said position for loss of confidence was in violation of her security of tenure as a civil service employee, yet by her acceptance of the position of Junior Examiner in the Office of the Auditor, GSIS on April 1, 1976, she was deemed to have abandoned former position of “confidential agent” in the same office.

CORPUS VS. CUADERNO

FACTS: Marino Corpus, Special Assistant to the Governor of the Central Bank, was administratively charged with dishonesty, incompetence, neglect of duty and violation of the internal regulations of the office. He was suspended by the Mnetary Board desoie the recommendation of the investigating committee that he be reinstated and there was no basis for actions against Corpus. The Board considered him resigned as of the date of his suspension. Corpus moved for reconsideration but was denied. He filed the petition to CFI of Manila which favored him and declared the Resolution of the Board as null and void. He was awardedP5,000 as attorney’s fees. Both Petitioner and respondent appealed the judgment. Petitioner was appealing the amount awarded to him contending that it was lower than what he has spent for attorney’s fees. While the respondent claimed that an officer holding highly technical position may be removed at any time for lack of confidence by the appointing power who was Governor Cuaderno.

ISSUE: Is the lack of confidence by the appointing power be a ground for removing an employee or a public officer?

HELD: The Constitution distinguishes the primarily confidential from the highly technical employees, and to the latter the loss of confidence as a ground for removal is not applicable. No public officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for a cause provided by law. Pertaining to the petitioner’s claim for damages, the agreement between a client and his lawyer as to attorney’s fees cannot bind the other party who was a stranger to the fee contract. While the Civil Code allows a party to recover reasonable counsel fees by way of damages, such fees must lie primarily in the discretion of the trial court. Decision appealed affirmed by the Supreme Court.

Delos Santos v. MallareG.R. No. L-3881 August 31, 1950

Tuason, J.

Facts:

                Eduardo de los Santos, the petitioner, was appointed City Engineer of Baguio on July 16, 1946, by the President, appointment which was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments on August 6, and on the 23rd of that month, he qualified for and began to exercise the duties and functions of the position. On June 1, 1950, Gil R. Mallare was extended an ad interimappointment by the President to the same position, after which, on June 3, the Undersecretary of the Department of

Public Works and Communications directed Santos to report to the Bureau of Public Works for another assignment. Santos refused to vacate the office, and when the City Mayor and the other officials named as Mallare's co-defendants ignored him and paid Mallare the salary corresponding to the position, he commenced these proceedings.

Issue:

                whether or not the removal of the petitioner from his present position for assignment to another position violates Section 4, Article XII of the 1935 Constitution which provides that "No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law."

Held:

                Yes. Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution ordains: "A Civil Service embracing all branches and subdivisions of the Government shall be provided by law. Appointments in the Civil Service, except as those which are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature, shall be made only according to merit and fitness, to be determined as far as practicable by competitive examination." Section 670 of the Revised Administrative Code provided that "Persons in the Philippine civil service pertain either to the classified service," and went on to say that "The classified service embraces all not expressly declared to be in the unclassified service." Then section 671 described persons in the unclassified service as "officers, other than the provincial treasurers and assistant directors of bureaus or offices, appointed by the President of the Philippines, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly, and all other officers of the government whose appointments are by law vested in the President of the Philippines alone."

                Three specified classes of positions — policy-determining, primarily confidential and highly technical — are excluded from the merit system and dismissal at pleasure of officers and employees appointed therein is allowed by the Constitution. None of these exceptions obtain in the present case.

                The office of city engineer is neither primarily confidential, policy-determining, nor highly technical. A confidential position denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state. Nor is the position of city engineer policy-determining. A city engineer does not formulate a method of action for the government or any of its subdivisions. His job is to execute policy, not to make it. With specific reference to the City Engineer of Baguio, his powers and duties are carefully laid down for him be section 2557 of the Revised Administrative Code and are essentially ministerial in character. Finally, the position of city engineer is technical but not highly so. A city engineer is not required nor is he supposed to possess a technical skill or training in the supreme or superior

degree, which is the sense in which "highly technical" is employed in the Constitution. There are hundreds of technical men in the classified civil service whose technical competence is not lower than that of a city engineer. As a matter of fact, the duties of a city engineer are eminently administrative in character and could very well be discharged by non-technical men possessing executive ability.

Civil Liberties Union vs Executive Secretary

194 SCRA 317 – Political Law – Ex Officio Officials – Members of the Cabinet – Singularity of Office – EO 284

In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No.  284 which allowed members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions subject to limitations set therein. The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring that such law is unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by CLU on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution which provides:

“Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.”

CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution“, the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.

HELD: No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to posts held without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all appointive officials should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the constitution’s manifest intent and the people’s understanding thereof.

In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than 2 positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.

FLORES V DRILON

FACTS

Petitioners, taxpayers and employees of U.S facilities at Subic, challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 13 (d) of the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 which directs the President to appoint a professional manager as administrator of the SBMA…provided that “for the 1st year of its operations, the mayor

of Olongapo City (Richard Gordon) shall be appointed as the chairman and the CEO of the Subic Authority.”

ISSUES

(1) Whether the proviso violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts.

(2) Whether or not the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the position of Mayor of Olongapo City and thus an excepted circumstance.

(3) Whether or not the Constitutional provision allowing an elective official to receive double compensation (Sec. 8, Art. IX-B) would be useless if no elective official may be appointed to another post.

(4) Whether there is legislative encroachment on the appointing authority of the President.

(5) Whether Mayor Gordon may retain any and all per diems, allowances and other emoluments which he may have received pursuant to his appointment.

HELD

(1) YES, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution Provides: No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. The subject proviso directs the

President toappoint an elective official i.e. the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government post (as Chairman and CEO of SBMA). This is precisely what the Constitution prohibits. It seeks to prevent a situation where a local elective official will work for his appointment in an executive position in government, and thus neglect his constitutents.(2) NO, Congress did not contemplate making the SBMA posts as automatically attached to the Office of the Mayor without need ofappointment. The phrase “shall be appointed” unquestionably shows the intent to make the SBMA posts appointive and not merelyadjunct to the post of Mayor of Olongapo City.(3) NO, Sec. 8 does not affect the constitutionality of the subject proviso. In any case, the Vice-President for example, an elective official who may be appointed to a cabinet post, may receive the compensation attached to the cabinet position if specifically authorized by law.(4) YES, although Section 13(d) itself vests in the President the power to appoint the Chairman of SBMA, he really has no choice but to appoint the Mayor of Olongapo City. The power of choice is the heart of the power to appoint. Appointment involves an exercise of discretion of whom to appoint. Hence, when Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint an officer, it cannot at the same time limit the choice of the President to only one candidate. Such enactment effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to choose and constitutes an irregular restriction on the power of appointment. While it may be viewed that the proviso merely sets the qualifications of the officer during the first year of operations of SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of Olongapo City, it is manifestly an abuse of congressional authority to prescribequalifications where only one, and no other, can qualify. Since the ineligibility of an elective official for appointment remains all throughout his tenure or during his incumbency, he may

however resign first from his elective post to cast off the constitutionally-attached disqualification before he may be considered fit forappointment. Consequently, as long as he is an incumbent, an elective official remains ineligible for appointment to another public office.(5) YES, as incumbent elective official, Gordon is ineligible forappointment to the position of Chairman and CEO of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto cannot be sustained. He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may be considered a de facto officer, and in accordance with jurisprudence, is entitled to such benefits.

Quimson v. OzaetaG.R. No. L-8321 March 26, 1956

Montemayor, J.

Facts:

                The Rural Progress Administration is a public corporation created for the purpose of acquiring landed estates through purchase, expropriation or lease, and later sub-letting or sub-leasing the same to tenants or occupants. The officials and employees of the Administration may be considered as civil service employees embraced in the classified service. Sometime in 1947, one Aurelio R. Peña, then comptroller of the Administration and performing duties of auditor in representation of the Auditor General recommended to the Board of Directors of the Administration that for purposes of economy municipal treasurers be appointed agent-collectors of the Administration, and this recommendation was adopted by the Board of Director. Thereafter, Faustino Aguilar, then manager of the Administration, prepared the appointment for the post of agent- collector on a part-time basis in favor of Plaintiff-Appellant Braulio Quimson, with compensation of P720 per annum, the appointment to take effect upon assumption of duty. At the time, Quimson was deputy provincial treasurer and municipal treasurer of Caloocan, Rizal. Defendant-Appellee Roman Ozaeta who by reason of his office of Secretary of Justice was acting as Chairman of the Board of Directors, signed the appointment and forwarded the papers to the President through the Secretary of Finance for approval. Without waiting for the said approval Quimson assumed his position on May 6, 1948 and rendered service as agent-collector of the Administration until October 21, 1949, inclusive, when he was informed that because of the disapproval of his appointment, his services were considered terminated. There were several objections to his appointment, among them that of the Auditor General on the ground that since Quimson was deputy provincial treasurer and municipal

