Comparative Policy Analysis of Minority Language & Citizenship Ties

Comparative Policy Analysis of Minority Language & Citizenship Ties:

The cases of Ukraine, Latvia and Estonia

Introduction:

Since January of 2014, President Putin’s annexation/invasion of the Crimean Peninsula

has created a stir in international politics and a sovereignty crisis in Ukraine. At the same time,

an identity crisis has involved the majority of all post-Soviet states with a large portion of the

population being ethnic Russians or Russian speakers. In particular, the Baltic states of Latvia

and Estonia where the memory of Soviet/Tsarist oppression and occupation is still very strong,

as is the fear of Russian aggression. Unlike Ukraine, Latvia and Estonia are shielded and

protected by NATO and the European Union (EU), along with the type of protections this status

brings to minorities, particularly ethnic Russian or Russian speakers in both states. However,

current language and citizenship policies in these EU member states are less than optimal for

Russian speakers. With the current policies in Latvia and Estonia and the tensions in Ukraine it

could create a breeding ground of ethnic tensions or peaceful co-habitation between historical

antagonists under EU governance united by the fear of possible Russian aggression or cultural

dominance that has destabilized Ukraine.

While each of these post-Soviet states may differ in terms of geography, language and

where they may be categorized upon the conflict spectrum (Ukraine being crisis and Latvia and

Estonia in preventive/unstable peace), what all three of these states share in common are the

following factors : (i) strong ethnic identities, (ii) the collective trauma of Soviet/Russian Empire

occupations/oppression, (iii) a large minority of ethnic Russians or Russian speakers, and (iv)

most of all anti-Russian speaker language policies. This paper will act as a comparative case

study in terms of discussing and critiquing current language and citizenship policies in: Ukraine,

Latvia, and Estonia.

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History:

As previously stated above, these Post-Soviet states have similar histories in regards not

just Soviet rule but Imperial Russian rule creating three unique and diverse histories that have

expanded since independence in the 1990’s as well as retaining their own cultural autonomy/

ethnic heritage through legislation of language and citizenship.

Ukraine:

For centuries Ukraine has had close socio-historical or socio-political ties with Russia and her

empire under both White and Red Tsars and is difficult to exclude one or the other when

discussing historical and cultural ties, though politics are even harder. Many politicians,

academics and sociologists have referenced this unbreakable bond dating back to the origins of

both Russia and Ukraine, via the Kievan Rus.1,2,3 While this tie may be ancient it is one of the

most current and potent historical symbols of the bonds between Ukrainians and ethnic Russians;

however, when studied more carefully the ethno-symbolic tale becomes more illusive and

complex. In the early 9th century, various groups inhabited the steppes of Ukraine, from Eastern

Slavs, to Vikings, and nomads and traders, who created a very loose and localized federation to

fend off external threats of the rising and declining empires around them, the Byzantines and

Mongols. It was during the campaigns that the first cultural/religious ties were formed between

modern Russians and Ukrainians.2,3

Religion is just as important today in both countries as it was back in the 10th-12th

centuries for the Rus and Eastern Slavs. This is what united the loose federation to the Christian

1 Sasse 20072 Davies 20123 Hoffman 2013

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West (i.e. Europe) with the arrival of Orthodox Christianity with intermarriage between the

princes of Kiev and Byzantine royal families that established a bond that protected the Rus

politically and economically. This was only to last a few centuries until internal strife weakened

the loose federation over land inheritances disputes within the royal families only to be surpassed

with the Mongol/Tartar invasion.2,3 It was after this conquest that history of Ukraine became

geo-political with numerous different historical narratives dependent upon those of the branches

of the Rus who survived and retained their cultural contacts with Europe3.

It was not until the 14th century that Western Ukraine4 was able to break away from the

Tartar culture and dominance with their absorption into the chaotic period of the Polish-

Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1569 and absorption into the Russian Empire in the 1700’s by

Peter (II) the Great. While northern and eastern Ukraine5 were brought into the Russian Empire

much earlier in the 16th century under Ivan the Terrible. As for southern Ukraine6 and Crimea it

was able to retain the Tartar culture under the Crimean Khanate until its absorption into the

Ottoman Empire in 1478.3 It would only be added to the Russian Empire in 1783 under

Catherine (II) the Great. During these periods numerous languages came and went but the

ancient tongue of the Rus7, remained strong in these areas just as much as the Tartar language

and culture making the Eastern and Southern parts of Ukraine ethnically diverse, which was to

be the weakness of the Russian Empire in later years. Ukraine remained one of the most unique

4 Western Ukraine (i.e. Chernivtsi, Halych (hence - Halychyna), Ivano-Frankivsk, Khotyn, Lutsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, Uzhhorod5 Eastern Ukraine (i.e. Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, Luhansk,Mariupol, Kryvyi Rih, Makiivka6 Southern Ukraine: Crimean, Sevastapool, Odessa 7 Ancient Rus language by the mid 1600s morphed into the modern day Ukrainian language

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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uzhhorod

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ternopil

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rivne

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lviv

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lutsk

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khotyn

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ivano-Frankivsk

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ivano-Frankivsk

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Halych

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chernivtsi



and strategic regions within Russia from the preservation of ancient norms to amounts of wealth

and food that came from Ukraine.8,3

Ukraine was shortly then nicknamed “little Russia” during the early 18th and late 19th

centuries, despite the academic debates that circulated about the major differences between

Russians and Ukrainians in the 1840’s. It was the few cosmopolitan Ukraine-born academics9

whose literary works set the foundation for the vision of an independent Ukraine.3 Such a

sentiment also existed in the far western Ukraine that remained under Hapsburg rule until WWI

where a majority of Ukrainian nationalists flocked there and continued to preserve and develop a

sense of Ukrainian identity that linked both the Polish-Ukrainian culture of the west with the old

Russo-Cossack traditions of the east.3,8 After the fall of Tsar Nicholas (II) in 1917 and the rise of

the Bolsheviks in 1918 both sides of Ukraine worked side by side in taking the initial step of

unifying and declaring independence from not only Russia but their Hapsburg rulers, but this

was short lived and in April of 1919 the Red Army invaded Kiev and became a part of Russia

