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Written by: ICF
January 2018
Comprehensive evaluation of the European Union
humanitarian aid, 2012-2016 Annexes to the Final Report
Volume 2: field reports
Comprehensive evaluation of the European Union humanitarian aid, 2012-2016
This report was commissioned by the European Commission.
The opinions expressed in this document represent the authors’ point of view which is not
necessarily shared by the European Commission or by the authorities of the concerned countries.
Comprehensive evaluation of the European Union humanitarian aid, 2012-2016
Table of Contents
List of abbreviations ........................................................................................... 5 Note on the terminology used in this Annex .......................................................... 7 ANNEX 6.1: Field report - Democratic Republic of Congo ........................................ 8
A1.1 Introduction ...................................................................................... 8 A1.1.1 Overview of the fieldwork undertaken .................................................. 8 A1.1.2 Challenges encountered ...................................................................... 9 A1.1.3 Methodology ..................................................................................... 9 A1.1.4 Structure of the report ......................................................................11 A1.2 ECHO’s humanitarian aid activities in DRC............................................11 A1.2.1 Key contextual elements and rationale for ECHO’s intervention ...............11 A1.2.2 Nature of ECHO’s humanitarian aid activities ........................................13 A1.2.3 Key external factors that impacted (positively and negatively) the delivery
of ECHO’s humanitarian aid activities ...............................................................15 A1.3 Key lessons to take into account in the comprehensive evaluation ..........16 A1.3.1 Relevance ........................................................................................16 A1.3.2 Coherence .......................................................................................23 A1.3.3 EU added value ................................................................................31 A1.3.4 Effectiveness ....................................................................................33 A1.3.5 Efficiency .........................................................................................35 A1.3.6 Sustainability ...................................................................................37 A1.3.7 Key additional insights for rapid evaluations .........................................37 A1.3.8 Prospective evaluation .......................................................................43 A1.4 Conclusion .......................................................................................44
ANNEX 6.2: Field report - Tanzania .....................................................................45
A1.1 Introduction .....................................................................................45 A1.1.1 Overview of the fieldwork undertaken .................................................45 A1.1.2 Challenges encountered .....................................................................46 A1.1.3 Methodology ....................................................................................46 A1.1.4 Structure of the report ......................................................................48 A1.2 ECHO’s humanitarian aid activities in Tanzania .....................................48 A1.2.1 Key contextual elements and rationale for ECHO’s intervention ...............48 A1.2.2 Nature of ECHO’s humanitarian aid activities ........................................51 A1.2.3 Key external factors that impacted (positively and negatively) the delivery
of ECHO’s humanitarian aid activities ...............................................................53 A1.3 Key findings and lessons to take into account in the comprehensive
evaluation .....................................................................................................54 A1.3.1 Relevance ........................................................................................54 A1.3.2 Coherence .......................................................................................59 A1.3.3 EU added value ................................................................................62 A1.3.4 Effectiveness ....................................................................................64 A1.3.5 Efficiency .........................................................................................66 A1.3.6 Sustainability/connectedness ..............................................................67 A1.3.7 Key additional insights for rapid evaluations .........................................68 A1.3.8 Prospective evaluation .......................................................................70 A1.4 Conclusion .......................................................................................71
ANNEX 6.3: Field report – Myanmar ....................................................................72
A1.1 Introduction .....................................................................................72 A1.1.1 Overview of the fieldwork undertaken .................................................72 A1.1.2 Challenges encountered .....................................................................72 A1.1.3 Methodology ....................................................................................73 A1.1.4 Structure of the report ......................................................................74 A1.2 ECHO’s humanitarian aid activities in Myanmar .....................................74
Comprehensive evaluation of the European Union humanitarian aid, 2012-2016
A1.2.1 Key contextual elements and rationale for ECHO’s intervention ...............74 A1.2.2 Nature of ECHO’s humanitarian aid activities ........................................77 A1.2.3 Key external factors that impacted (positively and negatively) the delivery
of ECHO’s humanitarian aid activities ...............................................................79 A1.3 Key findings and lessons to take into account in the comprehensive
evaluation .....................................................................................................81 A1.3.1 Relevance ........................................................................................81 A1.3.2 Coherence .......................................................................................85 A1.3.3 EU added value ................................................................................89 A1.3.4 Effectiveness ....................................................................................90 A1.3.5 Efficiency .........................................................................................93 A1.3.6 Sustainability/connectedness ..............................................................95 A1.3.7 Key additional insights for rapid evaluations .........................................96 A1.3.8 Prospective evaluation .......................................................................97 A1.4 Stakeholders consulted ......................................................................99
ANNEX 6.4: Field report – Mauritania ................................................................ 102
A1.1 Introduction ................................................................................... 102 A1.1.1 Overview of the fieldwork undertaken ............................................... 102 A1.1.2 Challenges encountered ................................................................... 104 A1.1.3 Methodology .................................................................................. 104 A1.1.4 Structure of the report .................................................................... 106 A1.2 DG ECHO’s humanitarian aid activities in Mauritania ............................ 106 A1.2.1 Key contextual elements and rationale for DG ECHO’s intervention ....... 106 A1.2.2 Nature of DG ECHO’s humanitarian aid activities ................................. 108 A1.2.3 Key external factors that impacted (positively and negatively) the delivery
of DG ECHO’s humanitarian aid activities ........................................................ 110 A1.3 Key lessons to take into account in the comprehensive evaluation ........ 111 A1.3.1 Relevance ...................................................................................... 111 A1.3.2 Coherence ..................................................................................... 114 A1.3.3 EU added value .............................................................................. 116 A1.3.4 Effectiveness .................................................................................. 117 Examples of positive outcomes ...................................................................... 119 A1.3.5 Efficiency ....................................................................................... 121 Examples of solutions to increase cost-effectiveness ........................................ 122 A1.3.6 Sustainability/connectedness ............................................................ 122 A1.3.7 Key additional insights for rapid evaluations ....................................... 123 A1.3.8 Prospective evaluation ..................................................................... 126
A1.4 Conclusions ........................................................................................ 127
Comprehensive evaluation of the European Union humanitarian aid, 2012-2016
5
List of abbreviations
3MDG Three Millennium Development goals fund
AIDES Actions et Interventions pour le Développement et l'Encadrement
Social
CBT Cash-Based Transfer
CMC Camp Management Committee
CRRF Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework
DA Designated Area
DEVCO DG for International Cooperation and Development
DFID Department for International Development (UK)
DIPECHO Disaster Preparedness ECHO programme
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
DRM Disaster Risk Management
DRR Disaster Risk Reduction
ECHO DG European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
EDF European Development Fund
ERM Emergency Response Mechanism
FPA Framework Partnership Agreement
FPI Foreign Policy Instrument
GBT General Food Distribution
GHD Good Humanitarian Donorship
HARP Humanitarian And Resilience Programme
HCT Humanitarian Country Team
HDI Human Development Index
HIP Humanitarian Implementation Plan
HQ Headquarter
HRP Humanitarian Response Plan
IAF Integrated Assessment Framework
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
IcSP Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace
IDP Internally Displaced People
IGA Income Generating Activities
IHL International Humanitarian Law
INGO International Non-Governmental Organisation
IOM International Organization for Migration
IGA Income Generating Activities
IRC International Rescue Committee
JMC Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee
KIYADO Kigoma Youth Agricultural Development Organisation
Comprehensive evaluation of the European Union humanitarian aid, 2012-2016
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KMSS Karuna Missions Social Solidarity
LIFT Livelihood and Food Security Trust Fund
LNGO Local Non-Governmental Organisation
LRRD Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
MCCA Myanmar Climate Change Alliance
MES Myanmar Engineering Society
MPC Myanmar Peace Centre
MHA Ministry of Home Affairs (Tanzania)
MIMU Myanmar Information Management Unit
MMK Myanmar Kyat
MONUSCO Mission de l'Organisation des Nations unies en République
démocratique du Congo
MSF Médecins Sans Frontieres
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NRC Norwegian Refugee Council
OFDA US Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
OPC Open Public Consultation
PEACE EU Peace Support programme
RRMP Rapid Response to Population Movements
SC Save the Children
SI Solidarités International
SIDA Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
TA Technical Assistant
UCPM Union Civil Protection Mechanism
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNOCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
USAID United States Agency for International Development
WASH Water, sanitation and hygiene
WFP World Food Programme
Comprehensive evaluation of the European Union humanitarian aid, 2012-2016
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Note on the terminology used in this Annex
This Annex uses the terminology agreed with DG European Civil Protection and
Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) at the start of this evaluation, namely:
“ECHO humanitarian aid action or intervention” should be understood as:
“all humanitarian aid activities funded by ECHO, including the policy and
implementation frameworks put in place for humanitarian aid, as well as the
delivery of this aid”.
“ECHO funded actions” refers to “humanitarian aid activities in the field
funded by ECHO and delivered by its framework partners”.
“ECHO humanitarian aid funding” refers to “the budget allocated by ECHO to
humanitarian aid actions or interventions (including European Development
Fund (EDF) appropriations)”.
Note that this is different from the terminology used in the Final Report of the
evaluation.
Comprehensive evaluation of the European Union humanitarian aid, 2012-2016
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ANNEX 6.1: Field report - Democratic Republic of Congo
A1.1 Introduction
This document describes the fieldwork undertaken in the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC) as part of the Comprehensive evaluation of the European Commission’s
humanitarian aid, 2012-2016 and presents the evidence collected from the field. As
stipulated in the terms of reference for this consultation, “the Field Report is not an
evaluation as such, and should not include overall conclusions and recommendations,
neither a collection of project evaluations. It is a working document to report on the
fieldwork and identify any particular issues to be tackled during the synthesis phase
(e.g. remedial actions related to the methodological approach, etc.).”
A1.1.1 Overview of the fieldwork undertaken
Table A1.1 provides a snapshot of the project sites visited and the consultations
conducted during the mission. Error! Reference source not found. and Error!
Reference source not found. at the end of this document provide a list of
stakeholders consulted.
Table A1.1 Consultations conducted
Field sites Dates Stakeholder consulted
Kinshasa 3 to 7 July 2017 ECHO field staff
EU Delegation
ECHO framework partners: UNICEF,
International Non-Governmental Organisation
(INGO) Forum (i.e. Oxfam, Action Contre la
Faim, ActionAid International, Acted, Solidarités
International, ALIMA), International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC), International
Organization for Migration (IOM) and the United
Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA)
Other donors: US Office of Foreign Disaster
Assistance (OFDA), Swedish International
Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA)
Goma 7 July and 13 to
14 July 2017
ECHO field staff
ECHO framework partners: IOM, ICRC,
Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), UNOCHA,
Danish Refugee Council, Medair, INSO
Mission de l'Organisation des Nations unies en
République démocratique du Congo
(MONUSCO) Civil Protection Senior Adviser
Rutshuru region 10 to 12 July
2017
IOM and its local implementing partner Actions
et Interventions pour le Développement et
l'Encadrement Social (AIDES)
Local administration
MONUSCO battalion commander
Table A1.2 provides more details about the projects visited. These were selected
among the projects funded by ECHO in DRC and North Kivu in 2017 on the basis of
Comprehensive evaluation of the European Union humanitarian aid, 2012-2016
9
the following considerations: diversity of contexts, intervention types and partners and
security and access.
Table A1.2 Projects visited and activities observed
ECHO partner Project title Overview of fieldwork activities
IOM Ensure the dignity and
quality of life for conflict-
affected internally
displaced populations in
Eastern DRC
Reference: 2017/00171
Visit to Kanaba and Kabizo Internally
Displaced People (IDP) camps
(11/07/2017): Visit of hospital, Water,
sanitation and hygiene (WASH) facilities,
new arrivals hangar, women focus
group, meeting with key IDPs, walk
through the site
ICRC ICRC economic security,
protection and
psychosocial assistance
activities in DRC
Reference: 2017/00158
Visit to the ICRC surgical project at
hospital CBCA Ndosho: Surgery and
post-surgery services to patients victims
of conflict (war surgery and banditry)
Water for the population of
Goma
Not financed by ECHO –
example of urban project.
Visit to Lac 2 Pumping Station (Lake
Kivu): Potable water provision
infrastructure for the city of Goma
(pumping and water treatment station)
A1.1.2 Challenges encountered
The field mission went very well and the evaluation team’s initial planning was mostly
respected. A few challenges were encountered that entailed some changes to the
initial field plan:
It was not possible to conduct an interview with the UK Department for
International Development (DFID) as planned in Kinshasa. A follow-up
telephone interview will be organised if possible;
The time in the field was limited due to insecurity and the need to travel before
night time with an armed escort (MONUSCO).
A1.1.3 Methodology
A1.1.3.1 Context and link with the consultation strategy
Table A1.3 presents how the field work designed for this evaluation feed into the
evaluation framework by targeting key stakeholder groups. This table, associated with
the evaluation framework, served as basis for the development of the research tools
which were used during the field mission to DRC. The cells highlighted in green in the
table below show which stakeholder categories were targeted by the field work
completed during this evaluation. In the case of DRC, host governments were not
consulted due to the current political impasse in the country.
Table A1.3 Overview of methods that will be used to consult with the different
stakeholders group
Online
surveys
Semi-
structur
ed
intervie
ws
OPC
Fieldw
ork
works
hop
Fieldwor
k
interview
s, focus
groups
Roundtab
le
Comprehensive evaluation of the European Union humanitarian aid, 2012-2016
10
Affected
communities
(via
Reps)
ECHO staff–
Headquarter (HQ)
ECHO staff - Field
Other EU entities
Other donors
ECHO partners
Local implementing
partners
Host governments
National/ local
NGOs
Academics and
think tanks
Private sector
Military forces
European
Parliament
European Council
Member States
EU citizens
Global forums and
clusters
A1.1.3.2 Research tools
The main research tool used for the consultation during the field missions were semi-
structured interviews. Topic guides were developed for the following stakeholders’
groups:
ECHO field;
Representatives of the EU delegation;
ECHO framework partners;
Local implementing partners;
Other donors (including Member States);
Local authorities and host government officials;
Academics and think tanks; and
Military representatives.
Additionally, a range of participatory approaches (i.e. focus groups and workshops)
were applied to engage directly with affected communities. The specific stakeholders
interviewed during the field mission to DRC were identified based on suggestions from
ECHO field staff.
Comprehensive evaluation of the European Union humanitarian aid, 2012-2016
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A1.1.4 Structure of the report
The remainder of this report is structured as follows:
Section A1.2 provides an overview of the DRC context and the humanitarian aid
activities financed by ECHO in DRC;
Section A1.3 provides an overview of the key findings and lessons to take into
account in the comprehensive evaluation. The findings are organised by
evaluation question. It also includes a section covering the sectors and themes
subject of rapid evaluations to facilitate the analysis at later stage; and
Error! Reference source not found. and Error! Reference source not
found. at the end of this document provide a detailed list of interviewed
stakeholders.
A1.2 ECHO’s humanitarian aid activities in DRC
A1.2.1 Key contextual elements and rationale for ECHO’s intervention
Table A1.4 Key facts about DRC
Population 77.27 millions
Surface (sq. km) 2,344.9 thousands
Density 34.1 (people per sq. km of land area)
Languages French, Lingala, Kiswahili, Kikongo,
Tshiluba
Political regime Semi-presidential regime
President Joseph Kabila
Prime Minister Augustin Matata
GDP per capita (2015 PPP $) $800
Currency Congolese Franc
Exchange rate (05/09/2017) 10 000 CDF = 5.44 EUR1
Human Development Index (HDI)
ranking (out of 188)
176
% population below poverty line 77.1 % of the population lives with less
than $1.9 a day
Sources: World Bank2 and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)3.
The DRC has 10,000 km of border shared with 9 countries. Despite its abundant
natural resources, DRC was ranked 176th out of 188 countries in the 2016 UNDP
Human Development Index. According to the INFORM indexes DRC ranks among the
most vulnerable countries in the world with the most striking lack of coping capacity.
1 With the fall of the local currency the country faces an important inflation. The local currency lost 50% of its
value since November 2016 (i.e. from CDF/EUR exchange rate of 0.00102 on 20/11/2016 to 0.00054 on 5/09/2017). Source: XE currency, 2017. Available at: http://www.xe.com/fr/currencycharts/?from=CDF&to=EUR&view=1Y [5 September 2017]. 2 World Bank, 2016. World Development Indicators database, country profile: DRC. Available at:
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/Views/Reports/ReportWidgetCustom.aspx?Report_Name=CountryProfile&Id=b450fd57&tbar=y&dd=y&inf=n&zm=n&country=COD [5 September 2017]. 3 UNDP, 2016. Human Development Report: DRC. Available at: http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/COD
[5 September 2017].
Comprehensive evaluation of the European Union humanitarian aid, 2012-2016
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Out of a scale of 10 (maximum risk), DRC scored 6.2 on hazard and exposure risk
index, 7.3 on vulnerability and 8 on lack of coping capacity4. The
Armed conflict and general insecurity in the DRC associated with a worsening political,
economic and general underdevelopment crisis have created one of the world’s most
complex and long-standing humanitarian crisis. As reported by most of the
stakeholders met during the field mission DRC is not facing one longstanding crisis but
rather a succession of acute crisis affecting different population groups across the
country. During our discussion with ECHO framework partners the following crisis and
tension points were identified as particularly problematic:
High tension and fragmentation of the military landscape in North Kivu;
Emergence of new crisis in South Kivu involving Maï-Maï rebel groups;
Resurgence of ethnic conflicts in Tanganyika with extremely difficult
humanitarian access;
Large scale crisis in the Kasaï region affecting very large population groups;
Continuous conflict in Ituri complicated by the arrival of refugees from
neighbouring countries;
Increase in insecurity across the country reinforced among others by large
escapes from prisons.
As stated in the 2017 Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) these acute crisis are
characterized by: “violent armed conflicts in numerous regions, a very high number of
displaced persons and refugees, numerous epidemics and epizooties, natural
disasters, a general context of poverty and precariousness, and local conflicts
sometimes tainted with an ethnic/clan dimension, over the control of access to natural
resources and over political or traditional power, which lead to political instability at a
local level”5. As of July 2017 UNOCHA and the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) identified 3.8 million IDPs across DRC, with 1.4 million IDPs in the
Kasaï region only, and more than 470,000 refugees from the surrounding countries
with an ongoing influx of people fleeing the conflict in South Sudan. Roughly half a
million Congolese have also sought refuge outside of their country.6
Given the size of the country and the complex nature of the crisis, priority needs vary
from one region to another. In the conflict affected areas, the overarching need is
protection of civilians from violence. All armed groups routinely commit human rights
violations. Those who flee the violence are in need of basic goods and services, and
livelihoods. Communities that welcome displaced families often see their meagre
resources and services depleted.
The major humanitarian needs identified by UNOCHA in their 2017 humanitarian
needs overview7 include:
Acute vulnerability of people caused by the lack of access to good and basic
services and livelihoods:
- Around 6.1 million people are severely affected by the conflicts and violence
as well as by natural disasters occurring in a precarious socio-economic
environment;
4 INFORM, 2017. Country profile: DRC. Available at: http://www.inform-index.org/Countries/Country-Profile-
Map [5 September 2017]. 5 European Commission, 2017. HIP Great Lakes Region. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/sites/echo-
site/files/great_lakes_hip_final_-_en_v2.pdf [5 September 2017]. 6 UNHCR, 2017. DRC Regional Refugee Response. Available at: http://data.unhcr.org/drc/regional.php [5
September 2017].
7 UNOCHA, 2017. Aperçu des besoins humanitaires. Available at: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/drc_hno_2017.pdf [5 September 2017].
Comprehensive evaluation of the European Union humanitarian aid, 2012-2016
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- 3.5 million people are facing a food crisis situation – this number reached
5.9 million by July 2017;
- 2.8 million have no access to water, hygiene and sanitation;
- 2.1 million need basic household items and shelter; and
- 2.9 million children are in need for urgent education.
Violations of the right to decent life, dignity and integrity of the person: 1.4
million people face infringement to fundamental rights because of the violent
intercommunity conflicts. The massive violation to their human rights include
large scale killings, sexual or physical abuse as well as frequent looting,
robbery, arrests, forced recruitment of children, and forced population
movement.
Epidemics, acute malnutrition and food emergencies: 35 million of Congolese
are at risk of severe illness with epidemic potential. Malaria, cholera, measles or
yellow fever were all registered in 2016. 3.9 million malnourished people and
847,000 food-insecure people also require emergency aid.
Although most of the humanitarian needs in the country are due to the armed conflicts
and economic crisis, the DRC is also exposed to natural disasters like flooding,
droughts, erosion, and landslides that have exacerbated the situation in some regions.
Health crisis have also impacted the country over the last years.
Since August 2016 the previously peaceful Kasaï region is also subject to armed
conflict which led to an addition 1.4 million IDPs in DRC and an additional 1.2 million
people in need of humanitarian assistance to cover their basic needs. The food
security situation is deteriorating drastically in the provinces affected by the conflict.
WFP reports that 42% of the population in Kasaï are food insecure.
A1.2.2 Nature of ECHO’s humanitarian aid activities
ECHO has provided humanitarian aid funding to DRC since 1994. During the
evaluation period (2012-2016), EUR 239.8 million were allocated to humanitarian
activities in DRC across a total of 177 projects. As of June 2017, ECHO had allocated
EUR 19.9 million across 14 projects out of a total of EUR 22.7 million allocated by the
HIP in a first phase. On 5 July 2017 ECHO announced the allocation of an additional
EUR 5 million for the crisis in the Kasaï region. As the results of that second round of
funding are not known it is not reflected in Figure A1.1 below. This adds up to a total
of EUR 27.7 million for the whole country. In addition in the last years ECHO also
spent 50% of the budget allocated to ECHO flight in DRC, equivalent to
approximatively EUR 7 million.8
ECHO's funding for DRC has decreased steadily from 2012 to 2016 with an important
drop in funding from 2016 to 2017 equivalent to a 28.7% decrease9. To put this in
perspective, the 2017 humanitarian appeal issued by UNOCHA for DRC is equivalent to
EUR 680.9 million. So far EUR 179.3 million were provided leaving a funding gap of
EUR 501.6 million.10
Every year, almost half of ECHO funding was dedicated to the food security and
livelihood sector, which received on average 25% of the annual funding, and the
8 In 2016 ECHO flight HIP amounted to EUR 13,935,000 of which about 50% was spent in DRC. Source:
European Commission, 2017. HIP Great Lakes Region. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/sites/echo-site/files/great_lakes_hip_final_-_en_v2.pdf [5 September 2017]. 9 DRC allocated EUR 62.5 million for the whole Great Lakes region in its 2016 HIPs, as of October 2017, the
region had been allocated EUR 37 million equivalent to a 40.8% decrease. 10
UNOCHA, 2017. DRC. Available at: http://www.unocha.org/drc [5 September 2017]. Exchange rate: 1 USD = 0,837888 EUR. source: http://www.xe.com/fr/currencyconverter/convert/?Amount=598%2C7&From=USD&To=EUR [5 September 2017].
Comprehensive evaluation of the European Union humanitarian aid, 2012-2016
14
health sector, which received on average 23% of the annual funding. Wash and
shelter were also prioritised during the evaluation period, receiving respectively an
average of 12% and 9% of the annual funding. The funding allocated to the protection
sector decreased over the years, attaining the lowest funding in 2015. This decrease
can partly be explained by the new transversal approach adopted by ECHO in the field
of protection. The nutrition sector did not receive much funding in 2012 but as the
needs increased, the funding raised as of 2013 and the share of funding continued to
increase over the years to reach 10% of the annual funding in 2016.
Figure A1.1 Evolution of ECHO funding to DRC from 2012 to 2016
Source: EVA database extracted on 18 December 2017
DRC is characterised by the presence of a multitude of humanitarian actors and
international NGOs. Between 2012 and 2016 ECHO funded 46 different partners.
UNICEF was ECHO's main partner and was granted EUR 45 million over the evaluation
period. This is equivalent to 19% of the total funding and these funds were allocated
to the Rapid Response to Population Movements (RRMP) Program coordinated by
UNICEF. The ICRC and Médecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) are the next major partners
that respectively received EUR 18.5 million (8%) and EUR 17.8 million (7%) during
the evaluation period. The majority of ECHO’s funding was spread across all the other
actors.
Figure A1.2 ECHO's main partners in DRC (share of total funding over the period
2012-2016)
Source: EVA database extracted on 18 December 2017.
Comprehensive evaluation of the European Union humanitarian aid, 2012-2016
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A1.2.3 Key external factors that impacted (positively and negatively)
the delivery of ECHO’s humanitarian aid activities
ECHO’s humanitarian activities in DRC mainly focus on displaced population and are
therefore strongly influenced by the different crises affecting the country. The nature
of this response is also influenced by a series of external factors. They key ones
include:
The DRC is facing repeated crises for more than 20 years and the country does
not show signs of recovery. This long period has led to the perception that DRC
is subject to one single protracted crisis whereas it is subject to a series of
separate acute crises underpinned by common drivers. This perception has led
to a certain element of fatigue in donor countries but also in the humanitarian
community. This negatively impacted the funding allocated to DRC;
Due to the armed conflicts in many areas, the humanitarian response provided
by ECHO’s partners is often restricted in time and space and access has to be
constantly negotiated with all the stakeholders involved in the conflict (regular
and irregular armed forces). This insecurity makes the development of accurate
needs assessment to inform humanitarian interventions more difficult. It also
prevents the development of medium term strategies. Finally, the nature of
some of the armed groups involved in the conflict with strong traditional beliefs
makes these discussions very difficult in some regions;
The level of corruption within the DRC government and the highly unstable
environment in which humanitarian actors operate implies that the
humanitarian principles are sometimes difficult to apply;
The presence of a UN integrated mission combining multiple components,
including the peace keeping mission managed by the MONUSCO – see 0 for
more details on its role and mandate – creates confusion on the nature and role
of UN agencies and their partners, including ECHO and many INGOs;
The government of the DRC does not make the tasks of humanitarian actors
easy and creates administrative obstacles. ECHO partners have to spend a
considerable amount of time and resource to minimise these "transaction"
costs;
The national context is extremely complex and the ongoing conflicts are caused
by a multitude of drivers all underpinned by a deepening political and economic
crisis as the national elections are being continuously reported and the national
currency has lost 50% of its value against the dollar since between November
2016 and July 2017. This chaotic context means among others that there is no
linear evolution from a crisis situation to stabilisation and development. This is
perfectly illustrated by the crisis in the Kasaï region, which used to be relatively
peaceful and on its way to development and is now in the middle of an acute
crisis with vulnerable population in need of life saving support. This chaotic
context challenges many pre-existing concepts that traditionally frame
humanitarian interventions;
The total level of funding allocated to the DRC by all the donors has
continuously decreased since 2013 (i.e. from EUR 620.9 million in 2013 to EUR
179.3 million in 2017)11. This puts high pressure on the different humanitarian
projects as the needs have not decreased accordingly, but rather increased.
This sharp decrease in funding also led to the departure of some INGOs from
DRC, with the remaining ones being under greater pressure as they have to
prioritise their funding towards the most vulnerable, leaving some population
groups in great difficulty.
11
FTS, 2017. Congo, The Democratic Republic of the 2017. Available at: https://fts.unocha.org/countries/52/summary/2017 [5 September 2017] and UNOCHA, 2017. DRC. Available at: http://www.unocha.org/drc [5 September 2017]. Exchange rate: 1 USD = 0,837888 EUR. source: http://www.xe.com/fr/currencyconverter/convert/?Amount=598%2C7&From=USD&To=EUR
Comprehensive evaluation of the European Union humanitarian aid, 2012-2016
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A series of external factors also facilitate ECHO interventions in the DRC. These mainly
relate to the strong presence of the UN agencies which allows for a good level of
coordination of the humanitarian aid activities.
Role and mandate of the MONUSCO
As stipulated on the MONUSCO’s website: “MONUSCO took over from an earlier UN
peacekeeping operation – the United Nations Organization Mission in Democratic
Republic of the Congo (MONUC) – on 1 July 2010. The original mandate of the
mission was established by Security Council resolution 1925 of 28 May to reflect the
new phase reached in the country. It was authorized to use all necessary means to
carry out its mandate relating, among other things, to the protection of civilians,
humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders under imminent threat of
physical violence and to support the Government of the DRC in its stabilization and
peace consolidation efforts”12. Over the years the mandate and role of the MONUSCO
evolved:
■ In March 2013 a specialised “intervention brigade” operating under direct
command of the MONUSCO Force Commander was created for a one year period.
Its responsibilities are to neutralise armed groups in order to contribute to
reducing the threat posed by armed groups to state authority and civilian security
in eastern DRC and to make space for stabilization activities.
■ In 2014, the intervention brigade was integrated into MONUSCO’s mandate and
the need for a clear exit strategy was noted.
■ In March 2017 the MONUSCO mandate was extended by one year but with a
further decrease in troops.
The MONUSCO is coordinated by the Humanitarian Coordinator who is also UNDP
Resident Representative in DRC. This position is currently occupied by Mr Mamadou
Diallo.
A1.3 Key lessons to take into account in the comprehensive
evaluation
A1.3.1 Relevance
A1.3.1.1 EQ1: To what extent do ECHO budget allocations consider the
needs, actions of other donors and the EU objectives on humanitarian
aid?
ECHO’s resource allocation at country level is considered as very relevant but
the allocation of fund across countries and regions raise questions
ECHO’s resource allocation process at country level was considered by the majority of
the consulted stakeholders as relevant and highly qualitative. Other donors considered
that ECHO field staff have a strong need-based approach which is clearly reflected in
their choice of actions to be funded. This was again illustrated by the new envelope of
EUR 5 million allocated to the crisis in the Kasaï region: during the presentation of the
new HIPs to the framework partners it was clearly communicated that organisations
with a presence on the ground and a pre-existing understanding of the needs would
be privileged in the selection process.
12
MONUSCO, 2017. Mandate. Available at: https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/mandate [5 September 2017].
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ECHO allocated EUR 5 million for the Kasaï crisis in July 2017
On 5 July 2017 ECHO announced the allocation of EUR 5 million to scale up the
current humanitarian response in the Grand Kasaï provinces in DRC. It was a
response to the flash appeal issued by UNOCHA on 25 April 2017 requesting USD
64.5 million to cover the needs of 731,000 people during a six months period. As
specified in the revised HIPs and during the meeting announcing the new envelope
to the framework partners the additional funds were allocated to support in priority
key partners already present in the area and/or having at least performed needs'
assessments and responding to the basic needs of the population affected with a
focus on protection and life-saving assistance while looking at additional
components if needed and relevant such as coordination, security, access and
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) advocacy.
During the meetings with framework partners it was communicated that ECHO staff
visited the region before the launch of the funding in order to have first-hand
information about the situation on the ground. ECHO did not have predefined
sectors of interventions in mind and no predefined budget by project, their objective
was to select the most relevant projects based on the identified needs. ECHO also
communicated the following points:
Consortium will have no strict advantages although they are encouraged;
‘Modification request’ to existing projects would allow to ensure rapid
implementation but the modification needs to remain within the scope of the
original project and they will have no strict advantage;
ECHO is conscious that logistical costs are high in Kasaï but the ratio logistical
costs / aid must remain reasonable. The funding is moreover earmarked to
the Kasaï.
ECHO is in contact with other donors through the Good Humanitarian
Donorship group to ensure coordination and prevent funding duplication.
ECHO’s resource allocations at global level were however questioned by the vast
majority of interviewed stakeholders. The sharp decline in funding allocated to DRC in
2017, resulting in a drop of 28.7% despite the increasing humanitarian needs,
perplexed the framework partners and other donors, especially as ECHO’s global
envelope remained stable during the same period. Although they all understood that
choices had to be made, they recorded a strong dichotomy within ECHO’s positioning:
ECHO’s discourse remains needs-based while ECHO’s resource allocations are
influenced by other factors, as it does not reflect the scale of the identified needs. This
also puts ECHO’s field staff in DRC in a difficult position as they have the difficult tasks
to assess where their limited funding can best be allocated to.
ECHO’s resource allocation takes the funding of other donors into account
The coherence between ECHO and other donors will be discussed in more details
under the evaluation question 7 (see section A1.3.2.2). In general, ECHO maintains
good and close cooperation with all the other donors present in DRC. This close
cooperation allows ECHO to take the activities of other donors into account when
allocating their budget to specific projects. This is done through two informal
mechanisms:
The contribution of other donors to specific projects is analysed by ECHO during
the project selection process, alongside the project quality and its overall cost;
and
Within the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) forum, the key donors keep
track of the funding allocated by the different donors in order to prevent
duplication.
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UNOCHA also plays an important coordination role in DRC preventing duplication of
efforts. The prevention of duplication is also facilitated by the scale of the country and
the associated humanitarian needs. A good example of complementarity is the funding
of the INSO project by different donors and benefiting all the donors and partners. The
main obstacles for closer coordination in terms of funding relates to the different
funding cycles of the different donors which doesn’t always match and creates
difficulties.
A1.3.1.2 EQ2: To what extent is ECHO’s choice of framework partnerships
appropriate? How could ECHO improve in the choice of partners?
The selection process is considered as strong, robust and transparent
As said in section A1.2.2 above, ECHO provided financing to 50 framework partners
during the evaluation period which together implemented 177 projects. The choice of
partners by ECHO field staff and the desk officers in Brussels is considered as very
relevant and appropriate to the needs identified in the HIPs. In the words of one of the
other donors interviewed in Kinshasa: “ECHO funding is benefiting the best
humanitarian actors. They have a very strong selection process”. Another donor
commented that ECHO’s transparency with regard their selection process was also
much appreciated as it supports their own analysis.
The framework partners share this positive evaluation of the selection process. As was
stressed by one of them: “The selection process is clear, precise and has a fixed
timing. The fact that ECHO doesn’t speak with the partner during the proposal period
is appreciated. The negotiation period between ECHO technical assistant and the
framework partners is also perceived as a very positive and adding value to the
projects”.
Different framework partners and donors also reported that ECHO puts a strong focus
on the quality of the framework partner’s needs assessment.
Funded actions implemented in consortium and involving local implementing
partners are an exception in DRC
Out of the 10 ongoing projects analysed in details for this field mission only two have
implementing partners: the RRMP project implemented by UNICEF and the IOM
project focusing on IDPs in Eastern DRC13. This is fairly limited and partly due to the
fact that ECHO does not strongly push for the development of consortia among the
framework partners. This contrasts with DFID’s and OFDA’s approach which clearly
favour consortia. As was exposed at the announcement of the new envelope for the
crisis in the Kasaï region, consortia are welcomed by ECHO but do not benefit from a
strict advantage compared to other proposals. The involvement of local implementing
partners is also welcomed by ECHO but the framework partners leading the funded
action have to clearly demonstrate their added value and remain the sole responsible
party for the implementation of the funded action14. It is important to clarify that
ECHO cannot legally directly fund local NGOs and cannot formally favour consortium.
When framework partners were asked whether or not ECHO should push for the
development of consortium, no strong views emerged. It was however stressed by
many that the choice of partners should always be guided by the quality of the
13
IOM’s implementing partners include: Actions et Interventions pour le Développement et l'Encadrement Social (AIDES), CAAP-TUJITEGEMEE and Première-Urgence Internationale (PUI). 14
As specified on ECHO Partners’ Website: “The lead partner carries the full legal and financial responsibility for the action and will ensure that the obligations of the Specific Grant Agreement are respected by the implementing partners”. Source: European Commission, undated. CONSORTIUM & COORDINATED APPROACH. Available at: http://dgecho-partners-helpdesk.eu/actions_implementation/consortium_and_coordinated_approach/start [5 September 2017].
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support provided to the beneficiaries. In other words donors should not favour
consortium to facilitate their monitoring work.
Concerning the role of local implementing partners, the IOM project focusing on IDPs
in Eastern DRC is the only analysed project that currently involve local implementing
partners, namely: AIDES and CAAP-TUJITEGEMEE. Alongside Première-Urgence
Internationale (PUI), these two local NGOs are involved in the management of IDP
sites. They were selected and recruited by IOM in September 2016 up until the end of
July 2017. At the time of the field mission AIDES was expecting their contract renewal.
