COMPILATION OF SC DECISIONS FOR LEGAL ETHICS (2014-2015)

8/9/2019 COMPILATION OF SC DECISIONS FOR LEGAL ETHICS (2014-2015)

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COMPIL TION OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

(MARCH 2014-MARCH 2015)

Prepared by : ATTY. RESCI ANGELLI RIZADA, RNAteneo de Davao University

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LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS

• A.C. No. 10179. March 4, 2014 Benjamin Q.

Ong Vs. Atty. William F. Delos Santos• A lawyer's issuance of a

worthless check renders him inbreach of his oath to obey thelaws. To accord with the canon ofprofessional responsibility thatrequires him to uphold theConstitution, obey the laws of theland, and promote respect for thelaw and legal processes, hethereby becomes administrativelyliable for gross misconduct.

Being a lawyer, Atty. Delos Santos was

well aware of the objectives and coverageof Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. If he did not,he was nonetheless presumed to knowthem, for the law was penal in characterand application. His issuance of theunfunded check involved herein knowinglyviolated Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, andexhibited his indifference towards thepernicious effect of his illegal act to publicinterest and public order.

He thereby swept aside his Lawyer’s Oaththat enjoined him to support theConstitution and obey the laws. He alsotook for granted the express commands ofthe Code of Professional Responsibility ,specifically Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon7, Rule 7.03, viz :

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THECONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THELAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THELAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A Lawyer shall not engage in

unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitfulconduct.

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALLTIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY ANDDIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION ANDSUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THEINTEGRATED BAR.

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage inconduct that adversely reflects on hisfitness to practice law, nor shall he,whether in public or private life, behave ina scandalous manner to the discredit of

the legal profession.

These canons, the Court has said in Agnov. Cagatan, required of him as a lawyer anenduring high sense of responsibility andgood fidelity in all his dealings

That his act involved a private dealingwith Ong did not matter. His being alawyer invested him – whether he wasacting as such or in a non- professionacapacity – with the obligation to exhibitgood faith, fairness and candor in hisrelationship with others. There is noquestion that a lawyer could be disciplinednot only for a malpractice in hisprofession, but also for any misconductcommitted outside of his professionacapacity. His being a lawyer demandedthat he conduct himself as a person of thehighest moral and professional integrityand probity in his dealings with others.

Moreover, in issuing the dishonored check,Atty. Delos Santos put into serious

question not only his personal integritybut also the integrity of the entireIntegrated Bar. It cannot be denied thatOng acceded to Atty. Delos Santosrequest for encashment of the checkbecause of his complete reliance on thenobility of the Legal Profession.

Atty. Delos Santos should always bemindful of his duty to uphold the law andto be circumspect in all his dealings withthe public. Any transgression of this dutyon his part would not only diminish hisreputation as a lawyer but would alsoerode the public’s faith in the LegaProfession as a whole. His assuring Ongthat he was in good financial standingbecause of his lucrative law practice whenthe contrary was true manifested hisintent to mislead the latter into giving asubstantial amount in exchange for hisworthless post-dated check. Such

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actuation did not speak well of him as amember of the Bar.

Accordingly, Atty. Delos Santos was guiltyof serious misconduct, warranting

appropriate administrative sanction.• A.M. No. RTJ-14-2376/A.M. No. RTJ-14-

2377. March 5, 2014 Ma. Liza M. Jorda,

City Prosecutor's Office, Tacloban City Vs.Judge Crisologo S. Bitas, RTC, Branch 7,Tacloban City; Prosecutor Leo C. TabaoVs. Judge Crisologo S. Bitas, RTC, Branch7, Tacloban City

• As a matter of public policy, notevery error or mistake of a judge inthe performance of his officialduties renders him liable. In theabsence of fraud, dishonesty orcorruption, the acts of a judge inhis official capacity do not alwaysconstitute misconduct although thesame acts may be erroneous. True,a judge may not be disciplined forerror of judgment, absent proofthat such error was made with aconscious and deliberate intent tocause an injustice. This does notmean, however, that a judge neednot observe propriety, discreetnessand due care in the performance of

his official functions.• In the instant case, Miralles was

charged with Qualified Trafficking,which under Section 10 (C) of R.A.No. 9208 is punishable by lifeimprisonment and a fine of not lessthan Two Million Pesos(P2,000,000.00) but not more thanFive Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00).Thus, by reason of the penaltyprescribed by law, the grant of bailis a matter of discretion which canbe exercised only by respondent

judge after the evidence issubmitted in a hearing. Thehearing of the application for bail incapital offenses is absolutelyindispensable before a judge canproperly determine whether theprosecution’s evidence is weak orstrong.

As correctly found by the InvestigatingJustice, with life imprisonment as one ofthe penalties prescribed for the offensecharged against Miralles, he cannot beadmitted to bail when evidence of guilt is

strong, in accordance with Section 7, Rule114 of the Revised Rules of CriminaProcedure.

Here, what is appalling is not only didrespondent judge deviate from therequirement of a hearing where thereis an application for bail, respondent judge granted bail to Miralles withoutneither conducting a hearing nor amotion for application for bail.Respondent judge's justification that hegranted bail, because he found the

evidence of the prosecution weak, cannotbe sustained because the records showthat no such hearing for that purposetranspired. What the records show is ahearing to determine the existence ofprobable cause, not a hearing for apetition for bail. The hearing for bail isdifferent from the determination of theexistence of probable cause. The lattertakes place prior to all proceedings, sothat if the court is not satisfied with theexistence of a probable cause, it may

either dismiss the case or deny theissuance of the warrant of arrest orconduct a hearing to satisfy itself of theexistence of probable cause. If the courtfinds the existence of probable cause, thecourt is mandated to issue a warrant ofarrest or commitment order if the accusedis already under custody, as when he wasvalidly arrested without a warrant. It isonly after this proceeding that the courtcan entertain a petition for bail where asubsequent hearing is conducted todetermine if the evidence of guilt is weak

or not. Hence, in granting bail and fixing itat P20,000.00 motu proprio, withoutallowing the prosecution to present itsevidence, respondent judge denied theprosecution of due process. This Court hadsaid so in many cases and had imposedsanctions on judges who grantedapplications for bail in capital offenses andin offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, without

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giving the prosecution the opportunity toprove that the evidence of guilt is strong.

Clearly, in the instant case, respondent judge's act of fixing the accused's bail and

reducing the same motu proprio is notmere deficiency in prudence, discretionand judgment on the part of respondent judge, but a patent disregard of well-known rules. When an error is so grossand patent, such error produces aninference of bad faith, making the judgeliable for gross ignorance of the law.

Likewise, we are convinced thatrespondent judge’s actuations in the courtpremises during the hearing of thepetition for commitment to the DSWDconstitute abuse of authority and manifestpartiality to the accused. Indeed,respondent judge’s utterance of: “I don’twant to see your face!”; “You bettertransfer to another court!; You are beinginfluenced by politicians” was improperand does not speak well his stature as anofficer of the Court. We note the improperlanguage of respondent judge directedtowards complainants in his Answers andComments where he criticized them fortheir incompetence in handling the subject

case. Respondent Bitas' use of abusiveand insulting words, tending to projectcomplainant’s ignorance of the laws andprocedure, prompted by his belief that thelatter mishandled the cause of his client isobviously and clearly insensitive,distasteful, and inexcusable.Complainants, likewise, cannot be blamedfor being suspicious of respondent’s biasto the accused considering that the formercan be associated with the accusedfollowing his admission that his sister wasa classmate of one Nora Miralles.

Considering the apprehension andreservation of the complainants, prudencedictates that respondent should haveinhibited himself from hearing the case.Such abuse of power and authority couldonly invite disrespect from counsels andfrom the public.

In pending or prospective litigations

before them, judges should bescrupulously careful to avoid anything thatmay tend to awaken the suspicion thattheir personal, social or sundry relationscould influence their objectivity. Not only

must judges possess proficiency in lawthey must also act and behave in suchmanner that would assure litigants andtheir counsel of the judges’ competenceintegrity and independence.

