CONCEPT FOR FUTURE LOGISTICS - Department of Defence

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CONCEPT FORFUTURE LOGISTICS

Version 1.0 Reference: DPN BN23633384

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CONCEPT FORFUTURE LOGISTICS

Version 1.0 Reference: DPN BN23633384

Concept for Future Logistics

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© Commonwealth of Australia 2020

This work is copyright. Apart from any use as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cwth), no part may be reproduced by any process without prior written permission from the Department of Defence. Requests and inquiries concerning reproduction and rights should be addressed to Defence Publishing Services, Department of Defence.

Announcement statement – Title and any unclassified contents may be announced to the public.

All Defence information, whether classified or not, is protected from unauthorised disclosure under the Crimes Act 1914 and Privacy Act 1988, and may only be released in accordance with the Defence Security Principles Framework (DSPF).

Considered: Joint Warfare Council Date: 11 November 2020

Version Date Drafted by Description

0.4 29 Jun 20 MAJ North Draft for working level engagement

0.5 21 Jul 20 MAJ North Draft for experimentation

0.7 24 Aug 20 MAJ North Draft for 1 Star / SES Band 1 engagement

0.8 30 Sep 20 MAJ North Draft for 2 Star / SES Band 2 engagement

0.9 23 Oct 20 MAJ North Draft for Joint Warfare Council submission

1.0 16 Nov 20 MAJ North Submitted to JFA for endorsement

Lead Author:Major Ian NorthStaff Officer Grade Two – Joint Concepts (Land)Joint Futures and Concepts DirectorateForce Exploration BranchForce Design Division

Contributing Author: Lieutenant Colonel Carney Elias Deputy Director Joint Logistics Futures (Concepts)Directorate of Joint Logistics Futures Strategic Logistics BranchJoint Logistics Command

Lead Analyst:Ms Elizabeth KohnWargaming and Experimentation AnalystStrategy and Joint Force BranchJoint and Operations Analysis DivisionDefence Science and Technology Group


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FOREWORDJoint Concepts are published to increase warfighting effectiveness, and link strategy to the development and employment of Future Force capabilities. They are the method by which the Australian Defence Force develops ideas that can embrace the opportunities and confront the challenges that we will face in the Future Operating Environment. Joint Concepts inform future iterations of the Integrated Investment Program to design a Joint Force that can defend Australia and its national interests.

The Concept for Future Logistics is the amalgamation of research activities from scientific and academic communities, the concepts of partner nations and the ideas of critical thinkers from within the Department of Defence. This concept has been tested by the Defence Science and Technology Group to confirm that the alternate models of capability and thought it proposes is fit for purpose.

This Concept is to guide the acquisition of capabilities, employment of the Joint Force, and education and training of our people. However, Joint Concepts must be subject to continual improvement, as the nature of the operating environment evolves we must reconsider the design of the Future Force. Your feedback is critical to the continued relevance of our capability.

DL Johnston, AOVice Admiral, RAN

Vice Chief of the Defence Force

November 2020


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SECTION 1 – EXECUTIVE SUMMARY1.1 In response to a dynamic and shifting strategic environment, including the impact of recent crises exposing the vulnerabilities of global supply chains, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) no longer has time for gradual adjustment of military capability and preparedness. Additionally, the Future Operating Environment (FOE) will be more complicated, contested and congested. As a result, the conventional practice of generating the majority of logistic effects through single Service / domains must be expanded to a more multi-domain approach.

1.2 The Concept for Future Logistics (CFL) answers the military problem:

How does the ADF generate logistics effects to create advantage across the cooperation-to-conflict continuum in the FOE, and how can the ADF work with partners to counter threats to the Defence Logistics Enterprise?

1.3 The central idea of the CFL is:

The future Defence Logistics Enterprise must become survivable, assured, resilient and adaptive.

1.4 The CFL analyses the threats and opportunities that will be present in the FOE and provides force design guidance for the Defence Logistics Enterprise (DefLogEnt) (and its engagement with the Logistics System) that will enable achievement of these four characteristics. The DefLogEnt is Defence’s internal organisations and functions which are a core component of warfighting, and the Logistics System is the government, coalition, industry and academic partners that provide support to Defence capabilities and operations.


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1.5 To create advantage across the cooperation-to-conflict continuum in the FOE, the DefLogEnt must be able to coordinate and integrate the generation of logistic effects across multiple domains. This will require cultural change and the establishment of an appointed technical control authority to coordinate increased commonality across the Services and mutually beneficial collaboration with Logistics System partners. These measures will ensure that Future Force capabilities are synchronised and sustainable, such that support can be provided to concurrent contingencies ranging from crisis response, to high-intensity warfighting.

1.6 In the FOE, technological developments in manufacturing, distribution and maintenance will increase in pace and provide opportunities for the DefLogEnt to become more effective (the CFL does not cover health support). The majority of these opportunities are reliant on the ability to analyse and exploit big data, which has wide ranging implications for the structure and training of the DefLogEnt workforce. Particularly for distribution and maintenance functions, the increasing use of Robotics and Autonomous Systems (RAS) will permit redistribution of some tasks from human to machine. This will both increase the speed at which tasks can be completed, and reduce the requirement for personnel to be exposed to threat environments arising from hostile action, environmental risks or both.

1.7 Complementing these opportunities is a requirement for a renewed approach to mutually beneficial, long-term collaboration with partners in the Logistics System. This approach will improve the ADF’s interoperability with Australian government agencies and coalition partners; while collaboration with industry and academia will enhance Australia’s sovereignty and support acquisition of common capabilities that can be integrated across the Future Force.


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TABLE OF CONTENTSSECTION 1 – EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 7SECTION 2 – INTRODUCTION 12

Definitions 12Strategy 15Cultural and organisational change 17Related concepts 18Effectiveness assessments 19Intent 19Scope 19Implementation and review 20

SECTION 3 – MILITARY PROBLEM, CENTRAL IDEA AND OPPORTUNITIES 22

Military problem 22Central idea 27Opportunities to create advantage 29

SECTION 4 – IMPLEMENTATION 41Introduction 41Ability statements 41Organisation 43Command and management 45Personnel 48Collective training 50Major systems 51Facilities and training areas 52Supplies 52Support 54Industry 55


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SECTION 5 – CONCLUSION 58ANNEXES 60GLOSSARY 61ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 71CONSULTATION RECORD 73BIBLIOGRAPHY 75ENDNOTES 84


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SECTION 2 – INTRODUCTION 2.1 The Five Eyes Future Operating Environment 2040 (FVEY FOE 2040) forecasts that the future will be more complicated, contested and congested. Specifically for logistics, that adversaries will be able to identify and exploit weaknesses to the extent that interference is to be anticipated.1 These assessments have contributed to the revised strategic policy framework in the 2020 Defence Strategic Update, which directs Defence to achieve the objectives of ‘shape, deter and respond’.2

2.2 By 2040, the ADF’s advanced capabilities, adversaries’ offensive options, and concurrent requirement to support high-intensity warfighting through to Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) tasks must expand the generation of logistics effects to more frequently use a multi-domain approach. To achieve Government direction and provide effective support to dependent force elements, the DefLogEnt must have greater resilience, a central control authority, be networked and integrated across multiple domains, and commonality must be pursued across the Groups and Services.