According to the interviewed framework partners, the involvement of local
implementing partners bring the following advantages:
They benefit from good acceptance among the local communities and better
access to insecure zones: this is especially important in the DRC context where
access is sometimes difficult for INGOs;
It facilitates the transfer of knowledge from INGOs to local organisations which
can benefit the long term impact of the funded actions. Under the IOM project
AIDES benefited for example from good capacity building from PUI notably in
the area of coordination and site management;
They can bring local knowledge in the design of the projects to adapt the
project to local specificities;
They ensure a permanent local presence close to the project sites: this is for
example the case with AIDES who has local offices in Kiwanja and Tongo close
to the IDP camps located in Kabizo and Kanaba.
In areas subject to sudden and acute crisis, such as the Kasaï region, working
with Local Non-Governmental Organisations (LNGOs) would allow to ensure the
sustainability of the existing network of local organisations and not replace
them by INGOs who would then leave after the crisis.
Despite these important benefits it is important to recognise that the involvement of
LNGOs is not always straightforward and is sometimes perceived as a risk by
framework partners. It implies for example the development of strong coordination
mechanisms and standard operating procedures to ensure high quality management
and aid delivery. Overall, most of the framework partners agreed that a full risk
analysis should be done prior to the involvement of LNGOs.
Broadening the successful involvement of LNGOs in ECHO funded actions would also
require some additional efforts such as: further capacity building, further reflection on
remote management possibilities, reflection on the simplification of the reporting
standards, etc.
A1.3.1.3 EQ3: To what extent does ECHO have appropriate,
comprehensive and context-adapted strategies in place for
addressing country/regional humanitarian needs and different
challenges, including medium and longer term objectives, where
applicable?
ECHO strategic priorities reflects the needs on the ground but are relatively
broad
The vast majority of the stakeholders consulted during the field visit considered that
ECHO’s strategies, as defined in the HIPs and the associated technical annexes,
answered to the most urgent humanitarian needs on the ground. As stated above
during the evaluation period the focus has been mainly put on: rapid response to
population movements and helping people affected by acute malnutrition and
epidemics. This translates in a focus on: food security, health, WASH, shelter,
protection and nutrition. The interviewed donors recognised the quality of ECHO’s
needs assessment as some of them use the HIPs as input to define their own
strategies. Despite this positive evaluation an ECHO staff interviewed in the field
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recognised that given the scale, complexity and changing nature of the crises in DRC
and the limited resources available, it is challenging for them to develop a deep
context analysis. They therefore largely rely on the input provided by the framework
partners.
Some framework partners did, however, question the reasons for broadening the
scope of the HIP from DRC only to DRC and the Great Lakes region in 2013. They also
considered that some changes in approaches were not consistent over time, the latest
example of such changes concern the response to epidemics which used to be focused
on prevention and is since the 2017 HIP focused on rapid response to epidemics.
According to some framework partners this change is not aligned with the approaches
adopted by other donors. In ECHO’s perspective this change is justified by the failure
of the prevention approach adopted until 2017.
Another more fundamental criticism of the recent HIPs and their technical annexes is
that their wording is quite generic and leave a lot of flexibility in terms of geographical
and sectoral coverage. This can lead to a certain level of scattering of the available
funding as there are no clear focus and priorities. This is especially the case in a
context of decreasing funding and increasing needs. It should however be recognised
that ECHO’s reasoning behind this relatively open strategy is to allow framework
partners to submit a variety of projects and only select the most relevant ones among
those submitted. This also gives the opportunity to framework partners to flag
particular needs in their proposal.
ECHO did acknowledge that that given their limited funding they might have to move
towards a more prescriptive approach in the future. The sharp decrease in funding in
2017 also forced ECHO to focus on its core mandate and three core objectives, i.e.
save lives, reduce morbidity and suffering and improving dignity of life. This focus was
reflected in the design of the projects visited during the field visit, e.g. IOM focused its
IDP project in North Kivu on coordination and life-saving activities and drop some
elements such as the biometric identification of IDPs, their generating revenue
activities and protection activities.
The process to develop the HIPs is considered by most stakeholders as robust but
many framework partners insisted on the fact that they would like to be involved in
that process in order to leverage their field knowledge. ECHO recognised that such a
consultation would add value to the HIPs and ensure the buy-in of the framework
partners into ECHO’s strategy. The framework partners also noted that ECHO has good
mechanisms in place to revise the HIPs when the situation on the grounds requires it
as was recently the case with the crisis in the Kasaï.
ECHO’s support to protection was very much adapted to the local context
During the evaluation period, ECHO strongly supported the protection agenda at a
global level but also in the DRC, which benefited from 3% of ECHO’s total funding
allocated to protection between 2012 and 2016. This push was clearly noted and
welcomed by some of the key protection actors in the DRC (e.g. CICR, IOM, NRC),
who rightfully consider that protection and throughout protection needs assessment
are fundamental for the design of humanitarian strategies and project. It was also
recognised that ECHO’s positioning towards protection influenced other donors in the
DRC. The protection sector is discussed in more details under section A1.3.7.2.
ECHO’s lack of medium and longer term objectives is partly explained by the
DRC context
The vast majority of the interviewed framework partners stressed that in the DRC
context it is extremely difficult for a donor such as ECHO to set out medium and/or
longer term objectives. It is particularly the case as there are no linear path from
crisis to emergency response, early recovery and development in DRC but rather a
chaotic landscape of progresses and setbacks due to various crises making long term
planning really challenging for a humanitarian donor. ECHO’s approach towards
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Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) is discussed in more details
under section A1.3.2.5 and section A1.3.6.1
A1.3.1.4 EQ4: To what extent does the configuration of ECHO’s field
network ensure an added value in terms of efficiency and
effectiveness of ECHO’s actions?
ECHO field staff clearly steers the national and regional strategies but has a
limited impact on global strategies
ECHO field staff have a leading role in the development of the HIPs and in the
selection of ECHO funded actions. Their formal role in these processes allows them to
reflect their knowledge of the local contexts into ECHO’s strategies, guaranteeing their
relevance. The field staff also have the opportunity to feed into the development of
the integrated assessment framework (IAF), which serves as basis for the
development of the HIPs, but the interviewed ECHO staff were unclear about how their
inputs were actually used in the IAF. Overall, the interviewed ECHO field staff
considered their influence on ECHO global policies as relatively limited. The sectoral
field staff are however consulted during the development of ECHO’s sectoral guidance
and strategies.
ECHO’s field network is considered by all the stakeholders as a key added
value of ECHO, strongly contributing to its efficiency and effectiveness
There was an overall consensus among the stakeholders consulted during the field
visit that the ECHO field network is a key added value and distinguishing factor for
ECHO compared to other donors. The continuous involvement of ECHO’s technical
assistants in the funded actions, i.e. from their pre-selection, refinement,
implementation and monitoring, is considered as a key specificity of ECHO’s approach
to humanitarian aid. This strong partnership allows the development of a common
understanding of the funded actions by the framework partners and the donor. This
ensure the relevance of the feedback provided by ECHO during the funded actions’
monitoring. The high technical knowledge of ECHO field staff also helps them provide
constructive feedback on the funded actions design and implementation, supporting
their efficiency and effectiveness. Their local presence also gives them a high mobility
and the ability to rapidly intervene if required.
The drawback associated with this permanent local presence is that the monitoring
and evaluation burden can become heavy for the framework partners. It was however
recognised that it also ensures a transparent follow-up to the funded actions. It is
considered as a good illustration of ECHO’s commitment towards its framework
partners. Other framework partners reported that despite this local presence they
found it sometimes difficult to access the ECHO field staff.
The ECHO field network’s architecture, expertise and geographic coverage is
fit for purpose
In 2015, ECHO’s Kinshasa office changed its status and became a regional office for
the Great Lakes region (i.e. covering ECHO’s activities in DRC, Rwanda, Burundi,
Tanzania and to a lesser extent Congo-Brazzaville and Angola). The Kinshasa office is
supported by a sub-country office in Goma supervising ECHO funded actions in North
Kivu and an antenna office in Bukavu supervising ECHO funded actions in South Kivu
and other regions in DRC as well as Tanzania. The staffing of these different offices is
illustrated in the table below.
Table A1.5 Structure of the field network in the Great Lakes region
Offices Staff
Kinshasa 1 Technical Assistant (TA) – Head of the regional office
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Offices Staff
2 TA with sectoral expertise in WASH and Health
5 support staff including 2 drivers, 1 programme officer, 1
administrative coordinator and 1 administrative and finance assistant
Goma 1 TA
2 Programme officers
1 Programme assistant supporting ECHO flight
3 administrative and finance/logistics assistant
Bukavu 1 TA
1 Programme officer
1 driver
Source: ECHO field staff, situation on 3 April 2017, communicated by ECHO to ICF.
Overall the ECHO field network’s architecture, expertise and geographic coverage was
considered as fit for purpose by the consulted stakeholders. Some important
framework partners stressed for example that: “ECHO field network is an
immeasurable advantage of ECHO [compared to other donors]. The level of
geographical and technical expertise of ECHO field staff is very high”.
Compared to the other ECHO regional offices, the Kinshasa office is a hybrid office as
it combines coordination and monitoring tasks. In view of the local TAs this is a good
model for two main reasons:
Sectoral experts are close to the field and can provide rapid guidance. It is
easier to work with them locally than to work with the sectoral experts based in
other regional offices; and
The head of the regional office, which is among others in charge of all the
advocacy and representation tasks, is close to the funded actions. This
reinforces his advocacy tasks.
Some framework partners did challenge this structure as, de facto, the whole Great
Lakes region has only two TA in charge of project monitoring. In reality the sectoral
experts and the Head of the Regional Office also monitor projects but this puts
pressure on their other tasks. The choice of sectoral expertise (i.e. WASH and Health)
also raised questions among the framework partners as, given ECHO’s priorities and
the funded actions’ portfolio, they were not sure these sectors were the most in need
of sectoral expertise. It was for example suggested that the local presence of a
protection or food security expert would be welcomed. This was also recognised by
ECHO (both at field and HQ level) but given the overall cap on the number of TA, they
recognised that choices had to be made. In DRC WASH and Health experts were
preferred as these are among the most crucial sectors to be covered in the case of
violent conflicts with important populations’ movements.
More fundamentally some of the interviewed stakeholders within ECHO recognised the
need to challenge the current global architecture of the field network. Questions linked
to further decentralisation of the network, distribution of sectoral experts across the
globe, cap to the number of TAs, recognition of ECHO’s field staff in ECHO advocacy
efforts, etc. need to be raised.
A1.3.1.5 EQ5: To what extent are ECHO humanitarian aid objectives still
relevant to the global humanitarian needs and context?
ECHO’s humanitarian aid objectives as stipulated in its regulation, HIPs and other
strategic documents are considered as very relevant to the global humanitarian needs
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– see more about this under evaluation question 1. As stated above, the sharp decline
in funding observed in 2017 despite the increasing needs was however not understood
by the framework partners and interpreted as a move towards the politicisation of
humanitarian aid, as the overall resources of ECHO did not decline.
A1.3.2 Coherence
A1.3.2.1 EQ6: To what extent were the ECHO funded actions (particularly
considering the challenges posed by restricted humanitarian access in
conflict-related crises) consistent with the four humanitarian
principles in their design and implementation?
ECHO is considered as a strong principles-based donor…
ECHO is considered by all framework partners and other humanitarian aid actors
interviewed in DRC as a strong principles-based donor. This is reflected in their choice
of funded actions and framework partners, which are all well-known organisations with
strong reputation of respect towards the humanitarian principles. No specific tensions
were identified between the ECHO funded actions in DRC and the humanitarian
principles.
Based on the geographical distribution of ECHO’s funded actions across North Kivu it
also clearly appears that ECHO puts the principle of humanity and neutrality at the
centre of its project selection process as it aims to cover a maximum of geographical
zones despite the limited humanitarian access in some areas. The projects
implemented by Medair and DRC respectively in in Masisi and Walikale and North of
Beni are good example of this will to cover regions with limited humanitarian access.
The allocation of a new budgetary envelope to cover the crisis in the Kasaï is also a
sign of ECHO’s attachment to the principle of humanity.
Different framework partners also stressed that ECHO is a strong advocate of the
respect of humanitarian principles in the different humanitarian aid coordination
mechanisms present in DRC.
… But there are some important challenges and tensions in the DRC context
The complex DRC context briefly exposed in section A1.2 presents some particular
challenges and tensions between the humanitarian principles and the practicalities of
delivering humanitarian assistance. The key tensions identified during the field mission
include:
The presence of an integrated UN mission combining multiple components
including the MONUSCO creates tension with regard to the neutrality and
independence principles. Some INGOs and international organisations refuse for
example to directly cooperate with the MONUSCO as they do not consider it as
a neutral actor but as a party involved in the conflict. The UN agencies however
are required to be accompanied by MONUSCO escorts in the zones considered
as red in terms of security. The MONUSCO presence therefore also guarantees
humanitarian access in these areas.
With regard to the principle of independence, the fact that the Humanitarian
Coordinator is also the MONUSCO coordinator and the UNDP Resident
Representative in DRC also creates tensions.
The strong ethnic divisions which underpin many of the internal conflicts in DRC
create an additional layer of complexity for humanitarian actors as they need to
carefully design their projects in order to be fully impartial. This seems to be
fully integrated by all the framework partners met during the field mission.
The increasing violence and the emergence of kidnapping targeting
humanitarian actors reduce humanitarian access and the overall humanitarian
space leading to tension with the principle of humanity as some zones are not
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covered by the key actors in DRC. ICRC stopped for example its activities in
North Kivu following the kidnapping of two of its staff in June 201715.
A1.3.2.2 EQ7: To what extent are ECHO humanitarian aid actions coherent
and complementary, and avoiding overlaps with those of the Member
States?
ECHO is one of the most involved donors in humanitarian coordination structures in
DRC. No strong differences were however identified between ECHO coordination
activities and efforts towards EU Member States and other donors. These two groups
are therefore covered together under this evaluation question, which starts with an
overview of the humanitarian aid coordination structure in DRC. It then provides more
details about ECHO’s role in each fora and its different efforts to ensure a coherent
approach with all the relevant actors.
Overview of the humanitarian aid coordination structure in DRC
The humanitarian response in DRC involves many different actors, the coordination
structures are therefore key to ensure the coordination between all these actors and
their respective activities. Figure A6.3 presents a first attempt to capture all these
structures into one diagram. The blue boxes represent the coordination structure of
the cluster approach as developed by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee involving
UN agencies and INGOs. Humanitarian aid donors, such as ECHO, SIDA, OFDA, DFID,
etc. meet under the GHD group in DRC. These meetings are used to coordinate the
funding efforts of these donors. The donors are also involved in the cluster
coordination structure at different level, although their involvement in the
humanitarian country team (HCT) is being challenged as they are officially not part of
the HCT anymore. In practice they still take part to the HCT meetings in DRC.
The green boxes at the bottom of the diagram presents the four key financing
channels or mechanisms used by donors to support humanitarian aid projects in DRC,
i.e.:
Direct project financing;
Contribution to the DRC Pooled Fund16;
Contribution to the RRMP mechanism17 coordinated by UNICEF;
Contribution to the ‘Camp Coordination and Camp Management’18 sector.
15
ICRC, 2017. République démocratique du Congo : le CICR appelle à la libération sans conditions des membres de son équipe enlevés au Nord-Kivu. Available at: https://www.icrc.org/fr/document/republique-democratique-du-congo-le-cicr-appelle-la-liberation-sans-conditions-des-0 [18 September 2017]. 16
The multi-donor humanitarian fund in DRC (in short the DRC Pooled Fund) falls under the authority of the UN Humanitarian Coordinator and aims to channel resources to projects within the Humanitarian Action Plan, to strengthen coordination and increase the extent to which funding is allocated to priority humanitarian needs. It was created in 2006. More details: UNDP, 2017. Democratic Republic of the Congo Humanitarian Fund. Available at: http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/HCG10 [18 September 2017]. 17
Humanitarian reponse, 2017. A propos du RRMP. Available at: https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/fr/operations/democratic-republic-congo/propos-du-rrmp [18 September 2017]. 18
Humanitarian reponse, 2017. Secteur CCCM - Gestion et Coordination des sites de déplacement. Available at: https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/fr/operations/r%C3%A9publique-d%C3%A9mocratique-du-congo/coordination-gestion-des-camps [18 September 2017].
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Figure A1.3 Overview of the key humanitarian coordination structures and financing
channels for intervention in DRC
Source: ICF, 2017. Based on: humanitarianresponse.info, 2017. Who does what? Available at: https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/about-clusters/who-does-what [18 September 2017].
ECHO is strongly involved in the UN coordination structures
The Humanitarian Needs Assessment and Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP)
developed by the HCT and its partners under UNOCHA supervision aim to serve as
basis for the coordination and coherence of humanitarian aid activities in DRC. As
stated by UNOCHA, the objective of the HRP is to articulate the shared vision of how
to respond to the assessed and expressed needs of the affected population. For the
first time the 2017 HRP covers a three years period and strongly push for a multi-
sectorial approach to humanitarian aid – more details about the 2017-2019 HRP and
its implications for ECHO are provided in the box below.
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DRC Humanitarian Response Plan 2017-2019 and its implications for ECHO’s
strategies
For the first time the HRP published by the HCT in 2017 presents a multi-annual
(2017-2019) and multi-sectorial approach19. The objective of this approach is to:
■ Ensure a holistic assistance adapted to the identified needs through the
strengthening of the complementarity between sectors; and
■ Adapt the response strategy to the context of a long term crisis.
The implications of this new HRP for ECHO mainly relates to its multi-annual character
as ECHO is already strongly pushing for multi-sectoral projects. As stated in the
document the multi-annual approach is linked to specific context of DRC, i.e.:
■ Affected a cyclical crisis, which is acute with successive and repetitive shocks but
with a continuous intensity, making the anticipation of the needs possible and
necessary;
■ Wide spread and prolonged crisis requiring a response to chronic vulnerabilities,
closer coordination with development actors and an improved response capacity
in newly affected zones.
The objective of the multi-annual approach is to ensure a more effective, context-
specific response with particular attention for the support to sustainable solutions for
IDPs. This contrast with the strong focus on new IDPs set out in ECHO’s 2016 HIPs. It
potentially also creates an opportunity for ECHO to also develop a multi-annual
strategy for its interventions in DRC and the Great Lakes region.
As set out by UNOCHA, the HRP and the associated ‘hotspot’ exercise used to inform
the humanitarian response every six month serve as basis for the prioritisation of the
humanitarian aid activities within the HCT. As an observer in the HCT, formally until
June 2017 and informally since then20, ECHO field staff are involved in these
discussions. The prioritisation is then discussed within the GHD group to coordinate
the funding efforts. ECHO has been supporting the HCT in the DRC since its sept up in
2006. ECHO is also part of the Consultative Council of the DRC Pooled Fund although it
does not contribute to its financing. ECHO is also present in the clusters but to a more
limited extent given their large numbers and presence at different levels (i.e. regional,
national, global levels).
The role of ECHO in these different coordination structures was considered by all the
interviewed stakeholders as constructive. As stated by a framework partner “ECHO
stands as vocal observer in the coordination structures and ring the alarm bell with
others in order to raise awareness and ensure the respect of the humanitarian
principles”.
A few framework partners questioned ECHO’s ability to challenge the UN cluster
approach while other noted that it was not within ECHO’s responsibility to do so. Other
stressed that ECHO should have a clearer position towards some of the UN agencies.
The lack of clear positioning from ECHO towards the MONUSCO exit strategy was for
example identified as an important gap. It was also emphasised by many that with the
sharp decline in ECHO funding in DRC their impact on the coordination structures
might decrease on the medium or long term.
19
UNOCHA, 2017. Plan de Réponse Humanitaire RDC. Available at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/DRC_HRP_2017.pdf [19 September 2017]. 20
The decision to exclude the donors from the HCT was taken on the basis of the independence principle. In the fact it clearly appeared that ECHO and other donors will still take place to the HCT meetings. It is however a sign of a certain level of mistrust between some UN agencies and humanitarian donors.
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Good coordination with other donors including Member States
Overall ECHO's activities are considered as fully coherent and complementary to all
the other traditional donors’ activities. ECHO has particularly close relationships with
OFDA, DFID and SIDA. The interaction between ECHO and new donors seems to be
limited at this stage as there don’t seem to be much interest from both sides to
pursue active coordination.
The GHD group is the main forum involving all the traditional humanitarian aid donors,
most of them being EU Member States21. ECHO is a key player in this group and is
currently co-chairing it with OCHA. As reported by other donors, the GHD group is a
good mechanism to ensure complementarity between donors. They, for example, keep
track of all the financing of the participating donors in order to prevent double funding
and keep everyone informed. This is not an easy task given the financing cycles of the
different donors. Hence donors also rely on their implementing partners to identify
their different funding channels. A good example of complementarity in terms of
financing is the support given to INSO’s security information services which is shared
among the key donors present in DRC and benefits all of them.
One EU Member States representative noted that the GHD group has no EU sub-group
and no European character. This is not considered as a real need given the landscape
of donors present in DRC. It was however recognised that ECHO could and should do
more to raise awareness about humanitarian needs in DRC among the EU Member
States and encourage them to provide more financing to fulfil the needs. The
channelling of more funds through ECHO via the mechanism of external assigned
revenue should also be encouraged as, according to one EU donor, ECHO has a clear
strategy and portfolio of funded actions and can guarantee good performance due to
its presence on the ground. The role of the Council and the Council working party on
Humanitarian Aid and Food Aid is considered as unclear in this context.
A series of obstacles for further cooperation between humanitarian aid donors,
including Member States, were identified:
In many countries the humanitarian aid budget is managed by the development
aid department and these often do not get involved in the GHD group. They
however have separated meetings focusing on development aid;
Many countries want to keep a visibility through their humanitarian aid
activities, which limits the scope of joint implementation efforts;
Coordination at strategy level is complicated but at operational level it is even
more complicated and really depends on the personalities of the people
involved.
Representatives from the EU Delegation stressed that in terms of advocacy there is a
good level of coordination between the different players at EU level and the EU
Member States. This allows all the European actors to push for common policy
messages.
A1.3.2.3 NEW EQ1: To what extent were ECHO’s actions coherent and
complementary, and avoiding overlaps, with actions implemented by
other international partners?
This evaluation question is discussed together with evaluation question 7 above.
21
The member of the GHD group identified during the interviews include: very involved donors: ECHO, OFDA, Food for Peace, SIDA, DFID; limited engagement: Belgian authorities, AFD, Canadian authorities; very limited engagement: Dutch authorities, German authorities.
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A1.3.2.4 EQ8: To what extent were ECHO’s humanitarian actions
internally coherent and complementary, and avoiding overlaps,
including with the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) and EU
Aid volunteers?
This evaluation question is not applicable to the DRC context as the UCPM was not
activated in DRC and no ECHO funded actions welcomed EU aid volunteers.
A1.3.2.5 EQ9: To what extent were ECHO’s actions coherent and
complementary, and avoiding overlaps, with the EU’s other external
financing instruments?
The main other source of EU financing relevant for ECHO’s activities in DRC is the
financing provided by DG for International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO)
under its different programmes – these are briefly presented alongside other smaller
EU financing in the box below.
Other EU interventions in DRC
As noted in the Great Lakes HIPs, alongside ECHO humanitarian aid financing
the European Commission provides the following financing to DRC:
■ The 11th EDF National Indicative Programme (NIP) amounts to EUR 709
million22 for the period 2014-2020 and focuses EU support on four main
areas: health, environment and sustainable agriculture, roads, as well as
governance and the rule of law (with special attention to police, justice and
defence). Public finance management will also be prioritised as a cross-
cutting issue.
■ DRC benefits from a number of thematic budget lines, including:
– The European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights;
– Food Security;
– The Environment and Tropical Forests;
– Mine Clearance;
– There is also a budget line for co-financing local NGOs.
■ The EU is also involved in the field of security sector reform:
– An EU advisory and assistance mission for security reform in DRC ended
in June 2015;
– An EU police mission in DRC ended in September 2014.
■ The EU is providing support to vulnerable women and girls in the east of the
DRC with access to holistic quality health services as well as judicial and
reintegration with a total amount of EUR 3 million. This complements efforts
against gender based violence supported by humanitarian interventions for
over a decade in South Kivu.
The cooperation and coherence between ECHO and DEVCO was extensively discussed
with representatives from both DGs and ECHO’s key framework partners. The key
outcomes from these discussions are presented below according to: (1) existing
coordination efforts; (2) existing obstacles and (3) identified improvement
opportunities.
22
The national indicative programme in the DRC for the current spending round initially budgeted €561.7 million for these priorities. This budget was later increased by €40 million from the Millenium Development Goals (link is external) Initiative (accelerating achievement of MDGs 4 and 5) and €15 million after the end-of-term review (allocated to the infrastructure sector). The envelope B also increased from €47.7 million to €140 million. The budget allocated to DRC under the National Indicative Programme is currently €709 million. Source: European Commission, 2017. DRC overview. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/countries/congo-democratic-republic_en [19 September 2017].
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Existing cooperation efforts supporting coherence
According to both ECHO and DEVCO staff the information exchange between
the two DGs is fluid in DRC. This is facilitated by the location of ECHO’s offices
within the same building as the EU Delegation. The ECHO Head of Office takes
part to weekly coordination meetings with the key departments of the EU
Delegation, he also provides daily update to the EU ambassador. This ability to
raise awareness of key EU Delegation staff is considered as a good assets of
ECHO by other donors. It should however be noted that the information sharing
can be limited by ECHO’s obligation to stick to its mandate and protect its
partners which cannot be considered as source of intelligence for the EU
Delegation.
Some discussions took place between ECHO and DEVCO about where they
could work together on the development of transition strategies. This resulted
for example in the development of a transition programme in the health sector
in Ituri where DEVCO is integrating health zones previously covered by ECHO
funded actions in its work – cooperation in the health sector is not always so
easy as set out in the box below. There are also ongoing discussions about the
reallocation of EUR 10 to 20 million from DEVCO’s 11th EDF security budget line
(which is currently blocked due to the political impasse in DRC) to the 11th EDF
health budget line. One option is to work with ECHO to support the population
affected by the crisis in the Kasaï region. The discussions are still at early stage
but it shows that even in complex context such as the Kasaï region some LRRD
/ transition work is possible when budgets are available.
ECHO’s ability to work in insecure environment is complementary to DEVCO’s
activities as they cannot work in such environment. ECHO is therefore able to
take over or at least ensure continuity of support in zones subject to insecurity.
This is now the case in the Kasaï region – even though the modality of the
support provided are different.
DEVCO manages the group of donors in the health sector (“coordination des
partenaires techniques et financiers”), which is the equivalent of the health
cluster in the humanitarian world. ECHO is often invited to the meetings of that
group. This allows them to ensure a connection with the health cluster.
DEVCO is consulted during the development of the HIPs.
Existing obstacles for further cooperation
Based on their respective mandates ECHO and DEVCO staff have different
perspectives on the concepts of transition and LRRD, which prevents close strategic
and operational cooperation. ECHO field staff consider that their core mission is to
focus on humanitarian emergency response and immediate relief. As such LRRD
components are helpful but the feasibility of their integration into humanitarian aid
project depends on the local context. This discourse from the field sometimes
contrasts with the official policy line of ECHO which strongly pushes for LRRD. DEVCO
staff on the other side consider that all humanitarian aid project should have a clear
LRRD and exit strategy from their launch.
The DRC context is very complicated for the development of LRRD strategies as there
is no linear development process but rather a chaotic landscape of progresses and
setbacks due to various crises. This adds to the conceptual differences presented
above and makes the operational cooperation between ECHO and DEVCO difficult as
they sometimes end up working on the same thematic in the same geographical zones
but with different approaches. This is particularly the case in the health sector as
exposed in more details in the box below.
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Example of difficult cooperation in the health sector
The health sector is one of the sectors targeted by the 11th EDF in the two Kasaï’s,
North Kivu and the Province Orientale. It is also a sector targeted by ECHO through
different funded actions. ECHO and DEVCO however have very different approach in
the health sector, as briefly summarised here23:
■ DEVCO and the 11th EDF aim to further support the transition towards LRRD and
development in the health sector by among others integrating the health zones
covered by humanitarian projects into the national health system and supporting
the institutional capacities of the Public Health Ministry24. The structural support
provided by DEVCO is conditional on good performance in the area of governance,
differential diagnosis and quality of care. It is fundamentally based on a system of
cost recovery which according to DEVCO should be maintained in most situations
– even in times of crisis. The origin of the payment can however vary, i.e. from
the patients or through voucher provided by other organisation.
■ ECHO’s approach in the health sector is primarily to guarantee (free) access to
healthcare to all persons living in the zones where the structures have been
severely damaged by crises.
These differences between the two approaches become even more flagrant in the
field when ECHO and DEVCO end up working alongside each other. This will be the
case in the Kasaï with the new financing provided by ECHO in that zone. To a lesser
extent it is also the case in North Kivu where DEVCO is working with different health
structure on LRRD strategy without involving ECHO, which doubt that the DEVCO
effort will succeed.
There is no fixed framework provided by ECHO for the development of LRRD or
transition activities within funded actions. This means that the success of these
activities fully rely on the implementing partners.
There are also a series of obvious obstacles which are not specific to the DRC
context including the different financing cycles between ECHO and DEVCO or
the political agenda defended by DEVCO compared to ECHO’s political
independence.
Improvement opportunities
A series of stakeholders argued that if the European Commission wants to
achieve real results in the area of LRRD and transition, they have to develop a
strong framework at HQ level and provide sufficient financing to implement it.
This does not mean developing a ‘one size fits all’ approach but rather
developing a framework for differentiated cooperation levels depending on the
context and the sector. It also needs clear financing. It could for example be
covered by a fixed share of the EDF subject to joint programming between
ECHO and DEVCO.
ECHO and DEVCO could learn from the Swedish experience where development
aid financing is used to tackle the root causes of vulnerability in the sectors
targeted by humanitarian aid.
A series of other options exist to ensure more sustainability within the
humanitarian aid sector but these are discussed in more details under section
A1.3.6.1.
23
These are short summaries flagging the key difference between ECHO and DEVCO approaches to cost recovery. The whole approach of each organisation is obviously much more complex than that. 24
European Commission and DRC government, 2014. Programme Indicatif National 11eme FED. 2014-2020. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/nip-drc-20140626_fr.pdf [19 September 2017].
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A1.3.3 EU added value
A1.3.3.1 EQ10: What was the added values of DG ECHO’s HA
interventions? How could ECHO maximise its EU Added Value? What
would happen if DG ECHO would stop its HA interventions?
ECHO added value in the field is important in terms of financing but its added
value is larger than financing only
ECHO is one of the main donors in the area of humanitarian aid in DRC and its
financial added value is therefore very important for all the framework partners. As
shown in the table below with the exception of the three projects implemented by
large UN agencies or the ICRC and the Oxfam project linked to the Forum of
International NGOs, all the projects funded by ECHO in 2016 rely on ECHO for more
than 57% of their funding.
Table A1.6 ECHO framework partners rely on ECHO for an important share of their
project’s budget (2017 budgets of the sample of analysed projects)
Partners Total cost ECHO contribution Share of ECHO
contribution
COOPI-IT 888,000 850,000 96%
PUI-FR 2,000,000 1,800,000 90%
NRC-NO 3,589,957 3,200,000 89%
MEDAIR 2,517,288 1,879,044 75%
IOM-CH 816,739 600,000 73%
DRC-DK 1,750,000 1,000,000 57%
OXFAM-UK 339,999 80,000 24%
CICR-CH 20,299,618 2,500,000 12%
UNICEF-US 38,540,615 4,000,000 10%
OCHA-CH 14,320,082 600,000 4%
Note: ECHO contribution is based on the requested support as communicated in the last version of the e-Single form (May 2017).
Alongside this important financial added value the framework partners identified a
series of additional features which really distinguish ECHO from other donors and
ensure its high added value. These include:
ECHO field staff have high technical expertise and are very mobile. This allows
a close monitoring of the funded actions through their whole life-cycle (i.e. from
design to implementation and evaluation) and the provision of constructive
advice leading to increased project’s effectiveness.
ECHO is very concerned with the security of its framework partners which is
much appreciated. Since 2015 they co-finance the security information services
provided by INSO to support the framework partners.
The transport services provided by ECHO flight and the flexibility of the tool are
considered as an important to facilitate the work of the framework partners and
ensure humanitarian access.
It was also reported that ECHO administrative and financial processes are
relatively straightforward compared to other donors – although this opinion was
not shared by all framework partners.
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ECHO also has a systemic added value as it is strongly involved in the
humanitarian coordination structures
As exposed under evaluation question 7 (see section A1.3.2.2), ECHO field staff
are strongly involved in the humanitarian coordination structures and actively
engage with their partners and peers through various fora (e.g. Good
Humanitarian Donorship, Humanitarian Country Team, UN clusters, etc.). They
are considered as an active and constructive observers and/or contributors
depending on the forum bringing constructive solutions and recommendations
forward both in terms of projects and coordination efforts.
ECHO also pushed for different strategic agenda’s which had a positive impact
on projects’ design and implementation but also on the humanitarian
landscape. Key examples include:
- ECHO’s strategic support for a multi-sectoral response;
- ECHO’s strategic focus on protection and protection needs- and risks
assessments also added value to the funded actions and pushed the whole
humanitarian community to put protection at the heart of its preoccupation;
- ECHO’s support to the use of multi-purpose cash transfer as transfer
modality, which was done both at HQ and field level and led big
organisations to change their approach, e.g. of the ICRC which adopted this
transfer modality in DRC.
ECHO also has an EU added value for the Member States present in DRC
The key added value of ECHO for the EU Member States is linked to its strong
presence in the field, its good analytical skills and its strong linkages with the
humanitarian actors present in DRC. This allows EU Member States, also represented
via the EU Delegation, to access first-hand information on ongoing crises and benefit
from ECHO analysis of the situation. EU Member States also benefit from the needs
assessments developed by ECHO to inform their funding decisions.
Opportunities to further increase ECHO’s added value
A number of improvement opportunities were identified to further increase ECHO’s
added value including:
ECHO should position itself clearly towards some of the key discussions
currently ongoing in the humanitarian community. It was for example
recognised by different framework partners that ECHO, and many other INGOs,
have not yet realised the full potential of working closely with LNGOs (e.g. in
terms of humanitarian access, local acceptance, local knowledge, sustainability,
etc.). As the potential drawbacks associated with the involvement of LNGOs
were also recognised, ECHO should further explore how to best cooperate with
LNGOs. This could positively impact both ECHO’s funded actions and the whole
humanitarian community.
ECHO should consider integrating multi-year programming and funding within
its approach, especially in context of long-lasting crises like in DRC. In addition
to all the obvious benefits for the framework partners (e.g. financial planning,
reduced administrative burden, improved efficiency, etc.), this would allow
framework partners to really adopt community-based approaches which are
much needed in the context where the governmental structures are not fulfilling
their mission.
ECHO should further improve the timeliness of its response by shortening its
internal decision process in the case of new crises requiring additional funding.
In the case of the crisis in the Kasaï, it took ECHO HQ more than four months to
reach a funding decision after the original request from ECHO field.
From a practical point of view, ECHO could further improve its added value by
simplifying its online monitoring tools. It was stressed by one framework
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partner that the APPEL system and ECHO’s online monitoring tools were
becoming increasingly complex and less flexible.
In parallel to these improvement opportunities, it was noted that one risk to ECHO
added value is the dichotomy which is sometimes between the policies and statements
made by ECHO HQ, e.g. with regard to the Grand Bargain commitments, and the
interpretation and actions of the ECHO field staff. This does not imply that the ECHO
field staff do not implement ECHO’s policies but the way in which they implement
them may not be internally coherent. It was also recognised that some of the policies
developed at ECHO HQ would require important budgets to be implemented (e.g.
LRRD and transition agenda), while the field aims to fulfil ECHO’s core mandates with
the limited funding they receive.
A1.3.4 Effectiveness
A1.3.4.1 EQ11: To what extent has ECHO achieved its objectives?