Even on the face of boorish behavior fromthose he deals with, he ought to conducthimself in a manner befitting a gentlemanand a high officer of the court.

The use of intemperate language isincluded in the proscription provided bySection 1, Canon 4 of the New Code ofJudicial Conduct, thus: “Judges shall avoidimpropriety and the appearance ofimpropriety in all the activities of a judge.” It bears stressing that as adispenser of justice, respondent shouldexercise judicial temperament at all timesavoiding vulgar and insulting language. Hemust maintain composure and equanimity

This Court has long held that courtofficials and employees are placed with a

heavy burden and responsibility ofkeeping the faith of the public. Anyimpression of impropriety, misdeed ornegligence in the performance of officiafunctions must be avoided. This Courtshall not countenance any conduct, act oromission on the part of all those involvedin the administration of justice whichwould violate the norm of publicaccountability and diminish the faith of thepeople in the Judiciary.

• A.C. No. 10164. March 10, 2014 Stephan

Brunet and Virginia Romanillo Brunet VsAtty. Ronald L. Guaren

• Atty. Guaren to have violated theCanon of ProfessionaResponsibility when he acceptedthe titling of complainants’ lot anddespite the acceptance ofP7,000.00, he failed to perform hisobligation and allowed 5 long yearsto elapse without any progress in



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the titling of the lot. Atty. Guarenshould also be disciplined forappearing in a case againstcomplainants without a writtenconsent from the latter.

The practice of law is not a business. It isa profession in which duty

to public service, not money, is theprimary consideration. Lawyering is not

primarily meant to be a money-makingventure, and law advocacy is not a

capital that necessarily yields profits. Thegaining of a livelihood should be

a secondary consideration. The duty topublic service and to the

administration of justice should be theprimary consideration of lawyers,

who must subordinate their personalinterests or what they owe to

3 themselves.

Canons 17 and 18 of the Code ofProfessional Responsibility provides that:

CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to thecause of his client and he shall be mindfulof the trust and confidence reposed inhim.

CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his clientwith competence and diligence.

In the present case, Atty. Guaren

admitted that he accepted the amount ofP7,000.00 as partial payment of hisacceptance fee. He, however, failed toperform his obligation to file the case forthe titling of complainants' lot despite thelapse of 5 years. Atty. Guaren breachedhis duty to serve his client withcompetence and diligence when heneglected a legal matter entrusted to him.

• A.C. No. 5359. March 10, 2014 Ermelinda

Lad Vda. De Dominguez, represented byher Attorney-in-Fact, Vicente A. Pichon VsAtty. Arnulfo M. Agleron Sr.

• Atty. Agleron to have violated theCode of Professional Responsibility

when he neglected a legal matterentrusted to him, andrecommended that he besuspended from the practice of lawfor a period of four (4) months.

Atty. Agleron violated Rule 18.03 of theCode of Professional Responsibility, whichprovides that:

Rule 18.03-A lawyer shall not neglect alegal matter entrusted to him, and hisnegligence in connection therewith shalrender him liable.

Once a lawyer takes up the cause of hisclient, he is duty bound to serve his clientwith competence, and to attend to hisclient’s cause with diligence, care anddevotion regardless of whether he acceptsit for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity tosuch cause and must always be mindful ofthe trust and confidence reposed in him.

In the present case, Atty. Agleron

admitted his failure to file the complaintagainst the Municipality of Caraga, DavaoOriental, despite the fact that it wasalready prepared and signed. Heattributed his non-filing of the appropriatecharges on the failure of complainant toremit the full payment of the filing fee andpay the 30% of the attorney's fee. Such

justification, however, is not a validexcuse that would exonerate him fromliability. As stated, every case that is

entrusted to a lawyer deserves his fulattention whether he accepts this for a feeor free. Even assuming that complainanthad not remitted the full payment of thefiling fee, he should have found a way tospeak to his client and inform him aboutthe insufficiency of the filing fee so hecould file the complaint. Atty. Agleronobviously lacked professionalism indealing with complainant and showed



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incompetence when he failed to file theappropriate charges.

• A.M. No. P-12-3070. March 11, 2014 Civil

Service Commission Vs. Nenita C. Longos,Clerk II, MCTC, Del Carmen-Numancia-

San Isidro-San Benito, Surigao del Norte• At bench is an administrative case

involving respondent Nenita C.Longos, employed as Clerk II ofthe Municipal Circuit Trial Court,Del Carmen-Numancia-San Isidro-San Benito, Surigao del Norte. TheOffice of the Court Administrator(OCA) found her guilty ofdishonesty for allowing anotherperson to take her 1992 CivilService Professional Examination.

It is beyond question that the act offraudulently securing one’s appointmentconstitutes dishonesty. In Office of theCourt Administrator v. Bermejo, wesquarely ruled thus:

Dishonesty is defined as intentionallymaking a false statement on any materialfact, or practicing or attempting topractice any deception or fraud insecuring his examination,appointment or registration.

Dishonesty is a serious offense whichreflects a person’s character and exposesthe moral decay which virtually destroyshis honor, virtue and integrity. It is amalevolent act that has no place in the judiciary, as no other office in thegovernment service exacts a greaterdemand for moral righteousness from anemployee than a position in the judiciary.(Emphasis supplied)

The case of Longos is not one of firstimpression. In numerous other cases, thisCourt has dismissed erring personnel ofthe judiciary whose civil service eligibilitywas unscrupulously obtained through theguise of another.

This fraudulent act by an aspiring civilservant will not be countenanced by theCourt, much more so when committed byone who seeks to be employed in our fold.

After all, credibility undergirds thesubstance and process ofthe renderingofjustice.

All public service must be founded on and

sustained by character. With the rightcharacter, the attitude ofjudiciaryemployees is set in the right direction. Itis then of utmost consequence that everyemployee of the

judiciary exhibit the highest sense ofhonesty and integrity to preserve the goodname and integrity of the courts of justice

• A.M. No. RTJ-08-2151. March 11,2014 Office of the Court Administrator

Vs. Judge Edwin C. Larida, Jr., RTC,Branch 18, Tagaytay City

• A mysterious early Sundaymorning fire in the records room ofa courthouse set off a series of redflags pointing to anomalous actsallegedly committed by itsinhabitants. It led to theresignation of a clerk of court afterhe had formally denounced thePresiding Judge for committingvarious anomalies and irregularitiesthat are now the subjects of this

administrative case against thePresiding Judge.

•

1. Violation of Administrative CircularNo. 28-2008 by authorizing the detaiof locally-funded employees to Branch18 without obtaining permission fromthe Court, and by allowing them totake custody of court records and todraft court orders and rulings for him

Paragraph 3 of Administrative Circular No28-2008 also confined the service oflocally-funded employees to givingassistance in the performance of clericaworks, like receiving letters and othercommunications for the Branch, typing ofaddresses on envelopes for mailing, typingof certificates of appearance, and typingof monthly reports. Such employees werenot to have the custody of court records,

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or to have anything to do with theimplementation of judicial processes, or todischarge other duties involving courtproceedings beyond the merely clerical.The prohibition was intended to preserve

the confidentiality of court records andproceedings, because such employeeswere not employed in the Judiciary.