treasurer of Caloocan, his additional compensation as agent-collector would contravene the Constitutional prohibition against double compensation. The Commissioner of Civil Service said that he would offer no objection to the additional compensation of Quimson as agent-collector provided it was authorized in a special provision exempting the case from the inhibition against the payment of extra compensation in accordance with section 259 of the Revised Administrative Code. In this connection, it may be stated that this section of the Administrative Code provides that in the absence of special provision, no officer or employee in any branch of the Government service shall receive additional compensation on account of the discharge of duties pertaining to another or to the performance of public service of whatever nature. Faustino Aguilar as manager of the Administration asked for the reconsideration of the ruling of the Auditor General, alleging that the appointment of the Plaintiff was for reasons of economy and efficiency, but the Auditor General denied the request stating that reasons of economy and efficiency are not valid grounds for evading the constitutional prohibition against additional compensation in the absence of a law specifically authorizing such compensation. So, the services of Quimson as agent-collector of the Administration were terminated. But R. Gonzales Lloret, then manager of the Administration on October 18, 1949, inquired from the auditor of the Administration whether Quimson could be paid for the period of actual service rendered by him from May 10, 1948, and the said auditor gave the opinion that it could not be done for the reason that in his opinion the appointment extended to Quimson was clearly illegal and the Administration may not be obliged to pay him for the services rendered since it was a violation of section 3, Article XII, of the Constitution prohibiting double compensation. At the same time he expressed the opinion that under section 691 of the Revised Administrative Code the appointing official who made the illegal appointment should be made liable for the payment of salary of the appointee, and consequently, Plaintiff should claim his salary for services rendered against said appointing officer. It is highly possible that this opinion was what induced and prompted Quimson to file the present case against Roman Ozaeta who, as Chairman of the Board, signed his appointment, and the members of the said Board, namely: Faustino Aguilar, Vicente Fragante, Roman Fernandez and Pedro Magsalin.

Issue:

                whether or not Plaintiff’s complaint for the recovery of accrued salaries as provincial treasurer and municipal treasurer must be denied on the ground of the constitutional prohibition against double compensation

Held:

                No. Section 691 of the Revised Administrative Code reads as follows:

“SEC. 691.  Payment of person employed contrary to law. — Liability of chief of office. — No person employed in the classified service contrary to law or in violation of the civil service rules shall be entitled to receive pay from the Government; but the chief of the bureau or office responsible for such unlawful employment shall be personally liable for the pay that would have accrued had the

employment been lawful, and the disbursing officer shall make payment to the employee of such amount from the salary of the officers so liable.”

Section 691 of the Administrative Code above reproduced refers and applies to unlawful employment and not to unlawful compensation. The appointment or employment of Plaintiff-Appellant Quimson as agent-collector was not in itself unlawful because there is no incompatibility between said appointment and his employment as deputy provincial treasurer and municipal treasurer. In fact, he was appointed agent-collector by reason of his office, being a municipal treasurer. There is no legal objection to a government official occupying two government offices and performing the functions of both as long as there is no incompatibility. Clerks of court are sometimes appointed or designated as provincial sheriffs. Municipal Treasurers like Plaintiffare often appointed and designated as deputy provincial treasurer. The Department Secretaries are often designated to act as Chairman or members of Board of Directors of government corporations. The objection or prohibition refers to double compensation and not to double appointments and performance of functions of more than one office.

According to law, under certain circumstances, the President may authorize double compensation in some cases, such as government officials acting as members with compensation in government examining boards like the bar examinations, or department secretaries acting as members of Board of Directors of government corporations, and in such cases the prohibition against double compensation is not observed. This undoubtedly, was the reason why the appointment of Quimson had to be coursed through different offices like the Department of Finance, the Civil Service Commission, and the Office of the Auditor General to the President for approval. If the President approves the double compensation, well and good. The appointee whose appointment may then be regarded as valid from the beginning could receive extra compensation. If it is disapproved, then the appointment will have to be withdrawn or cancelled, unless of course, the appointee was willing to serve without compensation, in which case there could be no valid objection. This is another proof that the appointment of Quimson was not illegal or unlawful. It was only the double compensation that was subject to objection. The trouble was that Plaintiff herein assumed office without waiting for the result of the action to be taken upon his appointment and compensation by the President and the different offices which the appointment had to go through.