Definitions2.3 Terms in italics are defined in the Glossary (Annex A) starting on page 71. All acronyms and abbreviations are listed in Annex B.

2.4 What is logistics? The ADF defines logistics as the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, it includes those aspects of military operations which deal with:

a. design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, [materiel engineering and] maintenance, evacuation and disposal of materiel

b. transport of personnel

c. acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation and disposition of facilities


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d. acquisition of furnishings or services

e. medical and health service support.3

2.5 Whilst accurate, this definition risks overlooking the purpose of military logistics – namely as a vital component of warfighting. For that reason, the CFL’s use of ‘logistics’ is contextualised by the strategy and tactics the ADF applies to achieve victory.4

2.6 Due to its highly specialised and technical nature, medical and health support is not included in the CFL. The exception to this is coverage of non-clinical aspects of casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) and the distribution of Class VIII supplies (medical and dental stores).

2.7 Defence logistics is enabled by an architecture of three interconnected networks that link and permit the rapid control of forces and sharing of information. These networks are the:

a. control – decision-makers, managers, governance, policy and processes

b. information – data and the Communication and Information Systems (CIS) interfacing the control and physical networks

c. physical – the nodes (locations where logistics functions are conducted) and modes (the means to move personnel and materiel, such as road, rail, air and sea).5

2.8 DefLogEnt. The DefLogEnt is a diverse and complex array of Defence organisations (including elements within the Services, Joint Operations Command [JOC] and Enabling Groups) that contribute in different ways across a multitude of functions aimed at supporting Defence logistics capability. The DefLogEnt is nested within the wider, external to Defence, Logistics System responsible for the provision of logistics support to Defence capability.6


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2.9 Logistics System.i The Logistics System is the ‘government departments, foreign militaries and government, global and national defence industry and academia’ that provides the external support network that ‘facilitates, enables and assures support to capability and operations’.7

2.10 Subordinate to these definitions are the respective Services’ descriptions of logistics, the logistics functions, enduring principles of logistics, and the role of professional mastery.8 In the FOE the functions, enduring principles and role of professional mastery will retain their utility; however, the lack of commonality across the Services’ descriptions undermines integration and must be aligned.

2.11 Supply networks. Doctrine defines a supply chain as ‘the process of planning, implementing and controlling the efficient and effective flow and storage of goods, services and related information from point of origin to point of consumption for the purpose of conforming to customers’ requirements’.9 The CFL progresses this definition and refers to supply networks throughout as a means to reflect the non-linear, cumulative and interrelated nature of supply functions in the FOE.10 Additionally, the CFL refers to dependencies (not customers), and includes the use of supply networks for the reverse / lateral movement of materiel for repair / rotation.

2.12 Supply network visibility. ‘The identity, location and status of entities transiting the supply [network], captured in timely messages about events, along with the planned and actual dates / times for these events’.11 Supply network visibility is essential for developing a range of interoperability measures across Defence and Logistics System partners, e.g. logistic fields within a User Defined Operational Picture (UDOP) to inform planning and decision making.

2.13 Supply network illumination. The ability to understand the provenance of equipment and commodities back to base materials. Whilst initially used by commercial industry to counter exploitation of workers and resources, supply network illumination provides the Logistics System and the DefLogEnt with information that is needed

i This definition is amended from the current doctrinal definition of the Logistics Domain and reflects that logistics is not a domain equivalent to air, land, sea, space, and information and cyber. Capability Life Cycle (CLC) Manual, para 3.4a


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to make decisions on assurance and security related matters. Navy is currently leading the development of the Defence-wide Supply Network Analysis Program that will use supply network illumination to understand security and supply network risks, support optimisation and improve understanding of sovereign content (where appropriate).

Strategy2.14 2020 Defence Strategic Update. In response to a dynamic and shifting strategic environment, including the impact of COVID-19 exposing the vulnerabilities of global supply chains, the Defence Strategic Update states that the ADF no longer has time for gradual adjustment of military capabilities and preparedness.12 For Defence to achieve the new strategic objectives of shape, deter and respond, the DefLogEnt must rapidly reorientate and reform.

2.15 2020 Force Structure Plan (FSP). The FSP has begun the reorientation of the ADF to meet Government direction in the Defence Strategic Update. For the DefLogEnt, significant funding has been allocated to provide the Future Force with greater logistics resilience, lethality, force projection platforms, deployable repair and sustainment capabilities, RAS, expanded sovereign capacity in fuel and explosive ordnance, digitisation and CIS, and workforce reskilling.13

2.16 Necessity of logistics. Logistics is essential to Defence’s ability to achieve strategic objectives as it is critical to executing five of the seven joint functions (force generation and sustainment, force projection, force protection, force application and information application) across the cooperation-to-conflict continuum.14 When combined with effective offensive and defensive capabilities, a credible logistics capability will:

a. Contribute to deterrence by enhancing national resilience and sovereignty through the ability to force generate, prepare, stage, project and sustain ADF operations.15 Further, it will enable the ADF to impose a cost of hostile action perceived by an adversary, creating uncertainty in their capabilities or reducing their will and coercive power.


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b. Allow the ADF freedom of action by providing a range of options to the execution of the joint functions and enabling freedom of operational manoeuvre.

c. Contribute to the provision of secure basing for ADF elements by generating the ADF’s ability to sustain forces within areas of operation through assured logistic effects.16

d. Contribute to domestic and regional assurance by rapidly responding to the Australian Government, strategic partners and affected populations in times of crisis.

2.17 Geography. The Defence Strategic Update directs that Defence’s planning is to be focussed on our immediate region; whilst also maintaining the ability to deploy forces globally.17 Given the extreme diversity of physical and human terrain in our immediate region, achieving the requirements of this direction in austere and hostile environments (for example either physical threats from adversary action, or environmental risks in a disaster response scenario) necessitates that the DefLogEnt develops more survivable and resilient capabilities.18

2.18 Enhanced capabilities will increase the capacity for the DefLogEnt to generate logistics effects in the more complex environments within our immediate region. Specifically, there is a reliance on extended sea and air lines of communication across extensive archipelagic and littoral areas, many of which are devoid of significant infrastructure and demonstrate an increasing trend of unstable or reduced access to resources, especially water, fuel and food.

2.19 While Australia’s geography provides some protection through standoff, our adversaries now have the ability to strike the Australian mainland. Therefore, the safety of the National Support Base (NSB) to prepare for and sustain conflict can no longer be assumed, and existing coercion, competition and grey-zone activities have invalidated strategic warning time as a planning buffer.19 Consequently, Defence must seek adaptive ways for the DefLogEnt to generate a diversity of logistic effects from field locations as well as established, bare, and dual use facilities domestically and regionally.