The objective of this section is not to make an overall assessment of whether or not
ECHO achieved its specific objectives in DRC or not as this is out of the scope of this
field report. The specific outputs and outcomes of the visited projects were therefore
not assessed in details.
Overall the projects implemented in DRC seem to have been effective and
achieved their expected results
Out of the sample of 22 funded actions implemented in DRC between 2012 and 2016
and mapped prior to the field mission 16 fully (8 projects or 36%) or partially (8
projects or 36%) achieved their results while the results of 6 projects (28%) were
considered as unclear in the project reports. During the field mission all the visited
projects seem to ensure a high level of effectiveness and were all on track to meet
their objectives.
On a strategic level ECHO’s effectiveness is among others supported through their
selection process and choice of partners:
ECHO really scrutinise the proposals it receives during the selection process and
provide constructive feedback on funded actions’ design and implementation to
maximise the impacts of its funding;
ECHO pays great attention to prevent duplication by among other coordinating
with other donors through the GHD group;
ECHO ensures a good geographical spread of its projects to maximise its
geographical coverage with a particular focus on the zones identified as the
most vulnerable. This outreach is however limited by ECHO’s reluctance to work
with INGOs managing local implementing partners remotely due to security and
access concerns. In some cases access is simply not possible.
One of the framework partners stressed that ECHO’s rigidity towards some activities
(e.g. infrastructure or livelihood activities) limited the effectiveness of their projects.
MEDAIR wanted for example some limited financing to reinforce a short section of
transport infrastructure to ensure better access to the health and market
infrastructures in their zone of intervention. However, as they had to justify the
financing using the ‘traditional’ aid indicators (e.g. impact on mortality, etc.), which
was a difficult exercise, ECHO did not grant them funding for this part of the project.
ECHO monitoring and reviewing mechanisms allow for an effective
assessment of progress made and support the projects’ effectiveness
ECHO’s monitoring approach consists in online reporting on key indicators through the
FicheOp and monitoring missions by ECHO field staff. Overall the framework partners
considered this approach as constructive and contributing to the effectiveness of their
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projects. IOM explained for example that ECHO encouraged them to prioritise the
most vulnerable zones in North Kivu and monitor the situation in the return zones in
order to facilitate the return of IDP when possible and stop the closing of IDP camps
by the government. ECHO also supported the biometric identification of IDPs in 2015
and 2016, which supported the effectiveness of aid delivery in North Kivu by
preventing double counting of IDPs and facilitating accurate planning.
ECHO’s monitoring approach was also praised by other donors, although some of them
opted for a completely different approach as exposed in the box below. One UN
framework partner even defined ECHO’s monitoring approach as “a very well
developed monitoring system, probably the best among all the donors”.
This opinion was not shared by all UN framework partners interviewed, as one of them
considered ECHO’s approach as too technical and not strategic enough in comparison
for example to DFID’s approach considered as putting more emphasis on medium
term objectives and value for money. As reported under evaluation question 10 above,
the user-friendliness of the online reporting tool was also questioned by some
framework partners.
SIDA’s distinctive funding and monitoring approach
As reported by a Nordic INGO, SIDA adopted a new ‘strategy financing’ approach,
which consist in the signature of framework contracts with a limited number of
INGOs. These framework contracts are signed following an audit of the selected
INGOs. Once selected SIDA finance the INGOs’ whole strategy, as opposed to single
projects. It works through the following steps:
1. Agreement to finance the INGOs’ global strategy;
2. Internal discussion within the INGOs to divide the envelope by region and
country including the allocation of an emergency reserve;
3. Validation of the envelope’s division by SIDA;
4. Implementation of the strategy by the INGOs;
5. Annual reporting and review of the envelope’s division by the INGOs and the
donor.
According to the interviewed partner this approach has the benefit to be flexible and
allows rapid deployment.
Despite this overall positive evaluation of ECHO’s monitoring approach it was reported
that ECHO’s typical key results indicators and key outcomes indicators were not
adapted for projects which are not purely focusing on aid delivery. This point was
particularly raised by INSO and the Forum of INGOs which are both financed by ECHO
and support advocacy, outreach and security objectives but do not deliver aid directly
to affected populations. They therefore had to be imaginative and INSO is for example
reflecting on the types of consultation they could implement in order to demonstrate
the impact of the security information they share with ECHO’s partners.
A1.3.4.2 EQ12: To what extent do ECHO sectoral policies contribute to the
effectiveness of ECHO’s operations?
ECHO’s sectoral approaches and priorities are appropriate to the needs…
Framework partners stressed that ECHO successfully managed to push different
agendas forward which were in line with the needs in the field, e.g. push for cash-
based transfer, support to protection agenda and associated needs- and risks-
assessment. It was also stressed that the fact that these sectoral and/or thematic
agendas are pushed for at both field and HQ level reinforce their impact. The CICR for
example recognised that ECHO played a key role in the introduction of cash transfer
within their projects.
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… But the sectoral guidance are not well known by framework partners and
other humanitarian actors
However, there is a general lack of awareness about ECHO’s specific sectoral guidance
and policies amongst the framework partners. Some INGOs which have for example
been working on detailed internal protection guidance and template and which were
well aware of ECHO’s push for protection mainstreaming had never heard of ECHO’s
protection guidance published in May 2016. This raises important question about the
usefulness of these guidance and the effectiveness of their distribution and outreach.
This has to be investigated into more details as ECHO invests a considerable amount
of resources into the development of these guidance.
As stressed by one framework partner, these guidance are however helpful for new
framework partners as they provide a good overview what ECHO is ready to finance or
not. For the traditional framework partners, which have been working with ECHO for
many years, this is just a confirmation of what they already know. A potential way to
improve this could be to have a more participatory approach during the development
of such guidance.
A1.3.4.3 EQ13: With reference to ECHO’s visibility manual, to what extent
do ECHO activities achieve proper visibility through funded actions?
All the framework partners seem to align with ECHO’s visibility requirements as set
out in the visibility manual. They all advertise the European Commission’s logo across
their projects through different means (e.g., tags, flags, stickers) and ensure a
transparent communication about their sources of funding. In the current DRC
context, visibility is however not on top of the framework partners’ agenda.
The discussions on visibility often led to considerations on awareness raising about
humanitarian needs in Europe and the need to communicate more actively about the
crisis in DRC in Europe. Different framework partners consider that ECHO should play
a stronger role in that context. They should adopt a modern and narrative based
communication strategy in order to reach out to the European public. Other framework
partners noted that although ECHO, and most humanitarian actors, are excellent in
technical communication and advocacy they should also develop political messages in
order to increase their impact. One can however question whether this is really
ECHO’s role and not the role of the framework partners.
A1.3.5 Efficiency
A1.3.5.1 EQ14: To what extent did ECHO achieve cost-effectiveness in its
response?
ECHO takes cost-effectiveness into account during the selection of its funded
actions
As reported by different framework partners and ECHO field staff, cost-effectiveness is
one of the criteria taken into account during the selection of actions to be funded. The
budget are closely looked at and ECHO staff pay attention to hidden costs and support
costs, although they realise that implementing projects in DRC implies high logistical
and security costs. During the project’s assessment ECHO also examines different
ratios (e.g. administrative budget / budget reaching beneficiaries; logistics budget /
budget reaching beneficiaries) but the real focus is put on the expected results.
Different ECHO staff and framework partners stressed that it is important for
humanitarian donors and workers to not focus on cost/beneficiary ratio. The main
reasons being that support costs differ highly from one sector or context to the other.
There is also no good benchmark to potentially compare these ratio with.
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One ECHO field staff recognised that the cost-effectiveness analysis performed during
the project selection process was not done based on a fixed and pre-defined approach.
This lack of consistent approach was considered as a weakness by one UN framework
partner, who considered it as important to inform the framework partners and ensure
transparency. Other framework partners considered ECHO’s approach as reasonable
and adapted to capture lessons learned and ensure continuous improvements.
Once selected there is a good project’s monitoring but no close scrutiny on
the budget as the key focus is put on the funded actions’ results
As presented under evaluation question 11 above (section A1.3.4.1) ECHO has a
strong approach to monitor projects once they are launched. During this monitoring
the focus is put on the activities and how to maximise their impact. This way of
working (i.e. balance between scrutiny at selection stage and relative freedom for
projects once selected) was considered as git for purpose by the framework partners.
For many stakeholders the real added value of ECHO relies in its field staff who closely
monitor the projects and are able to provide rapid and adapted support ensuring a
cost-efficient implementation of the funded actions.
In parallel to this monitoring undertaken by ECHO field staff, framework partners are
audited. One ECHO field staff stressed that all monitoring, reporting and audit
obligations imposed on framework partners require considerable resources, which
might negatively impact their cost-efficiency.
Key remarks and potential options to further improve the cost-efficiency of
ECHO’s funded actions
A series of remarks were raised with regard to the cost-efficiency of ECHO’s funded
actions:
Different actors (i.e. framework partners and donors) questioned the cost-
efficiency of funding projects via UN agencies. It was stressed that they often
implement their projects through contracts with INGOs, which are in many
cases also directly benefiting from ECHO funding. They often represent the first
step in the ‘humanitarian transmission chain’ (i.e. UN agency, INGO, LNGO,
local association) but they do not always add considerable value to the projects
according to these actors – although in some context they bring clear added
value, e.g. coordination of large response projects. According to the interviewed
framework partners ECHO should continue its efforts to challenge UN agencies
and push for cost-efficiency.
ECHO should look into how LNGOs could take a more prominent role in project
delivery as they have the potential to considerably reduce the project’s
implementation costs alongside bringing other benefits to the projects.
ECHO should look into the involvement of private actors in the implementation
of humanitarian projects as they can potentially provide cost-effective solutions.
One donor stressed for example that during the Ebola crisis the private sector
proved to be much more effective and efficient than INGOs.
ECHO should push for the use of common reporting and audit standards across
donors in order to decrease the administrative burden linked to all the reporting
and auditing requirements imposed on humanitarian actors.
ECHO’s running costs are important in DRC and the Great Lakes region as there
are currently five TA and 15 support staff. ECHO is also spending over EUR 7
million in DRC to operate ECHO flights services. Although the services provided
by the ECHO field staff and ECHO flights are considered as extremely valuable
their cost might be questioned if the share of ECHO’s funding allocated to the
region continues to decrease. There are ongoing efforts to consider ECHO flight
services in DRC as a project and not purely as an ECHO support as it truly
serves the whole humanitarian community in DRC.
Comprehensive evaluation of the European Union humanitarian aid, 2012-2016
37
A1.3.5.2 EQ 15: How successful has ECHO been in coordinating its
operations with other main humanitarian actors, and with its civil
protection actions, e.g. by promoting synergies and avoiding
duplications, gaps and resource conflicts?
This question is already answered by evaluation question 7 above (section A1.3.2.2).
Overall it can be said that ECHO coordinates well with the other stakeholders to
provide an efficient response. This occurs both formally and informally and is
reinforced by the regular monitoring visits.
A1.3.6 Sustainability
A1.3.6.1 EQ16: To what extent have the ECHO-funded actions been
successful in linking relief, rehabilitation and development,
considering both the continuum and contiguum aspects?
LLRD is very complex in the DRC context but improvements are possible
ECHO’s approach to the LRRD or transition agenda is already largely discussed under
evaluation question 9, which assesses the coherence between ECHO and DEVCO
financing. As stated above there is an overall agreement that the DRC context is very
complicated for the development of LRRD strategies as there is no linear development
process but rather a chaotic landscape of progresses and setbacks due to various
crises. . This doesn’t imply that the development of such strategies is impossible but it
needs to be well thought and allow sufficient flexibility to rapidly adapt to different
contexts. The key points to be considered for the development of such strategy
identified by the consulted stakeholders include:
In the DRC context an LRRD strategy needs to be coupled with a LRRD
strategy, i.e. Linking Development to Relief and Rehabilitation, to be prepared
for the occurrence of crises bringing regions from development stages back to
emergency support and relief.
ECHO and the European Commission as a whole should consider the
development of hybrid projects allowing different actors specialised in both
humanitarian and development aid to work together in consortia and tackle
complex contexts.
Within its own strategy ECHO has to consider how to move towards multi-
annual programming and financing in contexts of long-lasting crisis as it will
help all the involved actors in thinking more strategically in terms of medium-
term objectives. New set of indicators directly linked to these medium-term
objectives have to be defined.
ECHO has to consider how LNGOs could play a role in ensure the sustainability
of its funded actions.
A1.3.7 Key additional insights for rapid evaluations
This section provides a summary of the key insights feeding into the rapid evaluations
as captured during the field mission to DRC. The sections are organised based on the
evaluation framework developed for each rapid evaluation. The write-up and style of
this section is more concise than in the previous sections. The authors of the rapid
evaluations will have to combine these insights with the more detailed minutes of the
different interviews and focus groups.
Comprehensive evaluation of the European Union humanitarian aid, 2012-2016
38
A1.3.7.1 Advocacy
Relevance
Nature of ECHO advocacy activities and target audience
ECHO completes and supports advocacy activities at different levels in DRC including:
Funding of advocacy activities implemented by the framework partners: the
funding of the Forum of INGO25 is a good example of project with strong
advocacy objectives.
Direct implementation of advocacy activities at different levels:
- External advocacy towards the DRC government, which is extremely
difficult in the current context;
- External advocacy towards the donor community and the
humanitarian aid community in DRC to push ECHO’s vision and
objectives and raise awareness about the needs in DRC. ECHO field staff
consider that they receive clear guidance from ECHO HQ about the
messages they have to pass towards these audiences. These advocacy
efforts are implemented through ECHO’s strong involvement in the
humanitarian coordination structures present in DRC – as presented in
section A1.3.2.2. . Through its local presence ECHO field staff also have the
opportunity to organise many bilateral meetings with the relevant actors;
- Internal advocacy towards ECHO and the European institutions, the
objective of these activities is to raise awareness about the humanitarian
needs in DRC in order to access more funding and mitigate the influence of
other factors on ECHO’s funding decisions.
ECHO advocacy objectives
ECHO’s advocacy activities in DRC do not seem to rely on formal needs assessment as
no evidence of such assessment was identified during the field mission to DRC. The
clarity of ECHO’s advocacy objectives was considered as variable as some framework
partners FPA found them clear (i.e. based on the humanitarian principles and the
priorities set out in the HIPs) while others considered them as unclear, stressing
particularly the lack of a more global long-term vision and the strong reactivity of
ECHO’s advocacy efforts.
The key advocacy messages pushed forward by ECHO, as identified by the consulted
stakeholders, include:
Maintenance of the humanitarian space;
Support to the humanitarian principles;
Profiling of DRC crisis, which is often perceived as a protracted crisis while it is
actually a succession of acute crisis across the country affecting different
population groups.
It was stressed by some framework partners that ECHO should also integrate the
following aspects in its advocacy efforts in DRC:
Clear positioning towards the MONUSCO and its exit strategy, the need to
develop a common message with the framework partners was stressed in that
context;
ECHO is often praised by its partners for its technical advocacy but more should
be done in the area of political advocacy, where MSF and OXFAM are perceived
as being much more active.
25
Nore details about the Forum: http://www.ongirdc.org/#Accueil.A
Comprehensive evaluation of the European Union humanitarian aid, 2012-2016
39
Coherence
Coherence with the EU Delegation and EU Member States
The EU Delegation in Kinshasa reported that good coordination in Brussels allowed
ECHO and DEVCO to align their advocacy efforts in DRC. EU Member States are also
involved in these discussion ensuring a coordinated EU approach. This does not
prevent ECHO to also push for a more humanitarian advocacy message when
required.
Coherence with the framework partners
A particularity of the DRC context is the multitude of INGOs present, many of which
are ECHO partners. Compared to other context these partners do not always advocate
for the same things and do not agree on key points, e.g. the level of cooperation with
the MONUSCO. Despite these difficulties, different framework partners reported that
ECHO is open to discussions and the development of common messages to convey
towards different audiences.
EU added value
According to some of the other donors met in Kinshasa, ECHO’s strong advocacy role
is one of its key added value and distinguishing factor compared to other donors. Their
local presence, constructive role in the humanitarian coordination structures and
reputation as strong principles- and needs-based donor reinforce their advocacy
messages towards the humanitarian community. It was however stressed that in order
to maintain this strong added value, ECHO should make sure to align its discourse on
humanitarian principles and needs-based approach with its funding decisions.
Effectiveness
Although it is of course very difficult to assess the impact of advocacy efforts, a few
example of successes of ECHO advocacy activities were identified, including:
IOM representatives noted that they successfully advocated with ECHO towards
the RRMP partners to encourage them to also allocate resources to support
services after the initial three months of the RRMP intervention;
ECHO successfully pushed for the use of cash and voucher as transfer modality
when the local context allows it;
ECHO contributed towards bringing protection and protection needs and risks
assessment at the heart of humanitarian actions in DRC.
A1.3.7.2 Protection
Protection is a highly relevant sector in the DRC context (i.e., conflicts with many
different armed groups including governmental force and MONUSCO, strong ethnic
components in the conflicts, etc.). It was therefore discussed extensively during the
field mission. This section provides a short overview of the key points raised under the
relevant evaluation criteria.
Relevance
All framework partners, including the ones specialised in protection such as ICRC, NRC
or IOM, recognised that ECHO played a key role in bringing the protection agenda at
the heart of humanitarian aid activities in DRC. They saw a clear evolution in ECHO
positioning since 2011, i.e. push for systematic considerations of protection elements
in funded actions, support to strong protection needs- and risks-assessments, etc.
This move was very much appreciated by the partners, and according to them had a
real impact on the wider humanitarian aid community. Different partners also
Comprehensive evaluation of the European Union humanitarian aid, 2012-2016
40
recognised the positive role that ECHO played in the protection clusters to structure
the discussion.
With regard to ECHO protection policy published in 2016, most of the framework
partners did not know it existed. Despite this lack of knowledge of the specific policy,
the framework partners were familiar with the key pillars of ECHO’s approach through
their interaction with ECHO field staff. NRC for example praised ECHO’s strong focus
on protection needs and risks assessment. They further developed that ECHO should
push for a strong community based approach towards protection needs and risks
assessments.
The mainstreaming of protection and its association with other sectors through
integrated actions was also much appreciated by some partners. The coupling of
protection activities with education was for example very much appreciated by the
beneficiaries of the MEDAIR project. Others had more doubts about whether or not the
mainstreaming of protection was the best approach in the DRC context. It was argued
that protection mainstreaming might over time decrease the relevance of core
protection actors, which should remain central.
Coherence
The interviewed framework partners did not have a good knowledge of ECHO specific
protection policy and guidance, hence it was difficult for them to assess to which
extent ECHO’s approach was internally and externally coherent. The fact that most
partners welcomed ECHO’s positioning towards protection is however a good sign that
they pushed for a coherent approach in line with global guidelines on the subject. EU
added value
ECHO’s push for protection needs and risks assessment was considered as a key
added value by different partners. As stated above ECHO also played a key role in
bringing protection at the heart of the humanitarian aid community. It was stressed
that in order to maintain this added value, ECHO efforts should certainly continue.
Effectiveness
The impact of protection on project’s effectiveness was not discussed in details during
the field mission, it was however stressed that:
Without a good protection needs and risks analysis, which is strongly supported
by ECHO, there is a high risk of misallocating humanitarian aid funding;
The added value of a strong protection approach in a project is very high in
DRC as it allows to correctly design and implement the project and maximise its
impact.
Efficiency
The impact of protection on project’s efficiency was not discussed in details during the
field mission.
A1.3.7.3 WASH
WASH was discussed during two project sites visits. The key points of the discussion
are summarised below:
IOM, Visit to IDP camps in North Kivu
WASH was one of the sectors lacking support in the IDP camps visited during the field
mission and coordinated by AIDES (local NGO) under IOM’s supervision. Due to the
lack of financing there was no dedicated WASH provider in the camps at the time of
the field mission. IOM has some contingency resources to provide basic services in the
Comprehensive evaluation of the European Union humanitarian aid, 2012-2016
41
absence of aid provider in specific sectors but this is fairly limited. They for example
managed to install basic WASH infrastructure but their number is below international
standards and at the time of the visit the water pumps were not functioning since
more than three weeks in the Kanaba IDP camp. The table below provides an
overview of the WASH infrastructure in the Kanaba and Kabizo camps compared to
international and local standards.
Table A1.7 There are important gaps in WASH infrastructure in the IDP camps
located in Kanaba and Kabizo
Infrastructure Number of
working units
Number of
IDP/unit
Number of IDP/unit
according to standards
SPHERE Local
Kanaba, 6,905 IDPs
Latrines 30 230 20 50
Showers 28 247 50 100
Hand washing
tank
37 182 80 250
Waste pits 25 276 250 500
Kabizo, 10,284 IDPs
Latrines 24 429 20 50
Showers 56 184 50 100
Hand washing
tank
47 214 80 250
Waste pits 15 686 250 500 Source: CCCM reports for Kanaba and Kabizo camps from June 2017. Communicated by IOM to ICF. Red cells highlights for which infrastructure the number of IDP/unit is above both SPHERE
and local standards; Yellow cells highlights for which infrastructure the number of IDP/unit is
above SPHERE standards but below local standards.
Another example relates to the plastic canvas used for the IDP tents, which should be
replaced every six month according to international standards but have not been
replaced in more than one year in the Kanaba IDP camp. Other NFIs are also missing,
which rises the risk of cholera outbreaks. In this context a strong emphasis is put on
awareness raising and the need to keep a high level of hygiene in the camp to prevent
such outbreaks, which could have dramatic consequences given the proximity of the
tents. This seems to be effective as the camps were clean and neat at the time of the
field visit. Discussion with groups of beneficiaries also demonstrated the level of
awareness of IDPs about the need to keep a high level of hygiene. This was identified
as one of the key long term learning points by IDPs, i.e. something they were not
aware before and will be able to bring back to their communities when they return.
ICRC, visit to urban WASH infrastructure in Goma
ICRC aims to facilitate access to drinking water in Goma via an improvement of the
city’s infrastructure in cooperation with REGIDESO (the Congolese state water
distribution agency). ICRC built the water station ‘Lac 2’, which has doubled the
volume of water distributed in the city of Goma and benefits 500,000 inhabitants. In
order to further expand the water distribution network in the city, ICRC is currently
financing a study to define a strategy to supply water to the western part of Goma and
define an appropriate implementation programme.
This project is fully self-financed by ICRC and ECHO has no role in it. ICRC however
consider that this is a good example of humanitarian project in an urban context,
Comprehensive evaluation of the European Union humanitarian aid, 2012-2016
42
especially the second part of the project consisting in the development of a master
plan for the city. ICRC’s objective is to develop a master study which could then be
used by development actors and local authorities to finance the infrastructure
development. Such project therefore potentially offer a way forward for LRRD in the
DRC context but it needs long term commitment in order to not be just a waste of
resources. It therefore require commitments from development actors or multi-annual
programming and funding. Although this might read more like a development project,
ICRC staff consider it as a crucial humanitarian aid project as:
Water network in urban and peri-urban areas is a requirement for any type of
humanitarian aid activities in these area;
Without good water access, the results of any other humanitarian aid project in
the area of health or WASH are jeopardised, as for example the risk of cholera
outbreaks becomes very high;
Urban and peri-urban areas are attracting more and more people but there is
an overall lack of NGOs working in these areas even if the humanitarian needs
are there.
A1.3.7.4 Food security and livelihood
Food security
Food security and livelihood is the sector which received the most funding in DRC
during the evaluation period, equivalent to 25% of the total funding. As the other
sectors it is also affected by the drop in funding between 2016 and 2017. During the
visit to the Kanaba IDP camp, the following issues linked to food security and
livelihood were identified:
The food distribution provided by WFP is not general anymore: due to decrease
in funding WFP is now only targeting the most vulnerable population in the
camps;
The decrease in food distribution creates serious malnutrition issues which did
not exist before according to AIDES;
The distribution of food in-kind creates conflicts with the local communities that
also suffer from hunger but don’t receive any support.
Cash transfer and other modalities
The framework partners recognised that ECHO strongly advocated for the use of multi-
purpose cash transfer, which led some of them, including ICRC, to adopt such
modality when possible. Among the other donors DFID also pushed for the use of
cash. The impact of the use of cash was recognised by all. UNICEF stressed for
example that they analysed the value for money of the RRMP for DFID and found out
that they had 55% delivery chain losses when using conventional modality and only
33% when using cash – they however did not specify for which sector(s) where
included in these shares.
The framework partners stressed that in the DRC context the use of cash is however
not always possible due to the fragile security context. There is for example a big
difference between North-Kivu, where cash is the default option as the local market is
functional, except in certain zones, and Kasaï where the use of cash is not possible at
the moment.
These differences reinforce the need to involve local communities in needs assessment
as they are well aware of the situation in the field. For the development of their
project in Kasaï, NRC adopted such a community based approach to choose the best
transfer modalities and adapt their whole project design to the communities’ security
and protection concerns. It also allowed them to ensure continuity with the ongoing
transition efforts in the communities. They recognise that it makes the definition of
monitoring indicators more difficult as the project need to be highly flexible depending
Comprehensive evaluation of the European Union humanitarian aid, 2012-2016
43
on the local needs but it for example allowed them to not use large markets for the
distribution of aid but rather use other distribution networks in order to make the aid
less visible.
Livelihood & revenue generating activities
Alongside food distribution, livelihood support is also an important component of this
sector. IOM tried to include sustainable solutions in its project design through different
means including the development of income generating activities (IGA) for IDPs. It
was stressed that ECHO only provided limited funding for such activities although IOM
and AIDES consider these activities as essential. According to AIDES, livelihood
support activities are the only way to allow IDPs to reach development on the long
term. IOM also considers IGA as a key elements of their approach to accompany
household relocating to their original villages. In the case of the closure and local
integration of the IDP leaving in the Burora camp, which occurred in April 2017, IOM
provided USD 180 to 130 households to support their livelihood after the closure of
the camp.
A1.3.7.5 Shelter & settlements
With the exception of the need to allocate more resources to shelter and settlements
activities in the IDP sites in order to renew the tents and negotiate expansion areas
with the local population, the shelter and settlement sector was not extensively
discussed during the field visit.
A1.3.8 Prospective evaluation
The future challenges to be tackled by ECHO were discussed with the majority of the
consulted framework partners and donors. The following challenges and opportunities
were identified as the most important to be tackled by ECHO:
Although ECHO is already a flexible humanitarian donor, this flexibility could be
further increased in order to allow a more effective and efficient humanitarian
response. Key elements to be considered include:
- Need to ensure quicker decision making when new funding is required to
address a new acute crisis, as was the case in the Kasai. It was argued that
the new emergency response mechanism is a step in the right direction but
it remain too slow and its budget is too limited;
- Need to better integrate LNGOs in ECHO’s humanitarian aid approach;
- Need to further encourage the involvement of local communities in the
design and implementation of funded actions;
- Need to consider moving towards multi-annual programming and multi-
annual funding to allow for better medium-term planning and more
anticipation capacity.
ECHO should better position itself towards new humanitarian actors and seek to
actively engage with them. This includes new donors but also national NGOs or
national Red Cross / Red Crescent organisations. The role of private actors in
humanitarian aid delivery was also raised by a few stakeholders.
ECHO should further increase its advocacy efforts and leverage its field
experience to raise awareness about humanitarian needs among other actors
including other departments within the European Commission, the EU Member
States and UN agencies. Regarding this last groups, many actors emphasised
that ECHO should more actively engage with UN agencies and challenge their
ways of working in order to guarantee more transparency and efficiency;
As mentioned under evaluation question 9 (A1.3.2.5) and 16 (A1.3.6.1) ECHO
needs to define a clear framework for tackling the LRRD or transition questions
Comprehensive evaluation of the European Union humanitarian aid, 2012-2016
44
together with DEVCO and other key relevant departments of the European
Commission.
While tackling these challenges was considered as important by many, the vast
majority of the consulted stakeholders emphasised that ECHO should make sure to
maintain its current position within the humanitarian aid landscape, i.e. being a
principled and needs-based donor able to push the humanitarian community in the
right direction (e.g. support to protection agenda, push for CBT, etc.).
A1.4 Conclusion
The field mission to DRC was a success as the evaluation team managed to meet with
most of the stakeholders relevant to ECHO’s work in the country – based both in
Kinshasa and Goma. As the last ECHO evaluation covering DRC goes back to 2010,
this field mission represented a good opportunity to collect new evidences and fill in
information gaps about ECHO’s activities in the country. This is particularly important
for the ongoing Comprehensive evaluation of the European Commission’s
humanitarian aid, 2012-2016 as DRC benefited from an important share of ECHO
funding during the evaluation period.
The field mission also illustrated how ECHO operates in complex context characterised
by a succession of multiple acute crises underpinned by common drivers. It showed
that ECHO is one of the most influential humanitarian aid actors in DRC. This not only
due to the scale of its funding, which remain significant despite the observed
decrease, but also to its proactive and constructive role in the different humanitarian
coordination structures present in the country. It also demonstrated the important
added value of having technical staff present in the beneficiary country. The field
mission also illustrated the types of challenges faced by ECHO when it operates in
chaotic contexts and how some of these challenges can be tackled, (e.g. focus on core
humanitarian activities, push for protection needs assessments, etc.), while other
remain difficult to handle (e.g. development of medium-term strategies, cooperation
with development actors, ensure humanitarian access, etc.).
Given the complexity of the local context, the persistence of local conflicts involving
many different armed groups and the presence of the MONUSCO, the field mission
also delivered interesting findings for some of the rapid evaluations completed under
this project (i.e. the rapid evaluations on protection and advocacy in particular).
Comprehensive evaluation of the European Union humanitarian aid, 2012-2016
45
ANNEX 6.2: Field report - Tanzania
A1.1 Introduction
This document describes the fieldwork undertaken in Tanzania as part of the
Comprehensive evaluation of the European Commission’s humanitarian aid, 2012-
2016 and presents the evidence collected from the field. As stipulated in the terms of
reference for this consultation, “the Field Report is not an evaluation as such, and
should not include overall conclusions and recommendations, neither a collection of
project evaluations. It is a working document to report on the fieldwork and identify
any particular issues to be tackled during the synthesis phase (e.g. remedial actions
related to the methodological approach, etc.).”
A1.1.1 Overview of the fieldwork undertaken
Table A1.1 provides a snapshot of the project sites visited and the consultations
conducted during the mission.
Table A1.1 Consultations conducted
Field sites Dates Stakeholders consulted
Dar es Salam 14 July 2017 EU Delegation
ECHO framework partners: World Food
Programme (WFP), United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
Kigoma region 17 to 20 July 2017 ECHO framework partners: UNCHR, WFP,
OXFAM, Plan International, International
Rescue Committee (IRC), Save the Children
Local implementing partners: Redeso, Adra
Tanzania, Kigoma Youth Agricultural
Development Organisation (KIYADO)
Focus groups with beneficiaries
Local authorities and camp commanders
Table A1.2 provides more details about the projects visited. These were selected
among the projects funded by DG ECHO in Tanzania in 2017 on the basis of the
following considerations: diversity of contexts, intervention types and partners; and
security and access.
Table A1.2 Projects visited and activities observed
ECHO
partners
Project title Overview of fieldwork activities
UNHCR Protection and Mixed
Solutions for refugees in
the Great Lakes Region
Ref: 2017/00178
Visit to Nyarugusu (18/07/2017) and
Nduta (19-20/07/2017) refugee camps
Meeting with the camp commander in
Nyaragusu and deputy camp commander
in Nduta
Visit of transition centre in Nduta
WFP Assistance to Burundian
and Congolese refugees
in Burundi, Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC),
Visit to food distribution centre in
Nyarugusu refugee camp
Focus groups with: local implementing
Comprehensive evaluation of the European Union humanitarian aid, 2012-2016
46
ECHO
partners
Project title Overview of fieldwork activities
Rwanda and Tanzania
Ref: 2017/00170
partners (ADRA Tanzania), general food
distribution (GBT) beneficiaries and cash-
based transfer (CBT) beneficiaries.
OXFAM Water, Sanitation,
Hygiene promotion
(WASH) for Burundian
and new Congolese
refugees in Nduta and
Nyarugusu camps,
Kigoma Region, North
Western Tanzania, 2017
Ref: 2017/00207
Visit to water extraction and distribution
centres in Nduta refugee camp
Visit to households in Nduta refugee camp
(observation of: latrines, stoves, etc.)
Focus groups with: beneficiaries, local
implementing partners (KIYADO and
Redeso)
Plan
International,
IRC, Save the
Children
Burundian and Congolese
refugees have access to
quality and holistic
protection services in
refugee camps in
Tanzania.
Ref: 2017/00203
Visit to Nduta refugee camp: Child
Friendly Zone, Support Centre (meetings
with two IRC staff and beneficiaries),
Wellness Centre (meetings with staff and
beneficiaries)
Focus groups with:
beneficiaries of the Wellness Centre,
beneficiaries of the Support Centre,
child clubs & child protection committee,
foster parents,
children receiving support from Plan,
USAC children.
A1.1.2 Challenges encountered
No challenges were encountered during the field visit to Tanzania. All scheduled
meetings occurred as planned and the evaluation team had the opportunity to visit all
the identified projects.
A1.1.3 Methodology
A1.1.3.1 Context and link with the consultation strategy
Table A1.3 presents how the field work designed for this evaluation feed into the
evaluation framework by targeting key stakeholder groups. This table, associated with
the evaluation framework, served as basis for the development of the research tools
which were used during the field mission to Tanzania. The cells highlighted in green in
the table below show which stakeholder categories were targeted by the field work
completed during this evaluation. Due to the time constrains of the field work no other
donors were interviewed in Tanzania. Military forces were not interviewed as
considered as not relevant for ECHO’s intervention.
Comprehensive evaluation of the European Union humanitarian aid, 2012-2016
47
Table A1.3 Overview of methods that will be used to consult with the different
stakeholders group
Online
surveys
Semi-
structur
ed
intervie
ws
OPC
Fieldw
ork
works
hop
Fieldwor
k
interview
s, focus
groups
Roundtab
le
Affected
communities
(via
Reps)
ECHO staff– HQ
ECHO staff - Field
Other EU entities
Other donors
ECHO partners
Local implementing
partners
Host governments
National/ local
NGOs
Academics and
think tanks
Private sector
Military forces
European
Parliament
European Council
Member States
EU citizens
Global forums and
clusters
A1.1.3.2 Research tools
The main research tool used for the consultation during the field missions were semi-
structured interviews. Topic guides were developed for the following stakeholders’
groups:
ECHO field;
Representatives of the EU delegation;
ECHO framework partners;
Local implementing partners;
Other donors (including EU Member States);
Local authorities and host government officials;
Academics and think tanks; and
Comprehensive evaluation of the European Union humanitarian aid, 2012-2016
48
Military representatives.
Additionally, a range of participatory approaches (i.e. focus groups and workshops)
were applied to engage directly with affected communities. The specific stakeholders
interviewed during the field mission to Tanzania were identified based on suggestions
from ECHO field staff.
A1.1.4 Structure of the report
The remainder of this report is structured as follows:
Section 2 provides an overview of the Tanzanian context and the humanitarian
aid activities financed by ECHO in Tanzania;
Section 3 provides an overview of the key findings and lessons to take into
account in the comprehensive evaluation. The findings are organised by
evaluation question. It also includes a section covering the sectors and themes
subject of rapid evaluations to facilitate the analysis at later stage; and
Annex 1 provides a detailed list of interviewed stakeholders.
