ALFEO D. VIVAS, ON HIS BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF THE SHAREHOLDERS OF EUROCREDIT COMMUNITY BANK, PETITIONER, vs. THE MONETARY BOARD OF THE BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS AND THE PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.The Case: This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a status quo ante order or writ of preliminary injunction ordering the respondents to desist from closing EuroCredit Community Bank, Incorporated (ECBI) and from pursuing the receivership thereof. The petition likewise prays that the management and operation of ECBI be restored to its Board of Directors (BOD) and its officers.FACTS: The Rural Bank of Faire, Incorporated (RBFI) was a duly registered rural banking institution. Record shows that the corporate life of RBFI expired on May 31, 2005.Notwithstanding, petitioner Alfeo D. Vivas and his principals acquired the controlling interest in RBFI sometime in January 2006. At the initiative of Vivas and the new management team, an internal audit was conducted on RBFI and the results highlighted the dismal operation of the rural bank. On December 8, 2006, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas issued the Certificate of Authority extending the corporate life of RBFI for another 50 years. The BSP also approved the change of its corporate name to EuroCredit Community Bank, Incorporated.Pursuant to Section 28 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7653, otherwise known as The New Central Bank Act, the Integrated Supervision Department II of the BSP conducted a general examination on ECBI. Sometime in April 2008, the examiners from the Department of Loans and Credit of the BSP arrived at the ECBI and cancelled the rediscounting line of the bank. Vivas appealed the cancellation to BSP. Thereafter, the Monetary Board issued a resolution placing ECBI under Prompt Corrective Action framework because of 1) negative capital of ?14.674 million and capital adequacy ratio of negative 18.42%; 2) Capital Asset Management Earnings Liquidity composite rating of "2" with a Management component rating of "1"; and 3) serious supervisory concerns particularly on activities deemed unsafe or unsound. Vivas moved for a reconsideration of the said resolution on the grounds of non-observance of due process and arbitrariness. The ISD II, on several instances, had invited the BOD of ECBI to discuss matters pertaining to the placement of the bank under PCA framework and other supervisory concerns before making the appropriate recommendations to the MB. The proposed meeting, however, did not materialize due to postponements sought by Vivas. The BSP then directed ECBI to explain why it transferred the majority shares of RBFI without securing the prior approval of the MB in apparent violation of the Manual of Regulation for Banks. Also, the scheduled general examination of the books, records and general condition of ECBI did not push through. According to Vivas, ECBI asked for the deferment of the examination pending resolution of its appeal before the MB. Vivas believed that he was being treated unfairly because the letter of authority to examine allegedly contained a clause which pertained to the Anti-Money Laundering Law and the Bank Secrecy Act.The MB, on the other hand, posited that ECBI unjustly refused to allow the BSP examiners from examining and inspecting its books and records, in violation of Sections 25 and 34 of R.A. No. 7653.ECBI asked for another deferment of the examination due to the pendency of certain unresolved issues subject of its appeal before the MB, and because Vivas was then out of the country. The ISD II denied ECBIs request and ordered the general examination to proceed as previously scheduled.Thereafter, the MB issued another resolution approving the issuance of a cease and desist order against ECBI, which enjoined it from pursuing certain acts and transactions that were considered unsafe or unsound banking practices, and from doing such other acts or transactions constituting fraud or might result in the dissipation of its assets.On March 4, 2010, the MB issued Resolution No. 276 placing ECBI under receivership.Vivas filed a petition for prohibition ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the MB for prohibiting ECBI from continuing its banking business and for placing it under receivership assailing the legality of Resolution no. 276.RULING: The Monetary Board (MB) may forbid a bank from doing business and place it under receivership without prior notice and hearing.It must be emphasized that R.A .No. 7653 is a later law and under said act, the power of the MB over banks, including rural banks, was increased and expanded. The Court, in several cases, upheld the power of the MB to take over banks without need for prior hearing. It is not necessary inasmuch as the law entrusts to the MB the appreciation and determination of whether any or all of the statutory grounds for the closure and receivership of the erring bank are present. The MB, under R.A. No. 7653, has been invested with more power of closure and placement of a bank under receivership for insolvency or illiquidity, or because the banks continuance in business would probably result in the loss to depositors or creditors.Accordingly, the MB can immediately implement its resolution prohibiting a banking institution to do business in the Philippines and, thereafter, appoint the PDIC as receiver. The procedure for the involuntary closure of a bank is summary and expeditious in nature. Such action of the MB shall be final and executory, but may be later subjected to a judicial scrutiny via a petition for certiorari to be filed by the stockholders of record of the bank representing a majority of the capital stock. Obviously, this procedure is designed to protect the interest of all concerned, that is, the depositors, creditors and stockholders, the bank itself and the general public. The protection afforded public interest warrants the exercise of a summary closure.The Petition Should Have Been Filed in the CAEven if treated as a petition for certiorari, the petition should have been filed with the CA. Section 4 of Rule 65 reads:Section 4. When and where petition filed. The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. [Emphases supplied]That the MB is a quasi-judicial agency was already settled and reiterated in the case of Bank of Commerce v. Planters Development Bank And Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas.30Doctrine of Hierarchy of CourtsEven in the absence of such provision, the petition is also dismissible because it simply ignored the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. True, the Court, the CA and the RTC have original concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. The concurrence of jurisdiction, however, does not grant the party seeking any of the extraordinary writs the absolute freedom to file a petition in any court of his choice. The petitioner has not advanced any special or important reason which would allow a direct resort to this Court. Under the Rules of Court, a party may directly appeal to this Court only on pure questions of law.31 In the case at bench, there are certainly factual issues as Vivas is questioning the findings of the investigating team.Strict observance of the policy of judicial hierarchy demands that where the issuance of the extraordinary writs is also within the competence of the CA or the RTC, the special action for the obtainment of such writ must be presented to either court. As a rule, the Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate lower courts; or where exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and with serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.32 The judicial policy must be observed to prevent an imposition on the precious time and attention of the Court.No Undue Delegation of Legislative PowerIn this case, under the two tests, there was no undue delegation of legislative authority in the issuance of R.A. No. 7653. To address the growing concerns in the banking industry, the legislature has sufficiently empowered the MB to effectively monitor and supervise banks and financial institutions and, if circumstances warrant, to forbid them to do business, to take over their management or to place them under receivership. The legislature has clearly spelled out the reasonable parameters of the power entrusted to the MB and assigned to it only the manner of enforcing said power. In other words, the MB was given a wide discretion and latitude only as to how the law should be implemented in order to attain its objective of protecting the interest of the public, the banking industry and the economy.WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition is DENIED.Pacific Ace Finance Ltd. (PAFIN) v. EjieYanagisawaG.R. No. 175303 (2012)

FACTS:Eiji, a Japanese, married Evelyn, Filipina, in 1989 at the City Hall of Manila.On August 23, 1995, Evelyn purchased a townhouse in Paranaque. The Registry of Deeds issued a title to Evelyn P. Castaneda, Filipino, married to EjieYanagisawa, Japanese citizen, both of legal age.In 1996, Eiji filed a complaint before RTC Makati for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Evelyn on the ground of bigamy. During the pendency of the case, he asked that Evelyn be enjoined from disposing or encumbering all of the properties registered in her name. Evelyn and her lawyer voluntarily undertook to acede to the motion of Eiji.In 1997, Evelyn obtained a loan of P500,000 from petitioner PAFIN. To secure the loan, Evelyn executed a real estate mortgage (the property above-described). At the time of the mortgage, Eijis's appeal was pending before the CA.Eiji filed an action before RTC Paranaque for annulment of the real estate mortgage. PAFIN denied prior knowledge of the Order in the first case. PAFIN admitted that it did not conduct any verification of the title because Evelyn is good and friendly. Moreover, PAFIN averred that Eiji has no personality to seek the annulment of the REM because a foreign national cannot own real properties located within the Philippines.The RTC Paranaque dismissed the case for lack of cause of action. Eiji cannot possibly own the property because he is a foreigner.Eiji appealed, arguing that his inability to own a real estate does not automatically deprive him of all his interest in the mortgaged property, because the same was purchased with his money.The CA reversed the ruling of the RTC. It ruled that the property should be liquidated and divided between Eiji and Evelyn.The appellate court determined that the Paraaque RTCs Decision was improper because it violated the doctrine of non-interference. Courts of equal jurisdiction, such as regional trial courts, have no appellate jurisdiction over each other. For this reason, the CA annulled and set aside the Paraaque RTCs decision to dismiss Eijis complaint.