(USSR after 1922) did western Ukraine by 1921. 3,8 However, the terror and suffering of the

Ukrainian people would only become worse under both Communist and Fascists from organized

famines, to forced industrialization and collectivization, to suppressing any nationalist sentiments

for an independent Ukraine. 3,8 Even after WWII, Ukraine would still fall victim to Soviet

control at Yalta in 1945. Ukraine was designated as a continued part of the USSR. It would not

be until perestroika that Ukraine would see more liberal reforms and leaders sympathetic to the

re-emergence of Ukrainian culture in the 1960’s with the process of de-Stalinzation. 3,8

8 Kuzio 20079 Chechenko

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During this time that the Ukrainian language and culture become more prominent, thus

creating a foundation the nationalist fervor in the 1980s. The events of the 1970s also hastened

Ukrainian independence with the failed policies of perestroika and glasnost. Moreover, the

intervention in Afghanistan, the martial law imposed on Poland, as well as the hidden truths

behind the Chernobyl disaster in 1986 led to the growth of civil society and political

activism/Human Rights groups.3 These events united both sides of the Ukraine and her people to

push for further cultural and political autonomy which occurred in 1987 and with the pressures

from the Baltic States for independence the Ukrainians rallied and demanded full independence

from the USSR; which was not to occur until 1991.3 However, the transition to independence

was not a smooth one and can still be seen today with the current debate over language and

citizenship.

Latvia & Estonia

The Baltic states of Latvia and Estonia have a similar historical narrative to Ukraine’s

story when it comes to long term suffering and being taken over by the neighboring empires of

Sweden, Russia, and Nazi Germany. However, their origins are very different than that of

Ukraine. Latvia and Estonia was known for amber, timber industries, and a trade route to the

Baltic. However it was during the Dark Ages (900A.D-1200s) that both states were plagued with

raids from various Viking and Germanic tribes, being that of the Livonians and Oeselians who

settled in the areas of Riga and Tallinn establishing feudal fiefdoms until the mid-1200’s.2 It was

during this period that Latvia and Estonia were first introduced to Germanic customs and

language only to be overshadowed by the invading Swedes and Danes. Latvia and Estonia from

the early 1200’s until 1560 retained their ancient lingo-cultural roots even with the arrival of

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Christianity by the Crusaders in 1210 and Germanic settlers. By the mid 1520’s Latvia and

Estonia became a wealthy region in Europe desired by surrounding empires under Ivan IV, and

the kings of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Sweden, and Denmark. During this period

Latvia and Estonia saw a rise in Russian influence in the regions of Narva and Tartu. This

resulted in many of the rich elite allying themselves with the Russia Empire, while others wanted

to be a part of the Swedish empire or part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, setting the

scene for a geopolitical clash between empires.2 It was in 1585, when the Russians made their

first invasion into the Baltic in attempt to reassert their authority within the region; resulting in

the emergence of the Livonian Confederation who allied with the Swedes, the Poles, Danes and

Norwegians. Russian influence in the region was beaten back 1576 only to return in full force by

Peter the Great in the Great Northern War in 1721.2

It was under the Russian Empire that the Livonian Oblast (i.e. Latvia and Estonia) were

exploited for their timber, warm water ports, and access to trade routes with the rest of Western

Europe. These Baltic States were a key asset in Russian foreign policy during the Tsars who

acted as a buffer zone towards the Sweden, Denmark-Norway, Prussia, and the Holy Roman

Empires. This time for the Baltic States remained stable and peaceful until 1848 with the rise of

ethno-nationalism and populism in Europe, which had spread to intelligentsia of Latvia and

Estonia.2 This period was known and the National Awaking where Baltic nationalists spread the

idea of independence in reaction to the intense Russification process of Alexander III during the

1860’s-1880s.2 The Russification process was met with heavy opposition in the Baltics,

especially in regards to the reinforcement of Russian language school replacing the local

language and vast amounts of political repression on any nationalist activist groups. The Baltic

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Germans were exiled off to Siberia in the thousands, setting the scene for anti-Russian

sentiments that would become a part of the collective memory of the Baltic peoples.2

During WWI Latvia and Estonia were heavily occupied with by German forces as early

as 1915, but the people of Latvia and Estonia fought for the Russians, up until the October

Revolution of 1917 with the Bolshevik takeover. 2,10 This proved to be disastrous for the Baltics

for all nationalist organizations and local Parliaments were dissolved and thousands of people

were forcibly conscription to fight on the side of the Red Army in the Russian Civil War. 2,10

Nationalist movements were driven underground, but remained powerful in the international

sphere for by 1918 both Latvia and Estonia were able to obtain de-facto independence

recognized by the Allies (with the exception of Russia). Latvia remained steadfast in the course

of achieving sovereignty and fighting back the Soviets in the Latvian War of Independence

(1918-1921) with her ability to maintain underground independence movements whereas, in

Estonia the situation was much more complicated.2,10 German influence was not as strong in

Estonia as it had been in Latvia in WWI, Estonians allied themselves mostly with Russia and

many Estonians took an active part in fighting for the Bolsheviks in the Civil War and for the

Soviets in the early period of the Soviet Union, but the desire for an independent Estonia was

still present.2,10

Formal independence for Latvia and Estonia in the years prior to WWII came at the

expense of the British and Finnish who provided the military support to pressure the Soviets into

accepting Latvian and Estonian Independence.2,10 It was during this time that Latvia and Estonia

used diplomacy and the entrance into the League of Nations in September of 1921 as a buffer

10 International Historic Film 1985

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from external aggression from the USSR and Germany. Unfortunately for the Latvia and Estonia

this was a short lived victory, for from 1926-1939 both Latvia and Estonia were under constant

military and diplomatic threats by the Soviets.10 By 1939, the Soviet made their intentions clear

and sent troops and communist agitators into the Latvia and Estonia, and in June of 1940 the

Soviets invasion of Latvia and Estonia was complete for all National Parliaments were usurped

and replaced by Soviet leaders, who pushed for the formal annexation of Latvia and Estonia into

the USSR.2,10 Only a few days later, both Baltic States were declared a part of the USSR.