A1.2 ECHO’s humanitarian aid activities in Tanzania
A1.2.1 Key contextual elements and rationale for ECHO’s intervention
Table A1.4 Key facts about Tanzania
Population 52,482,726
Surface (sq. km) 947,300 sq km
Density 60.36 people per sq km
Languages Kiswahili or Swahili, English
Political regime Presidential republic
President John Magufuli (since 5 November 2015)
Prime Minister Kassim Majaliwa MAJALIWA (since 20
November 2015)
GDP per capita (2016 PPP $) USD 3,100
Currency Tanzanian shillings (TZS)
Exchange rate (09/06/2017) 1 EUR = 2 502,03 TZS (23/06/2017)
Human Development Index (HDI)
ranking (out of 188)
151
% population below poverty line 46.6% of the population lives below the
income poverty line (USD 1.9 a day) Sources: CIA, 2017. Available at:https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tz.html; United Nations Development Programme, 2017. Available at: http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/TZA; Tradingeconomics, 2017. Available at: https://tradingeconomics.com/tanzania/population-density-people-per-sq-km-wb-data.html
Tanzania has hosted thousands of refugees fleeing conflict and violence in Burundi and
DRC over the last decades. The country went through a series of influx and return
movement which led to the opening and closure of different camps along the
Burundian border. The Nyarugusu refugee camp is the oldest camp in the region, it
was opened in 1996.
Mass refugee influx from Burundi to Tanzania started again in April 2015 following the
announcement that Burundian President Pierre Nkurunziza would run for a third term.
Comprehensive evaluation of the European Union humanitarian aid, 2012-2016
49
This led to the re-opening of two refugee camps in Nduta and Mtendeli. A
consolidation of the numbers of refugees was observed during the first half of 2017 (in
part due to prima facie refugee status withdrawal for Burundians) but influx from DRC
are raising again and there are concerns that Congolese population will continue to
flee toward Tanzania as the political tensions and instability rise in the country.
Stakeholders met during the field visit flagged that as of July 2017, there were no
contingency plan in place to cope with these future influx.
A UNHCR representative also noted that around 5,000 Burundians indicated there will
to return to their country – mainly to maintain their land in view of the next harvest.
The UNHCR is currently only recording interest as there is no return agreement in
place with the Burundian government.
According to the latest update published by the UNHCR in June 201726, the total
refugee population in the Kigoma region adds up to 315,737 individuals (77%
Burudians and 23% Congolese) representing an increase of 10% since January 2017.
This population is spread across three camps which are all at full capacity. Figure A1.1
provides an overview of the geographical distribution of these refugees in the Kigoma
region. Box A1 below provides an overview of the Tanzanian national refugee policy,
which sets the framework for all the projects financed by ECHO in the region.
26
UNHCR, 2017. Refugee camps population update. Available at: https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/58413 [23 August 2017].
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Figure A1.1 Refugee camps population update, 30 June 2017
Source: UNHCR, 2017. Refugee camps population update. Available at: https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/58413 [23 August 2017].
Box A1 Tanzanian national refugee policy
Tanzania has a strict refugee policy. A legislative Act passed in 1998 gives the
authorities the power to require any asylum seeker or refugee to reside within a
designated area (DA, i.e. a refugee camp or settlement). Refugees willing to live
outside the DA need a permit are difficult to obtain and are only granted for
exceptional cases. Tanzania's 2003 National Refugee Policy affirms that refugees will
be hosted in designated areas whereby the international community will be obliged to
provide material assistance.
A practice has developed which prohibits refugees from moving outside a four-
kilometre radius of their camp. This is intended to allow refugees to move outside
their DA in order to collect amenities, such as firewood. Refugees crossing the four-
kilometre boundary line are be subject to penalties, including prison.
In 2007, the Tanzania Comprehensive Solution Strategy had the purpose to find
solution for either repatriation of refugees or naturalisation. This strategy specifically
targeted the 1972 Burundian refugees group. However, if the first solution to
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repatriate some (voluntary) refugees was effectively managed, the naturalisation
process came to a halt in 2010. The government announced that the naturalisation
would no longer be given in mass but done at a slower pace as the newly naturalised
refugees first needed to be relocated.27
In June 2017 the Tanzanian government announced that it would act as pilot country
for the development of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF),
considered as a game-changing commitment from 193 states agreed at last year's
UN Summit on Refugees and Migrants to develop a holistic and sustainable refugee
response that reinforces legal protection of refugees while bolstering support for host
communities. Tanzania made five pledges towards strengthening the protection of
refugees and asylum-seekers. At the launch of the CRRF, the Government
reconfirmed its pledges to:
1. Continue to receive people fleeing war, political instability and persecution;
2. Review the 1998 Refugees Act and the 2003 National Refugee Policy to ensure
refugee protection is in line with international law and current realities:
3. Provide durable solutions to the remaining 1972 Burundian refugees who
applied for Tanzanian citizenship but have not been naturalized;
4. Strengthen refugee protection by enhancing their access to education and
employment; and
5. Support the global compact on refugees, once adopted.28
However, in the same period, the Government also withdrew the prima facie refugee
recognition of Burundians, which led to a strong decrease in the number of
Burundians crossing the border and to some concerns about refoulement. Most
applications for refugee status of those who have arrived since are rejected. The
Government has also started encouraging Burundians to notify their interest in
returning to their home country.
A1.2.2 Nature of ECHO’s humanitarian aid activities
ECHO has provided humanitarian aid funding to Tanzania throughout the whole
evaluation period (2012-2016), representing a total of EUR 60.25 million spread
across 17 projects. For 2017, ECHO allocated EUR 8.3 million across six projects,
including one regional project. As these funds have not all been disbursed yet there
are not accurately reflected in the EVA database and hence not included in the Figures
below which focus on the evaluation period. However, the 2017 allocations mark a
significant decrease from funding disbursed in 2016 (just over a third of the previous
year’s funding), which is something that was raised in numerous consultations during
the field mission.
Until 2012, ECHO strategy for Tanzania was presented in a Humanitarian
Implementation Plan (HIP) dedicated to the Burundian crisis and its impact on
Tanzania. Since 2012 it is included in a regional HIP covering the Great Lakes region
with a strong focus on DRC. As illustrated in Figure A1.2 most of ECHO funding during
the evaluation period went to the protection sector with a strong increase for this
sector in 2015-2016 due to the influx of Burundian refugees. This focus on protection
is also explained by the strict national refugee policy and the need for international
donors to ensure that international law is respected and that refugee populations are
treated with dignity and receive adequate support and viable durable solutions. With
the strong increase in refugee population and the re-opening of Nduta and Mtendeli
refugee camps in 2015 a strong focus was also put on financing the vital needs of the
27
Nordic Consulting Group, 2010. Evaluation of the protracted refugee situation (PRS) for Burundians in Tanzania. Available at: https://www.oecd.org/countries/sudan/47164501.pdf [23 August 2017]. 28
UNHCR, 2017. Government of Tanzania brings together 'whole of society' to implement landmark refugee reforms. Available at: http://www.refworld.org/country,,,,TZA,,5937ff174,0.html [23 August 2017].
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population, i.e. health, shelter and settlements and WASH. The ongoing projects also
focus on these key sectors.
Figure A1.2 Evolution of ECHO funding in Tanzania
Source: EVA database extracted on 18 December 2017
Figure A1.3 provides an overview of ECHO’s key framework partners in Tanzania. The
UNHCR clearly stands out as a major partner with a total financing of almost EUR 45.5
million since 2012. This represent over a third of UNHCR total funding during the
2012-2017 period according to FTS data, i.e. USD 132.2 million.29 ECHO’s other key
partners include: the Danish Refugee Council, the International Committee of the Red
Cross, WFP and Oxfam.
Figure A1.3 ECHO's main partners in Tanzania (share of total funding over the
period 2012-2016)
Source: EVA database extracted on 18 December 2017.
In parallel to ECHO funding, Tanzania is a significant beneficiary of EU development
cooperation, mainly financed by the EDF. As stipulated in Tanzanian National
Indicative Programme for the period 2014-2016, the EDF cycle amount to EUR 626
million for Tanzania and will be used to address key challenges such as food and
nutrition insecurity, low agriculture productivity, lack of energy access, and a range of
governance issues. ECHO and DG for International Cooperation and Development
29
FTS data export on 22/12/2017.
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(DEVCO) funding were however not spent in the same region and/or sectors during
the evaluation period.30
As stated in the 2017 HIP, the EU is currently analysing additional options of support
for the Burundian refugee crisis in Tanzania, possibly with the EU Trust Fund, in order
to complement humanitarian interventions and offer longer term responses to current
needs.
A1.2.3 Key external factors that impacted (positively and negatively) the delivery of ECHO’s humanitarian aid activities
ECHO’s humanitarian response in Tanzania is obviously strongly influenced by
the political crises taking place in the Great Lakes region, and in Burundi and
DRC in particular. The nature of this response is also influenced by a series of
external factor including:
The political situation in Tanzania and the positioning of the government
towards refugees. The cessation of the prima facie status for Burundians fleeing
into Tanzania announced in January 2017 raised for example some important
question about the protection of the refugee population and their possible
return.
Linked to the above is the encampment policy, which also has a big impact on
the design of humanitarian aid projects and which inhibits refugees from
becoming economically independent. The government also requires all new
structures built in the camps to be ‘permanent’ (and hence more expensive to
build) instead of temporary, so that they can potentially be used by the local
community when the camps scale down / are closed;
The economic situation in particular in the Kigoma region, which is the least
developed region of Tanzania. In particular amongst local politicians and the
wider local community, there is a sense that the refugees are better off than
the poorer part of the local population, in terms of food / cash assistance,
healthcare, etc. Recently, the international organisations active in the camps
have started initiatives which should also allow the local community to benefit,
such as the opening of common markets, the sharing of healthcare facilities,
etc. There is a fair degree of mistrust between the different populations;
The outbreak of epidemics which led for example to the use of the Epidemics
HIP in 2016 with the allocation of EUR 400,000 grant to break the chain of
transmission of a cholera outbreak;
The environmental situation in the areas in which the camps are based strongly
influence the extent to which they can be expanded and all camps are
exceeding their maximum capacity at present. Water is lacking in particular in
Mtendeli and Nduta, with pumps having to run for significant more hours than
what they should and what they are able to technically handle. The government
has allowed the international community to prospect another area which was
however not fit for another camp;
The funding available for humanitarian aid. As discussed already above, ECHO
in 2017 substantially reduced its funding allocations to Tanzania and other
donors have not increased and in a few cases also reduced their respective
contributions. The UNHCR estimated that for 2017, only 10% of the funding
needed for the Refugee Response Plan had yet been secured. To some extent,
this has affected the relations with both local and national governments, who
consider that they are left alone in their efforts to develop and implement the
CRRF.
30
European Commission and Government of Tanzania, 2014. National Indicative Programme for United Republic of Tanzania. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/nip-tanzania-20140619_en.pdf [26 September 2017].
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A1.3 Key findings and lessons to take into account in the
comprehensive evaluation
A1.3.1 Relevance
A1.3.1.1 EQ1: To what extent do ECHO budget allocation consider the
needs, actions of other donors and the EU objectives on humanitarian
aid?
The majority of interviewed stakeholders agreed that ECHO’s budget allocation were
based on needs during the evaluation period. The important fall in funding in 2017
(from EUR 20.9 million to EUR 8.5, based on the latest information about the funding
allocated in 2017) was however not understood as in their view the humanitarian
needs in Tanzania had not decreased. The refugee population increased at a lower
rate than in previous two years but the overall needs in the country did not decline. In
May 2017 the UNHCR estimated that USD 98.3 million were required in Tanzania to
deal with the influx of Burundian refugees only. An additional USD 38.8 million are
required to cover the other humanitarian needs amounting to a total of USD 137
million.31 Compared to these values the EUR 8.3 million allocated by ECHO are of
limited significance. The drop in ECHO funding is considered by the majority of the
interviewed stakeholders as an important issue and as a potential sign that ECHO is
moving away from its needs-based approach to humanitarian aid towards a more
politicised approach which prioritises funding crises which may affect the EU directly.
The decline in funding has obviously a direct impact on the partners’ activities and
many of them had to decrease the scope of their activities in 2017. A good examples
is WFP, which decided to decrease the food ration distributed to the refugees in the
last months in anticipation of the lack of funding later in the year and some partial
pipeline breaks for some of the food commodities. In July 2017 only 70% of the maize
meal ration was distributed while it was at 80% in May and June. Based on its
planning figure for the Refugee Operation WFP expect a funding shortfall of up to USD
45.6 million over the period May 2017 – January 2018.32
The camp commander of Nyarugusu also listed a series of needs which could not be
met due to the low funding levels, e.g. WASH infrastructures, shelter infrastructure
leading to longer period in transition centres for new refugees, increased
environmental degradation which is only partly tackled, lack of education structures.
On this last point it was noted that ECHO strongly contributed to improving the
situation by financing the construction of permanent school buildings replacing old
tents classrooms.
With regard to the coordination with other donors and humanitarian aid actors, Box A2
below provides an overview of the four coordination levels for the refugee response in
Tanzania.
Box A2 Humanitarian leadership and coordination
The refugee response in the Tanzania is coordinated at four levels:
- Central Level: The Tanzanian Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) and UNHCR
coordinate the UN refugee programme working group which oversees the
overall management of the response by UN agencies and government
focusing on planning, oversight and policy implications.
31
UNHCR, 2017. Burundi Situation 2017. Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/59244aa77.pdf [23 August 2017]. 32
WFP, 2017. WFP Tanzania Situation Report #61. Available at: http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/Public/documents/ep/WFP292438.pdf?_ga=2.198290152.690169162.1503506271-1351801102.1503506271 [23 August 2017].
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- Regional Level: At the sub-national level the head of Kigoma Regional
Government coordinates all UN agencies and NGOs who work on the refugee
response.
- Inter-Agency/Inter-Camp Level: UNHCR and the MHA are responsible
for coordinating the inter-agency response linkages between all three
camps, which include sector specific coordination and response.
- Camp Level: At the camp level UNHCR and the MHA coordinate the refugee
response among all UN agencies and NGOs.
In the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Persons of Concern, UNHCR has
partnered with the MHA, Refugee Services Department and Ministry of Health33.
As set out in Box A2 above, the UNHCR is the agency in charge of response
coordination in the camps where all the activities concentrate. This is done under the
Refugee Coordination Model34. The development of additional coordination structures
at project level is therefore not needed.
At central and regional level, the UNHCR and other UN agencies are also in charge of
coordinating the refugee response with the Tanzanian government. Currently the
UNHCR is leading on this but they are in a rather uncomfortable position as they need
to advocate for refugee rights, especially in light of some of the recent developments,
but are also a key partner of the government and depending on it to provide support
to the refugee populations.
It was noted that in parallel the donors also coordinate both in terms of funding and
advocacy but as ECHO has no permanent representation in Dar-es-Salam, they are
not very much involved in this coordination discussions. Some framework partners
considered that it would be helpful if ECHO could be more present to help other donors
in conveying a stronger advocacy message towards the government. With the launch
of the CRRF, there is really a need for coordinated advocacy efforts to ensure that the
government remains committed to its pledges and also coordinated efforts to ensure
that these pledges are implemented successfully for all affected parties.
A1.3.1.2 EQ2: To what extent is ECHO’s choice of framework partnerships
appropriate? How could ECHO improve in the choice of partners?
The choice of partners is considered as appropriate and in line with the priorities
identified in the HIPs by all the interviewed stakeholders. The table below provides an
overview of the key sectors tackled by the framework partners visited during the field
mission. In the refugee camps each partner financed by ECHO covers a specific
intervention area and they all strive to complementarity. No duplication of efforts were
observed among the different projects.
Table A1.5 Overview of key sectors tackled by the framework partners in Tanzania
Framework partners Sectors
WFP Food; Nutrition
UNHCR Protection; Health; Shelter and settlements; WASH;
33
UNICEF, 2016. Tanzania Humanitarian Situation Report. Available at: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UNICEF%20Tanzania%20Humanitarian%20SitRep%20%28Burundi%20%26%20DRC%20Refugee%20Response%29%20-%20December%202016.pdf [23 August 2017]. 34
The RCM is intended to provide an inclusive platform for planning and coordinating refugee response in order to ensure that refugees and other persons of concern receive the protection and assistance they require through the collective efforts and capacities of all partners involved. Source: UNHCR, 2017. Tanzania, factsheet, August 2017. Available at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/59089.pdf [26 September 2017].
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Framework partners Sectors
Education in emergencies; Nutrition
Plan International Protection
Oxfam WASH
Danish Refugee Council Protection
Helpage International Protection; Health; Food
ECHO also supported Plan International in building a consortium with other key
partners (first with Save the Children (SC) and then with the IRC) in order to reach all
the beneficiaries across the different refugee camps. The table below provides an
overview of the division of tasks between the different partners of this consortium.
Table A1.6 Split of tasks within Plan’s consortium to cover all the identified needs
Consortium partners Tasks
Plan International Focus on Nduta and Mtendeli
Case management of unaccompanied and separated
children, children at risk, Child Protection Committees
support
SC Focus on Nyaragusu
Psychosocial Support activities through Child Friendly
Spaces activities
IRC Focus on case management for SGBV survivors, MHPSS in
Nyarugusu, Mtendeli and Nduta
Child protection in Nyarugusu
Three out of the four ECHO funded actions which were visited during the field visit
included at least one local implementing partner in their delivery. The role and
characteristics of these local implementing partners vary greatly, as presented in the
table below. The local implementing partners were either selected through a call for
tender (e.g. ADRA Tanzania) or a needs assessment approach (e.g. Redeso and
KIYADO). Each of the partner fulfil a clear mission in their projects. They were all
consulted during the design of the projects in order to ensure their relevance over the
years. Redeso was for example identified as key environmental partner by Oxfam as
they needed to better understand how to design their ‘energy efficient stoves’
initiative. Redeso’s input resulted in an important change in the design of the project
as the stoves are now directly built by the beneficiaries and not distributed as was the
case before their involvement (which led to refugees selling them to others).
Table A1.7 Overview of the main characteristics and key role of the local
implementing partners
Local
implementing
partner
Main
characteristics
Role in the projects
ADRA Tanzania National entity of an
international network
Support WFP with the general food
distribution
Control of all the inputs: control at the
gate, accounting, etc.
Distribution of the food: organisation of
the distribution sessions, cooperation
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Local
implementing
partner
Main
characteristics
Role in the projects
with refugees supporting them, quality
control, etc.
Maintenance of the stock.
Redeso National NGO Works with Oxfam and UNHCR
Management of firewood in the camps
Environmental and energy saving
training in the reception centres
Continuous information sharing about
environment and energy in the shelters
Construction of energy efficient stoves
KIYADO Regional NGO Works with Oxfam
Focus on food security and livelihood
activities
The ECHO funded actions in Tanzania also presents a good example of the potential
risks associated with the involvement of partners in humanitarian projects. Many
International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) used to work intensively with
Tanzania Water & Environment Sanitation, a local NGOs working with Oxfam on WASH
services and acting as the WASH lead for the pre-influx population located in zones 1-
7 of Nyarugusu but they had to stop this cooperation and managed to find suitable
solutions to ensure continuation of support. The reasons for this change of partners
were not clearly explained but it shows the ability of INGOs to quickly detect potential
issues and find alternative solutions.
A1.3.1.3 EQ3: To what extent does ECHO have appropriate,
comprehensive and context-adapted strategies in place for
addressing country/regional humanitarian needs and different
challenges, including medium and longer term objectives, where
applicable?
The HIPs covering the Great Lakes region during the 2012-2017 period were
considered to be relevant and in line with the beneficiaries’ needs. The framework
partners recognised the timeliness and flexibility of the HIPs and ECHO’s ability to
allocate additional funding in case of new needs. This was for example the case in
2016 with the allocation of EUR 400,000 grant to break the chain of transmission of a
cholera outbreak. The ECHO field network is considered as a key asset in that
prospects as they have a very good knowledge of the local contexts and emerging
needs. ECHO was also one of the first donors to act following the start of the
Burundian crisis in 2015.
Although the EU Delegation was involved in the development of recent HIPs, the lack
of consultation with the framework partners during that process is considered as a
weakness. The framework partners are kept informed in case of new developments
but they do not have the opportunity to feed into the development of the HIPs. A lack
of clarity and transparency about ECHO’s medium term strategy in the country was
also flagged as an issue. One partner indicated for example that they were unsure
about whether or not Tanzania would still be part of the HIP in 2018.
In order to ensure the relevance of its funded actions, ECHO strongly encourages the
involvement of final beneficiaries in the needs assessment to be completed by the
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framework partners. This is considered as an important feature of ECHO by the
framework partners.
Despite this overall positive assessment, one important issues flagged by the
framework partners is the fact that medium and longer term objectives are
insufficiently addressed by ECHO. There is for example no support for livelihood
activities in and around the refugee camps as ECHO considers such activities as out of
its mandate. This is considered as a missed opportunity as the Tanzanian context (i.e.
stable government, development of the CRRF, etc.) is seen as appropriate for the
development of longer term solutions, especially given that at present refugees are
entirely dependent on support by the international community.
However more recently ECHO, which organised a joint mission to Tanzania with
DEVCO and the EU Delegation in February 2017, has demonstrated an interest in
exploring more durable solution, as the objectives of that mission were to: “explore
support to the Tanzanian government in 1) addressing the Burundi refugee crisis, 2)
to fulfil its commitments made at the NY Summit in September through a programme
that supports the implementation of the CRRF and the EU Communication on Forced
Displacement and identifies better linkages between humanitarian and development
interventions”35. Although a series of sectors which could benefit from more integrated
support both at humanitarian and development level were identified during the
mission (e.g. WASH, health, and education but also sustainable livelihoods and conflict
resolution), a lack of follow-up was stressed by all framework partners. This topic is
discussed in more details under evaluation question 9 and 16.
A1.3.1.4 EQ4: To what extent does the configuration of ECHO’s field
network ensure an added value in terms of efficiency and
effectiveness of ECHO’s actions?
The ECHO field network is perceived as a great added value by all the framework
partners. They provide good technical advices and a fresh pair of eyes on the
implementation of the projects. Their mobility and frequent presence in the field
allows them to provide rapid follow-up on operational challenges. ECHO is also
considered as a very committed and engaged donor, which is very appreciated by the
framework partners. These assets are key distinguishing factors of ECHO compared to
other donors.
Despite this overall very positive assessment, a series of drawbacks were also
identified by the framework partners including:
The fact that ECHO has no permanent presence in Dar-es-Salam prevents it to
take a prominent role in areas such as donor coordination, advocacy, etc. This
being said, framework partners also understood the rationale behind the
limitations on the number of ECHO field offices and field staff;
The lack of formal feedback and follow-up on ECHO field missions. A summary
of key decision points and follow-up actions would be helpful to keep track of
what was discussed and agreed, as well as keep track of progress;
ECHO field staff are not always fully aware of the operational dynamics and
national contexts in which some of the framework partners operate. In
Tanzania, for example, it is important that the complex and sometimes tense
refugee context is well understood. This sometimes led to recommendations
which are not adapted to the context.
The ECHO field network also plays a key role in the HIPs development process and the
allocation of funds to specific projects. Their presence in the field allows them to
35
European Commission, 2017. Note for the attention of Jean-Louis DE BROUWER, Koen DOENS, Androulla KAMINARA, Jean-Louis VILLE, Roeland VAN DE GEER. Communicated by the European Commission to ICF.
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ensure the relevance of the selected projects compared to the identified needs. This
very good knowledge also helps other as the EU Delegation relies on their intelligence
to develop some of their briefing covering for example refugee related topics.
A1.3.1.5 EQ5: To what extent are ECHO humanitarian aid objectives still
relevant to the global humanitarian needs and context?
ECHO’s humanitarian aid objectives as stipulated in its regulation, HIPs and other
strategic documents are considered as very relevant to the global humanitarian needs
– see more about this under evaluation question 1. As stated above, the sharp decline
in funding observed in 2017 despite the increasing needs was however not understood
by the framework partners and interpreted as a move towards greater politicisation of
humanitarian aid, as the overall resources of ECHO did not decline.
A1.3.2 Coherence
A1.3.2.1 EQ6: To what extent were the ECHO funded actions (particularly
considering the challenges posed by restricted humanitarian access in
conflict-related crises) consistent with the four humanitarian
principles in their design and implementation?
It should first be stressed that no specific tensions were identified between the ECHO
funded actions in Tanzania and the humanitarian principles. All the framework
partners fully adhere to these principles and apply them in their activities. Two
elements were however identified as factors putting pressure on the respect of
humanitarian principles: the government’s refugee policy and the sharp decrease in
funding.
The UNHCR stressed that, as they work with many different partners and
different levels of Tanzanian authorities, it is not always easy to implement the
humanitarian principles harmoniously. In order to tackle this issue, the UNHCR
standards are clearly set out and distributed to all the partners. The UNHCR
also establishes tri-partite agreements between them, NGOs and the
government in order to set out standard operating procedures in particular
areas of work. Some basic principles such as ‘access to territory’ need to be
clearly explained to government officials.
Following the withdrawal of the prima facie recognition of Burundians as
refugees, the UNHCR organised several trainings from 22 to 29 May 2017 for
Immigration and Law Enforcement Officers on International Refugee Protection
Principles, including admission and non-refoulement, as they were concerned
that the screenings of Burundian asylum seekers at the border to determine
their eligibility for admission to the Tanzanian territory went against the
Refugee Convention and could lead to refoulement of those in need of
protection. The change in policy put the UNCHR in a rather difficult position as
on the one hand they had to take a strong stand against any potential
refoulement while on the other they had to tread very carefully in order to not
reduce the governments ongoing support to the existing camps. The UNHCR
indicated in June 2017 that no instructions to cease screening had thus far been
reported.36
The important decrease in funding also puts pressure on the humanitarian
principles as the most recent arrivals seem to proportionally be more affected
by this decrease in funding (e.g. the quality of the distributed shelter declined).
36
UNHCR, 2017. Inter-Agency Operational Update on the Burundian Refugee Operation - Bi-Weekly Operational Update. Available at: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/58411.pdf [23 August 2017].
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The vulnerability of these most recent arrivals needs to be highlighted through
advocacy activities towards the government but also towards other donors.
A1.3.2.2 EQ7: To what extent are ECHO humanitarian aid actions coherent
and complementary, and avoiding overlaps with those of the Member
States?
As set out under evaluation question 1 above, the UNHCR is in charge of refugee
response coordination in Tanzania. Humanitarian aid interventions are therefore very
well coordinated at project level. This largely explained the fact that very little
evidence of coordination between ECHO funded actions and Member States funded
actions was identified in the field despite the presence of several other Member States
in Tanzania. The framework partners flagged that there was not a lot of interest from
ECHO or the Member States to look into such coordination. In addition to the
coordination role played by the UNHCR two other factors can explain this lack of
coordination efforts:
Many Member States operate in Tanzania through their development aid agency
which only have a limited knowledge of ECHO’s activities as they mainly work
with DEVCO;
ECHO has no permanent presence in Dar-es-Salam and is therefore not able to
maintain a constant contact with the Member States active in Tanzania.
The development of additional coordination structures at project level is therefore not
considered as needed. At stated under evaluation question 1 above, in the current
context and with the launch of the CRRF there is a real need for ECHO to step in and
coordinate with other donors at central level to convey a strong advocacy message to
ensure that the government remains committed to its pledges and that these pledges
are implemented successfully for all affected parties.
A1.3.2.3 NEW EQ1: To what extent were ECHO’s actions coherent and
complementary, and avoiding overlaps, with actions implemented by
other international partners?
A similar response to the evaluation question 7 (coherence) can be given to this
evaluation question. The efforts of the UNCHR in the coordination of the humanitarian
aid activities in the camps fulfils the coordination needs on the ground.
There is however a good opportunity for ECHO to reinforce its presence in the
coordination discussions with other donors in order to convey a stronger advocacy
message in view of recent developments and the launch of the CRRF.
A1.3.2.4 EQ8: To what extent were ECHO’s humanitarian actions
internally coherent and complementary, and avoiding overlaps,
including with the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) and EU
Aid volunteers?
This evaluation question is not applicable to the Tanzanian context as the UCPM was
not activated in Tanzania and no ECHO funded actions welcomed EU aid volunteers.
A1.3.2.5 EQ9: To what extent were ECHO’s actions coherent and
complementary, and avoiding overlaps, with the EU’s other external
financing instruments?
The main other source of EU financing relevant for ECHO’s activities in Tanzania is the
financing provided by DEVCO under its different programmes. The cooperation and
coherence between these two entities of the Commission was extensively discussed
with ECHO, their key framework partners and the EU Delegation in Tanzania. All the
Comprehensive evaluation of the European Union humanitarian aid, 2012-2016
61
consulted stakeholders recognised that there were very good opportunities for
complementarity between ECHO and DEVCO’s financing in Tanzania, also to ensure
sustainability and host community development. Some of the framework partners are
already actively pursuing these opportunities by combining humanitarian and
development projects (e.g. WFP agricultural projects financed by the World Bank).
In terms of direct cooperation between ECHO and DEVCO it was noted that the two
DGs regularly exchanged information on programming and that ECHO consulted with
the EU Delegation for the development of its strategies. A number of ongoing
initiatives could contribute to further improve the coherence and complementarity
between ECHO and DEVCO financing. These include:
The joint mission organised between ECHO, DEVCO and the EU Delegation
already mentioned under evaluation question 3 (relevance). As stressed above,
the follow-up to this joint mission is still unclear for the framework partners but
it certainly represents a good basis for further cooperation. The internal note
which followed that mission includes an analysis of different options for
engagement in terms of relevance, feasibility and operational
partners/synergies. The sector covered by the analysis include: education,
WASH, energy, agriculture / environment and health.
Tanzania is one of the eligible countries under the EU Emergency Trust Fund
For Africa set up to “help foster stability in three regions - Sahel region and
Lake Chad, Horn of Africa and North Africa - and to contribute to better
migration management by addressing the root causes of destabilisation, forced
displacement and irregular migration, through the promotion of economic and
equal opportunities, security and development”37. Some initial research on how
to operationalise the Trust Fund in Tanzania was reported but so far no projects
were financed through the Trust Fund in Tanzania. The scoping process is still
ongoing and there have been delays in the decision-making process, mainly
because nearly all EU Trust Fund partners have insisted on being extensively
consulted.
ECHO’s involvement in the development of the Trust Fund in Tanzania seems to
have been very limited so far. It was noted that ECHO took part in the training
developed on the Trust Fund and its potential use. Activities put in place under
the CRRF are also eligible under the Trust Fund, hence the refinement of the
CRRF and its implementation might create future opportunities for greater
involvement. However, as the CRRF is also only in its very initial stages of
development in Tanzania, it is unclear which role ECHO and DEVCO will play in
its implementation.38
Despite these developments, no concrete activities combining ECHO’s and DEVCO’s
financing were observed so far and collaboration between ECHO and DEVCO is still
inexistent.
ECHO’s framework partners have also been exploring coherence with other policy
areas such as climate change, environment and social inclusion. Key examples of such
initiatives include:
WFP’s work on resilience and support to the government’s initiative on climate
smart agriculture39;
37
European Commission, undated. EU Trust Fund for Africa for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/eutf_general_final_en.pdf [23 August 2017]. 38
More details about the roll-out of the CRRF in Tanzania is available here: http://crrf.unhcr.org/en/country/tza 39
More details on this initiative: Ministry of agriculture food security and cooperatives. 2015. Tanzania climate-smart agriculture program. Available at: https://ccafs.cgiar.org/publications/tanzania-climate-smart-agriculture-program#.WZ_pmD4jGUk [23 August 2017] and WFP’s positioning: WFP, 2017. Country Strategic Plans — United Republic of Tanzania (2017–2021). Available at: http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/resources/wfp291918.pdf [23 August 2017].
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Oxfam’s 2016 WASH project included the installation of a solar-powered water
pump in the Nyarugusu camp. The new pump reaches a depth of 103 meters
releasing the pressure on other water sources. It also leads to less dependence
on fossil fuel as the previous pumps operated with a diesel-powered generator
and important cost savings, i.e. USD 34,000 annually in running cost.40
Oxfam’s project also includes the construction of energy efficient stoves in
order to decrease the pressure on the environment surrounding the camp. This
has important co-benefits as firewood picking outside the camp exposes the
refugees to important risks of violence.
Redeso and KIYADO, the two local implementing partners working with Oxfam,
are both combining their humanitarian aid projects with projects falling mainly
in the environmental sector for Redeso and social inclusion and livelihood sector
for KIYADO.
The framework partners reported that although these different initiatives were not
strongly pushed by ECHO, ECHO is always open to new approaches and innovation
and is willing to take the risks to test them if they can deliver better outcomes for the
final beneficiaries.
A1.3.3 EU added value
A1.3.3.1 EQ10: What was the added values of DG ECHO’s HA
interventions? How could ECHO maximise its EU Added Value? What
would happen if DG ECHO would stop its HA interventions?
ECHO is one of the main donors in the area of humanitarian aid in Tanzania and its
financial added value is therefore very important for all the framework partners. As
shown in the table below all but one project rely on ECHO for more than 55% of their
funding.
Table A1.8 ECHO framework partners rely on ECHO for an important share of their
project’s budget (2017 budgets)
Partners Total cost ECHO contribution Share of ECHO
contribution
UNHCR € 13,074,958 € 3,000,000 23%
WFP € 3,578,415 € 2,000,000 56%
DRC € 1,102,090 € 1,000,000 91%
Plan International € 888,857 € 800,000 90%
Oxfam € 1,324,816 € 800,000 60%
Helpage International € 1,178,594 € 700,000 59%
Source: ECHO contribution is based on the requested support as communicated in the last version of the e-Single form (May 2017).
Alongside this important financial added value the framework partners identified a
series of additional features which really distinguish ECHO from other donors and
ensure its high added value. These include:
40
More details about this project: Oxfam, 2016. 207 solar panels, plenty of clean water. Available at: http://www.oxfamblogs.org/eastafrica/?p=8600 [23 August 2017]; Oxfam, 2016. Nyarugusu camp, Tanzania, 2016. Available at: http://water.oxfam.org.uk/en/green-technology-en/solar-powered-pumping-at-depth-nyarugusu-camp-tanzania-2016-2/ [23 August 2017]; and Lorentz, 2016. Hybrid pumping in Tanzania. Available at: https://partnernet.lorentz.de/pdf/lorentz_casestudy_tanzania_refcamp_en.pdf [23 August 2017].
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ECHO’s unique positioning as specialised humanitarian aid donor focussing on
the fully cycle of emergency support, as well as prevention and preparedness;
ECHO’s presence in the field and high technical knowledge which ensure a good
follow-up on projects and a high level of commitments towards the framework
partners;
The timeliness of ECHO’s response and its flexibility in terms of financing and
project set-up;
ECHO’s efforts to share good practice amongst the framework partners through
among others the publication of guidelines – even if these are not always well
known by the partners;
ECHO’s openness towards innovative approaches and willingness to test and
further disseminate and promote these in case of success across other
projects41;
ECHO pushed for a series of developments and introduced requirements which in the
views of the framework partners added value to their projects. These include:
Push for CBT, which is a very relevant way to implement humanitarian aid in
the Tanzanian context;
Push for protection mainstreaming and the implementation of common
standards across partners for example in the case of child protection;
Push for the involvement of local communities and beneficiaries in the needs
assessments and project design;
Push for local procurement when possible;
Attention for the complementarity of efforts and the prevention of duplication
between different projects;
Push for the use of strong vulnerability criteria and evidence based assessment
for the distribution of aid.
Despite this overall very positive assessment, the framework partners identified a
series of opportunities for ECHO to further improve its added value:
Lack of concrete follow-up on field visits during which substantial issues are
discussed. It was argued that having a more systematic follow-up would further
improve the quality and effectiveness of the projects;
Limited support to strengthen the role of local NGOs in the implementation of
ECHO funded actions although some very good examples were identified in
Tanzania, e.g. Redeso and KIYADO. Pushing for their involvement in more
projects could support the sustainability of the projects and lead to cost-
efficiency improvements;
Lack of medium- long-term strategy with the partners and other donors.
Although the framework partners do realise the specificity of ECHO and the
need to focus on emergency support, they argue that in the Tanzanian context
it would make sense to develop a clear Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and
Development (LRRD) or transition strategy with longer term development
objectives. The recent efforts deployed by ECHO and DEVCO in this prospects
were also recognised.
41
It should be noted that Tanzania is considered as a Innovation Hub by WFP. This implies testing and scaling innovations from WFP and both the public and private sector. WFP and its partners in Tanzania are facilitating to foster, test, refine and scale up innovation that contributes to achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals by 2030. More details: WFP, 2017. WFP Tanzania. Country Brief. Available at: http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ep/wfp273553.pdf?_ga=2.98131935.1515286247.1503913667-1351801102.1503506271 [28 August 2017].