ISSUESWhether the RTC Paranaques decision was proper?

RULING:No. A review of the complaint shows that Eiji did not claim ownership of the Paraaque townhouse unit or his right to consent to the REM as his bases for seeking its annulment. Instead, Eiji invoked his right to rely on Evelyns commitment not to dispose of or encumber the property (as confirmed in the October 2, 1996 Order of the Makati RTC), and the annotation of the said commitment on TCT No. 99791.The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference dictates that the assumption by the Makati RTC over the issue operates as an insurmountable barrier to the subsequent assumption by the Paraaque RTC. By insisting on ruling on the same issue, the Paraaque RTC effectively interfered with the Makati RTCs resolution of the issue and created the possibility of conflicting decisions.Contrary to petitioners stance, the CA did not make any disposition as to who between Eiji and Evelyn owns the Paraaque townhouse unit. It simply ruled that the Makati RTC had acquired jurisdiction over the said question and should not have been interfered with by the Paraaque RTC. The CA only clarified that it was improper for the Paraaque RTC to have reviewed the ruling of a co-equal court.G.R. No. 176162 : October 9, 2012CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,Petitioner,v.COURT OF APPEALS, DR. DANTE G. GUEV ARRA and ATTY. AUGUSTUS F. CEZAR,Respondents.G.R. No. 178845ATTY. HONESTO L. CUEVA,Petitioner,v.COURT OF APPEALS, DR. DANTE G. GUEV ARRA and ATTY. AUGUSTUS F. CEZAR,Respondents.D E C I S I O NMENDOZA,J.:These are consolidated petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the December 29, 2006 Decisionof the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 95293, entitled"Dr. Dante G. Guevarra and Atty. Augustus Cezar v. Civil Service Commission and Atty. Honesto L. Cueva."FACTS:Respondents Dante G. Guevarra (Guevarra) and Augustus F. Cezar (Cezar) were the Officer-in-Charge/President and the Vice President for Administration, respectively, of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUPHonesto L. Cueva (Cueva), then PUP Chief Legal Counsel, filed an administrative case against Guevarra and Cezar for gross dishonesty, grave misconduct, falsification of official documents, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, being notoriously undesirable, and for violating Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713specifically the Application for Bond of Accountable Officials and Employees of the Republic of the Philippines, in which the latter denied the existence of his pending criminal and administrative casesIn his Application for Bond of Accountable Officials and Employees of the Republic of the Philippines (General Form No. 58-A), he answered Question No. 11 in this wise:11. Do you have any criminal or administrative records? NO. If so, state briefly the nature thereof NOThis was despite the undisputed fact that, at that time, both Guevarra and Cezar admittedly had 17 pending cases for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 before the SandiganbayanThe respondents explained that they believed "criminal or administrative records" to mean final conviction in a criminal or administrative casebecause their cases had not yet been decided by the Sandiganbayan, they asserted that Guevarra responded to Question No. 11 in General Form No. 58-A correctly and in good faithMarch 24, 2006, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) issued Resolution No. 060521formally charging Guevarra with Dishonesty and Cezar with Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service after a prima facie finding that they had committed acts punishable under the Civil Service Law and Rules.the respondents filed their Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Declare Absence of Prima Facie Case.Cueva, on the other hand, filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of Preventive Suspension12rlland an Omnibus Motion13rllseeking the issuance of an order of preventive suspension against Guevarra and Cezar and the inclusion of the following offenses in the formal charge against them: Grave Misconduct, Falsification of Official Document, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, Being Notoriously Undesirable, and Violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 6713.CSC denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the respondents for being a non-responsive pleading, akin to a motion to dismiss, which was a prohibited pleading under Section 16 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service Commission.15rllIt also denied Cuevas motion to include additional charges against the respondents. The CSC, however, placed Guevarra under preventive suspension for ninety (90) days, believing it to be necessary because, as the officer-in-charge of PUP, he was in a position to unduly influence possible witnesses against him.Guevarra and Cezar filed a petition forcertiorariand prohibition before the CA essentially questioning the jurisdiction of the CSC over the administrative complaint filed against them by Cueva. CA rendered its Decision granting the petition and nullifying and setting aside the questioned resolutions of the CSC for having been rendered without jurisdictionthe CA noted that the CSC erred in recognizing the complaint filed by Cueva, reasoning out that the latter should have exhausted all administrative remedies by first bringing his grievances to the attention of the PUP Board of Regents.Hence, these petitions.ISSUE:Whether or not the Civil Service Commission has original concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases falling under the jurisdiction of heads of agencies.The Court agrees that the only question which must be addressed in this case is whether the CSC has jurisdiction over administrative cases filed directly with it against officials of a chartered state university.HELD:The petitions are meritorious.CSC has jurisdiction over casesfiled directly with it, regardless ofwho initiated the complaintSection 2(1), Article IX(B) of the 1987 Constitution defines the scope of the civil service:The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.By virtue of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1341 PUP became a chartered state university, thereby making it a government-owned or controlled corporation with an original charter whose employees are part of the Civil Service and are subject to the provisions of E.O. No. 292.The controversy, however, stems from the interpretation of the disciplinary jurisdiction of the CSC as specified in Section 47, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of E.O. No. 292:SECTION 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. (1) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office. A complaint may be filed directly with the Commission by a private citizen against a government official or employee in which case it may hear and decide the case or it may deputize any department or agency or official or group of officials to conduct the investigation. The results of the investigation shall be submitted to the Commission with recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed or other action to be taken.(2) The Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction. Their decisions shall be final in case the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary. In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission, the same may be initially appealed to the department and finally to the Commission and pending appeal, the same shall be executory except when the penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be executory only after confirmation by the Secretary concerned.The understanding by the CA of Section 47, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of E.O. No. 292 which states that "a complaint may be filed directly with the Commission by a private citizen against a government official or employee" is that the CSC can only take cognizance of a case filed directly before it if the complaint was made by a private citizen.There is no cogent reason to differentiate between a complaint filed by a private citizen and one filed by a member of the civil service, especially in light of Section 12(11), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the same E.O. No. 292 which confers upon the CSC the power to "hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal" without any qualification.It cannot be overemphasized that the identity of the complainant is immaterial to the acquisition of jurisdiction over an administrative case by the CSC. CSC has concurrent original jurisdictionwith the Board of Regents overadministrative casesThe Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service(the Uniform Rules) explicitly allows the CSC to hear and decide administrative cases directly brought before it:Section 4. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. The Civil Service Commission shall hear and decide administrative cases instituted by, or brought before it, directly or on appeal, including contested appointments, and shall review decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies attached to it.Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the Civil Service Commission shall have the final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all officers and employees in the civil service and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline and efficiency of such officers and employees. The CA construed the phrase "the Civil Service Commission shall have the final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all officers and employees in the civil service" to mean that the CSC could only step in after the relevant disciplinary authority, in this case the Board of Regents of PUP, had investigated and decided on the charges against the respondents. Regrettably, the CA failed to take into consideration the succeeding section of the same rules which undeniably granted original concurrent jurisdiction to the CSC and belied its suggestion that the CSC could only take cognizance of cases on appeal:Section 7. Jurisdiction of Heads of Agencies. Heads of Departments, agencies, provinces, cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities shall have original concurrent jurisdiction, with the Commission, over their respective officers and employees.All members of the civil service are under the jurisdiction of the CSC, unless otherwise provided by law. Being a non-career civil servant does not remove respondent from the ambit of the CSC.Career or non-career, a civil service official or employee is within the jurisdiction of the CSC.CSC has original concurrent jurisdiction shared with the governing body in question, in this case, the Board of Regents of PUP. This means that if the Board of Regents first takes cognizance of the complaint, then it shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the CSC.Thus, not all administrative cases will fall directly under the CSC. Secondly, Section 47, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code affords the CSC the option of whether to decide the case or to deputize some other department, agency or official to conduct an investigation into the matter, thereby considerably easing the burden placed upon the CSC.WHEREFORE, the petitions areGRANTED. The December 29, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals is herebyREVERSEDandSET ASIDE. Resolution Nos. 060521 and 061141 dated March 24, 2006 and June 30, 2006, respectively, of the Civil Service Commission areREINSTATED.FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS AND CARMELITA C. LLAMAS VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, BRANCH 66 OF THE REGIONALTRIALCOURTOF MAKATICITYAND THE PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES

NOTE: Di ko maintindihan to. Wala yung topic natin dito. Yung decision na nilagay ko yan yun. Huhuhuhu!

FACTS

Petitioners were charged before the RTC ofMakatiwith the crime of other forms of swindling for selling the mortgaged land. The land was mortgaged to Rural Bank of Imus.On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court. The appellate court further denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

Petitioners filed before this Court a petition for review, however, denied the same for petitioners failure to state the material dates. Since it subsequently denied petitioners motion for reconsideration, the judgment of conviction became final and executory.With the consequent issuance by the trial court of the April 19, 2001 Warrant of Arrest, the police arrested, on April 27, 2001, petitioner Carmelita C. Llamas for her to serve her 2-month jail term. The police, nevertheless, failed to arrest petitioner Francisco R. Llamas because he was nowhere to be found.

Petitioner Francisco moved for the lifting or recall of the warrant of arrest, raising for the first time the issue that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the offense charged.

There being no action taken by the trial court on the said motion, petitioners instituted, the instant proceedings for the annulment of the trial and the appellate courts decisions.

The Court initially dismissed on technical grounds the petition in the September 24, 2001 Resolution, but reinstated the same, on motion for reconsideration, in the October 22, 2001 Resolution. In its September 29, 2009 Decision, this Court held that, following the ruling inPeople v. Bitanga the remedy of annulment of judgment cannot be availed of in criminal cases. The Court likewise rejected petitioners contention that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE

1. Whether the ruling on PEOPLE VS BITANGA would apply to this case?2. Whether the accused were guilty of other forms of swindling?

RULING

1. No.

Petitioners took many procedural missteps in this case, from the time it was pending in the trial court until it reached this Court, all of which could serve as enough basis to dismiss the present motion for reconsideration. However, considering petitioners advanced age, the length of time this case has been pending, and the imminent loss of personal liberty as a result of petitioners conviction, the Court resolves to grantpro hac vicethe motion for reconsideration.

This Court has, on occasion, suspended the application of technical rules of procedure where matters of life, liberty, honor or property, among other instances, are at stake. It has allowed some meritorious cases to proceed despite inherent procedural defects and lapses on the principle that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. The strict and rigid application of rules that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must always be avoided.It is far better and more prudent for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case to attain the ends of justice, rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause grave injustice to the parties.

Thus, the Court, at the first instance, had recognized that the petition, although captioned differently, was indeed one for certiorari.

Since we have resolved to treat the petition as one forcertiorari, the doctrine inPeople v. Bitangano longer finds application in this case.

2. Article 316 (2) of the Revised Penal Code states:

ART. 316.Other forms of swindling. The penalty ofarresto mayorin its minimum and medium periods and a fine of not less than the value of the damage caused and not more than three times such value, shall be imposed upon:

2. Any person who, knowing that real property is encumbered, shall dispose of the same, although such encumbrance be not recorded;

In every criminal prosecution, the State must prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime chargedandthe complicity or participation of the accused.

For petitioners to be convicted of the crime of swindling under Article 316 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, the prosecution had the burden to prove the confluence of the following essential elements of the crime:1.that the thing disposed of be real property;2.that the offender knew that the real property was encumbered,whether the encumbrance is recorded or not;3.that there must be express representationby the offender that the real property is freefrom encumbrance; and4.that the act of disposing of the real property be made to the damage of another.

One of the essential elements of swindling underArticle 316, paragraph 2, is that the act of disposing the encumbered real property is made to the damage of another. In this case, neither the trial court nor the CA made any finding of any damage to the offended party. Nowhere in the Decision of the RTC or that of the CA is there any discussion that there was damage suffered by complainant, or any finding that his rights over the property were prejudiced.

On the contrary, complainant had possession and control of the land even as the cases were being heard. His possession and right to exercise dominion over the property was not disturbed. Admittedly, there was delay in the delivery of the title. This, however, was the subject of a separate case, which was eventually decided in petitioners favor.

If no damage should result from the sale, no crime of estafa would have been committed by the vendor, as the element of damage would then be lacking.The inevitable conclusion, therefore, is that petitioners should be acquitted of the crime charged.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration isGRANTED. The assailed Decision dated September 29, 2009 isSETASIDEand a new one is enteredACQUITTINGpetitioners of the crime charged on the ground of the prosecutions failure to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.SO ORDERED.

DIRECTOR GENERAL ROBERTO LASTIMOSO, ACTING CHIEF PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP), DIRECTORATE FOR PERSONNEL AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT (DPRM), INSPECTOR GENERAL, P/CHIEF SUPT. RAMSEY OCAMPO and P/SUPT. ELMER REJANO, petitioners, vs. P/SENIOR INSPECTOR JOSE J. ASAYO, respondent.FACTS: The Court granted the petition, holding that the Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the civilian complaint against respondent and that the latter was accorded due process during the summary hearing. Hence, this motion for reconsideration.

Respondent argues that the decision should be reconsidered for the following reasons:1. Proceedings were null and void because no hearing was conducted; and 2. The evidence does not prove that respondent is guilty

ISSUES: 1. Whether the Summary Proceedings conducted were null and void2. Whether the evidence presented is insufficient to prove respondents guilt

RULING: 1. NO. The fact that there was no full-blown trial before the summary hearing officer does not invalidate said proceedings. In Samalio v. Court of Appeals, the Court reiterated the time-honored principle that: Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in courts of justice. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. In other words, it is not legally objectionable for being violative of due process for an administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence submitted by the parties as affidavits of witnesses may take the place of their direct testimony.

2. To resolve the second issue, respondent would have the Court re-calibrate the weight of evidence presented before the summary hearing officer, arguing that said evidence is insufficient to prove respondent's guilt of the charges against him. However, it must be emphasized that the action commenced by respondent before the RTC is one for certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC and as held in People v. Court of Appeals,3 where the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision not the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision the same is beyond the province of a special civil action for certiorari.The general rule is that the filing of a petition for certiorari does not toll the running of the period to appeal. However, Section 1, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. In Ginete v. Court of Appeals5 and Sanchez v. Court of Appeals,6 the Court saw it proper to suspend rules of procedure in order to promote substantial justice where matters of life, liberty, honor or property, among other instances, are at stake. The present case clearly involves the honor of a police officer who has rendered years of service to the country.