Judge Larida admitted in his judicialaffidavit that Marticio had drafted courtorders and had done legal research inBranch 18. Under the circumstances, hisclaim of discontinuing Marticio’s draftingactivities upon the effectivity ofAdministrative Circular No. 28-2008 onMarch 11, 2008, assuming it to be true,did not diminish or excuse his violation if

he still permitted Marticio to do legalresearch work thereafter. Legal researchwas an activity that was more thanclerical. Clearly, Judge Larida did notcomply with Administrative Circular No.28-2008, which was a less serious chargeunder Section 9 of Rule 140, Rules ofCourt ,

Knowingly allowing detailedemployeesto solicit commissions from bonding

companies

Based on the foregoing, Judge Larida wasnot unaware of the solicitations byMarticio, Laggui and Cabanizas from thecomplaining bonding company. Thesolicitations were surely irregular andimproper activities undertaken by personsvisibly working for the courts. Consideringthat such activities were committed withhis knowledge, Judge Larida should havedone more than merely confronting themin the presence of the representative ofthe complaining bonding company, andthen and there merely telling them to stopthe solicitations. He should have insteadimmediately caused or called for theirinvestigation and, if the evidencewarranted, seen to their proper criminalprosecution. The firmer action by himwould have avoided the undesirableimpression that he had perversely

acquiesced to their activities. He thuscontravened the Code of Judicial Conduct which imposed on him the duty to take orinitiate appropriate disciplinary measuresagainst court personnel for unprofessiona

conduct of which he would have becomeaware,

Charge of soliciting money from theaccused in Criminal Case No. TG-2969-98.

It is truly proper to emphasize at thispoint that a charge of bribery against a judge is easy to concoct and difficult todisprove; hence, the Court alwaysdemands that the complainant present apanoply of evidence in support of theaccusation. A mere affidavit attesting thata judge demanded a bribe in exchange forthe exoneration of an accused being triedbefore him is not sufficient. In order thatan accusation of this nature is not to beconsidered a fairy tale, competent andreliable evidence other than the testimonyof a lone witness needs to be adducedEvery administrative complaint levelledagainst a sitting judge must be examinedwith a discriminating eye, thereforebecause its consequential effects are by

their nature highly penal, to the extentthat the respondent judge may face thesanction of dismissal from the serviceIndeed, no judge should be disciplined formisconduct unless the evidence againsthim is competent and sufficientAccordingly, the Court rightfully rejectsany imputation of judicial misconduct inthe absence of sufficient proof to sustainit.

Releasing the accused in CriminaCase No. TG-432-03 on bail despitetheir being positively identified as theperpetrators of the crime

Verily, the determination of whether ornot the evidence of guilt of the accused inCriminal Case No. TG-4382-03 was strongfor purposes of resolving the petition forbail was a matter of judicial discretion forJudge Larida as the trial judge. Only he


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merit.

In administrative proceedings, thecomplainant has the burden of proving theallegations of the complaint by substantial

evidence. Failure to do so will lead to thedismissal of the complaint for its lack ofmerit. This is because an administrativecharge against any official of the Judiciarymust be supported by at least substantialevidence. But when the charge equates toa criminal offense, such that the judicialofficer may suffer the heavy sanctions ofdismissal from the service, the showing ofculpability on the part of the judicialofficer should be nothing short of proofbeyond reasonable doubt, especiallybecause the charge is penal in character.

AMALI fell short of the requirements forestablishing its charge of knowinglyrendering an unjust judgment againstrespondent Justices.

Knowingly rendering an unjust judgmentconstitutes a serious criminal offense.Article 204, Revised Penal Code, providesthat any judge who “knowingly render[s]an unjust judgment in any case submittedto him for decision” is punished with

prision mayor and perpetual absolutedisqualification. To commit the offense,the offender must be a judge who isadequately shown to have rendered anunjust judgment, not one who merelycommitted an error of judgment or takenthe unpopular side of a controversial pointof law. The term knowingly means “sureknowledge, conscious and deliberateintention to do an injustice.”

Thus, the complainant must not onlyprove beyond reasonable doubt that the judgment is patently contrary to law ornot supported by the evidence but that itwas also made with deliberate intent toperpetrate an injustice. Good faith and theabsence of malice, corrupt motives orimproper consideration are sufficientdefenses that will shield a judge from thecharge of rendering an unjust decision. Inother words, the judge was motivated by

hatred, revenge, greed or some othersimilar motive in issuing the judgmentBad faith is, therefore, the ground forliability. The failure of the judge tocorrectly interpret the law or to properly

appreciate the evidence presented doesnot necessarily render himadministratively liable.

But who is to determine and declare thatthe judgment or final order that the judicial officer knowingly rendered orissued was unjust? May suchdetermination and declaration be made inadministrative investigations andproceedings like a preliminaryinvestigation by the public prosecutor?The answers to these queries are obvious

– only a superior court acting by virtue ofeither its appellate or supervisory jurisdiction over the judicial actionsinvolved may make such determinationand declaration. Otherwise, the publicprosecutor or administrative hearingofficer may be usurping a basic judiciapower of review or supervision lodged bythe Constitution or by law elsewhere inthe appellate court.

Moreover, AMALI’s allegations directly

attacked the validity of the proceedings inthe CA through an administrativecomplaint. The attack in this mannerreflected the pernicious practice bydisgruntled litigants and their lawyers ofresorting to administrative chargesagainst sitting judges instead ofexhausting all their available remediesWe do not tolerate the practice. In Re:Verified Complaint of Engr. Oscar L.Ongjoco, Chairman of the Board/CEO ofFH-GYMN Multi-Purpose and TransportService Cooperative, against Hon. Juan Q

Enriquez, Jr., Hon. Ramon M. Bato, Jr. andHon. Florito S. Macalino, Associate Justices, Court of Appeals, weemphatically held that the filing ofadministrative complaints or even threatsof the filing subverted and undermined theindependence of the Judiciary,

It appears that AMALI is prone to bringing


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charges against judicial officers who ruleagainst it in its cases. That impression isnot at all devoid of basis. The complaintherein is actually the second one thatAMALI has brought against respondent

Justices in relation to the performance oftheir judicial duty in the same case.

The filing of the meritless administrativecomplaints by AMALI was not onlyrepulsive, but also an outright disrespectof the authority of the CA and of thisCourt. Unfounded administrative chargesagainst judges truly degrade the judicialoffice, and interfere with the dueperformance of their work for theJudiciary. Although the Court did not thendeem fit to hold in the first administrative

case AMALI or its representativepersonally responsible for the unfoundedcharges brought against respondentJustices, it is now time, proper andimperative to do so in order to uphold thedignity and reputation of respondentJustices, of the CA itself, and of the rest ofthe Judiciary. AMALI and itsrepresentatives have therebydemonstrated their penchant forharassment of the judges who did not doits bidding, and they have not stopped

doing so even if the latter were sitting judges. To tolerate the actuations ofAMALI and its representatives would be toreward them with undeserved impunity foran obviously wrong attitude towards theCourt and its judicial officers.

Indeed, no judicial officer should have tofear or apprehend being held to accountor to answer for performing his judicialfunctions and office because suchperformance is a matter of public duty andresponsibility. The office and duty to

render and administer justice areafunction of sovereignty, and should not besimply taken for granted.

• A.M. No. MTJ-13-1838. March 12,2014 Spouses Ricardo and Evelyn

Marcelo Vs. Judge Ramsey Domingo G.Pichay, MeTC, Br. 78, Paranaque City

• The essential issue in this case iswhether or not Judge Pichay should

be held administratively liable forundue delay in the resolution of thepending incidents in Civil Case No2004-286.

The Constitution requires our courts toconscientiously observe the time periodsin deciding cases and resolving mattersbrought to their adjudication, which, forlower courts, is three (3) months from thedate they are deemed submitted fordecision or resolution. Section 15, ArticleVIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution(1987 Constitution) states this rule

the Court held that non- compliance withthe periods prescribed under Section 15,Article VIII of the 1987 Constitutionconstitutes gross inefficiency, andperforce, warrants the imposition ofadministrative sanctions against thedefaulting judge, viz.: The Court hasconsistently impressed upon judges theneed to decide cases promptly andexpeditiously under the time-honoredprecept that justice delayed is justicedenied. Every judge should decide caseswith dispatch and should be careful,punctual, and observant in theperformance of his functions for delay in

the disposition of cases erodes the faithand confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its standards and bringsit into disrepute. Failure to decide acase within the reglementary periodis not excusable and constitutes grossinefficiency warranting the impositionof administrative sanctions on thedefaulting judge.

