Concept, Act, and Interest in Professional Practice: Implications of an Empowerment Perspective

Mary Ellen Kondrat Ohio State University

Within recent social work literature, the concept of empowerment as a practice perspective has received wide endorsement. In this article, I argue that adopting the notion of empowerment as a framework for practice requires not only that we think differently about professional practice but, more fundamentally, that we think differently about professional knowledge. Using the work of philosopher Jiirgen Habermas, particularly the distinction he makes among three arenas of human activity—work, interaction, and power—I outline ways in which the functional and cognitive interests associated with these arenas dictate differing orientations to practice, alternate commitments to various forms of knowledge as applicable in practice settings, and different accounts of practitioner error. Implications for pro­fessional education are addressed.

Historically, t he social work l i terature has made repeated efforts to reconci le differences be tween theoretical knowledge for the profession a n d t h e pragmat ics of pract ice. 1 O n e of the most fundamental issues has b e e n epistemological: the relat ionship between knowledge and h u m a n act ion. At tempts to address this issue have resulted in a n u m b e r o f models for s t ruc tur ing educat ion in a profession tha t is both a discipline a n d a pract ice . 2 A l though the basic quest ion is an epistemo­logical o n e , t h e r e has been little a t t empt to define the assumptions a b o u t knowledge tha t underl ie these educat ional frameworks. Yet it

Social Service Review (September 1995). © 1995 by T h e University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0037-7961/95/6903-0002$01.00

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seems reasonab le to suppose t ha t wha t social work educa to rs believe abou t knowledge will influence the models and prescr ipt ions they a d o p t in e d u c a t i n g n e w professionals.

T w o f rameworks for resolving t h e concept- to-pract ice d i l emma ap­p e a r to h a v e h a d the widest cur rency over t i m e — t h e "technical" and t h e "pract ical" a p p r o a c h e s . 3 T h e technical a p p r o a c h emphasizes the centrali ty of concep tua l knowledge and p rocedu ra l ru les acqui red in formal set t ings. I n this f ramework, the exper ient ia l c o m p o n e n t of profess ional educa t ion provides a convenient o p p o r t u n i t y to apply a n d test f o rma l knowledge . T h e practical f ramework takes as its start­i ng po in t t h e s tudent ' s o r t h e professional 's s tore of cul tura l a n d experi­ent ial know-how, which is ref ined largely t h r o u g h guided practice. W h e n r ecou r se is m a d e to re levant theory, it is a s s u m e d to be in the novel o r p rob lemat ic instance. T h u s , the technical f ramework e m p h a ­sizes "concept , " and t h e practical f ramework focuses o n "action." Al­t h o u g h n o t necessarily identified by n a m e , t he two perspectives have coexisted in t he profession's appl ied and educat iona l practices, usually in some u n e a s y combinat ion .

Recent ly , the professional l i tera ture has advocated the no t ion of " e m p o w e r m e n t " as a pract ice f ramework . 4 Despi te t he g rowing litera­t u r e o n this topic, t he re has b e e n virtually n o a t ten t ion to the epistemo-logical a n d educat iona l implications of an e m p o w e r m e n t perspect ive . 5

T h a t is to say, t he r e has b e e n little no te of its po tent ia l significance for t h e ways we have historically s t ruc tured and t a u g h t knowledge for practice. T h i s article is a n a t t empt to address this issue.

T o m a k e my case, I d raw o n the work of G e r m a n ph i losopher J i i r g e n H a b e r m a s , 6 adap t ing his schema to fit t he context of social work pract ice and educat ion . Of par t icular re levance is t h e distinction H a b e r m a s makes be tween th ree domains of h u m a n activity—work, in terac t ion , and p o w e r . 7 I will out l ine areas of concep tua l over lap that link Habe rmas ' s t h r ee a renas of h u m a n activity with t h e technical, t he practical , and the e m p o w e r m e n t f rameworks . 8 After out l in ing the concep tua l background and rat ionale, I will go o n to c o m p a r e and contras t s o m e of the philosophical presupposi t ions of the technical and pract ical f rameworks . A l though recognizing t h a t p r o p o n e n t s of these two f rameworks have someth ing valid to say a b o u t social work practice a n d educa t ion , I will a r g u e tha t ne i the r adequate ly addresses two crucial phi losophical issues: t he relat ionship be tween concept and act ion i n pract ice, a n d the re la t ionship be tween knowledge and p o w e r . 9 Finally, I will out l ine how the " e m p o w e r m e n t " perspective, w h e n conceptua l ized as a practice metaf ramework, addresses these cent ra l epistemological issues more thoroughly t h a n e i ther t he techni­cal o r pract ical f ramework. Essentially, I will a r g u e t h a t t he empow­e r m e n t perspect ive does no t oppose or supp lan t the technical and practical f rameworks b u t r a the r subsumes t h e m wi th in a la rger and m o r e e n c o m p a s s i n g pract ice knowledge s c h e m a . 1 0