Latvian and Estonian languages were banned and replaced by the Russian language and those

opposed this policy were deported to the work gulags11. However, Soviet occupation would not

last long. Nazi Germany was to invade in 1941 brining the Baltics into the WWII. During WWII

both Latvians and Estonians were divided on who to support the Nazis or the Red Army or to

take continue to assert their de facto independence.10 Some choose both working for

independence by working with either the Red Army and the Nazis, as seen with the emergence

of Latvian and Estonian underground forces as well as partisan armies12; their main focus was

independence but by the 1943, it was clear that the Germans were intent on “Germanizing” the

population rather than allowing the Baltic states to establish their own local government under

Nazi rule.10

In Estonia, this was made clear with the numerous of mass murders of the “Slavic

peoples” in conjunction with Jews and Roma in the region along with the massive plunder

campaign had turned once sympathetic Estonians to the side of the Soviet Union.10 This was

made clear in Estonia when many refused to enlist in the German army to fight the Finns during

11 About 50,000 people died in the first years of 1939-1941 under Communist rule; 140,000 were deported to gulags12 Latvian Central Council (Pro-German) and Latvian Partisan Movement (Pro-Soviet)

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the winter war of 1942-1944 whereas in Latvia there was little support for either the Nazis or the

Red Army. This was to change in 1942 when the Soviet Union began to continue to pressure all

Baltic States through the underground NKVD to enlist on the side of Red Army; thousands were

conscripted into the Red Army.10 There is no exact number to how many were conscripted and

died within the ranks of the Red Army. Unfortunately, the situation was only to get worse by

1944 with the Red Army’s advance and re-occupation of the Baltic. The re-occupation of the

Baltic was a huge blow for Latvians and Estonians fighting in the underground resistance

movement during the war not only were the Soviets back in power but were more repressive than

ever. Those who did not submit to Soviet rule and the Sovietzation process were deported to

Siberia in gulags.10 Over half a million Baltic peoples were deported during 1944–5513 has been

estimated at over half a million: 124,000 in Estonia, and 136,000 in Latvia.10 Not only were

nationalist movements silenced by deportation but by an attack on Baltic culture, from the

continual criminalization of using local languages, forced industrialization, disastrous economic

plans, forced colonization of ethnic Russians etc. 10

It was only under perestroika that the Third Baltic (1986-1991) Awaking brought the

independence movement out from the underground and into the open with non-violent protests

for independence.10 Lithuania took the lead an establishing constitutional amendments declaring

independence Estonia and Latvia followed. Estonia in March of 1990 declared that “the Soviet

Union an occupying power” and announced the start of a “transitional period” to independence

International Historic Film 1985. In May 1990, the Latvian Supreme Soviet made a similar

13 An estimated 200,000 people were been deported from the Baltic in 1940–1953. Over 75,000 were sent to gulags ten percent of the entire adult Baltic population was deported or sent to labor camps

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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_deportations_from_Estonia



declaration and opened negotiations with the international community to recognize their new

status.

The USSR immediately condemned all three declarations as illegal under the 1977

Constitution of the Soviet Republics. 10 However, Moscow was slow to respond due to their own

internal issues with the dissolution of other republics, mainly the Russian Federation. But the

showdown between Soviet tanks and Baltic nationalists was only delayed by a few months, after

diplomatic peace talks failed. By late 1991, the Soviets made an aggressive attempt re-control

the situation but failed and resorted to sending in troops which ended up killing twenty and

injuring hundreds of civilians in Vilnius sending a clear message that the fight for independence

for the Baltics was not over.10 Similar events followed in Riga in January 1991 with the battle of

the "the barricades." Other peaceful methods were used against the Soviets in attempt to halt the

violence. Numerous Latvians, Estonians, and Lithuanians joined together in a human chain

linking together from Vilnius to Riga in attempt to deter Soviet troops.10 The end of the Soviet

occupation was finalized with the failed coup and the USSR’s final collapse recognizing the

sovereignty of all three Baltic States who were eager to join NATO and the EU. Their

application in 2002 was readily accepted but met with some concerns in regards to stateless

citizens, the status of former soviet settlers, and ethnic speaking Russians. These concerns have

continued especially after the Estonia and Latvia were integrated into both NATO and the EU.

Overview of the Language and Citizenship Polices:

Each of the states mentioned above all have a similar history when it comes to having

collective trauma from the USSR/Russian Empire and their occupation/colonization of their

native lands, which has resulted in strong ethno-nationalist fervor within Ukraine, Latvia, and

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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Barricades



Estonia. However in terms of policy and coping with this trauma and intense nationalism has

been defined through the means of ethnic identity via language and the availability of

citizenship, that is determined not by birth but by one’s ability to speak the “ethnic” or “national”

languages in these countries; which has caused some controversy and sparks for conflict.

Ukraine

While the Ukraine may not be in the EU or forced to abide by their living standards the

state does have an obligation to care for those “who live within their borders” in spite of their

lack of citizenship or speaking the native language. In this case, Ukraine can be an excellent case

study in terms of government policies (i.e. language and citizenship) of what not to do. Since

Ukraine’s declaration of Independence from Russia there have been numerous tensions in terms

of re-inventing a “Ukrainian identity” along ethnic-linguistic lines.1,8,14,15,16 Like the Baltic states

Ukraine has a large population of ethnic Russians and stateless persons as defined in the

Ukrainian constitution of 1994, the re-defined 200417 constitution and the return to the 1994

version since the illegal annexation of Crimea. 1,8,14,15 There have been numerous attempts to

address the divide between ethnic Russians, “ethnic” Ukrainians, and Russian speaking

Ukrainians, but have all attempts have ended in violence, as displayed by the Parliamentarians in

2012 with the proposal that Russian should become secondary language in Ukraine in order

address the numerous concerns over education and culture 1,8,14, 15, 16,18 ,19

14 Umland 200715 Bloom 200816 Kachuyevski 201217 Amendments made regarding fair election policies in wake of the Orange Revolution18 Blacker 201419 McGuinness 2014