As correctly observed by the OCA in thiscase, Judge Pichay failed to resolve thesubject motions, namely the motion forreconsideration and supplemental motion,within the three (3) month-periodprescribed therefor. Records show thatSps. Marcelo’s period to file theircomment/opposition to the supplementamotion and/ or rejoinder to the replylapsed on October 18, 2009, at whichtime, the pending incidents were, asstated in the Order dated October 1,

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2009, already deemed submitted forresolution. This is concordant with Section15(2), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitutionwhich states that “[a] case or matter shallbe deemed submitted for decision or

resolution upon the filing of the lastpleading, brief, or memorandum requiredby the Rules of Court or by the courtitself.”

Notwithstanding that the matter hadalready been submitted for resolution,Judge Pichay continued with theproceedings by setting the motions forhearing to the effect of unreasonablydelaying the execution of the subjectdecision. Indeed, while it has been heldthat a presiding judge shall at all times

remain in firm control of the proceedings,he is nevertheless mandated to adopt apolicy against unwarranted delays. In thiscase, Judge Pichay did not sufficientlyexplain the reasons as to why he failed toresolve the pending incidents on time, aswell as to why he still had to set the samefor hearing and repeatedly grantpostponements therefor, either motu proprio or by motion, despite thesummary nature of ejectment proceedingsand the ministerial nature of the

subsequent issuance of a writ ofexecution. These considerations he shouldhave been fully aware of. As case lawinstructs, “[e]jectment cases are summaryproceedings intended to provide anexpeditious means of protecting actualpossession or right of possession ofproperty,” and that “it becomesmandatory or ministerial duty of the courtto issue a writ of execution to enforce the judgment which has become executory.To add, the fact that Judge Pichayrequired medical attention on June 7,

2010 is no excuse for his default,considering that on such date, the subjectmotions were already due for resolution.Thus, without having duly applied for anyextension before the Court, Judge Pichaywas bound to resolve the pendingincidents in the said case within the three(3) month-period prescribed by theConstitution. This, he, however, failed to

do, and, as such, the imposition of

administrative sanctions against himremains in order.

•

A.C. No. 10185. March 12, 2014

LicerioDizon Vs. Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr.

ISSUE: DISBARMENT DUE TO falsificationof public document.

Section 1, Public Act No. 2103, otherwiseknown as the Notarial Law states:

The acknowledgment shall be before anotary public or an officer duly authorizedby law of the country to takeacknowledgments of instruments or

documents in the place where the act isdone. The notary public or the officertaking the acknowledgment shall certifythat the person acknowledging theinstrument or document is known to himand that he is the same person whoexecuted it, acknowledged that the sameis his free act and deed. The certificateshall be made under the official seal, if heis required by law to keep a seal, and ifnot, his certificate shall so state.

The requirement of affiant's persona

appearance was further emphasized inSection 2 (b) of Rule IV of the Rules onNotarial Practice of 2004 which providesthat:

A person shall not perform a notarial act ifthe person involved as signatory to theinstrument or document -

(1) is not in the notary's presencepersonally at the time of the notarization;and

(2) is not personally known to the notarypublic or otherwise identified by thenotary public through competent evidenceof identity as defined by these Rules.

As a notary public, Atty. Cabucana shouldnot notarize a document unless the personwho signs it is the same person executingit and personally appearing before him to



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attest to the truth of its contents. This isto enable him to verify the genuineness ofthe signature of the acknowledging party

and to ascertain that the document is the

party's free and voluntary act and deed.• A.C. No. 9116. March 12, 2014 Nestor

Figueras and Bienvenido Victoria, Jr. Vs.Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez

• Respondent now comes to thisCourt essentially raising the issuewhether the IBP correctly foundhim administratively liable forviolation of Rule 12.03, Canon 12,Canon 17, Rule 18.03, and Canon18 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility.

• After careful consideration of therecords of the case, the Court findsthat the suspension of respondentfrom the practice of law is proper.

• The Court finds no merit inrespondent’s contention thatcomplainants have no personalityto file a disbarment case againsthim as they were not his clientsand that the present suit wasmerely instituted to harass him.

• The procedural requirementobserved in ordinary civil

proceedings that only the realparty-in-interest must initiate thesuit does not apply in disbarmentcases. In fact, the person whocalled the attention of the court toa lawyer’s misconduct “is in nosense a party, and generally hasno interest in the outcome.”

In Heck v. Judge Santos, the Court heldthat “[a]ny interested person or the courtmotu proprio may initiate disciplinaryproceedings.” The right to institutedisbarment proceedings is not confined toclients nor is it necessary that the personcomplaining suffered injury from thealleged wrongdoing. Disbarmentproceedings are matters of public interestand the only basis for the judgment is theproof or failure of proof of the charges.

The Court agrees with the IBP that

respondent had been remiss in theperformance of his duties as counsel forCongressional Village Homeowner’sAssociation, Inc. Records show thatrespondent filed the first motion for

extension of time to file appellant’s brief95 days after the expiration of thereglementary period to file said brief, thuscausing the dismissal of the appeal of thehomeowner’s association. To justify hisinexcusable negligence, respondentalleges that he was merely the supervisinglawyer and that the fault lies with thehandling lawyer. His contention, howeveris belied by the records for we note thatrespondent had filed with the CA anUrgent Motion for Extension, which hehimself signed on behalf of the law firm,

stating that a previous motion had beenfiled but “due to the health condition ofthe undersigned counsel...he was not ableto finish said Appellants’ Brief within thefifteen (15) day period earlier requestedby him.” Thus, it is clear that respondentwas personally in charge of the case.

A lawyer engaged to represent a client ina case bears the responsibility ofprotecting the latter’s interest with utmostdiligence. In failing to file the appellant’s

brief on behalf of his client, respondenthad fallen far short of his duties ascounsel as set forth in Rule 12.04, Canon12 of the Code of ProfessionaResponsibility which exhorts everymember of the Bar not to unduly delay acase and to exert every effort andconsider it his duty to assist in the speedyand efficient administration of justiceRule 18.03, Canon 18 of the same Codealso states that:

Canon 18—A lawyer shall serve his client

with competence and diligence.

Rule 18.03.—A lawyer shall not neglect alegal matter entrusted to him and hisnegligence in connection therewith shalrender him liable.

• A.M. No. P-12-3074. March 17, 2014 The

Office of the Court Administrator VsClarita R. Perez, Clerk of Court II,

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Municipal Trial Court, San Teodoro-Baco-Puerto Galera, Oriental MindoroISSUE: misconduct for her failure totimely remit the judiciary funds in hercustody and submit the Monthly Reports

of Collections, Deposits and Withdrawals.

Clerks of Court perform a delicate functionas designated custodians of the court’sfunds, revenues, records, properties andpremises. As such, they are generallyregarded as treasurer, accountant, guardand physical plant manager thereof. Theyare the chief administrative officers oftheir respective courts. It is also their dutyto ensure that the proper procedures arefollowed in the collection of cash bonds.Thus, their failure to faithfully perform

their duties makes them liable for anyloss, shortage, destruction or impairmentof such funds and property.

Under the Supreme Court (SC) CircularNo. 13-92, clerks of courts are mandatedto immediately deposit their fiduciarycollections upon receipt thereof, with anauthorized government depository bank.Section 3, in relation to Section 5 of SCAdministrative Circular No. 5-93,specifically designates the Land Bank of

the Philippines (LBP) as the authorizedgovernment depositary of the JDF.

In the present case, not only did therespondent incur delay in the remittanceof her fiduciary collections but she alsoused the money for her personal use.

While the Court empathizes with therespondent in her predicament concerningher brother’s medical needs, herwrongdoing cannot be excused. Ascustodian of the court’s funds andrevenues, she was entrusted with theprimary responsibility of correctly andeffectively implementing regulationsregarding fiduciary funds. She was anaccountable officer entrusted with thegreat responsibility of collecting moneybelonging to the funds of the court. Shewas, therefore, liable for any loss,shortage, destruction, or impairment of

said funds and property.