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Philosophical Background for an Empowerment Metaframework By contras t wi th strictly phi losophical app roaches to the na tu r e of knowledge , in t h e work of H a b e r m a s a phi losophy of knowledge is firmly wedded to a sociology of knowledge . 1 1 H a b e r m a s suggests tha t peop le ho ld t h e beliefs they d o abou t knowledge not because of their par t icular epistemological posit ions but , primari ly, because they a re commi t t ed to cer ta in types of h u m a n activity and to certain kinds of h u m a n accompl i shmen t . I n o the r words , H a b e r m a s links ways of knowing wi th p r a g m a t i c commi tmen t s of individuals acting in their "world." T h u s , ins tead of appea l ing to differing epistemologies to ex­plain differences in a p p r o a c h e s to knowledge (basically a tautological a r g u m e n t , similar to expla in ing fatigue by exhaust ion) , Habe rmas a rgues tha t t h e funct ional and cognitive interests of h u m a n beings e n g a g e d in par t i cu la r activities de te rmine the fo rm in which the knowl­edge used in those activities is s t ruc tured and advanced.

Accord ing to H a b e r m a s , t he re a re t h ree pr incipal ways in which h u m a n be ings a t t e m p t to m a n a g e or alter the i r mater ia l and social condit ions: t h r o u g h work, t h r o u g h interact ion, and t h r o u g h power . Each of these d o m a i n s p resupposes the influence of fundamenta l h u ­m a n interests . T h r o u g h the activity of work, individuals and societies a t t emp t to m a n a g e t h e physical and social world to mee t their needs and desires. H e n c e , t h e basic, h u m a n interest involved is a n ins t rumen­tal one , m a k i n g changes in some aspect of the h u m a n env i ronmen t in o rder to m e e t a n identified n e e d . 1 2 I n social work practice, this interest is opera t iona l ized in the technical f ramework. T h r o u g h inter­action (or symbolic activity), individuals and communi t ies of individu­als try to give m e a n i n g a n d order to their collective existence. T h e interest h e r e is communica t ion , tha t is, shared m e a n i n g and consensus in t h e broades t sense of t he t e r m . 1 3 I n professional practice, the com­municat ive in teres t is identified most closely with the "practical f rame­work." Finally, t h r o u g h t h e exercise of power , individuals negot iate and legi t imate the i r claim to mater ial , social, and symbolic resources in t he service of the i r own identified pr ior i t ies . 1 4 T h e interest is a n emanc ipa to ry o n e ; t ha t is, it is or ien ted toward maximizing the free­d o m of individuals and g r o u p s to p u r s u e a fu ture they choose for themselves. I will a r g u e tha t in social work practice t he emancipatory interest is expressed in wha t has come to be called the "empow­e r m e n t perspect ive ."

In H a b e r m a s ' s view, the activity domains of work, interaction, and power and t h e basic interests with which they a re associated are "knowledge const i tut ive." W h a t H a b e r m a s m e a n s by the t e rm "knowl­edge const i tut ive" is tha t differences in the na tu res of the activities and in t h e p r agma t i c interests of those engaged in such activities de te rmine fundamenta l ly different ways of s t ruc tur ing knowledge and inqu i ry . 1 5

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J o h n Dewey offers a s imple, yet effective, example of the concept of knowledge-const i tut ive interests . " A . . . traveller whose end is the most beautiful pa th , " he suggests, "will look for o the r signs and will test suggest ions on a n o t h e r basis t h a n if h e wishes to describe the way to a given city. The nature of the problem fixes the end of thought, and, the end controls the process of thinking "™ According to H a b e r m a s , it is the n a t u r e of the p rob lems typically posed within each of t h e activity domains tha t de te rmines t he most app ropr i a t e aim, s t ruc ture , and process of t h o u g h t . 1 7