In addition, it is also understandable why respondent immediately resorted to the remedy of certiorari instead of pursuing his motion for reconsideration of the PNP Chiefs decision as an appeal before the National Appellate Board (NAB). It was quite easy to get confused as to which body had jurisdiction over his case. The complaint filed against respondent could fall under both Sections 41 (where it shall be filed in Peoples Law Enforcement Board) and 42 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6975 (states that it is the PNP Chief who has authority to immediately remove or dismiss a PNP member who is guilty of conduct unbecoming a police officer) or the Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990.It was only in Quiambao v. Court of Appeals, promulgated in 2005 or after respondent had already filed the petition for certiorari with the trial court, when the Court resolved the issue of jurisdiction. The Court held that the PLEB and the PNP Chief and regional directors have concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases filed against members of the PNP which may warrant dismissal from service, but once a complaint is filed with the PNP Chief or regional directors, said authorities shall acquire exclusive original jurisdiction over the case. With the foregoing peculiar circumstances in this case, respondent should not be deprived of the opportunity to fully ventilate his arguments against the factual findings of the PNP Chief. He may file an appeal before the NAB, pursuant to Section 45, R.A. No. 6925. It is a settled jurisprudence that in administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied.8 In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada,9 the Court stressed thus: After all, technical rules of procedure are not ends in themselves but are primarily devised to help in the proper and expedient dispensation of justice. In appropriate cases, therefore, the rules may be construed liberally in order to meet and advance the cause of substantial justice. Thus, the opportunity to pursue an appeal before the NAB should be deemed available to respondent in the higher interest of substantial justice.MR: Partly granted. Allowed to file an appeal.GARCIA VS. SANDIGANBAYANG.R. NO. 165835

FACTS:Major General Carlos F. Garcia was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Comptrollership of the AFP.On 27 September 2004, the Ombudsman, after due investigation, filed a COMPLAINT before the Sandiganbayan against Garcia for VIOLATION of the following:1. SECTION 8 in relation to Section 11 of RA 6713 (Code of Conduct of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees)2. Art 183, RPC3. Sec52(A)(1), (3) & (20) of the Civil Service Law

His wife and 3 sons were impleaded for violation of RA 1379 insofar as they acted as conspirators, conduits, dummies and fronts of petitioner in receiving, accumulating, using and disposing of ill-gotten wealth.Also, a PETITION W/ VERIFIED URGENT EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT was filed by Ombudsman before the SB vs. Garcia, his wife and 3 sons. Ombudsman has determined a prima facie case exists against Maj. Gen Garcia since during his incumbency as a soldier and public officer he acquired huge amounts of money and properties manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer and his other lawful income. SB GRANTED PETITION, ISSUED WRIT OF PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT

Garcia filedMotion to Dismiss and a Petition for Certiorari:Garcia alleged that the Sandiganbayan has a LACK OF JURISDICTION over forfeiture proceedings (CIVIL ACTION) under RA 1379. He claimed that RTC has the jurisdiction as provided under Sec2(9) of the law.Moreover, the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction in Civil Actions pertains only to separate actions for recovery of unlawfully acquired property vs. Pres. Marcos etc.SB was intended principally as a criminal court. This is supported by Presidential issuances and laws, to wit:E.O. No. 1 creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth amassed by President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his family and cronies,E.O. No. 14 which amended P.D. No. 1606 and R.A. No. 1379 by transferring to the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over civil actions filed against President Marcos, his family and cronies based on R.A. No. 1379, the Civil Code and other existing laws, andE.O. No. 14-A which further amended E.O. No. 14, P.D. No. 1606 and R.A. No. 1379 by providing that the civil action under R.A. No. 1379 which may be filed against President Marcos, his family and cronies, may proceed independently of the criminal action. Even if SB has jurisdiction, petition for forfeiture is fatally defective for failing to comply with jurisdictional requirements under RA 1379, Sec. 2:i. inquiry similar to a Preliminary Investigationii. Certification to Solicitor General of prima facie case (In this case: there is no certification)iii. action filed by Solicitor General. (In this case it is filed by Ombudsman)

COMMENT by SB:

In Republic v. SB the Court ruled that there is no issue that jurisdiction over violations of [R.A.] Nos. 3019 and 1379 now rests with the Sandiganbayan.Moreover, under Constitution and prevailing statutes, SB is vested w/ authority and jurisdiction over the petition for forfeiture under RA 1379.SBs jurisdiction based on PD 1606 encompasses all cases involving violations of RA 3019 IRRESPECTIVE OF WON THESE CASES ARE CIVIL OR CRIMINAL IN NATURE

COMMENT BY OMBUDSMAN:

1. Republic vs. SB2. Grant of jurisdiction over violations of RA 1379 did not change even under the amendments of RA7975 and RA 8294, though it came to be limited to cases involving high-ranking public officials3. It has authority to investigate and initiate forfeiture proceedings vs. petitioner based on Constitution and RA 6770: The constitutional power of investigation of the Office of the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified; its power to investigate any act of a public official or employee which appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient covers the unlawful acquisition of wealth by public officials as defined under R.A. No. 13794. Section 15, RA 6770 expressly empowers Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute such cases of unlawful acquisition of wealth.5. ON REQUIREMENTS under RA 1379: inquiry was conducted similar to PI + SOLGENs participation no longer required since Ombudsman endowed w/ authority to investigate and prosecute6. dismiss petition for forum shopping: MTD was already filed before SB

REPLY by Garcia1. SBs criminal jurisdiction is separate and distinct from its civil jurisdiction : SBs jurisdiction over forfeiture cases had been removed w/o subsequent amendments expressly restoring such civil jurisdiction2. Petition for forfeiture is not an ancilliary action for the criminal action against him, so not under jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan

ISSUES1. Whether SB has jurisdiction over petitions for forfeiture under RA 13792. Whether Ombudsman has authority to investigate, initiate and prosecute such petitions for forfeiture3. Whether petitioner is guilty of forum shopping

HELDPetition without MERIT, dismissed

I. SB HAS JURISDICTIONUnder RA 8249, jurisdiction over violations of RA 3019 and 1379 is lodged w Sandiganbayan.In Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, originally, the solicitor general was authorized to initiate forfeiture proceedings before CFI of the city or province where the public officer/employee resides or holds office [RA 1379, SEC2]. However, upon the creation of the Sandiganbayan [PD 1486], original and exclusive jurisdiction over such violations was vested in SB.Eventually, PD 1606 repealed PD 1486 and modified jurisdiction of SB by removing its jurisdiction over civil actions brought in connection w/ crimes within the exclusive jurisdiction of SB, including:* Restitution or reparation for damages;* Recovery of instruments and effects of the crime;* Civil actions under Art32 and 34 of the Civil Code; and* Forfeiture proceedings provided under RA 1379BP 129 abolished concurrent jurisdiction of SB and regular courts, and expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of SB over offenses enumerated in Sec. 4 of PD 1606 to embrace all such offenses irrespective of imposable penalty.PD 1606 was later amended by PD 1869 and eventually by PD 1861 because of the proliferation of filing cases w/ penalty not higher than Prision Coreccional or its equivalent and even such cases not serious in nature.