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A1.3.4 Effectiveness
A1.3.4.1 EQ11: To what extent has ECHO achieved its objectives?
Although the objective of this section is not to make an overall assessment of whether
or not ECHO achieved its specific objectives in Tanzania or not as this is out of the
scope of this field report, the EU Delegation recognised that the budget cuts
introduced by ECHO in 2017 made it rather difficult for ECHO to achieve its objectives.
On a more strategic level one other framework partner stressed that ECHO could
improve its effectiveness if they were to develop more comprehensive strategy, both
in terms of geography, i.e. develop regional strategies aiming to tackle the root cause
of protracted crisis, and timing, i.e. integrate longer term objectives to develop more
sustainable solutions.
This being said the visited projects seem to ensure a high level of effectiveness and
were all on track to meet their objectives. Some interesting examples of mechanisms
to measure effectiveness and long term impacts were identified among the framework
partners. One of them is presented in the box below.
Box A3 Plan International approach to measure the effectiveness of its programmes
Plan International, SC and IRC ran a series of assessments to measure the
effectiveness of their programmes over the last years. These included:
Assessment of 10,000 children attending child friendly spaces through the
distribution of ‘strengths and difficulties’ questionnaire to measure
psychological changes over a three months interval period. This assessment
showed a significant improvement in psychological and social well-being of
children in all 3 camps. The percentage changes in Nduta and Mtendeli are
presented in the Figure below. In addition to these questionnaires 144
interviews were also conducted in order to identify where to adjust the
programme. This is based on different indicators and differ from pure output
indicators.
Source: Plan International, SC, IRC, 2017. Burundi Refugee Crisis. Presentation given on 19 July 2017.
A large survey of the refugee population (covering 14,672 individuals) was
conducted to assess their level of awareness about the SGBV/PSN services.
This showed an awareness level of 66%.
House visits and community monitoring were used to assess the level of
satisfaction with the foster parenting programme. This assessment showed a
high effectiveness as 100% unaccompanied minors are placed in alternative
living arrangements indicating effectiveness of registration and care
arrangements.
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ECHO monitoring mechanisms are considered as overall good by the framework
partners. The UNHCR indicated that they organised a series of training to ensure a
good understanding of the ECHO requirements by the relevant partners. This was
supported by ECHO and facilitated good compliance levels. One framework partner
indicated that the Key Performance Indicators which need to be included in the e-
single form were aligned with their internal practices. Reporting and monitoring is
therefore most of the time not a challenge. It was however stressed that ECHO is not
very flexible in terms of reporting template which sometimes lead to the completion of
different reports for different donors supporting the same projects. This could be
further improved.
A1.3.4.2 EQ12: To what extent do ECHO sectoral policies contribute to the
effectiveness of ECHO’s operations?
Framework partners stressed that ECHO successfully managed to push different
agendas forward. The main one being the support to cash based assistance. ECHO’s
support to CBT was recognised by different framework partners as a crucial element to
persuade their internal hierarchy and the authorities in the beneficiary country. WFP
representatives stressed that with the scale of ECHO funding worldwide, when they
push for an agenda coherently and at all levels, it has a big impact. WFP’s move to
cash based assistance in Tanzania is a clear example of that impact.
However, there is a general lack of awareness about ECHO’s specific sectoral guidance
and policies amongst the framework partners. This can partly be explained by the fact
that ECHO’s main partners in Tanzania are ‘sector leaders’ and therefore have very
strong internal guidelines which have usually informed those published by ECHO. This
is for example the case of the UNHCR and their protection guidelines and WFP and
their approach to food assistance. Both organisations consider that there are in line
with ECHO’s guidelines but mainly assuming that these reflects their internal
processes. It was suggested by one framework partner that a good way to improve
the general awareness about ECHO’s sectoral guidelines would be to have a more
participatory approach during their development. The interviewed ECHO staff indicated
that this participatory approach exist but mainly takes place at headquarter level, it is
then the task of the framework partners’ headquarters to consult with their local staff.
A1.3.4.3 EQ13: With reference to ECHO’s visibility manual, to what extent
do ECHO activities achieve proper visibility through funded actions?
All framework partners seem to align with ECHO’s visibility requirements as set out in
the visibility manual. They all advertise ECHO’s logo across their projects through
different means (e.g., tags, flags, stickers). The framework partners also recognised
that some good examples of activities to further increase visibility were put in place by
ECHO and its partners over the last years. In 2014, WFP, for example, organised a
concert in Nyarugusu which was interspersed with information about ECHO.42 ECHO’s
use of social media was also praised. The framework partners noted that ECHO has
become more stringent with the partners not respecting the visibility requirements.
Despite this overall positive assessment, it was stressed that ECHO visibility guidance
could be more “innovative”. One framework partner also raised the point that ECHO
visibility requirements should not only target direct beneficiaries but also the larger
public and other organisations. This need was confirmed by the EU Delegation which
consider ECHO visibility as very limited. They reported the case of the visit from a
European Member State’s development agency which did not even mention ECHO in
their mission report. Finally, a few framework partners also stressed that it is not
42
WFP, 2014. The Day I Performed At Nyaragusu Refugee Camp In Tanzania. Available at: https://www.wfp.org/stories/day-i-performed-nyaragusu-refugee-camp-tanzania [28/08/2017].
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always easy for them to ensure the visibility of all their donors and of their own
organisations. This is especially the case for new form of assistance, such as CBT
which is harder to brand.
A1.3.5 Efficiency
A1.3.5.1 EQ14: To what extent did ECHO achieve cost-effectiveness in its
response?
All the framework partners confirmed that ECHO is taking cost-effectiveness criteria
into account in the selection of actions to be funded. During the negotiation phase
between ECHO and the framework partners, ECHO pushes for cost-effective
approaches (e.g. CBT, local procurement – although this is not always the cheapest
option) and pays attention to the project’s financial planning. Once the projects are
launched, different UN framework partners stressed that they had quite a lot of
flexibility with regard to their spending and budget as long as they achieve their
objectives and remain in line with their original planning. It was for example reported
that as ECHO paid more attention to the final results of a funded actions and less to
the input (e.g. the type of product) used to achieve these results.
This flexibility is considered as real added value by the framework partners as it saves
a considerable amount of administrative burden and cost. It is also made possible by
the frequent projects’ visit of ECHO’s technical assistants (TAs). The TAs ensure a
good follow-up on checks and balances and the projects’ value for money based on
performance. It also allows for rapid adaptation if required. However, a few framework
partners stressed that the limited feedback received after ECHO’s project visit stood in
the way of further efficiency improvements.
Alongside pushing for cost-effective approaches such as CBT, ECHO is also open to
other innovative solutions leading to cost savings. A good example of such innovation
is the installation of a solar-powered water pump in the Nyarugusu camp in 2016 by
Oxfam – this example is presented in more details under evaluation question 9
(coherence).
ECHO’s framework partners are also facing a series of external obstacles sometimes
preventing them to choose for the most cost-effective solutions. Examples of such
obstacles include:
Tanzania has rigid national procurement procedures that sometimes stand in
the way of cost-effective local procurement. In some cases it forced the
partners to go back to international suppliers;
The Tanzanian government only permits the use of permanent structures for
school classrooms preventing the use of cheaper semi-permanent structures, so
that these can be used later by the local population. Although the intention
behind these requirement is understandable, it is a real challenges for the NGOs
in charge of education in the refugee camps. A UNHCR operational update from
March 2016 stressed that: “the overwhelming need for classrooms, coupled
with funding constraints and the time required to build permanent structures
make this a critical issue”. An advocacy paper was prepared in 2016 to appeal
to the Tanzanian government to: “reconsider its current policy of only
permitting the use of permanent structures for school classrooms; and to
consider allowing also the use of semi-permanent structures for classrooms”.43
43
UNHCR, 2016. United Republic Of Tanzania. UNHCR Operational Update - Burundi Refugee Situation. Reporting Period: 26 February – 3 March 2016. Available at: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UNHCRTanzania-BurundiRefugeeSituationOperationalUpdate26February3March2016.pdf [28 August 2017].
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Alongside these external obstacles it was stressed that the use of local implementing
partners was sometimes limited by the fact that ECHO does not fully recognise the
resources required to train and build the capacity of the local partners and does
consider this as an eligible expense in their budget set-up. This takes up considerable
resources at first but in the long term has the potential to lead to important cost-
efficiencies. The representative from KIYADO stressed for examples that they received
excellent training and capacity-building support from Oxfam. This helped them
structure their organisation and reinforce their delivery capacity and mechanisms.
A1.3.5.2 EQ 15: How successful has ECHO been in coordinating its
operations with other main humanitarian actors, and with its civil
protection actions, e.g. by promoting synergies and avoiding
duplications, gaps and resource conflicts?
This question is already answered by evaluation question 7 and new evaluation
question 1 above (coherence).
A1.3.6 Sustainability/connectedness
A1.3.6.1 EQ16: To what extent have the ECHO-funded actions been
successful in linking relief, rehabilitation and development,
considering both the continuum and contiguum aspects?
As already described under evaluation question 9 (coherence), there are good
opportunities to link relief, rehabilitation and development in Tanzania. This is
recognised by all the framework partners and by ECHO, DEVCO and the EU Delegation
as they organised a joint mission in February 2017 to explore concrete cooperation
opportunities, and also an integral part of the CRRF. Although the above efforts are
mainly preparatory in nature and have not resulted in any concrete outcomes yet, the
framework partners are putting various activities in place in their ECHO funded actions
to ensure sustainability, including:
Plan International and IRC are working with government social workers in order
to build their capacity to manage child protection cases in a refugee camp
setting. They also strengthen community-based child protection mechanisms
and support capacity building among the refugee population to deliver crucial
services;
Through its large CBT programme WFP is working with different partners to
further develop the common market at Nyarugusu. This market brings refugees
together with the host communities and if properly managed will lead to
important development in and around the camp – potential pitfalls for the
development of the local market include: the attraction of international
suppliers that would replace the host communities in the supply chain, the need
to diversify local agricultural production to ensure diversity of supply on the
market, perception of some government officials that CBT is perceived as a
pooling factor by refugees;
Oxfam and other framework partners are working with local implementing
partners who are involving the host communities in their activities. These
activities mainly relate to livelihood support. It was however noted that these
project’s components are not directly financed by ECHO.
The framework partners noted that despite these activities there is a lot to be done to
improve LRRD and ensure the successful transition from humanitarian aid to
development. They stressed that based on ECHO’s current mandate it is unclear to
them to which extent ECHO can actually (and should) tackle longer term activities
which are closer to development. Developing a clear LRRD or transition strategy would
however make a lot of sense as:
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Different key framework partners are currently going through important
structural and organisational changes in order to better programme their
humanitarian and development actions and to ensure better connections
between the two work streams;
Multi-year and multi-partner planning is being introduced by the UNHCR, which
is the key partner responsible for the coordination of the humanitarian aid in
Tanzania, as well as by the WFP, another key partner;
Supporting LRRD and transition will require common advocacy efforts between
ECHO, DEVCO and other partners and donors in order to tackle key obstacles
for LRRD, e.g. encampment policy, possibility for refugee to generate revenues,
etc.;
Tanzania is piloting the CRRF, which will potentially offer important
opportunities to scale up and link humanitarian aid projects with longer term
development projects.
The joint mission which took place in February certainly provides a good basis for the
development of a clear LRRD or transition strategy in Tanzania, although there has not
been any concrete follow up to date. As stated under evaluation question 9
(coherence) Tanzania is one of the eligible countries under the EU Emergency Trust
Fund For Africa. This also represents a good opportunity to finance projects linked to
the humanitarian-development nexus but as the scoping process is still ongoing it is
unclear how it will be used in Tanzania.
A1.3.7 Key additional insights for rapid evaluations
This section provides a summary of the key insights feeding into the rapid evaluations
as captured during the field mission to Tanzania. The write up is more concise than in
the previous sections. The writer of the rapid evaluation will have to combine these
insights with the more detailed minutes of the different interviews and focus groups.
A1.3.7.1 Advocacy
According to all the interviewed partners, ECHO’s advocacy efforts in Tanzania are
currently very limited. It is considered as very difficult for ECHO to have much impact
on this area as they are not based in Dar-es-Salam. The framework partners would
however strongly welcome more efforts in this area, notably to tackle some of the key
issues faced by the refugees, e.g. encampment policy, access to revenue generating
activities, etc. ECHO (and DEVCO) advocacy efforts are considered as being
particularly important at the moment as the CRRF is taking shape. The UNHCR
advocates for the rights of the refugees but its position is difficult as they also
coordinate all actions in the camps and need to maintain good working relationships
with the government who are in charge of the camps.
ECHO has however supported the advocacy activities of the framework partners,
which are part of a joint inter-agency INGO advocacy group at national level. This
group developed the following papers over the last months:
A letter co-signed by DRC, IRC, Oxfam, HelpAge and SC to the Tanzanian MHA
requesting direction from the MHA on plans for a new camp;
A position paper for the UN Summit for Refugees and Migrants. This paper,
jointly prepared by Plan, WorldVision, Oxfam, IRC, DRC, HelpAge, Good
Neighbours Tanzania and SC called for UNHCR to develop a CRRF for Tanzania;
A CRRF Issue Paper in response to the CRRF roll out in Tanzania.
A1.3.7.2 Protection
The UNHCR is the key actor coordinating and mainstreaming protection across all the
activities implemented in the different refugee camps. All the framework partners
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therefore follow their approach / standards, etc. and implement them in their projects.
ECHO is also supporting these efforts notably by providing specific technical assistance
in that area.
Plan International stressed that the protection needs identified by ECHO in the HIPs
were in line with the needs on the ground. They also flagged that ECHO is pushing for
the development of standards for child protection, a topic which was not tackled by
the UNHCR so far. Plan International, IRC and SC conducted for example inter-agency
child protection assessments to support children in identifying their protection needs
and risk assessments.
A1.3.7.3 WASH
The continuous influx of refugees in the camps has put a lot of pressures on the WASH
facilities in the camps, especially in the new zones in Nduta, where for example a new
water distribution system had to be developed. Oxfam is the key partner leading on
the provision of WASH services in the Nduta. They faced the following challenges in
the last years:
A key challenge is to scale up the infrastructure and make sure they can
provide water to all the refugees. They are exploring different water sources
(e.g. boreholes up to 25 km away from the camp) as river extraction is not
ideal from an environmental perspective. It also creates conflicts with the host
communities;
There are lot of committees and volunteers in the camp, but these shift
continuously. It is a logistical challenge which needs to be stabilised and
requires a lot of capacity building of the refugees, to enhance ownership.
There are some important gaps in resources leading to limited distribution of
WASH items. The most important needs relate to hygiene kits for woman. This
also leads to some incoherence: they for example raise awareness about
handwashing but are lacking soap so cannot convey a consistent message.
Overall the WASH conditions in the camps are under the SPHERE standards;
Oxfam started installing individual household latrines, which are expensive, but
are more environmentally friendly and guarantees more protection for their
users. They are also being adapted to disabled people. However after a first
round of installation latrines for 8,000 latrines there are still a lot of work to be
done.
In term of LRRD and transition, WASH is considered as a key priority sector.
A1.3.7.4 Food security and livelihood
WFP is the framework partner in charge of food distribution in the camps. Refugees
are fully dependent on food distribution. As already mentioned above, WFP is
combining GFD with CBT – started with 10,000 beneficiaries in Nyarugusu and will be
gradually expanded to up to 80,000 by the end of 2017. ECHO played a key role in
supporting the use of CBT and this was very much appreciated by WFP and other
framework partners.
The design of WFP project is described in details in the different project document so
the objective of this section is not to repeat that information but rather to reflect the
key points of feedback received from different stakeholders, notably on CBT. These
include:
WFP is the leading organisation working with cash but other partners are
looking into this as well. It will therefore be important to design a single
management platform for all the cash based programmes in order to not have
competing systems;
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Involving private sector partners, such as Airtel or Vodacom, is a requirement
for the implementation of CBT but engaging with such partners requires time
and expertise as they are not used to work in humanitarian contexts. WFP has
now established a good routine that includes the training of Airtel staff the day
before the cash distribution to cope with the changes of staff within Airtel. More
guidelines on how to work with such private organisations would be welcome;
The increase in CBT requires the training of the framework partner’s staff in
order to have the right expertise in-house and in the field;
Purchasing behaviour are difficult to monitor but WFP is conducting monitoring
activities to better understand these behaviours. Recent monitoring activities
revealed that beneficiaries were spending most of the money on food and the
remaining shares on livelihood goods or activities;
Beneficiaries were involved in the design of the CBT scheme and had a good
understanding of its key objectives, some were however complaining about the
lack of fixed prices for commodities;
Beneficiaries of GFD noted that although their food ratio were decreasing due to
the lack of funding, it was not the case of the distributed cash which remained
at the same level.
Overall the move towards CBT is considered as very relevant in the Tanzanian context
and potentially a game changer in terms of: interaction with the host community
through the common market; economic development in the host communities; longer
term development of the region.
In term of pure livelihood support activities (e.g. income generating activities) ECHO is
far less present as they consider these activities as out of their mandate. Different
framework partners consider however that these activities are key to ensure the
sustainable development of the refugee population. They moreover have many co-
benefits such as support to the host communities through improved local economy or
women protection through livelihood activities targeting vulnerable women. A clear
example of these benefits is the development of the common market in Nyarugusu,
which considerably increased following the launch of the CBT programme and benefits
both refugees and host communities.
A1.3.7.5 Shelter and settlements
Shelter infrastructures are coordinated by the UNHCR while the settlements areas are
defined by the Tanzanian governments. Very good results were achieved in that sector
as for example the Nduta camp was re-build from scratch following the influx of
Burundian refugees in 2015. Many families also benefit from transitional shelter with
individual latrines and kitchen which is key for their comfort and hygiene. As many
other sector the shelter sector is however suffering from under funding leading to:
Longer stay in transition centres for new arrivals; and
Currently over 27,000 refugees live in plastic shelter in Nduta. They now also
work with hybrid shelter to facilitate the transition towards more permanent
structure (metal roof + plastic walls). Despite this hybrid solution, it was
reported that around 15,000 refugees still live in emergency shelters and tents,
with reduced access to WASH.
A1.3.8 Prospective evaluation
The prospective evaluation was mainly discussed with the framework partners during
the workshop organised at the end of the visit to Tanzania. Based on Grand Bargain
commitments and a series of potential ways forward for ECHO, the framework
partners were asked to identify the most urgent areas of work for ECHO in the coming
years. The discussion resulted in the identification of three key areas:
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Funding: The overall decrease in funding allocated to the Great Lakes region
creates a lot of uncertainty and anxiety among the framework partners, their
local implementing partners and the beneficiaries. ECHO could play a role in
bringing more stability in this landscape in terms of engaging with both existing
and new donors (e.g. China or the World Bank which is currently looking into
supporting regions affected by protracted crisis).
The reduction in funding has also made it more difficult for the
humanitarian organisations to work with national and local government,
which feels that support from the international community is dwindling just
when they have committed themselves, through the CRRF, to some major
actions in the field. This has led to distrust and possibly the slowing down
of the agenda around the CRRF.
LRRD: ECHO should further promote the development of a clear LRRD or
transition strategy, also as part of its cooperation with DEVCO. This strategy
should consider issues linked to:
- Area based targeting;
- Host communities engagement and acceptance;
- Multi-annual funding;
- Advocacy efforts.
Linkages with environmental and climate issues: The refugee camps are
both affected by and causing important environmental issues, which need to be
addressed, especially as these often have important cost-effectiveness
implications (e.g. cost of water extraction, firewood, disaster prevention, etc.).
This requires longer term thinking and expertise which is not typically present
within the humanitarian aid community.
A1.4 Conclusion
The field mission to Tanzania was relatively short but allowed the evaluation team to
meet with all key stakeholders relevant to ECHO’s work in the country and cover most
of the evaluation questions identified by ECHO. Bearing in mind the specificities of the
Tanzanian crisis, i.e. long term and cyclical refugee crisis confined in a very limited
part of the country, the field mission report provides relevant findings which will feed
into the ongoing Comprehensive evaluation of the European Commission’s
humanitarian aid, 2012-2016, in particular – but not comprehensively:
It illustrates how ECHO works in an environment with a stable, though not
always collaborative government, and strong coordination structures managed
by UN agencies;
It provides a very good example of how ECHO successfully pushed for the use
of cash based transfer contributing to a change of approach within a major
organisation such as WFP;
It illustrates the difficulties to develop sound LRRD or transition strategy even
in a context, which is a priori suitable for the development of such strategies –
although some important initiatives are currently ongoing.
It also includes practical examples of protection mainstreaming;
It illustrates a need for ECHO to also get involved in advocacy activities in
countries where they have no country office and where other donors or
agencies may already be advocating.
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ANNEX 6.3: Field report – Myanmar
A1.1 Introduction
This document describes the fieldwork undertaken in Myanmar as part of the
Comprehensive evaluation of the European Commission’s humanitarian aid, 2012-
2016 and presents the evidence collected from the field. As stipulated in the terms of
reference for this consultation, “the Field Report is not an evaluation as such, and
should not include overall conclusions and recommendations, neither a collection of
project evaluations. It is a working document to report on the fieldwork and identify
any particular issues to be tackled during the synthesis phase (e.g. remedial actions
related to the methodological approach, etc.).”
A1.1.1 Overview of the fieldwork undertaken
Table A1.1 provides a snapshot of the project sites visited and the consultations
conducted during the mission. Annex 1 provides a list of stakeholders consulted.
Table A1.1 Consultations conducted
Field sites Dates Stakeholders consulted
Yangon 2 -11 October 2017 EC actors: DG ECHO, EU Delegation, DG
DEVCO
Other donors: USAID, DFID/
Humanitarian And Resilience Programme
(HARP)
ECHO framework partners (INGOs):
ICRC, Solidarités International, DRC,
Action Aid, Save the Children, WFP
ECHO framework partners (UN): UNDP,
UNHCR, UN OCHA, UNICEF
Local implementing partners: Myanmar
Red Cross, Myanmar Engineering Society
Local NGOs: Karuna Missions Social
Solidarity (KMSS)
Other: Trocaire, Myanmar Information
Management Unit (MIMU), INGO forum
A1.1.2 Challenges encountered
Due to the situation in Rakhine and the lack of travel authorisations the evaluation
team was unable to visit project sites outside Yangon. In order to talk to teams
working in the field, two phone interviews with ECHO partners based in Sittwe were
organised.
Otherwise everything went very smoothly, thanks to the availability and flexibility of
the stakeholders to meet with the evaluation team in Yangon.
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A1.1.3 Methodology
A1.1.3.1 Context and link with the consultation strategy
Table A1.3 presents how the field work designed for this evaluation feeds into the
evaluation framework by targeting key stakeholder groups. This table, associated with
the evaluation framework, served as basis for the development of the research tools
used during the field mission to Myanmar. The table cells highlighted in green
demonstrate which stakeholder categories were targeted by the field work completed
during this evaluation. In the case of Myanmar, host governments and military forces
were not consulted due to the current political impasse in the country. It was also
impossible to meet and talk to the affected communities due to the lack of travel
authorisation.
Table A1.2 Overview of methods that will be used to consult with the different
stakeholders group
Online
surveys
Semi-
structured
interviews
OPC Fieldwork
workshop
Fieldwork
interviews,
focus
groups
Roundt
able
Affected
communities (via Reps)
ECHO staff– HQ
ECHO staff -
Field
Other EU
entities
Other donors
ECHO partners
Local
implementing
partners
Host
governments
National/ local
NGOs
Academics and
think tanks
Private sector
Military forces
European
Parliament
European
Council
Member States
EU citizens
Comprehensive evaluation of the European Union humanitarian aid 2012-2016
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Online
surveys
Semi-
structured
interviews
OPC Fieldwork
workshop
Fieldwork
interviews,
focus
groups
Roundt
able
Global forums
and clusters
A1.1.3.2 Research tools
The main research tool used for the consultation during the field mission was semi-
structured interviews. Topic guides were developed for the following stakeholder
groups:
ECHO field staff;
Representatives of the EU delegation;
ECHO framework partners including UN entities;
Local implementing partners;
Other donors (including Member States); and
Academics and think tanks.
Additionally, a debriefing meeting with stakeholders consulted was organised in
Yangon, to inform the stakeholders on the key findings of the field mission and clarify
any remaining questions. The specific stakeholders interviewed during the field
mission to Myanmar were identified based on desk research and suggestions from
ECHO field staff.
A1.1.4 Structure of the report
The remainder of this report is structured as follows:
Section A1.2 provides an overview of the Myanmar context and the
humanitarian aid activities financed by ECHO in Myanmar;
Section A1.3 provides an overview of the key findings and lessons to take into
account in the comprehensive evaluation. The findings are organised by
evaluation question;
Section A1.3.7 includes a section covering the sectors and themes subjected to
rapid evaluations to facilitate analysis at later stages of the comprehensive
evaluation; and
Section A1.5 provides a detailed list of interviewed stakeholders.
A1.2 ECHO’s humanitarian aid activities in Myanmar
A1.2.1 Key contextual elements and rationale for ECHO’s intervention
Table A1.3 Key facts about Myanmar
Population 51,486,253 (2014 census)
Surface (sq. km) 676,578 km2
Density 76ppl/km² (2014 census)
Languages Burmese (official), Kachin, Kayah, Karen,
Chin, Mon, Rakhine, Shan (recognised
regional languages)
Political regime Constitutional Republic
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President Htin Kyaw
Prime Minister Aung San Suu Kyi (note: the position of
prime minister was replaced by the
position of state counsellor in 2016)
GDP per capita (2016 PPP $) 6,360 USD
Currency Kyat (MMK)
Exchange rate (09/06/2017) 44 10,000 MMK =6.39199 EUR
1 EUR = 1,564.46 MMK
Human Development Index (HDI)
ranking (out of 188)
145th
% population below poverty line45 25.6% (2016 est.)
Myanmar is a country with a past of armed conflicts and exposure to reoccurring
natural hazards such as cyclones, floods and earthquakes. Due to the above, the
humanitarian situation in the country is a combinations of vulnerability to food and
nutrition insecurity, statelessness, displacement, trafficking and migration. Myanmar is
ranking 145th out of 188 countries in the Human Development Index (HDI), indicating
chronic poverty and underlying structural inequalities and discrimination, including on
the basis of gender, ethnicity and religion. These elements exacerbate needs and
vulnerabilities of affected people in many parts of the country.46
The country has experienced armed conflicts for more than six decades. Resulting in a
heavy toll on local population. According to the UN humanitarian needs assessment
report, at the end of 2016, more than half a million people were in a need for
humanitarian assistance. It is estimated that more than 0.3 million people remain
displaced with limited access to basic services.47 Significant share of those (73%)
remain in camps or camp like situations in Kachin, Shan and Rakhine States. The
displacement is a result of armed conflict in Kachin and northern Shan State (resumed
in 2011), inter-communal tensions in Rakhine and natural emergencies like flash
floods and landslides exacerbating many of already existing vulnerabilities.
The timeline below summarises emergencies during the evaluation period (2012-
2016).
44
http://www.xe.com/fr/currencyconverter/convert/?Amount=10000&From=MMK&To=EUR 45
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2046.html 46
UN and partners (December 2016) Humanitarian Needs Overview, available at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Ref_Doc_Humanitarian_Needs_Overview_HCT_2017.pdf 47
DG ECHO website (19 October 2017), Myanmar/ Burma. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/where/asia-and-pacific/myanmar_en
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Figure A1.1 Evolution of emergencies in Myanmar (2012-2016)
Source: UN report on Humanitarian Needs in Myanmar, December 201648
According to the most recent Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) report on
Humanitarian Needs in Myanmar, the highest concentration of people in need are in
Rakhine State (North) followed by Kachin and Shan. It is estimated that about 218
thousand people remain in camps or camp-like situations in these three states. In
Kachin (87k) and Shan (11k) were displaced following the conflict that resumed in
2011.
Rakhine has the highest poverty rate in the country (78 per cent, compared to 37.5
per cent nationally) according to a November 2014 report by the World Bank.
Rakhine has a diverse ethnic and religious population. Majority of the people are
Buddhists while the remaining belong to a defined group of the Islamic faith.
The humanitarians face a challenging environment in Rakhine due to historical
tensions concerning identity, religion and
ethnicity.
In Rakhine State, more than one million
Muslims who call them selves ‘Rohingya’
have been rendered stateless by the 1982
Myanmar Citizenship Law. As a result, they
are deprived of their basic rights, and
restrictions of movement seriously impact
their livelihood and access to basic services.
In August 2017, new cycle of violence
erupted prompting over 0.53 million people
to flee to Bangladesh within a month. This
was following clashes in October 2016 when
already 87 thousand Rohingya fled to
Bangladesh.49
Despite the significant humanitarian needs,
the humanitarian access in the Rakhine and
Kachin States remains a problem. Lengthy
and cumbersome administrative procedures
hamper the ability of international aid organisations to provide life-saving assistance.
48
UN and partners (December 2016) Humanitarian Needs Overview, available at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Ref_Doc_Humanitarian_Needs_Overview_HCT_2017.pdf 49
DG ECHO website (19 October 2017), Myanmar/ Burma
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Disaster preparedness also remains a major challenge as Myanmar is considered to be
one of the countries at highest risk of natural disasters in South East Asia. Due to the
accelerated urbanisation, the consequences of natural hazards in the country’s main
cities of Mandalay, Sagaing, Naypyidaw, and Yangon would have particularly heavy
consequences. There is a continued need for disaster risk reduction and activities
aimed at strengthening national capacity to prepare for and respond to natural
disasters.
A1.2.2 Nature of ECHO’s humanitarian aid activities
The humanitarian aid and civil protection of the European Commission has provided
financial support to relief programmes in Myanmar since 1994. The total amount of
this funding has been over EUR 145 million to programmes supporting victims of
conflicts, violence and epidemics and EUR 84 million to victims of natural disasters
(through DIPECHO programme).50
Over the evaluation period (2012-2016), the ECHO funding to Myanmar has amounted
to total EUR 99.41 million for 83 different actions. The funding was at its peak in 2012
(EUR 26.77 million) and at its lowest in 2014 (EUR 17.8 million).
Figure A1.2 Evolution of ECHO funding in Myanmar, in EUR millions (2012-2016)
Source: EVA database extracted on 18 December 2017
In 2012-2014, the ECHO funding to Myanmar was allocated through dedicated HIPs51
while from 2015 onwards Myanmar was included under the HIP for South East Asia
and Pacific. Although ECHO funding has been used to finance activities in various
sectors, the majority of funding was used to implement results in Food security and
Livelihoods (EUR 31.77 million), Health (EUR 14.43 million), Protection (EUR 11.33
million) and WASH (EUR 11.04 million). The figure below presents the evolution of
ECHO’s funding per sector for the period 2012-2016. Indeed, as per the timeline of
events in Figure above (Figure A1.1), the displacement experienced in 2012 resulted
in a significant funding for food security and livelihoods and protection actions. Similar
correlation can be also observed in line with natural emergencies, where following the
floods in 2015 and 2016 the funding allocated to activities implementing DRR/Disaster
Preparedness actions increased. As per HIP 2016, Myanmar has only recently become
a priority DRR country and activities are expected to continue over the coming years.
This reflects the shift in Southeast Asia from a traditional DIPECHO model (i.e. largely
community-based disaster preparedness, awareness raising and advocacy) to a new
integrated operational approach to DRR and resilience.
50
Ibid. 51
In 2012, 2013, 2014 HIP for Myanmar and Thailand,
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Figure A1.3 Evolution of ECHO's funded sectors from 2012 to 2016
Source: EVA database extracted on 18 December 2017
Figure A1.3 provides an overview of ECHO’s key framework partners in Myanmar.
Over 2012-2016, ECHO had allocated EUR 99.4 million to 26 different framework
partners. The World Food Programme (WFP) receiving the highest share with a total
financing of almost EUR 19 million since 2012. This is followed by the UNHCR with EUR
11 million over the same period. Considering the significant needs in food security and
protection, this seems to be an appropriate choice. ECHO’s other key partners include:
the Danish Refugee Council, International Committee for the Red Cross (CICR), Action
Contre la Faim (ACF) and Solidarités International (SI).
Figure A1.4 ECHO's main partners in Myanmar (share of total funding over the
period 2012-2016)
Source: EVA database extracted on 18 December 2017; Total budget= EUR 99.4 million; * 16 FPA partners received each less than 3% of the total ECHO funding in 2012-2016, all together they accounted for 20.0% or EUR 21.0 million.
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In parallel to ECHO funding, Myanmar is a significant beneficiary of EU development
cooperation. For 2014-2020 the main sectors supported was the rural development,
education, governance and support to peace building.52 As stated in HIP 2016,
Myanmar also receives support under other EU thematic and regional instruments and
programmes, covering a wide range of issues, including democracy and human rights,
civil society, environment and climate change, human development, sustainable
energy as well as trade.
The EU also provides financial support and expertise to the Myanmar Peace Centre
(MPC) and in 2016 was designing a Joint Peace Fund, together with other interested
donors, aimed at supporting the forthcoming stages of the peace process, such as the
envisaged joint ceasefire monitoring mechanism, the National Political Dialogue and
research needs assessments, and assistance for recovery and development in former
conflict affected areas.
According to IATI, DEVCO committed almost EUR 264 million in the period 2012-2016
to activities in Myanmar that among other included support to Livelihood and Food
Security Trust Fund (LIFT), Three Millennium Development goals fund (3MDG) and EU
Peace Support programme (PEACE).
In order to respond to the growing needs of people fleeing Northern Rakhine and
displaced on the border between Myanmar and Bangladesh, on 23 October 2017, EU
together with Kuwait hosted an international fundraising. Additional EUR 30 million in
aid were pledged by the EU. Amounting a total EUR 51 million to Rohingya this year.53
As stated in the 2016 HIP, the EU is continuing to advocate for efficient coordination
and promotion of the Rights Upfront Initiative54 in view of the restricted humanitarian
space and other challenges. The need for enhanced coordination between
humanitarian and development systems is also strongly recognised.
A1.2.3 Key external factors that impacted (positively and negatively)
the delivery of ECHO’s humanitarian aid activities
They key external factors impacting the delivery of ECHO’s humanitarian aid in
Myanmar include:
Hostile environment due to tensions concerning identity, religion and
ethnicity has led to new emergencies requiring humanitarians to be flexible in
their response. The environment has also required humanitarians to work more
with the host community (even where they might not be the most vulnerable)
to mitigate these concerns:
- The tensions concerning religion and ethnicity have not been resolved. The
Rohingya population is not recognised as Myanmar citizens limiting their
access to basic services, food and livelihood opportunities. The political
situation surrounding the Rohingya people is intensifying in a deadly mix in
which surrounding communities and Burmese across the country
increasingly believe the Rohingya to be usurpers and terrorists leading to a
deterioration of the situation.
- The situation deteriorated significantly following the violent acts of protect in
October 2016 and August 2017. The government reacted with mass
52
DG DEVCO website, Myanmar/ Burma. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/countries/myanmarburma_en [11 December 2017] 53
EEAS website (23 October 2017), EU pledges additional €30 million for Rohingya refugees from Myanmar. Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headQuarters-homepage/34361/eu-pledges-additional-%E2%82%AC30-million-rohingya-refugees-myanmar_en [11 December 2017] 54
The Human Rights up Front (HRuF) initiative was launched by the UN Secretary-General in late 2013. Its purpose is to ensure the UN system takes early and effective action, as mandated by the Charter and UN resolutions, to prevent or respond to large-scale violations of human rights or international humanitarian law.
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burnings55 of the area which resulted in mass exodus of Muslim Rohingya
into Bangladesh out of North Rakhine. This lead to suspension of some
programmes implemented in the area and need to react quickly with an
ability to move the resources to the response of these displacements.
- The host society is also very vulnerable, therefore humanitarians need to
balance their assistance between the two communities, which is challenging.