H a b e r m a s originally developed his three-category distinction a m o n g t he sciences to describe how differing h u m a n in t e re s t s—the ins t ru­men ta l , t he communica t ive , and the emancipatory in t e r e s t s—are deci­sive in de t e rmin ing ways in which inquiry is c o n d u c t e d . 1 8 A l t h o u g h H a b e r m a s d id no t address the relevance of his schema specifically for professional educa t ion and practice, the case may b e m a d e that these fundamen ta l categories also s t ructure the ways in which knowledge is o rgan ized for appl icat ion and for dissemination in the profess ions . 1 9

F o r example , wha t is t he assumed relat ionship be tween conceptua l knowledge and knowledge in practice? How is t h e re la t ionship be­tween discipline and practice s t ruc tured in t he academic setting? W h a t counts as "necessary" knowledge, and who defines wha t is "necessary"? Answers to these and similar quest ions concern ing t he p u r p o s e , com­mi tmen t s , and s t ruc ture of professional educat ion will vary depend ing o n the knowledge theory adopted , and theories of knowledge, as Ha­be rmas a rgues , a re t ied directly to fundamenta l interests and c o m m i t m e n t s . 2 0

The Technical and Practical Frameworks Reconsidered As o u d i n e d above, in t he domain of h u m a n activity tha t H a b e r m a s t e rms "work," t he p r imary h u m a n interest is an ins t rumenta l o r techni­cal o n e — t h a t of m a n a g i n g or al ter ing the mater ial o r social envi ron­m e n t in some systematic way to mee t specific h u m a n needs . I n the activity d o m a i n t h a t H a b e r m a s calls " in te rac t ion ," t h e basic i n t e r e s t is t h e a c h i e v e m e n t of s h a r e d m e a n i n g , u n d e r s t a n d i n g , a n d c o n s e n ­sus t h r o u g h c o m p e t e n t c o m m u n i c a t i o n . H a b e r m a s re fers t o this l a t t e r i n t e re s t a l te rna t ive ly as t he c o m m u n i c a t i v e o r t h e prac t ica l in te res t . W h e n H a b e r m a s ' s no t ions a re a d a p t e d to fit p ro fess iona l social w o r k p rac t i ce , we find tha t t h e dis t inct ion b e t w e e n t h e s e two f u n d a m e n t a l in te res t s t ends to g e n e r a t e d i f fe r ing o r i e n t a t i o n s to t h e field of p rac t i ce , a l t e r n a t e c o m m i t m e n t s to va r ious f o r m s of k n o w l e d g e as app l i cab le in prac t ice set t ings , and d i f fe ren t a c c o u n t s of p r a c t i t i o n e r e r r o r . 2 1

Orientation to the Field of Social Work

Each of Habermas ' s fundamenta l h u m a n interest categories corres­ponds to a par t icular or ienta t ion to h u m a n activity. T h u s , or ienta t ions

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to social work pract ice differ depend ing o n t h e in teres t tha t is be ing p u r s u e d . 2 2

W h e n t h e h u m a n in teres t is a n ins t rumenta l o n e , t h e a im is to alter some aspect of t h e social o r mater ia l e n v i r o n m e n t . I n fur ther ing this interest , t h e funct ional c o m m i t m e n t of the prac t i t ioner is necessarily technical and p r a g m a t i c : de t e rmin ing how to m a k e things work, or work be t te r . T h e p r e d o m i n a n t issues of pract ice take the form of p rob lem-pos ing q u e s t i o n s — f o r example , how to deliver bet ter services to clients; h o w to m a k e t h e system more responsive to needs of those it p u r p o r t s to serve; o r h o w to improve a n individual client's or family's economic , social, o r emot ional condit ion. P rob l em solving is defined by systematic a n d theory - in fo rmed intervent ions in tended to p roduce a specified c h a n g e in condit ions. Wi th in the c u r r e n t l i terature, the technical f r amework is ep i tomized by advocates of "empirically based pract ice ." T h e a s s u m p t i o n is tha t the pract i t ioner , bor rowing from c u r r e n t theory a n d research findings, will locate t h e most strategic po in t to i n t e rvene in o rde r to achieve the desi red r e su l t . 2 3 It follows tha t this c o m m i t m e n t to i m p r o v e d services wou ld b e operat ionalized in t e rms of effective in te rvent ions and m e a s u r e d by a n observable i m p r o v e m e n t in cond i t i ons . 2 4 F r o m this perspect ive, t h e practice a r ena becomes a "delivery system," a n objective p h e n o m e n o n to be investi­ga ted a n d i m p r o v e d . I t should be added, pr imar i ly because the posi­t ion is so of ten mischarac ter ized by those who subscribe to a n al ternate view, tha t c o m m i t m e n t s to scientific app roaches a r e advocated not simply as a way of contro l l ing ou tcomes bu t as a necessary condition for ethical p r a c t i c e . 2 5