ON CIVIL NATURE OF FORFEITURE ACTIONSForfeiture actions are actions in rem, therefore, civil in nature BUT FORFEITURE OF AN ILLEGALLY ACQUIRED PROPERTY PARTAKES THE NATURE OF A PENALTY [as discussed in Cabal vs. Kapunan]

SB VESTED W/ JURISDICTION OVER VIOLATIONS OF RA 1379[An Act Declaring Forfeiture In Favor of the State Any Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired By Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing For the Proceedings Therefor.]: the law provides a procedure for forfeiture in case a public officer has acquired during his incumbency an amount of property manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his lawful income and income from legitimately acquired property. No penalty for the public officer for unlawful acquisition but the law imposes forfeiture as a penalty for unlawfully acquired properties

2. YES, as resolved in Republic vs. SB (it was the main issue there)

RA 6770 and Article XI, Sec. 13 of 1987 Constitution provides for the POWERS OF OMBUDSMAN:

1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases;(11) Investigate and initiate the proper action for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth amassed after 25 February 1986 and the prosecution of the parties involved therein.

It is the Ombudsman who should file petition for forfeiture under RA 1379BUT powers to investigate and initiate proper action for recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth is restricted only to cases for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth amassed AFTER FEB 1986.

3. ON FORUM SHOPPING: GUILTY!Garcia failed to inform the SC that he had filed a Motion to Dismiss in relation to the petition for forfeiture before the SB.A scrutiny of the Motion to Dismiss reveals that petitioner raised substantially the same issues and prayed for the same reliefs therein as it has in the instant petition. In fact, the petitioners argument that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over separate civil actions for forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties appears to be wholly lifted from the Motion to Dismiss. The only difference between the two is that in the Petition, petitioner raises the ground of failure of the petition for forfeiture to comply with the procedural requirements of R.A. No. 1379, and petitioner prays for the annulment of the Sandiganbayans Resolution dated 29 October 2004 and Writ of Preliminary Attachment dated 2 November 2004. Nevertheless, these differences are only superficial. Both Petition and Motion to Dismiss have the same intent of dismissing the case for forfeiture filed against petitioner, his wife and their sons. It is undeniable that petitioner had failed to fulfill his undertaking. This is incontestably forum-shopping which is reason enough to dismiss the petition outright, without prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against the counsel and party concerned.G.R. No. 173121 April 3, 2013FRANKLlN ALEJANDRO, Petitioner, vs.OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN FACT-FINDING AND INTELLIGENCE BUREAU, represented by Atty. Maria Olivia Elena A. Roxas, Respondent.D E C I S I O NBRION, J.:We resolve the petition for review on certiorari,1 filed by Franklin Alejanctro (petitioneJ), assailing the February 21, 2006 decision2 and the June 15, 2006 resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 88544. The CA dismissed for prematurity the petitioner's appeal on the August 20, 2004 decision4 of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-03-0310-I finding him administratively liable for grave misconduct.

FACTS:On May 4, 2000, the Head of the Non-Revenue Water Reduction Department of the Manila Water Services, Inc. (MWSI) received a report from an Inspectorate and Special Projects team that the Mico Car Wash (MICO), owned by Alfredo Rap Alejandro, has been illegally opening an MWSI fire hydrant and using it to operate its car-wash business in Binondo, Manila.5On May 10, 2000, PNP-CIDG conducted an anti-water pilferage operation against MICO.During the anti-water pilferage operation, the PNP-CIDG discovered that MICOs car-wash boys indeed had been illegally getting water from an MWSI fire hydrant. The PNP-CIDG arrested the car-wash boys and confiscated the containers used in getting water. At this point, the petitioner, Alfredos father and the Barangay Chairman or punong barangay of Barangay 293, Zone 28, Binondo, Manila, interfered with the PNP-CIDGs operation by ordering several men to unload the confiscated containers. This intervention caused further commotion and created an opportunity for the apprehended car-wash boys to escape.Office of the Ombudsman Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau, after conducting its initial investigation, filed with the Office of the Overall Deputy Ombudsman an administrative complaint against the petitioner for his blatant refusal to recognize a joint legitimate police activity, and for his unwarranted intervention.In its decision9 dated August 20, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman found the petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and ordered his dismissal from the service. The Deputy Ombudsman ruled that the petitioner cannot overextend his authority as Barangay Chairman and induce other people to disrespect proper authorities. The Deputy Ombudsman also added that the petitioner had tolerated the illegal acts of MICOs car-wash boys.10The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.The petitioner appealed to the CA via a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. But the CA dismissed the petition for premature filing.The petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the CA ruling-DENIED.Hence this petition.The petitioner argues that the Office of the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to order his dismissal from the service since under Republic Act No. (RA) 7160 (otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991), an elective local official may be removed from office only by the order of a proper court. Finally, he posits that the penalty of dismissal from the service is not warranted under the available facts.

ISSUES:I.WHETHER THE PRINCIPLE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES REQUIRES A REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION FROM THE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN TO THE OMBUDSMAN FOR THE PURPOSE OF A RULE 43 REVIEW.II.WHETHER THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER ELECTIVE OFFICIALS AND HAS THE POWER TO ORDER THEIR DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE.III.WHETHER PETITIONERS ACT CONSTITUTES GRAVE MISCONDUCT TO WARRANT HIS DISMISSAL.