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Cultural and organisational change2.20 In order to maximise limited resources and achieve joint integration, the DefLogEnt requires a fundamental cultural change in how Defence personnel view logistics, in particular that logistics is not an enabling function but a core part of warfighting. Rather than the majority of logistic capabilities being generated along single domain or Service lines, Defence must focus on the collection, analysis and dissemination of information from across the DefLogEnt and the Logistics System, to facilitate the generation of effects from and across multiple domains. Key to the achievement of this cultural shift will be the increased use of joint doctrine, and common training, processes and procedures, as well as improved Command and Control (C2) arrangements and a more collaborative approach to industry engagement that will enable the synchronisation of effects across Defence.

2.21 To achieve Government direction and intent the DefLogEnt must:

a. Establish a technical control framework, with sufficient resources, to support the Joint Force Authority (JFA) integrate logistics across the Future Force.

b. Change the culture from a focus on efficiency and ‘just-in-time’ principals to one of access confidence that reflects the role of logistics as a core element of warfighting and other mission types.

c. Increase the speed of acquisition and introduction into service of CIS, data and information management tools that support the planning and execution of the control functions needed to achieve synchronisation, as well as enabling supply network visibility and illumination.

d. Re-assess the various plans for the NSB to support operations and ensure that they are resilient, provide options and rapid expansion capacity to support all operations across the cooperation-to-conflict continuum, particularly high-intensity warfighting.


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e. Assess Australian (and selected coalition partners’) defence industry capability, identify where the risks to the supply network are, and where Defence can leverage expertise to create options and capacity.

f. Establish a program of professional mastery in joint logistics that complements the Groups and Services in the rationalised delivery of training and education (which includes Professional Military Education [PME], individual and collective training).

g. Identify and consolidate any policy / regulatory frameworks (e.g. security) that prevent or encumber the ADF from utilising national critical infrastructure to conduct operations from Australia.

h. With assistance from government and industry, create resilience to scale by promoting the enhancement of civilian infrastructure domestically, and with regional partners who have shared security interests, to provide additional options from which to provide logistic effects.

i. Strengthen strategic logistics agreements and arrangements with coalition partners to set the theatre by providing options from which to generate logistics effects regionally and globally.

Related concepts2.22 The CFL is informed by the FVEY FOE 2040 and sets longer-term force design considerations for Australia’s Joint Operating Concept (AJOC).20 It also complements the ADF Concept for Command and Control of the Future Force and its supporting Joint Concept Notes (Future Sensors, Processing Exploitation and Dissemination and Future Networks and Communications).21


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Effectiveness assessments2.23 A number of assumptions are made in regard to the potential for future capabilities where Defence does not currently possess detailed technical assessments. The requirements of these assessments (listed in Section 4 but based on analysis throughout the CFL) are purposefully broad and intended to highlight areas of investment and change that provide the greatest opportunity to create advantage. It is also apparent that the rate of technological change will continue unabated, which will challenge the current capability acquisition process and interoperability measures.22 Overcoming this will require strengthening the DefLogEnt framework, as well as an ongoing cycle of detailed analysis to inform Future Force design and the optimum mix of capabilities for investment towards 2040.

Intent2.24 The CFL provides actionable force design considerations for the DefLogEnt, such that it can create advantage in the FOE and work with Whole-of-Government (WoG), coalition, industry and academic partners to counter threats. It is intended to be used by those involved in operational planning, force design, force exploration, experimentation and in the delivery of training and education. It may also be used by external partners to understand how the ADF will provide logistic effects in coalition and inter-agency operations, and it provides industry and academia with context on how the DefLogEnt must evolve out to 2040.

Scope2.25 The CFL describes how logistics effects can and should be generated in the FOE to support the ADF’s execution of the joint functions. At a minimum, the DefLogEnt must be able to support a regional or global deployment of a major Joint Task Force (JTF); concurrent with a regional or domestic deployment of a minor JTF, and routine Raise, Train and Sustain (RTS) tasks. Commitments exceeding this scope will require the DefLogEnt to upscale as part of a mobilisation process, and will be addressed by the Defence Mobilisation Plan.23


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Implementation and review2.26 Detail on implementation of the CFL’s outcomes is covered in paragraph 3.17 and Section 4. Progress on implementation is to be reported annually to the JFA through the Joint Analytical Advisory Group. It is recommended a complete review of the CFL is conducted once the Defence Mobilisation Plan is published.


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SECTION 3 – MILITARY PROBLEM, CENTRAL IDEA AND OPPORTUNITIES Military problem3.1 This concept answers the military problem of:

How does the ADF generate logistic effects to create advantage across the cooperation-to-conflict continuum in the FOE, and how can the ADF work with partners to counter threats to the Defence Logistics Enterprise?

3.2 How does the ADF generate logistic effects? Effects are ‘the consequence of an action or cause, which impacts physical, physiological or functional capabilities’.24 Therefore, logistic effects describe the ‘planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces’ (personnel, platforms and systems); as well as the subsequent physiological outcomes, e.g. morale and the will to fight.25 Consequently, the generation of logistic effects incorporates all task organised actions taken before, during, after (redeployment) and following (reconstitution) any activity that contributes to the movement and maintenance of the ADF.

3.1 As medical and health support is not covered, the CFL focuses on the core elements of manufacturing, distribution, and materiel engineering and maintenance. The ability of the DefLogEnt to effectively synchronise these three activities, including by exploiting broader technological developments, will provide opportunities to improve effectiveness and create advantage across the cooperation-to-conflict continuum.

3.2 Creating advantage. Advantage refers to both competitive advantage and collaborative advantage. It has strategic, operational and tactical impacts.


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3.3 At the strategic level, creating advantage through logistics encompasses the efficiencies, effectiveness and economies generated by proximity to the NSB and connections to the Logistics System.26 This includes but is not limited to:

a. achieving redundancy by ensuring acquisition, warehousing, inventory management, medical and health support, and maintenance functions are balanced between centralised (supporting efficiency) and distributed (supporting effectiveness) approaches

b. increasing resilience and responsiveness by collaborating with a range of industry partners across domestic and global supply networks for materiel and services, including increased sovereign manufacturing (completed product or components thereof, i.e. interdependence)

c. generating agility with options to use contracted / WoG / coalition partner support to upscale baseline capabilities (which forms a foundational element of mobilisation)

d. increasing resilience and adaptability by setting the theatre to establish potential forward support nodes within the immediate region, and further developing strategic partnerships with countries across the Indo-Pacific, including North Asia (e.g. Japan, India and Indonesia).27

3.4 At the operational and tactical levels, logistics creates advantage through those actions and capabilities that provide freedom of manoeuvre to the commander and dependent force elements. These actions will vary depending on:

a. suitable levels of preparedness, particularly balancing the risks and costs associated with stock holdings of essential items that have long lead-times / require strategic warning28

b. physical, human and information terrain considerations / factors

c. where the mission / operation lies on the cooperation-to-conflict continuum


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d. the size and construct (joint, coalition, interagency) of the supported dependency.