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Such discussions have become the “hot bed” topic that has revisited the internal divisions

of pre-independent Ukraine to re-emerge, and it was this memory that has pushed politicians in

Kiev to implement hard line policies that sound of “ethnic” Ukrainian chauvinism as a backlash

towards those with Russian sympathies.1,8,14,15,16,18,19, 20 This was one of the key factors that had

caused the “initial” escalation of conflict within Ukraine prior to former President Yanukovych’s

decision to halt ambitions of EU integration. The divide over language acts the physical

embodiment of what has internally divided Ukraine between those seeking to become closer with

Russia rather than the “West” or EU.; which has been exploited by Russia with the annexation of

Crimea and the continual instigation of Russian separatists in Eastern Ukraine.1,8,14,15,16,18,19 While

Latvia and Estonia may not be at the point of crisis, as seen in the Ukraine but there are eerie

similarities, besides historical memory of Soviet oppression, but in terms of Latvia and Estonia’s

current demographics in terms of language and citizenship, which that have long been defined

(both in 1991 and post-EU Accession Treaty in 2004) along ethno-nationalist lines; and have the

potential to further isolate a vulnerable population, giving rise to the fears of “what could

happen” with Baltic Russian speakers.

Latvia

In 1991, Latvia like her Baltic sister states, Estonia and Lithuania declared independence

from the USSR. One of the first major problems facing Latvia was the demographic concerns in

regards to who to define their citizenship. Like most EU nations Latvia is legally bound to follow 20 Both in language and those wishing for ties with Russia over the EU

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certain codes in terms of minority protection. This is not the case in Latvia today, where

numerous minority groups, either ethnic Russians or Russian speakers, still face a great deal of

discrimination when it comes to accessibility and citizenship. 19,21,22,23,24,25 During the transition

from a the USSR to independent Latvia, legislation has established that only those who speak

Latvian and those who can prove their citizenship past 1919 are allowed to become citizens, this

lead a part of the population becoming stateless persons or non-citizens. 25,26 Citizenship in

Latvia initially was based on the principle combination of jus sanguinis27 and a rigorous

naturalization process rather than jus soli.26,28 According to the legislation passed in 1994 in order

to be considered a Latvian citizen one must have the following criterion:

a person who was a Latvian citizen on 17 June 1940, as well as a descendant of such

person if such person or his or her descendant, by 1 October 2013, has registered as a

Latvian citizen in accordance with the procedures set out in law or who had the right to

register as a Latvian citizen

a person whose both parents at the time of his or her birth are Latvian citizens or one of

them is a Latvian citizen, provided that the conditions (Section 2 Article I),

Latvian or Liv who has certified all of the following conditions in Latvia:

a) born after 1881 or later his or her ancestor had been permanently living in the

territory of Latvia as it existed until 17 June 1940,

b) his or her fluency in the Latvian language in accordance if he or she has been

released from the test for fluency in the Latvian language

21 Znotins 201222 Fedorenko 201323 Evans 201424 Linton 201425 Djackkova 201426 Latvian State Language Law 199427 Only established in the amendments of 201328 Ethnic Minorities in Latvia The Russians 2010

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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jus_sanguinis



c) his or her belonging to the constituent nation (Latvians) or autochthon population

(Livs), by submitting a documentary confirmation on the fact that he or she or at

least one of his or her parents or grandparents belongs to the constituent nation or

autochthon population,

d) A woman whose permanent place of residence is in Latvia and who, in

accordance has lost her Latvian nationality post 1919 may register for citizenship

(Section 3 & 7 Article II)

These are only a few of the provisions that where established in 1994 and were later amended

in October of 2013; the law’s main purpose was to lay out the processes and restrictions (Section

11 Article II) for the naturalization process in Latvia as well. Particularly those who did not have

citizenship through their parents (Section 20 & 21 Article III)29: must adhere to the following

procedures. 26,28,30,31

Express and prove eligibility to register or apply for citizenship

Must be over 15 years of age

Must be able to pass/prove fluency in Latvian language through an exam

Must have permanent residence

Must swear allegiance to the Republic of Latvia & prove knowledge of political process

Provide proof of eligibility of naturalization (especially after 1992)

Each of these legal codes has been established as the legal precedents or codes that have

regulated the citizenship process of Latvia. However, there are numerous flaws with this piece of

legislation in terms of stateless or non-citizens having access to the tools needed to pass or obtain

citizenship within the confines of the 1994 law and the 2013 Amendments.26,28,30,31

Estonia29 There are additional protocols for children of Stateless persons30 Ministry of the Interior: Report on Language Laws 201331 Naturalization, Dual Citizenship and Registration of Citizenship 2014

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In comparison to Latvia, her sister state Estonia has a similar principles of jus sanguinis and

their naturalization process with language requirements, but are less strict on terms of who is

considered a citizen in terms of dates. Under the Estonian constitution which was adopted by

the Estonian National Council in 1918 states that Estonian citizenship applies to those who:

were permanent residents on the day the law came into force on the territory of the

Republic of Estonia;

prior to the Estonian Declaration of Independence on 24 February 1918 had been subjects

of the Russian State

Those entered in the parish registers or originated from the territory of Estonia

regardless of their ethnicity and faith was proclaimed Estonian citizens.

These clauses over time have become ambiguous and in 1922 the Parliament had amended

the citizenship clauses to include the jus sangiuins principle, but have differ from Latvia’s rigid

definition of rights when it comes to stateless persons and non-citizens; under the Constitution

with Articles 8-13 those who are not born as Estonian citizens are not deemed or given the status

of non-citizens but stateless persons or “undefined citizens” who choose not to declare Estonian

nationality, but have the right to do so; through the naturalization process as dictated by the

following: 28,30, 31,32,33

applicant is aged 15 or over

resided in Estonia legally for at least eight years and from that last five years permanent stay

in Estonia

be familiar in the Estonian language. People who have graduated from an Estonian-speaking

high school or an institute of higher education are assumed to fulfill this criterion without the

need to take a full examination.