She was not supposed to keep those fundsin her possession or worse appropriatethem for her personal use.

The respondent should have diligentlyobserved SC Circular No. 13-92. Sincethere was no LBP branch near the court’sstation and the nearest branch is locatedan hour away in Calapan City, therespondent should have deposited thefunds via Postal Money Order (PMO)According to the report of the CMO-OCAaudit team, the respondent attributed thedelay in the remittance of her fiduciarycollections to the non-availability of PMOsin the Local Post Office of San TeodoroOriental Mindoro. However, the audit teamwas able to verify from the LocaPostmaster that PMOs are alwaysavailable. Stocks of PMOs run out onlywhen the amount to be deposited reachesthe maximum allowable amount of₱10,000.00. Further, according to theLocal Post Office, “as soon as the PMOsare exhausted, replenishment of the sameis done immediately via the Post Office ofCalapan City, which takes not more than amonth.”

The respondent’s subsequent restitution ofthe amounts did not alter the fact that shewas remiss in the discharge of her dutiesShortages in the amounts to be remittedand the years of delay in the actuaremittance constitute gross neglect ofduty for which the clerk of court shall beadministratively liable.

By failing to timely remit the cashcollections constituting public funds, sheviolated the trust reposed in her asdisbursement officer of the JudiciaryDelay in the remittance of collection is aserious breach of duty. It deprives theCourt of the interest that may be earned ifthe amounts are promptly deposited in abank. It constitutes dishonesty whichcarries the extreme penalty of dismissafrom the service even if committed for thefirst time.


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• A.C. No. 5329. March 18, 2014 Heinz R.

Heck Vs. City Prosecutor Casiano A.Gamotin, Jr.

• This administrative complaint was

brought against a City Prosecutorwhose manner of dealing with thecomplainant, a foreigner, hadoffended the latter. We dismiss thecomplaint because of thecomplainant's failure to prove thatthe respondent thereby breachedany canon of professional conductor legal ethics. Indeed, everylawyer who is administrativelycharged is presumed innocentofwrongdoing.

However, unlike the OBC, we do not findany justification to sanction therespondent. A lawyer like the respondentis not to be sanctioned for every perceivedmisconduct or wrong actuation. He is stillto be presumed innocent of wrongdoinguntil the proof arrayed against himestablishes otherwise. It is the burden ofthe complainant to properly show that theassailed conduct or actuation constituted abreach of the norms of professionalconduct and legal ethics. Otherwise, the

lawyer merits exoneration.

To begin with, the holding of the meetingbetween Atty. Babarin, Heck’s counsel,and Atty. Adaza in the respondent’s officewas not suspicious or irregular, contraryto the insinuation of Heck. We are notunmindful of the practice of some legalpractitioners to arrange to meet with theiropposing counsels and their clients in thepremises of the offices of the publicprosecutors or in the courthousesprimarily because such premises are

either a convenient or a neutral ground forboth sides. Accordingly, holding themeeting between Heck and his adversary,with their respective counsels,

in the respondent’s office did not by itselfindicate any illegal or corrupt activity. Wealso note that the respondent was not

present in the meeting.

Secondly, we cannot sanction therespondent for having angrily reacted toHeck’s unexpected tirade in his presence

The respondent was not then reacting toan attack on his person, but to Heck’sdisrespectful remark against Philippineauthorities in general. Any self-respectinggovernment official like the respondentshould feel justly affronted by anyexpression or show of disrespect in hispresence, including harsh words like thoseuttered by Heck. Whether or not Heck was justified in making the utterance is of norelevance to us. Lawyers may be expectedto maintain their composure and decorumat all times, but they are still human, and

their emotions are like those of othernormal people placed in unexpectedsituations that can crack their veneer ofself-control. That is how we now view theactuation of the respondent in reacting toHeck’s utterance. The Court will notpermit the respondent’s good record to betarnished by his having promptly reactedto Heck’s remark.

Moreover, Heck could have sincerelyperceived the respondent’s actuations to

be arrogant and overbearing, but it is notfair for us to take the respondent to taskin the context of the events and occasionsin which the actuations occurred in theabsence of a credible showing that hisactuations had been impelled by any badmotive, or had amounted to any breach ofany canon of professional conduct or legaethics.

Lastly, Heck complains that therespondent still entertained Atty. Adazadespite the latter having been alreadysuspended from the practice of law. Therespondent explains, however, that he “had no personal knowledge of AttyAdaza’s suspension and that suchinformation was not properly disseminatedto the proper offices.”

We are inclined to believe the



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respondent’s explanation.

The Court meted on Atty. Adaza thesuspension from the practice of law in itsdecision promulgated on March 27, 2000

in Adm. Case No. 4083 entitled Gonato v. Adaza. When Heck confronted therespondent on September 15, 2000 abouthis allowing Atty. Adaza to practice lawdespite his suspension, the respondentasked when Heck had learned of thesuspension. The respondent therebyimplied that he had been unaware of thesuspension until then.

We believe that the respondent was notyet aware of the suspension at that time.In Heck v. Atty. Versoza (Adm. Case No.5330, December 5, 2000), the Courtclarified that Atty. Adaza's suspensionbecame final and effective only after hisreceipt on September 5, 2000 of theresolution denying his motion forreconsideration with finality; andexplained that he would be denied hisright to due process if his suspension wereto be made operative on March 27, 2000,the date when the Court ordered hissuspension for six months. The Courtfurther clarified in Heck v. Atty. Versoza

that the courts in the country as well asthe public would be informed of thesuspension only after the lapse of areasonable period after September 5,2000 considering that as a matter ofpolicy the circularization of the order ofsuspension could be done only after thedecision upon the suspension had attainedfinality.

It was possible that at the occasion whenAtty. Adaza appeared before therespondent on September 15, 2000, hissuspension had not yet attained finality,or that the order of suspension had notyet been known to the respondent.Accordingly, it will be unjustified to holdthe respondent liable for allowing Atty.Adaza to practice law and to represent hisclient in the OCP of Cagayan de Oro City.

• A.C. No. 3405. March 18, 2014 Julieta B.

Narag Vs. Atty. Dominador M. NaragDissenting Opinion J. Leonen

• Before this Court is a "Petition forReadmission" to the practice of lawfiled by Dominador M. Narag

(Respondent).

“Whether the applicant shall be reinstatedin the Roll of Attorneys rests to a greatextent on the sound discretion of theCourt. The action will depend on whetheror not the Court decides that the publicinterest in the orderly and impartiaadministration of justice will continue tobe preserved even with the applicant’sreentry as a counselor at law. Theapplicant must, like a candidate foradmission to the bar, satisfy the Court

that he is a person of good moracharacter, a fit and proper person topractice law. The Court will take intoconsideration the applicant’s characterand standing prior to the disbarment, thenature and character of the charge/s forwhich he was disbarred, his conductsubsequent to the disbarment, and thetime that has elapsed between thedisbarment and the application forreinstatement.”

The extreme penalty of disbarment wasmeted on the respondent on account ofhis having committed a grossly immoraconduct, i.e., abandoning his wife andchildren to live with his much youngerparamour. Indeed, nothing could be morereprehensible than betraying one’s ownfamily in order to satisfy an irrational andinsatiable desire to be with anotherwoman. The respondent’s act was plainlyselfish and clearly evinces hisinappropriateness to be part of the noblelegal profession.

More than 15 years after being disbarred,the respondent now professes that he hadalready repented and expressed remorseover the perfidy that he had brought uponhis wife and their children. That suchrepentance and remorse, the respondentasserts, together with the long years thathe had endured his penalty, is now

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sufficient to enable him to be readmittedto the practice of law.

The respondent's pleas, however, aremere words that are hollow and bereft of

any substance. The Court, in decidingwhether the respondent should indeed bereadmitted to the practice of law, must beconvinced that he had indeed beenreformed; that he had already rid himselfof any grossly immoral act which wouldmake him inept for the practice of law.However, it appears that the respondent,while still legally married to Julieta, is stillliving with his paramour - the woman forwhose sake he abandoned his family. Thisonly proves to show that the respondenthas not yet learned from his prior

misgivings.