HELD:We deny the petition for lack of merit.No further need exists to exhaust administrative remedies from the decision of the Deputy Ombudsman because he was acting in behalf of the OmbudsmanThe petitioner has fully exhausted all administrative remedies when he filed his motion for reconsideration on the decision of the Deputy Ombudsman. There is no further need to review the case at the administrative level since the Deputy Ombudsman has already acted on the case and he was acting for and in behalf of the Office of the Ombudsman.The Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases which are within the jurisdiction of the regular courts or administrative agenciesThe Office of the Ombudsman was created by no less than the Constitution.18 It is tasked to exercise disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials, save only for impeachable officers. While Section 21 of The Ombudsman Act19 and the Local Government Code both provide for the procedure to discipline elective officials, the seeming conflicts between the two laws have been resolved in cases decided by this Court.20The Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction to investigate any act or omission of a public officer or employee who is under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. RA 6770 provides:Section 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties:(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases. [italics supplied; emphasis and underscore ours]The Sandiganbayans jurisdiction extends only to public officials occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 and higher.22Since the complaint against the petitioner was initially filed with the Office of the Ombudsman, the Ombudsman's exercise of jurisdiction is to the exclusion of the sangguniang bayan whose exercise of jurisdiction is concurrent.The Ombudsman has the power to impose administrative sanctionsSection 15 of RA 677027 reveals the manifest intent of the lawmakers to give the Office of the Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary authority. These powers unmistakably grant the Office of the Ombudsman the power to directly impose administrative sanctions; its power is not merely recommendatory. It is likewise apparent that under RA 6770, the lawmakers intended to provide the Office of the Ombudsman with sufficient muscle to ensure that it can effectively carry out its mandate as protector of the people against inept and corrupt government officers and employees. The Office was granted the power to punish for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. It was given disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies (with the exception only of impeachable officers, members of Congress and the Judiciary). Also, it can preventively suspend any officer under its authority pending an investigation when the case so warrants.Substantive IssueThe petitioner is liable for grave misconductAfter the petitioner introduced himself and inquired about the operation, the police officers immediately showed their identifications and explained to him that they were conducting an anti-water pilferage operation. However, instead of assisting the PNP-CIDG, he actually ordered several bystanders to defy the PNP-CIDGs whole operation. The petitioners act stirred further commotion that unfortunately led to the escape of the apprehended car-wash boys.Sufficient records exist to justify the imposition of a higher penalty against the petitioner. His open interference in a legitimate police activity. and defiance of the police's authority only show his clear i1itent to violate the law; in fact, he reneged on his first obligation as the grassroot official tasked at the first level with the enforcement of the law. The photographs, taken together with the investigation report of the Police Superintendent and the testimonies of the witnesses, even lead to conclusions beyond interference and defiance; the petitioner himself could have been involved in corrupt activities, although we cannot make this conclusive finding at this point.43 We make this observation though as his son owns MICO whose car-wash boys were engaged in water pilferage. What we can conclusively confirm is that the petitioner violated the law by directly interfering with a legitimate police activity where his own son appeared to be involved. This act qualifies the misconduct as grave. Section 52(A)(3), Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides that the penalty for grave misconduct is dismissal from the service.WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit, and AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88544.DARMA MASLAG VS ELIZABETH MONZON, WILLIAM GESTON, AND REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF BENGUETFACTSThis is a Petition for Review on Certiorari on the resolution of CA which dismissed petitioner Darma Maslag's ordinary appeal to it for being an improper remedy. The Petition also assails the CAs September 22, 2006 Resolution denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.The petitioner filed a Complaint for reconveyance of real property with declaration of nullity of original certificate of title against the respondents. The Complaint was filed before the Municipal Trial Court.After trial, the MTC found respondent Monzon guilty of fraud in obtaining an OCT over petitioners property.Respondents appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) declaring the MTC without jurisdiction over petitioners cause of action. The presiding judge declared that it will take cognizance of the case pursuant to Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court which provides for appeal from orders dismissing the case without trial; lack of jurisdiction. RTC thereafter reversed the decision of the MTC, prompting the petitioner to file a Notice of Appeal. The Court of Appeals dismissed the said appeal and affirmed the respondents contention that the proper remedy is a Petition for Review under Rule 42, and not an ordinary appeal. Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari. ISSUE:1. Who has jurisdiction over the case?2. Whether petioners appeal is the proper remedy?HELD:1. Under the present state of the law, in cases involving title to real property, original and exclusive jurisdiction belongs to either the RTC or the MTC, depending on the assessed value of the subject property. Pertinent provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129,29as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 7691,30provides:Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where x x x the assessed value of the property exceeds Fifty thousand pesos ([P]50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;x x x xSEC. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:x x x x(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00).2. Yes. The CA is correct in holding that the proper mode of appeal should have been a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, and not an ordinary appeal under Rule 41.In fact and in law, the RTC Resolution was a continuation of the proceedings that originated from the MTC. It was a judgment issued by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.It cannot be overemphasized that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by law and it is not within the courts, let alone the parties, to themselves determine or conveniently set aside. Neither would the active participation of the parties nor estoppel operate to confer original and exclusive jurisdiction where the court or tribunal only wields appellate jurisdiction over the case.The present court looks at what type of jurisdiction was actually exercised by the RTC, and not into what type of jurisdiction the RTC should have exercised.Inquiring into what the RTC should have done in disposing of the case is a question that already involves the merits of the appeal, but the court obviously cannot go into that where the mode of appeal was improper to begin with.Wherefore, Petition for Review is denied for lack of merit. The Court affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals. MARK JEROME S. MAGLALANG, Petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR), as represented by its incumbent Chairman EFRAIM GENUINO, Respondent.FACTS: Petitioner was a teller at the Casino Filipino, Angeles City Branch, Angeles City, which was operated by respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). While he was performing his functions as teller, a lady customer identified later as one Cecilia Nakasato (Cecilia) approached him in his booth and handed to him an undetermined amount of cash consisting of mixed P1,000.00 and P500.00 bills which in total amounts to P50,000.00. Following casino procedure, petitioner laid the bills on the spreading board. However, he erroneously spread the bills into only four clusters instead of five clusters worth P10,000.00 per cluster. He then placed markers for P10,000.00 each cluster of cash and declared the total amount of P40,000.00 to Cecilia. Perplexed, Cecilia asked petitioner why the latter only dished out P40,000.00. She then pointed to the first cluster of bills and requested petitioner to check the first cluster which she observed to be thicker than the others. Petitioner performed a recount and found that the said cluster contained 20 pieces of P1,000.00 bills. Petitioner apologized to Cecilia and rectified the error by declaring the full and correct amount handed to him by the latter. Petitioner, however, averred that Cecilia accused him of trying to shortchange her and that petitioner tried to deliberately fool her of her money. Petitioner tried to explain, but Cecilia allegedly continued to berate and curse him. To ease the tension, petitioner was asked to take a break. After ten minutes, petitioner returned to his booth. However, Cecilia allegedly showed up and continued to berate petitioner. As a result, the two of them were invited to the casinos Internal Security Office in order to air their respective sides. Thereafter, petitioner was required to file an Incident Report which he submitted on the same day of the incident.On January 8, 2009, petitioner received a Memorandum issued by the casino informing him that he was being charged with Discourtesy towards a casino customer and directing him to explain within 72 hours.On March 31, 2009, petitioner received another Memorandum dated March 19, 2009, stating that the Board of Directors of PAGCOR found him guilty of Discourtesy towards a casino customer and imposed. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration seeking a reversal of the boards decision. During the pendency of said motion, petitioner also filed a Motion for Production dated April 20, 2009, praying that he be furnished with copies of documents relative to the case including the recommendation of the investigating committee and the Decision/Resolution of the Board supposedly containing the latters factual findings.Subsequently, on June 18, 2009, PAGCOR issued a Memorandum dated June 18, 2009 practically reiterating the contents of its March 19, 2009 Memorandum. It informed petitioner that the Board of Directors 2009 resolved to deny his appeal for reconsideration for lack of merit.On August 17, 2009, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, before the CA, averring that there is no evidence, much less factual and legal basis to support the finding of guilt against him. Moreover, petitioner ascribed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to the acts of PAGCOR in adjudging him guilty of the charge, in failing to observe the proper procedure in the rendition of its decision and in imposing the harsh penalty of a 30 -day suspension. Justifying his recourse to the CA, petitioner explained that he did not appeal to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) because the penalty imposed on him was only a 30- day suspension which is not within the CSCs appellate jurisdiction. He also claimed that discourtesy in the performance of official duties is classified as a light offense which is punishable only by reprimand.In its assailed Resolution dated September 30, 2009, the CA outrightly dismissed the petition for certiorari for being premature as petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking recourse from the CA. Invoking Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, the CA held that the CSC has jurisdiction over issues involving the employer-employee relationship in all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the Government, including government- owned or controlled corporations with original charters such as PAGCOR. Petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration which the CA denied in the assailed Resolution. In denying the said motion, the CA relied on this Courts ruling in Duty Free Philippines v. Mojica citing Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corp. v. CA, where this Court held as follows: It is now settled that, conformably to Article IX-B, Section 2(1), [of the 1987 Constitution] government-owned or controlled corporations shall be considered part of the Civil Service only if they have original charters, as distinguished from those created under general law. PAGCOR belongs to the Civil Service because it was created directly by PD 1869 on July 11, 1983. Consequently, controversies concerning the relations of the employee with the management of PAGCOR should come under the jurisdiction of the Merit System Protection Board and the Civil Service Commission, conformably to the Administrative Code of 1987. Section 16(2) of the said Code vest[s] in the Merit System Protection Board the power inter alia to: a) Hear and decide on appeal administrative cases involving officials and employees of the Civil Service. Its decision shall be final except those involving dismissal or separation from the service which may be appealed to the Commission.Hence, this petition where petitioner argues that the CA committed grave and substantial error of judgmentISSUE: Was the CA correct in outrightly dismissing the petition for certiorari filed before it on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies?RULING: Court of Appeals decision reversed.Prior exhaustion of administrative remediesOur ruling in Public Hearing Committee of the Laguna Lake Development Authority v. SM Prime Holdings, Inc.on the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is instructive, to wit: Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court's judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to ones cause of action. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and legal reasons. The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case.Exception to prior exhaustion of administrative remediesHowever, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute as it admits of the following exceptions: (1) when there is a violation of due process; (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question; (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned; (5) when there is irreparable injury; (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter; (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim; (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings; (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, and unreasonable delay would greatly prejudice the complainant; (12) where no administrative review is provided by law; (13) where the rule of qualified political agency applies and (14) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot.The case before us falls squarely under exception number 12 since the law per se provides no administrative review for administrative cases whereby an employee like petitioner is covered by Civil Service law, rules and regulations and penalized with a suspension for not more than 30 days.Availability of appeal in administrative disciplinary casesSection 37 (a) and (b) of P.D. No. 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines,provides for the unavailability of any appeal: (a) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days , or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from Office. A complaint may be filed directly with the Commission by a private citizen against a government official or employee in which case it may hear and decide the case or it may deputize any department or agency or official or group of officials to conduct the investigation. The results of the investigation shall be submitted to the Commission with recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed or other action to be taken. (b) The heads of departments, agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction. Their decisions shall be final in case the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary. In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission, the same may be initially appealed to the department and finally to the Commission and pending appeal, the same shall be executory except when the penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be executory only after confirmation by the department head.Similar provisions are reiterated in the aforequoted Section 47 of E.O. No. 292 essentially providing that cases of this sort are not appealable to the CSC.Judicial review in administrative casesNevertheless, decisions of administrative agencies which are declared final and unappealable by law are still subject to judicial review. In Republic of the Phils. v. Francisco, we held: Decisions of administrative or quasi-administrative agencies which are declared by law final and unappealable are subject to judicial review if they fail the test of arbitrariness, or upon proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law. When such administrative or quasi-judicial bodies grossly misappreciate evidence of such nature as to compel a contrary conclusion, the Court will not hesitate to reverse the factual findings. Thus, the decision of the Ombudsman may be reviewed, modified or reversed via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, on a finding that it had no jurisdiction over the complaint, or of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.Distinction between ordinary appeal and petition for certiorari under Rule 65It bears stressing that the judicial recourse petitioner availed of in this case before the CA is a special civil action for certiorari ascribing grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of PAGCOR, not an appeal. Suffice it to state that an appeal and a special civil action such as certiorari under Rule 65 are entirely distinct and separate from each other. One cannot file petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules where appeal is available, even if the ground availed of is grave abuse of discretion. A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when there is no appeal, or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Certiorari cannot be allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy, as the same should not be a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.In sum, there being no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law in view of petitioner's allegation that PAGCOR has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the CA's outright dismissal of the petition for certiorari on the basis of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is bereft of any legal standing and should therefore be set aside.Finally, as a rule, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is valid only when the question involved is an error of jurisdiction, or when there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the court or tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions. Hence, courts exercising certiorari jurisdiction should refrain from reviewing factual assessments of the respondent court or agency. Occasionally, however, they are constrained to wade into factual matters when the evidence on record does not support those factual findings; or when too much is concluded, inferred or deduced from the bare or incomplete facts appearing on record. Considering the circumstances and since this Court is not a trier of facts, remand of this case to the CA for its judicious resolution is in order.Dipad v. OlivanG.R. No. 168771 (2012)