I n contras t , w h e n t h e p r imary h u m a n in teres t is focused o n the in teract ion b e t w e e n h u m a n subjects (i.e., H a b e r m a s ' s communicat ive or practical in teres t ) , t h e p ragmat ic issues of pract ice a re posed in relat ional t e r m s : h o w to develop the kind of in te rpersona l rappor t , under s t and ing , a n d consensus tha t facilitate positive change for cli­e n t s . 2 6 I n o r d e r to fo rm the relat ionships necessary for change , the most essential issue for t h e pract i t ioner is tha t of i n fo rming his o r he r j u d g m e n t with rel iable u n d e r s t a n d i n g — u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the other , of t h e self, a n d of t h e e m e r g i n g re la t ionship . T o unders t and is to grasp t h e subjective m e a n i n g tha t t h e self o r the o t h e r pe r son is constructing o u t of a par t i cu la r s i tuat ion. Wi thou t an accura te unders tanding of self and o the r , t h e r e would be n o basis for mean ingfu l h u m a n transac­t ion. I n h u m a n t ransact ions , inc luding practice situations, action is a s s u m e d to flow f rom unders tanding; if act ion a n d t h e response it evokes a r e correct ly in t e rp re t ed , action may b e said to inform subse­q u e n t unde r s t and ing . I n this way, a kind of t ransact ional , self-and-o t h e r awareness provides t h e basis for tak ing correct ive steps should p r e s e n t i n g issues r e m a i n unreso lved or should p rob lems develop in t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p . 2 7 T o t h e ex ten t tha t t he j u d g m e n t of t he practi t ioner is i n fo rmed by his o r h e r o n g o i n g unders tand ing of wha t is occurr ing

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be tween par t ies in t h e re la t ionship, evaluat ion of pract ice becomes a con t inuous process. T h e pract i t ioner is assumed accountable in two ways: first, to the client for the quality of the whole re la t ionship , and second, to t h e self for the competence and integrity of professional c o n d u c t . 2 8 However , t h e not ion tha t t he worker is responsible for client ou tcomes is viewed as incompat ible with a fundamenta l belief in client se l f -de te rmina t ion . 2 9 T h u s , in the practical f ramework, as in the tech­nical accoun t of pract ice, accountability is bo th a practice prescr ipt ion and an ethical responsibility, a l though, of course, t h e r e is wide diver­gence b e t w e e n the two perspectives in the way accountabili ty is conceptual ized .

Assumptions about Knowledge

T h e s e two different or ienta t ions to the world of pract ice a re significant for t he k ind of knowledge deemed necessary to pract ice effectively. T h e s e or ienta t ions gene ra te (a) a l ternate forms of knowledge and (b) commi tmen t s to differing cognitive achievements and modes of rationality.

Type of knowledge.—In the technical framework, t h e m e t a p h o r of choice for t he p r e s u m e d relat ionship between knowledge and practice is c a p t u r e d by te rms such as "use," "application," and "translat ion." Accord ing to the formula , a central p roblem faced by t he social worker is tha t of us ing or app ly ing the most effective m e t h o d , t echnique , o r theory in the individual instance. T o be available for "use" in solving the p rob lems of practice, knowledge must meet several impor t an t r equ i r emen t s : (a) it mus t be external to the one w h o knows, tha t is, available to more t h a n the singular knower; (b) it mus t be generalizable across a specified r a n g e of instances; and (c) its claims to be valid and applicable m u s t be supp o r t ed by the use of systematic m e t h o d s of inquiry accepted within t he relevant "knowledge communi ty ." Knowl­edge tha t meets these criteria is t e rmed "formal knowledge ." Ab­stracted f rom exper ience , formal knowledge is extrinsic to exper ience a n d hence , muta t i s mutandis , exportable across si tuations.