3.5 Cooperation-to-conflict continuum. Doctrine defines armed conflict as ‘a spectrum ranging from stable peace to general war’.29

However, in the FOE ‘persistent military competition will be enduring’, such that competition between states will be the constant condition, while cooperation and conflict are temporal.30 This model (graphically represented in Figure 1 below) is characterised by simultaneity, dynamism and scale.31

Violent Conflict

Cooperate

Collaborate

Compromise Confrontation

Compete

Less

More

Violent conflict thresholdViolent conflict threshold

‘Grey Zone’Accelerated environment:The complex interplay

between geopolitics, threat,technology and domains.

Work with othersto avert conflict

Strategic miscalculations leading to violent conflict

Figure 1 – The Competition Prism32

3.6 These three characteristics amplify the ADF’s requirement to support the full range of mission types with concurrent commitments domestically, regionally and globally.33 Provision of logistic effects that cover such a broad scale, variety of preparedness requirements and potential locations creates both Operations Generation (OPGEN) and Force Generation (FORGEN) tasks for the DefLogEnt. Collectively, the generation of logistic effects across the RTS cycle can then be measured


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financially, as well as risks to the preparedness of limited-redundancy / dual-assigned capabilities.

3.7 Collaboration with partners. Collaboration with WoG, coalition, industry and academic partners is essential to the ADF’s ability to achieve the strategic objectives of shape, deter and respond.34 This collaboration is a reflection of the realities of Australia’s status as a middle power, relative geographic isolation, the globalised nature of the majority of manufacturing and service industries, and subsequent reliance on air and sea lines of communication.35

3.8 Collaboration provides access to capabilities outside of, and contributes to, Australia’s sovereignty and overall supply network resilience.36 Benefits include:

a. opportunities to integrate high-end, skilled and technical sovereign industry workforce to sustain niche capabilities

b. global markets provide diversity and competitive pricing of goods and services at quantities or scale not available domestically (e.g. crude oil and aeronautical manufacturing)

c. access to additional sources of innovation, advanced technologies and systems

d. use of alternate staging and sustainment locations

e. a diversity of logistic intelligence and assessment functions.37

3.9 Deriving advantage from collaboration is founded on relationships established over the long-term, including a shared understanding of risk to the supply network.38 Therefore, the development of policy, resourcing agreements and interoperability (and its subsets including integration as defined by Aurora) measures in strategic guidance is vital to providing certainty to the DefLogEnt and partners across the Logistics System.

3.10 Countering threats to the DefLogEnt. In the FOE, kinetic, non-kinetic, electromagnetic and cyber-attacks will target people, platforms, CIS and physical stockholdings.39 Therefore, the growing reliance on connected digital systems, especially CIS, will require additional measures to protect and assure the information network.40 Further, as


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the Internet of Things (IoT) provides a proliferation of connected sensors, strategic logistic effects (including those functions conducted from / in the NSB) will grow increasingly vulnerable to cyber-attack.41 As a result, an understanding of the levels of assurance and integrity of information will be central to collaborating with partners and countering threats.42

3.11 Amplifying this threat are improvements to adversaries’ Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) that, along with developments to disruptive technologies, will provide greater capacity to identify and target elements of the logistic network.43 While improving survivability provides a means to treat this risk, it is not the only solution. Abilities such as Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS) signature management, greater levels of mobility for logistic force elements, decentralised manufacturing, dispersed stock holding, and utilising a variety of platforms and systems (e.g. multi-modal distribution) to provide highly adaptive support forward only when required, all offer alternatives.

3.12 ADF support to the 2019-20 bushfire crisis and COVID-19 pandemic response has highlighted both the DefLogEnt’s concurrency requirements and the current vulnerabilities and volatility of global supply networks.44 To overcome these threats, Defence must acknowledge that developing resilience and scalability in supply networks will generate additional costs, and that not all sources of risk can be mitigated. Countering this will require collaborative supply network risk management with partners across the Logistics System, as well as enhancing sovereign industrial capability and building structural flexibility into the DefLogEnt’s network architecture.45


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Central idea3.13 To counter the threats detailed above, the FVEY FOE 2040 states that ‘militaries must develop hardened, resilient, adaptive and assured logistics’.46 Detailed consideration of this requirement throughout the development of the CFL identified that to create advantageii:

The future Defence Logistics Enterprise must become survivable, assured, resilient and adaptive.

3.14 The DefLogEnt will maintain the ability to achieve the functions and principles of logistics but opportunities and threats must drive improved synchronisation of capabilities and options available for the provision of logistic effects using a combination of the four characteristics. Definitions of these characteristics are provided in the Glossary but applied to the DefLogEnt they denote the following.

a. Survivable. While providing support to ADF and other dependent force elements, logistic personnel, platforms and systems must be able to survive in all operational environments across the cooperation-to-conflict continuum.

b. Assured. Routine testing and supply network visibility will provide access confidence and verification of the DefLogEnt’s capacity to meet preparedness requirements and ability to provide support across the cooperation-to-conflict continuum.

c. Resilient. The DefLogEnt must have sufficient depth across its workforce, structure and equipment, and through collaboration with Logistics System partners, such that any impact to the ability to generate effects (through concurrent tasking, maintenance or loss) can be overcome without detriment to operational capability.

ii The Consultation Record is in Annex C.


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d. Adaptive. The DefLogEnt must achieve joint integration and Logistics System interoperability to be able to rapidly switch between different types of tasks, as well as generating multiple options to achieve logistic effects, thereby creating advantage for dependent force elements.

3.15 To address the military problem, the DefLogEnt must take concerted steps to prioritise the development of these characteristics and improve the level of collaboration with Logistics System partners. These reforms will occur across the following four themes:

a. Theme 1 – Workforce reshaping and reskilling. Recruitment, retention, education and training programs will be required to prepare the workforce for the cultural, technological and structural change that will deliver commonality; as well as developing the professional mastery of practitioners to communicate both the science and art of logistics.47 This theme supports the Defence Enterprise Learning Strategy 2035.48

b. Theme 2 – Force design. The force design theme will develop the future logistic network architecture (i.e. all components of the control, information and physical networks) through the Defence Capability Assurance Program. This is the broadest theme and will effect both enterprise / RTS, and deployed / operational logistic effects.

c. Theme 3 – Capability acquisition and sustainment. The capability acquisition and sustainment process requires improved agility and responsiveness to allow Defence to increase its technological advantage.49 This theme will support all Capability Managers (CMs) increase the rate of introduction into service and interoperability outcomes, examine the opportunities and threats of a reduced focus on exquisite solutions, and ensure fully resourced and developed Integrated Logistic Support (ILS) arrangements are central to acquisition and sustainment.


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d. Theme 4 – Interoperability. The interoperability theme reflects the ongoing work of Force Integration Division and provides the overall coordination function of implementing all outcomes for the Force-In-Being (FIB).

Opportunities to create advantage 3.16 As the FOE will be more complicated, contested and congested, the DefLogEnt must use the four themes to move away from a business as usual approach if it is to become survivable, assured, resilient and adaptive. While new technologies will offer opportunities to be more efficient and effective, creating advantage across the cooperation-to-conflict continuum is reliant on commonality of processes, platforms and systems that allow synchronisation and joint integration.