That he was supposedly forgiven by hiswife and their children would likewise notbe sufficient ground to grant respondent'splea. It is noted that only his son,Dominador, Jr., signed the affidavit whichwas supposed to evidence the forgivenessbestowed upon the respondent. Thus, withregard to Julieta and the six other childrenofthe respondent, the claim that they hadlikewise forgiven the respondent is

hearsay. In any case, that the family ofthe respondent had forgiven him does notdiscount the fact that he is still committinga grossly immoral conduct; he is still livingwith a woman other than his wife.

Likewise, that the respondent executed aholographic will wherein he bequeaths allhis properties to his wife and their childrenis quite immaterial and would not bedemonstrative that he had indeedchanged his ways. Verily, nothing wouldstop the respondent from later onexecuting another last will and testamentof a different tenor once he had beenreadmitted to the legal profession.

In fine, the Court is not convinced that therespondent had shown remorse over histransgressions and that he had alreadychanged his ways as would merit hisreinstatement to the legal, profession.

Time and again the Court has stressedthat the practice of law is not a right but aprivilege. It is enjoyed only by those whocontinue to display unassailable character.

•

A.M. No. 07-9-454-RTC/A.M. No. 05-2-108-RTC. March 18, 2014 Re: Judicia

Audit Conducted in the Regional TriaCourt, Branch 20, Cagayan De Oro City,Misamis Oriental/Request of JudgeGregorio D. Pantanosas, Jr., Regional TriaCourt, Branch 20, Cagayan De Oro City,for Extension of Time to Decide CriminaCases Nos. 92-1935 & 26 Others

• A Judge who fails to decide casesand related matters within theperiods prescribed by law is guiltyof gross inefficiency, and may be

punished with dismissal from theservice even for the first offenseunless he has been meanwhileseparated from the service, inwhich instance he may be imposedthe stiffest of fines. For falselyrendering certificates of service tothe effect that he did not have anyunresolved cases and matterspending in his court's docket, he isalso guilty of dishonesty, anotheract of gross misconduct, for which

he should be sanctioned withdismissal from the service even forthe first offense. But hisintervening separation from theservice leaves the only properpenalty to be the forfeiture of hisentire retirement benefits, excepthis earned leaves.

• A.C. No. 9896. March 19, 2014 Ma. Elena

Carlos Nebreja Vs. Atty. Benjamin Reonal

ISSUE: failure to file the contractedpetition for annulment of marriage in herbehalf; for his misrepresentation on itsstatus; and for his use of a fictitious officeaddress.

Despite the engagement of his servicesrespondent did not file the contractedpetition. His conduct, as held in Vda. DeEnriquez v. San Jose, amounted to

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inexcusable negligence. This was found tobe contrary to the mandate prescribed inRule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code ofProfessional Responsibility, which enjoineda lawyer not to neglect a legal matter

entrusted to him.

Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code ofProfessional Responsibility provides for therule on negligence and states:

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect alegal matter entrusted to him and hisnegligence in connection therewith shallrender him liable.

This Court has consistently held, inconstruing this Rule, that the mere failureof the lawyer to perform the obligationsdue to the client is considered per se aviolation. Thus, a lawyer was held to benegligent when he failed to do anything toprotect his client's interest after receivinghis acceptance fee. In another case, thisCourt has penalized a lawyer for failing toinform the client of the status of the case,among other matters. In another instance,for failure to take the appropriate actionsin connection with his client's case, thelawyer was suspended from the practice of

law for a period of six months and wasrequired to render accounting of all thesums he received from his client.

With regard to respondent’smisrepresentation of his office address,the case of Porac Trucking, Inc. v. Courtof Appeals, sets an example. In the saidcase, the Court imposed a six-monthsuspension on the lawyer after it wasestablished that the said lawyer indeedclaimed to be a lawyer of Porac Trucking,Inc. when, in truth and in fact, he wasnot. Still, in another case, the same six(6) month suspension was inposed on theerring lawyer after it was established thathe claimed before the trial court to be amember of Citizens Legal Assistance Officewhen in truth, he was not.

In this case, respondent clearly receivedhis acceptance fee, among others, and

then completely neglected his client’scause. Moreover, he failed to informcomplainant of the true status of thepetition. His act of receiving money asacceptance fee for legal services in

handling the complainant's case and,subsequently, failing to render theservices, was a clear violation of Canon 18of the code of Professional Responsibility.

For all of respondent's acts - failure to filethe contracted petition for annulment ofmarriage in behalf of the complainant, hismisrepresentation on its status and hisuse of a fictitious office address, hedeserves the penalty imposed upon himby the IBP.

The Court, however, deletes theaforementioned order stated in theresolution of the IBP, to wit, "To returnthe amount of Eighty Thousand NineHundred Pesos (P80,900.00) tocomplainant within five (5) days fromnotice with 12% interest per annum fromthe date this recommendation is affirmedby the Supreme Court." The Court hasrecently adopted the policy to let thecomplainant claim and collect the amountdue from the respondent in an

independent action, civil or criminal.

Nevertheless, the Court looks withdisfavor at the non-payment by a lawyerof his due obligations.

• A.M. No. MTJ-13-1823. March 19, 2014

P/Sr. Insp. Teddy M. Rosqueta Vs. JudgeJonathan A. Asuncion, Municipal TriaCourt in Cities, Branch 2, Laoag City,Ilocos Norte

• The members of the Bench are oneof the pillars of our justice systemThey must strive to observe thehighest standards of integrity andprobity in their professional andpersonal lives. The public has theright to expect an unimpeachablebearing from them. Thisexpectation is not limited to their judgments, but extends to theirpublic demeanor, and should standto the closest of scrutiny. They

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deserve to be condignly sanctionedotherwise.

Did Judge Asuncion take the firearm andgive it to Refuerzo? If so, did he violate

the New Code of Judicial Conduct as tomake him guilty of gross misconduct?

After due consideration of the findings andevaluation of Executive Judge Ragucos,which the OCA adopted, we find thatJudge Asuncion took the firearm and gaveit to Refuerzo in violation of the New Codeof Judicial Conduct . Accordingly, wepronounce him guilty of gross misconduct.

1.Explanations of Judge Asuncion werenot entitled to credence

The firearm, then in the custody of Branch2 of the MTCC, would have been evidencein Criminal Case No. 34412 to prove thecharge of illegal possession of a firearmand its ammunitions, but its being offeredas evidence did not ultimately come topass because of the intervening quashal ofthe information on October 5, 2005 uponthe motion of Canlas. Being unofferedevidence, the firearm had to be properly

disposed of thereafter either by the Officeof the City Prosecutor of Laoag City,whose evidence the firearm was supposedto be offered in court, or by the PNP, theagency expressly authorized by law totake custody of the firearm. Under SCCircular 47-98, supra, which was asubstantial reiteration of SC Circular 2dated May 13, 1983, Judge Asuncion andhis clerk of court in Branch 2 had theministerial duty and the primaryresponsibility to turn over the firearm tothe proper office of the PNP (i.e., FESAGS)because it would no longer be needed asevidence upon the dismissal of CriminalCase No. 34412. A ministerial duty orfunction is one that an officer or tribunalperforms in the context of a given set offacts, in a prescribed manner and withoutregard to the exercise of judgment uponthe propriety or impropriety of the act tobe done. However, on April 11, 2006,

Judge Asuncion denied the motion filed onJanuary 16, 2006 by the Office of the CityProsecutor of Laoag City seeking theturnover of the firearm to the PNP.

The actuations of Judge Asuncion inrelation to the firearm conceded that thedismissal of Criminal Case No. 34412 didnot invest the rightful custody of thefirearm either in him or his court. Yet, theestablished facts and circumstances showthat he still appropriated the firearm andgiven it to Refuerzo, his bodyguard. Hisappropriation of the firearm would havegone undiscovered had not the team ledby Sr. Insp. Rosqueta seized it fromRefuerzo, who had nothing to do with itsproper custody. It then became incumbent

upon Judge Asuncion to explain how thefirearm landed in the possession ofRefuerzo.

