competition policy number 1 NEWSLETTER February

EUROPEAN COMPETITION DAY

LISBON, JUNE 9th 2000

Following a proposal of Commissioner Monti, a European Competition Day willbe organised in Lisbon, on June 9th . This event is dedicated to the citizens of theEuropean Union who are not really aware of the positive impact of Europeancompetition policy on their day-to-day life.

The Conference will take place in :Forum TelecomAv. Fontes Pereira de Melo 38c1050 Lisbon

For more information, please contact :European Commission-DG CompDirectorate A - Unit A1Mr. Eric Cuziat (tel: 32 2 295 77 62)

Direcçao-Geral do Comercio e da ConcorrenciaAv. Visconde Valmor, 721050-242 LisboaMr. A. Bangy (21/ 791 92 62)

JOURNEE EUROPENNE DE LA CONCURRENCE

LISBONNE, LE 9 JUIN 2000

A la suite d'une proposition du Commissaire Monti, une Journée européenne dela concurrence sera organisée le 9 juin à Lisbonne. Cet événement est destiné auxcitoyens de l'Union européenne qui n'ont pas toujours conscience des incidencespositives de la politique européenne de concurrence sur leur vie quotidienne.

La conférence se tiendra:Forum TelecomAv. Fontes Pereira de Melo 38c1050 Lisbonne

Pour de plus amples informations, vous pouvez contacter:Commission Européenne-DG CompDirection A - Unité A1M. E. Cuziat ( tel: 32 2 295 77 62)

Direcçao-Geral do Comercio e da ConcorrenciaAv. Visconde Valmor, 721050-242 LisboaM. A. Bangy (21/ 791 92 62)

ECCOMPETITIONPOLICYNEWSLETTER

Editor:HenrikMørchProduction& Layout:VickyHannan

Address:European Commission,C150, 00/158Wetstraat 200, rue de la LoiBrussel B-1049 BruxellesTel : +322 2957620Fax : +322 2955437

Electronic Mail:X400: C=be;A:rtt;P:cec;OU=dg4;S=info4Internet:[email protected] Wide Web:http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg04/

ISSN1025-2266

c o m p e t i t i o n p o l i c y

NEWSLETTER2000number 1February

Published three times a year by the Competition Directorate-General of the European Commission

Contents1 European Competition Day in Lisbon

Articles2 The case Totalfina/Elf Aquitaine: preserving a

contestable and competitive market in anindustry that is of a particularly sensitive natureto the consumer, by Alexander SCHAUB,Claude RAKOVSKY, Henri PIFFAUT and PeterDE LUYCK

5 Nordic Satellite Cases, by Andrew HOBBS

Opinion and comments7 Who can be the beneficiary of a State aid, by

Ben SLOCOCK

Anti-trust Rules13 Commission approves an agreement to improve

energy efficiency of washing machines, byManuel MARTíNEZ LÓPEZ

15 La Commission inflige des amendes à un cartelde producteurs de tubes d'acier sans soudurepour partage de marchés, par Ingrid BREIT etFrancisco PÉREZ FLORES

17 The Commission fines FEG, the Dutchassociation of electrotechnical equipmentwholesalers and its biggest member TU, byErnst FERDINANDUSSE

Mergers19 Recent developments and important decisions,

by Tiina PITKÄNEN and Neil MARSHALL28 Commission fines Deutsche post, KLM,

Anheuser-Busch and Scottish & Newcastle forsupplying incorrect or misleading information incompetition procedures, by HolgerDIECKMANN, Gudrun SCHMIDT, MatthijsVISSER and Nils VON HINTEN-REED

30 Case No COMP/JV.26 - FreeCom / DangaardHolding

31 Commission authorises creation of joint ventureBOL Spain by Bertelsmann AG and PlanetaCorporación S.R.L., by Hubert GAMBS

31 Commission authorises takeover of Cdnow byTime Warner and Sony, by Ali NIKPAY

32 La Commission européenne autorise la créationde l'entreprise commune Hearst MondadoriEditoriale SRL, by Jacques LOVERGNE

State Aid33 The Multisectoral framework on regional aid for

large investment projects: a mid-term review, byAdolfo BARBERÁ DEL ROSAL

42 Main developments between 1st September and31st December 1999

Information Section49 Competition DG Staff list51 Documentation78 Coming up

79 CASES COVERED IN THIS ISSUE

➢ ARTICLES

Competition Policy Newsletter 2000 Number 1 February2

On 24 August 1999 theCommission was notified of theproposed acquisition byTotalFina of Elf Aquitaine.These two companies are theFrench national players in the oilindustry. This transaction gavebirth to the world’s fourth-largest oil group valued ataround € 101 billion. After a fullinvestigation, the Commissionadopted on 9 February 2000 aclearance decision conditionalon the realisation of variousdivestitures in France.

TotalFina's public takeover bidwas initially hostile andtriggered a counter offer by ElfAquitaine. This created theunprecedented situation of twocompeting notifications. Elfeventually recommended Total-Fina's offer and the transactionwas successfully completed inthe Autumn. Both groups carryout their principal activities inthe sectors of exploration andproduction of petroleum andnatural gas, refining, distributionof petroleum products, petro-chemicals, speciality chemicalsand in the case of Elf,healthcare.

On 6 October 1999, theCommission announced itsintention to initiate a detailedinvestigation of the proposedoperation.

The Commission’s investi-gation revealed a number ofserious competition problems,firstly on the wholesale marketsfor motor fuels and heating oil,secondly on the retail marketfor the sale of motor fuels onmotorways, thirdly on theliquefied petroleum gas market(LPG) and lastly on the marketfor Aviation fuel sales at theLyon and Toulouse airports.

The wholesale market. One ofthe main peculiarities of theFrench motor fuel market hasbeen the emergence, over thelast decade, of the hyper- andsupermarket chains as majorretailers, accounting todaytogether for 52% of total sales.This has led to price-levels(before taxes) among the lowestwithin the EU. However, retailchains are only resellers andthey must procure fuels fromthe integrated refiners who arealso their competitors on theretail market. Prior to the

concentration this situation wasnot problematic as refinerswere themselves in competitionon the wholesale market andfor the provision of logisticservices. In fact competitionexisted at the wholesale levelfirstly between the refinersbased in France and secondlybecause of European-wideover-capacities in the refiningindustry that made possible theimport of refined products. Itcould however only take placebecause of the ability of theresellers to access the logisticsnecessary to import, stock andtransport refined products...

The Commission found that theconcentration between TotalFinaand Elf would have put injeopardy every element of thecompetitive balance of thesemarkets. The notified transactionwould have put an end to therivalry between the two mainnational refiners (Totalfina andElf) and would have placed intheir hands 55% of the refiningcapacities (and an equivalentmarket share on the wholesalemarket), control over a majorityof the French import terminals,control over the three principalpipelines supplying Frenchterritory and over a substantialpart of the local terminals. Thiscombination would haveconferred on TotalFina/Elf asubstantial market power on thewholesale market that could notbe contested either by demand(supermarkets or large finalcustomers) or by competingrefiners or even by imports. Itwould have, in turn, allowedTotalFina/Elf to contain any

The case TotalFina / Elf Aquitaine:preserving a contestable andcompetitive market in an industry thatis of a particularly sensitive nature tothe consumerBy Alexander SCHAUB, Director General,Claude RAKOVSKY, Henri PIFFAUT andPeter DE LUYCK, DG COMP-B-1

➢ ARTICLES

Competition Policy Newsletter 2000 Number 1 February 3

competitive pressure on the retailmarket from the retail chainsand, ultimately, to increase retailprices for motor fuels anddomestic heating oil.

In order to obtain the agreementof the Commission to theirproposed concentration,TotalFina has thereforecommitted to divest the majorityof the assets of the newcombined entity in logistics.These divestments, if fullycomplied with, will openfacilities for importing, storingand transporting refined productson French territory. In fact, onlysuch a significant opening of theinfrastructure could enable thirdparties to contest efficientlyTotalFina/Elf's market powerthrough recourse to imports andto independent transport andstorage facilities.

In practice, TotalFina gives upall presence it has or abandonsits control positions in themajority of French importterminals, and in particular inthose that supply the majorpipeline systems supplyingFrench territory. Moreover,TotalFina/Elf will keep onlyminority shares in the twoprincipal French pipelinesystems and completelywithdraw from the third pipelinesystem as well as from alladjacent terminals . Finally anumber of inland terminals(terminals located in the mostimportant urban areas) will bedivested.

The opening of the logistics, upto now dominated by the major

refiners, was consideredsufficient to allow themaintenance of the competitiveconditions on the retail marketand will have a dissuasive effecton those refiners who would betempted to raise prices for motorfuel and domestic heating oil.

Motorways.The Commissionalso found that the merger wouldeliminate competition in themarket for retailing motor fuelon the French motorways. As theCommission had already notedin previous cases (the Total/Finaand Exxon/Mobil case), motorfuel sales on the motorwaysconstitute a separate market withprices being significantly higherthan prices charged off-motorways. The supermarketsare almost absent from thismarket, which was essentiallyshared between five operators,all being integrated refiners. Theinvestigation conducted by theCommission has shown thatcompetition, already reducedbefore the TotalFina/Elfconcentration, would be nearlyeliminated as the combinedentity would hold almost twothirds of the market.

TotalFina proposed to divest 70service stations, a figure roughlycorresponding to Elf’s motorwaynetwork, bringing the total downto 144. The elimination of theoverlap was considered by theCommission as necessary topreserve the free choice of themotorists, and as the only meansof preserving effectivecompetition on a marketcharacterised by partially captivecustomers.

LPG. Liquefied petroleum gas(LPG) is used by households forcooking and heating as well asby industry. The market wasalready very concentrated priorto the concentration. In fact, thefour principal operators holdbetween 20 and 28% of marketshares each, and two smallercompetitors are linked withTotalFina and Elf throughparticipation or joint venture.

The investigation of theCommission revealed that, postconcentration, the new entitywould acquire a dominantposition on the market andwould control an important partof the import logistics, storageand bottling infrastructure (forconditioned LPG), all of whichwould guarantee the new entityfull autonomy throughoutFrench territory, freeing it fromdependency on infrastructure-access exchanges with itscompetitors. As the French LPGlogistics situation is tense, itwould be difficult forcompetitors to increase supply ifthe dominant group shouldincrease its prices. In such ascenario, competitors ofTotalFina / Elf would thenfollow the market leader ratherthan risk a confrontation.

TotalFina proposed thedivestment of Elf Antargaz, thesecond actor on the LPG marketin France. This eliminates theoverlap between TotalFina andElf. Also in this market, theimplementation of thecommitments will allow themaintenance of an accessible andcompetitive market in an

➢ ARTICLES


economic sector that is of aparticularly sensitive nature forconsumers.

Airports. Finally, theCommission raised concerns thatthe new entity would have thepossibility to foreclose thesupply of aviation fuels at theLyon and Toulouse airports asthe operation would concentratethe essential infrastructure in thehands of the merging parties.The Commission found that eachof these two airports, which rankrespectively as the third andfourth French airports,constituted substantial parts ofthe Common market . Indeed,they ensure an extendedgeographical cover of importanturban and industrial areas aswell as isolated regions.Moreover, Lyon – Satolas andToulouse – Blagnac are both onthe list of airports for priorityliberalisation under the directiveon groundhandling services.1Under this directive, theCommission publishes four listsof airports covered by theliberalisation requirements laiddown in it.

TotalFina committed itself todivest the 50% share acquiredfrom Elf in the supply of thesetwo airports.

1 Council Directive 96/67/EC of 15

October 1996 on access to thegroundhandling market atCommunity airports, OJ L 272,25.10.1996.

Conclusion

The review of this transactionwas of a particular importancefor at least two reasons. First,the markets (motor fuel, energysources, etc.) where the notifiedoperation led to competitionproblems are vital in the dailylife of most individuals. Second,this case illustrates the approachfollowed by the Commissionwhere national majors are liableto combine to form a nationalchampion. Such operations mayresult in the partitioning of thecommon market. In suchcircumstances, the Commissionhas to ensure the elimination ofthe activity overlaps (as the casefor fuel retail on motorways,LPG and aviation fuel sales) andof all the bottlenecks that couldenable the new entity toforeclose the market to its profit(control of the import logistics,transport and distribution ofrefined petroleum products).

➢ ARTICLES


During the later part of 1998and most of 1999 theCommission examined a seriesof notifications2 involvingagreements relating to satellitetransponder capacity in theNordic region. As well asraising issues in their own right,these cases were of particularinterest because of theirconnections to two merger cases,Telia/Telenor3 and NSD.4

The first of these merger casesinvolved the combination ofTelenor, the leading supplier ofsatellite transponder capacity inthe Nordic region and ashareholder in a Nordic pay-TV

2 The 1999 cases were: Case No.

IV/35.650 – NSAB, Kinnevik andTele Danmark transponder leaseagreement; Case No. IV/C-2/36.517– NSAB, MTG, MTV Europe, SciFi Channel Europe LLC, andNickelodeon International Ltd; CaseNo. IV/36.895 Tele Danmark andCanal Digital; Case No. IV/C-2/37.303 – NSAB and SES Sirius 3lease; Case No. IV/C-2/37.406 –NSAB, Terracom, SSC and TeleDanmark operations agreement; and ,Case No. IV/C-2/37.517 – NSABand SVT. Two related cases with in1998 were: Case No. IV/35.891 -NSAB+GECSI: TransponderPurchase Agreement; and, Case No.IV/36.150 - NSAB and Telenor JointMarketing Agreement.

3 Case No M.1439 – Telia/Telenor,13/10/99

4 Case IV/M490 Nordic SatelliteDistribution, Official Journal L053,02/03/96, page 20.

operator, and Telia. Teliacontrols a major cable operatorand leases a significant amountof transponder capacity fromNSAB, the only other operator inthe Nordic region. Theexamination of the mergerbenefited from the knowledge ofthe market gained by examiningthe notifications, in particular onmarket power in relation tosatellite transponder capacityand the structure of pay-TVoperations in the Nordic region.

The second merger case, NSD,related to various partiesinvolved in the provision of pay-TV. It was prohibited by theCommission in 1995. The jointventure would have foreclosedthe market for satellitetransponder capacity in theNordic region, as well as havingan anti-competitive impact onpay-TV, cable-TV operators andthe related markets fortechnological and administrativeservices. As NSD and thenotifications involved a similarset of parties (a satellitetransponder capacity provider, apay-TV operator and a cable TVoperator) and markets, it wasconsidered whether theagreements constituted anattempt to replicate what thatDecision had prohibited.Accordingly the agreementswere considered collectively anda Notice was published in the

Official Journal5 to see if anythird parties had made similarconnections.

All the notifications involvedNSAB, or its parents. NSABowns and operates satellites,primarily providing transpondercapacity for broadcastingservices to the Nordic and Balticregions. It is owned by two state-owned Swedish companies, SSCand Teracom, and TeleDanmark, Denmark’s largestcable-TV operator.

The first concern was to ensurethat there was no collusionbetween existing Nordic satelliteoperators, NSAB and Telenor, orrestriction on potential newentrants. Co-operation withTelenor to promote the sales of adual-antenna capable ofreceiving from both NSAB andTelenor satellites, as well as aagreements with SES (theoperator of the Astra satellites)to lease an NSAB satellite andthe GECSI (a satellite builder) tojointly finance a new satellite,were examined. It was found thatthere was no restriction ofcompetition.

The next concern was withcompetition between parents ofNSAB, in particular whetherTele Danmark could haveprovided its own satellitecapacity and whether the limitsplaced on the parents use ofNSAB’s transponder capacitywere a form of market sharing.The later was of particular 5 Official Journal C168 16/06/99,

page 9

Nordic Satellite CasesBy Andrew HOBBS,DG COMP-C-2

➢ ARTICLES


concern as it involved unfamiliarmarkets and led to thepublication of the Notice in theOfficial Journal.

Another issue involved NSAB’sagreements with broadcasters(SVT) and pay-TV operators(MTG/Viasat). It was necessary toensure they were neither tied toNSAB, or in a position wherethey controlled sufficienttransponder capacity to denyaccess to other customers. This is

particularly of concern when, as isthe case in the Nordic region,there are only two satelliteoperators and two pay-TVoperators in the relevant markets.In such a market there must bestrong justification for anyexclusivity.

Finally, in relation to an issueraised in NSD, it was consideredwhether any party could usecontrol of transponder capacity toimpose a proprietary conditional

access and encryption system onbroadcasters, pay-TV operatorsand cable television operators.Again this issue warranted thepublication of a Notice in theOfficial Journal.

The conclusion of theexamination was that, despite thesimilarities, the agreements didnot replicate NSD. Havingexamined the notifications on anindividual basis as well they allreceived comfort letters.

OPINION AND COMMENTSIn this section DG IV officials outline developments in community competition procedures. It is importantto recognise that the opinions put forward in this section are the personal views of the officials concerned.They have not been adopted or in any way approved by the Commission and should not be relied upon as astatement of the Commission’s or DG IV’s views.


The title of this article isdeliberately ambiguous: it canmean at the same time: “who isentitled to benefit from a stateaid?” and also “for a given stateaid, who can be said to be abeneficiary for the purpose ofassessing its compatibility withthe Treaty and for deciding theconsequences if the aid isincompatible?”

This article identifies a numberof linked issues which arise inanswering these questions in theexercise of the Commission’sstate aid control under articles87-89 EC, and signals somerecent developments. The articledoes not attempt to list all casesin which these issues arise or toprovide a definitive analysis.However, it will argue that acoherent picture is emerging onthe Commission’s view of suchissues.

The assumption of a singlebeneficiary

State aid analysis traditionallyoperates on the assumption that agiven individual grant of aid hasa single beneficiary, which is,crudely put, the name to whomthe cheque is made out. There isof course an element of fiction inthe implied belief that only thisenterprise enjoys the benefit ofthe aid. In most cases not only

this enterprise but also itsshareholders, suppliers,creditors, clients and employeesmay be better off as a result ofthe aid than they would havebeen without it. However, theassumption of a singlebeneficiary is entirely defensibleas a means of carrying out stateaid control in a manageable way.It is also fair to say thatdistortion of competition, at leastin the markets of suppliers andclients, is likely to be limited, onthe assumption that thesemarkets are open (in particularbecause their competitors alwayshave the option to trade with theaid beneficiary)6. 6 In some recent decisions, the

Commission found that an analysison the assumption that there was asingle beneficiary, namely the directrecipient of the advantage conferredby the Member State, could notadequately assess the measure’sdistortive effect. This is the casewhere Member States have devisedschemes granting incentives to oneset of economic operators to providefinance, services, premises etc toanother set. Examples are section52(8) of the German Income TaxesAct (OJ L 212/50 of 30.7.1998) andthe Partnerships InvestmentProgramme of English Partnerships(Case C 39/99, decision of 22December 1999, not yet published).Such measures, often described aspublic/private partnerships, presenttheir own difficulties in terms ofstate aid control. They are nothowever the subject of this article.

However, although it is usuallyreasonable to regard a measureas having a single beneficiary,the question can arise what isactually the precise meaning ofthe term. Is it the legal person?Is it the economic activity?What if one or both of these hasdisappeared or changedownership?

New guidelines on rescue andrestructuring aid

Such issues often arise in theanalysis of state aid granted torestructure a company indifficulty. In the recent revisionof the relevant guidelinescovering such aid7, theCommission clarified its positionon two points. Firstly, itobserved that the justification foraccepting such aid is to allow apotentially viable enterprise torid itself of the “weight of thepast”. It concluded from this thata new enterprise could not beeligible for such aid, including inthat term an enterprise whichemerges from the liquidation ofa previous firm or merely takesover a previous firm’s assets.Thus the Commission waseffectively saying that the legalentity receiving the aid had to bethe same as the one whosedifficulties justified publicintervention.

This position can be justified inseveral ways. From an economicpoint of view, the new enterprisehas decided to buy the assets ofthe old one at a particular price

7 OJ C 288 of 9.10.1999

Who can be the beneficiary of aState aid ?By Ben SLOCOCK, DG COMP-G-1

➣ OPINION AND COMMENTS


which will take into account therestructuring costs which willfollow. Adding aid simplydistorts the market for thoseassets. It may help the creditorsbut makes little or no differenceto the continuation of the activityin question, which is of coursethe aim of (and reason forauthorising) a restructuring aid.So such aid is likely in any caseto fail the necessity test. Againstthis it can be argued that assetsmay have a negative value andwill not be purchased at allwithout aid: but then that is agood indication in a marketeconomy that they will never beviable – so another importanttest applied to such aid is likelynot to be met8.

From a legal point of view also,the new and old legal entities areentirely separate. Under nationalinsolvency law the new one israrely if ever responsible for theactions or omissions of the lastone, even under specialprocedures (such as the Frenchsystem of “reprise aprèsredressement judiciaire”) where 8 The Commission has accepted a

limited exception to the “newcompanies” rule in the New Laenderof Germany (see footnote 10 in thenew guidelines). The economicargument for doing so is that therule that assets sold for €1 withoutdebt and still not viable, have littleor no chance of ever being viable,holds because market forces wouldnormally have ensured that the useof viable assets is optimised. Wherethere have been no market forces, itis more likely to happen that viableassets can be extracted from a non-viable whole but that the costs ofdoing so exceed the future profitsfrom doing so.

the continuation of the activity,rather than the reimbursement ofcreditors, is the prime objective.If the Commission were to allowrestructuring aid in such cases,successive liquidations and aided“Phoenix” companies, keepingalive non-viable operationsthrough the creation of new legalvehicles, would be much morelikely.

The Commission was thusidentifying the legal entity,rather than the economicactivity, as the important conceptfor the purpose of state aidanalysis. It maintained thisposition in the second point tonote in the new guidelines,namely in the application of thenewly-introduced “one time lasttime” rule to successorcompanies purchasing the assetsof previous aid beneficiaries. Itindicated that such successorcompanies would not “inherit”the ban on a second restructuringaid from the previousbeneficiary, provided that certainsafeguards to prevent abuse weremet. These are that thepurchaser is clearly separatefrom the old firm; that thepurchaser has acquired the oldfirm’s assets at market prices;and that the winding-up orcourt-supervised administrationand purchase of the old companyare not merely circumventiondevices (the Commission coulddecide that this is the case if, forexample, the difficultiesencountered by the purchaserwere clearly foreseeable when ittook over the assets of the oldcompany). These safeguards arereferred to further below.

Recovery of incompatible aidfrom successor companies

When a Member State hasgranted state aid illegally (iewithout Commissionauthorisation) and theCommission finds this aid to beincompatible with the commonmarket, it normally decides thatthe Member State must recoverthe aid. In normal circumstances(ie where the original beneficiarystill exists and is continuing itsactivity) there is no doubt overwhere recovery should be soughtfrom. However the Commissionhas been confronted with othercircumstances and has had todecide from where recoveryshould be sought.

An important case in this area isFinmeccanica/Alfa Romeo. TheCommission decided in 1989that capital injections to AlfaRomeo made in 1985 and 1986through public holding companyFinmeccanica were illegal andincompatible state aid9. Itordered recovery. In themeantime the main productiveassets of Alfa Romeo had beensold to Fiat. The legal entity(Alfa Romeo SpA) which hadreceived the aid initiallyremained in Finmeccanica’sownership but had its remainingassets (apart from tax credits)transferred to Finmeccanica andwas then sold. It was liquidatedin December 1987.

The Commission had to decidefrom whom the recovery should

9 OJ L 394/9 of 1989.



be sought. The Commissiondecided that recovery should besought from Finmeccanica andnot from Fiat, even though thelatter was now carrying out theeconomic activity in respect ofwhich the aid had been granted.This decision was upheld by theECJ10.

Here too we can see aconcentration on the legal entityrather than the economicactivity. But the concentration isnot total and dogmatic. Strictlyspeaking the legal entity whichhad received the aid no longerexisted at the time of theCommission decision, havinghad all its remaining assetstransferred to its parent. Thatbeing the case the Commissionsought recovery from the parent.The point tested by the Courtwas whether recovery shouldhave been sought from Fiat.Noone contested that recoverywas by then impossible becausethe legal vehicle had ceased toexist.

The Commission has dealt withsimilar issues more recently. Inthe Gröditzer decision11 theCommission indicated thatrecovery should be made fromGröditzer or “any otherundertaking to which assets havebeen transferred in such a way asto deprive paragraph 1 [therecovery decision] of anyeffect”. The Commission tookthis unusual step because it had

10 Case C-305/89, judgment of 21

March 1991, I-160311 OJ L 292/27 of 13.11.1999

been hinted that the assets ofGröditzer might be transferred toanother legal vehicle, in thesame ownership, to evade therecovery decision. Thus theCommission saw a possibilitythat a future operator of theoriginal beneficiary’s assetsmight be liable to pay recovery.This possibility was also raisedin the case of the Frenchshipyards ACH and in the Italiancase Seleco.

So would the Commissionalways “pursue the assets” inorder to effect recovery when theoriginal legal entity no longerexists or is not in a position torepay the aid? The answer mustbe no. The obligation on theMember State is to use allavailable remedies to recover theaid from the entity whichreceived it. Assuming it is acompany, this may extend toforcing the company’sliquidation. Even if theliquidation does not produceenough proceeds to repay the aidin full, this could not in itselfjustify pursuing any futureowner of the assets. Such aliquidation has a significantvalue in terms of the conditionsof competition, since competingundertakings, which may havebeen harmed by the incompatiblestate aid, will have theopportunity to fill the marketvoid left and/or to acquire theassets being sold12. (There is

12 This is true even in the worst case

scenario that the liquidation hasalready happened before theMember State tries to seek recovery

also a salutary lesson forcreditors and shareholders of thedangers of trading with andowning businesses receivingincompatible state aid.)

The question, then, is where theline is drawn between caseswhere assets can be pursued andthose where they cannot. In allcandour the line is not yetprecisely defined. A parallel canhowever be drawn with thesafeguard conditions mentionedabove in connection with the“one time last time” rule13. Oneimportant test is whether theassets are still in the sameultimate ownership, as was thecase both in Finmeccanica, inrelation to the “remaining assets”of Alfa Romeo, and – potentially– in Gröditzer (cf the “clearlyseparate” condition above, whichis clearly not met by the old andnew owners of assets which arein the same ultimate ownershipas before)14. Another is whetherthe transfer of assets was atmarket conditions. A third iswhether the specific aim of the

in compliance with the Commissiondecision.

13 The kind of situation which wouldlead the Commission to pursue theassets canalso be compared withnational insolvency provisions onfraud on creditors etc.

14 A further interesting example fromthe world of anti-trust is the case ofSAGA Petrokjemi which had itsassets transferred to, and was thenliquidated by, a new parent Statoilbetween the time of its participationin the polypropylene cartel and theimposition of fines. TheCommission imposed the fine onStatoil. See OJ L 230/1 of18.8.1986, recitals 97ff.



transfer was to frustrate recoveryof the aid, though theCommission would probably notfeel it necessary to prove thiswas the case if other testsshowed that the recoverydecision had, in fact, beendeprived of effect. But thesemay not be exhaustive.

The “pass-through” doctrine

Underlying all this thinking isthe view that assets transferred atmarket conditions betweenindependent economic operatorsare “cleansed” by the transactionboth of the difficulties of theirprevious owners - assets carry nodebts with tem - and of anycontinuing advantage conferredby previous aid (but not iftransferred at other conditions).There is a certain logic in this: itis hard to argue, at least in themajority of cases, that the priceof those assets, and therefore thesituation of the new owner,would have been lower in theabsence of the previous owner'sdifficulties or higher in theabsence of the state aid. Bycontrast there is nothing in thearguments and examples abovewhich would suggest that changeof ownership of a given legalentity, such as a company, onwhatever terms, would affect theassessment that that entitycontinued to enjoy the benefit ofa previous state aid. Thisdifferent treatment of “assetsales” and “share sales” isfurther referred to below.

The view that a benefit continuesto be enjoyed after a change ofownership, whether of assets or

of shares, is known as the “pass-through” doctrine. A version ofthis doctrine was recently testedin a different context fromCommunity state aid control,namely an appeal to the WorldTrade Organisation by theCommunity against impositionby the USA of countervailingduties on certain hot-rolled leadand bismuth carbon steelproducts from the UK15. In 1992the USA imposed duties againsta company called UES whichwas previously 50% owned bythe public (and subsidised)British Steel Corporation (BSC).BSC established UES in 1986 inassociation with anothercompany GKN. British Steel plcwas the successor of BSC in thesense that the former assumedthe property, rights and liabilitiesof the latter in September 1988.

The UK government privatisedBritish Steel plc in December1988 through a sale of shares. Itwas not disputed that theprivatisation of British Steel plcwas at market conditions. TheUS found that a portion of thealleged subsidies in question (inthe form of capital contributionsdating from 1977-1985, whichthe US allocates over an 18 yearperiod) "passed through" fromBSC to UES and remained withUES after privatisation of BritishSteel plc. The US thereforeimposed countervailing duties onimports of leaded bars producedby UES (later renamed BSES)based on that portion of "benefit" 15 Panel decision dated 23.12.1999.