3.17 Focus of acquisition. The current focus on the acquisition of exquisite solutions limits the DefLogEnt’s ability to exploit technological evolution in the FOE. Exquisite solutions represent value for money through factors such as interoperability across the FIB and with coalition partners, mandated levels of sovereign content and long life-of-type. However, the high-cost per item and lengthy acquisition process provides ability over quantity, rather than achieving a balance with the ‘affordable and plentiful’.50 Exquisite solutions also limit the diversity of industry support options available and force a reliance on technically advanced capabilities over mass; a position that will not be sustainable for the ADF in the FOE.51 As a result, the current acquisition process is unlikely to be agile enough to keep pace with the rate of technological change.52 To overcome this and ensure capability acquisition and sustainment includes agreed logistic support arrangements, balances a technological edge with lead time and quantity and supports overall resilience, the DefLogEnt must have a greater influence on contestability within the CLC.53

3.18 Agile and cooperative logistics arrangements. Increased focus on the Indo-Pacific by Australia and its key collation partners must drive increased use of agile and cooperative logistic arrangements to set the theatre and improve resilience. This will require better visibility of opportunities for logistics cooperation, and the ability to exchange ‘like for like’ services, rather than being reliant on slow-moving and complex cash-based payment systems. For example, the Movement Coordination Centre Europe provides visibility of available lift capabilities (sea, air and


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land) and simplified processes for exchange of transport services (e.g. air-to-air refuelling) amongst like-minded nations.54 A similar adaptability arrangement in Australia’s region could yield efficiencies in the use of scarce lift assets belonging to all participating nations, generating additional levels of assurance and resilience. Of note, development of this outcome will need the support from the Directorate of International Government Agreements and Arrangements (Defence Legal Division).

3.19 Big Data and Advanced Analytics (BDAA). BDAA is the methodology that makes sense and enables visualisation of large volumes of information; it has particular application to the development of algorithms and applications for use in Artificial Intelligence (AI).55 BDAA is the enabling technology that will allow the exploitation of emerging and disruptive technologies but requires data that is ‘relevant, timely and reliable’.56 To be able to exploit BDAA in the medium to long-term, the DefLogEnt must rapidly develop a data collection / archiving policy. Once realised, use of BDAA will contribute to supply network visibility and illumination, planning and decision making (e.g. through use of a UDOP that fuses information from ISR feeds on the physical network), as well as broader logistics governance and assurance functions.57 BDAA has a Technological Readiness Level (TRL) of 4 (validation in a laboratory environment), with a predicted horizon of 2025.58

3.20 Quantum technology. The use of BDAA and quantum technology in predictive analytics will provide greater efficiencies for the DefLogEnt and the Logistics System. Future quantum technology capabilities will include improving the accuracy of forecasting functions, anticipating resupply requirements based on live data, and optimising the use of the physical and information networks (including real-time integration of ISR feeds).59 As such, quantum technology has the potential to optimise the generation of a range of logistic functions which will contribute to both resilience and adaptability. Quantum (information science) technology has a TRL of 4 and a predicted horizon of 2035.60

3.21 Manufacturing. Developments in manufacturing, including production of novel materials, will have both emergent and disruptive impacts in the FOE, particularly by enabling a diversity of options for materiel engineering and maintenance of platforms and systems to enhance supply network resilience (especially in distant, disconnected


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and austere settings).61 iii These developments concern both conventional (subtractive) manufacturing processes, such as computer numerical control machining, and Additive Manufacturing (AM) which includes both 3D printing (already a mature capability) and 4D printing.62

3.22 The DefLogEnt has been using 3D printing on a limited scale for almost ten years to increase the efficiency of supply and repair functions.63 To date, introduction of 3D printing has required training for personnel on design and modelling, and is indicative of the broader changes to education and training that are needed. This change from developing ‘manual workers’ to the creative skills of ‘knowledge workers’ is a key characteristic of the opportunities presented by the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR, also known as Industry 4.0), and therefore a common factor across the fields of manufacturing, distribution, materiel engineering and maintenance.64 Future developments include the following.

a. In the short-term, 3D printing will include greater ability to grow complex structures out of a pool of liquid. This technology overcomes some of the issues listed in paragraph 3.25 below, and will provide far greater accuracy for printing of smaller-scale items.65

b. In the longer-term, robotic flying / mobile 3D printers will increase the range of options available for complex or dangerous engineering and maintenance functions.66 For distribution functions, 3D printing of a growing variety of items such as food and explosive ordnance will offer added survivability, resilience and adaptability measures for the supply network.67

3.23 Challenges for broader use of AM across the DefLogEnt (particularly in deployed / austere environments) include: limits on part size (as determined by the size of the printer), anisotropic mechanical properties (especially for traditional 3D printing), poor accuracy (causing

iii Military applications for future manufacturing and novel materials also extend beyond logistics effects, e.g. 3D printed drones and buildings. However, as these uses are not unique to logistics they are not addressed by the CFL. Atherton (2017), ‘The Marine Corps want to 3D print cheaper drones’; Yin et al (2018), ‘3D Printing and Buildings: A Technology Review and Future Outlook’, p 104-5


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issues such as warping and voids in the formations between layers), raw material usage (including multi-material printing) and the mobility, connectivity and power demands of printers.68 Overall, AM is assessed at being at TRL 7 (system prototype demonstration), with a predicted horizon of 2025.69

3.24 Development of novel materials such as graphene indicate potential for improved strength to weight ratios, EMS absorptive properties, longer operational life, greater energy storage and superconductivity.70 Energy storage and conductivity are of particular interest to the DefLogEnt due to the growing sustainment demands of battlefield sensors, vehicles, communications and computers.71 Future energy storage is assessed as having a TRL of 5 (component validation in a relevant environment) and a time horizon of 2030; while novel materials are at TRL 2 (concept formulated), with a predicted horizon of 2040.72

3.25 Future manufacturing will complement and expand the DefLogEnt’s current integral capabilities by reducing costs associated with the stockholding of low-turnover items and sourcing issues due to obsolescence. To take advantage of these opportunities, the DefLogEnt must collaborate with Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) and partners across the Logistics System to inform a targeted investment and development strategy. This step must also consider Intellectual Property (IP) ownership and use agreements that provide the flexibility to support appropriate and relevant operational capabilities in the most effective manner.

3.26 To support resilience (especially by contributing to engineering and maintenance functions) and assuredness measures, introduction into service of new manufacturing capabilities must replace the current piecemeal business as usual practices and focus on supporting CMs by developing comprehensive ILS arrangements, and ensuring interoperability is maintained (where possible).73 This may be achieved through manufacture of complete products, or the establishment of interdependent agreements, whereby each partner nation across a supply network is responsible for different components of a complete product.