32Estonian Citizenship Act 1998 33 Ministry of the Interior: Estonian Minorities 2013,

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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Estonian_Declaration_of_Independence

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Permanent_residency

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Estonian_National_Council



take an examination demonstrating familiarity with the Estonian Constitution

showing a demonstrated means of support

taking an oath of loyalty

The only possible limitation to deny citizenship would be the failure to follow these criterion

or someone who have “committed serious crimes or are foreign military personnel” are not

eleigble to apply for citizenship.26,28,30,31,32,33 Therefore it is much easier to gain citizenship for

minorities in Estonia based on these principles; however there is still the problem of those 6.5%

of persons who have not declared any sort of citizenship. 26,28,30,31,32,33 The main solution to this

problem in Estonia was that of the Alien Passport law or “grey passport” law that acts as “de

facto” identity for these persons who have not applied or are waiting for Estonian

citizenship.26,28,30,31,32,33 Such persons have the same “natural protections” as Estonian citizens, but

do not have the same political rights in terms of voting rights; the gray passport holder can only

vote in local elections and are limited to certain fields in the private sphere, as dictated by the

Citizenship Act of 1996.32

There have also been numerous policies set in place in Estonia to accommodate those who

do not wish to declare citizenship and to hasten the integration and naturalization process, as

seen with Citizenship Act of 1998 that declared: any children born of parents who have lived in

Estonia since 1992 are eligible for citizenship if they apply.26,28,31,32,33 This policy has been very

successful in terms of attracting younger citizens in Estonia over 13,246 children have acquired

citizenship on the basis of this amendment, and has also pushed further integration by: 26,28,30,31,32,33

1. the simplifying the naturalization process for disabled or elderly persons

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2. persons with a “restricted active legal capacity” in ( which local NGOs and

local government organization have provided legal aide,

3. provided classes that easily accessible for minorities to study the citizenship

and language exams

4. have the waiting time required for obtaining Estonian citizenship,

5. reimbursed costs to those who pass the citizenship and language exams,

6. removing the previous fees for taking these exams, and if one does not pass

these exams there is no fee for taking it a second or third time

Each of these reforms by the Estonian government have helped incentives and reduce the

number of “undetermined citizens” in Estonia from 9.2% in the mid 1990s to only 6.2.% as of

2014.26,28,30,31,32,33 However, there is still the concern over the issue of language in Estonia but is

not as polarizing of an issue as it is in Latvia. 26,28,30,31,32,33 According to OSCE and the Praxis

Center for Policy Studies at the University of Tartu34 that of this 6.2% 64% of these

undetermined citizens wish to become Estonian in the near future, 75% have no desire to be

annexed by Russia, and 60% do not feel that they are discriminated in terms of retaining their

Russian ethnicity or language.26,28,30,31,32,33,35

Analysis & Recommendations:

Latvia

34 Has the largest Russian speaking population besides the Narva region along the Russian border35 Estonia: Russian Minority 2013, OSCE 2014

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Since the Crimean crisis Latvian nationalists have become more concerned about the

Russian speaking minority within Latvia, but have done very little to accommodate or try and

integrate ethnic Russians and/or Russians Baltic speakers. The 1994 laws are not only rigid but

exclusionary, as seen with the provisions in Section 3 limitations of descendants d non-citizens

or stateless person36 applying for citizenship, as well as section 10, 20, and 21 that non-citizens

(as defined as descendants of Soviet settlers from 1956 and still living in Latvia after July of

1992), or stateless person can only become citizens if proven their personal history within the

country; as well as being forced to take a language exam; only if they do not fall under Section

11’s broad list of political undesirables who cannot seek or become eligible for citizenship.26,37 It

is understandable as to why the Latvian government has undertaken and supported such language

polices to create a stable and sovereign state, but the exclusion of 17% of the total population

living with Latvians borders of which 12% are excluded from any sort of political or civic

activity due their choice of using their demo-lect or “community language” whereas the Latvian

language being imposed as the politolect “national/primary” language which has only been

present since the 1880s, whereas the Russian language has always been present.25,38,39 Given the

history of the Latvia and the Baltic in general, it is understandable as to why so many Latvians

are keen on asserting the Latvian language over the Russian language as a reminder of national

identity which was continually denied to Latvians for hundreds of years under both Russian and

Soviet Empires.

36 Stateless persons are not equivalent to Non-Citizens according to Law of 1999 & 2004; non-citizens have more political rights and restrictions in the civic sphere in terms of: cannot participate in political parties on local or national level ,exclusion from civil servant jobs in government and education, cannot possess arms or purchase land37 Republic of Latvia Language Law 199238 Ministry of the Interior: Report on Language Laws 201339 Latvian Center for Human Rights 2014

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However given the current tensions from the Crimean crisis, the Latvian language

provision in order to obtain citizenship and civic involvement in the state of Latvia has become a

weapon of Latvian nationalist politicians as a way to separate and isolate those who are not seen

as “ethnically Latvian” the text within the 1994 language and citizenship law; even with the 2013

amendments has made this very clear.40,41,42,43 In 2013 there was a language referendum vote

where 17% of the 71% of the eligible voters voted in favor or establishing Russian as a second

language.25,38,39,40,41,42,43, Key note here is that those who had the most gain, being the non-citizens

or Russian speaking stateless persons were excluded from the vote due their inability to speak

Latvian.40,41,42,43

This referendum was not only a sham but was designed to impose the nationalist will

upon the state’s community as whole; sending a clear message to those Russian speaking

minorities. What is most disturbing is that this policy has prevailed since Latvia became and EU

state member in 2004 with the Accession Treaty that has given clear mandates of protecting

minority groups from any form of discrimination either political or linguistic.40,41, 43,44,45,46

Linguistic discrimination in Latvia is very present and felt by 70% of the 17% of excluded

persons living within the state of Latvia.25,39

However, their concerns are only based on the law not against the state, which has been

misinterpreted by media that has fed into the fears of those who fear a possible re-occurrence of

the Crimean crisis in Latvia. According to OSCE Human Rights Commissioner and the Latvian