Available at http://www.wto.org/wto/ddf/ep/public.html.

from prior subsidies that wasdeemed to have passed throughto UES.

The US argued that thedeterminative factor is theproductive assets, not theowners, citing relevant WTOtexts referring to the "subsidy" asbeing "bestowed, directly orindirectly, upon the manufacture,production or export of" theproduct. In focusing on theproductive assets, the USasserted that the successor firmreally is "no different" from thesubsidy recipient. Clearly, thisis a very different logic from theone which emerges fromCommunity state aid texts anddecisions described above, evenif the case in question iscomplicated by the chain oftransactions before and after theprivatisation, and even if theconcepts and aims of WTOdisciplines are not directlyparallel to those of Communitystate aid law.

The WTO panel’s finding is aninteresting one. Essentially itrejects the pass-through doctrine.It has, however, been appealedby the US (the WTO appellatebody is due to report by lateApril 2000). It finds in the firstinstance that “fair market valuewas paid for all productiveassets, goodwill etc. employedby UES and BSplc/BSES in theproduction of leaded barsimported into the United Statesin 1994, 1995 and 1996” (theperiod of the measures inquestion). In thesecircumstances, the panel failedto see “how pre-1985/86



"financial contributions"bestowed on BSC couldsubsequently be considered toconfer a "benefit" on UES andBSplc/BSES during the relevantperiods of review”. Thus it cancertainly be seen that in thecircumstances where theCommission would generally,for state aid purposes, see notransfer of advantage (sale ofassets at market conditionsbetween independent economicoperators), the WTO panelwould also do so.

The panel goes on to make afurther statement, in connectionwith the argument that theprivatisation of British Steel onmarket terms also eliminated anyaid effects. The panel said “inour view, it is irrelevant that theaforementioned fair market valuewas paid by the (new) owners ofUES and BSplc/BSESrespectively, rather than thosecompanies themselves. Anyapproach requiring that fairmarket value be paid by thecompany itself, rather than itsowners, would elevate form oversubstance. In the context ofprivatizations negotiated at arm'slength, for fair market value, andconsistent with commercialprinciples, the distinctionbetween a company and itsowners is redundant for thepurpose of establishing"benefit"”.

On this point it can be arguedthat the panel diverges withCommission practice in state aidcases. As a rule, the Commissiondoes distinguish between acompany and its owners. Since

quoted companies change theirownership many times a day, itis hard to see how it could beotherwise. There is howeverestablished practice in the area ofprivatisation which suggests thatthe outcome in this particularcase is not divergent. In theCommission’s 23rd (1993)annual competition report theCommission noted that “Whenthe privatisation is effected bythe sale of shares on the stockexchange, it is generallyassumed to be on marketconditions and not to involveaid. Before flotation, debt maybe written off or reduced withoutthis giving rise to a presumptionof aid as long as the proceeds ofthe flotation exceed thereduction in debt”. Thus wherea business is owned by the stateand afterwards sold, debt write-off before the sale – which,without the sale, would certainlybe considered to be aid to thatenterprise – is no longer held toconfer an advantage on thebusiness after it.

Conclusion

The author of this article is not alawyer (this may already be clearto those who are). As such hetends to dislike the elevation oflegal form over economic reality(or “form over substance” as theWTO expressed it). But it is tooeasy to fall into thinking thateconomic reality consists ofactivity, assets, employees whilelegal entities are mere chimericconstructions. Legal entities, andin particular companies, are infact collections of economicinterests organised in a particular

way. There is an economiclogic, as well a legal one, in theview that the beneficiary of astate aid should generally beheld only to be the legal entitywhich has received, or isproposed to receive it.

This general view can be seen tobe maintained coherently by theCommission in the variousexamples cited above. TheCommission does not, andshould not, elevate this view tothe level of dogma. Nor is therea strict logical need that thisview should apply equally in allinstances. It would, for example,be possible to defend a stricterposition on the “one time lasttime” rule – no second aid forthe same economic activity usingthe same assets – whilemaintaining the same view asnow in relation to recovery andeligibility.

There are of course possibleobjections to the general view. Inrelation to eligibility forrestructuring aid, it can beobserved that when an enterprisebuys the shares of a company indifficulty then the price will takeinto account the restructuringcosts which will follow just asmuch as if it had purchased theassets. The crucial difference,however, is that a buyer ofshares acquires an enterprisecomplete with liabilities. It is ofcourse possible to construct anexample where, perhapsfollowing a concordat ofcreditors, an enterprise indifficulty has rid itself of mostliabilities and the economicdifference between a share and



an asset sale is minimal. Butthese cases are exceptional ifthey ever exist in practice at all.The Commission took the viewin the new guidelines that theneed to avoid abuse throughdrawing a clear line overrodeany potential “hard cases” whichcould be theoretically imagined.

The general view shouldcertainly not be maintained whenit denies state aid decisions of

effect (hence the need to retainthe possibility of “pursuingassets” in cases of aid recovery,even if the circumstances inwhich this can be done have notbeen precisely defined by theCommission). Against this, itcan be argued that if the rule isnot absolute, or if the exceptionsare not clear, there is a lack oflegal certainty. However in stateaid, legal certainty comes fromnotification and approval. In the

recovery situation it should beremembered that we are bydefinition dealing with cases ofillegality. Some doubt may beunavoidable – absolutely clearrules would need to be extremelycomplex (and would be aninvitation to devise ways to getround them).

ANTI-TRUST RULES

Application of Articles 81 & 82 EC and 65 ECSCMain developments between 1st November 1999 and 31st January 2000


On 24 January 2000, theCommission adopted anexemption decision16 regardingan agreement notified by theEuropean Council of DomesticAppliance Manufacturers(CECED).

The agreement gathers theprincipal European producersand importers of washingmachines and aims at reducingenergy consumption of domesticwashing machines thereby redu-cing polluting emissions frompower generation. To achievethis, participants, which hold inexcess of 95% of the EC market,will stop producing for andimporting into the EU the leastenergy-efficient machines17. Theparties also undertake to achievea common target of efficiency,promote technology andawareness on environmentallyfriendly use of machines andmonitor implementation withannual reports.

16 Not yet published. Publication

pursuant to article 19(3) ofRegulation 17 in OJ C/382 of9.12.98, p.6. Press release IP/00/148of 11 February 2000.

17 Such machines are labelled undercategories D to G, pursuant toCommission Directive 95/12 (EC)

This is the first time that aformal decision of application ofArticle 81 concerns a horizontalagreement between almost allEC manufacturers and importersaiming at eliminating productswhich do not meetenvironmental criteria. It istherefore useful to summarisethe criteria set forth in it.

Among the four commitments,only the discontinuation ofproduction and import of certaincategories of washing machinesis found to fall under Article 81(1). The three others, in view oftheir modalities ofimplementation, are unlikely toappreciably restrict competitionand affect trade betweenMember States.

The commitment to promoteinformation and technologydissemination is formulated in ageneral way and does not limitthe parties’ autonomy ofbehaviour in the market. Theexchange of information takesplace in a non oligopolisticmarket and concerns one yearold aggregated data. Thecontribution to a commonefficiency target is formulated ina general way. Since there are no«quotas» on the basis of whichindividual contributions are

allocated, the commitment tocontribute to the target is notdeemed restrictive.

However, the discontinuation ofproduction and imports of somecategories of washing machinescovers 10-11% of the machinessold in the EC. These machinesamounted to a considerableproportion of the sales of somemanufacturers prior to theagreement. Moreover, energy-efficiency is an importantpurchase criterion, on whichmanufacturers focus advertisingand, therefore, on whichcompetition takes place in themarket. Finally, technicalimprovements may also increaseprices in the short run.

Such an agreement betweenalmost all producers andimporters in the market fallsunder the prohibition of Article81 (1). The decision concludes inrespect of Article 81 (3) asfollows:– The agreement objectively

contributes to technical andeconomic progress, byfocusing production on moreefficient machines. Suchbenefits would be unlikely orwould occur less quicklywithout the agreement.

– Consumers derive benefits atthe same time individuallyand for society as a whole :likely higher purchase costsof more efficient washingmachines are quicklycompensated by savings inelectricity bills; theagreement contributes to ECenvironmental objectives andthe benefits very largely

Commission approves anagreement to improve energyefficiency of washing machines

By Manuel MARTINEZ LOPEZ, DG COMP-F-1

➣ ANTI-TRUST RULES


exceed potential costincreases triggered as a resultof the agreement. Even ifindividual purchasers werenot to derive the financialbenefits that they actuallyattain, the magnitude ofenvironmental benefits issuch that the net contributionto society’s economic welfarewould still be positive.

– The restrictions ofcompetition are indispensableto attaining those benefits.Consumers do notsufficiently take externalcosts into account in theirpurchase decisions. Theapplication of a minimumefficiency ratio mitigates thismarket failure. Alternativessuch as public awarenesscampaigns or application ofecolabels would becomplementary, rather thansubstitutable to theagreement.

– The agreement does noteliminate competition.Various technical means toimprove energy efficiency ofwashing machines areeconomically available to allmanufacturers; competitionremains also on importantpurchase criteria such asprices, technicaleffectiveness, brandimage etc; finally, 90% ofsales of washing machinesare not directly concerned.

Three additional aspects need tobe stressed in connection withthe exemption decision. First, thedecision illustrates the Treatyprinciple of integration ofenvironmental concerns in

competition policy, taking intoaccount quantitatively the costsand the benefits for theenvironment18. It also recognisesthe contribution of initiatives onthe part of industry to achieveEC environmental objectives, inparticular as regards energyefficiency and reduction of airpollution. Finally, the existenceof a de facto minimum energyefficiency ratio renderssuperfluous legislation in thisrespect.

The exemption is granted for ashort duration, from the date ofnotification until 31 December2001, which is the expiry date ofthe agreement. Thereafter, it willbecome apparent whether theactual results and effects of theagreement are, on balance,satisfactory.

18 Article 174 of the EC Treaty and

Articles 3(1)(f) and 7 of EP andCouncil Decision 2179/98/EC of 24September 1998 on the review ofthe European Communityprogramme of policy and action inrelation to the environment andsustainable development “Towardssustainability” (OJ L 275,10.10.1998, p.1).



(1) Introduction

Le 8 décembre 1999 laCommission a adopté unedécision sur base de l’article 81CE imposant des amendestotalisant 99 millions d’euros àhuit producteurs de tubes d’aciersans soudure. Ils se sont concertésjusqu’en 1995 sur le respect deleurs marchés domestiquesrespectifs en ce qui concernecertains tubes sans souduredestinés à la prospection et autransport de pétrole.

Cette décision s’inscrit dans lecadre de la lutte de laCommission contre les ententesillégales dans le secteursidérurgique19.

(2) Rappel des faits

(a) Les produits

Les produits ayant fait l’objet ducartel sont les tubes de sondageen acier (communément appelés 19 Décision du 16.02.1994 dans l’affaire

« Poutrelles » (JO L 116 du6.5.1994, p.1), décision du26.11.1997 dans l’affaire« Wirtschaftsvereinigung Stahl » (JOL 1 du 31.01.1998) et décision du21.01.1998 dans l’affaire « Extrad’alliage » (JO L 100 du 01.04.1998,p.55)

OCTG) “standard” et les tubesde transport (communémentappelés linepipe) “project” quiconstituent une partie des tubesutilisés pour le sondage et letransport du pétrole et du gaz.

(b) Les producteurs de tubesd’acier sans soudure concernés

Les huit entreprises concernéesfigurent parmi les plus grandsproducteurs de tubes sanssoudure au niveau mondial. Ils’agit de quatre entreprisescommunautaires (British SteelLimited, Royaume-Uni, DalmineS.p.A., Italie, Mannesmann-röhren Werke A.G., Allemagne,et Vallourec S.A, France) et dequatre entreprises japonaises(Kawasaki Steel Corporation,NKK Corporation, Nippon SteelCorporation et Sumitomo MetalIndustries Limited).

(c) Le fonctionnement du cartel

En vue de coordonner leurcomportement sur les marchésdes OCTG standard et deslinepipe project, les producteurseuropéens et japonais ont mis surpied un cartel qu’ils ont appelé le« Club Europe –Japon ».

Ce cartel a restreint laconcurrence dans le marché

commun en prévoyant le respectdes marchés domestiques desdifférents producteurs (c’est-à-dire les marchés allemand,français, italien, britannique,japonais) dans la mesure oùl’offre de tubes sans souduredans les Etats de la Communautéoù était établi un producteurnational a été limitée parl’abstention des autresproducteurs parties à l’accord delivrer des tubes sur ces marchés.D’autres volets de l’accord decartel concernant certainsmarchés tiers n’ont pas faitl’objet de décision puisque laCommission n’a pas pu apporterla preuve d’un effet restrictif àl’intérieur de l’UE.

En ce qui concerne la durée del’infraction, la Commission aretenu la période 1990-1995(sauf pour British Steel Limitedqui a abandonné la productiondes tubes en question en 1994).

(d) Amendes

Lors de la fixation des montantsdes amendes la Commission atenu compte du fait qu’un accordvisant le respect des marchésdomestiques des entreprisesparticipantes constitue par natureune infraction très grave au droitcommunautaire puisqu’il porteatteinte au bon fonctionnementdu marché intérieur. De plus, lesquatre Etats membres en causereprésentent la majorité de laconsommation des OCTG et deslinepipe sans soudure dans la CEet, dès lors, un marchégéographique étendu.

La Commission inflige des amendes àun cartel de producteurs de tubesd’acier sans soudure pour partage demarchésPar Ingrid BREIT , DG COMP-E-1 etFrancisco PÉREZ FLORES, DG COMP-H-1



Cependant, la Commission aaussi tenu compte du fait que lesOCTG standard et les linepipeproject vendus par les entreprisesdestinataires de la décision dansla Communauté ne représententqu'environ 19% de laconsommation communautairedes OCTG et linepipe sanssoudure. En outre, une partie dela demande d’OCTG et delinepipe sans soudure pouvaitêtre couverte par des tubessoudés de moyen diamètre.Enfin, les ventes de ces produitspar les entreprises destinatairesde la décision dans les quatreEtats membres concernés nes’élevaient qu’à environ 73millions d’euros par an pendantla période 1990-1995. L’impactconcret de l’infraction sur lemarché est dès lors resté limité.

La Commission a retenu commecirconstance atténuante la crisede longue durée qu’a connu lesecteur et le fait que depuis 1991la situation du secteur s’estdétériorée ce qui, combiné àl’afflux croissant desimportations, a entraîné desréductions de capacités et desfermetures d’usines.

Il a enfin été fait application dela communication concernant lanon-imposition d’amendes ou laréduction de leur montant dansles affaires portant sur lesententes20.

Vallourec a été la seuleentreprise à fournir des élémentssubstantiels sur l’existence et le

20 JO C 207 du 18 juillet 1996, p.4

contenu de l’entente et a ainsipermis à la Commission deconstater l’infraction à l’article81, paragraphe 1, CE avec moinsde difficulté. Cette coopération ajustifié une réduction de 40 % dumontant de l’amende. Dalmine,qui n’a pas contesté lamatérialité des faits sur lesquelsla Commission avait fondé sesaccusations, a obtenu uneréduction de 20 % du montant del’amende.

La décision fait une nettedistinction entre ces deuxentreprises qui ont réellementcoopéré et celles aucomportement ambigu commeMannesmannröhren Werke etBritish Steel: bien qu’ellesn’aient pas contesté les faits,elles n’ont jamais clairementexprimé leur position ou mis endoute l’existence de l’accord telque décrit dans lacommunication de griefs. Un telcomportement ne constitue pasune coopération effective quiaurait pu justifier une applicationde la communication précitée.



On 26 October 1999, theCommission adopted a Decisionby which fines have beenimposed on the Dutch associationof electrotechnical equipmentwholesalers (FEG) and its biggestmember Technische Unie (TU)for violating Article 81(1) of theEC Treaty21. The Commissionfound that FEG and TU restrictedcompetition by operating asystem of collective exclusivedealing in combination with asystem of price co-ordination onthe Dutch wholesale market forelectrotechnical equipment. TheCommission therefore imposedfines of euro 4.4 million on FEGand euro 2.15 million on TU.

The case started as a result of acomplaint in 1991 by the UKbased wholesaler inelectrotechnical equipment CityElectrical Factors and its Dutchsubsidiary (“CEF”). It concernstwo infringements of Article81(1) of the EC Treaty on theDutch wholesale market forelectrotechnical equipment,essentially over the period 1986-1994. Electrotechnicalequipment includes a wide rangeof electrical products such ascables, plugs, lightsources,

21 OJ L 39 of 14 February 2000, p. 1

switches and sockets used forcreating an electrical system inbuildings, houses and industries.The first infringement regardedthe operation of a collectiveexclusive dealing arrangementinvolving the FEG, theassociation of importers of suchproducts in the Netherlands(“NAVEG“) and a large numberof individual suppliers of suchproducts.

Under this agreement FEGprohibited members of theNAVEG and individualsuppliers from selling towholesalers which were notmembers of FEG. Theprohibition deprived thesewholesalers of many of theirsources of supply andcomplicated and delayed theentry to the Dutch market offoreign wholesalers such as thecomplainant. At the same time,the arrangement preventedsuppliers from selling theirproducts on the Dutch marketvia wholesalers who were notFEG members. As the turnoverof the NAVEG members,especially depended for a largepart on sales to FEG members itwas difficult for them to ignorethe wishes of the FEG.

The arrangement was based on agentleman’s agreement betweenthe FEG and the NAVEG whichwas joined by individualsuppliers. It appeared that untilthe late fifties the collectiveexclusive dealing arrangementhad been based on a formalwritten agreement. TheCommission found evidence thatafter its prohibition by the Dutchcompetition authorities the partieshad decided to convert the formalwritten agreement into the above-mentioned more covertgentleman’s agreement.

The second infringementidentified by the Commissionregarded the interference by FEGin the pricing policy of itsmembers. It appeared from manydocuments that FEG and itsmembers aimed at lessening pricecompetition among themselvesand at creating artificial pricestability to ensure healthymargins. In order to achieve thesegoals FEG and its members hadrecourse to the followinginstruments:- a binding FEG decision

prohibiting its members fromadvertising using specially-reduced prices;

- a binding FEG decisionobliging the FEG membersto pass on to their customersprice increases implementedby the supplier after theyhave ordered the products;

- discussions among FEGmembers on prices anddiscounts in the context ofFEG meetings; and

- price recommendationsissued by FEG to itsmembers.

The Commission fines FEG, the Dutchassociation of electrotechnicalequipment wholesalers and its biggestmember TUBy Ernst FERDINANDUSSE, DG COMP-F-1



The effects of the pricearrangements were enhanced bythe collective exclusive dealingarrangement. As the exclusivecollective dealing arrangementintended to deprive potentialprice cutters such as non-FEGwholesalers from their sources ofsupply, the possibility that theartificial price stability createdby FEG and its members wouldbe put at risk by outsiders wasstrongly reduced.

Considering that FEG membersaccount for 96% of the Dutchwholesale market forelectrotechnical equipment, theviolations have appreciablyrestricted competition. Asbetween 30-50 % of allelectrotechnical products sold onthe Dutch market are imported,trade between Member Stateshas also been appreciablyrestricted.

The decision orders the parties toput an end to the aboveinfringements in so far as thishas not yet occurred and imposesfines on both FEG and TU. TheCommission has calculated thefines on the basis of its publishedfining guidelines22. Indetermining the amounts of thefines the Commission has takeninto account that theinfringements were serious andof long duration.

The Commission has identifiedFEG as the initiator andcontroller of both the collective

22 Guidelines on the method of setting

fines, OJ No. C 9 of 14.1.1998

exclusive dealing arrangementand the pricing arrangements.The Commission has also finedFEG’s biggest and mostimportant member TU for tworeasons, namely for supportingthe infringements through:- its active and long-term

participation in the board ofFEG and its committees; and

- its individual behaviour insupport of both restrictionsin its contacts withindividual companies.

The Commission decided not toact against the 6 other membersof the FEG which also receivedthe Statement of objections. Theinformation provided by those 6parties in their writtenobservations to the Statement ofObjections and their commentsduring the hearing showed thatin their case the Commissionpossessed insufficient evidence.The procedure which started in1991 has taken a considerableamount of time. Although theCommission considers that it isnot solely responsible for thelength of the proceedings, it hasaccepted its responsibility bytaking into consideration thecase law of both the Court ofFirst Instance and the EuropeanCourt of Justice in setting theamount of the fine23. The finesfor both FEG and TU weretherefore reduced by 100.000euro each.

23 See the Court of Justice, case C-

185/95 P, Baustahlgewebe [1998]ECR I-8485 and the Court of FirstInstance in the joined cases T-213/95and T-18/96, SCK and FNK vCommission [1997] ECR II-1739.

At the start of this year FEG (T-05/00) and TU (T-06/00) lodgedappeals with the Court of FirstInstance against the CommissionDecision.

MERGERSApplication of Council Regulation 4064/89


Introduction and statisticaloverview

The number of incomingnotifications continued at recordlevels between 1 September and31 December 1999. A total of107 operations were notified and92 decisions were adopted oncases under the MergerRegulation’s main provisions(Articles 6 and 8). This was ninedecisions more than over theprevious four month period. TheCommission also adopted onepartial referral decision underArticle 9 of the MergerRegulation.

In total, the Commission cleared63 transactions in the first phaseof the investigation. Of these 4were approved in the first phaseonly after the parties submittedundertakings. A detailed enquiryin accordance with Article 6(1)cof the Merger Regulation wasopened in a record number of 10cases. One further operation wasabandoned. The Commissiontook a decision after a detailedinvestigation in 5 cases. Thisincluded one prohibitiondecision. The others wereapproved subject to divestitureand other commitments, nonewas cleared without some formof commitment

The Commission imposed finesfor providing incorrectinformation in mergerproceedings in 2 cases. Ninedecisions were taken involvingjoint ventures where the risk ofparental co-ordination wasanalysed under Article 2(4). Oneof these was cleared subject tocommitments, the remaindercleared without commitments.The Commission issued adecision under Article 7(4) in 4cases.

Decisions adopted following adetailed investigation (Article8)

Decision adopted under Article8(3) (declaring the operationincompatible with the commonmarket)

Following a detailedinvestigation, the Commissiondecided to prohibit the proposedmerger between Airtours plc andFirst Choice24 in the UKpackage holiday sector, ascompetition in the short-haulpackage tour market in the UKwould have been significantlyreduced. The transaction would

24 Case No. IV/M.1524 –

Airtours/First Choice; Article 8(3)decision 22 September 1999

have led to the creation of asituation of collective dominancebetween the mergedAirtours/First Choice and thetwo other large, verticallyintegrated suppliers, Thomsonand Thomas Cook. This was thefirst occasion on which theCommission prohibited a mergeron the grounds of collectivedominance among more thantwo firms.

The Commission found that allfour companies were fullyvertically-integrated, bothupstream into charter airlineoperation, and downstream intodistribution via the chains oftravel agents which they owned.This tended to align their coststructures and increase thetransparency of the market bymaking the large firms’ costsmore easily visible to each other,reducing the likelihood of strongprice competition between them.It also increased the scope forcommercial links between them.Another key feature of themarket was the relativeinflexibility of supply, whichcreated an incentive for thelarger, integrated tour operatorsto keep the market ‘tight’ andnot to expand capacity in orderto compete aggressively witheach other for market share. TheCommission also found thatthere were potentially significantbarriers to expansion by themany smaller tour operators to asize comparable to that of thefour large firms.

The Commission found that therisk of an oversupplied marketwould act as a deterrent for the

Recent developments andimportant decisionsBy Tiina PITKÄNEN, DG COMP-B-2 andNeil MARSHALL, DG COMP-B-1

➣ MERGERS


oligopolists to compete formarket share. The Commissionalso found that there would bescope for retaliation among theoligopolists if one of them wereto do so. Against thisbackground, the removal of FirstChoice as a competitor in touroperation and travel agency, andits likely loss as a major supplierof airline seats to third partieswould, in the Commission’sview, lead to the creation of acollective dominant positionamong the three remaining largefirms, with significantanticompetitive consequences. Itwould strengthen theirinterdependency, furthermarginalise the ‘fringe’ ofsmaller players, and increasemarket transparency. That wouldraise the incentives for theoligopolists to restrict theircapacity, and facilitate theadoption of effective strategiesfor doing so.

Airtours proposed undertakingsto remedy the Commission’scompetition concerns. Theproposal was to divest certaintour operating assets - includingbrand names and existingbookings - to a suitable thirdparty. However, this was foundto be inadequate largely becauseit did not address the problem ofaccess for the prospective buyerto a suitable channel ofdistribution for its holidays. Itwould not, therefore, haveremedied one of the maincompetition detriments of themerger., Subsequently theoperation was prohibited.

Decisions adopted underArticle 8(2)

In the five cases summarisedbelow, the transactions werecleared subject to undertakingsfollowing in-depth investi-gations.

In Exxon/Mobil25, the operationas notified would have created orstrengthened dominant positionsin a large number of markets.Serious competition concernsarose, amongst others, on themarkets for wholesaletransmission of natural gas in theNetherlands and Germany,motor fuel retailing in severalMember States, group I base oils(an ingredient for the productionof lubricants) in the EEA andaviation lubricants world-wide.In order to remedy theseconcerns, the parties offeredwhat is the most comprehensiveremedy package accepted underthe Merger Regulation to date.Several of these remedies raisedparticularly difficult issues. Forexample, Mobil agreed towithdraw from its joint venturewith BP covering motor fuel andlubricants retailing in Europe.But the Commission had tobalance the need for a quickresolution of its competitionconcerns against the need for theparties to get a properconsideration for Mobil’sinterests in a sale to amonopsonist buyer. In relation toaviation lubricants, the

25 Case No. IV/M.1383 –

Exxon/Mobil; Article 8(2) decisionwith undertakings of 29 September1999

Commission obtained thedivestiture of Exxon’s businessafter the parties had initiallyproposed to divest Mobil’saviation lubricants business. TheCommission considered the saleof Mobil’s business to beinadequate because even thoughit would have eliminated theoverlap between the parties, theCommission found that Mobil’sbusiness was more integratedwith the Mobil group than that ofExxon. Therefore, Exxon’saviation lubricants business wasconsidered to be more viable as astand-alone entity, allowing theeventual purchaser to competeindependently from the parties.

At the same time as theCommission was investigatingExxon/Mobil, it was alsoinvestigating another importantmerger in the oil and chemicalssector: the take-over by BPAmoco of Atlantic Richfield26.To illustrate the rapid pace ofconsolidation in this sector, theBP Amoco Group had itself onlybeen formed after the mergerbetween The British PetroleumCompany and AmocoCorporation in December 1998.As initially notified, theoperation would have createddominant positions on themarket for the transport ofunprocessed natural gas to theUK mainland through off-shorepipelines from fields in theSouthern North Sea (‘SNS’)

26 Case No. IV/M.1532 – BP

Amoco/Atlantic Richfield; Article8(2) decision with undertakings 29September 1999

➣ MERGERS


sector of the UK ContinentalShelf and also on the market forprocessing natural gas inprocessing facilities on the UKmainland servicing the SNSarea. In order to eliminate thecompetitive concerns, BPAmoco undertook to divestcertain pipeline and processinginterests which had the effectthat the merged entity’s positionremains similar to that of BPAmoco’s beforehand.

In its investigation into themerger between the SwedishTelia and the NorwegianTelenor27, the Commissionconcluded that the concentrationas originally notified would havecaused serious competitionconcerns in a number oftelecommunications and relatedservices markets in both Swedenand Norway. The operationwould have also led to adversecompetition effects in the Irishmobile telephony market, wherethe merged entities would havehad control over both of the onlytwo operators active on the Irishmarket. Lastly, there wereserious competition concerns ina number of Nordic, Swedishand Norwegian televisionservices markets. The operationwas subject to far-reachingcommitments to open up accessto the local access networks fortelephony as well as to divestTelia and Telenor’s respectivecable-TV businesses and otheroverlapping business. Inparticular, Telia and Telenor 27 Case No IV/M.1439 –

Telia/Telenor; Article 8(2) decisionwith undertakings 13 October 1999

committed to divest all existingoverlaps in the field of telecomservices. The parties alsoundertook to sell eithercompany’s stake in one of thetwo existing Irish mobiletelephony operators. The partiesalso undertook to divest theirrespective interests in cable-TVnetworks in Sweden and Norwayand to implement a set ofmeasures to introduce local loopunbundling (LLU) in bothcountries.

In the form notified to theCommission, the transactionbetween Sanitec and Sphinx28

would have led to adversecompetition effects in ceramicsanitary-ware and other bathroomproducts in the Nordic countries.The high market shares (up to90%), an absence ofcountervailing buying power andonly marginally presentcompetitors led the Commissionto conclude that the operationwould have had a particularlynegative effect on the Nordiccustomers. Sanitec offeredsubsequently a full divestiture ofSphinx’s Gustavsberg businessin the Nordic countries. Anotable feature of theseundertakings is that while theCommission did not findcompetition problems in taps andmixers as such, the possibilityfor the potential buyer to buythis business as well wasconsidered important for theviability of the divested

28 Case No IV/M.1578 –

Sanitec/Sphinx; Article 8(2)decision with undertakings 1December 1999

business. The option to acquirethis taps and mixers businesswill ensure that the buyer will beable to offer a full range ofproducts and compete fully withSanitec on the Nordic market.