FACTS:The car of Dipad and passenger jeep of Olivan collided. Dipad filed a civil action for damages. Dipad claimed that he is entitled of damages because he was not able to use his car for his buy-and-sell business. But when Dipad was being asked by the defense to produce his Income Tax Return years 2001-2003, he refused to do so on ground of confidentiality. He claimed that the demand for his ITR was incriminatory and in the nature of a fishing expedition. The MTC judge ordered the petitioners to show their basis for invoking the confidentiality of the ITR's. Dipad invoked the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) on the rule on confidentiality of Income Tax return.[footnoteRef:1] Moreover, in a commentary of the NIRC by Gonzales, there is a general rule that despite a court order, copies of the income tax returns cannot be furnished in view of the prohibition contained in Section 332 (now Section 286) of the Tax Code. Eventually, the court required the production of the ITR's. [1: Natinoal Internal Revenue Code, Sec. 71: Disposition of Income Tax Returns, Publication of Lists of Taxpayers and Filers - After the assessment shall have been made, as provided in this Title, the returns, together with any corrections thereof which may have been made by the Commissioner, shall be filed in the Office of the Commissioner and shall constitute public records and be open to inspection as such upon the order of the President of the Philippines, under rules and regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of the Commissioner.]

Dipad filed a MR, but was denied. He instituted a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 before the RTC alleging that the MTC issued the order with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The RTC dismissed the case because the petition filed is an inappropriate remedy. The error alleged to be committed is error of judgment. Errors of judgment is correctible by appeal, and not by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.

ISSUE:Whether the petition for certiorari is a proper remedy in this case?Whether the ITR's sought to be produced are confidential in nature?

RULING:INo. A petition for certiorari is not a mode of appeal. This remedy only corrects errors of jurisdiction. If the issue involves an error of judgment, it is correctible by an appeal via a Rule 45 petition.Errors of jurisdiction occur when the court exercises jurisdiction not conferred upon it by law.Errors of judgment are those that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. They include errors of procedure or mistakes in the court's findings20 based on a mistake of law or of fact.Here, it is patently clear that petitioners do not question whether the MTC has jurisdiction or authority to resolve the issue of confidentiality of ITRs. Rather, they assail the wisdom of the MTC's very judgment and appreciation of the ITR as not confidential. Specifically, they claim that the ruling violated the provisions of the NIRC on the alleged rule on confidentiality of ITRs.

IINo. The commentary was explaining Sec. 270. This provision prohibits employees of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) from divulging the trade secrets of taxpayers. The provision does not in any way address the confidentiality of ITR's.Thus, petitioners cannot rely on the inappropriate provision.Section 71 is an excerption to the rule on unlawful divulgence of trade secrets.G.R. No. 162757 December 11, 2013UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK, Petitioner, vs.CHRISTOPHER LUMBO and MILAGROS LUMBO, Respondents.D E C I S I O NBERSAMIN, J.:The implementation of a writ of possession issued pursuant to Act No. 3135 at the instance of the purchaser at the foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property in whose name the title has been meanwhile consolidated cannot be prevented by the injunctive writ.FACTS:Petitioner United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) appeals the decision of Court of Appeals (CA) reversed and set aside the order by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 8,2 denying the motion of respondents Christopher Lumbo and Milagros Lumbo for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the implementation of the writ of possession issued against them.The respondents borrowed the aggregate amount of P12,000,000.00 from UCPB. Tosecure the performance of their obligation, they constituteda real estate mortgage on a parcel of land located in Boracay, Aklanand all the improvements thereon that they owned and operated as abeach resort known as Titays South Beach Resort.Upon theirfailure to settle the obligation, UCPB appliedon November 11, 1998 for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage, and emerged as the highest bidder at the ensuing foreclosure sale held on January 12, 1999. Thecertificate of sale was issued on the same day, andUCPB registered the sale in its name on February 18, 1999. The title over the mortgaged property was consolidated in the name of UCPB after the respondents failed to redeem the property within the redemption period.On January 7, 2000, the respondents broughtagainst UCPB inthe RTC3 an action for the annulment of the foreclosure, legal accounting, injunction against the consolidation of title, and damages(Civil Case No. 5920).During the pendency of Civil Case No. 5920, UCPB filed an ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession to recover possession of the property (Special Proceedings No. 5884).-GRANTED and ISUUE the writ of possession directing the sheriff of the Province of Aklan to place UCPB in the actual possession of the property. The writ of possession was served with a demand for them to peacefully vacate. Although the possession of the property was turned over to UCPB on February 1, 2002, they were allowed to temporarily remain on the property for humanitarian reasons.On February 14, 2002, the respondents filed inthe RTC handling Special Proceedings No. 5884 a petition to cancel the writ of possession and to set aside the foreclosure sale.Special Proceedings No. 5884 was consolidated with Civil Case No. 5920 on March 1, 2002.On March 19, 2002, the RTC denied the respondents application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Aggrieved by the denial, the respondents brought a petition for certiorari and/or mandamus in the CA which resolved C.A.-G.R. SP No. 70261 by granting the respondents petition, setting aside the assailed orders,and enjoining the RTC from implementing the writ of possession "pending the final disposition of the petition for its cancellation and the annulment of the foreclosure sale.UCPBsought thereconsiderationof the decision, butthe CA denied itsmotion for reconsiderationon March 8, 2004.Hence, UCPB appeals by petition for review on certiorari.ISSUES:UCPB asserts that the CA did not rule in accordance with prevailing laws and jurisprudence when it granted the respondents petition for certiorariand enjoined the implementation of the writ of possession issued by the RTC in favor of UCPB;that the respondents were not entitled to the issuance of an injunctive writ;that the assailed decision and resolution were tantamount to a pre-judgment of the respondents petition to cancel the writ of possession; andthat the respondents were illegally attempting to wrest away its possession of the property.HELD:The petition is impressed with merit.It is necessary to explain the nature of the writ of possession and the consequencesof its implementation.A writ of possession commands the sheriff to place a person in possession of real property. It may be issued inthe following instances, namely: (1) Land registration proceedings under Section 17 of Act No. 496; (2) judicial foreclosure, provided the debtor is in possession of the mortgaged property, and no third person, not a party to the foreclosure suit, had intervened; (3) extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage, pending redemption under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118; and (4) Execution sales, pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