40 Solska 201141 Cheskin 201242 National People’s Congress 201443 Checskin 201344 Priedı¯te 200345 Pisarenko 200646 Commercio 2009

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Center for Human Rights, the frustration of the non-citizens or stateless persons is mainly legal

in terms of not being recognized as a citizen of Latvia when they have lived and worked in the

area since 1991 or before then, under Soviet occupation have not been integrated or included in

any sort of political activity or given a voice in the decisions being made in Riga about

citizenship and language laws.25,35,39 While 26.2 % of the population in Latvia are ethnic Russian

more than speak Russian as a secondary language (majority being non-citizens) and have made

numerous attempts to apply for citizenship; and 40% of that population has failed the language

exam, according to the Latvian Center for Human Rights report of 2014. 25,35,39,47 Numerous

policy recommendations have been made by the EU Commission for Latvia to address the issue

of political-ethnical or linguistic discrimination and the only visible step forward on this issue

was the 2013 amendments to the 1994 Citizenship Law, and the mandated asylum protection and

human trafficking as mandated to Latvia in the 2004 Accession Treaty.26,33,37,38

That which has been neglected by the Latvian government NGOs in the private sphere

have come to address by establishing local grassroots NGOs and Human Rights groups who

have risen up to defend those who have no voice in Latvia. Most notably the Latvian Human

Rights Center and the National People’s Congress who have petitioned both in Riga and in

Brussels for reform in terms of the nationalization process to become more obtainable and

accessible to those who desire citizenship.25,35,39 The National’s People’s Congress in recent years

have petitioned the EU to place pressure on the Latvian government by proposing to implement

naturalization quotas as well as advocating for Russian language schools to teach Latvian, in

order for Latvia to directly address the problem rather than ignoring the issue or labeling

Russian speakers as “Russian Agents.”42 This is the biggest fear from the Russian minority, all

47 Minister of Foreign Affairs of Latvia 2014

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they desire is more accessibility to citizenship as well as the cultural respect of being allowed to

speak Russian as secondary language, but do not see it becoming any easier with the current

political atmosphere; hence the rational for the following policy recommendations to the

Republic of Latvia.

Recommendations to the Republic of Latvia:

1. Recommendations on Language:

1. Respect the results of the 2013 Amendment Referendum & political memory and

symbolism the Russian language has amongst ethnic Latvians

2. Use the private sphere and local NGOs to initiate, promote and fund education

programs that are accessible to all Russian speakers, ethnic Russians, and non-

citizens who wish to study the Latvian language in order to pass the language exam

3. Provide and allow the development of language schools in Russian minority

communities that teach both Latvian and Russian from primary school onward

4. Provide a provision for the Russian Language to be formally established the

“demolect” not a secondary language, but to have this language accessible to all who

speak it by having “public or shared spaces” provide signs in Russian as it is in

Latvian

5. Media outlets should provide a “shared space” for news in both Latvian and

providing viewers with Russian subtitles if needed.

These recommendations will not only speed up the naturalization process in terms of the

education gap that causes 40% of those who fail the exam to pass the exam, but also help

accelerate the integration process by recognizing the importance and presence of the Russian

language not as a formal second language, due to the socio-political sensitivity , but to

acknowledged as “community language” that is accessible in public spheres shared by the

population as a whole; as seen elsewhere in other EU states.

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2. Recommendations for Citizenship:

1. Adhere to the international Agreements and Minority protection clauses in EU law, as an

EU member state is mandated to do

2. Adopt the Estonian model of “Citizenship policies” (as seen above) as well as the Grey

passport policy and non-citizen visa policy :

- provides some sort of sense of belonging or identity for non-citizens and

stateless persons

- Following the policy as a whole will allow non-citizens as in Estonia, the ability

to participate in “local elections” not national elections

The main goal of these Citizenship recommendations is that of trust building between

ethnic Latvians and non-citizens and /or stateless persons by: (i) giving the some form of indent

or sense of belonging with gray passports, but not violating current citizenship laws as well as

(ii) providing political and economic opportunities via identity visas; which can reduce the

concern of pensions and welfare, and (iii) giving minorities some sort of voice in local

government to help balance the power in Parliament. Each of these policies are geared to initiate

and accelerate integration measures that have been ignored, but not disrespecting the cultural or

historical sensitivity of what it means to be an Latvian citizen.

Estonia

Unlike the Latvian government, the Estonian government has taken an “active role” in

adhering to the rules and conduct of an EU state in terms of “ accommodating” or “facilitating”

minorities Russian or otherwise through the process of becoming an Estonian citizen from

providing: education, flexibility with the preparing and taking exams, as well as the semi-

integration with those who still wish to remain “undetermined citizens” by granting them gray

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passport and some political rights within Estonia. 18,24, 40,48,49,50. These are the type of policies that

have made Estonian integration of minorities in particular Russian speakers or ethnic Russians

successful and should continue to move forward. But the only remaining concern is that of

recognizing Russian as a secondary language rather than a demo-lect, however, this issue is not

as polarized as it is in Latvia; the Russian is still very present in Estonia especially in the Narva

region, Tartu and the capital Tallinn.24,40 ,50,51,52,53, 54,55Only a few see the presence of the language

as a threat, but there are many who would not wish to see it become a secondary language. 24,40 ,50

Such sentiments may still be a barrier for those who still wish to remain undetermined, but in

Estonia there seems to be an underlying cultural understanding of socio-political history that

accompanies the presence of the Russian language .48,49, 50, 51 There is more of an “acceptance” or

tolerance for the presence of the Russian being a part of Estonia’s cultural identity, and is not

seen as threat to ethnic Estonians; the only threat that is real is that of possible military action or

aggression by Russia. 24,40 ,50,56,57,58, 59,60 The threat of another Crimean crisis in Estonia is present,

but unlike Latvia does not have a linguistic dimension to it, for many of the ethnic Russians and

Russian speakers in Estonia, have more of an incentive to retain or seek Estonian-EU citizenship

and privileges rather than allying themselves with Russian chauvinism.