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3.27 Distribution. Examples of current distribution technology (TRL 9) with direct military application include: warehouses staffed by robots, supply chain ordering and delivery functions optimised by AI, heavy loads distributed by autonomous trains and trucks, and medical and blood products being delivered by drone.74 These examples demonstrate how a convergence of RAS and AI (enabled by BDAA) in the FOE will allow greater numbers of tasks that are deemed ‘dull, dirty, dangerous or dear’ to be transferred from human to machine, improving survivability and allowing focus to shift to developing the unique creative skills of ‘knowledge workers’.75

3.28 Additionally, advances made in the study of last mile logistics such as route optimisation, omni-channel satisfaction of demands (which aligns with ‘hierarchal command – agile control’) and multi-modal distribution (e.g. moving items from a freight vehicle to a drone or unmanned ground vehicle for the final stage of delivery) will support resilience by diversifying the range of capabilities available.76 They are especially relevant to developing options for providing logistic effects in complex physical environments such as archipelagic areas, slums or mega-cities dominated by high-rises and subterranean networks.77

3.29 While the DefLogEnt will still be reliant on fossil fuels in 2040, future investment decisions (for platforms and infrastructure) must seek to diversify power / energy sources, capture and storage technologies.78 This requirement is driven by the ongoing decline in Australia’s sovereign fuel refining capability and subsequent reliance on vulnerable sea lines of communication for fuel imports.79 The Logistics System has already adopted a two speed response to this problem, with smaller nations, local authorities and corporations announcing future bans on sales of vehicles with internal combustion engines, net zero emissions targets and adopting alternate energy sources (especially for transport use) much faster than militaries.80

3.30 The DefLogEnt must identify the most adaptable future distribution platforms, standardised modular storage and delivery systems (e.g. containerisation, packaging etc.) and CIS to invest in. Acquisition of these will assist in addressing the challenges arising from the threats, extended lines of communication, diversity and austerity of the geography within our immediate region.


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a. Acquisition of future platforms, modular systems and CIS must leverage structural flexibility measures (such as late product configuration) to allow Service / domain specific requirements to be accommodated without undermining the advantages attained through interoperability.81 However, measures to increase adaptability must not detract from survivability.

b. Improvements to standardised modular warehousing, storage and delivery systems (including increasing levels of automation) are being driven by online retailers’ search for efficiencies.82 Military applications of these include increasing the options to conceal items from adversarial ISR, and reducing the need to reconfigure or break-down stores as they move towards the final stages of delivery.

3.31 Materiel engineering and maintenance. The DefLogEnt must pursue advances in materiel engineering and maintenance that enable forward production of repair parts and the ability for Defence to conduct deep maintenance / heavy grade repair to sustain and prolong the life of platforms and equipment fleets. These process must take advantage of future technologies to maintain appropriate assuredness functions such as sea, land and air worthiness. To support survivability and adaptability measures, future materiel engineering capabilities must be able to provide design assurance at the point of application and the ability to design bespoke solutions at the point of need.

3.32 The increased digitisation of platforms and infrastructure as part of the 4IR will permit greater levels of remote monitoring and assessments (including by drone), leading to greater assurance and efficiency through predictive maintenance functions.83 Some of these opportunities will be impacted by the issues arising from increased cyber threats, OEMs’ use of black box systems and arrangements to access to IP but reflect the broader trend of logistic functions being increasingly reliant on BDAA.84 Examples include:

a. Digital twins. Digital twins progress the current use of Health Usage and Monitoring Systems and allows platform / system and external data to be aggregated to generate predictive or simulated information for areas such as building information


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management, predictive maintenance (through real-time performance monitoring), optimisation and system status.85 Digital twins generate ‘guided intelligent decision support’ to prepare for and conduct maintenance, e.g. through the use of Augmented Reality (AR).86 The use of BDAA technologies to support digital twins for military platforms has TRLs between 4 and 6 (prototype demonstration), with a predicted horizon of 2025-2030.87

b. Remote and autonomous systems. Automated systems are already used for a range of analytic functions that support engineering and maintenance, e.g. the Prognostic and Health Management System on the F-35.88 However, future RAS (such as miniaturised robots able to assess and repair large engines) will support survivability measures through the transfer of engineering and maintenance tasks from human to machine.89

3.33 The DefLogEnt must use the convergence of digital twins and RAS to improve platform / system availability and the technical assuredness (e.g. for sea, land and air worthiness) provided by logistic governance functions. This includes the ability for commanders to accept risk in delaying or reducing maintenance for operational necessity, and the conduct of repairs in isolated settings (e.g. with limited or no OEM support). Future maintenance functions, either manual, augmented or autonomous, will continue to be essential in providing commanders and operators the assurance that platforms / systems will function as intended.

3.34 Recovery. The DefLogEnt must pursue advances in distribution and maintenance technology to allow RAS to augment or independently conduct a range of recovery tasks (e.g. battlefield clearance and downed aircraft retrieval), which will improve survivability and reduce risks to personnel from exposure to adversary and environmental threats. The same capabilities can also support the collection of materiel for weapons and technical intelligence assessments.

3.35 Salvage. Salvage describes the reuse of materiel to prevent usable resources from falling into adversary hands, and to mitigate


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against the risk of shortfalls in items of high demand.90 iv Use of salvaged items is reliant on technically qualified assessment, inspection and classification prior to use, and the increased prevalence of digital operating systems generates an opportunity to accelerate this process through the use of RAS. To improve adaptability and realise this capability, the DefLogEnt must develop common principles (noting processes will be specific to the platform / system) to describe how RAS would conduct salvage for component parts (e.g. ammunition, fuel or CIS), through to complete platforms (e.g. a drone or vehicle).

3.36 Use of pre-existing infrastructure and local resources. Increased urbanisation, climate change and rates of digitisation and automation will continue to drive higher energy requirements, strain global resources, and remain a source of competition / conflict.91 As a result, high-intensity, large-scale operations will make the ability to use locally acquired resources, both natural and synthetic (especially water and fuel), a means to improve survivability and generate advantage.v Such contingencies will also see the capture or seizure of infrastructure becoming an operational or strategic imperative.vi Much like recovery and salvage, the use of RAS to augment or conduct assessments, inspections and classifications of resources reduces exposing personnel to risk, and provides an opportunity to accelerate these functions.

3.37 Support to whole of government. Increased threats to human security (including from extreme weather events), state fragility and ongoing support to civil authorities for activities such as HADR require the Future Force to be interoperable with agencies from across the WoG, including the States and Territories.92 Opportunities to create advantage in the provision of logistic support to WoG in domestic, regional or global settings are based on routine partnerships that underpin adaptability,

iv Although contemporary examples of salvage are restricted to insurgencies, there is historical precedent for the ADF with the use of Italian weapons, ammunition, vehicles and supplies to supplement the defences at Tobruk. Joseph (2020), ‘Enemies under fire from their own guns’; Australian War Memorial (2017), Tobruk

v For example, the 4th Light Horse Brigade’s seizure of wells at Beersheba in the First World War. Van-Dyk (2007), The charge of the 4th Light Horse Brigade at Beersheba.

vi In July 1942, Nazi Germany planned to seize oil fields in the Caucasus to both bolster their own fuel supplies and deny them to the Soviets. Weinberg (1994), A world at arms: a global history of World War II, p 410; Craig (1986), ‘The political leader as strategist’, p 495.


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for example: acquisition of interoperable platforms and CIS, shared use of infrastructure including training facilities, and regular interaction throughout the RTS cycle.