Some Rakhine persistently believe humanitarian aid benefits only Rohingya
(as opposed to being distributed according to needs). The interviews also
revealed that the Government has requested equality and not equity in aid
distribution to the two communities. Granting access is a tool used by the
government for these requests.
Lack of access:
- All international but as of early-October 2017 also national staff is required
to have a travel authorisation to visit the camps. The travel authorisation
process was already very time consuming process, but with the increased
number of personnel who need to request this authorisation, the waiting
times are expected to increase significantly. This is a significant limitation
for humanitarians in provision of adequate and timely assistance.
- Following 27 August, when the militants attacked government forces and
the army responded with a counteroffensive, the Government issued a
statement accusing aid workers of helping ‘terrorists’. This lead to an anti-
aid worker sentiment growing stronger than ever before where INGOs were
obliged to remove their staff or work under very low visibility for the
security reasons.
The lack of identity documents lead to a number of issues related to
protection and rights of return:
- Citizenship and right of return access: Since 1982 the ‘Citizenship Law’
removed Rohingya citizenship and the right to self-identify. The Rohingya
people are not recognized as an official ethnic group of Myanmar. In 1994
birth certificates stopped being provided to Rohingya people. As a result,
most Rohingyas are un-documented with no formal legal status. Recent
change in provision of birth certificates for Rohingyas was identified but as
learned in the interviews in the field, these do not identify a place of birth.
This provides partial proof of identity but no ability to claim a right of return
to Rakhine State, unless it is to IDP camps (proposed by Government of
Myanmar) in Northern Rakhine.
- Bangladesh is providing Myanmar birth certificates to children born in the
Bangladeshi camps, and their mothers. However again, as the place of birth
is not Myanmar, these will not permit to prove the right of return.
- Family tracing and unification: Many children in Rakhine have not been
issued with birth certificates since the 1990s, further restricting their rights
and increasing their vulnerability.56 Due to the lack of documentation, many
unaccompanied minors are unable to prove family ties or citizenship – with
siblings separated – and therefore are exposed to risks of violence and
trafficking. Though Government of Bangladesh discusses separate camps for
unaccompanied and separated children, this comes with its own set of
55
MIMU (29 November 2017) Fire detections 25 Aug 2017-25 Nov 2017. Available at: http://themimu.info/sites/themimu.info/files/documents/Map_Imagery_Analysis_Fire_Detections_in_Buthidaung_Maungdaw_Rathedaung_-_Rakhine_UNITAR-UNOSAT_29Nov2017_A3.pdf 56
UN and partners (December 2016) Humanitarian Needs Overview, available at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Ref_Doc_Humanitarian_Needs_Overview_HCT_2017.pdf
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severe challenges. Most of these minors are unlikely be able to return to
Myanmar.
A1.3 Key findings and lessons to take into account in the comprehensive evaluation
A1.3.1 Relevance
A1.3.1.1 EQ1: To what extent do ECHO budget allocation consider the
needs, actions of other donors and the EU objectives on humanitarian
aid?
The majority of interviewed stakeholders agreed that ECHO’s budget allocation were
based on needs during the evaluation period. The needs were identified through
formal and informal needs assessments and proactive monitoring mechanisms.
However, stakeholders also acknowledged that the ECHO funding envelope for
Myanmar has decreased despite the needs (see Figure A1.2). According to the
Humanitarian Needs Overview, the number of people who need humanitarian
assistance in country had not decreased.57
The reduced funding envelope has required ECHO to strategically prioritise its funding.
The close presence and day-to-day interactions with partners allowed this to happen.
According to the stakeholders consulted in the field, ECHO budget allocations in
country were based on needs that were determined through formal assessments but
also through active, continuous and context-based formal and informal communication
mechanisms in the country (e.g., humanitarian breakfasts, visits to projects,
WhatsApp groups). These regular communication mechanisms were also used as
coordination tools with other donors in the field (in addition to the formal coordination
with the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT)). For example, one of examples
mentioned in the field was a WhatsApp group with the other key donors such as
American and Australian humanitarian aid. These communication tools resulted in a
strong and up-to-date-overview of context, and evolution of needs resulting in
strategically relevant allocation decisions.
Local input plays a large part in adapting the HIP as required and ensuring actions are
relevant to the context – even when rapidly evolving. Interviews with local NGOs
revealed that ECHO funded actions were developed in close consultation. For example,
activities for DRR were sometimes suggested by INGOs but also requested by local
NGOs. This approach was seen as ensuring relevance and increasing ownership of
implemented activities.
ECHO has showed a flexibility to fund IT hardware vital to sustainable emphasis on
new technologies as drivers of transformative change and delivery. For example,
ECHO have supported purchasing of mobile broadcasting stations that will be used for
early warning mechanisms.
The funding available has been used to emergency response (food security receiving
31% of the total funding within the period, Health 14%, Protection 12%, WASH 11%,
Shelter and Settlement 9% and Nutrition 8%) but also DRR activities (7% of the total
funding). ECHO funding allocation to DRR and DR preparedness was seen as vital and
relevant in the context of Myanmar where urbanisation is at an early but growing
stage58. Indeed, the funding has been used to bridge isolated crisis responses (e.g.,
57
UN Humanitarian Needs Overview: 2014 - 421,000 people in need of humanitarian assistance; 2015 - 540,700; 2016 – 1,200,000 (including flood response); 2017 – 525,448 58
World Bank (26 January 2016) Myanmar: Urbanization at an Early but Growing Stage. Available at: http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2015/01/26/myanmar-urbanization-at-an-early-but-growing-stage [Accessed on 25 October 2017]
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floods in 2015 and 2016) to a longer term resilience approach addressing institutional
capacity gaps, such as developing policies (e.g., Myanmar National Framework for
Community Disaster Resilience59), guidelines and SOPs (for example, project ‘Safe
hospitals’ works on building the surge capacity in case of an emergency causing
damage to infrastructure and resulting in mass casualties).
The decline in funding (see Figure A1.5) had a direct impact on the partners’ activities
and many of them had to decrease the scope of their activities. Proportionally, Shelter
and Settlement experienced the highest decrease (-77% in comparison to 2015),
however significant decrease was also experienced in other sectors – Nutrition (-
41%), Food security and livelihoods (-29%) and WASH (-26%).
Figure A1.5 ECHO funding evolution per key sectors in Myanmar, 2012-2016, million
EUR
Source: EVA database extracted on 18 December 2017.
For example, ECHO funding to the WASH activities in Sittwe was reduced significantly,
permitting to cover the maintenance of the lifesaving activities only. At the same time,
partners underscored that ECHO country office communicates these funding gaps to
other donors and implementing partners with larger financial envelops from other
donors than ECHO (e.g. UNICEF) in order to try to rapidly fill gaps and address the
needs on the ground.
Stakeholders consulted also considered that ECHO allocates money strategically,
sometimes supporting activities with small but vital grants. One of the most visible
examples is around EUR 200,000 per year to MIMU (Myanmar Information
Management Unit) and EUR 100,000 annually to the INGO forum. These activities are
seen as highly relevant and effective by partners in country (see more Section
A1.3.4).
The funding of MIMU was seen as highly relevant in terms of the outputs – quality
data and robust information analysis are strong drivers of relevance. MIMU is a
reliable source of information and a strategic asset in supporting coordination of
humanitarian actions, providing access and increasing visibility of funding (and ECHO)
through every map developed (e.g., maps available and seen on the number and
59
Myanmar National Natural Disaster Management Committee, Myanmar National Framework for Community Disaster Resilience. Available at: http://themimu.info/sites/themimu.info/files/documents/Core_Doc_National_Framework_for_Community_Disaster_Resilience.pdf
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location of villages, languages spoken, location of schools, topography, natural
resources, areas of flooding and many more).
This ‘small grants approach’ was also seen as an important way to advocate for other
donors to step in where ECHO funding is not or no longer sufficient. Having robust
data on the needs (supported by MIMU) was seen as an excelled tool to strengthen
advocacy messages. Similarly, well-coordinated INGOs contributed to this objective.
A1.3.1.2 EQ2: To what extent is ECHO’s choice of framework partnerships
appropriate? How could ECHO improve in the choice of partners?
ECHO choice of partners is considered as relevant to the context and ECHO’s
objectives by the majority of the consulted stakeholders. There is consistent evidence
that ECHO chooses to fund a variety of NGOs and spend a large percentage of the HIP
funding through NGOs with a pragmatic approach to funding for the UN and INGOs
(see Figure A1.4).
As per Figure A1.6, ECHO had one key FPA per sector. Each partner financed by ECHO
covers a specific intervention area and they all strive to complementarity. No
duplication of efforts were observed among the different projects.
Figure A1.6 Key FPA per sector as a share of the total ECHO funding in 2012-2016
and the number of other FPAs in the sector
Source: EVA database extracted on 18 December 2017As confirmed by ECHO country office
and partners consulted, the selection of projects is fully based on the quality and
relevance of the proposed actions. One of the partners consulted acknowledged that
they lost the funding due to a poorly tailored and less-than- innovative proposal.
Which they found to be a positive sign as it required them to think outside the box
when proposing actions to ECHO.
ECHO promotes a pragmatic approach to localisation – where possible ECHO would
encourage to work with local partners to ensure sustainability (see more under Section
A1.3.6). There are areas where due to strong Civil Society Organisations (CSOs)
localisation is possible and strongly encouraged (e.g. Kachin, Shan states) while in
other areas (e.g. Rakhine) this is less possible. The differences are well understood
and acknowledged by ECHO.
[CELLRANGE], [VALUE]
[CELLRANGE], [VALUE]
[CELLRANGE], [VALUE]
[CELLRANGE], [VALUE]
[CELLRANGE], [VALUE]
[CELLRANGE], [VALUE]
[CELLRANGE], [VALUE]
[CELLRANGE], [VALUE]
[CELLRANGE], [VALUE]
[CELLRANGE], [VALUE]
[CELLRANGE], [VALUE]
[CELLRANGE]
[CELLRANGE]
[CELLRANGE]
[CELLRANGE]
[CELLRANGE]
[CELLRANGE]
[CELLRANGE]
[CELLRANGE]
[CELLRANGE]
[CELLRANGE]
[CELLRANGE]
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Child protection
Coordination
DRR / DR Preparedness
EiE
Food sec. & livelihoods
Health
Mine actions
Nutrition
Protection
Shelter & settlements
WASH
Main partner Rest (number)
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A1.3.1.3 EQ3: To what extent does ECHO have appropriate,
comprehensive and context-adapted strategies in place for
addressing country/regional humanitarian needs and different
challenges, including medium and longer term objectives, where
applicable?
ECHO framework partners consulted strongly acknowledged the flexibility and
adaptability of ECHO HIPs and how this provides the capability to ECHO to react to
new situations and fund actions relevant to the context, even when it is quickly
evolving. This can be confirmed by the number of HIPs’ revisions in the country/
region (e.g. five versions in 2012, three versions in 2015 and six versions in 2016).
Framework partners highlighted ECHO’s willingness to take calculated risks, encourage
out-of-the-box thinking and innovation. Framework partners also highlighted the
rapidity of ECHO response to evolving situations on the ground. According to one
framework partner, following the cyclone in 2016 ECHO responded with an additional
financing decision within only two weeks, which was seen as very reactive.
The key factors contributing to the relevance of ECHO’s HIP include:
Local input;
Experienced field presence; and
Technical knowledge in the country combined with technical expertise from the
field network/ regional offices.
Local input plays a big part in adapting both HIPs and the projects to ensure maximum
relevance. While experienced field presence and technical knowledge allows to
interpret the needs and transfer into policy documents. Despite the lack of formal
consultations on HIP, framework partners and other donors were of the same opinion
that HIPs accurately reflect the situation.
The funding duration varies in Myanmar. Actions in DRR sector have been funded for
18 months period and there is a discussion to increase this to 24 months. This was
seen to be highly relevant as facilitated the collection and dissemination of lessons
learned.
The duration of actions providing relief is however 12 months. In context like
Myanmar, country of protracted crises, this was not seen to be relevant to develop
long term strategies. This is further discussed under Section A1.3.5 on efficiency.
As most of the framework partners have been funded by ECHO for several subsequent
years, the importance for simplifying the approach and increasing predictability
through a multi-annual funding was discussed.
A1.3.1.4 EQ4: To what extent does the configuration of ECHO’s field
network ensure an added value in terms of efficiency and
effectiveness of ECHO’s actions?
The ECHO field office in Myanmar is very well perceived by all the stakeholders
consulted. The consultation revealed the importance of having highly experienced, well
selected humanitarian experts with long-term strategic vision in the country offices,
and willingness to take risks and push for innovation.
The ECHO field network/regional offices were also well perceived in terms of the
delivery of their technical expertise – in particular as this expertise was combined by
strong in-country knowledge.
The relationship between ECHO and its framework partners was highly praised in the
field. Due to the field presence, a well-developed communication and mentoring based
on mutual trust and confidence was observed. The close relationship also provide
space for open dialogue. Framework partners appreciated the capacity building offered
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by ECHO to fulfil certain gaps. Training on protection issues was mentioned as one of
examples.
The monitoring activities carried out by the country office were perceived as necessary
to identify and address issues and improve project quality. The technical and sectoral
expertise of the ECHO field staff was seen to be relevant and provided at times
needed. For example, some framework partners mentioned that they were confident
to ask for technical advice when in need and they were sure of getting it. The technical
advice received had helped to identify issues and weaknesses, find innovative
solutions and increase effectiveness and efficiency of actions implemented. According
to the partners consulted, technical experts are very well updated and informed on the
country situation which was highly appreciated as it allows technical issues to be
addressed in a context specific and improved way.
The knowledge of ECHO is also useful for the humanitarian donor community (e.g.,
USAID, DFID, UNHCR). ECHO field office and network is also appreciated by EU DEL
who sometimes joins the project visits to have a better understanding of where and
when interaction between funded actions can take place.
Partners and donors consulted also agreed that ECHO country office plays a significant
role in coordination between framework partners and donors. One of the examples
mentioned by the INGO forum was ECHO’s push for developing advocacy strategy.
Push for this strategy has helped to coordinate and have a joint message from all
actors involved in implementing humanitarian aid activities. The funding of MIMU, vital
for coordinated overview of humanitarian funding in Myanmar is an excellent case in
point, and fairly unique (see more in A1.3.1.1).
A1.3.1.5 EQ5: To what extent are ECHO humanitarian aid objectives still
relevant to the global humanitarian needs and context?
This evaluation questions was not specifically targeted by the field mission. This
evaluation question is addressed by other research tools.
A1.3.2 Coherence
A1.3.2.1 EQ6: To what extent were the ECHO funded actions (particularly
considering the challenges posed by restricted humanitarian access in
conflict-related crises) consistent with the four humanitarian
principles in their design and implementation?
Overall ECHO is seen as a strong advocate of humanitarian principles. The fact that
ECHO is an independent humanitarian donor and a separate unit from the EU
delegation with separate funding mechanisms and envelopes from the European
Commission’s development funds gives ECHO the freedom to have a strong stand on
humanitarian principles. It is fully recognised and appreciated by the stakeholders
consulted in the field. At the same time, ECHO plays a strong advocacy role on the
need to support resilience activities and longer-term development-type actions, and
encourages EUDEL and DEVCO to support nexus areas.
ECHO has gravitas in Myanmar as a ‘senior humanitarian’, with a very proactive
approach to coordination and united messaging and advocacy through formal and
informal coordination and communication platforms such as Humanitarian Country
Team (HCT) and clusters, supporting INGO Forum and Humanitarian Breakfasts, and
the DRR working group.
When talking about localisation, ECHO partners and local NGOs were of a common
opinion that ‘neutrality’ is a principle not easy to adhere to. Partners also
acknowledged working on identifying mitigating measures to put in place before
implementing activities through local organisations.
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An issue regarding needs or vulnerability based approach was identified (providing
assistance to one group but not the host community created increased antagonism).
Several ECHO partners consulted were of an opinion that the adherence to principles
needs to be weighed against the benefit of saving lives. For example, MCCR (Myanmar
Consortium for Community Resilience) implemented DRR activities in Sittwe.
Government had requested to implement these activities to the same number of
people from Muslim and Buddhist communities, for the same amount of budget.
Although this was not clearly based on the needs but rather vulnerabilities
assessment, this approach helped to increase the participation rates and improve the
dialogue between the communities.
Similarly, also local NGOs highlighted the added value of response being locally driven,
acceptable to local culture over the importance of adhering to the ‘neutrality’ principle.
ECHO is also strongly promoting participative and consultative approaches to ensure
the voice of various vulnerable groups is heard. Partners consulted highlighted the
change in the way partners consider inclusive approaches since the requirement to
use Gender-Age and resilience markers in Single Form.
A1.3.2.2 EQ7: To what extent are ECHO humanitarian aid actions coherent
and complementary, and avoiding overlaps with those of the Member
States?
In Myanmar, the coordination actors vary a lot all over the country. Coordination
actors depend on the footprint in each sector and geographical area. MIMU has
published an overview of Coordination Teams in country60 for humanitarian and
development actors. Myanmar provides a rather silo-approach and this is visible in the
coordination challenges for humanitarian actors. Actors consulted acknowledged ECHO
being a strong advocate for functioning of HCT and INGOs coordination (funding INGO
forum).
Myanmar has a very limited presence of EU Member States. Their humanitarian aid
budget is mostly implemented through bilateral/ multi-donor agreements. Out of all
Member States, it is only the United Kingdom (DFID) that has dedicated humanitarian
staff in Myanmar. As already mentioned above, ECHO has a well-developed
coordination mechanisms with the key humanitarian donors and the UN system,
therefore avoiding the overlaps of humanitarian aid actions.
Although outside the evaluation scope (2012-2016), in 2017, the United Kingdom has
started to implement the Humanitarian Assistance and Resilience Programme (HARP)
facility in Myanmar. It has envisaged to provide GBP 108.5 million from 2017-2022 for
both protracted conflict-related crises and natural disasters. It is an attempt to adopt
a resilience approach and better address nexus-type issues.
A1.3.2.3 NEW EQ1: To what extent were ECHO’s actions coherent and
complementary, and avoiding overlaps, with actions implemented by
other international partners?
A lot of effort is made to have formal and informal information exchange, coordination
of messages and overview. Despite developed Humanitarian Response Plan for
Myanmar and a rather good coordination with INGOs, stakeholders consulted still
experienced coordination issues with the UN and development actors, disjointed
process and a lack of unified strategy. According to some framework partners, the
coordination has improved in a very recent past.
60
Available at: http://themimu.info/sites/themimu.info/files/documents/Overview_of_Coordination_Teams_in_Myanmar_Sep2017_MIMUIG001v03.pdf
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There is however very little transparency on non-Western and non-UN international
partners in Myanmar. Key humanitarian donor countries in Myanmar are Australia, UK,
USA, Canada, Japan and Switzerland. The ‘great four’ – ECHO, Australia, UK and USA
was seen by partners as well coordinated. Other humanitarian actors, China, Thailand,
Malaysia are less visible in the ‘coordinated humanitarian’ group. The interaction with
these however is less frequent due to different priorities and ways of working.
However, ECHO did express the acknowledgement for the need to improve this
relationship.
In relation to natural disaster management, ECHO has linked its activities to the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) level framework.61 This is a legally
binding set of agreements. ECHO had input into this framework, in particular with the
idea that it is not possible to look at recovery from emergencies in an isolated fashion
but it is essential to address the big capacity gap on ‘preparedness’. ECHO with
funding DRR activities has been able to do it in a coherent approach.
A positive example is a recently developed DRR coordination group for framework
partners receiving ECHO funding for this sector. With the recent HIP, ECHO has
increased the number of partners receiving DRR funding, from one (Action Aid) to
three. These partners saw a need for a well-coordinated approach, hence they have
come together to have open discussions. This is not ECHO imposed instrument
though, but works on their own initiative in parallel to the formal Disaster Risk
Reduction Working Group (DRR WG) which was formed in 2008.
A1.3.2.4 EQ8: To what extent were ECHO’s humanitarian actions
internally coherent and complementary, and avoiding overlaps,
including with the UCPM and EU Aid volunteers?
There is very limited knowledge of the UCPM in the country. During the activation
in 2015 floods, Myanmar received in-kind assistance only and not expertise. The
added value of this assistance was seen to be fairly limited.
Stakeholders with an opinion on civil protection, thought that the UCPM could do more
and better in preparedness strengthening by doing missions beforehand in
countries highly exposed to natural emergencies, such as Myanmar.
It was also suggested to pay closer attention to the adherence to humanitarian
principles, when civil protection actors are deployed in a humanitarian context. The
concern was raised as civil protection actors are working with and for the government
but also because the working culture differs a lot between humanitarian and civil
protection actors. This concern was also raised during the interim evaluation of the
UCPM.
A1.3.2.5 EQ9: To what extent were ECHO’s actions coherent and
complementary, and avoiding overlaps, with the EU’s other external
financing instruments?
1.1.1.1 Coherence with EU DEL/ DEVCO
The context in Myanmar is very complex. The situation amongst states differs
significantly. All stakeholders fully agree that due to the context of the government
and military relationship and the hostile environment for international community
there is a need for a unified approach from the EU and the international community.
61
In 2015, ASEAN vision 2025 on Disaster Management was developed. The strategic policy document outlines Institutionalisation and Communications, Finance and Resource Mobilisation, and Partnerships and
Innovations as the three elements to guide the implementation of AADMER (ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response) to 2025.
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However, partners consulted were concerned that there is no strong overview of
projects funded by ECHO, DEVCO and Peace Programme. In general, development and
peace donor coordination mechanisms (not only EU) seem to be far less developed
than humanitarian – this imbalance potentially poses a challenge for overall coherence
of EU actions in Myanmar, and effectiveness of decisions made. Lack of data is only
one of examples where the shortcomings can be identified. For example, whilst MIMU
provides an overview of humanitarian aid actions funded in the country, for
development and peace actors such information is lacking.
Changes in the lack of data were identified. With Myanmar being the pilot country for
nexus, ECHO and DEVCO is carrying out an exercise to map their funded activities in
order to identify areas for better cooperation.
Though focused on the need for the nexus, some challenges remain, conceptually and
in relation to adaptability of EUDEL and DEVCO financing mechanisms to making a
nexus approach robust. Myanmar, as a pilot project for nexus, will provide a strong
environment to delve into the opportunities and obstacles, but the highly politicised
environment will be a challenge.
There was substantial discussion on how best to generate and use a ‘vulnerabilities-
resilience’ analysis, or an in-country situational analysis in order to span across the
humanitarian, peace and development sectors; and how to increase coherence,
relevance, effectiveness and efficiency in resource allocations across instruments.
The cooperation and relationship between ECHO and EU DEL has improved
significantly largely thanks to the willingness of all parties and facilitated by the move
within the same building. The relationship was formalised in 2016 and resulted in
regular strategic meetings, joint missions, exchange of information and a beginning of
joint programming. The positive results of this relationship have been noticed also by
partners.
The three parts of the EU here – ECHO, development and peace – are starting to work
in a more coordinated way, although there is still a long way to go to achieve LLRD.
However good examples are identified:
The continuation of a 2014 Children of Peace project with DEVCO funding and
on-going discussions regarding the possibility to support the continuation of few
interventions;
Support to the liaison between Foreign Policy Instrument (FPI) team and IOM
as well as the development of the proposal which lead to Instrument
contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) funding of counter trafficking
activities in Northern Rakhine State;
Significant input on the EU DEL's phase in II program of a nutrition/livelihood
program for Northern Rakhine State in relation with the ECHO funded ACF
emergency nutrition intervention;
Active contribution to DEVCO's consultancies and Mid-Term Review with a view
to develop a coherent joint humanitarian-development framework to further
operationalize LRRD and to better position ECHO within the EU Joint
Programming process;
Support to the selection of interventions in relation with ECHO funding (Kachin
DPP includes a livelihood support component for IDPs) and development of
synergies with Emergency Response Mechanism (ERM); and
Joint Context Analysis in Central Rakhine, to be used to develop a joint
development-peace-humanitarian strategy (i.e. a nexus approach).
Local NGOs also highlighted the importance for coordinated approaches in particular in
urban contexts. Local NGOs would welcome some kind of a platform where all of the
activities are well integrated from the very beginning. Important when it comes to a
city planning to have a well thought through strategy. Currently for them it appears
that there is a funding from different donors for different interests.
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Areas identified in which EU instruments could take over from ECHO included:
ACF nutrition actions in Northern Rakhine (ECHO has provided funding for past
15 years);
Protracted displacement in Kachin and Rakhine States – provides room for
development interventions;
On-going ADRA education intervention funded under the Education in
Emergencies;
Mine risk education and child protection activities (implemented by UNICEF) are
equally long-term endeavours; and
Urban earthquake preparedness, where ECHO is the lead donor.
1.1.1.2 Coherence with other EU external instruments
Some linkages with other EU external instruments was identified:
Climate Change: good coherence of approach here: joint lessons learned and
advocacy alliance integrated into government climate change policy (using
vulnerability index system) as well as agreed set of actions/strategies including
at township level (AA).
Myanmar Climate Change Alliance (MCCA)62 has received EU support
through UN HABITAT and UNEP. Creating MCCA has helped to develop a
strategy, bring all climate change elements together and work towards the
implementation of the Paris Agreement.
A1.3.3 EU added value
A1.3.3.1 EQ10: What was the added values of DG ECHO’s HA
interventions? How could ECHO maximise its EU Added Value? What
would happen if DG ECHO would stop its HA interventions?
Field presence was highlighted as the main added value by all of the
stakeholder consulted. The field presence resulted in:
- Very good understanding of the context that allows to make better decisions
on the funding allocation and willingness to take calculated risks;
- Continuous focus on building trust and ‘real time’ mentoring results in
robust partnerships;
- Strong real time mentoring and informal approach to communication;
- Flexibility and adaptability due to strong partnerships, developed trust and
contextual understanding. As mentioned by one partner: “..there is no need
to ‘please the donor’ but we can have an open dialogue and focus towards
the benefit of those in need”;
- Important to highlight that while development of relationship is very much
based on the personality of ECHO staff, partners acknowledged that the
partnership and flexibility is also possible due to the structures ECHO has
put in place; and
- Use of ECHO knowledge: EU DEL highlighted the importance of being able to
consult with ECHO experts who have strong contextual knowledge when
developing follow-up programmes (e.g., concrete examples included
development of education and nutrition programmes).
Focus on needs and forgotten crisis:
- Focus on needs and forgotten crises such as Myanmar is a key added value
and comparative advantage of ECHO that should be kept;
62
MCCA website: http://myanmarccalliance.org/en/about-mcca/
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- At the same time – ECHO HQ is reorienting towards closer-to-home regions,
and crucial commitment to (i.a.) Myanmar is diminishing though needs are
increasing;
- In all of these areas ECHO has unique capabilities, with a clear added-value
and a strong comparative advantage to Member States;
- According to partners consulted, ECHO is the only donor funding
preparedness activities in Myanmar and perhaps more importantly – is
providing a strong continuity factor and programmatic approach that tries to
ensure crucial gaps are addressed – by ECHO or as a result of ECHO
advocacy; and
- Partners emphasized the need for a ‘humanitarian needs overview’ for the
whole of Myanmar now, essential for relevance and coherence but also for
mitigation and prevention. Partners look to ECHO to champion this.
Advocating for humanitarian principles:
- Other donors and partners acknowledge ECHO’s commitment to
International Humanitarian Law, humanitarian principles and needs-based
decision making;
- This stands in contrast with other donors, who often have more biased and
politicized decision making as a result of being development actors; and
- At the same time, ECHO takes a pragmatic approach, as mentioned, to
providing assistance to surrounding communities, to mitigate tensions.
Ability to advocate for sectors/ gaps:
- ECHO is seen as one of the few donors with clear understanding of
protection needs and hence providing funding but also advocating for
funding in this sector. Development of sector guidelines was seen as a
significant turning point;
- Use of gender and age markers in reporting has been important to make
partners think more about these topics and in a more systematic way;
- Ability to advocate and coordinate other donors in addressing certain areas
where ECHO lacks funding; and
- ECHO is pushing for topics that are not priorities to other donors. For
example, in DRR project ECHO funds the Safe Hospital project which works
on hospital preparedness in case of natural emergency. The push for this
comes following ECHO advocating for the concept – ‘no one left behind’.
Support to strategic things that are important for the long term, like MIMU,
INGO forum. Although very little funding from ECHO, for these initiatives, this
support makes a huge difference (MIMU, INGO) with long lasting positive effect.
ECHO is an independent donor. Sometimes it is taken for granted, but
partners should be able to question ECHO, to keep it accountable and relevant.
It is important that ECHO and partners continue to have the partnership to
remain mutually relevant.
A1.3.4 Effectiveness
A1.3.4.1 EQ11: To what extent has ECHO achieved its objectives?
The objective of this section is not to make an overall assessment of whether or not
ECHO achieved its specific objectives in Myanmar as this is out of the scope of this
field report. This being said the framework partners consulted seemed to ensure a
high level of effectiveness and were all on track to meet the objectives of actions
implemented. However, it is important to take into account the complex political
environment and access issues when assessing effectiveness.
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When assessing effectiveness, framework partners highlighted the importance of:
Baseline data; and
Monitoring.
ECHO has been one of the key donors in providing strategic support to ensuring
baseline data and information is gathered and analysed (e.g., support to MIMU)
therefore contributing to the effectiveness of actions because these are based on
(more complete) data sets and base-analyses that are evidence based.
Monitoring has contributed to the effectiveness to the actions implemented. This was
highlighted by Solidarités where for one of their recent WASH activities, the first
monitoring visit identified significant shortcomings, but thanks to the advice received
during the visit they were able to address the issues and increase the effectiveness
significantly.
Good evidence of Myanmar ability to quickly embrace new technologies for emergency
response and data gathering were identified. Framework partners are using WhatsApp
to carry out remote field monitoring activities by sharing regular pictures, video calls
and messages. Also national NGOs use this modality a lot to map natural disasters and
have real time monitoring.
Other donors also highlighted the importance of monitoring and evaluating activities.
In fact, the fact that ECHO is conducting this Comprehensive Humanitarian Aid
evaluation of its activities was seen as a way to improve effectiveness of activities
funded.
Framework partners provided some concrete examples demonstrating effectiveness.
Those are provided in two boxes below.
Box A4 Preparedness of hospitals for mass casualties included in Myanmar Action
Plan
ECHO funded MCCR has worked with the government and has recently
developed the Myanmar Action Plan (MAP) for DRR. For the first time in the
history of the country this includes points on preparedness of hospitals and
health facilities for mass causalities.
The previous MAP included only epidemics which is relevant after disaster has
struck the country, but there was no inclusion of preparedness for when the
disaster occurs. This is seen a significant achievement by partners consulted.
Box A5 Changes in curricula on DRM
The Safe School Initiative have brought together partners and government
service providers to develop School Disaster Risks Management Guidelines63. As
learned through the interview with local partners, this is a significant
achievement. Previously curricula covered only the type of disasters but not
DRM. The curricula is specific for each region based on the type of natural
hazards the area is exposed to.
63
School Disaster Risks Management Guidelines. Available at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full SDRM Guidelines.pdf 27 May 2016.pdf
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A1.3.4.2 EQ12: To what extent do ECHO sectoral policies contribute to the
effectiveness of ECHO’s operations?
Stakeholders consulted had various reactions to the effectiveness of the sectoral
policies. Development of sectoral policies was seen as an effective tool for advocacy.
Framework partners were of an opinion that by having a dedicated policy for a sector,
it gives a better understanding of what ECHO is willing to fund and also raises
attention of other donors to a certain sector. Development of protection guidelines was
seen as particularly effective in achieving this.
Despite advocacy purposes, there was a limited awareness on ECHO developed
guidelines and documents. Stakeholders consulted agreed that there is an overlap
with SPHERE and UN standards, therefore ECHO documents are rarely used at the
country level. However, the opinion was slightly different when asking about sectors
on which partners were not experts. For example, Solidarités International as a WASH
partner were not using ECHO’s WASH Guidelines however they were consulting
Protection Guidelines when implementing activities concerning this sector.
There is clear evidence that programmes supported by ECHO integrate conflict
sensitivity, resilience, sustainability (exit strategies/hand-overs where qualitatively
feasible), gender-age dimensions, pragmatic approaches to localisation and
overheads.
Some partners were also of an opinion that sectoral policies are effective for training
ECHO technical experts before they are deployed to the field. This information
however was not triangulated with the opinion of technical experts.
ECHO partners and ECHO staff however were positive that trainings accompanying
ECHO sectoral policies is an effective way to increase the knowledge in the field. These
were valued more than the documents themselves.
A1.3.4.3 EQ13: With reference to ECHO’s visibility manual, to what extent
do ECHO activities achieve proper visibility through funded actions?
Overall ECHO is seen as a flexible donor for visibility criteria:
In natural disaster context the visibility criteria are easier to meet; while
In man-made disaster areas, visibility requirements are met only partially due
to sensitivity issues.
Good visibility was observed in Myanmar, with nice examples of using visibility to
spread knowledge products and access to knowledge at all levels – community, donor,
partner and government. Examples include:
Developed CD for DRR projects that is disseminated to different stakeholders;
and
MIMU annual planner, with a clear reference to ECHO, is widely distributed.
There are actions that go beyond minimum visibility requirements, developing videos
and materials for further distribution. However, there was an impression that it varies
depending on the partner and the type of sectors covered. Emergency response
activities were adhering to the very minimum visibility requirements also because of
the sensitivity of being visible in the field where international actors are not very
welcomed, while DRR projects elaborated on the visibility approaches. One of the
partners consulted elaborated a lot on the use of their Facebook page, the monitoring
of hits and the type of information used there while others barely commented on the
use of logos.
Emergency response partners in particular highlighted the lack of capacity to develop
a communication strategy fit for purpose and also the lack of understanding of what
the strategy should look like. They also expressed a need for more support, which
could result in having a good example or a template on this.
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The region however has the communication expert placed in Bangkok. There seems to
be a discrepancy between partners being aware of the possibility to benefit from this
resource. Some partners fully relied and utilised this capacity, while others seemed to
be confused and not reflecting any of this information.
Examples where visibility is hugely cost efficient were identified. The most cost
efficient action observed was the funding of MIMU. It receives only EUR 200 thousand
per year but with the variety of maps produced and made available to all stakeholders
in the country – government, donors, partners, local NGOs – ECHO’s logo is well
visible all over the country. When consulted with local NGOs, they were well aware of
who is funding these frequently used tools.
Some partners also reflected on the discussion regarding cash and mobile transfers
and how to implement these activities where the visibility is rather limited. However
there have not been any conclusions on this yet, but a fair amount of caution about
ensuring a ‘do no harm’ approach, and therefore carrying out in-depth analysis of
consequences and mitigating possible unintended effects.
A1.3.5 Efficiency
A1.3.5.1 EQ14: To what extent did ECHO achieve cost-effectiveness in its
response?
ECHO clearly has a strategic investment approach to its financing choices. Small
funding envelopes are used as seed funding or to boost the attention to certain topics.
Concrete examples where this has worked were observed:
Success of funding provided to MIMU for collection and analysis of data for
emergency preparedness and emergency response. This information was also
seen useful for development of political actors within the EU DEL;
Mine Risk Education Toolkit funded, although still not taken over by
development actors, filled in important gap. The toolkit has also been able to
support Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee (JMC) who is expected to become
a national centre for these activities. Currently these activities are not well
coordinated by the government; and
ECHO has funded earthquake preparedness actions (e.g., Yangon Earthquake
Preparedness Forum64). Following these activities, rapid visual assessment and
increased attention to earthquake and natural disaster risks, the World Bank
has provided a significant loan to prevent flooding in Yangon starting from
2017. According to partners working on these activities, this is something that
would have not happened in the absence of ECHO seed funding.
ECHO is flexible in accepting variation of cost-efficiency when different approaches
were proposed based on the context. Several partners consulted from activities
implemented in different sectors acknowledged that the flexibility is observed in:
Variations of staff cost based on circumstances;
- For example, there is a need to have more international staff when
implementing protection activities, there might also be a staff variation
when implementing in a context with a strong local NGO presence vs areas
where this is absent.