48 Zaagerman 199949 Manni 201150 Balmforth 201451 Amnesty International 201352 Aksel 200153 Estonia: Russian Minority 201354 Krutaine & Mardiste 201455 Lantzme 201456 Amnesty International 201357 Aksel 200158 Estonia: Russian Minority 201359 Krutaine & Mardiste 201460 Lantzme 2014

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Recommendations for Citizenship:

The policy recommendations to be suggested to the Estonian government are the following:

1. Continue the current policies in terms of educational and financial support of those

wishing to become naturalized citizens

2. Provide an amendment to the 1998 Citizenship law in relation to the “gray passport

holders” that after a period of 7 years there should be an “automatic naturalization” if

the person fulfills the following criterion:

-has followed Estonian laws

- is politically active

-speaks Estonian and at basic level,

-if the person has the desire to become an Estonian

This will not only hasten the integration process but will help solve it completely over time.

Conclusion:

These three states have much in common but are very different in how their government

has dealt with the issue of stateless persons, non-citizens, ethnic Russians or Russian speakers.

Ukraine being the worst case scenario, and Latvia being “two faced” by asserting their status as

an EU member but not following the protocols or criterion of retaining such as privileged status;

whereas Estonia has found some sort of political balance on a culturally sensitive issue that has

divided her sister states. History has left its mark on these states but as to how they coped with

this trauma is what has defined the possible course each one will be faced with the international

tensions connected with the Crimean Crisis of 2014. The main goal to success in this case would

be in the long terms to acceptance and tolerance of Russian speakers and ethnic Russians, who

are loyal to the state in which they are in but wish to retain their identity by not allying with

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anyone. Post-Soviet states that have recognized this are the best set to deal with the challenges

ahead.

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Works Cited

I. Books

Davies, N. (2012). Vanished kingdoms: The rise and fall of states and nations. (1 ed., Vol. 1, pp. 1-848). New York City , New York: Penguine. Retrieved from http://books.google.com/books?id=nZm3Mj9yRJYC&printsec=frontcover&dq=norm

Kuzio, T., & Umland, A. (2007). Chapters 1-5. Ukraine - Crimea - Russia: Triangle of Conflict (Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society). Stuttgart, Germany: ibidem-Verlag. Retrieved from https://blackboard.arcadia.edu/bbcswebdav/pid-1408824-dt-content-rid-1808734_1/courses/SPRING2014.GFS381.10/Kuzio%201%20and%203.pdf

II. Academic Articles

Minority rights in Estonia report excerpt (2009). Legal Information Centre for Human Rights, 1-160. Retrieved from www.jstor

Aksel, K. (2001). Estonian report on Russian Minorities. Europe-Asia Studies, 64(4), 1-12.

Bloom, S. (2008). Which minority is appeased? coalition potential and redistribution in Latvia and Ukraine. Europe-Asia Studies, 60(9), 1-26. doi: 10.2307/20451638

Cheskin, A. (2012). Synthesis and conflict: Russian-speakers' discursive response to Latvia's Nationalising State. Europe-Asia Studies, 64(2), 325-347. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/41478347

Cheskin, A. (2013). Exploring Russian-speaking identity from below: The case of Latvia. Journal of Baltic Studies, 1(27), 1-27. Retrieved from http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/69452/

Commercio, M. (2009). Emotion and blame in collective action: Russian voice in Kyrgyzstan and Latvia. Political Science Quarterly, 124(3), 1-24. doi: 10.2307/25655698

Kachuyevski, A. (2012). The possibilities and limitations of preventive action: he OSCE High Commissioner on national minorities in Ukraine. International Negotiation, 1-28. doi: 10.1163/15718069-12341237

Manni, M. (2011, August 5). For Estonia’s Russian Speakers, Two Decades with a Gray Passport. . Retrieved June 9, 2014, from http://www.tol.org/client/article/22601-for-estonias-russian-speakers-two-decades-with-a-gray-passport.html?print

Pisarenko, O. (2006). The acculturation modes of Russian speaking adolescents in Latvia: Perceived discrimination and knowledge of the Latvian Language.Europe-Asia Studies, 58(5), 751-773. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/20451247

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http://www.tol.org/client/article/22601-for-estonias-russian-speakers-two-decades-with-a-gray-passport.html?print

http://www.tol.org/client/article/22601-for-estonias-russian-speakers-two-decades-with-a-gray-passport.html?print

http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/69452/

http://www.jstor/

https://blackboard.arcadia.edu/bbcswebdav/pid-1408824-dt-content-rid-1808734_1/courses/SPRING2014.GFS381.10/Kuzio%201%20and%203.pdf

https://blackboard.arcadia.edu/bbcswebdav/pid-1408824-dt-content-rid-1808734_1/courses/SPRING2014.GFS381.10/Kuzio%201%20and%203.pdf

http://books.google.com/books?id=nZm3Mj9yRJYC&printsec=frontcover&dq=norm

http://books.google.com/books?id=nZm3Mj9yRJYC&printsec=frontcover&dq=norm



Priedı¯te, A. (2003). Surveying language attitudes and practices in Latvia. National Agency of Latvian Language Training, Riga, Latvia, 1(3), 1-14. Retrieved from www.jstor

Sasse, Gwendolyn. (2007). The Crimea Question: Identity, Transition and Conflict (Ukrainian Research Institute of Harvard University

Solska, M. (2011). Citizenship, collective identity and the international impact on integration policy in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Europe-Asia Studies,63(6), 1-20. doi: 10.2307/27975612

Zaagman, R. (1999). Conflict prevention in the Baltic states: The OSCE High Commissioner on national minorities in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) , 1-150.

