Comparative Theory Analysis of Defensive Realism and Offensive Realism.final

Running head: A COMPARATIVE THEORY ANALYSIS OF DEFENSIVE REALISM AND OFFENSIVE REALISM

A Comparative Theory Analysis of Defensive Realism and Offensive Realism

Joshua R. Willis

Troy University

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A COMPARATIVE THEORY ANALYSIS OF DEFENSIVE REALISM AND OFFENSIVE REALISM

Abstract

Defensive realism and offensive realism grew out of Kenneth Waltz's neorealism theory

in the 1990s. These two sub-theories were built to include variations in international relations,

including geography and technology, two factors that neorealism ignored (Wohlforth, 2008).

Defensive and offensive realism coexist as subschools. However, they do not exhaust the realm

of theories in realism. What separates offensive realism from defensive realism? Defensive

realism encourages the state to maintain moderate and reserved policies to attain security.

The state seeks to protect its power through security maximization, which reduces the uncertainty

of other states' intentions (Taliaferro, 2000). In contrast, offensive realism encourages the state to

maximize its power and influence to achieve security through domination and hegemony.

The state seeks to project its dominance through power maximization and view other states'

power as a threat, assuming the worst (Tang, 2008).

Keywords: offensive realism, defensive realism, security maximization, power

maximization, security dilemma

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In this comparative theory analysis, defensive realism and offensive realism, two

coexisting subschools of realism, will be compared and contrasted. Defensive realism and

offensive realism grew out of Kenneth Waltz's theory of neorealism in the 1990s. These two

subschools are important to study for two reasons. Firstly, the theoretical debate between

defensive realism and offensive realism has broad policy implications for the United States. Both

have divergent perspectives on military doctrine, foreign economic policy, military intervention,

and crisis management (Taliaferro, 130). Secondly, the theoretical debate between defensive

realism and offensive realism will likely generate progress in the study of international relations.

Jeffery Taliaferro observes: "By developing and testing theories derived from the same core

assumptions, researchers can more easily identify competing hypotheses, refine scope conditions

for theories, and uncover new facts" (Taliaferro, 130). In this analysis, it is argued that while the

study of these subschools is important, neither defensive realism nor offensive realism can

account for everything that is happening in the world (although both will attempt to do so). This

analysis begins by looking at the foundations of defensive realism and offensive realism

as well as why both subschools were needed.

The Beginning of Offensive Realism and Defensive Realism

To understand defensive realism and offensive realism fully, we must begin by looking at

the theory from which they both originate: neorealism. Neorealism was first outlined by Kenneth

Waltz in his book Theory of International Politics, published in 1979. Theory of International

Politics is two books in one: In the first half of the book, Waltz discusses well-known theories,

primarily propositions about the balance of power, imperialism, and tests derived from the

philosophy of science (Fox, 492). In the second half of the book, Waltz theorizes. Waltz's theory

takes its place in a distinguished group of theories primarily because of its emphasis on the

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potential for stability in a two-power system (Fox, 493). Waltz's sought to "revivify realist

thinking by translating some core realist ideas into a deductive, top-down theoretical framework"

by forming neorealism (Wohlforth, 137). According to Jeffery Taliaferro, "Neorealism seeks to

explain international outcomes, such as the likelihood of major war, the prospects for

international cooperation, and aggregate alliance patterns among states" (Taliaferro, 132). In his

book, Waltz presents three main questions about international politics: 1. Why has the modern

state system persisted in the face of attempts by certain states at dominance? 2. Why has war

among great powers recurred over centuries? 3. Why do states often find cooperation difficult?

(Waltz, 65, Wohlforth, 137). Waltz's influential work had a profound effect on international

relations and realist thought. As Robert Keohane observed, "The importance of neorealism has

been widely recognized, and it has been subjected to critical scrutiny from a variety of

perspectives, and with varying concentration on Waltz's work" (Keohane, 16).

By the 1990s, scholars began to turn away from the theory of neorealism. It was widely

viewed as a "degenerating" research program that could not withstand theoretical critiques and

empirical setbacks (Wohlforth, 136). Realists began working with Waltz's theory and realized

that "depending on how they thought about the core assumptions, and what they saw as the most

reasonable expectations about real-world conditions, neorealism could lead to very different

predictions" (Wohlforth, 138). Realists also realized that Waltz's theory ignored two significant

variations of international relations: geography and technology (Wohlforth, 139). From this

realization, defensive realism and offensive realism emerged in the 1990s from Waltz's

neorealism. Scholars, in keeping with the traditions established by Waltz, developed these

theories as a way to articulate the realist theory. William Wohlforth observes that "Scholars

framed much defensive realist theorizing as developments of Waltz's neorealism. And, in The

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Tragedy of Great Power Politics, [John] Mearsheimer portrays offensive realism as the

successor to Waltz's neorealism, which he equates with defensive realism" (Wohlforth, 138).