Judge Asuncion took the position that thefirearm, unoffered in evidence because ofthe quashal of the information, stil “impliedly belonged to Joseph Canlas;”hence, the directive of SC Circular 47-98for the turnover of the firearm to the PNPdid not apply to the firearm involved hereHis position is clearly untenable. Firstly,

he had no discretion to withhold thefirearm from the PNP and to return itinstead to Canlas, who held no license orauthority to possess it. Indeed, theturnover to the PNP was based on theclear and straightforward text and tenor ofSC Circular 47- 98 – Firearms being usedas evidence in courts will only be turned-in to FEO (now Firearms and ExplosivesDivision) upon the termination of thecases or when it is no longer needed asevidence. And, secondly, he did notsincerely believe in his own position,

because he did he not order the return ofthe firearm to Canlas upon the dismissaof Criminal Case No. 34412.

The foregoing incongruities contained inJudge Asuncion’s explanation inevitablylead us to conclude that he took apersonal interest in the firearm andappropriated it. Accountability for his


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actuations is inescapable for him. He wasguilty of misusing evidence entrusted tohis court. He thereby did not live up to theexacting standards prescribed by the NewCode of Judicial Conduct , specifically its

Canon 2 and Canon 4, viz :

CANON 2

INTEGRITY

Integrity is essential not only to theproper discharge of the judicial office butalso to the personal demeanor of judges.

Section 1. Judges shall ensure that notonly is their conduct above reproach, but

that it is perceived to be so in the view ofa reasonable observer.

Sec. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith inthe integrity of the judiciary. Justice mustnot merely be done but must also be seento be done.

CANON 4

PROPRIETY

Propriety and the appearance of proprietyare essential to the performance of all theactivities of a judge.

Section 1. Judges shall avoid improprietyand the appearance of impropriety in all oftheir activities.

The admonition that judges must avoidnot only impropriety but also theappearance of impropriety is more sternlyapplied to lower court judges. Indeed, judges are reminded that after havingaccepted their exalted position in theJudiciary, they owe to the public to upholdthe exacting standards of conductdemanded of them. The circumstancesobtaining here seriously tainted the goodimage and reputation of the Judiciary,even as it reflected badly on JudgeAsuncion’s personal and official

reputation.

• A.M. No. P-12-3055. March 26, 2014 Office

of the Court Administrator Vs. Johni GlennD. Runes

• We agree with the

recommendation of the OCA thatthe Complaint regarding case-fixingshould be dismissed for lack oftestimonial or documentaryevidence.

• Pursuant to Section 8, Rule II ofthe Revised Uniform Rules onAdministrative Cases in the CiviService (Uniform Rules): “Noanonymous complaint shall beentertained unless there is obvioustruth or merit to the allegationstherein or supported by

documentary or direct evidence, inwhich case the person complainedof may be required to comment.”

Indeed, the investigating team was able togather information from various sourcesbut these sources failed to particularlyidentify respondent as the perpetrator ofcase-fixing in the processing of motions orapplications for the reduction of bailThese informants refused to be identifiedand were reluctant to execute written

testimonies, thus, making the informationgathered from them inadmissible asevidence for being hearsay. Even the lonewitness who was willing to disclose heridentity did not directly identifyrespondent as the one responsible forcase-fixing. Also, the author of theanonymous complaint never came out inthe open to testify on his or her claim thatrespondent was engaged in illegal activity.

An accusation is not synonymous withguilt. One who alleges a fact has theburden of proving it, since mere allegationis not evidence. Reliance on mereallegations, conjectures and suppositionswill leave an administrative complaint withno leg to stand on. Therefore, due to theabsence of either testimonial ordocumentary evidence to prove theculpability of respondent in the charge ofcase-fixing, the case cannot be given due

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course for insufficiency of evidence.

• B.M. No. 2482. April 1, 2014 Re: Melchor

Tiongson, Head Watcher, During the 2011Bar Examinations

• This is an administrative case filed

against Melchor Tiongson(Tiongson), head watcher of the2011 bar e:xaminations held at theUniversity of Santo Tomas, Manila(UST), for bringing a digital camerainside the bar e:xamination room,in violation of the Instructions toHead W atchers.

The Instructions to Head Watchers issuedby the OBC clearly provide that “bringingof cellphones and other communicationgadgets, deadlyweapons, cameras, taperecorders, other radio or stereo equipmentor any other electronic device is strictlyprohibited.”

Padilla, Puruganan and Padre, who werethe watchers present in the sameexamination room, attested that theywitnessed Tiongson’s violation of thisprovision during the second Sunday of thebar examinations. Upon being called bythe OBC, Tiongson admitted that heindeed brought a digital camera inside the

bar examination room. Thus, we find thatTiongson’s transgression of the rulesissued by the OBC amounts tomisconduct.

We, however, disagree with the OBC’srecommendation that Tiongson’s infractionamounted to gross misconduct anddishonesty.

Misconduct is grave if corruption, clearintent to violate the law or flagrant

disregard of an established rule ispresent; otherwise, the misconduct is onlysimple. If any of the elements to qualifythe misconduct as grave is not manifestand is not proven by substantial evidence,a person charged with grave misconductmay be held liable for simple misconduct.On the other hand, dishonesty refers to aperson’s disposition “to lie, cheat, deceive,or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of

integrity; lack of honesty, probity orintegrity in principle; lack of fairness andstraightforwardness; disposition todefraud, deceive or betray.”

We hold Tiongson liable for simplemisconduct only, because the elements ofgrave misconduct were not proven withsubstantial evidence, and Tiongsonadmitted his infraction before the OBC.

As a CA employee, Tiongson disregardedhis duty to uphold the strict standardsrequired of every court employee, that is,to be an example of integrity, uprightnessand obedience to the judiciary. Thus, hemust be reminded that his infraction wasunbecoming o f a court employeeamounting to simple misconduct.

Finally, the Instructions to Head Watchersprovide that any violation of theinstructions shall be a sufficient cause fordisqualification from serving for theremainder of the examinations and infuture examinations. Thus, we modify therecommended penalty of the OBC fromindefinite disqualification to permanentdisqualification from serving as barpersonnel, in any capacity, in succeeding

bar examinations.• A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200. April 2, 2014

Antonio M. Lorenzana Vs. Judge MaCecilia I. Austria, RTC, Br. 2, BatangasCity

• We sustain Justice Gonzales-Sison’s finding of gross ignoranceof the law in so far as therespondent ordered the creation ofa management committee withoutconducting an evidentiary hearingThe absence of a hearing was amatter of basic due process that nomagistrate should be forgetful orcareless about.

• On the Charges of Grave Abuseof Authority; Irregularity in thePerformance of Duty; GraveBias and Partiality; and Lack ofCircumspection

Even granting that the respondent indeed

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presumed and this Court cannot concludethat bad faith intervened when none wasactually proven.

With respect to the action of the

respondent in ordering the creation of amanagement committee without firstconducting an evidentiary hearing for thepurpose, however, we find the error to beso egregious as to amount to bad faith,leading to the conclusion of grossignorance of the law, as charged.

Due process and fair play are basicrequirements that no less than theConstitution demands. In rehabilitationproceedings, the parties must first begiven an opportunity to prove (ordisprove) the existence of an imminentdanger of dissipation, loss, wastage ordestruction of the debtor-company’sassets and properties that are or may beprejudicial to the interest of minoritystockholders, parties-litigants or thegeneral public. The rehabilitation courtshould hear both sides, allow them topresent proof and conscientiouslydeliberate, based on their submissions, onwhether the appointment of amanagement receiver is justified. This is a

very basic requirement in everyadversarial proceeding that no judge ormagistrate can disregard.