3.38 Collaboration with coalition partners. Logistics interoperability with coalition partners offers improved resilience but will be determined by the regularity with which support can be exercised, and the extent to which data can be shared. For security and resource reasons, integration between the DefLogEnt and coalition partners’ logistics elements, can only be considered with high priority coalition partners.vii

3.39 Broader interoperability (compatibility and de-confliction) with other regional partners will require the capacity to overlay logistic data and information from other decision support tools to create a UDOP across coalition systems for operational and strategic level planning. It is reliant on a highly adaptable approach, and will be achieved using logistic support instruments that are regularly reviewed when setting the theatre to ensure flexibility for Government when considering military options.93

3.40 Partnership between Defence and industry. Industry (sovereign and international) is an essential element of the Logistics System that provides capability and support services; with Australia’s sovereign defence industry a national strategic asset.94 Secure, mutually beneficial and long-term partnerships with industry will provide flexibility for iterative capability development, allows the use of technologies that simplify configuration management, and provides greater resilience and assurance in both the NSB and on operations. These opportunities are based on considerations including: supporting policy measures (especially concerning security), criticality of the capability, technological complexity, and IP and data ownership / access (especially for black box systems). Realising these opportunities will require logisticians to have greater commercial acumen, including the ability to interpret and manage contracts, and greater use of relational contracts that support the establishment of strategic partnerships.95

vii The Defence International Engagement Plan provides strategic direction that drives engagement with coalition partners.


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3.41 Promoting innovation and adaptation. WoG, coalition, industry and academic partners all offer a diverse range of experiences to draw from and innovative ideas on how to counter threats and create advantage. To realise these opportunities, the DefLogEnt must promote adaptation and collaborative innovation (particularly internal to Australia) that complements the continual development of professional mastery and recognises the increasing tendency for individuals to move between various organisations.96 In order to achieve this, the DefLogEnt must engage with think tanks and organisations such as the Defence Science and Technology (DST) Group, the Defence Innovation Hub, the Centre for Defence Industry Capability and the Force Exploration Hub.97 This engagement must remain mindful of the unique requirement for military logistics to complement strategy and tactics in generating combat power.98

3.42 Preparedness. The DefLogEnt must support the principles of Defence preparedness management. In particular, the use of a common lexicon, supply network visibility, and measurable settings and requirements (i.e. developing sufficient logistics capabilities and stock holdings) will all contribute to assurance by mitigating threat-based strategic risk when warning-time can no longer be assumed.99 Further, the DefLogEnt has a central role in all five dimensions of preparedness (physical, cultural, intellectual, technological and organisational), reinforcing logistics’ position as a vital component of warfighting.100

3.43 Mobilisation. The DefLogEnt must support the development of and baseline capabilities for the Defence Mobilisation Plan. These actions will contribute to logistics assurance (at the strategic level) and the ability to achieve Government’s directed improvements to the ADF’s self-reliance.101 Critically, in the event of Defence mobilisation, the ADF will rapidly require interoperability not just with the WoG but the whole-of-nation to ensure limited resources are coordinated to achieve the maximum national security effect.102


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3.44 Storage. The DefLogEnt’s support to mobilisation and whole-of-nation interoperability must consider storage of critical items (such as weapons, spare / repair parts, munitions and fuel) to make Australia’s supply network more resilient and assured.103 Considerations include but are not limited to:

a. Achieving a balance between consolidated (efficient) and dispersed (effective) locales. This balance must take into account the desired quantities, as well as environmental and technical storage factors for the different classes of supply, e.g. the effect of humidity / temperature on perishable items, and minimising movement of highly sensitive items (such as guided weapons and explosive ordnance).

b. Ability and capacity of the storage location to support forward or bare basing (domestically and regionally), especially access / proximity to major infrastructure, i.e. the transport modes employed throughout the physical network.

c. The ability for pre-existing or dual use infrastructure to accommodate the security classification and sensitivity of materiel, especially for strike, cyber and space capabilities.

d. The practical measures needed to support supply network visibility and illumination, as well as the security of and access to associated data

3.45 Rare earth and critical minerals. In a highly globalised market, resource insecurity will mean the DefLogEnt must use supply network illumination to assess the level of risk being accepted by the reliance on a limited number of suppliers, in particular for rare earth and critical minerals.104 The current dominance of China in the production of rare earth minerals and their willingness to withhold supplies as a means to influence trade disputes is of particular concern.105 However, Australia’s significant geological reserves of critical minerals and expertise in extraction, processing and engineering provides opportunities for whole-of-nation economic development, increased self-reliance and resilience.106


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SECTION 4 – IMPLEMENTATION Introduction4.1 The following ability statements are arranged by the Fundamental Inputs to Capability (FIC) and drawn from analysis throughout the CFL. They have been tested through DST-led experimentation that included representation from across Defence and provide actionable considerations for the design of the Future Force.

Ability statements4.2 Table 1 below summarises the ability statements by FIC and assigns the Main Effort (ME) and Supporting Effort (SE) to the four themes. Full detail on each ability statement is provided below.

4.3 Following that, Figure 2 indicatively plots the thirteen ability statements chronologically along the four themes, either as the ME (represented by a yellow star), or as a SE (represented by a grey triangle). This is intended as a guide only, with overlap and concurrent activity expected.


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FIC Ability Statement

Them

e 1

– W

orkf

orce

re

shap

ing

and

resk

illin

g

Them

e 2

– Fo

rce

desi

gn

Them

e 3

– C

apab

ility

ac

quis

ition

and

sus

tain

men

t

Them

e 4

– In

tero

pera

bilit

y

Organisation

1. Authoritative technical control framework SE SE SE ME

2. Sufficient force packages SE ME SE SE

Command and management

3. C5ISREW arrangements supporting interoperability - ME SE SE

4. Interoperability with WoG and coalition SE SE SE ME

5. CIS that can fuse data and create advantage SE SE SE ME

Personnel 6. Adaptable and technically literate workforce ME - SE -

Collective training 7. Validate the provision of logistics - SE SE ME

Major systems 8. Influence acquisition of major systems - SE ME SE

Facilities and training areas

9. Fit for purpose and at industry standard SE ME SE -

Supplies 10. Stockholding, commonality and structural flexibility - ME SE -

Support

11. Use new and emerging technology for manufacturing, engineering and maintenance

SE - ME SE

12. Use RAS / AI for distribution SE SE ME SE

Industry 13. Mutually beneficial policies and regulations SE SE ME SE

Table 1 - Ability statements’ main and supporting efforts by theme


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1 4 13 6 5 11 12 9 2Theme 1 - Workforce reshaping and reskilling

1 8 7 4 133 10 295 12Theme 2 - Force design

1 3 7 4 1313 68 11 12 10 295 9 10 2Theme 3 - Capability aquisition and sustainment

3 13 11481 7 4 25 2Theme 4 - Interoperability

12

Survivable,Assusred, Resilient

andAdaptive

FIB Future Force

Key: ME SE

Figure 2 - Ability statements alignment to the themes over time

Organisation

Ability Statement 1: The DefLogEnt must incorporate an authoritative technical control framework with an appointed Logistics Authority that is able to integrate and synchronise the generation of logistic effects for the ADF and other dependent force elements.