Waltz joined other scholars such as Daryl Copeland and Robert Jervis, who contributed to the

defensive realism positions, while Mearsheimer joined scholars such as Robert Gilpin and

Randall Schweller in developing the offensive realist position. These scholars differ on many

positions, including their understanding of what counts as security and the relationship between

power and security (Chatterjee, 5498).

An Overview of Realism

Before comparing and contrasting defensive realism and offensive realism, it is important

to establish a basic understanding of how realism is defined and a few of its core premises.

Realism remains an important theoretical perspective in international relations; nevertheless,

over time, this realist theory has become fragmented into a variety of other theories, all under the

title of realism (Lynn-Jones, 157). Definitions of realism vary considerably from scholar to

scholar. However, most realists agree that realism is based on four central propositions. Firstly,

politics take place within and between groups. Secondly, these groups are driven by narrow self-

interest. Thirdly, the absence of self-government shapes international politics, and, fourthly,

international relations is largely a politics of power and security (Wohlforth, 133). Realists have

also established three core premises of realism. Firstly, realists are concerned with the question

of war and peace in the international system, their causes and conditions, variations, and the

possible transition from one to the other (Chatterjee, 5497). Realism is committed to the security

dilemma which the international system faces for the following reason: "being a self-help system

is perpetually unstable and risky, for the search for security of one becomes the cause of

insecurity for its adversaries" (Chatterjee, 5498). One of the points of contention between realists

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is the critical issue of how much power a state requires for its security. In fact, this is the central

point of focus between defensive realism and offensive realism. Shibashis Chatterjee observes

that "all forms of realism are essentially focused on the question of relative capabilities of states

in an environment bereft of a central regulatory mechanism." Chatterjee goes on to say, "Thus in

realism, unlike many other ideologies, conflict is a natural condition of the international order, an

axiomatic state of affairs rather than a consequence that can be attributed to larger, macro-

sociological or politico-economic factors" (Chatterjee, 5498). Second, realists are focused on

territorial units, and states, as the central actors of world politics (Chatterjee, 5498). Lastly,

realists believe that states are guided by the considerations of national interest, "defined along

survival, security, material development and enhancement of relative capabilities" (Chatterjee,

5498).

Defensive Realism and Offensive Realism

Similarities

Defensive realism and offensive realism share a similarity that is critical to address

before discussing the differences between the two subschools. The central concept that both

share is that of the security dilemma. The security dilemma is a situation in which "the means by

which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others" (Glaser, 174). Both

defensive realism and offensive realism assume that states want some power and that these states

seek power through similar means (Snyder, 151-152). These states engage in similar foreign

policy behaviors, ultimately motivated by the attempt to attain security for themselves (Rudloff,

46). Although defensive realism and offensive realism share this same basic security problem,

the similarities end there (Miller, 175). In this next section, the differences between defensive

realism and offensive realism, which are more abundant, will be discussed.

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Differences

There is a significant division within realism, and it is between defensive realism and

offensive realism (Lynn-Jones, 157-158). Defensive realism and offensive realism identify the

same security problem, but their responses are completely different (Miller, 175). The broad

differences between the two subschools of realism can be compared and contrasted in the

following way:

The security dilemma. Defensive realism encourages the state to maintain moderate and

reserved policies to attain security (Schmidt, 436). States defend themselves against all threats

and minimize relative losses, but attempts at expansion are unnecessary for state security (Miller,

176). States seek to protect their power through security maximization, reducing the uncertainty

of other states' intentions. Jeffery Taliaferro explains: "Under anarchy, many of the means a state

uses to increase its security decrease the security of other states. This security dilemma causes

states to worry about one another's future intentions and relative power. Pairs of states may

pursue security-seeking strategies purely, but inadvertently generate spirals of mutual hostility or

conflict" (Taliaferro, 129).

In contrast, offensive realism encourages the state to maximize power and influence to

achieve security through domination and hegemony. They seek to project their power through

power maximization and view other states' power as a threat, assuming the worst (Tang, 453).

Jeffery Taliaferro explains, "All states strive to maximize their power relative to other states

because only the most powerful states can guarantee their survival. They pursue expansionist

policies when and where the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs. States under anarchy face

the ever-present threat that other states will use force to harm or conquer them" (Taliaferro, 128).

Because of this, states are compelled to "improve their relative power position through arms

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buildups, unilateral diplomacy, mercantile (or even autarkic) foreign economic policies, and

opportunistic expansion" (Taliaferro, 128-129). Charles Glaser explains this argument further by

quoting Mearsheimer on power maximization in this way: "[States] aim to maximize their

relative power position… The reason is simple: the greater the military advantage one has over

other states, the more secure it is. States maximize relative power in order to maintain the means

for self-defense" (Glaser, 196).