I n the technical perspective, professional knowledge is formal , ex­plicit, a n d discursive. I t is "out t he re" in textbooks, in professional j o u r n a l s , in research repor t s , and in lecture no t e s . 3 0 F r o m the disciplin­ary perspect ive , professional knowledge is defined in t e rms of knowl­e d g e tha t ha s b e e n sanct ioned by the profession as legit imate for d iscourse a n d t ransmission; f rom the perspective of t he s tudent , this knowledge is "received" from the academic and scientific exper ts who attest to its value as "necessary" learning. In this f rame of reference, ins t ruc t ion becomes t h e t ransfer of relevant informat ion, and l ea rn ing is the receiving, r e m e m b e r i n g , and applying of informat ion thus t rans fe r red .

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J u s t as knowledge associated with the technical f ramework is formal and external ly given, knowledge associated with the practical f rame­work is, for t he mos t pa r t , colloquial and implicit. We are all, to varying extents , c o m p e t e n t as we act and interact in specific social contexts . 3 1

Seldom consciously aware of the subtle cues we learn to offer and receive, we t ransac t business as usual in in teract ion with others whose worlds of m e a n i n g a r e m u c h like o u r o w n . 3 2 Which behavior will be r ewarded , which p roh ib i t ed? H o w do m e m b e r s communica te needs , wants , affection, h u r t , ange r , solidarity, and social distance? W h a t const i tutes success, and w h o qualifies; wha t consti tutes failure, and w h o qualifies? O u r everyday behavior demonstra tes ou r knowledge in these mat te r s , even as we rout inely and, for t he most par t , unreflec-tively take o u r knowledge for g ran ted .

T h i s kind of everyday , interact ional knowing is acquired t h r o u g h processes t ha t a r e cul tural ly si tuated, contextual , and usually unmed i -a ted by conscious a t t en t ion . I t is l ea rned t h r o u g h living and interacting wi th in par t i cu la r e n c u l t u r a t i n g communi t ies : first of all, of course, in o u r commun i t i e s of or igin (families, kinship networks , and neighbor­hoods) , a n d la ter in o u r communi t i es of choice, such as work g roups and professions. W h e n defined in t e rms of its origin, knowledge that becomes e m b o d i e d in the rou t ine activities of daily life may be t e rmed cul tura l o r "lived" o r ind igenous knowledge . 3 3 Ind igenous knowledge is, of course , w h a t clients b r i n g to the practice situation. F rom the perspect ive of t h e practical f ramework, a large par t of t he knowledge social workers b r i n g to pract ice is also based o n this s tore of ordinary cul tura l know-how. T h u s , e m b e d d e d in everyday interaction, practice knowledge becomes w h a t compe ten t social workers know and know h o w to d o w h e n they a r e involved in the practice of social work. F rom this perspect ive , l e a r n i n g is equa ted with " learn ing how," especially u n d e r t h e gu idance of a professional w h o demonstra tes the excellence to which t he s tuden t a sp i r e s . 3 4

Cognitive commitments and their form of rationality.—The scientific pract ice o r i en ta t ion advocated in the technical f ramework is fur thered by a kind of rat ional i ty in which decisions a re m a d e by weighing alter­n a t e theor ies a n d a l t e rna te m e a n s relative to expected ou tcomes . 3 5

T h i s p ragmat i c in te res t in achieving par t icular outcomes is logically a ccompan ied by a cognitive c o m m i t m e n t to processes of explanation, p red ic t ion , and cont ro l . Wi thou t the ability to explain and predict, t he prac t i t ioner wou ld have n o confidence tha t alterations in specific fea tures of a pract ice s i tuat ion would actually increase the effectiveness of o u t c o m e s . 3 6 W i t h o u t control , t he re would be no way for the prac­t i t ioner to inf luence ou tcomes in any systematic way. Following Max Weber , who , to m y knowledge , was the first mode rn th inker to identify the concept , this fundamen ta l , means-end or ienta t ion may be t e rmed "technical ra t ional i ty ." 3 7