Finally, in Honeywell/AlliedSignal29, the Commis-sion’s investigation focused onthe markets for avionics forcommercial applications(products generally found in theaircraft cockpits, such ascommunication and navigationequipment). The operationcombined the first and the thirdlargest world-wide suppliers ofcommercial avionics with majorpresence in all aviationsegments. The combined marketshares produced by the merger insome markets were as much as100 % in weather radars for civilhelicopters. The combined entitywould have reached marketshares up to 74 % in AirborneCollision Avoidance Systems(ACAS) processors and ModeSTransponders and there wouldhave been only one remainingcompetitor in this market whichexhibited high barriers to entry.Furthermore, the parties’ strongposition in the market forTerrain Awareness WarningSystems (TAWS) would havehad an effect on the futuremarket for Integrated HazardAwareness Systems (IHAS),since the TAWS is a key part ofthis system. The new entitywould have been able to

29 Case No IV/M.1601 –

AlliedSignal/Honeywell; Article8(2) decision with undertakings 1December 1999

➣ MERGERS


technically link its engineeringforce and technology for the nextgeneration of IHAS and therebyforeclose competition. In orderto remedy their resultingdominant positions, the partiesoffered to divest Honeywell’sentire ACAS business andAlliedSignal’s weather radarbusiness. With respect to TAWS,commitments were given tosupply third parties with detailsof the open interface standardsof other avionics products of thenew entity, so that new supplierscan have their products installedon aircraft equipped with otheravionics from the new entity.Regarding IHAS, there will bean obligation to supply thirdparties with TAWS technologyas well as interface data so thatfuture product development bycompeting suppliers cancontinue to take place.

Decisions adopted underArticle 6(1)c

The period saw a record numberof ten proceedings opened underArticle 6(1)c of the MergerRegulation.

The Commission decided toopen a full investigation in twooperations in the industrial gasesindustry. In Air Liquide/BOC30,the main competition concernsarose from the strong positionAir Liquide would obtain inparticular in markets for thesupply of oxygen and nitrogen inlarge quantities to industrial 30 Case No. IV/M.1630 – Air

Liquide/BOC; Article 6(1)c decisionof 16, September 1999

users (so-called tonnagemarkets), in the markets forhelium and for speciality gasesused in the electronics industry.The proposed acquisition of theSwedish company AGA AB bythe German company LindeAktiengesellschaft (Linde/AGA31) raised serious doubts asto its compatibility with thecommon market in particular inGermany, the Netherlands andAustria.

Competition concerns arise alsoin case TotalFina/ElfAquitane32. The concentration,as notified to the Commission,could lead to dominant positionson the French territory, inparticular on the markets ofwholesale of fuel (petrol, gas oil,LPG), fuel retail sale of fuel onthe motorways, production andthe sale of LPG and the jet fuelsupply of the Toulouse andLyons airports. TotalFinapresented undertakings, but thesewere judged insufficient both inscope and in substance so as toeliminate the serious doubts raisedby the operation. For thesereasons, the Commission decidedto open a full investigation intothe notified operation.

The proposed acquisition by theCanadian Onex Corporation ofAir Canada and Canadian

31 Case No. IV/M.1641 – Linde/AGA;

Article 6(1)c decision of 1, October1999

32 Case No. IV/M.1628 – Totalfina/ElfAquitane; Article 6(1)c decision of5 October 1999

Airlines Corporation33 wouldhave brought the two mainCanadian airlines serving routesbetween Canada and Londonunder common control. It wouldalso have resulted in theOneworld airline alliancebecoming the only one servingUK-Canada direct routes. TheCommission was concerned thatthe operation would have led toanticompetitive effects as thetwo Canadian airlines, togetherwith British Airways (BA) are atpresent the only ones allowed,under bilateral governmentagreements, to fly scheduleddirect services between Canadaand London Heathrow, and allthree have substantial shares ofthis traffic. Moreover, theCommission’s enquiries sugges-ted that potential competitorsmay experience difficulty inobtaining appropriate take-offand landing ‘slots’ at Heathrow.The operation was abandoned amonth after the Commissionopened its detailed investigation.

A detailed investigation wasbegun into the acquisition byVolvo of Scania34, both leadingEuropean suppliers of trucks,buses and engines in the EEAand world-wide. TheCommission’s initial investi-gation suggested that the mergerwould lead to adversecompetition effects in the sectorsof heavy trucks and buses. For

33 Case No. IV/M.1696 – Onex/Air

Canada/Canadian Airlines; Article6(1)c decision of 15 October, 1999

34 Case No. IV/M.1672 –Volvo/Scania; Article 6(1)c decisionof 25 October 1999

➣ MERGERS


both sectors, the combinedmarket share of Volvo/Scaniaafter the merger would beextremely high, especially in thewhole of the Nordic area ofEurope (Denmark, Finland,Norway, Sweden), as well as inthe UK and Ireland, in particularin buses.

The Commission also opened in-depth investigations into threeoperations affecting the world-wide aluminium markets. Theproposed merger betweenaluminium producers Alcan,Alusuisse and Pechiney35

represented two of theseoperations since Alcan had madetwo separate and independentshare exchange offers, one forthe shares of Alusuisse and theother for the shares of Pechiney.Although the ultimate aim of thecompanies was a three-waymerger, the two offers were notconditional upon each other sothat it was possible for onemerger to happen without theother. The initial investigation ofthe Commission identified anumber of markets where theoperation would raise seriousdoubts as to its compatibilitywith the common market. Moreparticularly, the Commissionwas concerned that competitionproblems could arise in aluminatrihydrate, several flat rolledaluminium products (e.g.lithographic sheet, beverage can

35 Cases No. IV/M.1663 –

Alcan/Alsuisse; Article 6(1)cdecision of 10 November 1999; No.IV/M.1715 – Alcan/Pechiney;Article 6(1)c decision of 10November 1999

stock, food can stock,automotive sheet and architec-tural sheet), and packagingproducts (e.g. flexible alumi-nium packaging, semi-rigidaluminium containers, alumi-nium cartridges and aluminiumaerosol cans).

The third case in the aluminiumsector was the proposed mergerbetween Alcoa and Reynolds36

that would create one of thelargest integrated aluminiumcompanies in the world. TheCommission’s initial investiga-tion identified a number ofmarkets where the merger wouldraise serious competitionconcerns. Competition concernswould arise in smelter-gradealumina (SGA), commodityhydrate, aluminium flouride andsynthetic zeolite, high purityaluminium and in particularP0404 aluminium.

In MMS/DASA/Astrium37, theCommission had concerns thatthe creation of Astrium, a jointventure of the GermanDaimlerChrysler Aerospace AG(DASA) and the Netherlands-based Matra Marconi SpaceN.V. (MMS) could lead to thecreation of a dominant positionon certain institutional marketsfor space systems in Europe. Onthe prime contracting level,Astrium would have a leadingposition in observation and

36 No. IV/M.1693 – Alcoa/Reynolds;

Article 6(1)c decision of 20December, 1999

37 Case No. IV/M.1636 –MMS/S`DASA/Astrium; Article6(1)c decision of 3 December 1999

scientific satellites and spaceinfrastructure and is an importantsupplier of certain componentsto its main competitors, i.e.Alcatel Space and AleniaAerospazio. Astrium mighttherefore be in a position toforeclose these prime contractingmarkets. Similarly, there wererisks that the operation couldhave adverse effects at thecomponent level, as Astriumcould use its strong position as apurchaser to favour in-housesuppliers and therefore foreclosesuch markets to third partysuppliers.

Finally, the Commission decidedto open a full investigation intothe proposed acquisition by DowChemical of Union Carbide(UCC)38. The operation wouldresult in the creation of one ofthe world’s largest polyolefincompanies. Serious doubts as tothe compatibility of theoperation with the commonmarket arose on the polyethyleneresins, polyethylene technologyand ethyleneamines sectors.More particularly, on thepolyethylene resins sector, theparties would have high marketshares for all linear low densitypolyethylene (LLDPE) resinsand in particular in C6 LLDPEand C8 LLDPE. The operationalso gave rise to seriousconcerns also in relation to themarket for polyethylenetechnology. In the ethyle-neamines sector, the mergerwould result in significant 38 Case No. IV/M.1671 – Dow

Chemical/Union Carbide; Article6(1)c decision of 22 December 1999

➣ MERGERS


overlaps, giving the parties highmarket shares both in the EEA-wide and globally.

Decisions adopted underArticle 6(1)b involvingremedies

The Commission cleared, subjectto undertakings, four operationsin the initial phase of theinvestigation.

In Pakhoed/Van Ommeren39, theCommission cleared a mergerbetween the Dutch companiesPakhoed and Van Ommerenfollowing the undertakings of themerging firms to divest part oftheir liquids storage terminals inRotterdam and Antwerp. Amerger proposal between the twocompanies had already beenfiled to the EuropeanCommission one and a half yearsago, but at that time thedivestment proposals were notsufficient to remove thecompetition problems that hadbeen identified and the mergerwas called off. As a result of thecurrent divestment proposals, thecompetitive overlaps in thestorage markets in the ARA area(Antwerp - Rotterdam -Amsterdam) will be eliminatedand the merger therefore doesnot raise competition concerns.

The Commission furtherapproved the creation of a jointventure, EdF Trading Ltd, byElectricité de France (EdF) and

39 Case No. IV/M.1621– Pakhoed/Van

Ommeren; Article 6(1)b decision of10 September 1999

Louis Dreyfus40 in the field ofenergy trading. As a result of itsinvestigation, the Commissionfound that the proposedoperation could strengthen thedominant position of EdF on themarket for the supply ofelectricity to eligible customersin France, during the periodbetween the establishment ofEdF Trading and the legal andeffective opening of this market.In order to remove theCommission’s serious doubts asto the compatibility of theoperation with the commonmarket, the parties agreed thatEdF Trading would not directlyor indirectly assist EdF inestablishing prices or structuringcontracts for eligible customersin France, nor would it assumethe risks associated with suchcomplex offers until the Frenchmarket had been opened.

The Commission approved thetransaction between NewHolland and Case41 in theagricultural machinery andconstruction equipment sectorsfollowing far-reachingcommitments. The concentrationas originally notified would havecaused serious competitionconcerns in the agriculturalmachinery sector by threateningto create or strengthen dominantpositions in the markets forstandard tractors, combineharvesters and large square

40 Case No. IV/M.1557 – EDF/Louis

Dreyfus; Article 6(1)b decision of28 September 1999

41 Case No. IV/M.1571 – NewHolland/Case; Article 6(1)bdecision of 28 October 1999

balers in a number of MemberStates. The Commission’sconcerns related in particular tothe parties’ high combinedmarket shares, to the substantialbrand and/or dealer loyalty in theagricultural machinery sector,and to the high barriers to entrycaused by the need for densedistribution and aftersalesnetworks. In the constructionequipment sector, theconcentration would have causedserious competition concerns bythreatening to create a collectivedominant position on the EEAmarket for backhoe loaders. Inorder to address these seriousdoubts, the parties committed todivest various ranges and brandsof tractors, combine harvesters,large square balers and backhoeloaders. Moreover, the partiescommitted to open up theirdealer networks in the EEA forall of the products divested.These undertakings willmaterially reduce the marketshares of the merged entity ineach of the markets wherecompetition concerns wereidentified by the Commission.

The Commission approved thetransaction between Akzo Nobeland the Hoechst Roussel VetGroup42 subject to substantialcommitments to divest ofproducts for veterinarypharmaceuticals and biologicals.The Commission’s investigationshowed that the concentrationwould have caused serious

42 Case No. IV/M.1681 – Akzo

Noble/Hoechst Roussel VET;Article 6(1)b decision of 22November 1999

➣ MERGERS


competition concerns bythreatening to create orstrengthen dominant positions inthe markets for mastitistreatments as regards dry cowproducts based oncephalosporins in France. In themarket sector of endocrinetreatments the operation raisedconcerns of collectivedominance in the market forsynthetic prostaglandins inPortugal and of singledominance in the market forgonadotrophins in Spain.Moreover, competition concernswith regard to possible rangeeffects also arose as both partieshold strong positions inparticular in France andGermany for different endocrinetreatments. The concentrationwould have also caused seriouscompetition concerns bythreatening to create orstrengthen dominant positions inanimal vaccines in severalMember States. In order toaddress these serious doubts, theparties committed to divestproducts, and to licence andtransfer to a viable independentthird party the products in thosemarkets where the Commissionhad serious competitionconcerns. The undertakingsgiven will materially reduce themarket shares of the mergedentity in each of the marketswhere competition concernswere identified and theCommission therefore found thatthe modified concentration nolonger raised serious doubts.

Decisions adopted underArticle 2(4) (co-operative jointventures)

The Commission issueddecisions under Article 2(4) ofthe Merger Regulation in ninecases. Eight operations werecleared without undertakingswhile the co-operative jointventure between Fujitsu andSiemens43 was cleared subject tothe companies’ compliance withcertain commitments. Thisoperation combined theEuropean businesses of Siemensand Fujitsu for the development,manufacture and sale ofcomputer hardware and relatedproducts, including desktop PCs,laptops, workstations, serversand storage systems. TheCommission found that therewas a risk of parental co-operation on the financialworkstations market. To addressthe Commission’s seriouscompetitive concerns in thatmarket, Siemens undertook todivest Siemens Nixdorf Retailand Banking Systems GmbH, asubsidiary active on that market.

Decisions adopted underArticle 9 (referrals to MemberStates)

The French authorities asked,under Article 9 of the MergerRegulation, for the referral ofcertain product marketsconsidered as local in the caseTotalFina/Elf Aquitane. Thesewere the markets for storage ofpetroleum products, for sales of

43 JV.22 Fujitsu/Siemens

motor fuels on the Frenchmotorways and wholesales ofLPG. In response to this request,the Commission granted a partialreferral, that is, certain localmarkets considered as nonsubstantial parts of the commonmarket, such as several localpetroleum storage depots servingthe areas of Port-La-Nouvelle(south-eastern France), thenorthern part of Paris and thesouthern part of Paris and ofLyon, in view of the applicationof national legislation. However,as the Commission had initiatedproceedings in relation to theother markets covered by therequest of the French authorities,it did not refer the remainingmarkets, pending of a finalassessment at Community level.Eventually, the undertakingsoffered by TotalFina remedied theproblems indicated by the Frenchauthorities in those markets.Consequently the Frenchauthorities withdrew their requestfor the markets not included in theCommission’s referral decision,to the extent that the concernsraised by the French authoritieswere removed through theundertakings offered by theparties to the Commission.

Decisions adopted underArticle 14

The Commission imposed finesunder the provisions of theMerger Regulation in two cases.In Deutsche Post/trans-o-flex44,Deutsche Post AG notified its 44 Case No.IV/M.1610 – Deutsche

Post/trans-o-flex; Article 14decision of 14 December 1999

➣ MERGERS


planned acquisition of theGerman high-speed deliveryservice, trans-o-flex GmbH inFebruary 1999. According toDeutsche Post, it had acquired aminority shareholding in trans-o-flex in 1997 but the notificationcontained facts that pointed to anacquisition of sole control duringthat time. If that had been thecase, the Commission wouldhave had no jurisdiction toassess the transaction as notifiedin 1999 but, instead, theevaluation of the acquisition ofthe shares in 1997 would havehad to be carried out by anumber of national authorities.On the basis of these indications,the Commission requestedadditional information fromDeutsche Post and othersconcerning the 1997 transaction.In the course of thisinvestigation, it became apparentthat Deutsche Post haddeliberately supplied incorrectand misleading information todeceive the Commission. TheCommission’s investigationsuggested that Deutsche Post hadexercised control over trans-o-flex since 1997 through itslargest shareholder, IndustrialInformation. The Commissionfound that Deutsche Post hadcommitted a seriousinfringement of two provisionsof the Merger Regulation andtherefore imposed two separatefines, the maximum amount ofEUR 50 000 permitted under theMerger Regulation for each.

The Commission also imposed afine on KLM for supplyingincorrect and misleadinginformation in case

KLM/Martinair45. KLM notifiedto the Commission its plannedacquisition of Martinair inSeptember 1998 but thisnotification was withdrawn. Theoperation was re-notified to theCommission in December199846. The Commission startedproceedings in that case becauseKLM supplied incorrectinformation in its firstnotification, the one issued inSeptember 1998. In thatnotification, KLM submittedincorrect information on thecharter destinations of itssubsidiary Transavia andwithheld relevant information onscheduled flights of Transavia.In particular, KLM gave anincorrect description of thedestinations of Transavia andfailed to list ten importantTransavia destinations. KLMpresented the operations ofTransavia and of Martinair as‘largely complementary’ while,in reality, both airlines operatedto all Mediterraneandestinations. Furthermore, KLMfailed to inform the Commissionabout the fact that Transavia hadsubstantial scheduled operationsto Mediterranean destinationsand sold a significant number ofseats on these flights to Dutchtour operators, thereby giving amisleading description of theactivities of Transavia. TheCommission considered the

45 Case No.IV/M.1608 –

KLM/Martinair; Article 14 decisionof 14 December 1999

46 The operation was abandoned inMay 1999 after the Commissionraised objections against theoperation.

behaviour of KLM as grosslynegligent, at the very least, andimposed a fine of EUR 40 000.

Decisions adopted underArticle 7 (derogation fromsuspension)

Pursuant to Article 7(4) of theMerger Regulation, theCommission may, on request,grant a derogation from theobligation to suspend theimplementation of aconcentration until it has beendeclared compatible with thecommon market. In taking itsdecision, the Commission takesinto account, inter alia, theeffects of the suspension on oneor more of the undertakingsconcerned by the concentrationor on a third party, and the threatto competition posed by theconcentration.

The Commission granted aderogation from suspensionunder Article 7(4) in four cases.In two cases involving thedissolution of a joint venturebetween BP Amoco and Mobil infuels and lubricants, both BP andExxonMobil requested aderogation from suspension47.These requests were directlyrelated to the clearance of theExxon/Mobil merger. Theclearance of this merger wasconditional upon fulfilment of awhole series of commitments,including the dissolution of the

47 Case No.IV/M.1820 – BP/JV

dissolution; Article 7(4) decision of22 December 1999; No.IV/M.1822– Mobil/JV dissolution; Article 7(4)decision of 22 December 1999.

➣ MERGERS


BP/Mobil joint venture. Thejoint venture was active incertain markets for which theCommission considered that themerger, without thecommitment, would have led tothe creation or strengthening of adominant position. TheCommission considered that thespeedy transfer of control to BPAmoco was the best and mosteffective means of giving effectto the commitments secured bythe Commission as it enabled BPAmoco to re-establish itselfquicker as a competitor to themerged entity ExxonMobil.

The case BBL/BT/ISP Belgium48

involved the creation of anInternet service provider (ISP)joint venture in Belgium. Thederogation from suspension wasrequested because Skynet,Belgacom’s Internet subsidiary,was about to launch ansubscription free Internetproduct in Belgium. In the faceof this, any delay in theimplementation of the jointventure would have resulted inBelgacom achieving a verystrong market share, causingsignificant damage to the parties.The Commission considered thatthe derogation from thesuspension would not pose anythreat to competition since thejoint venture was a new entrant,which was supposed to challengethe incumbent Belgacom.

48 Case No.IV/M.1667 – BBL/BT/ISP

Belgium; Article 7(4) decision of 23September 1999

In Onex/Air Canada/CanadianAirlines49 the parties requested aderogation from suspension inorder to enable Onex to putcertain matters to Air Canadashareholders at a special meetingwhich was essential for the bidto be successfully completed andwhich was to take place beforethe expiry of the Commission’sreview of the transaction underthe Merger Regulation. TheCommission considered thatthere were grounds to grant thederogation as the suspensiveeffect of Article 7(1) could havecaused serious damage to theparties concerned.

49 Case No.IV/M.1696 – Onex/Air

Canada/Canadian Airlines; Article7(4) decision of 15 October 1999

➣ MERGERS


On 14 December 1999, theCommission adopted threedecisions by which it imposedtwo fines of 50.000 Euro onDeutsche Post, a fine of 40.000Euro on the Dutch airline KLMand fines of 3.000 Euro on eachof the brewers Anheuser-Buschand Scottish & Newcastle. Allcompanies had suppliedincorrect or misleadinginformation in competitionprocedures to the Commission.In the enforcement of the ECcompetition rules it is anessential condition thatcompanies provide accurate andcomplete information to theCommission. These decisionsunderline the Commission'sdetermination to ensure thatfirms comply fully with theirlegal obligations.

The Commission attachesconsiderable importance toensuring that its role of creatingand maintaining competitivemarkets, for the benefit of allcompanies and consumers in theEU, is not compromised.Incorrect or misleadinginformation can lead the

Commission to take flaweddecisions, with potentiallyserious effects on businesses andconsumers in the EU. Therefore,the Commission is determined tostrictly apply its procedural rulesand to impose fines if and whenthese rules are broken.

Pursuant to article 14 of theMerger Regulation50, theCommission can impose finesbetween 1.000 Euro and 50.000Euro when a company providesintentionally or negligentlyincorrect or misleadinginformation in a notification orin a response to a request forinformation. Pursuant to article15 of Regulation 1751 of 1962,the implementing regulation forprocedures under Articles 81 and82 of the EC Treaty concerning 50 Council Regulation (EC) No

4064/89 of 21 December 1989 onthe control of concentrationsbetween undertaking (OJ L 395,30.12.1989, p. 1 ; corrected versionOJ L 257, 21.9.1990, p. 13)

51 Council Regulation 17/62 of 6February 1962, first regulationimplementing Articles 81 and 82 ofthe Treaty (OJ 13, 21.2.1962, p.204)

cartels and the abuse of adominant position, the range offines for the same infringementsis from 100 Euro to 5.000 Euro.

Deutsche PostIn February 1999, Deutsche PostAG notified, in accordance withthe Merger Regulation, itsintention to acquire sole controlover the German high-speeddelivery service trans-o-flexGmbH. It had acquired aminority-shareholding already in1997. Deutsche Post withdrewthis notification some weeksafter the Commission opened anin-depth investigation. In themerger proceedings of 1999,during its initial examination,however, the Commission foundindications that the notifiedtransaction of 1999 might notlead to the acquisition of controlby Deutsche Post, because itcould have acquired control overtrans-o-flex already in 1997. Ifthat had been the case, theCommission would have had nojurisdiction to assess thetransaction notified in 1999.

On the basis of these indications,the Commission requestedadditional information fromDeutsche Post and othersconcerning the transaction of1997. In the course of thisinvestigation it became apparent,that Deutsche Post haddeliberately supplied incorrectand misleading information todeceive the Commission aboutits jurisdiction. Deutsche Postwithheld information relevant inthis context. The investigation ofthe Commission showed thatDeutsche Post may have

Commission fines Deutsche Post,KLM, Anheuser-Busch and Scottish &Newcastle for supplying incorrect ormisleading information in competitionproceduresBy Holger DIECKMANN, COMP-B-1,Gudrun SCHMIDT, COMP-B-3Matthijs VISSER, COMP-F-3 andNils VON HINTEN-REED, COMP-F-3

➣ MERGERS


exercised control over trans-o-flex since 1997 through a thirdparty which had acquired themajority of the shares:agreements show that DeutschePost carried the economic riskfor this majority shareholding.

This intentional supply ofincorrect and misleadinginformation in its notificationand incorrect information inreplying to information requestsof the Commission by DeutschePost, constitutes a seriousinfringement of two provisionsof the Merger Regulation, whichmade the Commission adopt adecision by which two fines of50.000 Euro each are imposedon Deutsche Post. Meanwhile,the German Bundeskartellamthas also launched aninvestigation in the matter.

KLMIn September 1998, KLMnotified, in accordance with theMerger Regulation its plannedacquisition of full control ofMartinair. KLM is the leadingDutch airline and Martinair isthe second largest Dutch airline.The notification was withdrawnby KLM after the Commissionhad discovered that it containedincorrect and misleadinginformation. The operation wasagain notified in December 1998and finally abandoned in May1999 after the Commissionraised objections against theoperation. The Commission thenstarted proceedings concerningthe supply of incorrectinformation contained in theinitial notification of September1998.

In its initial notification, KLMsubmitted incorrect informationon the charter destinations of itssubsidiary Transavia andwithheld relevant information onscheduled flights of Transavia.In the notification, KLM gave atable of the Mediterraneancharter destinations of Transaviaand of Martinair. In this tableKLM failed to list ten importantTransavia destinations.Furthermore, the table waspresented in conjunction with thestatement that the operations ofTransavia and Martinair were"largely complementary",whereas in reality Transaviaoperated to all Mediterraneandestinations which were alsoserved by Martinair.

KLM also gave a misleadingdescription of the activities ofTransavia as it referred toTransavia only as a charterairline and failed to make anyreference to the fact thatTransavia had substantialscheduled operations toMediterranean destinations andsold a significant number ofseats on these flights to Dutchtour operators. In both instancesthe incorrect or misleadinginformation was relevant for theassessment of the case. TheCommission considers thebehaviour of KLM as grosslynegligent, at the very least andtherefore decided to impose afine of 40.000 Euro.

Anheuser-Busch and Scottish& NewcastleAnheuser-Busch (USA) is theworld’s largest brewingorganisation and brews the

American Budweiser brand.Scottish & Newcastle is thelargest UK brewer. Thecompanies are party toagreements concerning thebrewing, distributing andmarketing of Budweiser beer inthe UK. Scottish & Newcastlebecame a party to the agreementfollowing its take-over ofCourage in 1995.

In the course of the Commissioninvestigation following thenotification of the agreements tothe Commission, a formalrequest for information was sentto ask the parties whether therehad been any changes to theagreements after Scottish &Newcastle signed up to them. Intheir joint response to theCommission’s request forinformation, the parties omittedthe so-called Budweisermarketing guidelines, whichwere agreed and accepted byScottish & Newcastle. Thenegligence of the parties in thiscase seriously hindered theproper instruction of the file. TheCommission therefore adopted adecision imposing fines of 3.000Euro on both Anheuser-Buschand Scottish & Newcastle.52

Concluding remarksIn the cases of Deutsche Postand KLM the amount of the fineis at or close to maximumpermitted, reflecting theCommission's view of theirseriousness. The maximum finewhich can be imposed for aninfringement of the procedural

52 OJ L 49 of 20.02.2000, p.37

➣ MERGERS


rules is relatively low, 50.000Euro in Merger cases and only5.000 Euro in cases concerningArticles 81 and 82 of the ECTreaty. In view of the

importance of accurateinformation in competitionprocedures the Commission istherefore considering whether itmight be appropriate to propose

to the Council to increase theamounts for an infringement ofthese rules.

The Commission approved thecreation of a joint venturebetween the German companiesBHS Holding GmbH &CoKG/debitel AG and theDanish companies FleggaardHolding AS/Fleggaard PartnerAS. The parent companiestransferred to the joint venturetheir respective wholesalebusinesses (FreeCom GmbH andDangaard Holding AS)concerning mobiletelecommunications devices, inparticular mobile phones, andrelated value added services (e.g.hot-line and repair services,implementation of promotion

programmes for retailers,packaging for retailers). Theoperation allowed the jointventure to offer its customers apan-European company structureand to better face increasingcompetition from networkoperators and service providersin bringing mobile phones to themarket.

The Commission, whileconsidering it not strictlynecessary to define in detail therelevant product market, tendedtowards considering thewholesaling and the provision ofrelated value added services to

be two distinct markets. As towhether the geographical marketwas EU-wide or national couldbe left open. FreeCom had awell-established position on theGerman market while Dangaardwas dominantly active in theScandinavian markets and inSwitzerland. Therefore, theactivities of the two companieswere to a large degreegeographically complementary.In Germany, where the Parties’activities overlapped, theresulting market share of thejoint venture in the wholesalemarket did not exceed 15percent.

The Commission concluded thatthe operation did not lead to thecreation of a dominant position.

Subject: Case No COMP/JV.26 -FreeCom./.Dangaard Holding

➣ MERGERS


The European Commission hascleared the concentrationbetween Bertelsmann AG andPlaneta Corporación S.R.L.Through this operation theparties will obtain joint controlover Books On-Line Ibérica, S.A(BOL Spain). The operation willnot lead to the creation orstrengthening of a dominantposition.

Bertelsmann heads a group ofcompanies that operateinternationally in printing,

publishing and distribution ofbooks, music and privatetelevision as well as relatedservices. Planeta belongs to thePlaneta group that operates inpublishing and distribution ofcultural and leisure content bymeans of all types of print andother media, mainly in Spanishlanguage. BOL Spain is active inthe sale of books in the Spanishlanguage as well as the otherofficial languages of Spain(Catalan, Galician, Basque) viathe Internet.