Variation of staff costs when piloting new approaches.
- For example, Action Aid developed a twinning approach for activities
implemented to two communities in Rakhine in order to improve the
64
Yangon Earthquake Preparedness Forum, available at: http://www.latmat.com.mm/earthquake-forum-yangon
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acceptance. This required increased number of staff to run the activities, but
benefitted the people in need;
- Innovation seemed to be encouraged by creating safe space for risk taking
(essential element of successful approaches to innovation) but limited by
the decreasing funding envelope and increasing basic humanitarian needs.
Efficiency concerns were raised concerning the time spent on proposal and report
writing. In a context where human resources are scarce, the heavy reporting format
places significant strain on the capacity of partners but also ECHO staff.
Big partners, who have more donors and therefore reporting requirements, have fully
dedicated staff who are working only on reporting – sometimes several staff. For
example, DRC said they have 14 donor reports to write only in October, these are
linked to 28 open grants. The intense reporting requirements limit the actual delivery
on the ground as well as the internal learning and management. Issue was recognised
not only by partners but also by ECHO. Having longer funding cycles was seen as a
solution for reduced resources needed for proposal writing and reporting. Working on
a one year contract has limited efficiency.
All stakeholders consulted were in strong favour of simplified reporting forms.
However, despite Myanmar being selected as the pilot country for this, none of the
stakeholders had heard how this is going to be implemented, and seemed sceptical.
This was also a concern for partners as in order to create a simplified form, partners
saw it as highly important to be consulted in order to develop something that works
for those required to report.
Partners consulted also raised a concern in relation to the indicators used for
reporting. Several partners did not see them fit for context but as rather general.
Although they are given a space to provide a narrative in the Single Form, they were
of the opinion that this is not the most efficient way for reporting. The form was also
not seen to be fit for purpose in situations where the partner is implementing different
types of activities, like coordination (e.g., INGO forum), working with the government
to develop policies or data analysis (e.g., MIMU). All of these activities were asked to
be reported against the same strict template.
In general, the internal instruments (Office Management Tool, HOPE) were seen to be
too complex, requiring a lot of overhead to work on these elements.
When consulting local NGOs, they also acknowledged the limitations of heavy
reporting requirements on their capacity to be able to receive ECHO funding. At the
same time, all NGOs consulted were in favour of accountability and transparency
requirements. For example, the Myanmar Red Cross – worried about its ability to
comply with all the different donor reporting requirements – while emphasising that
the financial reporting requirements helped ensure transparency and accountability -
so that “absorption capacity” issues were linked not to financial absorption constraints
– but to reporting constraints not linked to finances.
Although there is an acknowledgment that working with local staff and NGOs can have
effects on cost-efficiency, there are also concerns raised on the sustainability of the
approach. Rising Demand and Distortion of wages with influx of international actors
(World Bank, donors and private sector) reduces the availability of qualified local staff
in partner agencies – dearth of qualified colleagues may require increased budget for
hiring internationals.
Comprehensive evaluation of the European Union humanitarian aid 2012-2016
95
A1.3.5.2 EQ 15: How successful has ECHO been in coordinating its
operations with other main humanitarian actors, and with its civil
protection actions, e.g. by promoting synergies and avoiding
duplications, gaps and resource conflicts?
This question is already answered by evaluation question 7 and new evaluation
question 1 above (Section on coherence A1.3.2).
ECHO was seen to be efficient due to strong coordination mechanisms (formal and
informal) and the field presence that allows to identify needs and be the advocate for
these to other donors.
A1.3.6 Sustainability/connectedness
A1.3.6.1 EQ16: To what extent have the ECHO-funded actions been
successful in linking relief, rehabilitation and development,
considering both the continuum and contiguum aspects?
As already described under evaluation question 9 (coherence), there are opportunities
to link relief, rehabilitation and development in Myanmar. This is recognised by all the
framework partners and by ECHO, DEVCO and the EU Delegation However, certain
limitations were observed.
DEVCO and ECHO significant workload and the multi-donor and Budget Support
options have not allowed reaching the expected level regarding LRRD, DRR and
Resilience. The EU organisational set up between development, peace and
humanitarian aid funding was not seen fit for implementation of nexus approach.
There appears to be a lack of flexibility of DEVCO instruments to implement activities
that are not fully linked to the government policies yet, therefore leaving to ECHO
activities that would be better taken up by DEVCO’s significantly larger envelope.
Examples identified were the Mine Education, education in general and nutrition in
North Rakhine. Having strong joint analysis and unified advocacy messages between
all parts of the EU present in Myanmar was seen by some partners as a way to
approach the government in a more effective way.
The lack of coordinated approaches between funding instruments was also highlighted
by local NGOs as limiting sustainability. For them the time taken from humanitarian
aid till development coming in was seen as way too long. For them it was seen as
important to focus more quickly on livelihoods generation so as not to undermine
human integrity and human dignity – not enough is done to focus on this and this is
partly due to the fact that at the HCT there are no development actors participating.
And the donor coordination mechanisms and information of development and peace
donor activities and focus areas in the country seem far less developed than for
humanitarian actors.
ECHO project time frames were seen to be restricting the scope for sustainability.
ECHO Myanmar has worked around this being able to fund activities for consequent
years. This has resulted in strong evidence that in a continuous focus on resilience
(MCCR) and eventual prospects of sustainability (MIMU) by providing continuity of
effort with year-on-year funding, and an insistence on important foundations for
sustainability (capacity transfer, localisation, gender-age).
Multiyear funding was seen important in a country with a long term assistance as this
would increase the predictability and allow to work in a more strategic way also in
relation to local staff. Having activities funded for a short period was seen as a
limitation for working with locals. It takes a lot of mentoring and coaching to take
nationals through the process of reporting. However, partners also acknowledged that
multiyear funding should be flexible enough to not hinder the immediate response
capacity.
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Local NGOs consulted have built up their capacity in close collaboration with INGOs.
The time for them to get to the point where they are ready to take up international
funding has taken from three to ten years. However, local NGOs were still hesitant to
take the funding directly due to the significant reporting and accountability
requirements. They referred to the lack of capacity. Therefore, they prefer to continue
to operate through INGOs where the responsibility is shared.
Another constraint partners had in the field is the lack of ownership of beneficiaries in
implementing an activity. Good examples on how to address this were identified.
Partners reported the importance of beneficiaries to perceive the activities as their
own and not something imposed by international community. In Sittwe, incidents of
destruction of latrines was observed. Following a consultation with Camp Management
Committee (CMC) the partner was able to understand the reasons (anger, lack of
ownership and lack of livelihood activities) for such behaviour and address these. One
measure was to sign a ‘theft and damage agreement’ with CMC which made them feel
responsible for the infrastructure and therefore increased the ownership.
Working with locals showed clear importance for sustainability of actions in the
situations where the access for international staff is restricted. Following the events in
August 2017, international staff was not permitted to go to the camps. However, due
to strategy where partners had worked with hired national staff in camps, some
activities were less affected by this restriction. For example, Solidarités International
revealed that thanks to the long relationship, supervision and mentoring over the past
three years, they were confident that in their absence, basic life-saving activities (e.g.,
water testing and treatment, distribution, dislodging of latrines) are going on. National
staff were sending WhatsApp pictures and reporting for confirmation. The only
limitation was the possibility of purchasing material, such a chlorine.
A1.3.7 Key additional insights for rapid evaluations
This section provides a summary of the key insights feeding into the rapid evaluations
as captured during the field mission to Myanmar. The write up is more concise than in
the previous sections. The writer of the rapid evaluation will have to combine these
insights with the more detailed minutes of the different interviews.
A1.3.7.1 Advocacy
In Myanmar, all actors face two main obstacles – lack of access and the need for the
government to improve efforts to provide basic services to communities. Due to the
coordination mechanisms and shared analysis, all actors are working together to
jointly advocate on these issues. ECHO and DEVCO also work together, regularly
engaging in advocacy through the government officials, sharing main findings and
conclusions, organising joint missions to develop a common approach.
The main achievements of advocacy can be summarised as follows:
ECHO advocacy results in better-informed coordination among donors, laser-
sharp focus on needs;
Advocacy in relation to its mediating role (e.g. between UN and NGOs, or with
the national government), as well as an enabling role (strategic support INGO
Forum); and
At the policy level, ECHO has been a leader when it comes to gender in
emergencies and protection, via the introduction of the Gender-Age Marker, but
also on Disaster Risk Reduction (with DIPECHO), and on resilience.
The Safe School Initiative show the results of advocacy work – developed School
Disaster Risks Management Guidelines (see Section A1.3.4.1).
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A1.3.7.2 Protection
Since ECHO developed protection guidelines, the attention to the importance of
protection has increased. The guidelines have also helped partners to understand the
funding focus of ECHO and a possibility to approach ECHO on these issues. Guidelines
have also been an instrumental advocacy tool to other donors to raise attention to the
issue and advocate for including protection in programming.
Geographic inclusion of host or neighbour communities has been a more recent
emphasis by ECHO – for which ECHO advocates – to mitigate for perceived
‘distributional injustice’ from communities close to, or hosting, IDPs. This is a vital
element of a long-term strategy for protection and a ‘do no harm’ approach.
A1.3.7.3 WASH
The following points were raised in relation to WASH sector by WASH actors
consulted:
In comparison to other donors, ECHO is a very technical donor, with strong
sectoral knowledge;
Lack of reliable data to assess the effectiveness: In Myanmar data are very
political and therefore very limited/ restricted. The lack of data on health level
limits the ability to fully assess the effectiveness of WASH activities
implemented;
Issues on what do people use the assistance for: Difficult in the context of
camps, people have very little possibility for livelihood activities. Will use
assistance aid not for initial objectives but will stock and safeguard medicines in
order to be able to sell medicine for example to get money in time of great
need... Therefore disturbing or disrupting the data on health and water quality.
Similarly people are in such dire situations that they will not use hygiene kits
received but will store them for the possibility to sell or exchange so in some
instances, kits are not distributed – just specific elements of these;
Concern of cash and localisation: There is strong support to cash and
localisation as complementary but not stand alone element. These two
approaches can be very cost effective, but they have to be one tool of the
whole humanitarian system and should not be implemented in silo.
- In WASH framework partners consulted do use cash in emergencies. They
carry out multisector assessment that is based on situation, the capacity,
number of people, level of education, market, and security situation and
then adapt the response accordingly. Most of the time, cash on its own is
not sufficient to respond to needs. If beneficiaries have no capacity to install
water treatment systems, then providing cash will not be a relevant
response. Therefore, important to see the entire system and develop a
complimentary approach. Concerns were raised also about protection issues
in relation to use of cash.
A1.3.8 Prospective evaluation
Emergence of ‘new’ players:
- There is a need to lead, engage, share the information/ lessons learned, not
to reinvent the wheel.
- Consideration of humanitarian principles
◦ China for example, is seen excellent for developing infrastructure, but is
not involved in humanitarian debate, not neutral donor for humanitarian
assistance, though China is providing humanitarian assistance, and
apparently will increase its presence in this arena (though this was not
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98
triangulated). According to the stakeholders consulted involving China in
any humanitarian discussions has been a challenge.
- Western community should take the lead to identify ways how to work with
the rest of the international community (ASEAN; trade partners), that
perhaps has significant voice in the Myanmar context.
◦ Biggest trading partners are China, Thailand, India, Singapore, Japan
and Malaysia. What is the volume of assistance from these players in
relation to the volume of assistance from other DAC members and the
UN? What partnering is possible?
Private sector partnership:
- DRM network with the UN OCHA together could be an entry point. Relief
plus preparedness is in the interest for private sector and could be linked
with the government assistance;
- Part of work plan, ECHO is co-funding this initiative;
- EUROCHAM is also part of developing partnership with private sector.
Simplified reporting:
- There is a commitment by Germany to pilot simplified reporting, but it
seems no one in the field has heard of the approach or concrete elements;
- Would be highly important to increase efficiency and time spent for
delivering aid to beneficiaries;
- There has been simplification but this has not made it easier or less time
consuming. Important that no one from outside the field is inventing new
online format but that it is aligned with all donors based on a consultation
with partners. Important to harmonise generic categories among all donors.
High importance to have generic proposal and reporting templates that are
feasible from field perspective.
Localisation:
- Overall ECHO in the field has pragmatic approach – encourage where
possible but also consider risks and implement measures to mitigate these;
- Issues with competing with international salaries and retaining trained staff;
as well as ‘brain drain’ for Government of Myanmar. Hence need to re-think
emphasis and budget for hiring international staff.
- Important that by increasing the requirements and capacity for local NGOs,
there organisations are not turned into mini INGOs, therefore losing their
added value and specific capacity that they can offer.
Nexus:
- The push for nexus needs to come from HQ with adapted structures to allow
to implement this. For example, issue identified was that the EU
organisational set up between development, peace and humanitarian aid
funding was not seen fit for implementation of nexus approach (see
A1.3.6.1);
- Nexus will be piloted in Myanmar, concrete actions are being defined –
roadmap, mapping of activities where ECHO and EU are active to see how
this can be further developed, taken forward;
- As confirmed by EU DEL, there will not be specific dedicated funding to the
nexus. This is creating concerns from partner side – the current funding
from EU DEL is very complex to apply for, therefore limiting access to it. If
willing to work in practice then need to see how to make the system less
heavy;
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99
- It is also not sure how and if the cumbersome reporting will be adapted to
the nexus and localisation elements.
Realistic Time Frames and Situational Analysis:
- Though not new, humanitarian, development and peace actors need more
realistic time frames for achieving programme impact – tight time frames
(in countries with deep development gaps and long protracted crises that
are shifting in nature) reduce effectiveness and sustainability of
interventions, as do partial analyses. Providing a situational analysis (as was
done for south Myanmar) that provides a vulnerabilities and resilience
overview and cuts across development, peace and humanitarian spheres – is
an important tool to helping to ensure that approaches and time frames are
more realistic.
Changing character and complexities of protracted crisis:
- Though the nexus approach tries to mitigate for the complexity of protracted
crises such as those present in Myanmar, additional reflections are needed
on the nature and complexity of these, and what this means for funding
envelopes and geographical emphasis;
- Whilst ‘closer to home’ emphasis for ECHO envelopes focuses on the
geographical proximity of a neighbourhood approach – forgotten crises such
as Myanmar risk resulting in protracted desperation of highly vulnerable
populations with little to lose in relation to extremism. Geographic
boundaries are shifting – the world is more virtual and more fluid than the
paper maps used in decision making.
A1.4 Stakeholders consulted
Table A1.4 Stakeholders consulted in Dar es Salam
Date Organisation Names Position
02/10/2017 ECHO field office
Nicolas LOUIS Head of Office
Win Win THEIN Program Assistant
Sai-Nandar TUN Program Assistant
02/10/2017 EU Delegation/
DEVCO Pedro CAMPO LLOPIS Deputy Head of Cooperation
02/10/2017 USAID Leslie MACCRACKEN Senior Humanitarian
Assistance Advisor
03/10/2017 ICRC Mark SILVERMAN
Deputy Head of
Delegation/Deputy Resident
Representative
03/10/2017 DFID/HARP Ashley SARANGI Humanitarian Advisor
03/10/2017 TROCAIRE Birke HERZBRUCH Country Director
03/10/2017 UNDP Lat Lat AYE
Team Leader
(Environmental Governance
and Disaster Resilience)
03/10/2017 Solidarités Marie-Alice TORRÉ Country Director
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100
Date Organisation Names Position
International
04/10/2017 UNHCR Cecile FRADOT
Assistant Representative
(Protection)
Gwenolenn LE COUSTER Senior Programme Officer
04/10/2017 KMSS Win Tun KYI National Director
04/10/2017 DEVCO
Manuel DE RIVERA LAMO
DE ESPINOSA
Programme Manager –
Peace support
Lorenzo PASCOTTO Programme Officer
04/10/2017 UN OCHA
Chris HYSLOP Deputy Head of Office
Narciso ROSA-BERLINGA Head of humanitarian
financing unit
05/10/2017 UNDP Peter BATCHELOR Country Director
05/10/2017
Myanmar
Engineering
Society
Saw HTWE ZAW Managing Director
05/10/2017 DRC Stephen WILLIAMS Country Director
05/10/2017 UNICEF Lindsay SHEARER
Child Protection
Specialist/National
Coordinator
06/10/2017 Action Aid Lafir S.S MOHAMED Consortium Manager -
MCCR
09/10/2017 Save the
Children Shane BRADY
Head of Program
(humanitarian)
09/10/2017 MIMU Shon CAMPBELL Manager
10/10/2017 World Food
Programme Frederic VERJUS Head of Sub-office, Sittwe
10/10/2017 Myanmar Red
Cross Society San San MAW Director
10/10/2017 INGO forum Irene FRASER INGO Forum Director
11/10/2017 Solidarités
International Laure LARROQUETTE
Programme Manager in
Sittwe
ANNEX 6.4: Field report – Mauritania
A1.1 Introduction
This document describes the fieldwork undertaken in Mauritania by Melanie Dubuis,
ICF consultant and Kashka Huyton, independent expert, as part of the Comprehensive
evaluation of the European Commission’s humanitarian aid, 2012-2016 and presents
the evidence collected from the field. As stipulated in the terms of reference for this
consultation, “the Field Report is not an evaluation as such, and should not include
overall conclusions and recommendations, neither a collection of project evaluations.
It is a working document to report on the fieldwork and identify any particular issues
to be tackled during the synthesis phase (e.g. remedial actions related to the
methodological approach, etc.).”
A1.1.1 Overview of the fieldwork undertaken
Table A1.1 provides a snapshot of the sites visited and the consultations conducted
during the mission. Annex 1 provides a list of stakeholders consulted.
Table A1.1 Fieldwork sites and consultations conducted
Field sites Dates Stakeholder consulted
Nouakchott 04, 05, 08, 09,
14 and 15
September
2017
DG ECHO framework partners: UNCHR, UNICEF,
WFP, OXFAM, CRF, ACF
DG ECHO Implementing partner: ACORD
EU delegation
UN Resident Coordinator/ UNDP Resident
Representative
UN Coordination Officer
Agence Française du Développement (AFD)
Government institution (Comité Santé
Alimentaire)
Hodh Ech Chargui
region
06-08
September
2017
DG ECHO framework partners: WFP, ACF,
UNHCR
Local implementing partners: Intersos, ADICOR
Local staff
Local authorities
Local associations
Refugee chief
Community chief
Beneficiaries
Gorgol region 10-13
September
2017
DG ECHO field officer
DG ECHO framework partners: CRF, Oxfam
Local implementing partners: Croissant Rouge
Mauritanien (CRM), AMAD
Field sites Dates Stakeholder consulted
Local staff
Local authorities
Local associations
Beneficiaries
Table A1.2 provides more details about the projects visited. These were selected
among the projects funded by DG ECHO in Mauritania on the basis of the following
considerations: target beneficiaries (population and refugee), sectoral focus (WASH,
food security and nutrition) and main DG ECHO partners (mixed of NGOs and UN
agencies); as well as security and access. Annex 2 provides more details about each
of these projects.
Table A1.2 Projects visited and activities observed
DG ECHO
partners
Project title Overview of fieldwork activities
WFP Protecting lives and livelihoods
of Malian refugees in Mbera
camp
Meeting with the Hakem
Meeting with WFP field staff
Meeting with the implementing partner
Intersos
Visit of Mbera camp
Visit of the nutrition centre in the camp
Two focus groups with beneficiaries
Focus group with the school
management committee, pedagogic
committee and parents
Visit of the UNHCR biometric centre
ACF Renforcer l'amélioration des
conditions de vie de la
population réfugiée malienne
en Mauritanie
Meeting with ACF field staff
Visit of Mbera camp
Visit of Mbera 2
Visit of the WASH facilities in the camps
Meeting with Mbera 2 leader
Meeting with WASH committee
Focus group with beneficiaries
Croix
Rouge
Francaise
Projet de prévention et de prise
en charge intégrée de la
malnutrition aigüe globale chez
les enfants de moins de 5 ans
et les femmes enceintes et
allaitantes dans les Moughataas
du Gorgol
Meeting with CRF et CRM field staff
Meeting with the Regional Health
Director (DRAS)
Visit of two CRENA (Centre de
Récupération Nutrionnelle Ambulatoire)
Two focus groups with beneficiaries
Visit of the Unité de Santé Nutritionnelle
(USN)
DG ECHO
partners
Project title Overview of fieldwork activities
Meeting with the Hospital Director
Oxfam Renforcer la sécurité
nutritionnelle des enfants de
moins de 5 ans et des femmes
enceintes ou allaitantes des
ménages très pauvres, en leur
facilitant l'accès à la nourriture
et protégeant leurs moyens
d'existence durant la période de
soudure 2017
Meeting with Oxfam field staff
Visit of Sabar (village)
Focus group with beneficiaries,
community committee and complaint
committee
Meeting with the governor
Meeting with the local implementing
partner AMAD
A1.1.2 Challenges encountered
The evaluation team reached out to the main donors funding intervention in
Mauritania. However, major donors to Mauritania have no presence in the country
(e.g. DfID, USAID, BPRM, Japan) and one donor (World Bank) was not available
during our mission therefore a questionnaire was sent via email asking for a written
answer or a phone interview. We have been able to arrange a phone interview with
USAID, and received written contribution from Japan and the World Bank, the others
did not respond to our request despite our reminder emails.
In addition, only few Member States are present in Mauritania (France, Spain and
Germany), the team met with the AFD in Nouakchott and received a written
contribution from the Spanish Cooperation in Mauritania but did not hear back from
Germany.
More details on the people contacted can be found Error! Reference source not
found..
Furthermore, some local authorities and local implementing partners were not
available.
It also has to be noted that most of the people consulted were relatively new to the
job / country (some arrived just a few weeks or months ago). Their perspective over
the evaluation period was limited and therefore they focused on recent events and
development.
A1.1.3 Methodology
A1.1.3.1 Context and link with the consultation strategy
Table A1.3 presents how the field work designed for this evaluation feed into the
evaluation framework by targeting key stakeholder groups. This table, associated with
the evaluation framework, served as basis for the development of the research tools,
which were used during the field mission to Mauritania. The cells highlighted in green
in the table below show which stakeholder categories were targeted by the fieldwork
completed during this evaluation. In the case of Mauritania, academics and think tank,
the private sectors and military forces were not consulted.
Table A1.3 Overview of methods that will be used to consult with the different
stakeholders group
Online
surveys
Semi-
structured
interviews
OPC
Fieldwork
interviews,
focus
groups
Roundtable
Affected communities (via
Reps)
DG ECHO staff– HQ
DG ECHO staff - Field
Other EU entities
Other donors
DG ECHO partners
Local implementing
partners
Host governments
National/ local NGOs
Academics and think
tanks
Private sector
Military forces
European Parliament
European Council
Member States
EU citizens
Global forums and
clusters
A1.1.3.2 Research tools
The main research tool used for the consultation during the field missions were semi-
structured interviews. Topic guides were developed for the following stakeholders’
groups:
DG ECHO field;
Representatives of the EU delegation;
DG ECHO framework partners;
Local implementing partners;
Other donors (including MS); and,
Local authorities and host government officials.
Additionally, several focus groups were organised to engage directly with affected
communities. The specific stakeholders interviewed during the field mission to
Mauritania were identified based on suggestions from DG ECHO field staff and DG
ECHO framework partners.
A1.1.4 Structure of the report
The remainder of this report is structured as follows:
A1.2 provides an overview of the Mauritanian context and the humanitarian aid
activities financed by DG ECHO in Mauritania;
A1.3 provides an overview of the key findings and lessons to take into account in
the comprehensive evaluation. The findings are organised by evaluation question.
It also includes a section covering the sectors and themes subject of rapid
evaluations to facilitate the analysis at later stage;
A1.4 presents a short conclusion of the field report; and
Error! Reference source not found. to Error! Reference source not found.
provide a detailed list of interviewed stakeholders;
A1.2 DG ECHO’s humanitarian aid activities in Mauritania
A1.2.1 Key contextual elements and rationale for DG ECHO’s intervention
Mauritania, or officially the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, is a country in the Maghreb
region of western Africa. It is the eleventh largest country in Africa and is bordered by
the Atlantic Ocean, Western Sahara, Algeria, Mali, and Senegal.
Mauritania is a mostly desert country, such that only 0.5% of the land is considered
arable. The country has a density of 3.9 inhabitants per square kilometre placing it the
fourth least densely populated country in the whole of Africa. Some key facts are
presented below in Table A1.4.
Table A1.4 Key facts about Mauritania
Mauritania
Population (2016 est.) 3,677,293
Surface (sq. km) 1,030,700
Density (sq. km, 2016) 4.0
Languages Arabic (official and national), Pular,
Soninke, Wolof (all national languages),
French
Religion Muslim (100%)
Political regime Presidential republic
President (since 2009) Mohamed Ould Abdel AZIZ
Prime Minister (since 2014) Yahya Ould HADEMINE
GDP per capita (2016 PPP $) 4,400
Currency Mauritanian Ouguiya (MRO)
Mauritania
Exchange rate (11/08/2017) €1 = MRO 415
Human Development Index (HDI)
ranking (out of 188)
157
Population in multidimensional
poverty, headcount (%)
55.6
Source: CIA. 2017. The World Factbook: Mauritania. [ONLINE] Available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mr.html, UNdata. 2016. Mauritania. [ONLINE] Available at: http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=mauritania and UNDP. 2016. Mauritania. [ONLINE] Available at:
http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/MRT
Mauritania experiences structural food deficits, recurrent drought and environmental
degradation, making access to food difficult for vulnerable households.
The Sahel region is characterised by a high exposition to recurrent shocks; some of
them are specific to the local context (sand storms, locust invasion, etc.). They affect
very vulnerable population with poor coping capacities (widespread high poverty,
inadequate functioning of basic services, environmental degradation, climate change,
population growth, etc.). The combination of these elements leads to a very high
susceptibility to disasters. Droughts, floods and epidemics are the most recurrent
hazards in the region.65
The food and nutrition Crisis in Sahel66, has put many agro-pastoral households at
serious risk of food insecurity and alternatives means of income are lacking. Most
vulnerable populations continue to suffer from the cumulative impact of recurrent
shocks. Low access to healthcare and sanitation only increases vulnerability to
malnutrition and disease.67
The situation is further exacerbated by the spillover of conflicts in Mali. Many Malians
have fled the country since the violent clashes in 2012 and found refuge in the South-
East part of the country (Mbera camp). New arrivals have been constant, in 2016 only,
there were 4,780 new arrivals. Mauritania counts around 51,500 Malian refugees.68
Spontaneous returns to the country of origin are few, mostly due to the prevailing
security situation and the extremely poor access to basic services in North Mali. The
influx of refugees is straining already limited local resources.69
According to INFORM, the regions’ most at risk of humanitarian crisis are Hodh ech
Chargui, Guidimaka, Gorgol, Assaba, Brakna, Trarza and Tagant.
65
ECHO. 2017. Integrated Analysis Framework. 66
Four consecutive food and nutrition crisis occurred in the Sahel region in 2005, 2008, 2010 and 2012. 67
Mauritanie : Plan d’action intégré humanitaire et développement – 2017. 68
Acaps. 2017. Mauritania. Available at: https://www.acaps.org/country/mauritania/crisis-analysis 69
Mauritanie : Plan d’action intégré humanitaire et développement – 2017.
A1.2.2 Nature of DG ECHO’s humanitarian aid activities70
Between 2012 and 2016, DG ECHO funded 207 actions in Mauritania71 representing
a total contracted amount was € 180.4 million72 including 16.6 million (9%) in cash
and voucher. During this period, the largest share was allocated in 2012 (36%). The
funding decreased significantly in 2013 (58%) and 2014 experienced further reduction
while 2015 and 2016 saw a slight increase as it can be seen on Figure A1.1.
Figure A1.1 Evolution of total contracted amount, number of projects implemented
and targeted beneficiaries (2012-2016)
Source: DG ECHO dashboard
Over 26.8 million beneficiaries were targeted cumulatively over the period
2012-201673; the Mauritanian population (61%) were mostly targeted followed by
‘Other’ (20%), and refugees (17%). IDPs were also targeted to a lesser extent and
accounted for only 1%. Only five DG ECHO funded action focused on people with
disabilities.
Over the period 2012-2016, the nutrition sector received most funding with 71%
of the total DG ECHO funding in the country, followed by Food security and livelihoods
(14%). Other sectors funded by DG ECHO in Mauritania include Support to operation
(6%), WASH (3%), Shelter and settlements (2%), Disaster Risk Reduction/ Disaster
preparedness (1%), Coordination (1%) and Protection (1%). Education in
Emergencies and Health accounted for less than 1% each.
70
The data for this section has been extracted from DG ECHO HOPE database on 17 June 2017. HOPE offers a breakdown of the project by ‘Execution country’ which allows to identify all the projects that have been implemented in Mauritania. The EVA data utilised for the main report of this evaluation, does not provide such capabilities. Due to the regional approach taken in the Sahel, data from HOPE were deemed more useful as they provide a more complete picture of DG ECHO activities in Mauritania. This should be kept in mind as some figures might differ from the ones presented in the main report. 71
As per HOPE classification: health 72
The evaluation period includes projects that were granted funding in 2013 but were implemented in 2014.
The general summary data also includes 20 projects that were funded in non-Third countries (e.g.Bosnia-Herzegovina, Ukraine, Greece and Serbia) which accounted for €23.6 million of funding. 73
Some beneficiaries were repeatedly targeted / targeted by more than one action; it is not possible to establish how many single individuals were targeted.
Figure A1.2 Evolution of contracted amount per sector (2012-2016)
Source: DG ECHO dashboard
Mauritania is part of the Sahel Strategy. The Sahel Strategy is a regional, multi-
sectoral and multi-annual strategy implemented by DG ECHO in West Africa.74
Launched in 2007, the Strategy aims to reduce – in a sustainable way - the
persistently high levels of mortality linked to malnutrition among children and
pregnant and lactating women (PLW) in the region. Initially covering five countries
(Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger), the Strategy was extended to cover
Senegal in 2012 and some regions of Nigeria and Cameroon in 2014. As part of the
Sahel strategy, DG ECHO received funding from DfID to implement projects through
its partners in Mauritania.
In terms of partners, UNICEF received the largest amount (46%) over the period
2012-16 followed by WFP (27%) as can be observed in Table A1.5. The average
contracted amount per project was €847,870.
Table A1.5 DG ECHO partners in Mauritania (2014-2017)
Partner
Contracted
Amount (€)
Contracted
Amount (%)
Number of
projects
UNICEF-US € 90,620,000 46% 40
WFP-IT € 53,580,000 27% 30
ACF-ES € 12,919,632 7% 44
OXFAM-ES (INTERMON) € 9,340,000 5% 24
CROIX-ROUGE-FR € 5,200,000 3% 12
UNHCR-CH € 4,500,000 2% 8
STC € 4,130,000 2% 13
SI-FR € 4,125,877 2% 14
MEDICUS MUNDI-ES € 3,535,000 2% 13
74
ICF. 2015. Evaluation of ECHO's intervention in the Sahel (2010 - 2014). Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/sites/echo-site/files/evaluation_sahel_strategy_annexes_en.pdf
Partner
Contracted
Amount (€)
Contracted
Amount (%)
Number of
projects
ACORD-UK € 3,210,000 2% 7
TDH-IT € 2,740,000 1% 12
MSF-BE € 700,000 0% 3
OCHA-CH € 600,000 0% 4
FAO-IT € 377,475 0% 1
WV-DE € 280,000 0% 3
Total € 195,857,984 100% 231
Source: DG ECHO dashboard
A1.2.3 Key external factors that impacted (positively and negatively) the delivery of DG ECHO’s humanitarian aid activities
The nature of the response in Mauritania is influenced by a series of external factor
including:
The geopolitical situation which remains fragile with conflict in Mali causing
continued flows of refugees; 4,010 refugees arrived in Mbera camp during the
second half of 2016;75
Climate change as well as recurrent climate-related shocks, like droughts;
Limited presence of “traditional” humanitarian donors in Mauritania;
Lack of humanitarian actors’ engagement with Arab and Chinese donors, known to
be major players and investors in Mauritania;
Irregular dialogue between humanitarian and development donors to address long
term structural problems with potential humanitarian consequences;
Growth in scale of major international crises and reduction in global humanitarian
funding;
Uneven donor and agency coordination in-country at national level (during the
evaluation period); and,
Changes following the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) and in-country efforts to
implement the New Way of Working (NWOW) and the Humanitarian-Development
Nexus.
75
UNHCR. 2016. Mauritania. Available at: http://reporting.unhcr.org/node/5928
A1.3 Key lessons to take into account in the comprehensive
evaluation
A1.3.1 Relevance
A1.3.1.1 EQ1: To what extent do DG ECHO budget allocations consider the
needs, actions of other donors and the EU objectives on humanitarian
aid?
Most interviewed partners were unequivocal in their agreement that DG ECHO budget
allocations as articulated in the Humanitarian Implementation Plans (HIPs) during
2012-2016 were relevant and needs-based, albeit mostly focussing on short-term
needs. The gradual decrease in funding however was not considered justified as,
overall, needs remained at steady levels. Due to the decrease in funding, not all needs
could be covered by the DG ECHO contribution. As the budget shrunk, DG ECHO
beneficiary and technical criteria became increasingly strict, thus fewer beneficiaries
qualified for assistance, especially for food assistance.
For example, in an Oxfam-led nutrition and cash project in Gorgol, criteria for
providing cash-based assistance were introduced classifying households as “poor” or
“very poor”. However, the distinction between “poor” and “very poor” is almost
negligible on the poverty scale. For 2017, the criteria for assistance was further
tightened as the household, in addition to be part of the category “very poor”, has
now to have the presence of a PWL or children under five in the household. While
addressing the survival needs of the beneficiaries, DG ECHO conditions, particularly for
the cash vouchers, were considered exaggerated, and in some instances, contributed
to creating tensions between households.
In Mauritania, DG ECHO does not conduct first hand needs assessments, but rely on
framework partners’ analyses and inputs (e.g. SMART, Cadre Harmonise) as well as on
DG ECHO staff knowledge. This process feeds into the formulation of the West Africa
HIP, which also cover Burkina Faso, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea Conakry, Guinea
Bissau, Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.
These are then presented to the framework partners. DG ECHO framework partners
would see benefit in more consultation between their inputs and the decision on the
funding allocation and HIP, as the latter does not always correspond to the needs both
in terms of scale and type.
DG ECHO considered the interventions of other donors in its funding decisions,
particularly regarding refugees. However, coordination and the pursuit of coherence
with other interventions has been challenging due to the weakening humanitarian
coordination architecture in Mauritania since 2012. UN OCHA closed for example its
Nouakchott office and there is a perceived lack of humanitarian know-how in UN
leadership. This was also not facilitated by the closure of the DG ECHO field office in
2016.
A1.3.1.2 EQ2: To what extent is DG ECHO’s choice of framework
partnerships appropriate? How could DG ECHO improve in the choice
of partners?
DG ECHO’s choice of partners is mostly based on DG ECHO’s knowledge of the
partner’s presence in country. Senior UN official further commented that overall INGOs
capacity and availability is considerably lower in Mauritania than in other countries. In
some locations, there are simply no partners present, (e.g. in Hodh El Gharbi, UNICEF
pulled out in 2016). The EU delegation further reported the lack of INGOs’ presence as
a major challenge in Mauritania.
This shortage of partners may have negative consequences. For example, having a
single framework partner deliver a sectoral response makes them more vulnerable to
shortages of parts and supplies (e.g. water buckets not available to ACF, making the
water service chain fail at the very point of final delivery in the Mbera camp) without
there being alternative solutions.
As identified through the West Africa HIP 201676, the most acute humanitarian needs
include (i) addressing under-nutrition and food insecurity, (ii) protection and basic
services to conflict affected population, and (iii) preparedness, disaster risk reduction
and disaster response. Nutrition has been extensively covered by the framework
partners as seen in Table A1.6, food security has been covered to some extent while
other sectors, such as protection are covered to a very limited extent only. For
example, at the Mbera camp, none of the partners deals exclusively with protection
issues (e.g. GBV, disability, access to wash services). The limited number of partners
and the reduced funding meant that some sectors are prioritise over others. This also
leads to the absence of holistic interventions.