III. News Articles

Amnesty International (2013, May 23). Annual Report: Estonia 2013. . Retrieved June 9, 2014, from http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/countries/europe/estonia

Balmforth, T. (2014, April 2). Russians Of Narva Not Seeking 'Liberation' By Moscow. . Retrieved from http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-estonia-not-crimea/25321328.html

Blacker, U. (2014, March 4). No real threat to Ukraine’s Russian speakers. . Retrieved , from http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/uilleam-blacker/no-real-threat-to-ukraine%E2%80%99s-russian-speakers-language-law-ban

Evans, R. (2014, March 19). Moscow signals concern for Russians in Estonia. . Retrieved , from http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/19/us-russia-estonia-idUSBREA2I1J620140319

Fedorenko, V. (2013, March 7). Latvian culture minister urges citizens ‘don’t speak Russian’. . Retrieved , from http://rt.com/news/latvian-culture-minister-urges-its-citizens-not-to-speak-russian-946/

Krutaine, A. & Mardiste, D. (2014, March 23). Disquiet in Baltics over sympathies of Russian speakers. . Retrieved , from http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/23/us-ukraine-crisis-russia-insight-idUSBREA2K07S20140323#

Linton, E. (2014, March 19). Russia Protests Estonia's Treatment Of Russian Minority, Echoing Pretext For Crimea Takeover. . Retrieved , from http://www.ibtimes.com/russia-protests-estonias-treatment-russian-minority-echoing-pretext-crimea-takeover-1562399

McGuinness, D. (2014, June 7). Ukraine crisis: Latvia's Russian speakers find their voice. . Retrieved , from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27800878

Znotins, I. (2012, February 5). Too Russian to have rights? Latvia to vote on 'alien' language. . Retrieved June 1, 2014, from http://rt.com/news/russian-latvia-language-referendum-559/

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http://rt.com/news/russian-latvia-language-referendum-559/

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27800878

http://www.ibtimes.com/russia-protests-estonias-treatment-russian-minority-echoing-pretext-crimea-takeover-1562399

http://www.ibtimes.com/russia-protests-estonias-treatment-russian-minority-echoing-pretext-crimea-takeover-1562399

http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/23/us-ukraine-crisis-russia-insight-idUSBREA2K07S20140323

http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/23/us-ukraine-crisis-russia-insight-idUSBREA2K07S20140323

http://rt.com/news/latvian-culture-minister-urges-its-citizens-not-to-speak-russian-946/

http://rt.com/news/latvian-culture-minister-urges-its-citizens-not-to-speak-russian-946/

http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/19/us-russia-estonia-idUSBREA2I1J620140319

http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/uilleam-blacker/no-real-threat-to-ukraine%E2%80%99s-russian-speakers-language-law-ban

http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/uilleam-blacker/no-real-threat-to-ukraine%E2%80%99s-russian-speakers-language-law-ban

http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-estonia-not-crimea/25321328.html

http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/countries/europe/estonia

http://www.jstor/



IV. Websites

Naturalization, Dual Citizenship and Registration of Citizenship. (2014, February 1). Retrieved June 6, 2014, from http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/service/consular-services/4727/

Developing situation in Crimea alarming, says OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. (2014, March 6). . Retrieved June 6, 2014, from http://www.osce.org/hcnm/116180

Left Behind: Stateless Russians Search for Equality in Estonia. (2004, April 6).Retrieved June 6, 2014, from http://www.refintl.org/policy/field-report/left-behind-stateless-russians-search-equality-estonia

Republic of Latvia Language Law (Text). (1992, May 5).Retrieved June 6, 2014, from https://www.uta.edu/cpsees/latlang.htm

Ministry of the Interior: Report on Language Laws (2013, February 1).Retrieved June 6, 2014, from http://eudo-citizenship.eu/country-profiles/?country=Latvia

Ethnic Minorities in Latvia The Russians. (2010, January 1). . Retrieved June 6, 2014, from http://www.latvia.lv/library/ethnic-minorities-latvia

Ministry of the Interior. Ethnic Minorities in Estonia: The Russians. (2013, January 1). . Retrieved June 6, 2014, from http://estonia.eu/about-estonia/society/citizenship.html

Report on Citizenship Law. (2013, February 1). Retrieved June 6, 2014, fromhttp://eudo-citizenship.eu/country-profiles/?country=Latvia

Estonia: Russian Minority. (2013, February 6). Retrieved June 6, 2014, from http://www.minorityrights.org/2447/estonia/russians.html

Latvian State Language Law 1994. (2014, June 6). Retrieved June 6, 2014, from http://izm.izm.gov.lv/9419.html

Estonian Citizenship Act 1998. (2014, March 7). . Retrieved June 6, 2014, from http://estonia.eu/about-estonia/society/citizenship.html

V. Films:

Hoffman, J. (Director). (2013). Ukraine: The Birth of a Nation (Part I-IV) Ukraine: Zodiak Film Productions. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nRr-nrJ7xvQ

International Historic Films (IHF) (Producer). (1985).The Baltic Tragedy: Occupations of the USSR and Nazi Occupation. Sweden : International Historic Films. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hcmzWrKjmyI

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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hcmzWrKjmyI

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nRr-nrJ7xvQ

http://estonia.eu/about-estonia/society/citizenship.html

http://izm.izm.gov.lv/9419.html

http://www.minorityrights.org/2447/estonia/russians.html

http://eudo-citizenship.eu/country-profiles/?country=Latvia


http://estonia.eu/about-estonia/society/citizenship.html

http://www.latvia.lv/library/ethnic-minorities-latvia


https://www.uta.edu/cpsees/latlang.htm

http://www.refintl.org/policy/field-report/left-behind-stateless-russians-search-equality-estonia

http://www.refintl.org/policy/field-report/left-behind-stateless-russians-search-equality-estonia

http://www.osce.org/hcnm/116180

http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/service/consular-services/4727/



VI. Class & Trip Notes:

Djackkova, Svetlana (2014). Minorities, Stateless Persons and immigrants in Latvia. Latvian Center for Human Rights. May 29th 2014

National People’s Congress (2014). Current Concerns for Russian Minorities in Latvia. May 27th 2014

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Latvia (2014). Security Dilemma of the Ukraine and it’s affects on the Baltic States. May 27th 2014.

Lantzme, G. (2014). Current Concerns for the Baltic & Minority Rights-Citizenship. U.S. Embassy Tallinn, Estonia. May 30th 2014,

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Documents

Comparative Policy Analysis of Minority Language & Citizenship Ties