The parties will concentrate theiron-line sale activities of books inthese languages in BOL Spain.For this purpose, Planeta willacquire an 50% stake in BOLSpain, which is currently awholly owned subsidiary ofBertelsmann.

Although the parties are active inthe markets for distant sales ofbooks as well as for Internet salesof books in Spain, they are notdominant in these markets. Thereis also no indication of co-ordination in any other market,like e.g. the market for thepublishing of books in Spain.

The Commission has, therefore,decided not to oppose thisoperation.

The European Commission hascleared the takeover of Cdnowby Time Warner and Sony.Cdnow will become a subsidiaryof a new corporation Holdcowhich will be jointly controlledby Time Warner and Sony.CDnow’s share of the market inwhich it operates is low, as arethose of Time Warner and Sony.At the horizontal level thereforethe operation will not lead to the

creation or strengthening of adominant position. It will alsonot alter the competitivesituation from a verticalperspective as Time Warner andSony will need to continue tosell music and home videoproducts through other thirdparty distributors and retailers inthe EEA and world-wide. Theoperation will also not lead tothe co-ordination of the

competitive behaviour of Sonyand Time Warner either. TimeWarner is a Delawarecorporation, which is engaged inthe media and entertainmentindustries. Sony is a New Yorkcorporation which is an indirectsubsidiary of Sony Corporation,based in Tokyo, Japan. SonyCorporation is an entertainmentand consumer electronicscompany, providingentertainment and electronicproducts and services toconsumers around the world.

The Commission has, for theabove reasons, decided not tooppose this operation.

Commission authorises creation ofjoint venture BOL Spain byBertelsmann AG and PlanetaCorporación S.R.L.

By Hubert GAMBS, DG COMP-C-2

Commission authorises takeover ofCDnow by Time Warner and Sony

By Ali NIKPAY, DG COMP-C-2

➣ MERGERS


La Commission Européennedonne le feu vert à la créationen Italie de l’entreprisecommune Hearst MondadoriEditoriale SRL par la sociétéaméricaine HMI InternationalHoldings Inc et la sociéteitalienne Arnoldo MondadoriEditore S.p.A. L’objet de lafiliale commune est d’assurerl’édition et la diffusion d’uneversion italienne du magazine

féminin “Cosmopolitan”,appartenant au groupe Hearst.L’opération n’entraînera ni lacréation, ni le renforcementd’aucune position dominanteet ne soulève donc pas deproblème de concurrence.

HMI est une filiale du groupeHearst, une société activedans les métiers de lacommunication. Mondadori

appartient au groupeFininvest, dont il constitue lafiliale regroupant ses activitésdans l’édition.

L’opération concerne lemarché des magazinesféminins en Italie, qui sesubdivise en marché dulectorat et en marché de lavente d’espace publicitaire.

Si Mondadori détient uncertain nombre de magazinesféminins, il n’est pas enposition dominante en Italiesur le marché concerné. Legroupe Hearst n’a aucuneactivité en Italie.

La Commission européenne autorisela création de l’entreprise communeHearst Mondadori Editoriale SRL

By Jacques LOVERGNE, DG COMP-C-2

STATE AID

Main developments between 1st October 1999 and 1st January 2000


Introduction

On 16 December 1997, theCommission adopted theMultisectoral framework onregional aid for large investmentprojects53 (hereinafter “theMultisectoral Framework”). ThisFramework became applicablefrom 1 September 1998 for aninitial trial period of three years.Before the end of the trialperiod, the Commission willcarry out a thorough review ofthe utility and scope of theFramework, which will inter aliaconsider the question of whetherit should be renewed, revised orabolished.

The framework is intended tolimit the amounts of regional aidfor large investment projects.

One of the main objectives of thenew approach under theMultisectoral Multisectoralframework on regional aid forlarge investment projects is tore-focus regional aid on jobcreation.

It also fits into the Commission’sbroader objective of ultimatelyputting an end to the variousexisting sectoral rules on state

53 OJ C 107 of 7.04.1998, p. 7.

aid with a view to adopting asingle approach to major awardsunder regional aid schemesregardless of the sector involved,except in the case of coal andsteel, which will remain subjectto the ECSC Treaty until July2002.

The new framework generalises,in all sectors not covered bysectoral rules on state aid, theobligation to notify individuallyany aid planned for large-scaleprojects under regional aidschemes where one of thefollowing two criteria is met:

(i) the total project cost comes tomore than ECU 50 million 101and the aid intensity is morethan 50% of the relevantallowable ceiling and the aid perjob created or safeguardedexceeds ECU 40 000;

(ii) the aid amount exceeds ECU50 million.

For large-scale projects thusdefined, the framework laysdown rules aimed at reducingany competition-distortingeffects by lowering the aidceiling compared with themaximum ceiling of intensityauthorised in the region

concerned, and this on the basisof three criteria:

- the capital-labour ratio;- the degree of competition inthe relevant market; and- the impact on regionaldevelopment.

These three criteria are eachtranslated into a coefficient thevalue of which varies with theproject’s characteristics.

To obtain the theoretical ceilingof permissible aid for a large-scale project, the maximumintensity authorised in the regionconcerned must be multiplied bythe three coefficients obtained,provided the product of thesecoefficients is less than one.

In this latter respect, it isimportant to note that theMultisectoral Framework indi-cates that the maximum aidintensity (regional aid ceiling) tobe used for the calculations is theone a large company couldobtain in the assisted areaconcerned within the context ofthe authorized regional aidsystem valid at the moment ofnotification. A pre-condition forthis provision to be applied isthat a valid regional aid mapexists at the time of thenotification. However, this is notthe case for a number of MemberStates after 31 December 1999.However, all the notificationsreceived so far have been madeat a point in time where a validregional aid map existed.

The Multisectoral Frameworkthus aims at awarding a 'bonus'

The Multisectoral framework onregional aid for large investmentprojects: a mid-term review

By Adolfo BARBERÁ DEL ROSAL, DG COMP-H-2

➣ STATE AID


to aid financing investmentswhich generate direct andindirect jobs. It has also set outto reduce the amount of aid incases where the investmentcreates an increase in capacity ina declining sector or where anover-capacity situation exists, orin cases where the benefitingfirm owns, before the assistedinvestment is carried out, amarket share of at least 40%.

On the procedural level, theCommission has either toapprove aid within two monthsof their notification or, wherethere are doubts, to open aninquiry procedure and to take afinal decision after four monthsmaximum.

The decisions taken on thebasis of the MultisectoralFramework

Until now (15 February 2000),the Commission has received 14notifications, of which 4 haveresulted in a final decision. Onenotification was withdrawn afterseveral exchanges of informationwith the Member Stateconcerned.

The four decisions were takenwithout opening theinvestigation procedure, and canbe summarised as follows54:

54 A non-confidential version of these

decisions in the official language ofthe Member State concerned can befound at:http://europa.eu.int/comm/secretariat_general/sgb/state_aids/index.htm.

➣ STATE AID


Case N 94/99 (Spain) – Aid to Rockwool Peninsular S.A.

BENEFICIARY ROCKWOOL PENINSULAR S.A.Date of decision 21 April 1999Type of investment Factory for the production of stone woolEligible costs € 64.7 millionAmount of aid € 15.2 millionSmall and medium sizecompany

No

Location of the investment Caparroso (Navarra, Spain)Type of assisted area 87 (3) c)Regional aid ceiling 15% NGENet Grant Equivalent (NGE) 13.2%Direct jobs creation 107Indirect jobs creation 56Relevant product market Mineral woolRelevant geographical market European Community> 40% market share NoMarket features Non declining marketCompetition factor 1Capital/Work factor 0.8Regional development factor 1.1Conclusion Proposed intensity accepted

Case N 582/99 (Italy) – Aid to Marina di Stabia s.p.a.

BENEFICIARY MARINA DI STABIA S.P.A.Date of decision 8 December 1999Type of investment Construction of a sea marinaEligible costs € 71.3 millionAmount of aid € 50.6 millionSmall and medium sizecompany

Yes

Location of the investment Castellmmare di Stabia (Campania, Italy)Type of assisted area 87 (3) a)Regional aid ceiling 50% NGE plus 15% gross for SMENet Grant Equivalent (NGE) 47.36%Direct jobs creation 141Indirect jobs creation 374Relevant product market Renting or purchase of moorings for recreational

craftsRelevant geographical market Tirrenian coastline and Côte d’Azur> 40% market share NoMarket features Non declining market

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Competition factor 1Capital/Work factor 0.8Regional development factor 1.5Conclusion Proposed intensity accepted

Case N 583/99 (Italy) – Aid to Benfil s.r.l.

BENEFICIARY BENFIL S.R.L.Date of decision 22 December 1999Type of investment Installation of a cotton yarn production siteEligible costs € 49.56 millionAmount of aid € 37.36 millionSmall and medium sizecompany

Yes

Location of the investment Airola (Campania, Italy)Type of assisted area 87 (3) a)Regional aid ceiling 50% NGE plus 15% gross for SMENet Grant Equivalent (NGE) 50.57%Direct jobs creation 154Indirect jobs creation 131Relevant product market Cotton-type weaving marketRelevant geographical market European Community> 40% market share NoMarket features Structural overcapacityCompetition factor 0.75Capital/Work factor 0.9Regional development factor 1.25Conclusion Proposed intensity accepted

Case N 583/99 (Italy) – Aid to Tessival s.r.l.

BENEFICIARY TESSIVAL SUD S.R.L.Date of decision 22 December 1999Type of investment Installation of a cotton woven fabrics siteEligible costs € 80.09 millionAmount of aid € 65.92 millionSmall and medium sizecompany

Yes

Location of the investment Airola (Campania, Italy)Type of assisted area 87 (3) a)Regional aid ceiling 50% NGE plus 15% gross for SMENet Grant Equivalent (NGE) 50.7%Direct jobs creation 400

➣ STATE AID


Indirect jobs creation 273Relevant product market Cotton-type weaving marketRelevant geographical market European Community> 40% market share NoMarket features Structural overcapacityCompetition factor 0.75Capital/Work factor 0.9Regional development factor 1.25Conclusion Proposed intensity accepted

The application of theMultisectoral Framework:particular remarks on thecompetition and the regionalimpact factors

As expected, the experience untilnow has shown that the twocritical steps in the assessment ofthe maximum allowable aidintensity for a project are theestablishment of the competitionfactor as well as thedetermination of the regionalimpact factor.

The competition factor

As regards the competitionfactor, its calculation involves athorough examination of boththe capacity utilisation in thesector concerned and therelevant market. The conclusionsreached in the four decisions areas follows:

N 94/99 (Rockwool)

The relevant product marketconsists of mineral woolinsulation materials (mainlyfibre-glass and mineral wool)because most competing plasticsinsulation (e.g. polyurethane and

polystyrene) and other insulationmaterials (e.g. cellulose, perliteand vermiculite) have not thecombined very high thermal,acoustic and fire protectionvalues. Moreover, someimportant market participantshave specialised in one categoryof insulation products so that therelative positions of competitorsdiffer strongly in differentproduct market segments.

In the notification, Spainconsidered that the relevantgeographical market correspondsto the area which can be servedin a profitable way from theCaparroso. This areacorresponds to France, Spain andPortugal. However, in itsdecision, the Commission took adifferent view. In conformitywith point 7.6 of theMultisectoral Framework, therelevant geographic marketcomprises usually the EEA or,alternatively, any significant partof it if the conditions ofcompetition in that area can besufficiently distinguished fromother areas of the EEA. Giventhe geographical dispersion ofthe European manufacturers, thevarious supply areas can be seen

as a series of overlapping circleswith their centres at the mineralwool plants. There is relativelylow concentration of mineralwool plants in Southern Europe.To a certain extent, the argumentcould be made that thisrepresents a different market.However, given the dispersion ofthe individual mineral woolplants and various degrees ofoverlap for the natural supplyareas, so that effects can betransmitted from one circle toanother, it seems appropriate toconsider, in the absence of otherarguments put forward by Spain,that the geographical relevantmarket is the Community as awhole.

In the absence of sufficient dataon capacity utilisation, theMultisectoral Frameworkprovides in its point 3.4 that theCommission will considerwhether the investment takesplace in a declining market. Forthis purpose, the Commissionhas to compare the evolution ofapparent consumption of theproduct in question (that is,production plus imports minusexports) with the growth rate of

➣ STATE AID


EEA manufacturing industry as awhole.

The average annual growth ratefor the EC manufacturingindustry over the period 1992-1997 was 3.235%. On the basisof the information provided bythe European InsulationManufacturers Association“EURIMA”, the annual averagegrowth rate for mineral wool inEurope was 3.475%, for theperiod 1992-1997. To supporttheir view that the mineral woolmarket is expected to grow, theSpanish authorities indicated thatother manufacturers of mineralwool are also planning to expandtheir capacities. Isover (SaintGobain) is increasing its capacityin Orange (MT 15 000), Châlon(MT 5 000) and Etten Leurre(MT 15 000). Pleiderer isplanning to increase its output byMT 40 000. Poliglas is currentlybuilding a new factory in StAvold (MT 22 000). Accordingto the Spanish authorities theseincreases are intended to copewith the expected marketgrowth.

On the basis of the above, theCommission considered that themineral wool market could notbe deemed to constitute adeclining market. Since theCommission was satisfied thatthe market share of Rockwooldid not exceed 40% whatever theproduct or geographical marketdefinition used, it concluded thatthe competition factor was equalto 1.

N 582/99 (Marina di Stabia)

The Commission decided toconsider the whole Tirreniancoastline of Italy plus Côted’Azur as the relevant market.Bar the 18% transit and safetymoorings, the core of the traffic(around 82% of the total) of thenewly built marina will berepresented by local yachters,mainly from the provinces ofNaples and Salerno. Marina diStabia will cover only 6.46 % ofthe demand for moorings inCampania and just 0.7% of theestimated supply nation-wide inthe year 2005.

The new marina will favour thepromoters and operators whowill either sell or lease themoorings. In terms ofavailability of moorings forrecreational crafts, Italy findsitself at a competitivedisadvantage vis-à-vis otherMember States. The project aimsat filling the existing gap alongthe coasts of Campania, notablyin the Gulf of Naples. At themoment, Italy has just 343tourist ports and marinasunevenly distributed along acoast 8.000 km long. It thusappears that there is large scopefor an expansion of the marketfor these infrastructures, as thefew moorings which do existoffer little or nothing by way offacilities.

The market for recreationalcrafts is strictly linked to themarina-building market but willnot be significantly affected atthe EU level by the new project.

As far as the three-star hotel isconcerned, it is certain that itwill not affect the intra-EUexchanges to an extent that isincompatible with thecompetition conditions in theinternal market since:

- the relevant market for thehotel facilities is essentiallylimited to the marinaresidents, and

- the promotion or organisationof package holidays usuallysold by international agenciesand tours operators isincompatible with both thehotel’s standard and themarina’s business plan.

On the basis of the aboveconsiderations, and since Marinadi Stabia does not hold a marketshare of 40% or more of therelevant market, the Commissiondecided to consider acompetition factor of 1.

N 583/99 (Benfil)

The cotton yarn (NACE 17.11)produced by Benfil anddelivered to Tessival Sud Srl andTessival SpA is the basicmaterial for the production ofcotton fabrics. According to theItalian authorities, for technicalreasons the productionequipment for cotton weavenfabrics can not be reconvertedfor the production of alternativefabrics, i.e. synthetics or cotton-mixed. The production ofsynthetics requires loomsoperating at double speedcompared to the weaving ofcotton.

➣ STATE AID


The cotton fabrics can be used indifferent applications:– for the clothing market,

which can be subdivided inthe categories velvet, flats,denim, fabrics for shirtingand tissues, used for shirts,trousers, and coats.

– for technical articles toimitate leather, footwear,wallpaper as well as for thefurniture sector (upholstery,curtains).

Thus, from the demand-sidesubstitution for cotton weavenfabrics, many of the afore-mentioned final applications,namely fabrics for technicalarticles, can be thought to admitsubstitution by alternativefabrics, i.e. synthetic fibres, byreason of their characteristics,their prices and their intendeduse.

Consequently, the Commissionconsidered as relevant marketthe cotton-type weaving marketas a whole, which includesmanufacture of broad wovencotton-type fabrics, either withcotton or artificial or syntheticyarns.

On the basis of the informationsupplied by the Italianauthorities, the Commissionfurther decided that the relevantgeographical market was theCommunity as a whole.

The Commission scrutinised themarket for the time period of1995 to 1998 instead of a fiveyears period, as it wasimpossible to obtain data for alonger time period. The data

comprise the main EU MemberStates. However, due to the factthat the data on which theCommission based itsassessment cover 2/3 of theinstalled capacity, it considersthe figures to be sufficient togive a representative picture ofthe market situation.

Accordingly, the Commissionassessed the average capacityutilisation for the wholemanufacturing industry for theperiod 1995 to 1998 at 82.2%.

As to the capacity utilisationrate, the Italian authoritiesprovided capacity data for theweaving sector showing anaverage capacity utilisation of90.5% based on a 220 days-a-year benchmark used as atheoretical ceiling to which theeffective working time of thelooms is reported. However,bearing in mind the above-mentiond considerations, theaverage capacity utilisation forthe sector of cotton-typeweaving in the period 1995-1998, on the basis of a 240 days-a-year benchmark, which is theusual benchmark in this industry,amounts to 77.8%. Thisrepresents a difference of minus4.4 %. Thus, the Commissionnotes that a structuralovercapacity exists in therelevant market segment.

Based on the above, and takinginto consideration that the aidbeneficiary did not have amarket share of 40% or more inthe relevant market, theCommission decided that the

competition factor to be appliedwas 0.75.

N 584/99 (Tessival)

Cotton fabric is a material madefrom cotton yarn. The fabricscan be used in differentapplications. The cotton fabricfor the clothing market, whereinthe aid beneficiary will beoperating, can be subdivided inthe categories velvet, flats,denim, fabrics for shirting andtissues. The aid beneficiary willproduce the category “flats”which represents about 70% ofthe market concerned.

Within the clothing sector,fabrics produced by the aidbeneficiary will be used forshirts, trousers, and coats. Otherapplications of beneficiary'sproduction are technical articlesfor imitation leather, footwear,wallpaper as well as for furniture(upholstery, curtains). Theproduct competes withsubstitutes which the consumermight consider by reason of itscharacteristics, their prices andtheir intended use.

Thus, from the demand-sidesubstitution for woven cotton,many of the afore-mentionedfinal applications, namely fabricsfor technical articles, can bethought to admit substitution byalternative fabrics, i.e. syntheticfibres. In accordance with point7.6 of the MultisectoralFramework, the Commissionconsidered as relevant marketthe cotton-type weaving marketas a whole which includesmanufacture of broad woven

➣ STATE AID


cotton-type fabrics, either withcotton or artificial or syntheticyarns.

In the absence of preciseinformation, it seems appropriateto consider that the geographicalrelevant market is theCommunity as a whole.

The Commission scrutinised themarket for the time period of1995 to 1998 instead of a fiveyears period, as it wasimpossible to obtain data for alonger time period. The datacomprise the main EU.However, due to the fact that thedata on which the Commissionbased its assessment cover 2/3 ofthe installed capacity, itconsiders the figures to besufficient to give a representativepicture of the market situation.

Accordingly, the Commissionassessed the average capacityutilisation for the wholemanufacturing industry for theperiod 1995 to 1998 at 82.2%.

The Italian authorities providedcapacity data for the weavingsector showing an averagecapacity utilisation of 85.7%based on a 233 days-a-yearbenchmark used as a theoreticalceiling to which the effectiveworking time of the looms isreported. However, according toavailable data provided byEurocoton and the InternationalTextile Manufacturers Fede-ration, the average capacityutilisation in the period 1995-1998, on the basis of a 240 days-a-year benchmark which is theusual benchmark in this industry,

amounted to 77.8% representinga difference of minus 4.4%.Thus, the Commissionconsidered that a structuralovercapacity exists in therelevant market segment.

Based on the above, and takinginto consideration that the aidbeneficiary did not have amarket share of 40% or more inthe relevant market, theCommission decided that thecompetition factor to be appliedwas 0.75.

The regional impact factor

The regional impact factor isbased on the number of jobscreated by first-tier suppliers andcustomers in response to theaided investment. Theconclusions reached in the fourdecisions are as follows:

N 94/99 (Rockwool)

The transport of end-product isthe most important source ofindirect job creation (45). TheSpanish authorities justify thison the following basis:

For an estimated production of800 000 m³, 10 000 trips arescheduled. The average distanceper trip is estimated at 450/500km. One driver is estimated tomake 220 trips per year.

The transport of raw material isthe second source (together withthe maintenance) of indirect jobcreation. For an estimatedproduction of 800 000 m³,110 000 MT per year of basalt,slag and/or coke are needed.

Basalt, coke and slag aresourced, respectively, fromsuppliers located at 100 km, 200km and 400 km from Caparroso.A total of 4 500 trips are needed,that is 3 000 for basalt (50 MTper day over a year), 1 000 forslag (25 MT per day) and 1 000MT for coke (50 MT per day).

The extraction of MT 55 000 ofbasalt is expected to result in thecreation of 2 indirect jobs.

The manufacturing by a sub-contractor of MT 40 000 ofbricks from the recycling ofwaste is expected to result in thecreation of 4 indirect jobs.

The Commission considered thatthe justifications provided by theSpanish authorities areacceptable. Accordingly, a factorof 1.1 was applied.

N 582/99 (Marina di Stabia)

The new marina would have acapacity of 1 292 moorings andcreate around 515 new jobs, bothdirectly (141) and indirectly(374). The project also includesa three-star hotel with 220double rooms, a dry dock for161 crafts and an area destinedfor services, commercial andleisure activities. TheCommission also considered thatthe justifications provided by theItalian authorities wereacceptable. Accordingly, a factorof 1.5 was applied.

N 583/99 (Benfil)

The most important source ofindirect job creation (80) is in

➣ STATE AID


the re-processing sector. About4 000 tons/year of cotton yarnproduced by Benfil need re-processing before their finalmanufacture by Tessival Sud Srland Tessival SpA. Thecompanies Tessilsud, Fil Merand Filatura di Trani, all of themlocated in objective 1 regions(Campania and Puglia) will carryout the re-processing.

The second source of indirectjob creation is in the supplyservices (51).

The Commission was satisfiedby the evidence provided by theItalian government for thecausality between the Benfilproject and these jobs.Furthermore, they fulfil thecriteria of point 7.5 of theMultisectoral Framework,namely that they are permanentfull-time jobs or part-timeequivalents. They are all createdin objective 1 areas (Campaniaand Puglia).

Based on these facts, theregional impact factor is to becalculated from the ratio indirectjobs created in assistedarea/direct jobs created by theinvestment. The abovementioned figures account forthe creation of 131 jobs whichrepresents a medium degree ofindirect job creation, and thus afactor of 1.25.

N 584/99 (Tessival)

According to the Italianauthorities, the most importantsource of indirect job creation(276) is the customer market.

This involves dressmakingcompanies. However, theCommission noted that thebeneficiary’s production will besold to its mother company,Tessival. Although the fabricssupplied to the clothing industryin the region substitute partlyTessival’s imports from thirdcountries, it seems inconsistentto expect that the beneficiary’sproduction will generate anynew job in this industry.Consequently, the Commissiondid not consider an increase inindirect jobs in the clothingindustry in the region.

The most important source ofindirect job creation provides theexternal final treatment. Thenumber of 127 is calculated onthe basis of 2.05 jobs per millionm² out of the envisaged totalproduction of 62 million m². TheCommission held that the figureof 127 indirects jobs createdthrough the external finaltreatment of the total productionof the aid beneficiary wasrealistic.

The third source of indirect jobcreation is estimated in thesupplier market. TheCommission notes that the aidbeneficiary will buy two types ofraw material, 8 700 tons of open-end cotton yarn, supplied byBenfil, and 4 500 tons of ringcotton yarn, supplied by fivecompanies located in the regionor in adjacent regions.According to the Italianauthorities, the production of100 kg of ring cotton yarnrequests 4 man/hour. On thebasis of 1 700 man/hour/year,

the production of 4,500corresponds to 106.

Finally, the Commissionconsidered the indirect jobsamounting to 55 to be created inthe supply of services to be over-estimated and not proportionateto the size of the project.Therefore, the Commission heldthat only 40 full time jobs shouldbe considered.

Taking into account the above,the total number of indirect jobscreated in the assisted andadjacent assisted regionsamounted to 273. According tothis figure compared to the directjob creation of 400, the ratio isbetween 50% and 100% andtherefore a factor of 1.25 isapplicable.

Conclusion

As shown above, theMultisectoral Framework hasworked well so far and isexpected to work properlyduring the 3-year trial period.

With the exception of the factthat at present there is no validregional aid map for someMember States, there have beenno major obstacles with theimplementation of theMultisectoral Framework.

As expected, the experience untilnow has shown that the twocritical steps in the assessment ofthe maximum allowable aidintensity for a project are theestablishment of the competitionfactor as well as the determi-

➣ STATE AID


nation of the regional impactfactor.

Whereas the competition factoris to be determined in advanceby the Commission, the regionalimpact factor depends very muchon the effective creation of theanticipated indirect jobs. Thelatter, by definition, can only bemonitored after the implemen-tation of the project. That is whythe ex-post monitoring laid downin point 6 of the MultisectoralFramework is of the greatestimportance in order to ensurethat the Framework worksproperly and that the maximum

allowable intensity for a projectis not unduly increased.

In order to ensure compliancewith the Commission decision,the Member States, incooperation with the aidbeneficiaries, must provide theCommission with an annualreport on the project, includinginformation on the subsidiesalready paid, any interim reporton the execution of the aidcontract, and a final reportindicating the objectives in termsof the timetable, the investments,and compliance with anyspecific conditions laid down bythe authority granting the aid.

In the four above cases, theCommission was satisfied thatthe Member States concernedexplicitly undertook to complywith and to accept the obli-gations resulting from the appli-cation of point 6 theMultisectoral Framework. Thedecisions were therefore adoptedon the basis of this understan-ding. Should the monitoringshow that the execution of theproject is not in compliance withthe Commission decision, thenthe Commission shall require theMember State to activate the aidreimbursement instruments.

The Commission has adopted anotice on the application ofArticles 87 and 88 of the ECTreaty to State aid in the formof guarantees.

The Commission adopted on24th November 1999 the"Commission notice on theapplication of Articles 87 and 88of the EC Treaty to State aid inthe form of guarantees". Itspurpose is to give MemberStates more detailedexplanations about the principleson which the Commissionintends to base its interpretationof Articles 87 and 88 and theirapplication to State guarantees.The Commission intends in this

way to make its policy in thisarea as transparent as possible,thereby ensuring that itsdecisions are predictable and thatequal treatment is guaranteed.The document does in fact notset up new rules but only openlystates the existing principles ofassessment.

In 1989 the Commissionaddressed two letters on Stateguarantees to the Member States.In the first letter55 it pointed outthat it regards all guaranteesgiven by a State as falling within

55 Commission letter to the Member

States, SG(89) D/4328 of 5 April1989.

the scope of Article 87 (1).According to this letter, theCommission must therefore benotified of any plans to give oralter such guarantees insufficient time to enable it tosubmit its comments. In thesecond letter56 the Commissionmade it clear that it intended toexamine the establishment ofState guarantee schemes, andthat individual guarantees givenunder an approved schemewould not need to be notified. In1993 the Commission adopted acommunication57 which addres- 56 Commission letter to the Member

States, SG(89) D/12772 of 12October 1989.

57 Commission Communication to theMember States on the application ofArticles 92 and 93 of theEEC Treaty and of Article 5 ofCommission Directive 80/723/EECto public undertakings in the

Main developments between 1st Septemberand 31st December 1999

➣ STATE AID


sed the subject of guarantees aswell. Experience gained in themeantime suggested that theCommission's policy in this areashould be reviewed. The newNotice replaces the twoCommission letters of 1989 andparagraph 38 of the Commissioncommunication of 1993.

Guarantees are usuallyassociated with a loan or otherfinancial obligation to becontracted by a borrower with alender and may be granted asindividual guarantees or withinguarantee schemes. If aid isinvolved, this aid is in mostcases granted to the borrower.Typically, with the benefit of theState guarantee, the borrowercan obtain lower rates and/oroffer less security. In somecases, the borrower would not,without a State guarantee, find afinancial institution prepared tolend on any terms. The Noticeexplains how the aid element ofa guarantee should be calculatedand offers several ways for thiscalculation.

The Notice does not prejudicethe rules in Member Statesgoverning the system of propertyownership. However, theprinciples explained in theNotice apply to all forms ofpublic guarantees, regardlesswhether they are fixed in acontract or in a law. TheCommission also regards as aidin the form of a guarantee, themore favourable funding termsobtained by enterprises whose

manufacturing sector (OJ C 307,13.11.1993, p. 3).

legal form rules out bankruptcyor other insolvency proceduresor provides an explicit Stateguarantee or coverage of lossesby the State. The same applies tothe acquisition by a State of aholding in an enterprise ifunlimited liability is acceptedinstead of the usual limitedliability.