DG ECHO should therefore make sure to reach a wider pool of framework partners or
perhaps even encourage specific partners who seem to have the capacity but which
are not present in the country to consider submitting a proposal.
Table A1.6 Overview of key sectors tackled by the framework partners in
Mauritania (2017)
Nu
trit
ion
Fo
od
secu
rit
y
WA
SH
Healt
h
Ed
ucati
on
Pro
tecti
on
DR
R
Co
ord
ina-
tion
ACF
ACORD
Croix Rouge
MEDICUS MUNDI
OXFAM
Save the Children
Terre des Hommes
UNICEF
WFP
A1.3.1.3 EQ3: To what extent does DG ECHO have appropriate,
comprehensive and context-adapted strategies in place for
addressing country/regional humanitarian needs and different
76
DG ECHO. 2016. Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP). West Africa. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/funding/decisions/2016/HIPs/WF_HIP_EN_version2.pdf
challenges, including medium and longer term objectives, where
applicable?
DG ECHO’s strategy is appropriate and relevant yet its scope remains limited,
considering that decisions are not backed up by DG ECHO’s own needs assessments as
described earlier. It is also up to the DG ECHO TA and her/his knowledge of the wider
system, to position DG ECHO strategies in the context of other inter-agency strategic
plans (e.g. United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF),
Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP), national plans) in country.
DG ECHO partners perceive the HIPs as HQ-led decisions with limited manoeuvre for
change, the top priorities for the year are pre-defined and relatively rigid. In addition,
the annual nature of the HIP does not allow for longer term planning. This despite the
multi-annual funding received from DFID under PHASE (Providing Humanitarian
Assistance in Sahel Emergencies). PHASE’s funding covers a three-year period;
however, DG ECHO has kept its yearly funding, and insisted on annual budgeting,
monitoring and reporting.
Stakeholders consulted believe that the approach taken by DG ECHO to respond to the
identified needs was not always the most appropriate. It is widely recognised among
INGOs and national actors, that the causes of malnutrition are mainly structural and
therefore recurrent every year. In addition, the West Africa HIP for 2016 highlights the
need for “responding to food insecurity, building the resilience of most vulnerable
population to external shocks”.77 Nonetheless, DG ECHO’s approach focuses mainly on
short-term, life savings activities. Partners also reported that transfer of skills,
capacity and resilience building cannot be sufficiently addressed with the DG ECHO’s
annual humanitarian funding only.
In addition, despite the increasing importance placed on linking relief, recovery and
development (LRRD) and the scope to implement LRRD activities in the context of
Mauritania, only sporadic initiatives were attempted and led by DG ECHO. Examples
include:
the “autonomisation”78 of Mbera refugee camp;
introducing a paid water supply system in Mbera refugee camp; and
advocacy efforts to improve nutrition policies in the national legislation.
Overall, DG ECHO strategy in Mauritania is comprehensive to a limited extent only,
without positioning humanitarian response within the larger context of resilience
preparedness and capacity building, the same response will be needed every year, as
it has been the case since 2012.
A1.3.1.4 EQ4: To what extent does the configuration of DG ECHO’s field
network ensure an added value in terms of efficiency and
effectiveness of DG ECHO’s actions?
DG ECHO field network consists of a regional office in Dakar and regional technical
expertise based in other regional offices (ROs) in Africa. This network is considered as
very useful by all the consulted framework partners. They especially appreciated the
regular monitoring visits of DG ECHO field staff and the surge technical capacity
available on demand. However, partners felt that the regional network cannot be a
substitute to a permanent DG ECHO presence in country, and this absence has been
77
DG ECHO. 2016. Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP). West Africa. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/funding/decisions/2016/HIPs/WF_HIP_EN_version2.pdf 78
Increased self-reliance opportunities for refugees and their host community in the Bassikounou region
felt as a negative development since the departure of the last field officer in
Nouakchott in 2016. As the top humanitarian donor in Mauritania, the framework
partners consider that DG ECHO would be in a much better position to increase
efficiency and effectiveness if it had a permanent presence in country.
A1.3.1.5 EQ5: To what extent are DG ECHO humanitarian aid objectives
still relevant to the global humanitarian needs and context?
DG ECHO’s humanitarian aid objectives as stipulated in its regulation, HIPs and other
strategic documents are considered relevant to the global humanitarian needs.
However, the decline in DG ECHO funding for Mauritania is not understood by the
framework partners as the need have not declined accordingly.
A1.3.2 Coherence
A1.3.2.1 EQ6: To what extent were the DG ECHO funded actions
(particularly considering the challenges posed by restricted
humanitarian access in conflict-related crises) consistent with the
four humanitarian principles in their design and implementation?
All DG ECHO implementing partners met in Mauritania were fully aware and committed
to the four main humanitarian principles and to the over-arching principle of “Do No
Harm”.
Few examples of potential lack of consistency between different humanitarian
principles have however been identified:
A potentially more serious damage to the “Do No Harm” principle is DG ECHO’s
increasingly strict approach to cash transfers. Very stern standards are applied
by DG ECHO who only funds the “very poor” families with PLW or children
under five. This has created tensions between the poor and the very poor and
has led to communities taking action to, for instance, by redistributing the cash
among them.
DG ECHO in Mauritania stays clear of any politically risky debates by not
dealing directly with governments of the affected country, except through the
EU Delegation. Yet there seems to be inconsistency in interpreting “neutrality”.
While DG ECHO TAs in DG ECHO vehicles do accept armed escort for its
monitoring missions near the Malian border, this is not the case for its
implementing partner ACF, who work on the principle of acceptance.
A1.3.2.2 EQ7: To what extent are DG ECHO humanitarian aid actions
coherent and complementary, and avoiding overlaps with those of the
Member States?
The cooperation between DG ECHO and the Member States appears limited in
Mauritania during the evaluation period. ADF, the French Development Agency, which
was consulted in the field reported that although they actively cooperated with DG
DEVCO they were not involved in DG ECHO’s humanitarian activities. However, they
do work in close collaboration with some of DG ECHO partners such as Oxfam and ACF
and are therefore aware of some of DG ECHO-funded actions in the country. In
addition, framework partners reported the presence of Member States in sectoral
meetings, in particular Spain and France, but not DG ECHO.
A1.3.2.3 NEW EQ1: To what extent were DG ECHO’s actions coherent and
complementary, and avoiding overlaps, with actions implemented by
other international partners?
Despite the challenges associated with the local context, DG ECHO has developed
good efforts to coordinate with other players over the evaluation period but the results
of such coordination remain limited so far.
The humanitarian coordination architecture in Mauritania varied from year to year,
depending on the presence of other actors (e.g. UN OCHA), UN leadership levels
(Humanitarian Coordinator until 2015, Resident Coordinator/Resident Representative
since) and the engagement of the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT). As specified
earlier (section A1.3.1.1), this had a direct impact on the level of coordination and
coherence between DG ECHO and other humanitarian actors.
The coordination platform initially saw considerable regional mobilisation of efforts
with the onset of the Sahel-wide drought in 2012, but this changed due to the gradual
diminishing of funds, withdrawal of other donors and more recently of the DG ECHO
field office in Nouakchott. In this context characterised by a deepening coordination
vacuum, DG ECHO made valuable efforts to coordinate remotely, from its regional
office in Dakar, through frequent monitoring visits to the field and occasional trips to
Nouakchott to attend and sometimes organise national level meetings.
DG ECHO was also praised by partners for its efforts to find durable solutions for
refugees in the Mbera camp and taking the initiative to gather main donors and
agencies to coordinate the comprehensive response in June 2016. However, at
sectoral level, DG ECHO does not attend the monthly coordination meetings.
Following UN OCHA’s departure and the absence of a HRP for Mauritania in 2016, DG
ECHO was involved in encouraging, both at the regional and national levels, the
planning discussions for an alternative country strategy. The resulting “Plan d'Action
Intégré Humanitaire et Développement”, issued in 2017, was an attempt to fill the
strategic planning vacuum by brining humanitarian and development agencies
together. The plan, divided into Humanitarian and Development components, stops
short of providing an operational level guidance. It does, however, constitute an
important first step in bridging the humanitarian-development divide in Mauritania.
The work on the new UNDAF, the government approved development framework for
2018-2023 continues at the time of writing and will include a humanitarian
component.
A1.3.2.4 EQ8: To what extent were DG ECHO’s humanitarian actions
internally coherent and complementary, and avoiding overlaps,
including with the UCP and EU Aid volunteers?
This evaluation question is not applicable to the Mauritanian context as the UCPM was
not activated in Mauritania and no DG ECHO funded actions welcomed EU aid
volunteers.
A1.3.2.5 EQ9: To what extent were DG ECHO’s actions coherent and
complementary, and avoiding overlaps, with the EU’s other external
financing instruments?
Anecdotal and factual evidence points to the limited integration of different EU
instruments in Mauritania. While both DG ECHO and DG DEVCO are active in
Mauritania, they do not cooperate on joint and integrated countrywide strategies.
Definitions (e.g. of vulnerability criteria) vary between DG DEVCO and DG ECHO.
Some speakers even referred to “antagonisms” between different arms of the EU.
Potential for overlaps exists, as DG ECHO works on specific areas (e.g. Mbera Camp),
while DG DEVCO covers the entire country. Standards can also differ: DG DEVCO
follows national standards, which may diverge from humanitarian (Sphere) standards
used by DG ECHO. Even when partners received DG DEVCO funding (UNDP, Oxfam,
ACF), these are not in response to joined up plans.
None of the interlocutors was able to confirm any awareness of climate change related
policies or funding instruments.
A1.3.3 EU added value
A1.3.3.1 EQ10: What was the added value of DG ECHO’s HA
interventions? How could DG ECHO maximise its EU Added Value?
What would happen if DG ECHO were to stop HA interventions?
The stakeholders consulted during the field mission agreed on the important added
value of DG ECHO in Mauritania.
DG ECHO is a major donor in Mauritania and has been funding humanitarian
interventions every year during the evaluation period. Framework partners reported a
certain stability and continuation in DG ECHO funding in comparison to other donors.
DG ECHO contributed to 48% of the framework partners funding over the period
2015-2016,79 this proportion raises to 57% when removing the funding allocated to
the Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) covering a number of countries. Looking at
2016 only, the proportion of DG ECHO funding amounts to 90%.80 This illustrates the
strong financial added value of DG ECHO in the country and was further emphasised in
the interviews: “if ECHO were to leave, it would be catastrophic”.
In addition to the financial aspect, the stakeholders consulted highlighted several
strengths that distinguish DG ECHO from other donors, these include:
DG ECHO’s strong field orientation and presence and good knowledge of what is
happening on the ground as well as proximity to the activities financed. DG ECHO
no longer has a presence in the country, but the TA based in Dakar travels several
times a year to attend meetings in Nouakchott and visit projects. DG ECHO is also
one of the few donors to have clearance to enter the field. It is challenging for
other donors to receive similar security clearance.
DG ECHO’s technical expertise and inputs are highly valued and appreciated by DG
ECHO partners.
DG ECHO’s regular monitoring visits and monitoring mechanisms are considered
robust and very constructive. There is concrete follow-up of projects,
79
Calculation based on the data extracted from HOPE for the period 2012-2016. 80
This exclude the UNHAS funding for which ECHO funding accounted for 10% in 2016
recommendations are given after each monitoring visit and progress is monitored
closely.
The accessibility and proximity of DG ECHO staff and the strong relationship
between DG ECHO and its partners was appreciated by the partners, who feel
supported and encouraged. However, it was noted by the framework partners that
the nature of the relationship depends largely on the DG ECHO officer in place.
DG ECHO’s flexibility with the funding was also mentioned, it is possible to make
changes to ongoing projects.
DG ECHO’s engagement and advocacy effort in the country at operational level
particularly, in terms of mobilising other donors (e.g. UNHAS flight, Cash
intervention) was reported a key strength. DG ECHO is also thought to be more
reactive compared to other donors.
Despite the positive feedback, stakeholders believe that DG ECHO’s added value can
be further strengthened through the following:
DG ECHO’s presence in a country would allow them to be more engaged in new
development and further coordinate with other actors. It would also strengthen the
proximity with the partners and increase DG ECHO staff availability and
responsiveness.
DG ECHO could better coordinate its vision with other actors. A process is ongoing
to have a joint humanitarian-development plan; DG ECHO could be more involved
and engaged in this process.
DG ECHO could move towards multi-year funding and be more open to larger and
more varied projects. The framework partners understand the humanitarian focus
of DG ECHO. However, in the context of Mauritania where crises are structural and
chronic, it would make sense to move towards LRRD and longer term approaches.
A1.3.4 Effectiveness
A1.3.4.1 EQ11: To what extent has DG ECHO achieved its objectives?
Stakeholders consulted during the field visit believe that, overall, DG ECHO’s
intervention has contributed to some extent at stabilising the food and nutrition
situation in Mauritania, during the lean season in particular. However, the lack of
prevention and resilience strategies and activities over the evaluation period meant
that the same assistance was required every year. In a context where crises are
structural and chronic, DG ECHO could improve the effectiveness of its intervention by
developing more comprehensive strategies. On one hand, focusing on tackling the root
cause of the issues and on the other hand, by integrating more sustainable solutions.
DIPECHO81 funding, focusing on resilience were introduced in 2016 and three
framework partners benefited from it. However, there is scope for further use of this
funding mechanism in Mauritania.
DG ECHO ensures the effectiveness of the actions by closely monitoring the projects.
This is done through monitoring visits; the DG ECHO officer visits each project once or
sometimes twice per year, and through partner reporting as well (i.e. Single Form).
81
Disaster Preparedness ECHO programme, see: https://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/humanitarian-aid/risk-reduction_en
There seems to be no consistent way of monitoring projects and it varies depending
on the DG ECHO staff in charge. Though DG ECHO possesses technical guideline and
specific sectoral guidelines, there is no monitoring checklist or protocols. The specifics
of the monitoring are therefore left to each officer. The DG ECHO officer provides
recommendations following each monitoring visit and the framework partner has to
provide a list of actions to address them. In Mauritania, it was reported that DG ECHO
follows up closely on these actions. It was noted by some partners that the feedback
received are sometimes very critical and actions are imposed rather than discussed
together. In addition, although DG ECHO closely monitors each project, there is no
aggregate data, which would allow an assessment at country level.
Evaluations are not commonly undertaken by DG ECHO at project/programme level.82
DG ECHO can allocate money for external evaluation but rarely does it and does not
encourage its partners to do so either. Nonetheless, some kind of assessment is
undertaken by the framework partners such as post distribution monitoring (PDM)
surveys or more general surveys such as SMART surveys (conducted by UNICEF and
the Ministry of Health), Food Security Monitoring Surveys (FSMS) or baseline and
endline surveys. However, it was noted by the framework partners that DG ECHO has
been pushing for further evidence lately. Recommendations from the latest monitoring
visits included for instance the realisation of a Knowledge, Attitude and Practices (KAP)
survey or an impact assessment study.
While no country specific evaluation or impact assessment has been undertaken to
date, positive outcomes were observed by the framework partners, the authorities and
the beneficiaries. Stakeholders interviewed during the field mission are overall very
positive about DG ECHO’s achievement in the region. Positive development toward
achieving the project objectives were also identified in the Single Form and existing
surveys. Though, it should be noted that the achievements cannot be attributed solely
to DG ECHO.
82
An Evaluation of ECHO's intervention in the Sahel was undertaken in 2015 but no country specific evaluation took place.
Examples of positive outcomes
In the Mbera camp:
General improvement of living conditions in the camp: increased access to
education, health and nutrition services, and WASH facilities.
Improved children nutritional status: acute Malnutrition (GAM) rates for children
under 5 decreased from 19.7% in July 2012 to 5.7% in February 2016.83
Positive trends in food security indicators over the evaluation period in the camp:
the prevalence of food insecurity reduced from 22.2% in October 2013 to 9.1% in
July 2016.84
In Gorgol:
Increased awareness among communities on nutrition and hygiene practices.
Improved children nutritional status: acute Malnutrition (GAM) rates for children
under 5 decreased from 19.8% in July 2012 to 12.8% in February 2016.85
Improvement of nutrition status of communities during lean season and reduction
of negative coping strategies such as selling livestock.
Framework partners and local implementing partners also reported a number of
obstacles in ensuring the effectiveness of the actions and achieving DG ECHO’s
objectives. Some obstacles are related to DG ECHO’s operating model, while others
are specific to the context of Mauritania.
The budget cut imposed by DG ECHO over the years and in particular for 2017
was the main obstacle. It was difficult for the framework partners to maintain the
same level of activities and therefore contribute to DG ECHO objectives. As an
example, by the end of 2016, WFP was only able to distribute 60% of the planned
quantity of food, which had negatively affected the food security of refugees who
sometimes adopted negative coping strategies to respond to the reduced rations86.
Similarly, ACF was not able to respect the Sphere standards in terms of the
number of latrines provided (27.6 people per latrine instead of 20).
Indicators suggested by DG ECHO were reported not always appropriate and
realistic within the particular context of Mauritania (i.e. limited local capacities,
weakness of the system) and therefore not achievable within the timeframe.
The limited time available to implement the actions push NGOs to select
activities that are not necessarily the most effective, efficient and sustainable (e.g.
distribute hygiene kits instead of building latrines).
Prevention activities are scarce or inexistent especially when it comes to
nutrition and food security. DG ECHO support to such activities is limited.
Other challenges associated with Mauritania were also mentioned and included:
weak existing structure, lack of willingness and / or ability by the government,
83
UNICEF. 2015. SMART survey 84
WFP. 2016. ECHO Final Report. 85
UNICEF. 2015. SMART survey 86
WFP. 2016. ECHO Final Report.
scattered populations, fluctuations in refugee numbers, lack of human resources,
limited competencies of local staff and high turnover.
Unintended consequences of DG ECHO actions were also highlighted by the
stakeholders consulted. It is to be noted that beneficiaries are also well aware of these
issues:
Dependency: refugees depend entirely on the assistance provided in the camp,
while in Gorgol, the communities depend largely on the assistance during the lean
period. Some people consulted believe it has a negative effect as these people will
not look for alternatives but wait for the assistance.
Social tensions between refugees and host communities but also between
households benefiting from assistance and others were reported. Refugees are
thought to be better off than the host population with free access to all services in
the camp. While in Gorgol, the selection criteria have become very narrow and the
difference between beneficiaries of food assistance and other households is
minimal (see section A1.3.1.1), it could be a question of a few goats less. This
issue was also raised due to the lack of harmonization between partners’ salaries
to refugees working in the camp (while this has been harmonised in the Gorgol
region).
Redistribution: in some communities, the leader redistributes the food and cash
received, to be divided among the populations in an equal measure. This means
that the most vulnerable do not receive their allocated share and therefore remain
in need. There are also indications that cash received may have been transferred
to former slave owners, despite this practice being outlawed. This has stopped one
implementing partners from implementing cash vouchers.
(De-)motivation of local staff: NGOs tend to provide financial incentives to local
staff to undertake tasks that were already part of their daily activities (i.e.
Minimum Package of Activities) and were often already done before (although not
at the same pace and quality). When the motivation ceases (as it was the case
following the budget cut), the work is no longer done.
A1.3.4.2 EQ12: To what extent do DG ECHO sectoral policies contribute to
the effectiveness of DG ECHO’s operations?
Knowledge and utilisation of the DG ECHO’s sectoral guidance and policies among
framework partners is limited. Only the people directly involved in the development of
the proposals use them as reference. Some people know about them but do not use
them while others are not aware of their existence at all. One of the main reasons is
the abundance of such sectoral guidance and policies, framework partners therefore
favour international standards such as Sphere. The framework partners also work in
line with national protocols and policies.
Some framework partners suggested that DG ECHO should better communicate and
disseminate the information to increase general awareness about its sectoral
guidelines.
A1.3.4.3 EQ13: With reference to DG ECHO’s visibility manual, to what
extent do DG ECHO activities achieve proper visibility through funded
actions?
All the framework partners seem to align with DG ECHO’s visibility requirements as set
out in the visibility manual. They all advertise DG ECHO’s logo across their projects
through different means (e.g. t-shirt, stickers, board).
Framework partners mentioned that the guidance to apply the requirements was clear
and well-known and did not report any challenges or obstacles in implementing DG
ECHO visibility requirements; a proportion of the budget is allocated to it. One partner
however, highlighted that DG ECHO has higher visibility requirements compared to
other donors such as the USA and therefore more staff is needed to deal with the
requirements.
A1.3.5 Efficiency
A1.3.5.1 EQ14: To what extent did DG ECHO achieve cost-effectiveness in
its response?
DG ECHO does not assess the cost-effectiveness of the proposals they receive but can
do so for specific activities during monitoring visits for instance (e.g. the DG ECHO
officer can be accompanied by an engineer or DG ECHO expert who will propose cost-
effective measures for specific elements of the project).
Similarly, framework partners reported that they did not assess the cost-effectiveness
of their activities but they were conscious about it and made an effort to select
activities that are believed or known to be more cost-effective. However, they also
reported that it was very challenging as their leeway was extremely limited especially
following the budget cut which has led them to lay off staff, reduce their coverage and
the number of activities. They also recognised that humanitarian interventions are by
nature not necessarily cost-effective as they are aiming to reach the most vulnerable.
This is particularly noticeable in the case of Mauritania where the population is
scattered and logistics costs are significant. In addition, the national/regional market
offers limited options and supply has to be done overseas. Further to that, the limited
timeframe to implement the interventions (e.g. 3-4 months for some projects) does
not provide much scope for efficiency.
The framework partners attempted to find creative solutions to deliver the same level
of activities with fewer resources. Examples are presented in the blue box below.
Examples of solutions to increase cost-effectiveness
Concentrate the activities on the bigger needs (i.e. most life saving);
Offer a package of activities instead of independent activities;
Reduce the frequency of certain activities (e.g. 3 supervisions instead of 4);
Target specific localities identified as more vulnerable instead of entire regions;
Utilise existing resources such as government facilities (e.g. for storage);
Develop complementarity with other actors and/or share the costs among partners
working together (e.g. school in the camp);
Give particular attention to the quality and appropriateness of the material bought
to ensure it is long lasting;
Use economies of scale where feasible;
Reorganise human resources to have more multi-functional staff, use the same
staff for multiple projects/donors or have staff on temporary contracts;
Work closer with local implementing partners and volunteers (including refugees);
and
Closer monitoring of the activities on a regular basis.
Framework partners recognised that cost-effectiveness could be further improved and
discussions are currently ongoing. The main topics include local production versus
ready to use therapy, use of national tools (e.g. social protection) instead of having to
undertake parallel studies, increased coordination (e.g. economies of scale, sharing of
best practice). In addition, a socio-economic profiling exercise is ongoing in Mbera
camp with the aim of rationalising the scarce resources. This would allow to shift from
the conventional assistance towards a new approach based on a response adapted to
the degree of socio-economic vulnerability and the real needs of each refugee group.
Furthermore, several initiatives are ongoing such as the establishment of a water for
payment system in the camp or the use of Last Mile Mobile Solutions (LMMS) for the
distribution of cash
A1.3.5.2 EQ 15: How successful has DG ECHO been in coordinating its
operations with other main humanitarian actors, and with its civil
protection actions, e.g. by promoting synergies and avoiding
duplications, gaps and resource conflicts?
This question is already answered by evaluation question 7 and new evaluation
question 1 above (coherence).
A1.3.6 Sustainability/connectedness
A1.3.6.1 EQ16: To what extent have the DG ECHO-funded actions been
successful in linking relief, rehabilitation and development,
considering both the continuum and contiguum aspects?
Although sustainability was not directly assess as part of the Sahel Evaluation, findings
suggest that “the Sahel Strategy was a key programme for DG ECHO in developing its
policies around resilience and food assistance. It was also a vehicle through which DG
ECHO developed its approach to LRRD. It can be argued therefore that the Sahel
Strategy influenced key policies in these areas, and it did this on the basis of its work
on the ground.”87 However, the evaluation also found that a contiguum approach to
LRRD is not evident in the region.
These findings were further highlighted in the specific case of Mauritania. DG ECHO
has taken several initiatives on the partners’ forums to advocate for the development
of long-term solutions and advance the LRRD agenda. Notably, it mobilises Nouakchott
based donors to address durable solutions to the refugee crisis. In addition, the DG
ECHO funded longer term actions under its DIPECHO instrument; OXFAM-implemented
programme for Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) is a small step in this direction. The
“autonomisation” of refugees’ project for the Mbera camp population of 55,000 is also
under development. But despite these efforts, DG ECHO funded actions have not been
able to ensure comprehensive LRRD strategies were put in place under the evaluation
period.
In addition, while the awareness of LRRD exists, there are no framework or
operational tools on how to implement it. While sporadic proposals are made on
occasion, they are not part of a “bigger plan”. DG ECHO is not in a position, solo, to
either strategize, fund or implement such approaches. As specified earlier, cooperation
between DG ECHO and DG DEVCO remains limited.
Some implementing partners (e.g. ACF) are by definition “double mandated” so they
would be well placed to implement them. This opportunity is not made available to
them by DG ECHO who is bound by institutional requirement to abide by annual HIPs,
planning and budgeting. This, even when DG ECHO is itself a channel of contribution
of another donor multi-year funding (e.g. DFID three-year PHASE project and
contribution) but even with this three year funding, insists on annual budgeting,
monitoring and reporting.
One cannot on the one hand advocate for sustainable solutions and on the other hand
strictly limits its activities to pure live savings elements without taking livelihood
considerations into account. For instance, in Mbera camp, DG ECHO has asked ACF to
charge refugees to use water when it is used for non-human consumption (i.e. small
vegetable gardens). This is due to strict reporting procedures and DG ECHO standards.
Nonetheless, it also demonstrates a potential contradiction: trying to address long-
term sustainability and autonomisation while de facto not permitting self-sustaining
activity such as small-scale agricultural projects.
A1.3.7 Key additional insights for rapid evaluations
This section provides a summary of the key insights feeding into the rapid evaluations
as captured during the field mission to Mauritania. The write up is more concise than
in the previous sections. The writer of the rapid evaluation will have to combine these
insights with the more detailed minutes of the different interviews and focus groups.
A1.3.7.1 Advocacy
DG ECHO has advocated strongly for concerted inter-agency action on sustainable
solutions for the Malian refugees, for common inter-agency planning document (Plan
d’Action Integré). Durable solutions for refugees is an example of initiative among
donors and implementing partners. These are more operational instruments however
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motivated by the changing fiscal environment and the need for subsequent exit
strategies.
These efforts are not ambitious enough to create a “thought leadership” and change
the way the aid business is done in Mauritania. Climate of ideas needs to be created
for advocacy and public support for recommendation on a particular cause or policy. In
case of Mauritania, bad governance is at a root of chronic system failures. DG ECHO
does not sufficiently engage in advocating to government for a positive change in this
area.
A1.3.7.2 Protection
DG ECHO has funded protection activities in the past but marginally (1% of HIP). It
does not engage in full fledged protection activities. Rather, DG ECHO ensures that in
their proposals framework partners demonstrate basic knowledge of protection. In the
GBV and child protection areas, mechanisms are in place to address issue by UNHCR
and partners, but not fully. For instance, access to the DG ECHO funded latrines by
disabled/elderly is lacking, as the WASH partner does not have the capacity to
mainstream these fully. DG ECHO aim is to ensure that its implementing partners
have “a sense of protection” but does not insist on the “centrality of protection”. ACF
is also aware of instances of GBV in the camp.
With UNHCR in charge of the Mbera camp, the framework partners follow the UNHCR
approach and mainstream protection to the best of their ability in their projects.
Secondary effects of DG ECHO-funded cash distributions in the Mbera camp and
Gorgol have allegedly created tensions between those receiving and those not
qualified “poor enough” to receive them. The fundamental Principle of Protection - Do
No Harm - has been affected in this instance, according to UNHCR, who manages the
camp and who did not support this initiative.
A1.3.7.3 WASH
Over 50,000 refugees from the Malian conflict resident in the Mbera camp rely on
water and sanitation funded by DG ECHO since 2012 thorough the implementing
partner ACF. The positive impact of clean water and sanitation provision to the camp
has been undeniable, in terms of lowering morbidity and mortality rates, lowering
levels diarrheal diseases, general hygiene standards and awareness. A DG ECHO
funded ACF water tank has also been installed in the neighbouring Mbera 2 village,
inhabited by former Malian refugees, now naturalised in Mauritania.
This success is noticed despite challenges due to the fluctuating number of refugees
(UNHCR and DG ECHO often differ in their number assessment) and diminishing DG
ECHO budgets. While the impacts are indisputable – no epidemics in the camp since
its establishment - important challenges remain, particularly financial, with needs
levels remaining but budgets diminishing.
Funding reductions do not allow for full respect Sphere standards – 27,6 persons
per latrine instead of 20;
Strict DG ECHO drinking water standards fail to take into account the cultural
norms (the DG ECHO imposed levels of chlorine in drinking water exceed those
tolerated by the Malian refugees);
Sensibilization campaigns run by ACF in Mbera contributed both to hygiene
education and to transfer of skills to large number of volunteers and committees;
The massive investment in WASH in systems in the camp often fail at the very end
point of delivery as no sufficient numbers of buckets or soaps are available,
Fluctuating numbers of refugees and the unpredictability of situation and new
arrivals make it difficult to plan operations;
Double (humanitarian and development) mandated ACF is willing and able to
engage more fully in LRRD activities but is blocked due to lack of longer term
funding. It fears that if funding stops, all the investment in water system this far
may be lost;
Transfer of skills and capacity building of the local and refugee populations is not
sufficient with the humanitarian funding only;
In one example of an LRRD thinking, DG ECHO requested ACF to work on the exit
strategy to allow the refugee “autonomisation” and potentially to auto-finance
water provision;
At the same time, DG ECHO has been against providing water for small vegetable
gardens (i.e. income generation), insisting that it be used for drinking purposes
only;
Many commented on the strict DG ECHO monitoring and reporting standards,
which are considered to be particularly rigorous and lacking the flexibility needed in
an unpredictable refugee environment; and,
DG ECHO monitoring critiques are perceived as harsh at times, with tight
deadlines, and too little encouragement.
A1.3.7.4 Food security and livelihood
WFP has been responsible for general food distributions in Mbera camp since 2012. For
the first four years, food rations were distributed to refugees. Starting from June
2016, WFP provided refugees with 30% of in-kind commodities (cereals, pulses,
vegetable oil and salt) and 70% of cash (4,500 MRO per refugee per month) these
proportions were adapted to 35% and 75% respectively after the pilot phase in
October.
In Gorgol, Oxfam provides cash transfers (22,000 MRO per household per month) and
flour to households classified as very poor, those which include children under five,
and/or PLW during the lean season (May to August).
The introduction of Cash Based Transfers (CBT) in Mauritania was recognised as
beneficial by the majority of the stakeholders consulted. Though some concerns
remained on the appropriateness of the modality in the context of Mauritania,
particularly in the camp where it is believed that local prices may be influenced due to
the market’s inability to absorb the cash received. The increase in the share of cash in
the camp led to protests among refugees last January and led to concern from the
Prime Minister.
However, it was recognised that in-kind and cash distributions are essential, more
should be done to build resilience of the communities and develop their livelihoods. DG
DG ECHO does not finance livelihood activities in the region.
Beneficiaries consulted provided the following feedback on the assistance received, in
particular on the CBT:
There is a strong preference for a mix of cash and food rather than food only as
this allows them to diversify and compliment their diet; The majority of the cash is
spent on food items, the remaining amount is spent on items such as coal, soap or
debt repayment;
The cash distributed (in addition to the food) in the camp, does not offer cover for
basic food needs but is considered vital;
The assistance is only short term, i.e. in Gorgol, beneficiaries reported that it
allowed them to eat two meals a day instead of one the rest of the year;
There are negative consequences including dependency, social tensions, and
redistribution (see section A1.3.4.1)
It does not solve the food insecurity issue. Additional help such as resilience
activities would be preferred (i.e. fences to protect their field, material for
agriculture, etc.).
A1.3.7.5 Shelter and Settlements
In Mbera camp, shelter infrastructures are coordinated by the UNHCR. It was reported
that there were not enough shelters in the camps, especially for new arrivals.
A1.3.8 Prospective evaluation
An overwhelming majority of partners interviewed expressed both hope and
frustration regarding the emerging global humanitarian-development context and way
forward. There is consensus among stakeholders and a strong will to push forward the
GB commitments in particular the humanitarian-development nexus. It is the “how to
do it” that remains unanswered. Reconfigured UNDAFs, joined up, multiannual plans
based on common objectives, cash transfers and greater donor flexibility are all
considered sine qua nons for the NWOW to take hold.
Mauritania can be considered a textbook example of a country caught up in a chronic
cycle of poverty, drought and structural fragility, combined with surges of acute
humanitarian crises. DG ECHO is the largest and the most active humanitarian donor
in the country. Yet, despite its high contributions and active engagement, assistance
has been required every year. Yet together with the EU’s development arm (DG
DEVCO) and its preparedness funding (DIPECHO), DG ECHO would be well positioned
to reflect on how to innovate and influence the way aid and development business can
be done in an integrated comprehensive, joined up and forward thinking way.
Mauritania could therefore be considered by DG ECHO to implement its new LRRD
approach88.
Innovative approaches, a degree of risk taking and out of the box thinking, first within
the EU, DG ECHO, then within the international community, are needed to capitalize
on the grand ideas of the GB.
On that basis, DG ECHO should prioritise the following areas:
Multi-year funding: in contexts such as in Mauritania, where crises are
protracted (i.e. refugee camp) and structural (i.e. recurrent drought), DG ECHO
should adapt its funding mechanism and offer multi-year funding. DIPECHO is a
step in that direction but it could be further extended and used more widely. In
addition, DG ECHO should also increase collaborative humanitarian multi-year
88
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funding (such as with DfID), however, it must adapt its processes to actually
implement multi-year funding.
Humanitarian-Development Nexus: malnutrition and related mortality in
Mauritania (and in the Sahel89) is a humanitarian issue, but its causes are
structural and therefore also an issue for development action. DG ECHO and DG
DEVCO should establish an effective ‘contiguum’ approach to LRRD and
reinforce long term strategies such as the Sahel one.
Environment and climate change: The refugee camps are both affected by
and causing environmental issues, which need to be addressed, as these often
have significant cost-effectiveness implications. In addition, climate change is
one of the main causes of food insecurity and malnutrition in the country,
building resilience of the population is therefore key. Both aspects require
longer-term strategies.
Local partners: DG ECHO should work further with local implementing
partners as they are often more aware of the context and population needs.
Innovation: DG ECHO could be more flexible and allow for more innovative
approaches to tackle the root causes of the issues. This would increase the
effectiveness of the action and reduce the humanitarian needs over time.
A1.4 Conclusions
DG ECHO is highly visible and active in Mauritania. It is seen as an energetic, agile
and highly professional donor, valued for its presence, its networks, its expertise and,
not least, for its funding capacity. But DG ECHO must also pay attention to how it is
perceived. Its highly rigorous technical standards, its strict reporting procedures, its
logistical prowess, its ability to get to areas where no other donors can go, all this
creates an image of a “super power” donor, a donor who can do no wrong. As such,
DG ECHO plays an important role in shaping the future of humanitarian aid.
The field mission report provides relevant findings, which will feed into the ongoing
Comprehensive evaluation of the European Commission’s humanitarian aid, 2012-
2016, in particular – but not comprehensively:
The important role of DG ECHO in Mauritania not only in terms of funding
but also through its strong expertise and presence on the ground, its
flexibility and its proximity to its partners.
The key role played by DG ECHO in leading initiatives and bringing donors
and actors together.
The limitation in the appropriateness of DG ECHO’s strategy considering
that decisions are not backed up by DG ECHO’s own needs assessments.
The lack of prevention and resilience strategies and activities over the
evaluation period leading to the same assistance provided every year.
The important potential to develop strong and coherent LRRD strategies in
the context of Mauritania.
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