The purchaser at the foreclosure sale may apply ex parte with the RTC of the province or place where the property or any part of itis situated, to give the purchaser possession thereof during the redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the useof the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the debtor shouldit be shown that the sale was made without violating the mortgage or without complying with the requirements of Act No. 3135.The RTC, upon approval of the bond, order that a writ of possession be issued, addressed to the sheriff of the province in which the property is situated, who shallthenexecute said order immediately. The relief is granted even without giving an opportunity to be heard to the person against whom the relief is sought.Its natureas an ex partepetition under Act No. 3135, as amended, renders the application for the issuance of a writ of possessiona non-litigious proceeding.17 Indeed, thegrant of the writ of possession is but a ministerial act on the part of the issuing court, because its issuance is a matter of right on the part of the purchaser.18 The judge issuing the orderforthegranting of the writ of possession pursuant to the express provisions of Act No. 3135cannot be charged with having acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.The property was sold at the public auction on January 12, 1999, with UCPB as the highest bidder. The sheriff issuedthe certificate of saleto UCPB on the same day of the sale. Considering that UCPB registered the certificate of sale in its name on February 18, 1999,the period of redemption was one year from said date. By virtue of the non-redemption by the respondents within said period, UCPB consolidated the title over the property in its name.It isclear enough, therefore, that the RTC committed no grave abuse of discretion but acted inaccordance withthe law and jurisprudence indenying the respondents application for the injunctive writ filed on February 14, 2002 in Special Proceedings No. 5884 to prevent the implementation of the writ of possession issued on December 4, 2001.Consequently, the CAgrossly erred in granting the respondents petition for certiorariand/ormandamus, and in enjoining the RTC from implementing thewrit of possession in favor of UCPB.Otherweighty considerations justify resolvingthis appeal in favor of UCPB.The first is that the CA did not properly appreciate the nature of the supposed error attributed to the RTC.Assuming, though not conceding, that the RTC did err in denying the respondents applicationfor injunction to prevent the implementation of the writ of possession, itserror related only to the correctapplication of the law and jurisprudence relevant to the application for injunction. As such, the error amounted only to one of judgment, not of jurisdiction.An error of judgment is one that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and sucherror is reviewable only throughan appealtaken in due course.In contrast, an error of jurisdiction is committed where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction, and sucherror is correctible only by the extraordinary writ ofcertiorari.25Considering that there is no question that the RTC had jurisdiction over bothCivil Case No. 5920 andSpecial Proceedings No. 5884, it should follow that its consideration and resolution of the respondents application for the injunctive writ filed in Special Proceedings No. 5884 were taken in the exercise of that jurisdiction. As earlier made plain, UCPB as the registered owner of the property was at that point unquestionably entitled to thefull implementation of the writ of possession. In the absence of any clear and persuasive showing that itcapriciouslyor whimsicallydenied the respondents application,its denial of the application did not constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to either lack or excess of jurisdiction.The second concerns the CAs reversing and undoing the RTCs denial of the respondents application for the injunctive writ, andenjoining the RTC from implementing the writ of possession against the respondents "pending the final disposition of the petition for its cancellation and the annulment of the foreclosure sale."27 The CA effectively thereby granted the respondents application for the injunctive writ. In so doing, however, the CA ignored the essential requirements for the grant of the injunctive writ, and disregarded the patent fact that the respondents held noright in essence that the injunctive writ they were seeking would protect. Thus, the CA committed another serious error.A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order requiring a party or a court, an agency, or a person to refrain from a particular a particular act or acts. It may also require the performance of a particular act or acts, in which case it is known as a preliminary mandatory injunction. Under Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunctionmay be justified under any of the following circumstances, namely:(a)Theapplicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;(b)The commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or(c)A party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attemptingto do, or is procuring or suffering to bedone, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.In the case of injunction, the right sought to be protected should at least be shown to exist prima facie. Unless such a showing is made, the applicant is not entitled to an injunctive relief. The Court has stressed the essential significance of the applicant for injunction holding a right in ease to be protected, stating:As with all equitable remedies, injunction must be issued only at the instance of a party who possesses sufficient interest in or title to the right or the property sought to be protectedAccordingly, the conditions for the issuance of the injunctive writ arc: (a) that the right to be protected exists prima facie; (b) that the act sought to be enjoined is violative of that right; and (c) that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.The absence of a right in esse on their part furnishes a compelling reason to undo the CA's reversal of the RTC's denial of their application for injunction as well as to strike down the injunctive relief the CA afforded to the respondents. It cannot be otherwise, for they had no "right clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law".WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; REVERSES the decision promulgated on November 27, 2003 and the resolution promulgated on March 8, 2004 in C.A.-G.R. SP. No. 70261; DISMISSES the petition in C.A.-G.R. SP. No. 70261 for lack of factual and legal merits; DECLARES that there is now no obstacle to the implementation of the writ of possession issued in favor of the petitioner; and ORDERS the respondents to pay the costs of suit.LIGOT VS REPUBLIC-Guys nalampasan ko. AilaG.R. No. 193261 April 24, 2012MEYNARDO SABILI, Petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FLORENCIO LIBREA, Respondents.FACTS: COMELEC denied Sabilis Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for mayor of Lipa due to failure to comply with the one year residency requirement. When petitioner filed his COC for mayor of Lipa City for the 2010 elections, he stated therein that he had been a resident of the city for two (2) years and eight (8) months.However, it is undisputed that when petitioner filed his COC during the 2007 elections, he and his family were then staying at his ancestral home in Barangay (Brgy.) Sico, San Juan, Batangas. Respondent Florencio Librea (private respondent) filed a "Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and to Disqualify a Candidate for Possessing Some Grounds for Disqualification.Allegedly, petitioner falsely declared under oath in his COC that he had already been a resident of Lipa City for two years and eight months prior to the scheduled 10 May 2010 local elections.In its Resolution dated 26 January 2010,41 the COMELEC Second Division granted the Petition of private respondent, declared petitioner as disqualified from seeking the mayoralty post in Lipa City, and canceled his Certificate of Candidacy for his not being a resident of Lipa City and for his failure to meet the statutory one-year residency requirement under the law.Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the 26 January 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC, du