Under certain circumstances(e.g. if a guarantee is given expost in respect of a loan or otherfinancial obligation alreadyentered into without the terms ofthis loan or financial obligationbeing adjusted, or if oneguaranteed loan is used to payback another, non-guaranteedloan to the same creditinstitution), there may also be anaid to the lender. This has to beexamined on a case to case basis.

The Notice also states someconditions under which theCommission a priori assumesthat no aid element is included ina guarantee (and thus nonotification is necessary). Theseconditions comprise that theborrower is not in financialdifficulty and could in principleobtain a loan on marketconditions from the financialmarkets, that the guarantee islinked to a specific financialtransaction, is for a fixedmaximum amount and does notcover more than 80 % of theoutstanding loan and that themarket price for the guarantee ispaid. For guarantee schemessimilar considerations apply,including that the premiums paidby the beneficiary enterprisesshould be calculated in a way

making the scheme, in allprobability, self financing.However, this enumeration doesnot mean that guaranteesautomatically include aid if notall of these conditions are met.

The Notice does not address thequestion of compatibility of aidgranted in the form ofguarantees. In that respect thesame rules apply as to State aidin other forms.

Furthermore, the Notice explainsthe consequences of failure tonotify State aid in the form ofguarantees. Guarantees differfrom other State aid measures(e.g. grants) in so far as in thecase of a guarantee the Statedoes not only enter into a legalrelation with the beneficiary butalso with third parties, e.g. thelender of a loan which isguaranteed by the State.Therefore, it has to be examinedwhether the fact that a State aidhas been illegally granted hasalso consequences for these thirdparties. However, this question isa matter which has to beassessed under national law;national courts may have toexamine whether national lawprevents the guarantee contractsfrom being honoured.Nevertheless, lenders may havean interest in verifying, as astandard precaution, that theCommunity rules on State aidhave been respected, wheneverguarantees are granted.

In the past, Member States havenot always recognised the aidcontent of State guarantees andthe fact that the aid is granted

➣ STATE AID


when a guarantee is given andnot when it is actually honoured.Therefore, Commissioner Montihas asked the Member States in aseparate letter to communicatewithin four months all Stateguarantees falling within thescope of Article 87 (1) whichshould be, but have not been,notified to the Commission aswell as all State aid in the formof State guarantees which mightconstitute existing aid within themeaning of Article 88 (1).

Nouvelles Décisions sur lescartes des aides d'Etat à finalitérégionale

Tous les Etats membres ontdésormais communiquéofficiellement leurs projets decartes des aides régionales. Aprèsune première évaluation de cespropositions, la Commission acependant été amenée a exprimerdes doutes sur la compatibilitéavec le Traité des projets decertains Etats membres. Ainsi, enjuillet 1999, elle a ouvert laprocédure prévue à l’article 88§2du traité CE à l’encontre despropositions relatives aux cartesde la Belgique, de la France etdes Pays-Bas, ainsi qu’en ce quiconcerne la partie de la carterelative aux régions éligibles à ladérogation de l’article 87§3.c) dutraité CE en Allemagne. Depuislors, de nouvelles décisions ontété prises à l’égard des projets decartes soumis par le Danemark,la Grèce, l’Irlande, le Portugal etla Finlande.

En raison de leur notificationtardive, les cartes des autres Etats

membres (tout comme, à causedes doutes à l’égard de leurcompatibilité avec lesdispositions des lignesdirectrices, les parties "87.3.c)"des cartes allemande etportugaise) n’ont pas pu êtreapprouvées avant la fin 1999. Enattendant leur approbation, lesEtats concernés ne sont plus enmesure d’octroyer ce typed’aides depuis le 1er janvier2000.

Danemark

La Commission a approuvé lacarte danoise le 26 octobre 1999.La part de la population habitantdans les régions éligibles, toutesretenues au titre de la dérogationprévue à l'article 87§3.c) du traitéCE, diminue de 20% à 17,1%.

L’aide ne pourra en général pasdépasser 10% net de la valeur del’investissement, à l’exceptiondes régions de Bornholm etStorestrøm (20% net). Ces deuxdernières régions, constituées demultiples îles, rencontrent eneffet des problèmes spécifiquesde développement liés àl’insuffisance des infrastructuresde transport.

Grèce

La Commission a approuvé lacarte grecque le 22 décembre1999. Compte tenu du fait que lePIB par habitant reste inférieur à75% de la moyennecommunautaire dans toutes lesrégions grecques, cet Etatmembre est entièrement éligibleà la dérogation prévue à l'article87§3.a) du traité CE.

Cependant, les intensitésmaximales des aides diminuentde façon significative, et nepourront pas dépasser 50% net dela valeur des investissementsdans les régions AnatolikiMakedonia, Thraki, Ipeiros,Dykiti Ellada, Peloponissos etVoreio Aigaio. Dans toutes lesautres régions grecques, cetteintensité maximale a été fixée à40% net. En outre, ces tauxmaximaux sont modulés enfonction du type de projetsd’investissement, ainsi que dusecteur d’activité concerné.

Irlande

La Commission a approuvé lacarte irlandaise le 26 octobre1999. Alors que la nécessitéd’aides régionales continue de sefaire sentir dans toutes lesrégions irlandaises, ledéveloppement économiqueimpressionnant qu’a connul’Irlande durant les dernièresannées a été pris en compte autravers d’une réductionimportante des intensités d’aide.

Ainsi, l’intensité maximale desaides à l’investissement a étéfixée à 40% net dans les régionsBorder, Midlands et West. Avecun PIB par habitant inférieur à75% de la moyennecommunautaire, ces régionscontinuent d’appartenir auxrégions les moins développées del’Union, et restent donc éligiblesau titre de la dérogation prévue àl'article 87§3 a) du traité CE.

En revanche, des intensités moinsélevées sont prévues pour lesautres régions irlandaises, toutes

➣ STATE AID


éligibles à la dérogation prévue àl'article 87§3 c). Ainsi, dans leSouth-East, le Mid-West et leSouth-West, les intensités d’aideseront progressivement ramenéesde 40% (en 2000) à 20% net (àpartir de 2004), et dans le Mid-East de 40% à 18% net. Enfin,l’intensité d’aide qui s’applique àDublin à partir de 2000 est de17,5% net.

Portugal

Le 8 décembre 1999, laCommission a approuvé la partiede la carte qui concerne lesrégions portugaises éligibles à ladérogation prévue à l’article87§3.a) du Traité CE (Norte,Centro, Alentejo, Algarve,Açores et Madeira). Lesintensités maximales d’aideautorisées varient de 40% à 62%net, tout en étant modulées àl’intérieur de chaque région,compte tenu de sa situationsocio-économique.

En ce qui concerne la région deLisboa e Vale do Tejo, qui seraentièrement éligible à ladérogation prévue à l'article87§3 c) en tant que «région87§3 a) sortante», la notificationportugaise prévoit que l’entièretéde cette région, qui représente33,4% de la population nationale,bénéficie d’une période detransition de 4 ans pourl’adaptation des intensités d’aideactuelles. Or, au vu deslimitations établies par les lignesdirectrices à l’égard de la portéegéographique de cette dispositiontransitoire, seul un pourcentagede 10,2% de la populationportugaise pourrait bénéficier

d’une telle période. Enconséquence, la Commission adécidé d’ouvrir la procédureprévue à l’article 88§2 du TraitéCE à l’égard de cette partie de lacarte.

Finlande

La Commission a approuvé lacarte finlandaise le 26 octobre1999. Si la part de la populationhabitant dans les régions éligiblesaugmente très légèrement (de41,7% à 42,2%), les intensitésd’aide sont par contre endiminution sensible.

La région de Itä-Suomi, éligibleau titre de la dérogation prévue àl'article 87§3 a) du traité CE,bénéficiera des intensitésmaximales les plus élevées (24%net), tandis que pour ses autresrégions la Finlande limitera lesaides aux grandes entreprises à8%, 10% ou 12% net selon lescas.

United-Kingdom -With regardsto article 86 § 2 of EC Treaty,the Commission authorizes thefinancing of a 24-houradvertising-free channel out ofthe licence fee by the BBC,"BBC News 24".

In 1997 a private competitor fileda complaint against the launchingby the BBC of a 24-hours newsservice in the United Kingdom tobe financed solely by the licencefee. BBC News 24 is a channeldelivered free of advertising andfree of charge to carriers (cableor satellite operators).

The service was originallydeveloped as part of the basictier on the digital satelliteplatform that, at the time of thecomplaint, was being developedin the UK by British SkyBroadcasting Ltd. As thelaunching of the digital satelliteservice was delayed from theoriginally-planned Autumn1997, the BBC decided to makeBBC News 24 available also onthe free-to-air network duringnight hours, and on the analoguecable infrastructure, whilewaiting for the digital satelliteservice.

According to the complainant,the financing of BBC News 24by licence fees:- would have constituted Stateaid in the sense of Article 87, ascomprised of State resources,- was unlawful, as it was notnotified in accordance with theEC Treaty State aid rules,- was not compatible with thecommon market, as it could notqualify for any of theexemptions provided for inArticles 87, paragraphs (2) and(3), and Article 86(2).

The Commission took a decisionon 29 September 1999. Inaccordance with thejurisprudence of the Court58, itdecided that funds stemmingfrom licence fees are in fact to beconsidered State aid in the senseof Article 87. Also, it found outthat such aid was to be grantedwithout prior notification andapproval. 58 Case T-106/95 FFSA and others v

Commission, [1997] ECR II-229

➣ STATE AID


However, the Commissionrejected the third allegation ofthe complainant, finding out thatthe State aid in question wascompatible with the commonmarket, as it is granted ascompensation for the delivery of"services of general economicinterest", as defined andentrusted by the UK authorities.

The Commission concluded thatthe four conditions set out byArticle 86(2) are fulfilled. Inparticular, the Commissionconsidered that the UnitedKingdom did not abuse itscompetence by defining a 24-hour news channel with thespecific features described aboveas part of the public serviceremit for broadcasting. Also, itfound that the BBC wasentrusted with such publicservice task by means of anofficial act of the Government.

In addition, the financial meansgranted to the channel do notexceed its actual costs and aretherefore proportionate to thepublic service.

Finally, the Commissionconcluded that trade within theEU is not affected by thecreation and financing of BBCNews 24 to an extent contrary tothe common interest. In order toreach this conclusion, theCommission analysed the effecton the market of the UK decisionto launch a 24-hour news servicefunded solely by the licence fee.It found out that competition isindeed affected by such decision,in that some competitors lostmarket share and revenues in

consequence of the launching ofBBC News 24.

However, the Commissionconsidered that, according toArticle 86(2), a certain distortionof competition has to betolerated when a Member Statedecides to provide a service ofgeneral economic interest.Article 86(2) only requires suchdistortion not to be excessive, toan extent that it would precludethe development of trade in thesector concerned. TheCommission considered this tobe the case of BBC News 24, inthat, although it gained some ofits competitors’ market share, itdid not make it impossible forcompetitors to continueoperating on the market.

Therefore, since all theconditions of Article 86 (2) ofthe EC Treaty were met, theCommission decided that thefunds from the licence feesdedicated to BBC News 24,although constituting State aid inthe sense of Article 87, arecompatible with the Treaty rules.

France - La Commissionautorise l'octroi d'aides auxpetites et moyennes entreprisespar les collectivitésterritoriales françaises.

Le 22 décembre 1999, laCommission a décidé de ne passoulever d’objection à l’égardd'un régime qui permettra auxcollectivités territorialesd’accorder des aides aux PMEpour des investissementsmatériels ou immatériels, ainsique pour soutenir les efforts de

de ces entreprises en matière deprotection de l’environnement.Ce régime est appelé à remplacerplusieurs régimes d’aidesexistants et précise le cadrejuridique des interventions descollectivités territorialesfrançaises en faveur de leurspetites et moyennes entreprises.Les bénéficiaires en sont desPME définies conformément àl’Encadrement communautairedes aides d’Etat aux petites etmoyennes entreprises59.

La Commission a analysé lesdispositions du régime et aconclu qu’il était conforme àl’Encadrement communautairedes aides d’Etat aux petites etmoyennes entreprises et àl’Encadrement communautairedes aides d’Etat pour laprotection de l’environnement60.Les dispositions des Lignesdirectrices concernant les aidesd’Etat à finalité régionale61 sontégalement respectées.

Ainsi, en s’inscrivant clairementdans le cadre des dispositionsapplicables en matière d’aidesd’Etat, le régime d’aide seconforme parfaitement au droitcommunautaire et assure unepleine transparence desinterventions économiques descollectivités.

59 JO C 213 du 23.7.1996, p.460 JO C 72 du 10.3.1994, p.361 JO C 74 du 10.3.1998, p.4

➣ STATE AID


Germany - The Commissionapproved R&D aid for DornierLuftfahrt GmbH for thedevelopment of a family ofregional aircraft.

On 8 December 1999, theCommission approved aproposal to grant R&D aid toDornier Luftfahrt GmbH. Itconsidered that the aid, whichtakes the form of a Stateguarantee and was notified bythe Federal Government inaccordance with State aid rules,is compatible with the ECTreaty.

On 15 June 1999 the FederalRepublic notified theCommission, underArticle 88(3) EC, of its intention,together with the State ofBavaria, to guarantee a loan ofup to USD 350 million (€ 350million) to Dornier LuftfahrtGmbH to finance a developmentproject. The Federal Governmentguarantees a maximum ofUSD 270 million (€ 270million), while Bavariaguarantees a maximum of USD80 million (€ 80 million). Ineach case the guarantee covers80% of the loan volume.

The aid is granted for a R&Dproject which forms part of awider project for thedevelopment of a new family ofregional aircraft, including the728JET and two variants, the528JET and 928JET. The overalldevelopment costs far exceed thecosts of the research anddevelopment project at issuehere. The project covers thedevelopment of the technology

needed for the 728JET andsubsequently for the 528JET and928JET. It can be classified asprecompetitive development.

After examining this ad hoc aidin the light of the rules laid downin the EC Treaty, theCommission concluded that it iscompatible with those rules andin particular with theCommunity framework for Stateaid for research anddevelopment.62

Italie - La Commission interditl'octroi d'aides régionales enfaveur de la Société Fiat pourson projet d'investissementdans son établissement deMirafiori Meccanica.

Le 22 décembre 1999, laCommission a interdit l'octroid'aides régionales d’une intensitéde 4,6% en faveur d’un projetd’investissement mené par Fiat.La Commission a constaté queles aides en cause n’étaient pasnécessaires à la réalisation duprojet de Mirafiori Meccanica.

Fin 1997, en application de laLoi 488/92, l’Italie avait notifiésix dossiers d’aides régionales enfaveur de Fiat Auto, dontMirafiori Meccanica. Après unepremière analyse des cas, lesinformations fournies par l’Italien’avaient pas permis dedémontrer que les aidesrégionales envisagées étaientconformes aux principes del’encadrement automobile. LaCommission avait donc ouvert

62 OJ C 45, 17. 2.1996, p. 6.

en février 1999 la procédure autitre de l'article 88 § 2 du traitéCE63 à l’encontre des 6 projetsd’aides. Dans le courant du moisde mai, trois cas (dont MirafioriMeccanica) avaient fait l’objetd’une décision d’extension de laprocédure64 centrée sur laquestion de la nécessité des aidesenvisagées.

L’encadrement automobilestipule que pour être compatiblesavec le marché commun, lesaides régionales doivent êtrenécessaires à la réalisation duprojet d’investissement dans larégion assistée concernée. Or,d'une part, l’étude de localisationqui a amené Fiat à choisirMirafiori pour soninvestissement s’est dérouléevers 1993-1994, époque àlaquelle Mirafiori n'appartenaitpas encore à une zone assistée.Ce n'est qu'en mars 1995 queMirafiori a été classée en régionassistée au titre de l’article 87paragraphe 3 alinéa c du TraitéCE. Dès lors, Fiat n’a pas puintégrer dans le plan definancement de son projet àMirafiori l’obtention d’une aiderégionale. D'autre part, lamobilité du projet n’a pas étésuffisamment démontrée par lesautorités italiennes. Mirafioris’avère en effet l’unique site oùFiat a envisagé d’implanter sonprojet et aucun autre site crédiblen'a été indiqué à la Commission.Les aides notifiées par l’Italie enfaveur de Fiat MirafioriMeccanica ne sont donc pas

63 JO C 120 du 01.05.1999.64 JO C 288 du 09.10.1999.

➣ STATE AID


nécessaires pour atteindre lesbuts prévus par l’article 87paragraphe 3 alinéa c du Traité

CE, en l’espèce faciliter ledéveloppement de certainesrégions économiques. Dès lors,

ces aides s’avèrent incompa-tibles avec le marché commun etne peuvent pas être octroyées.

INFORMATION SECTION


COMPETITION DG staff listTélécopieur central : 295 01 28

Directeur général Alexander SCHAUB 2952387/2954576

Directeur général adjoint Jean-François PONS 2994423/2962284plus particulièrement chargé des Directions C et DDirecteur général adjoint Gianfranco ROCCA 2951152/2951139plus particulièrement chargé des Directions E et FDirecteur général adjointplus particulièrement chargé des Directions G et H

Conseiller pour les réformes Helmut SCHRÖTER 2951196/2960246

Conseiller auditeur Roger DAOÜT 2965383/2960090Conseiller auditeur . . .

Assistants du Directeur général Henrik MØRCH 2950766/2967532Bernhard FRIESS 2956038

directement rattachés au Directeur général :1. Personnel, Budget, Administration, Information Irène SOUKA 2957206/29502102. Questions informatiques Guido VERVAET 1959224/2951305

DIRECTION APolitique de concurrence, Coordination, Affaires Internationales et relations avec les autres Institutions Kirtikumar MEHTA 2957389/2995470Conseiller Juan RIVIÈRE MARTI 2951146/2960699Conseiller Georgios ROUNIS 2953404

1. Politique générale de la concurrence,aspects économiques et juridiques Bernd LANGEHEINE 2991855/2965019Chef adjoint d'unité . . . .

2. Projets législatifs et règlementaires ;relations avec les Etats membres Emil PAULIS 2965033/2955894Chef adjoint d'unité Paolo CESARINI 2951286

3. Affaires internationales Yves DEVELENNES 2951590/2966861Chef adjoint d'unité . . . .

DIRECTION BTask Force "Contrôle des opérations Götz DRAUZ 2958681/2952965de concentration entre entreprises"

Télécopieur du Greffe Concentrations 2964301/29672441. Unité opérationnelle I Claude RAKOVSKY 2955389/29623682. Unité opérationnelle II Francisco Enrique GONZALEZ DIAZ a.i. 29650443. Unité opérationnelle III Wolfgang MEDERER 29535844. Unité opérationnelle IV Paul MALRIC SMITH

DIRECTION CInformation, communication, multimédias John TEMPLE LANG 2955571/2954512

1. Télécommunications et Postes,Coordination Société d'information Suzanna SCHIFF 2957657/2951069- Cas relevant de l'Article 85/86 - Directives de libéralisation, cas article 90 Christian HOCEPIED 2960427/2958316

2. Médias, éditions musicales Anne-Margrete WACHTMEISTER 2953895/2963904Chef adjoint d’unité Georg Klaus DE BRONETT 2959268

3. Industries de l'information, électronique de divertissement Cecilio MADERO VILLAREJO 2960949/2965303

➣ INFORMATION SECTION


DIRECTION DServices Enzo MOAVERO MILANESI 2953427/2951490

1. Services financiers (banques, assurances) Serge DURANDE 2957243/29518022. Transports et infrastructures des transports Jürgen MENSCHING 2952224/2966946

Chef adjoint d’unité Joos STRAGIER 29524823. Commerce et autres services Lowri EVANS 2965029/2965036

DIRECTION ECartels, industries de base et énergie Angel TRADACETE 2952462/2950900

1. Cartels Maurice GUERRIN 2951817/2951816Chef adjoint d'unité Julian JOSHUA 2955519

2. Industries de base, Nicola ANNECCHINO 2961870/29564223. Energie, eau et acier Michael ALBERS 2961874/2995483

DIRECTION FIndustries des biens d'équipementet de consommation Sven NORBERG 2952178/2965550

1. Industries mécaniques et électriques et industries diverses Fin LOMHOLT 2955619/2957439Chef adjoint d'unité Carmelo MORELLO 2955132

2. Automobiles, autres moyens de transport Eric VAN GINDERACHTER 2954427/2950479et construction mécanique connexe

3. Produits agricoles, alimentaires, pharmaceutiques,textiles et autres biens de consommation Luc GYSELEN 2961523/2963781

DIRECTION G Aides d'Etat I Loretta DORMAL-MARINO 2958603/2992627Conseiller . . .

1. Politique des aides d'Etat . . .Chef adjoint d'unité . . .

2. Aides horizontales Jean-Louis COLSON 2960995/29625263. Aides à finalité régionale Wouter PIEKE 2959824/2955900

Chef adjoint d'unité Klaus-Otto JUNGINGER-DITTEL 2960376/29650714. Analyses, inventaires et rapports Reinhard WALTHER 2958434/2955410

DIRECTION HAides d’Etat II Humbert DRABBE 2950060/2952701

1. Acier, métaux non ferreux, mines, constructionnavale, automobiles et fibres synthétiques Maria REHBINDER 2990007/2963603Chef adjoint d'unité . . .

2. Textiles, papier, industrie chimique, pharmaceutique, Jorma PIHLATIE 2953607/2960821électronique, construction mécanique et autressecteurs manufacturiersChef adjoint d'unité . . .

3. Entreprises publiques et services Ronald FELTKAMP 2954283/2967987

Task Force ‘Aides dans les nouveaux Länder’ Conrado TROMP 2960286



SPEECHES AND ARTICLES

Global Airline Industry Competitionand Service Adequacy in an OpenMarket Environment - Jean-François PONS - CHICAGOBEYOND OPEN SKIESCONFERENCE - Chicago -07.12.1999

Das Weißbuch der EuropäischenKommission über dieModernisierung der Vorschriftenzur Anwendung der Artikel 81 und82 EG-Vertrag - Die Reform derVerordnung Nr.17 - AlexanderSCHAUB /Rüdiger DOHMS -Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb (WuW),issue 11/1999 - 30.11.1999

Concorrenza e regolazionenell'Unione europea - MarioMONTI - Convegno dell'AutoritàGarante della Concorrenza e delMercato - Roma - 22.11.1999

Competition Policy and FinancialServices - Mario MONTI -European Banking Congress 1999 -Frankfurt - 19.11.1999

Les opérateurs-câble et laconcurrence en Europe - Jean-François PONS - ECCA - Bruxelles- 18.11.1999

Decentralised enforcement ofCommunity Competition Law -John TEMPLE LANG - Conference

on Competition Enforcement -Dublin - 11.11.1999

Current issues arising with airlinealliances - Joos STRAGIER -EUROPEAN AIR LAWASSOCIATION - 11th AnnualConference - Lisbon - 05.11.1999

Sport and European CompetitionPolicy - Jean-François PONS -Fordham Corporate Law Institute -New York - 14.10.1999

COMMUNITY PUBLICATIONS ONCOMPETITION

LEGISLATION

Competition law in the EuropeanCommunities-Volume IA-Rulesapplicable to undertakingsSituation at 30 june 1994; thispublication contains the text of alllegislative acts relevant to Articles85, 86 and 90.Catalogue No: CM-29-93-A01-xx-C(xx=language code: ES, DA, DE,EL, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT).

Competition law in the EuropeanCommunities-Addendum toVolume IA-Rules applicable toundertakingsSituation at 1 March 1995.Catalogue No: CM-88-95-436-xx-C(xx=language code: ES, DA, DE,EL, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT).

Competition law in the EuropeanCommunities-Volume IIA-Rulesapplicable to State aidSituation at 30 June 1998; thispublication contains the text of alllegislative acts relevant to Articles42, 77, 90, 92 to 94.Catalogue No: PD-15-98-875-xx-C(xx=language code: ES, DA, DE;EN, FR, IT, NL, PT, SV; the otherversions will be available later).

Competition law in the EC-Volume II B-Explanation of rulesapplicable to state aidSituation at December 1996Catalogue No: CM-03-97-296-xx-C(xx=language code= ES, DA, DE,EL, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT, FI, SV)

Competition law in the EuropeanCommunities-Volume IIIA-Rulesin the international field-Situation at 31 December 1996(Edition 1997)Catalogue No: CM-89-95-858-xx-C(xx= language code: ES, DA, DE,EL, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT, FI, SV)

Merger control law in theEuropean Union-Situation inMarch 1998Catalogue No: CV-15-98-899-xx-C(xx=language code: ES, DA, DE,EL, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT, FI, SV)

Brochure concerning thecompetition rules applicable toundertakings as contained in theEEA agreement and theirimplementation by the ECCommission and the EFTAsurveillance authority.Catalogue No: CV-77-92-118-EN-C

OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

Application of EC State aid lawby the member state courtsCatalogue No: CM-20-99-365-EN-C

Documentation…This section contains details of recent speeches or articles givenby Community Officials that may be of interest. Copies of theseare available from Competition DG’s home page on the WorldWide Web. Future issues of the newsletter will contain details ofconferences on competition policy which have been brought to ourattention. Organisers of conferences that wish to make use of thisfacility should refer to page 1 for the address of Competition DG’sInformation Officer.



Dealing with the Commission(Edition 1997)-Notifications,complaints, inspections and fact-finding, powers under Articles 85and 86 of the EEC TreatyCatalogue No: CV-95-96-552-xx-C(xx= ES, DA, DE, EN, FR, IT, NL,PT, FI,SV)

Green paper on vertical restraintsin EC competition policy -COM(96) 721- (Ed. 1997)Catalogue No: CB-CO-96-742-xx-C(xx= ES DA DE GR EN FR IT NLPT SV FI)

Final report of the multimodalgroup - Presented toCommissioner Van Miert by SirBryan Carsberg, Chairman of theGroup (Ed. 1997).Catalogue No: CV-11-98-803-EN-C

The institutional framework forthe regulation oftelecommunications and theapplication of EC competitionrules - Final Report (ForresterNorall & Sutton).Catalogue No: CM-94-96-590-EN-C

Competition aspects of accesspricing-Report to the EuropeanCommissionDecember 1995 (M. Cave, P.Crowther, L. Hancher).Catalogue No: CM-94-96-582-EN-C

Community Competition Policy inthe Telecommunications Sector(Vol. I: July 1995; Vol. II: March1997)-volume II B a compediumprepared by DG IV-C-1; itcontains Directives under art 90,Decisions under Regulation 17and under the Merger Regulationas well as relevant Judgements ofthe Court of Justice. - Copies available through DG IV-C-1 (tel. +322-2968623, 2968622,fax +322-2969819).

Brochure explicative sur lesmodalités d'application duRèglement (CE) Nø 1475/95 de laCommission concernant certainescatégories d' accords dedistribution et de service de venteet d'après vente de véhiculesautomobiles - Copies availablethrough DG IV-F-2 (tel. +322-2951880, 2950479, fax. +322-2969800) EN, FR, DE

COMPETITION DECISIONS

Recueil des décisions de laCommission en matière d'aidesd'Etat -Article 93, paragraphe 2(Décisions finales négatives)-1964-1995Catalogue No: CM-96-96-465-xx-C[xx=FR, NL, DE et IT (1964-1995);EN et DA (73-95); EL (81-95); (ESet PT (86-95); FI et SV (95)]

Reports of Commission Decisionsrelating to competition -Articles85, 86 and 90 of the EC Treaty.-94/98Catalogue No: CV-90-95-946-xx-C(xx=language code= ES, DA, DE,EL, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT, FI, SV)

Reports of Commission Decisionsrelating to competition -Articles85,86 and 90 of the EC Treaty.-93/94Catalogue No: CV-90-95-946-xx-C(xx=ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT)

Reports of Commission Decisionsrelating to competition -Articles85,86 and 90 of the EC Treaty.-90/92Catalogue No: CV-84-94-387-xx-C(xx=ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT)

Reports of Commission Decisionsrelating to competition -Articles85,86 and 90 of the EC Treaty.-89/90

Catalogue No: CV-73-92-772-xx-C(xx=ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT)

Reports of Commission Decisionsrelating to competition -Articles85,86 and 90 of the EC Treaty.-86/88Catalogue No: CM-80-93-290-xx-C(xx=ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT)

Reports of Commission Decisionsrelating to competition -Articles85,86 and 90 of the EC Treaty.-81/85Catalogue No: CM-79-93-792-xx-C(xx=DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT, NL.)

Reports of Commission Decisionsrelating to competition -Articles85,86 and 90 of the EC Treaty.-73/80Catalogue No: CM-76-92-988-xx-C(xx=DA, DE, EN, FR, IT, NL.)

Recueil des décisions de laCommission en matièrre deconcurrence - Articles 85, 86 et 90du traité CEE-64/72Catalogue No: CM-76-92-996-xx-C(xx=DE, FR, IT, NL.)