Power and security. Defensive realists do not make a direct connection between

maximizing power and security. In fact, they subscribe to the belief that power maximization

may even harm state security under certain conditions (Miller, 175). Benjamin Miller observes

the following: "States defend themselves against threats and minimize relative losses, but

attempts at expansion are both unnecessary for state security and likely to backfire. Accordingly,

for security purposes, states should behave moderately and avoid threatening others." Miller goes

on to say: "An accumulation of power beyond what is needed to defend the status quo, especially

the acquisition of offensive capabilities, might make the state less secure through the familiar

working of the security dilemma" (Miller, 176). Nuclear-arming by a state, even if for self-

defense purposes might frighten other states. The perceived threat to other states may cause them

to respond by arming themselves as well.

Offensive realists make a direct connection between power and security. They hold the

belief that so as to ensure security, "the state has to maximize its relative power and achieve

superiority vis-à-vis its opponents" (Miller, 175). Benjamin Miller explains: "The more power [a

state] possesses, the greater the margin of security the state enjoys. Maximum security is

achieved through full-blown hegemony in the international system or at least in the region under

consideration. Under these conditions, the hegemon can deter potential rivals and compel others

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to make diplomatic, economic, and strategic concessions so as to maximize its power" (Miller,

175). Without a state's primacy, other states will seek to grow stronger and undermine any

challenger it faces. If a challenger is deemed a threat, the hegemon may choose to go to war to

meet the challenge head-on (Miller, 175).

Leverage against other states. Defensive realism holds the position that the defense has

the leverage at all times. Defensive realists maintain that the offensive is not likely to succeed

and will ultimately fail. They believe that bullying other states does not profit the international

system "because a countervailing coalition will be formed against the most threatening power to

prevent it from achieving its hegemonic objectives" (Miller, 176).

Not surprisingly, offensive realists believe that the offense has leverage at all times.

Offensive realists maintain that states seek to join with other states that are stronger rather than

balancing against them (Miller, 177). The offensive realists believe that they can achieve

hegemony and maximize power by "exploiting opportunities to expand at affordable costs"

(Miller, 177). Miller observes that "Security and peace are reached through strength and

superiority rather than through balance and restraint as advocated by defensive realists" (Miller,

177).

The state's intentions. Defensive realists view states with their best intention's in mind.

Defensive realism rejects that assuming the worst in other states intentions is profitable. They

argue that "assuming the worst over others' intentions is irrational, unsustainable, and

counterproductive, although they do admit that states may often assume the worst over each

other's intentions due to fear, thus ending up in exacerbating fear" (Shiping, 453-454). Richard

Betts takes this warning one step further, saying that, "Operationalizing worst-case analysis

requires extraordinary expenses; it risks being counterproductive if it is effective (by provoking

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enemy countermeasures or preemption), and it is likely to be ineffective because routinization

will discredit it" (Betts, 74).

Assuming the worst, offensive realism presupposes that states assume the worst about

others' intentions (Shiping, 453). Offensive realists do not give others states the

benefit of the doubt when analyzing their intentions (Rendall, 525). They believe that states are

inherently aggressive due to anarchy (Shiping, 453). John Mearsheimer defends this position by

saying, "The level of fear between great power varies with changes in the distribution of power,

not with assessments about each other's intentions. When a state surveys its environment to

determine which states pose a threat to its survival, it focuses mainly on the offensive capabilities

of potential rivals, not their intentions. Intentions are ultimately unknowable, so states worried

about their survival must make worst-case assumptions about their rivals' intentions"

(Mearsheimer, 120).

Conclusion

Defensive realism presents a more optimistic view of the international system than

offensive realism. Defensive realists claim that states strive to maximize relative security, not

relative power. They maintain that the international system itself provides incentives for

expansion and that states can achieve security by pursuing moderate foreign policies (Taliaferro,

158). In contrast, offensive realists predict frequent internationally driven expansion and hold

that all states want to maximize relative power. Offensive realists maintain that "anarchy

compels states to seek opportunities to weaken potential adversaries and improve their relative

power positions" (Taliaferro, 158).

This comparative theory analysis has attempted to compare and contrast defensive

realism and offensive realism in a clear and precise manner to further the debate between both.

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Waltz, in his influential book, Theory of International Politics and Mearsheimer, and in his

classic text, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, began this theoretical debate among scholars.

Quibbles aside about the differences between the two subschools, both have created a discussion

between many international relations scholars that otherwise would not have occurred. The

theoretical debate must continue, as defensive realism and offensive realism have broad policy

implications for the United States in the 21st century.

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References

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Comparative Theory Analysis of Defensive Realism and Offensive Realism.final