On this basis, we conclude that therespondent’s act of promptly ordering thecreation of a management committee,without the benefit of a hearing anddespite the demand for one, wastantamount to punishable professionalincompetence and gross ignorance of thelaw.

On the Ground of ConductUnbecoming of a Judge

On the allegation of conduct unbecomingof a judge, Section 6, Canon 6 of the NewCode of Judicial Conduct states that:

SECTION 6. Judges shall maintain orderand decorum in all proceedings before thecourt and be patient, dignified andcourteous in relation to litigants,witnesses, lawyers and others with

whom the judge deals in an officiacapacity. Judges shall require similarconduct of legal representatives, courtstaff and others subject to their influence,direction or control.

A judge should always conduct himself ina manner that would preserve the dignityindependence and respect forhimself/herself, the Court and theJudiciary as a whole. He must exhibit thehallmark judicial temperament of utmostsobriety and self-restraint. He should

choose his words and exercise morecaution and control in expressing himselfIn other words, a judge should possessthe virtue of gravitas.

As held in De la Cruz (Concerned Citizenof Legazpi City) v. Judge Carretas, a judgeshould be considerate, courteous and civito all persons who come to his court; heshould always keep his passion guardedHe can never allow it to run loose andovercome his reason. Furthermore, a

magistrate should not descend to the leveof a sharp-tongued, ill-mannered pettytyrant by uttering harsh words, snideremarks and sarcastic comments.

Accordingly, the respondent’s unnecessarybickering with SCP’s legal counsel, herexpressions of exasperation over triviaprocedural and negligible lapses, her snideremarks, as well as her condescendingattitude, are conduct that the Courtcannot allow. They are displays ofarrogance and air of superiority that theCode abhors.

She also failed to maintain the decorumrequired by the Code and to usetemperate language befitting amagistrate. “As a judge, [she] shouldensure that [her] conduct is always abovereproach and perceived to be so by areasonable observer. [She] must never


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show conceit or even an appearancethereof, or any kind of impropriety.”

Section 1, Canon 2 of the New Code ofJudicial Conduct states that:

SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that notonly is their conduct above reproach, butthat it is perceived to be so in the view ofa reasonable observer.

In these lights, the respondent exhibitedconduct unbecoming of a judge and thusviolated Section 6, Canon 6 and Section 1,Canon 2 of the New Code of JudicialConduct.

On the Ground of Impropriety

We are not unaware of the increasingprevalence of social networking sites inthe Internet – a new medium throughwhich more and more Filipinoscommunicate with each other. While judges are not prohibited frombecoming members of and fromtaking part in social networkingactivities, we remind them that theydo not thereby shed off their status as judges. They carry with them incyberspace the same ethicalresponsibilities and duties that every judge is expected to follow in his/hereveryday activities. It is in this light thatwe judge the respondent in the charge ofimpropriety when she posted her picturesin a manner viewable by the public.

Lest this rule be misunderstood, the NewCode of Judicial Conduct does not

prohibit a judge from joining ormaintaining an account in a socialnetworking site such as Friendster .Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code ofJudicial Conduct recognizes that judges,like any other citizen, are entitled tofreedom of expression. This right "includesthe freedom to hold opinions withoutinterference and impart information andideas through any media regardless of

frontiers.” Joining a social networking siteis an exercise of one’s freedom ofexpression. The respondent judge’s act of joining Friendster is, therefore, per se notviolative of the New Code of Judicia

Conduct.

Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code ofJudicial Conduct, however, also imposes acorrelative restriction on judges: in theexercise of their freedom of expression,they should always conductthemselves in a manner thatpreserves the dignity of the judiciaoffice and the impartiality andindependence of the Judiciary.

This rule reflects the general principle ofpropriety expected of judges in all of theiractivities, whether it be in the course oftheir judicial office or in their personalives.

Based on this provision, we hold that therespondent disregarded the propriety andappearance of propriety required of herwhen she posted Friendster photos ofherself wearing an “off -shouldered”suggestive dress and made this availablefor public viewing.

To restate the rule: in communicating andsocializing through social networks, judgesmust bear in mind that what theycommunicate – regardless of whether it isa personal matter or part of his or her judicial duties – creates and contributes tothe people’s opinion not just of the judgebut of the entire Judiciary of which he orshe is a part. This is especially true whenthe posts the judge makes are viewablenot only by his or her family and closefriends, but by acquaintances and thegeneral public.

Thus, it may be acceptable for therespondent to show a picture of herself inthe attire she wore to her family and closefriends, but when she made this pictureavailable for public consumption, sheplaced herself in a situation where she,and the status she holds as a judge, may


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be the object of the public’s criticism andridicule. The nature of cybercommunications, particularly its speedyand wide-scale character, renders this rulenecessary.

We are not also unaware that therespondent’s act of posting her photoswould seem harmless and inoffensive hadthis act been done by an ordinary memberof the public. As the visible personificationof law and justice, however, judges areheld to higher standards of conductand thus must accordingly comportthemselves.

This exacting standard applies both toacts involving the judicial office andpersonal matters. The very nature oftheir functions requires behavior underexacting standards of morality, decencyand propriety; both in the performance oftheir duties and their daily personal lives,they should be beyond reproach.

• A.M. No. MTJ-12-1806. April 7, 2014 Office

of the Court Administrator Vs. JudgeBorromeo R. Bustamante, Municipal TrialCourt in Cities, Alaminos City, Pangasinan

• Decision-making, among otherduties, is the primordial and most

important duty of a member of thebench. The speedy disposition ofcases in the courts is a primary aimof the judiciary so the ends of justice may not be compromisedand the judiciary will be true to itscommitment to provide litigantstheir constitutional right to aspeedy trial and a speedydisposition of their cases.

The Constitution, Code of JudicialConduct, and jurisprudence consistentlymandate that a judge must decide caseswithin 90 days from submission.

Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of JudicialConduct states that judges shouldadminister justice without delay . Rule 3.05of Canon 3 states that judges shalldispose of the court's business promptlyand decide cases within the required

periods.

This Court has always emphasized theneed for judges to decide cases within theconstitutionally prescribed 90-day period

Any delay in the administration of justice,no matter how brief, deprives the litigantof his right to a speedy disposition of hiscase. Not only does it magnify the cost ofseeking justice, it undermines the people’sfaith and confidence in the judiciary,lowers its standards, and brings it todisrepute.

Equally unacceptable for the Court isJudge Bustamante’s explanation that hefailed to decide Civil Case Nos. 1937 and2056 because of the lack of Transcript ofStenographic Notes (TSN). the Court findsJudge Bustamante’s lack of effort to havethe TSN completed as the root cause forthe delay in deciding the two cases.

Least acceptable of Judge Bustamante’sexplanations for his delay in decidingcases and/or resolving pending incidentswas oversight. A judge is responsible, notonly for the dispensation of justice butalso for managing his court efficiently toensure the prompt delivery of court

services. Since he is the one directlyresponsible for the proper discharge of hisofficial functions, he should know thecases submitted to him for decision orresolution, especially those pending formore than 90 days.

• Gershon N. Dulang Vs. Judge Mary JocylenG. Regencia, MCTC, Asturias-Balamban, Cebu A.M. No. MTJ-14-1841

June 2, 2014

• The sole issue raised for theCourt’s resolution is whether or notJudge Regencia may be heldadministratively liable for unduedelay in rendering a decision.

• • The Court’s Ruling • • The Court agrees with the findings

and conclusions of the OCA, withthe modification, however, as tothe penalty imposed on Judge

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Regencia.• • Prompt disposition of cases is

attained basically through theefficiency and dedication to duty of

judges. If judges do not possessthose traits, delay in thedisposition of cases is inevitable tothe prejudice of the litigants.Accordingly, judges should beimbued with a high sense of dutyand responsibility in the dischargeof their obligation to administer justice promptly.25 This isembodied in Rule 3.05, Canon 3 ofthe Code of Judicial Conduct whichs

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COMPILATION OF SC DECISIONS FOR LEGAL ETHICS (2014-2015)