COMPETITION REPORTS

XXVIII Report on CompetitionPolicy 1998Catalogue No: CV-20-99-785-xx-C(xx= ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT, FI, SV)

European Community onCompetition Policy 1998Catalogue No: CV-20-99-301-xx-C(xx= ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT, FI SV

XXVII Report on CompetitionPolicy 1997Catalogue No: CM-12-98-506-xx-C



European Community onCompetition Policy 1997Catalogue No: Cv-12-98-263-XX-C(xx= FR, ES, EN, DE, NL, IT, PT,SV, DA, FI)

XXVI Report on CompetitionPolicy 1996Catalogue No: CM-04-97-242-xx-C

European CommunityCompetition Policy 1996Catalogue No: CM-03-97-967-xx-C(xx= ES*, DA*, DE*, EL*, EN*,FR*, IT*, NL*, PT*,FI*, SV*)

XXV Report on CompetitionPolicy 1995Catalogue No: CM-94-96-429-xx-C

European CommunityCompetition Policy 1995Catalogue No: CM-94-96-421-xx-C(xx= ES*, DA*, DE*, EL*, EN*,FR*, IT*, NL*, PT*, FI*, SV*)

XXIV Report on competitionpolicy 1994Catalogue No: CM-90-95-283-xx-C(xx= language code: ES, DA, DE,EL, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT, FI, SV)

European Communitycompetition policy 1994 (xx=ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT, FI, SV ). Copies availablethrough Cellule Information DG IV

XXIIIe Report on competitionpolicy 1993Catalogue No: CM-82-94-650-xx-C(xx=ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT)

XXIIe Report on competitionpolicy 1992Catalogue No: CM-76-93-689-xx-C(xx=ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT

XXIe Report on competitionpolicy 1991Catalogue No: CM-73-92-247-xx-C(xx= ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT)

Fifth survey on State aid in theEuropean Union in themanufacturing and certain othersectors (Edition 1997)Catalogue No: CV-06-97-901-xx-C(xx= ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT, FI, SV )

Sixt survey on State aid in theEuropean Union in themanufacturing and certain othersectorsCatalogue No: CV-18-98-704-xx-C

Septième rapport sur les aidesd'Etat dans le secteur desproduits manufacturés et certainsautres secteurs de l'Unioneuropéenne [COM (1999) 148final]Catalogue No: CB-CO-99-153-xx-C(xx= language code: DE, FR; theother versions will beavailable later)

OTHER DOCUMENTS andSTUDIES

Buyer power and its impact oncompetition in the food retaildistribution sector of theEuropean UnionCataogue No: CV-25-99-649-EN-C

The application of articles 85 &86 of the EC Treaty by nationalcourts in the Member StatesCat. No: CV-06-97-812-xx-C (xx=FR, DE, EN, NL, IT, ES, PT)

Examination of current andfuture excess capacity in theEuropean automobyle industry -Ed. 1997Cat. No: CV-06-97-036-EN-C

Video : Fair Competition inEurope-Examination of currentCat. No: CV-ZV-97-002-xx-V (xx=ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT, NL,PT, FI, SV)

Communication de laCommission: Les servicesd'intérêt général en Europe (Ed.1996)Cat. No: CM-98-96-897-xx-C xx=DE, NL, GR, SV

Study of exchange of confidentialinformation agreements andtreaties between the US andMember States of EU in areas ofsecurities, criminal, tax andcustoms (Ed.1996)Cat. No: CM-98-96-865-EN-C

Survey of the Member StateNational Laws governing verticaldistribution agreements (Ed.1996)Cat. No: CM-95-96-996-EN-C

Services de télécomunication enEurope: statistiques en bref,Commerce, services et transports,1/1996Cat. No: CA-NP-96-001-xx-Cxx=EN, FR, DE

Report by the group of experts oncompetition policy in the newtrade order [COM(96)284 fin.]Cat. No: CM-92-95-853-EN-C

New industrial economics andexperiences from Europeanmerger control: New lessonsabout collective dominance ? (Ed.1995)Cat. No: CM-89-95-737-EN-C

Proceedings of the EuropeanCompetition Forum (coéditionwith J. Wiley) -Ed. 1996Cat. No: CV-88-95-985-EN-C

Competition Aspects ofInterconnection Agreements in



the Telecommunications Sector(Ed. 1995)Cat. No: CM-90-95-801-EN-C

Proceedings of the 2nd EU/JapanSeminar on competition (Ed.1995)Cat. No: CV-87-95-321- EN-C.

Bierlieferungsverträge in denneuen EU-MitgliedstaatenÖsterreich, Schweden undFinnland - Ed. 1996Cat. No: CV-01-96-074-DE-C DE

Surveys of the Member States'powers to investigate and sanctionviolations of national competitionlaws (Ed. 1995)Cat. No: CM-90- 95-089-EN-C

Statistiques audiovisuelles: rapport1995Cat. No: CA-99-56-948-EN-C

Information exchanges amongfirms and their impact oncompetition (Ed. 1995)Cat. No: CV-89-95-026-EN-C

Impact of EC funded R&Dprogrammes on human resourcedevelopment and long termcompetitiveness (Ed. 1995)Cat. No: CG-NA-15-920-EN-C

Competition policy in the newtrade order: strengtheninginternational cooperation andrules (Ed. 1995)Cat. No: CM-91-95-124-EN-C

Forum consultatif de lacomptabilité: subventionspubliques (Ed. 1995)Cat. No: C 184 94 735 FR C

Les investissements dans lesindustries du charbon et de l'acierde la Communauté: Rapport surl'enquête 1993 (Ed. 1995)Cat. No: CM 83 94 2963 A C

Study on the impact ofliberalization of inward crossborder mail on the provision ofthe universal postal service andthe options for progressiveliberalization (Ed. 1995) Finalreport,Cat. No: CV-89-95-018-EN-C

Meeting universal serviceobligations in a competitivetelecommunications sector (Ed.1994)Cat. No: CV-83-94-757-EN-C

Competition and integration:Community merger control policy(Ed. 1994)Cat. No: CM-AR-94-057-EN-C

Growth, competitiveness, employ-ment: The challenges and waysforward into the 21st century:White paper (Ed. 1994)Cat. No: CM 82 94 529 xx C(xx=ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT)

Growth, competitiveness, employ-ment: The challenges and waysforward into the 21st century:White paper (Ed. 1993)-Volume 2Part CCat. No: CM-NF-93-0629 A C

The geographical dimension ofcompetition in the Europeansingle market (Ed. 1993)Cat. No: CV-78-93-136-EN-C

International transport by air,1993Cat. No: CA-28-96-001-xx-Cxx=EN, FR, DE

Les investissements dans lesindustries du charbon et de l'acierde la Communauté: Enquête 1992(Ed. 1993) - 9 languagesCat. No: CM 76 93 6733 A C

EG Wettbewerbsrecht undZulieferbeziehungen derAutomobilindustrie (Ed. 1992)Cat. No: CV-73-92-788-DE-C

Green Paper on the developmentof the single market for postalservices, 9 languagesCat. No: CD-NA-14- 858-EN-C

PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIALJOURNAL1st November 99 to31st January 2000

ARTICLES 85, 86 (RESTRICTIONSAND DISTORTIONS OF COMPETITIOBY UNDERTAKINGS)

25.01.2000

C 21 2000/C 021-0023Notification of a joint venture(Case COMP/E-2/37.769)Textwith EEA relevance

15.01.2000

C 12 2000/C 012-0010Notification of a joint venture(Case COMP/E-/37.711)Textwith EEA relevance

C 12 2000/C 012-0009Notification of an agreement(Case COMP/37.718 -EBN)Text with EEA relevance

13.01.2000

C 9 2000/C 009-0009Notification of a joint venture(Case COMP/E-/37.747)Textwith EEA relevance

08.01.2000

L 5 2000/L 005-0055Commission Decision of 20July 1999 relating to aproceeding under Article 82 ofthe EC Treaty and Article 54 ofthe EEA Agreement (CaseIV/36.888 - 1998 Football



World Cup)Text with EEArelevance (notified underdocument number C(1999)2295)

17.12.1999

C 63 1999/C363-0002Communication made pursuantto Article 19(3) of CouncilRegulation No 17 concerningrequest for negative clearanceor for exemption pursuant toArticle 81(3) of the ECTreaty(Case No 37.632 - UEFArule on integrity of the UEFAclub competitions:independence of clubsText withEEA relevance

08.12.1999

C 355 1999/C 355-0006Notification of a joint venture(Case COMP/E-3/37.654 -Shell/Statoil)Text with EEArelevance

06.12.1999

L 312 1999/L 312-0001Commission Decision of 15September 1999 relating to aproceeding under Article 81 ofthe EC Treaty (Case IV/36.539- British InteractiveBroadcasting/Open) (notifiedunder document numberC(1999/2935))

19.11.1999

C 331 1999/C 331-0003Notification of a joint venture(Case COMP/37.659/C 3 -Koninklijke Philips ElectronicsNV (Philips) and LGElectronics Inc. (LGE))Textwith EEA relevance

18.11.1999

C 330 1999/C 330-005Notification of an agreementbetween undertakings - CaseCOMP/37.652 -Telefónica/Sogecable/AVSIIText with EEA relevance

29.10.1999

C 311 1999/C 311-0004Notification of cooperationagreements (Case No IV/37.669- Mediterranean CableMaintenance Agreement)Textwith EEA relevance

27.10.1999

C 308 1999/C 308-0006Notification of joint ventureagreements (Case No IV/E-2/37.650)Text with EEArelevance

26.10.1999

L 275 1999/L 275-0017Commission Decision of 15September 1999 relating to aproceeding under Article 81 ofthe EC Treaty and Article 53 ofthe EEA Agreement (Case NoIV/36.748 - REIMS II)Textwith EEA relevance (notifiedunder document number C(19

21.10.1999

L 271 1999/L 271-0028Commission Decision of 8September 1999 relating to aproceeding under Article 81 ofthe EC Treaty (IV/34.010 -Nederlandse Vereniging vanBanken (1991 GSA agreement),IV/33.793 - NederlandsePostorderbond, IV/34.234 -Verenigde Nederlandse

16.10.1999

C 298 1999/C 298-0011Notification of joint ventureagreements (Case No IV/E-2/37.644)Text with EEArelevance

13.10.1999

C 292 1999/C 292-0005Notification of cooperationagreements (Case No IV/37.562- Eutelsat)Text with EEArelevance

08.10.1999

C 287 1999/C 287-0005Notification of cooperationagreements (Case No IV/37.648- ScottishTelecom)Text withEEA relevance

CONTROL OF CONCENTRATIONS /MERGER PROCEDURE

29.01.2000

C 27 2000/C 027-0020 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1774 -Deutsche BP/DaimlerChryslerAG/Union-Tank Eckstein)Textwith EEA relevance

C 27 2000/C 027-0019 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1633 - RWEUmwelt/Vivendi/BerlinerWasserbetriebe)Text with EEArelevance

27.01.2000

C 23 2000/C 023-0004 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1397 -Sanofi/Synthelabo)Text withEEA relevance

26.01.2000

C 22 2000/C 022-0011 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/JV.23 -Telefonica/PortugalTelecom/Medi Telecom)Textwith EEA relevance

25.01.2000

L 20 2000/L 020-0001Commission Decision of 9March 1999 relating to aproceeding under CouncilRegulation (EEC) No 4064/89(Case IV/M.1313 - DanishCrown/Vestjyske Slagterier)



(notified under documentnumber C(1999) 560)Text withEEA relevance

C 21 2000/C 021-0024 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1796 -Bayer/Lyondell)Text with EEArelevance

C 21 2000/C 021-0022 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1810 -VW/Europcar)Text with EEArelevance

C 21 2000/C 021-0026 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1765 - KKRAssociates/Siemens NixdorfRetail and BankingSystems)Text with EEArelevance

C 21 2000/C 021-0027 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/JV.29 -Lafarge/Readymix)Text withEEA relevance

C 21 2000/C 021-0026 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1717 -Siemens/Italtel)Text with EEArelevance

C 21 2000/C 021-0025Renotification of a previouslynotified concentration (CaseCOMP/JV.38 -KPN/BellSouth/E-Plus)Textwith EEA relevance

C 21 2000/C 021-0002 Opinionof the Advisory Committee onConcentrations given at the60th meeting on 25 February1999 concerning a preliminarydraft decision relating to Case

IV/M.1313 - DanishCrown/Vestjyske Slagterier

20.01.2000

C 16 2000/C 016-0004 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1538 -Dupont/Sabanci)Text with EEArelevance

C 16 2000/C 016-0003 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1822 -Mobil/JV Dissolution)Text withEEA relevance

C 16 2000/C 016-0005 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1597 -Castrol/Carless/JV)Text withEEA relevance

C 16 2000/C 016-0004 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1771 - SedgwickNobleLowndes/Woolwich)Text withEEA relevance

C 16 2000/C 016-0005 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1790 - DeutscheBank/BHS/Pago)Text withEEA relevance

19.01.2000

C 14 2000/C 014-0005Renotification of a previouslynotified concentration (CaseCOMP/M.1782 - AmericanHome Products/Warner-Lambert)Text with EEArelevance

C 14 2000/C 014-0006 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1741 - MCIWorldCom/Sprint)Text withEEA relevance

C 14 2000/C 014-0007 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1791 - UBSCapital/Vencap/Stiga)Text withEEA relevance

C 14 2000/C 014-0007 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1736 -ULAG/Carlyle/Andritz)Textwith EEA relevance

18.01.2000

C 13 2000/C 013-0003 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1803 -Electrabel/Epon)Text with EEArelevance

C 13 2000/C 013-0004 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1787 - DeutscheBahn/NS Groep/JV ServiceStores)Text with EEArelevance

C 13 2000/C 013-0002 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1801Neusiedler/American IsraeliPaper Mills/JV)Text with EEArelevance

15.01.2000

C 12 2000/C 012-0011 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/ECSC.1322 -Scholz/Loacker/SaarländischeRohprodukte)Text with EEArelevance

14.01.2000

C 11 2000/C 011-0004 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/JV.17 -Mannesmann/BellAtlantic/OPI)Text with EEArelevance



C 11 2000/C 011-0005 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1553 -FranceTelecom/Editel/Lince)Text with EEA relevance

C 11 2000/C 011-0005 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1681 - AKZONobel/Hoechst RousselVet)Text with EEA relevance

C 11 2000/C 011-0003 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1637 - DBInvestments/SPP/Öhman)Textwith EEA relevance

C 11 2000/C 011-0004 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1711 -Tyco/Siemens)Text with EEArelevance

C 11 2000/C 011-0003 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1623 - AlliedSignal/MTU)Text with EEArelevance

C 11 2000/C 011-0002 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1794 -Deutsche Post/Air ExpressInternational)Text with EEArelevance

C 11 2000/C 011-0006 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1768 -Schoyen/GoldmanSachs/Swebus)Text with EEArelevance

13.01.2000

C 9 2000/C 009-0012 Non-opposition to a notified

concentration (CaseCOMP/M.1571 - NewHolland/Case)Text with EEArelevance

C 9 2000/C 009-0008 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1701 - Gruner +Jahr/Dekra/Faircar)Text withEEA relevance

C 9 2000/C 009-0010 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration and napplicabilityof the Regulation to a notifiedoperation (Case COMP/M.1587- Dana/GKN)Text with EEArelevance

C 9 2000/C 009-0011 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1820 - BP/JVDissolution)Text with EEArelevance

12.01.2000

C 8 2000/C 008-0016 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1797 -Saab/Celsius)Text with EEArelevance

11.01.2000

C 7 2000/C 007-0002 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1728 -CVC/Torraspapel)Text withEEA relevance

C 7 2000/C 007-0006 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1782 -American HomeProducts/Warner-Lambert)Textwith EEA relevance

C 7 2000/C 007-0005 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/JV.37 -BSkyB/KirchPayTV)Text withEEA relevance

C 7 2000/C 007-0004 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/JV.30 - BVITelevision (Europe) Inc./SPEEuromovies InvestmentsInc./Europe MoviecoPartners)Text with EEArelevance

C 7 2000/C 007-0003 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1830 -Finalrealm/UnitedBiscuits)Text with EEArelevance

C 7 2000/C 007-0002 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1710 - IndustriKapital 1997 LtdMarmorandum)/NesteChemicals)Text with EEArelevance

C 7 2000/C 007-0007 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1825 - SuzukiMotor/Suzuki KG/Fafin)Textwith EEA relevance

08.01.2000

C 5 2000/C 005-0004 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/JV.38 -KPN/BellSouth/E-Plus)Textwith EEA relevance

C 5 2000/C 005-0007 Initiationof proceedings (CaseCOMP/M.1671 - DowChemical/Union Carbide)Textwith EEA relevance

C 5 2000/C 005-0005 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/JV.35 -Chemag/Beiselen/BayWa)Textwith EEA relevance

C 5 2000/C 005-0008 Initiationof proceedings (CaseCOMP/M.1663 -



Alcan/Alusuisse)Text withEEA relevance

C 5 2000/C 005-0009 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1640 -Aceralia/Ucin)Text with EEArelevance

C 5 2000/C 005-0008 Initiationof proceedings (CaseCOMP/M.1715 -Alcan/Pechiney)Text with EEArelevance

C 5 2000/C 005-0007 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1348 - ArcherDaniels Midland/Alfred C.ToepferInternational/Intrade)Text withEEA relevance

C 5 2000/C 005-0006 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/JV.36 - TXUEurope/EDF LondonInvestments)Text with EEArelevance

07.01.2000

C 4 2000/C 004-0008 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1786 - GeneralElectric Company/Thomson-CSF)Text with EEA relevance

C 4 2000/C 004-0009 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1677 -BT/LGTTelecom)Text withEEA relevance

C 4 2000/C 004-0010 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1740 - Heinz/UnitedBiscuits Frozen and ChilledFood)Text with EEA relevance

C 4 2000/C 004-0009 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1644 - Wienerberger/DSCB/Steinzeug)Text withEEA relevance

C 4 2000/C 004-0010 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1599 -Dupont/Teijin)Text with EEA relevance

28.12.1999

C 376 1999/C 376-0006 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/ECSC.1321 -VEBA/VIAG)Text with EEArelevance

C 376 1999/C 376-0005 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1816 -Churchill Insurance Group/NIGHoldings)Text with EEArelevance

C 376 1999/C 376-0004 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1821 -BellSouth/VRT (E-Plus))Textwith EEA relevance

22.12.1999

C 371 1999/C 371-0011 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1673 -VEBA/VIAG)Text with EEArelevance

C 371 1999/C 371-0010 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1778 -Freudenberg/Phoenix/JV)Textwith EEA relevance

C 371 1999/C 371-0009 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1817 -BellSouth/Vodafone (E-Plus))Text with EEA relevance

C 371 1999/C 371-0008 Re-notification of a previously

notified concentration (CaseCOMP/M.1683 - The Coca-Cola Company/Kar-Tess Group(Hellenic Bottling))Text withEEA

21.12.1999

C 369 1999/C 369-0024 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case OMP/JV.3- BT/Airtel)Text with EEArelevance

18.12.1999

C 365 1999/C 365-0002 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/JV.6 -Ericsson/Nokia/Psion)Text withEEA relevance

C 365 1999/C 365-0002 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/JV.26 -Freecom/Dangaard)Text withEEA relevance

17.12.1999

C 63 1999/C363-0006 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1800 -Marconi/Bosch PublicNetwork)Text with EEArelevance

C 63 1999/C363-0005Renotification of a previouslynotified concentration (CaseCOMP/M.1709 -Preussag/Babcock/Celsius)Textwith EEA relevance

C 63 1999/C363-0007 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1777 -CGU/Hibernian)Text with EEArelevance

16.12.1999

C 62 1999/C362-0005 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1807 -



FNAC/Coin/JV)Text with EEArelevance

15.12.1999

C 61 1999/C361-0005 Priornotification of a concentration(Case OMP/ECSC.1319 -VIAG (ASD)/Richardsons-Westgarth)Text with EEArelevance

14.12.1999

C 360 1999/C 360-0003 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1792 -Ahlström/CapMan/FoldingCarton Partners)Text with EEArelevance

11.12.1999

C 359 1999/C 359-0033Renotification of a previouslynotified concentration (CaseCOMP/M.1684 -Carrefour/Promodès)Text withEEA relevance

10.12.1999

C 358 1999/C 358-0007 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1761 - ToyotaMotor/Toyota France)Text withEEA relevance

C 358 1999/C 358-0007Initiation of proceedings (CaseCOMP/M.1636 - MMS/DASA-Astrium)Text with EEArelevance

09.12.1999

C 357 1999/C 357-0004 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1748 - IndustriKapital Limited/Superfos)Textwith EEA relevance

C 357 1999/C 357-0004 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1652 -

D'Ieteren/PGSI)Text with EEArelevance

C 357 1999/C 357-0005 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1702 - Vedior/SelectAppointments)Text with EEArelevance

C 357 1999/C 357-0006 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case IV/JV.21 -Skandia/Storebrand/Pohjola)Text with EEA relevance

C 357 1999/C 357-0012Corrigendum to prior notice ofa concentration (CaseCOMP/JV.32 -BT/Autostrade/BLU) (OJ C342 of 30 November 1999)

C 357 1999/C 357-0005 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1719 - Delta LloydVerzekeringsgroep/NutsOhra)Text with EEA relevance

C 357 1999/C 357-0006Renotification of a previouslynotified concentration (CaseCOMP/M.1716 - Gehe/HerbaChemosan Apotheker)Text withEEA relevance

08.12.1999

C 355 1999/C 355-0007 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1799 -BSCH/AC/CGD/Totta/CPP)Text with EEA relevance

07.12.1999

C 353 1999/C 353-0005 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1714 -Föreningssparbanken/FI-Holding/FIH)Text with EEArelevance

C 353 1999/C 353-0004 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1742 - SunChemical/TotalFina/Coates)Text with EEA relevance

04.12.1999

C 351 1999/C 351-0038 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1772 -Continental Teves/AutomotiveDistance Control)Text withEEA relevance

C 351 1999/C 351-0037 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1707 - Gilde Buy-Out Fund/Synbra)Text withEEA relevance

03.12.1999

C 347 1999/C 347-0007 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1784 - DelphiAutomotive Systems/LucasDiesel)Text with EEArelevance

C 347 1999/C 347-0007 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1596 -Accor/Blackstone/Colony/Vivendi)Text with EEA relevance

C 347 1999/C 347-0006 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1694 - EMC/DataGeneral)Text with EEArelevance

02.12.1999

C 345 1999/C 345-0008Renotification of a previouslynotified concentration (CaseCOMP/M.1671 - DOWChemical/Union Carbide)Textwith EEA relevance

C 345 1999/C 345-0007 Priornotification of a concentration



(Case COMP/M.1790 -DeutscheBank/BHS/PAGO)Text withEEA relevance

C 345 1999/C 345-0006 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1720 -Fortum/ElektrizitätswerkWesertal)Text with EEArelevance

01.12.1999

C 344 1999/C 344-0006 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1789 -Ina/LuK)Text with EEArelevance

C 344 1999/C 344-0007 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1779 - AngloAmerican/Tarmac)Text withEEA relevance

C 344 1999/C 344-0008 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1791 - UBSCapital/VenCap/Stiga)Textwith EEA relevance

30.11.1999

C 342 1999/C 342-0004 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/JV.32 -Granaria/Ültje/Intersnack/MayHolding)Text with EEArelevance

C 342 1999/C 342-0008 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/JV.33 -Hearst/VNU Magazine GroupInternational BV/VNU HearstRomania SRL)Text with EEArelevance

C 342 1999/C 342-0012 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1588 -Tyco/Raychem)Text with EEArelevance

C 342 1999/C 342-0012 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1643 - IBM/Sequent)

C 342 1999/C 342-0011 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1755 -CVC/Acordis)Text with EEArelevance

C 342 1999/C 342-0010 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/JV.27 -Microsoft/LibertyMedia/Telewest)Text with EEArelevance

C 342 1999/C 342-0009 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/JV.32 -BT/Autostrade/BLU)Text withEEA relevance

C 342 1999/C 342-0007 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1771 -Sedgwick NobleLowndes/Woolwich)Text withEEA relevance

C 342 1999/C 342-0006 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1787 -Deutsche Bahn/NS Groep/JVServiceStores)Text with EEArelevance

C 342 1999/C 342-0005 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1775 -Ingersoll-Rand/Dresser-Rand/Ingersoll-DresserPump)Text with EEA relevance

26.11.1999

C 339 1999/C 339-0013 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1767 -AT&T/IBM/Intesa)Text withEEA relevance


(Case COMP/M.1773 - NordicCapital/Trelleborg)Text withEEA relevance

C 339 1999/C 339-0011 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1675 -Ducros/Hero France)Text withEEA relevance

C 339 1999/C 339-0010 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/JV.29 -Lafarge/Readymix)Text withEEA relevance

C 339 1999/C 339-0009 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/JV.25 - TimeWarner/Sony/CDNow)Textwith EEA relevance

C 339 1999/C 339-0008 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1763 -Solutia/Viking Resins)Textwith EEA relevance

C 339 1999/C 339-0014 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1693 -Alcoa/Reynolds)Text with EEArelevance

25.11.1999

C 337 1999/C 337-0003 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1781 -Electrolux/Ericsson)Text withEEA relevance

24.11.1999

C 336 1999/C 336-0007 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1765 - KKRAssociates/Siemens NixdorfRetail and BankingSystems)Text with EEArelevance

C 336 1999/C 336-0008 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/JV.23 -Telefónica/Portugal



Telecom/Médi Telecom)Textwith EEA relevance

C 336 1999/C 336-0006 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1760 -Mannesmann/Orange)Text withEEA relevance

23.11.1999

C 335 1999/C 335-0003 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1403 -Astra/Zeneca)Text with EEArelevance

C 335 1999/C 335-0003 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1679 - FranceTelecom/STI/SRD)Text withEEA relevance

22.11.1999

C 332 1999/C 332-0014 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (CaseCOMP/M.1632 -Reckitt+Colman/Benckiser)Text with EEA relevance

C 332 1999/C 332-0013 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1764 -Skandinaviska EnskildaBanken/BfG Bank)Text withEEA relevance

C 332 1999/C 332-0012 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1712 -Generali/INA)Text with EEArelevance

C 332 1999/C 332-0013 Priornotification of a concentration(Case COMP/M.1717 -Siemens/Italtel)Text with EEArelevance

19.11.1999


(Case COMP/JV.31 -Hearst/Mondadori/HearstMondadori Editoriale Srl)Textwith EEA relevance

18.11.1999

C 330 1999/C 330-005 Priornotification of a concentration(Case No OMP/M.1759 -RMC/Rugby)Text with EEArelevance

17.11.1999

C 328 1999/C 328-0005 Priornotification of a concentration(Case No COMP/M.1728 -CVC/Torraspapel)Text withEEA relevance

C 328 1999/C 328-0006 Priornotification of a concentration(Case No COMP/M.1768 -Schoyen/GoldmanSachs/Swebus)Text with EEArelevance

C 328 1999/C 328-0007 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case NoCOMP/M.1581 -AT&T/Unisource/AUCS)Textwith EEA relevance

16.11.1999

C 327 1999/C 327-0004 Priornotification of a concentration(Case No COMP/M.1709 -Preussag/Babcock/Celsius)Textwith EEA relevance

13.11.1999

C 326 1999/C 326-0012 Priornotification of a concentration(Case No COMP/M.1744 -UPM-Kymmene/StoraEnso/Metsäliitto/JV)Text withEEA relevance

C 326 1999/C 326-0013 Priornotification of a concentration(Case No COMP/M.1735 -Seita/Tabacalera)Text withEEA relevance

C 326 1999/C 326-0014 Priornotification of a concentration(Case No COMP/M.1636 -MMS/DASA/Astrium)Textwith EEA relevance

C 326 1999/C 326-0011 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case NoCOMP/M.1708 - Tapis Saint-Maclou/Allied CarpetsGroup)Text with EEArelevance

12.11.1999

C 324 1999/C 324-0010 Priornotification of a concentration(Case No COMP/M.1739 -Iveco/Fraikin)Text with EEArelevance

C 324 1999/C 324-0010Initiation of proceedings (CaseNo COMP/M.1672 -Volvo/Scania)Text with EEArelevance

C 324 1999/C 324-0009Renotification of aconcentration (Case NoCOMP/M.1683 - The Coca-Cola Company/Kar-Tess Group(Hellenic Bottling))Text withEEA relevance

11.11.1999

C 323 1999/C 323-0007 Priornotification of a concentration(Case No COMP/JV.24 -Bertelsmann/Planeta/BOLSpain)Text with EEA relevance

C 323 1999/C 323-0009 Priornotification of a concentration(Case No COMP/M.1716 -Gehe/Herba ChemosanApotheker)Text with EEArelevance

C 323 1999/C 323-0010 Priornotification of a concentration(Case No COMP/M.1740 -Heinz/United Biscuits Frozen



and Chilled Foods)Text withEEA relevance

C 323 1999/C 323-0011 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case NoCOMP/M.1557 - EDF/LouisDreyfus)Text with EEArelevance

C 323 1999/C 323-0008 Priornotification of a concentration(Case No COMP/M.1700 -Avnet/Eurotronics)Text withEEA relevance

10.11.1999

C 322 1999/C 322-0005Initiation of proceedings (CaseNo COMP/M.1628 -Totalfina/Elf)Text with EEArelevance

09.11.1999

C 321 1999/C 321-0003 Priornotification of a concentration(Case No COMP/M.1671 -Dow Chemical/UnionCarbide)Text with EEArelevance

C 321 1999/C 321-0004 Priornotification of a concentration(Case No COMP/M.1650 -ACEA/Telefónica)Text withEEA relevance

C 321 1999/C 321-0005 Priornotification of a concentration(Case No COMP/M.1754 -Morgan Grenfell/Piaggio)Textwith EEA relevance

C 321 1999/C 321-0006 Priornotification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.1761 - ToyotaMotor/Toyota France)Text withEEA relevance

06.11.1999

C 319 1999/C 319-0006 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No

IV/M.1649 - Gefco/KNElan)Text with EEA relevance

C 319 1999/C 319-0007 Priornotification of a concentration(Case No COMP/JV.26 -FreeCom/Dangaard)Text withEEA relevance

05.11.1999

C 318 1999/C 318-0015 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case NoIV/JV.22 -Fujitsu/Siemens)Text with EEArelevance

04.11.1999

C 316 1999/C 316-0008 Priornotification of a concentration(Case No COMP/M.1732 -Sydkraft/HEW/Hansa EnergyTrading)Text with EEArelevance

C 316 1999/C 316-0009 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case NoIV/M.1689 -Nestlé/Pillsbury/Häagen-DazsUS)Text with EEA relevance

30.10.1999

C 313 1999/C 313-0007Withdrawal of notification of aconcentration (Case NoIV/M.1703 - PhelpsDodge/Asarco)Text with EEArelevance

C 313 1999/C 313-0006 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case NoIV/M.1654 - Telexis/EDS)Textwith EEA relevance

C 313 1999/C 313-0007 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case NoIV/M.1691 - Aegon/GuardianLife)Text with EEA relevance

C 313 1999/C 313-0006 Non-opposition to a notified

concentration (Case NoIV/M.1651 -Maersk/Sea-Land)Text with EEA relevance

C 313 1999/C 313-0005 Priornotification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.1710 - IndustriKapital Ltd(Marmorandum)/NesteChemicals)Text with EEArelevance

29.10.1999

C 311 1999/C 311-0005 Re-notification of a previouslynotified concentration (Case NoIV/M.1538 -DuPont/Sabanci)Text with EEArelevance

28.10.1999

C 309 1999/C 309-0003 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case NoIV/M.1669 - DeutscheTelekom/One2One)Text withEEA relevance

C 309 1999/C 309-0005 Priornotification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.1748 - IndustriKapital Ltd/Superfos A/S)Textwith EEA relevance

C 309 1999/C 309-0004 Priornotification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.1599 - E.I. duPont de Nemours andCompany/Teijin Limited)Textwith EEA relevance

C 309 1999/C 309-0003 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case NoIV/M.1682 -Ashland/Superfos)Text withEEA relevance

27.10.1999

C 308 1999/C 308-0005 Priornotification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.1667 -



BBL/BT/ISP-Belgium)Textwith EEA relevance

26.10.1999

C 307 1999/C 307-0004 Priornotification of a concentration(Case No IV/ECSC.1316 -RAG/Burton)Text with EEArelevance

23.10.1999

L 274 1999/L 274-0001Commission Decision of 3February 1999 relating toproceedings under CouncilRegulation (EEC) No 4064/89(Case No IV/M.1221 -Rewe/Meinl) [notified underdocument number C(1999)228]Text with EEA relevance.

C 306 1999/C 306-0040Opinion of the AdvisoryCommittee on concentrationsgiven at the 59th meeting on 19January 1999 concerning apreliminary draft Decisionrelating to Case IV/M.1221 -Rewe/Meinl

C 306 1999/C 306-0037 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case NoIV/M.1616 - Antonio DeSommer Champalimaud/BancoSantander CentralHispanoamericano)Text withEEA relevance

C 306 1999/C 306-0038 Priornotification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.1736 -UIAG/Carlyle/Andritz)Textwith EEA relevance

C 306 1999/C 306-0039 Priornotification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.1701 -DEKRA/Gruner+Jahr/FairCar)Text with EEA relevance

22.10.1999

C 305 1999/C 305-0002 Priornotification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.1723 - IllinoisTool Works/Premark)Text withEEA relevance

C 305 1999/C 305-0003 Priornotification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.1626 -SAirGroup/SAA)Text withEEA relevance

C 305 1999/C 305-0002 Priornotification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.1723 - IllinoisTool Works/Premark)Text withEEA relevance

C 305 1999/C 305-0003 Priornotification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.1626 -SAirGroup/SAA)Text withEEA relevance

21.10.1999

C 304 1999/C 304-0003 Priornotification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.1652 -D'Ieteren/PGSI)Text with EEArelevance

C 304 1999/C 304-0004 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case NoIV/M.1452 -Ford/Volvo)Textwith EEA relevance

19.10.1999

C 302 1999/C 302-0006 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case NoIV/JV.18 -Chronopost/Correos)Text withEEA relevance

16.10.1999

C 298 1999/C 298-0014 Priornotification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.1711 -Tyco/Siemens)Text with EEArelevance

C 298 1999/C 298-0013 Priornotification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.1684 -Carrefour/Promodès)Text withEEA relevance

C 298 1999/C 298-0012 Priornotification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.1703 - PhelpsDodge/Arsarco)Text with EEArelevance

C 298 1999/C 298-0010 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case NoIV/M.1526 - Ford/Kwik-Fit)Text with EEA relevance

15.10.1999

C 295 1999/C 295-0002 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case NoIV/M.1699 - TPGBacchus/Bally)Text with EEArelevance

C 295 1999/C 295-0002 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case NoIV/M.1430 -Vodafone/Airtouch)Text withEEA relevance

14.10.1999

C 294 1999/C 294-0004 Re-notification of a previouslynotified concentration (Case NoIV/M.1681 - AkzoNobel/Hoechst RousselVet)Text with EEA relevance

13.10.1999

C 292 1999/C 292-0004 Priornotification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.1719 - DeltaLloyd Verzekeringsgroep/NutsOhra)Text with EEA relevance

C 292 1999/C 292-0003 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case NoIV/M.1594 -Preussag/Babcock



Borsig)Text with EEArelevance

12.10.1999

C 290 1999/C 290-0002 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case NoIV/M.1534 - Pinault-Printemps-Redoute/Gucci)Text with EEArelevance

C 290 1999/C 290-0003 Priornotification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.1348 - ArcherDanielsMidland/InTrade/Alfred C.Toepfer International)Text withEEA relevance

09.10.1999

C 288 1999/C 288-0047Renotification of twopreviously notifiedconcentrations (Case NoIV/M.1663 - Alcan/Alusuisse)(Case No IV/M.1715 -Alcan/Pechiney)Text with EEArelevance

C 288 1999/C 288-0046 Priornotification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.1677 - BT/LGTTeleCom)Text with EEArelevance

08.10.1999

C 287 1999/C 287-0004 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case NoIV/M.1396 - AT&T/IBMGlobal Network)Text with EEArelevance

C 287 1999/C 287-0003 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case NoIV/M.1504 -NSR/VSN/CMI/IGO Plus)Textwith EEA relevance

C 287 1999/C 287-0004 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No

IV/M.1631 - SuezLyonnaise/Nalco)Text withEEA relevance

C 287 1999/C 287-0003 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case NoIV/M.1656 HuhtamäkiOYJ/Packaging Industries vanLeer)Text with EEA relevance

C 287 1999/C 287-0006 Priornotification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.1697 - TPGPartners II/Piaggio)Text withEEA relevance

07.10.1999

C 285 1999/C 285-0004Initiation of proceedings (CaseNo IV/M.1641 -Linde/AGA)Text with EEArelevance (

C 285 1999/C 285-0005 Priornotification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.1687 -Adecco/Olsten)Text with EEArelevance

C 285 1999/C 285-0006 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case NoIV/M.1661 - CréditLyonnais/Allianz-Euler/JV)Text with EEArelevance

06.10.1999

C 283 1999/C 283-0007 Priornotification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.1587 -Dana/GKN)Text with EEArelevance

05.10.1999

C 282 1999/C 282-0003 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case NoIV/M.1621 - Pakhoed/VanOmmeren (II))Text with EEArelevance

C 282 1999/C 282-0002 Priornotification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.1708 - TapisSaint-Maclou/Allied CarpetsGroup)Text with EEArelevance

C 282 1999/C 282-0007Corrigendum to the priornotification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.1681 - AkzoNobel/Hoechst Roussel Vet)(OJ C 272, 25.9.1999)

02.10.1999

C 280 1999/C 280-0040 Priornotification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.1538 -DuPont/Sabanci)Text with EEArelevance

01.10.1999

C 278 1999/C 278-0003 Priornotification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.1714 -FöreningsSparbanken/FI-Holding/FIH)Text with EEArelevance

C 278 1999/C 278-0004 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case NoIV/M.1653 -Buhrmann/CorporateExpress)Text with EEArelevance

C 278 1999/C 278-0004 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case NoIV/M.1598 - Hicks, Muse, Tate& Furst InvestmentPartners/HillsdownHoldings)Text with EEArelevance

C 278 1999/C 278-0005 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case NoIV/M.1559 - STN Atlas MarineElectronics/Sait RadioHolland)Text with EEArelevance



C 278 1999/C 278-0005 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case NoIV/M.1627 - CU Italia/BancaDelle Marche/JV)Text withEEA relevance

C 278 1999/C 278-0006 Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case NoIV/M.1670 - Geril/FCCConstruccion/Engil)Text withEEA relevance

STATE AID

29.01.2000

C 27 2000/C 027-0017Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88(ex Articles 92 and 93) of theEC Treaty - Cases where theCommission raises noobjectionsText with EEArelevance

C 27 2000/C 027-0013 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) of the EC Treaty,concerning measure C 56/99(ex N 668/97) - Measures topromote employment - Italy -Sicily: Article 11(1) ofRegional Law No 16 of 27 May1997Text with EEA relevance

15.01.2000

C 12 2000/C 012-0007Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88(ex Articles 92 and 93) of theEC Treaty - Cases where theCommission raises noobjections

C 12 2000/C 012-0006Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88(ex Articles 92 and 93) of theEC Treaty - Cases where the

Commission raises noobjectionsText with EEArelevance


12.01.2000

L 7 2000/L 007-0006Commission Decision of 28July 1999 on state aid grantedby the Federal Republic ofGermany to Brockhausen HolzeGmbHText with EEA relevance(notified under documentnumber C(1999) 2914)

08.01.2000


06.01.2000

C 3 2000/C 003-0005Authorisation of State aidpursuant to Article 61 of theEEA Agreement and Article1(3) of Protocol 3 to theSurveillance and CourtAgreement - EFTASurveillance Authority decisionnot to raise objections

C 3 2000/C 003-0004Authorisation of State aidpursuant to Article 61 of theEEA Agreement and Article1(3) of Protocol 3 to theSurveillance and CourtAgreement - EFTASurveillance Authority decisionnot to raise objections

31.12.1999



C 379 1999/C 379-0004 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) of the EC Treaty,concerning aid C 67/99 (ex NN148/98) in favour ofDampfkesselbau HohenturmGmbH, GermanyText withEEA relevance

24.12.1999


C 375 1999/C 375-0003 Stateaid - C 3/98 (ex NN 162/97) -AustriaText with EEArelevance

18.12.1999

L 326 1999/L 326-0057Commission Decision of 28July 1999 on State aid grantedby the Federal Republic ofGermany to KranbauEberswalde GmbHText withEEA relevance (notified underdocument number C(1999)2915)







C 365 1999/C 365-0003 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) of the EC Treaty,concerning the aid C 34/99 (exN 576/97) - Recapitalisation ofthe company Siciliane AcqueMinerali SrlText with EEArelevance

11.12.1999

C 359 1999/C 359-0027 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) of the EC Treatyconcerning aid C 71/99 (ex N258/98) - Germany -Investment in an on siteenvironmental sugar beetcleaning method

C 359 1999/C 359-0013 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) of the EC Treatyconcerning the aid measure C72/99 (ex NN 149/98) Sweden -Aid to Nya Holmlunds Livs AB

C 359 1999/C 359-0007 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) of the EC Treatyconcerning aid C 70/99 (ex N79/99) - France - Aid foradapting the vineyards inCharentes




04.12.1999

L 310 1999/L 310-0056Commission Decision of 28July 1999 on state aid grantedby the Federal Republic ofGermany to Everts ErfurtGmbHText with EEA relevance(notified under documentnumber C(1999) 3024)

C 351 1999/C 351-0020 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) of the EC Treaty,concerning the aid C 62/99 (exNN 140/98) - Capital increaseand other support measures infavour of RAIText with EEArelevance

C 351 1999/C 351-0012 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) of the ECTreaty,concerning aid C 69/99(ex NN 83/99) - training aidgranted to Sabena by theFlemish RegionText with EEArelevance

C 351 1999/C 351-0029 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) of the EC Treatyconcerning tax aid in the formof a 45 % tax credit in theProvince of Guipúzcoa (Spain)- C 53/99 ex NN 33/99 - and inthe Province of Vizcaya Spain)- C 54/99 ex NN 60/99Textwith EEA relevance



C 351 1999/C 351-0002 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) of the EC Treaty,



concerning the measure C58/99 (ex N 289/99) - Regionalaid map - Belgium (2000 to2006)Text with EEA relevance

27.11.1999

C 340 1999/C 340-0064 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) of the EC Treatyconcerning the aid C 25/99 (exN 702/98) Germany - CommonGuidelines of Berlin Land forthe use of the economicdevelopment fundText withEEA relevance

C 340 1999/C 340-0002Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88(ex Articles 92 and 93) of theECTreaty - Cases where theCommission raises noobjections


C 340 1999/C 340-0005Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88(ex Articles 92 and 93) of theECTreaty - Cases where theCommission raises noobjectionsText with EEArelevance


C 340 1999/C 340-0008 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article

88(2) of the EC Treaty,concerning the aid measure C47/99 (ex N 195/99) - Newdelimitation of assisted areas ofthe Joint Action ProgrammeImprovement of the regionaleconomic structure in Ge

C 340 1999/C 340-0052 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) of the EC Treatyconcerning aid C 51/99 (ex NN31/99) - Tax aid in the form of50 % tax relief on corporationtax for newly established firmsin the Autonomous Communityof Na

C 340 1999/C 340-0057 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) of the EC Treatyconcerning the aid C 60/99 (exNN 167/95) - Capital increasesand other ad hoc subsidies infavour of France 2 and France3Text with EEA relevance

22.11.1999


C 332 1999/C 332-0002 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) of the EC Treatyconcerning measure C 59/99(ex N 352/99) - France -Regional aid map 2000 to2006Text with EEA relevance

C 332 1999/C 332-0009 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) (ex Article 93(2)) of theEC Treaty, concerning the aidC 19/99 (ex N 125/98, N

126/98 and N 341/98) -Italy -Ilva Lamiere e Tubi SpA andSiderumbra SpAText with EEArelevance


13.11.1999

L 292 1999/L 292-0027Commission Decision of 8 July1999 on State aid granted byGermany to GröditzerStahlwerke GmbH and itssubsidiary Walzwerk BurgGmbH (notified underdocument number C(1999)2264)Text with EEArelevance(notified underdocument number C(1999)903)Text with

L 292 1999/L 292-0023Commission Decision of 30March 1999 on State aid whichFrance is planning to grant asdevelopment aid in the sale oftwo cruise vessels to be built byChantiersde l'Atlantique andoperated by RenaissanceFinancial in French Polynesia(notified under doc

L 292 1999/L 292-0001Commission Decision of 24February 1999 concerning Stateaid granted by Spain to DaewooElectronics ManufacturingEspaña SA (Demesa) (notifiedunder document numberC(1999) 498)Text with EEArelevance.

C 326 1999/C 326-0002 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) of the EC Treaty



concerning the measure C66/99 (ex N 245/99) - Regionalaid map - The Netherlands(2000 to 2006)Text with EEArelevance

C 326 1999/C 326-0008Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88(ex Articles 92 and 93) oftheEC Treaty - Cases where theCommission raises noobjectionsText with EEArelevance




30.10.1999

L 280 1999/L 280-0087Commission Decision of 20July 1999 on the state aidimplemented by theNetherlands for 633 Dutchservice stations located near theGerman borderText with EEArelevance (notified underdocument number C(1999)2539)

C 313 1999/C 313-0004 Stateaid - C 4/96 (ex N 360/95) -Italy


C 313 1999/C 313-0003 Stateaid - C 6/94 (ex NN 151/B/93) -Italy

C 313 1999/C 313-0002uthorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88(ex Articles 92 and 93) of theEC Treaty - Cases where theCommission raises noobjectionsText with EEArelevance

23.10.1999

L 274 1999/L 274-0037Commission Decision of 20July 1999 concerning presumedaid allegedly granted by Franceto Sécuripost [notified underdocument number C(1999)2537]Text with EEA relevance

L 274 1999/L 274-0023Commission Decision of 3February 1999 relating toproceedings under CouncilRegulation (EEC) No 4064/89(Case No IV/M.1221 -Rewe/Meinl) [notified underdocument number C(1999)228]Text with EEA relevance.

C 306 1999/C 306-0011 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) of the EC Treaty,concerning the aid C 65/99 (exN 20/99) - Netherlands -additional measuresaccompanying the reform of thepig sector

C 306 1999/C 306-0019 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) of the EC Treatyconcerning State aid C 63/99(ex NN 84/99), Germany,Impact of new electricity tax onfeed-in price underStromeinspeisungsgesetzTextwith EEA relevance

C 306 1999/C 306-0025 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) of the EC Treatyconcerning aid measure C61/99 (ex NN 153/96) - Stateaid to Deutsche Post AGTextwith EEA relevance

C 306 1999/C 306-0002 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) of the EC Treatyconcerning the C 64/99 (ex NN68/99) - Italy, State aid to theGruppo Tirrenia di NavigazionecompaniesText with EEArelevance



22.10.1999

L 272 1999/L 272-0016Commission Decision of 3February 1999 on State aidwhich Germany is planning to



introduce for GraphischerMaschinenbau GmbH,BerlinText with EEA relevance(notified under documentnumber C(1999) 327

L 272 1999/L 272-0016Commission Decision of 3February 1999 on State aidwhich Germany is planning tointroduce for GraphischerMaschinenbau GmbH,BerlinText with EEA relevance(notified under documentnumber C(1999) 327

21.10.1999

L 271 1999/L 271-0025Commission Decision of 25February 1998 concerning aidwhich Germany intends to grantunder the 26th framework planof the joint scheme forimproving regional economicstructures with a view topromoting teleworking (26.Rahmenplan der Gemei

19.10.1999

L 269 1999/L 269-0029Commission Decision of 3March 1999 concerning aidgranted by Italy to firmsaffected by the bankruptcy ofSirap SpAText with EEArelevance (notified underdocument number C(1999)584)

L 269 1999/L 269-0036Commission Decision of 26May 1999 on State aid grantedby Germany to Dow/BunaSOW Leuna OlefinverbundGmbH (BSL)Text with EEArelevance (notified underdocument number C(1999)1469)

16.10.1999

L 268 1999/L 268-0019Commission Decision of 1 July1999 on State aid which Spain

is planning to implement infavour of Brilén SAText withEEA relevance (notified underdocument number C(1999)2131)

L 268 1999/L 268-0025Commission Decision of 20July 1999 which Germany isplanning to implement forSaxonylon Textil GmbHTextwith EEA relevance (notifiedunder document numberC(1999) 2535)

C 298 1999/C 298-0002 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) of the EC Treatyconcerning aid C 29/99 (ex NN20/99) - France - Presumed aidfor Manufacture Corrézienne deVêtements (MCV) and plannedaid for the new companyMCVText with E



15.10.1999

L 267 1999/L 267-0051Commission Decision of 22December 1998 concerning aidgranted by Germany to Riedel-de Ha‰n AGText with EEArelevance (notified underdocument number C(1998)4566)

09.10.1999

L 263 1999/L 263-0019Commission Decision of 9December 1998 on State aidgranted by Germany toMaschinenfabrik Sangerhausen(Samag)Text with EEArelevance (notified underdocument number C(1998)4274)

C 288 1999/C 288-0024 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) of the EC Treatyconcerning aid C 40/99 (ex NN178/97) - Belgium - forVerlipack (Wallonia)Text withEEA relevance

C 288 1999/C 288-0037 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) of the EC Treatyconcerning the aid Cases C5/99 (ex N 728/97) - Italy - FiatMirafiori Carrozzeria, C 8/99(ex N 834/97) - Italy - FiatRivalta and C 9/99 (ex N838/97) - Italy - Fiat Mi


C 288 1999/C 288-0002Community Guidelines on Stateaid for rescuing andrestructuring firms in difficulty(Notice to Member Statesincluding proposals forappropriate measures)Text withEE relevance

C 288 1999/C 288-0019Authorisation for State aidpursuant to Articles 87 and 88(ex Articles 92 and 93) of theEC Treaty - Cases where the



Commission raises noobjections


C 288 1999/C 288-0039 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article6(5) of the CommissionDecision 2496/96/ECSC,ncerning aid C 35/99 (ex N106/99) - Italy - FerriereNordText with EEA relevance(Italy - Fiat MirafiorieccanicaText with


06.10.1999

L 260 1999/L 259-0019Commission Decision of 3March 1999 on the aid whichGermany has granted by way ofdevelopment assistance toIndonesia in connection withthe construction of twodredgers by VolkswerftStralsund and the sale of thedredgers to Pengerukan

L 260 1999/L 260-0019Commission Decision of 16December 1998 on German aidin favour of Addinol MineralölGmbH i.GV and the newlyestablished separate hive-offvehicle Addinol Lube OilGmbH & Co. KG (notifiedunder document number

C(1998) 3867)Text with EEArelevance

L 260 1999/L 260-0001Commission Decision of 25November 1998 on measuresby Germany to assistInfraLeuna Infrastruktur undService GmbH (notified underdocument number C(1998)3840)Text with EEA relevance.

L 260 1999/L 259-0023Commission Decision of 8 July1999 on the measure whichGermany is planning toimplement for Neue MaxhütteStahlwerke GmbH i.K.Textwith EEA relevance (notifiedunder document numberC(1999) 2269)

02.10.1999


C 280 1999/C 280-0003 Stateaid - FranceText with EEArelevance

C 280 1999/C 280-0008 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) (ex Article 93(2)) of theEC Treaty, concerning the aidC 13/99 (ex NN 78/98) -Germany - activities of theLandesentwicklungsgesellschaft Thüringen mbH in relation toindustrial p

C 280 1999/C 280-0012 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) of the EC Treaty,concerning aid C 44/99 - (exNN 23/99 (ex N 678/98) - Ewesupplementary measure (1998))

and (ex NN 79/99 (ex N 90/99)- Scheme of Assistance forWinter Fodder Losse

C 280 1999/C 280-0022 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) of the EC Treaty,concerning Aid No C 33/98 (exN 332/99 and C 33/98) - Spain:New capital contribution toBabcock Wilcox EspañaSAText with EEA relevance

C 280 1999/C 280-0024 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article88(2) of the EC Treaty,concerning the aid C 55/99 (exN 534/97) Netherlands -Modification of parafiscal taxesfinancing existing aid forcapacity reduction in the cattleslaughtering se

C 280 1999/C 280-0029 Stateaid - Invitation to submitcomments pursuant to Article6(5) of Commission DecisionNo 2496/96/ECSC, concerningthe aid C 57/99 (ex N 601/98) -Environmental aid to Sidmar,ECSC steelText with EEArelevance

COURT OF JUSTICE / COURTOF FIRST INSTANCE

DEVANT LE TRIBUNAL

Devant le Tribunal

Aff. T-112/99Métropole Télévision - M6 e.a.Télévision française 1 SA (TF1)/ CommissionAnnulation des art. 2 et 3 de ladécision de la Commission, du 3mars 1999, relative à une procédured'application de l'article 85 du traité



CE (IV/36.237 - TPS), en ce qu'ellene prévoit pas une attestationnégative ou, subsidiairement, uneexemption d'une durée supérieure àtrois ans concernant certaines desclauses contenues dans les accorsportant création de la société detélévision par satellite (TPS)

Aff. T-115/99Société Système EuropéenPromotion (SEP) / CommissionAnnulation de la décision de laCommission, du 8 mars 1999,rejetant la plainte déposée par larequérante contre Renault France,Renault Nederland et RenaultAutocenter et concernant desprétendues entraves auximportations parallèles desmandataires ainsi qu'une demandede retrait du bénéfice de l'exemptionpar catégorie aux contrats dedistribution de Renault résultant durèglement (CE) n. 1475/95

Aff. T-116/99Ilmailulaitos / CommissionAnnulation de la décision1999/198/CE de la Commission du10 février 1999 relative à uneprocédure d'application de l'art. 86du traité (IV/35.767 -Ilmailulaitos/Luftfartsverket)concernant le système de rabais surles redevances d'atterrissage dansles aéroports de Finlande

Aff. T-126/99Graphischer MaschinenbauGmbH / CommissionAnnulation partielle de la décisionK(1999) 327 endg. de laCommission, du 3 février 1999, (aff.Staatliche Beihilfe Nr. C 54/98 /exNN 101/98) en ce qu'elle limite àDM 4.435 mio. le montant de l'aideque le Land de Berlin peut accorderà la requérante

Aff. T-127/99Diputación Foral de Álava /CommissionAnnulation de la décision C(1999)498 final de la Commission, du 24février 1999, relative à l'aideaccordée par les autoritésespagnoles à la société DaewooElectronics Manufacturing EspañaSA (DEMESA) dans la mesure oùcelle-ci déclare aides incompatiblesavec le marché commun lesavantages fiscaux octroyés par la«Diputación Foral de Alava»

Aff. T-129/99Comunidad Autónoma del PaísVasco et GasteizkoIndustriaLurra SA / CommissionAnnulation de la décision C(1999)498 final de la Commission, du 24février 1999, relative à l'aideaccordée par les autoritésespagnoles à la société DaewooElectronics Manufacturing EspañaSA (DEMESA)

Aff. T-144/99Institut des mandataires agréésprès l'Office Européen desBrevets (IMA) / CommissionAnnulation partielle de la décisionde la Commission, du 7 avril 1999,relative à une procédured'application de l'article 81 CE(IV/36.147 : Code de conduite del'IMA (EPI), en ce qu'elle concerneles dispositions du code de conduitede l'Institut des mandataires agréésauprès de l'Office européen desbrevets (IMA) qui interdisent lapublicité comparative ainsi quecelles qui se réfèrent à l'offre deservices aux utilisateurs qui ont déjàété clients d'autres mandataires

Aff. T-148/99Daewo Electronics ManufacturingEspaña SA / CommissionAnnulation de la décision C(1999)498 final de la Commission, du 24février 1999, relative à l'aideaccordée par les autorités

espagnoles à la société DaewooElectronics Manufacturing EspañaSA (DEMESA)

Aff. T-152/99Hijos de Andrés Molina SA (enliquidación) / CommissionAnnulation de la décision de laCommission C(1999) 41 final, du 3février 1999, concernant l'aideaccordée par le gouvernementespagnol en faveur de Hijos deAndrés Molina SA (HAMSA)

Aff. T-161/99Navigazione Libera del Golfo SpA/ CommissionRecours en carence visant à faireconstater que la Commission s'estillégalement abstenue de prendreune décision suite à la plaintedéposée par la requérante sur lefondement des articles 92 et 93 dutraité CE (devenus articles 87 et 88CE) relative aux aides prétendumentaccordées par les autorités italiennesà l'entreprise publique CAREMAR

Aff. T-168/99Diputación Foral de Álava /CommissionAnnulation de la décision de laCommission (SG(99)D/2945), du 31mars 1999, d'engager la procédureprévue au paragraphe 2 de l'article93 du traité CE (devenu article 88CE) en ce qui concerne l'aideaccordée par les autoritésespagnoles à la société RamondinSA, dans la mesure où celle-ciconsidère aides incompatibles avecle marché commun les avantagesfiscaux octroyés par la «DiputaciónForal de Alava»

Aff. T-170/99RJB Mining plc / CommissionAnnulation d'une décision de laCommission, du 4 mai 1999,autorisant les interventionsfinancières de l'Espagne en faveurde l'industrie houillère en 1999



Aff. T-175/99UPS Europe SA / CommissionAnnulation de la décision de laCommission, du 10 juin 1999,rejetant la plainte introduite par larequérante sur le fondement del'article 82 CE et relative àl'acquisition partielle de DHL par laDeutsche Post AG

Aff. T-187/99AGRANA Zucker GmbH /CommissionAnnulation de la décision de laCommission 1999/342/CE, du 30septembre 1998, concernant lesprojets d'aide de l'Autriche à lasociété AGRANA Stärke-GmbHpour la création et la transformationd'installations de productiond'amidon [notifiée sous le numéroC(1998) 3023]

Aff. T-190/99Sniace SA / CommissionAnnulation de la décision de laCommission, du 28 octobre 1998,concernant l'aide d'Etat accordée parl'Espagne à la partie requérante,dans la mesure où elle qualified'aides d'Etat incompatibles avec lemarché commun les accords derééchelonnement de dettes passésavec les autorités de la sécuritésociale ainsi que les accords passésavec le FOGASA (fonds de laprotection des salariés en casd'insolvabilité de l'employeur) en cequ'ils prévoyaient un taux d'intérêtinférieur au taux du marché

Aff. T-195/99SIM 2 Multimedia SpA /CommissionAnnulation de la décision n.C(1999) 1524 de la Commission, du2 juin 1999, concernant l'aide d'Etataccordée par la région Friuli-Venezia et le gouvernement italien àSeleco SpA, dans la mesure où elleconsidère la requérantesolidairement responsable pour la

partie de l'aide non récupérée auprèsde Seleco

Aff. T-210/99Johan Henk Gankema /CommissionAnnulation de la décision de laCommission C(1999)2539 def, du20 juillet 1999, relative aux aidesaccordées par les Pays-Bas à 633stations-services situées dans larégion frontalière entre les Pays-Baset l'Allemagne

Aff. T-219/99British Airways plc / CommissionAnnulation de la décision de laCommission , du 14 juillet 1999,relative à une procédured'application de l'art. 82 du traité(IV/D-2/34.780 - Virgin / BritishAirways) concernant des accordsconclus entre British Airways et lesagences de voyage établissant dessystèmes de commission et d' autresavantages liés à l'augmentation duvolume de vente de tickets de laditecompagnie aérienne

Aff. T-224/99European Council of TransportUsers ASBL e.a. / CommissionAnnulation de la décision de laCommission n. SG(99) D/6480,communiquée aux partiesrequérantes par lettre du 6 août1999, de ne pas souleverd'objections, au sens de l'article 12,paragraphe 3, du règlement (CEE)n. 1017/68 du Conseil, et d'accorder,en conséquence, une exemption enfaveur de la version révisée du«Trans-Atlantic ConferenceAgreement» (TACA) (affaire n.IV/37.396 - TACA révisé et affairen. IV/37.527 - European ShippersCouncil (ESC) / TACA révisé)

Aff. T-227/99Kvaerner Warnow Werft GmbH /CommissionAnnulation de la décision de laCommission C 66/98, du 8 juillet

1999, concernant une aide accordéepar les autorités allemandes à laKvaerner Warnow Werft

Aff. T-228/99Westdeutsche LandesbankGirozentrale / CommissionAnnulation de la décisionK(1999)2265 de la Commission, du8 juillet 1999, concernant unemesure prise par les autoritésallemandes en faveur de la banqueWestdeutsche LandesbankGirozentrale («WestLB»)dans le cadre de l'absorption parcelle-ci de la«Wohnungsbauförderungsanstaltdes Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen»

Aff. T-231/99Colin Joynson / CommissionAnnulation de la décision de laCommission, du 16 juin 1999,relative à une procédured'application de l'article 81 du traitéCE (Affaire IV/36.081/F3 - Bass),accordant une exemptionindividuelle à durée déterminée auxcontrats types de louage («bauxtype») appliqués par la société Bassaux locataires de ses débits deboissons, ainsi qu'à l'obligationd'achat exclusif et à l'obligation denon-concurrence («beer tie») qu'ilscomportent

Aff. T-232/99Margaret Mary McKenzieCampbell / CommissionAnnulation de la décision de laCommission, du 16 juin 1999,relative à une procédured'application de l'article 81 du traitéCE (Affaire IV/35.992/F3 - Scottishand Newcastle), accordant uneexemption individuelle à duréedéterminée aux contrats types delouage («baux type») appliqués parla société Scottish and Newcastleaux locataires de ses débits deboissons, ainsi qu'à l'obligationd'achat exclusif et à l'obligation de



non-concurrence («beer tie») qu'ilscomportent

Aff. T-235/99Garage Bergsteyn BV /CommissionVoir l'affaire T-210/99

Aff. T-236/99Direcks Service Station BocholtzBV / CommissionVoir l'affaire T-210/99

Aff. T-237/99BP Nederland vof e.a. /CommissionVoir l'affaire T-210/99

Aff. T-238/99Paulina Catharina Petronella VanOppen-Veger / CommissionVoir l'affaire T-210/99

Aff. T-239/99J.J.L. Alofs / CommissionVoir l'affaire T-210/99

Aff. T-242/99Esso Nederland BV / CommissionVoir l'affaire T-210/99

Aff. T-244/99Sadam Abruzzo SpA /CommissionAnnulation de la décision de laCommission du 11 mai 1999 [C(1999) 1363 def.] relative aux aidesaccordées par l'Italie en faveur dusecteur du sucre - Aides octroyées àdeux fabriques de sucre debetteraves

Aff. T-245/99Sadam Castiglionese SpA /CommissionVoir l'affaire T-244/99

Aff. T-246/99Tirrenia di Navigazione SpA e.a. /CommissionAnnulation de la décision de laCommission, du 6 août 1999,concernant le système d'aides

accordées par les autorités italiennesaux entreprises de transportmaritime du groupe Tirrenia diNavigazione SpA

Aff. T-248/99Autobedrijf Diepenmaat vof /CommissionVoir l'affaire T-210/99

Aff. T-249/99Gebr. Jongste BV / CommissionVoir l'affaire T-210/99Aff. T-250/99Shell Nederland Verkoop-maatschappij BV / CommissionVoir l'affaire T-210/99

Aff. T-251/99Texaco Nederland BV e.a. /CommissionVoir l'affaire T-210/99

Aff. T-252/99Total Nederland NV et FinaNederland BV / CommissionVoir l'affaire T-210/99

Aff. T-253/99Oliehandel Van den Belt BV /CommissionVoir l'affaire T-210/99

Aff. T-254/99Maja Srl / CommissionAnnulation de la décision de laCommission, du 5 août 1999,portant suppression de l'aideaccordée à la requérante pour lamodernisation d'une unité deproduction aquicole à Contarina(Veneto) dans le cadre du règlement(CEE) n. 4028/86 du Conseil, du 18décembre 1986, relatif à des actionscommunautaires pour l'améliorationet l'adaptation des structures dusecteur de la pêche et del'aquaculture

Aff. T-256/99Fédération nationaled'agriculture biologique desrégions de France / Conseil

Annulation du règlement (CE) n.1804/1999 du Conseil du 19 juillet1999 modifiant, pour y inclure lesproductions animales, le règlement(CEE) n. 2092/91 concernant lemode de production biologique deproduits agricoles et sa présentationsur les produits agricoles et lesdenrées alimentaires

Aff. T-258/99Makro ZelfbedieningsgroothandelCV / CommissionVoir l'affaire T-210/99

Aff. T-259/99Tankstation Jagt BV /CommissionVoir l'affaire T-210/99

Aff. T-262/99Anthony Goldstein / CommissionRecours en indemnité visant àobtenir réparation du préjudiceprétendument subi par le requérantsuite au défaut de la part de laCommission d'avoir fourni, enapplication de l'article 10 CE (exarticle 5) et conformément à laCommunication relative à lacoopération entre la Commission etles juridictions nationales pourl'application des articles 85 et 86 dutraité CEE, certains renseignementsdemandés par la juridictionnationale saisie par le requérant

Aff. T-263/99Autobedrijf Chr. Kerres BV /CommissionVoir l'affaire T-210/99

Aff. T-264/99Demarol BV / CommissionVoir l'affaire T-210/99

Aff. T-265/99Algemene Service- enVerkoopmaatschappij ArnhemsePoort BV / CommissionVoir l'affaire T-210/99



Aff. T-267/99Grooters Rekken BV e.a. /CommissionVoir l'affaire T-210/99

Aff. T-269/99Diputación Foral de Gipuzkoa /CommissionAnnulation de la décision de laCommission, (SG/99/D/6873), du17 août 1999, d'engager laprocédure prévue au paragraphe 2de l'article 88 CE en ce qui concerneles aides fiscales à l'investissementoctroyées par la «Diputación Foralde Gipuzkoa» sous forme d'uncrédit d'impôt de 45 %

Aff. T-271/99Diputación Foral de Alava /CommissionAnnulation de la décision de laCommission (SG/99/D/6873), du 17août 1999, d'engager la procédureprévue au paragraphe 2 de l'article88 CE en ce qui concerne les aidesfiscales à l'investissement octroyéespar la «Diputación Foral de Alava»sous forme d'un crédit d'impôt de 45%

Aff. T-272/99Diputación Foral de Bizkaia /CommissionAnnulation de la décision de laCommission (SG/99/D/6871), du 17août 1999, d'engager la procédureprévue au paragraphe 2 de l'article88 CE en ce qui concerne les aidesfiscales à l'investissement octroyéespar la «Diputación Foral deBizkaia» et par la «Diputación Foralde Gipuzkoa» sous forme d'uncrédit d'impôt de 45 %

Aff. T-273/99Autoservice J. van Deursen BV /CommissionAnnulation de la décision de laCommission C(1999)2539 def, du20 juillet 1999, relative aux aidesaccordées par les Pays-Bas à 633stations-services situées dans la

région frontalière entre les Pays-Baset l'Allemagne

Aff. T-274/99Self Service Station Borne BV /CommissionVoir l'affaire T-273/99

Aff. T-275/99Self Service de Bleek BV /CommissionVoir l'affaire T-273/99

Aff. T-276/99Self Service Station HasselerbaanBV / CommissionVoir l'affaire T-273/99

Aff. T-277/99Self Service Station Weghorst BV/ CommissionVoir l'affaire T-273/99

Aff. T-278/99Shell Hengelo Zuid BV /CommissionVoir l'affaire T-273/99

Aff. T-279/99De Haan Minerale Oliën BV /CommissionVoir l'affaire T-273/99

Aff. T-280/99Van Gelder Aardolie BV /CommissionVoir l'affaire T-273/99

Aff. T-281/99Visser's Oliehandel Horst BV /CommissionVoir l'affaire T-273/99

Aff. T-282/99Visser's Tankstations BV /CommissionVoir l'affaire T-273/99

Aff. T-283/99Vlutters Handelsonderneming BV/ CommissionVoir l'affaire T-273/99

Aff. T-284/99Vlutters Kapitein BV /CommissionVoir l'affaire T-273/99

Aff. T-285/99Maria Gerardus WilhelmusRuypers / CommissionVoir l'affaire T-273/99

Aff. T-286/99Tankstation en AutomobielbedrijfTromp CV / CommissionVoir l'affaire T-273/99

Aff. T-287/99Autobedrijf G. Nelissen St.Geertruid vof / CommissionVoir l'affaire T-273/99

Aff. T-288/99Evers vof / CommissionVoir l'affaire T-273/99

Aff. T-289/99Heiliger vof / CommissionVoir l'affaire T-273/99

Aff. T-290/99Autobedrijf Ueffing / CommissionVoir l'affaire T-273/99

Aff. T-291/99Autobedrijf Vruggink /CommissionVoir l'affaire T-273/99

Aff. T-292/99Bouw- en Handelsonderneming J.Peeters BV / CommissionVoir l'affaire T-273/99

Aff. T-293/99Brand Oil Service Stations BV /CommissionVoir l'affaire T-273/99

Aff. T-294/99Gebr. Derks Beers BV /CommissionVoir l'affaire T-273/99



Aff. T-295/99Diesel Oil Company BV /CommissionVoir l'affaire T-273/99

Aff. T-296/99Driessen Oosterbeek BV /CommissionVoir l'affaire T-273/99

Aff. T-297/99Emos BV / CommissionVoir l'affaire T-273/99

Aff. T-298/99Firma Erkens Servicestation enVerhuurbedrijf vof / CommissionVoir l'affaire T-273/99

Aff. T-299/99Firma Fieten / CommissionVoir l'affaire T-273/99

Aff. T-300/99Firma Reuvekamp vof /CommissionVoir l'affaire T-273/99

Aff. T-301/99Dirk Adrianus Gaikhorst /CommissionVoir l'affaire T-273/99

Aff. T-302/99Haagmans Taxicentrale voorValkenburg e.o. BV / CommissionVoir l'affaire T-273/99

Aff. T-303/99Hoogendijk ATW BV /CommissionVoir l'affaire T-273/99

Aff. T-304/99Oliehandel Kuster BV /CommissionVoir l'affaire T-273/99

Aff. T-305/99OK Nederland BV / CommissionVoir l'affaire T-273/99

Aff. T-306/99Oliecentrum Nederland BV /CommissionVoir l'affaire T-273/99

Aff. T-307/99Oliecentrum Strijbos BV /CommissionVoir l'affaire T-273/99

Aff. T-308/99H. Peeters Service BV /CommissionVoir l'affaire T-273/99Aff. T-309/99Snijders Olie BV / CommissionVoir l'affaire T-273/99

Aff. T-310/99Strijbos en zoon BV / CommissionVoir l'affaire T-273/99

Aff. T-311/99Tankstation Haarhuis BV /CommissionVoir l'affaire T-273/99

Aff. T-312/99Technische Handelsondernemingvan Dooren BV / CommissionVoir l'affaire T-273/99

Aff. T-313/99Veka BV / CommissionVoir l'affaire T-273/99

Aff. T-314/99Weghorst-Oliko BV / CommissionVoir l'affaire T-273/99

Aff. T-315/99J.H.Th. Verlinden / CommissionVoir l'affaire T-273/99

Aff. T-316/99Theresia Lucia Pierik-Bomers /CommissionVoir l'affaire T-273/99

DEVANT LA COUR

Aff. C-261/99Commission / FranceManquement d'Etat - Défaut d'avoiradopté dans le délai imparti lesmesures nécessaires pour récupérerauprès de leur bénéficiaire,«Nouvelles Filatures Lainière deRoubaix», les aides déclaréesillégales et incompatibles avec lemarché commun par la décision dela Commission du 4 novembre 1998

Aff. C-275/99Adidas Sarragan France SARLet Directeur des services fiscauxdu Bas-RhinPréjudicielle - Tribunal administratifde Strasbourg - Validité de ladécision 89/487/CEE du Conseil, du28 juillet 1989, autorisant laRépublique française à appliquerune mesure dérogatoire à l'art. 17,par. 6, deuxième alinéa, de lasixième directive 77/388/CEE enmatière d'harmonisation deslégislations des Etats membresrelatives aux taxes sur le chiffred'affaires - Principe deproportionnalité

Aff. C-276/99Allemagne / CommissionAnnulation de la décisionK(1999)1123 final dans uneprocédure au titre de l'art. 88 CAconcernant une aide d'Etat del'Allemagne en faveur de NeueMaxhütte Stahlwerke AG -Modalités de la répétition d'une aideincompatible avec le marchécommun - Obligation d'étendre lespoursuites judiciaires au montanttotal de l'aide à rembourser, àl'exclusion d'une poursuite «pour leprincipe» - Obligation de combattreune décision de sursis du jugenational en attendant une décisiondu juge communautaire



Aff.jtes. C-280/99 P, C-281/99 P etC-282/99 PMoccia Irme SpA e.a. /Commission e.a.Pourvoi contre l'arrêt du Tribunal(troisième chambre élargie) , rendule 12 mai 1999, dans les affairesjointes T-164/96, T-165/96, T-166/96, T-167/96, T-122/97 et T-130/97 opposant Moccia Irme SpAe.a. à la Commission - Refusd'annuler la décision de laCommission C(96) 2385 def., du 30juillet 1996, déclarant incompatibleavec le marché commun les aidesd'Etat que le gouvernement italienprojette d'accorder à certainesentreprises, dans le cadre de larestructuration du secteursidérurgique

Aff. C-302/99 PCommission/Télévision française 1 SA (TF1)FrancePourvoi contre l'arrêt du Tribunal(troisième chambre élargie), rendule 3 juin 1999, dans l'affaire T-17/96opposant Télevision française 1 SAà la Commission, en ce que leTribunal a jugé recevable un recoursen carence dirigé contre l'abstentionde la Commission d'agir au titre del'art. 90 du traité CE (devenu art. 86CE)

Aff. C-308/99 PFrance et Télévision française 1SA (TF1) CommissionPourvoi contre l'arrêt du Tribunal(troisième chambre élargie), rendule 3 juin 1999, dans l'affaire T-17/96opposant Télévision française 1 SA(TF1) à la Commission, en ce que leTribunal a jugé recevable un recoursen carence dirigé contre l'abstentionde la Commission d'agir au titre del'art. 90 du traité CE (devenu art. 86CE) et en ce que le Tribunal acondamné la France aux dépensexposés en raison de sonintervention par TF1

Aff. C-309/99J.C.J. WoutersRaad van de Balies van deEuropese GemeenschapJ.W. Savelbergh et PriceWaterhouse BelastingadviseursBV et Algemene Raad van deNederlandse Orde van AdvocatenPréjudicielle - Nederlandse Raadvan State - Interprétation des art. 85,86 et 90 du traité CE (devenus art.81, 82 et 86 CE) - Notions d'«association d'entreprises» et«entreprise» (exploitant uneposition dominante) - Législationnationale organisant le barreau enorganisme de droit public avecpouvoir d'établir des règles dedéontologie - Décision du barreauainsi organisé interdisant auxavocats de s'associer avec desexperts comptables («accountants»)- Interprétation des art. 52 à 58 dutraité CE (devenus art. 43 à 48 CE)(liberté d'établissement) et 59 à 66du traité CE (devenus art. 49 à 55CE) (libre prestation de services)

Aff. C-318/99Italie / CommissionAnnulation de la décision de laCommission du 11 mai 1999 [C(1999) 1363 def.] relative aux aidesaccordées par l'Italie en faveur dusecteur du sucre - Aides octroyées àdeux fabriques de sucre debetteraves

Aff. C-321/99 PAssociação dos Refinadores deAçúcar Portugueses (ARAP) e.a.et Commission Portugal DAI -Sociedade de DesenvolvimentoAgro-Industrial SAPourvoi contre l'arrêt du Tribunal(quatrième chambre élargie), rendule 17 juin 1999, dans l'affaire T-82/96 opposant Associação dosRefinadores de Açúcar Portugueses(ARAP) e.a. à la Commission -Annulation de la décision de laCommission, du 19 mars 1996,refusant d'ouvrir une procédure au

titre de l'art. 93, par. 3, du traité CE(devenu art. 88, par.3, CE) suite àune plainte des requérants relative àune aide accordée par legouvernement portugais dans lesecteur du sucre, ainsi que de ladécision de la Commission, du 11janvier 1996, autorisant l'aide enquestion

Aff. C-328/99Italie / CommissionAnnulation partielle d'une décisionde la Commission, du 2 juin 1999,relative à une aide d'Etat concédéepar l'Italie à la société Seleco SpA

Aff. C-334/99Allemagne / CommissionAnnulation de la décisionK(99)2264 endg. de la Commission,du 8 juillet 1999, relative aux aidesaccordées par le gouvernementallemand à l'entreprise GröditzerStahlwerke GmbH et à sa filialeWalzwerk Burg GmbH

Aff. C-337/99Commission / BelgiqueManquement d'Etat - Défaut d'avoirtransposé, dans le délai prévu, l'art.4 bis, par. 4, de la directive90/388/CEE de la Commission, du28 juin 1990, relative à laconcurrence dans les marchés desservices de télécommunication, telleque modifiée par la directive96/19/CE de la Commission, du 13mars 1996 - Réalisation de la pleineconcurrence sur le marché destélécommunications

Aff. C-340/99TNT Traco SpA et Poste ItalianeSpA Michele Carbonne e.a.Préjudicielle - Tribunale di Genova- Concurrence - Compatibilité avecles art. 86 et 90 du traité CE(devenus art. 82 et 86 CE) d'uneréglementation nationale soumettantla prestation des services de courrier



exprès par les entités n'ayant pas lagestion exlusive des servicesuniversels au paiement de droitspostaux normalement appliqués auxservices universels classiques -Attribution des bénéfices découlantdu paiement desdits droits à l'entitéchargée de la gestion des servicesuniversels

Aff. C-345/99Commission / FranceManquement d'Etat - Art. 17, par. 2,de la directive 77/388/CEE :Sixième directive du Conseil, du 17mai 1977, en matièred'harmonisation des législations desEtats membres relatives aux taxessur le chiffre d'affaires - Systèmecommun de taxe sur la valeurajoutée : assiette uniforme -Déductibilité de la taxe grevantl'acquisition de véhicules utiliséspour les besoins d'opérations taxées- Limitation aux véhicules affectés àl'enseignement de la conduite defaçon exclusive

Aff. C-364/99 P(R)DSR-Senator Lines GmbH /Commission e.a.Pourvoi formé contre l'ordonnanceen référé du Tribunal (Président) du21 juillet 1999, DSR-SenatorLines/Commission (T-191/98 R) -Rejet de la demande du requérant desurseoir à l'exécution de la décisionde la Commission, du 16 septembre1998, relative à la procédured'application des art. 85 et 86 dutraité CE (devenus art. 81 et 82 CE)(affaire n. IV/35.134 - TransAtlantic Conference Agreement)

Aff. C-376/99Allemagne / CommissionAnnulation de la décisionK(99)2265 de la Commission du 8juillet 1999 concernantune mesure de la Républiquefédérale d'Allemagne en faveur dela banque WestdeutscheLandesbank Girozentrale

(«WestLB») - Absorption de la«Wohnungsbauförderungsanstaltdes Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen»par la WestLB - Rémunération del'augmentation des fonds propres enrésultant - Aide d'Etat

Aff. C-382/99Pays-Bas / CommissionAnnulation de la décisionC(1999)2536 déf. de la Commissionconcernant les aides accordées parles autorités néerlandaises à 633stations-service situées dans la zonefrontalière avec l'Allemagne -Application prétendument erronéede la communication de laCommission concernant les aides«de minimis»

Aff. C-391/99Portugal / CommissionAnnulation de la décision C (1999)2406 final de la Commission du 20juillet 1999 relative à une procédureau titre de l'art. 21, du règlement(CEE) n. 4064 du Conseil, du 21décembre 1989, relatif au contrôledes opérations de concentrationentre entreprises (Proc. IV/M. 1616- A. Champalimaud/BSCH)

Aff.jtes C-396/99 et C-397/99Commission / GrèceManquement d'Etat - Défaut d'avoirtransposé, dans le délai prévu, l'art.2, par. 1, de la directive 96/2/CE dela Commission, du 16 janvier 1996,modifiant la directive 90/388/CEEen ce qui concerne lescommunications mobiles etpersonnelles, en combinaison avecl'art. 3a, par. 2 et 3 de la directive90/388/CEE de la Commission, du28 juin 1990, relative à laconcurrence dans les marchés desservices de télécommunication, telleque modifiée par la directive96/2/CE

Aff. C-400/99Italie / CommissionAnnulation de la lettre de laCommission SG (99) D 6463, du 6août 1999, relative aucommencement d'une procédured'enquête formelle sur les aidesoctroyées par la Républiqueitalienne à des entreprises duGruppo Tirrenia di Navigazione

Aff. C-427/99 PRJB Mining plc / CommissionPourvoi formé contre l'arrêt duTribunal (première chambre élargie)du 9 septembre 1999, RJB Mining /Commission (T-110/98) rejetant, ence qu'il se fondait sur deux moyensdéterminés, un recours enannulation d'une décision de laCommission portant sur desinterventions financières del'Allemagne en faveur de l'industriehouillière en 1997

Aff. C-429/99Commission / PortugalManquement d'Etat - Art. 2, par. 4,2., de la directive 90/388/CEE de laCommission, du 28 juin 1990,relative a la concurrence dans lesmarchés des services detélécommunication, tel que modifiépar la directive 96/19/CE de laCommission, du 13 mars 1996 -Interdiction du service «call back»international - Délai supplémentaireaccordé au Portugal pour l'abolitiondes droits exclusifs de PortugalTelecom en ce qui concerne laprestation de services de téléphonievocale - 97/310/CE : Décision de laCommission du 12 février 1997concernant l'octroi au Portugal dedélais supplémentaires pour la miseen oeuvre des directives90/388/CEE et 96/2/CE en ce quiconcerne la pleine concurrence dansles marchés des télécommunications(Texte présentant de l'intérêt pourl'EEE)



Aff. C-462/99Connect Austria Gesellschaft fürTelekommunikation GmbH etTelekom-Control-KommissionMobilkom Austria AGPréjudicielle -Verwaltungsgerichtshof -Interprétation de l'art. 5 bis, par. 3,de la directive 90/387/CEE duConseil, du 28 juin 1990, relative àl'établissement du marché intérieurdes services de télécommunicationpar la mise en oeuvre de lafourniture d'un réseau ouvert detélécommunication, telle quemodifiée par la directive 97/51/CEdu Parlement européen et duConseil du 6 octobre 1997 - Pourvoidevant une instance indépendantecontre les décisions de l'autoritéréglementaire - Effet direct -Interprétation de l'art. 86 du traitéCE (devenu article 82 CE), de l'art.90 du traité CE (devenu art. 86 CE),de l'art. 2 de la directive 96/2/CE dela Commission, du 16 janvier 1996,modifiant la directive 90/388/CEEen ce qui concerne lescommunications mobiles etpersonnelles, et des art. 9 et 11 de ladirective 97/13/CE du Parlementeuropéen et du Conseil du 10 avril1997 relative à un cadre communpour les autorisations générales etles licences individuelles dans lesecteur des services detélécommunications - Législationnationale en matière d'attribution defréquences dans la bande 1800MHZ

Aff. C-480/99 PGerry Plant e.a. /CommissionSouth Wales Small MinesAssociationPourvoi formé contre l'ordonnancedu Tribunal de première instance(deuxième chambre) du 29septembre 1999, J.G. Evans e.a. /Commission (T-148/98 et T-162/98), par laquelle le Tribunal arejeté comme irrecevables desrecours visant à l'annulation d'unedécision de la Commission, du 30juillet 1998 (affaire IV/E-3/SWSMA), rejetant les plaintesdéposées par les requérants contre leCentral Electricity GeneratingBoard (CEGB) et British Coal,relatives à une prétendue ententeconcernant les prix de vente ducharbon destiné à la productiond'électricité

Aff. C-482/99France / CommissionAnnulation de la décisionC(1999)3148 final de laCommission concernant les aidesaccordées par la France àl'entreprise Stardust Marine

Aff. C-497/99 PIrish Sugar plc / CommissionPourvoi formé contre l'arrêt duTribunal de première instance(troisième chambre) du 7 octobre1999, Irish Sugar plc / Commission(T-228/97) - Annulation de ladécision de la Commission, du 14mai 1997, relative à une procédured'application de l'art. 86 du traité CE

(devenu art. 82 CE) (IV/34.621,35.059/F-3 - Irish Sugar plc)

Aff. C-499/99Commission / EspagneManquement d'Etat - Défaut des'être conformé aux décisions91/1/CEE de la Commission, du 20décembre 1989, concernant les aidesaccordées en Espagne par legouvernement central et plusieursgouvernements automomes àMAGEFESA, producteurd'ustensiles de cuisine en acierinoxydable et de petits appareilsélectriques et C(1998)3211 final dela Commission, du 14 octobre 1998,relative à une aide accordée auxentreprises du groupe MAGEFESA

COMPETITION DG'S ADDRESSON THE WORLD WIDE WEB

http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg04/index_en.htm

COMING UP

Competition Policy Newsletter 2000- June -

European Community CompetitionPolicy - 1999

XXIX Report on CompetitionPolicy 1999



Cases covered in this issueAnti-Trust Rules

13 Agreement to approve energy efficiency of washing machines15 Carel de producteurs de tubes d'aciers17 FEG - TU

Mergers19 Airtours/First Choice20 Exxon/Mobil20 BP Amoco/Atlantic Richfield21 Telia/Telenor21 Sanitec/Sphinx21 Honeywell/Alliedsignal22 Air Liquide/BOC22 Linde/AGA22 Totalfina/Elf Aquitaine22 Onex/Air Canada/Canadian Airlines22 Volvo/Scania23 Alcan/Alusuisse23 Alcoa/Reynolds23 MMS/DASA/Astrium23 Dow Chemical/Union Carbide24 Pakhoed/Van Ommeren24 EDF/Louis Dreyfus24 New Halland/Case24 Akzo Nobel/Hoechst25 Fujitsu/Siemens25 Deutsche Post/Trans-o-flex26 KLM/Martinair27 BBL/BT/ISP Belgium28 Incorrect or misleading information in competition procedures30 Freecom/Dangaard Holding31 BOL Spain/Bertelsmann/Planeta Corporación31 Cdnow/Time Warner/Sony32 Hearst Mondadori Editoriale

State Aid33 Regional aid35 Rockwool Peninsular S.A.35 Marina di Stabia s.p.a.36 Benfil s.r.l.36 Tessival s.r.l.

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