4.4 The DefLogEnt must be formalised and resourced as an enduring technical control function. Formalisation includes the appointment of a Logistics Authority with the ability to make enforceable decisions, while resourcing will provide the additional personnel, systems and infrastructure necessary to undertake the new roles and responsibilities. This will support the JFA by developing the processes and capacity to integrate and synchronise logistic effects for Defence. Failure to implement this measure will see a repeat of previous unsuccessful


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attempts to achieve unity of effort across the DefLogEnt.viii

4.5 The appointed Logistics Authority is to lead the DefLogEnt to:

a. support the Groups and Services by coordinating and synchronising the activities of the DefLogEnt, including the adoption of new and emerging platforms and systems, to optimise the logistic network architecture

b. ensure PME, individual, joint and collective training uses common language, processes and systems to enable joint integration

c. endorse ILS support arrangements for the acquisition of major multi-domain systems as part of the CLC

d. support CMs and Estate and Infrastructure Group (E&IG) to inform facilities and training area investment

e. supporting the Groups and Services’ senior logistics appointees (Director General Logistics or Support) in achieving intra-Service logistics objectives and inter-Service integration

f. defining data and information communication technology standards (with assistance from the Chief Information Officer Group and Force Integration Division).

viii For example, despite being endorsed by the Defence Logistics Committee, the tasks and timelines provided in the Defence Logistics Enterprise Strategy 2016-2021 (JLC, 2016) have not been achieved. This document drew on analysis from the Future Logistics Concept 2035 (JLC, 2015), which had similarly limited outcomes.


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Ability Statement 2: The DefLogEnt will generate assuredness by having sufficient force packages to provide a diversity of capability options for all preparedness requirements, and achieve redundancy of logistic effects up to the operational level.

4.6 At all three levels of command, the DefLogEnt must have the resilience to ensure the Future Force is able to meet all preparedness requirements articulated in strategic guidance. At the tactical to operational levels, the DefLogEnt must have the structure and flexibility to generate a diversity of options for the provision of logistics across multiple domains. At the operational to strategic levels, scale and resource constraints will reduce the range of organic capability options, this must be mitigated by collaboration with Logistics System partners.107

4.7 Sufficient number and diversity of logistic force packages will provide JTF Commanders greater capacity to adapt to dynamic tactical and operational demands, including: rapid changes to mission types (e.g. from conflict to HADR) and resilience in the face of loss or unavailability through lack of communication, maintenance etc. Employment of these logistic force packages will continue to be reliant on appropriate Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Cyber, ISR and Electronic Warfare (C5ISREW) support arrangements.

Command and management

Ability Statement 3: The DefLogEnt’s C5ISREW support arrangements will enable the highly resilient and adaptive provision of logistic effects to dependent force elements.

4.8 The DefLogEnt requires C5ISREW support arrangements (for both FORGEN and OPGEN functions) that enable hierarchal command and agile control for optimal and effective logistic support to the Future Force. Success requires the existence of a culture that is founded on


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commonality, enables joint integration and embraces innovation and technological change within acceptable levels of risk.

a. Commonality across the Groups and Services is critical to achieving joint integration. Detail relevant to each FIC is provided below.

b. An integrated joint force will allow in support of control arrangements to be standard practice for logistics elements. This will increase the diversity of support options available to dependent forces, providing more adaptive and assured logistic effects.

c. Embracing innovation and technological change will complement the cultural change required to achieve joint integration and make Service or platform specific processes the exception, not the norm.

Ability Statement 4: C2 and management arrangements must enable the DefLogEnt to be interoperable with WoG and coalition partners.

4.9 The DefLogEnt must be integrated with key WoG agencies (i.e. those responsible for national security and emergency management) and select high priority coalition partners across the three key interoperability dimensions (technical, procedural and human). This includes the ability to develop a UDOP to facilitate logistics planning and effects down to the operational level.

4.10 The DefLogEnt must be compatible with coalition partners in our immediate region. Noting the array of technology access and standards across the immediate region, the DefLogEnt’s use of advanced and secure technologies must not compromise the ability for force elements and systems to interact with these partners for tasks across the cooperation-to-conflict continuum. This will support the development of agile and cooperative logistic arrangements.


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Ability Statement 5: The DefLogEnt requires CIS with the ability to fuse and visualise data from systems and sensors to develop relevant, timely and reliable information that supports decision-making, and creates advantage across all domains.

4.11 The DefLogEnt must be enabled by trained personnel, CIS and decision support tools that can employ BDAA to exploit collected data (including historic and unstructured data sets). This applies to the physical (e.g. determining the safest or fastest routes), information (e.g. use of supply network visibility to determine satisfaction of demands), and command (e.g. the use of agile control relationships) networks. CIS must also be able to maintain functionality without continuous connectivity to the NSB, or an intermediate node (either due to bandwidth limitations or hostile action).

4.12 Data sharing internally and across the Logistics System (especially industry and coalition partners) is essential because it will enable assured predictive analytics, supply network visibility and illumination, and result in a more resilient and adaptive DefLogEnt. However, supply network visibility with coalition and WoG partners only contributes to capability for items that are common, so CIS must be able to use autonomy / AI to rapidly and continually assess which data to share. Data sharing functions must also take into account application of security classifications, particularly of aggregated data.

4.13 To support the achievement of resilience and adaptability, redundancy for CIS in congested and contested information environments must be established and practiced. Processes completed off-line / manually must be able to synchronise with the NSB / intermediate node’s CIS without detriment to the level of information assurance.


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Personnel

Ability Statement 6: The DefLogEnt requires a workforce that has the adaptability and technical literacy to deliver, operate, sustain and dispose of new capabilities at a rate that enables advantage to be maintained, if not gained.

4.14 The DefLogEnt’s program of professional mastery must promote cultural change, innovation and creative opportunities that complements the Future Force’s PME to ensure that:

a. common language, processes and systems are employed to enable joint integration

b. operators, commanders, managers and directors within the DefLogEnt are able to adopt and exploit new technology

c. personnel are able to draw on skills, knowledge and attributes from across the Logistics System (especially industry and academia), without diminishing the unique requirement of the DefLogEnt to support dependent force elements engaged in high-intensity conflict

d. elements of the workforce retain the capability and capacity to support CMs in the development of comprehensive ILS arrangements.

4.15 The DefLogEnt must work with Defence People Group to develop recruitment and retention policies that will enable it to compete in a congested and dynamic labour market. This must include skills / qualification mapping in new and emerging technologies for personnel joining Defence, or providing support as part of the Logistics System.

4.16 Training for DefLogEnt’s workforce must support the ability to work with and be augmented by sovereign industry. This requires flexible and mutually beneficial arrangements that do not disadvantage OEMs / industry, or hinder their support to functions across the RTS cycle.


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4.17 Advances in technology will require changes to the DefLogEnt workforce, with personnel having the technological literacy to use a variety of data and information sources to support decision-making. This ability is founded on common training, processes and language that can rapidly integrate diverse ideas and solutions. Further to this:

a. As connectivity and information security cannot be guaranteed, relevant elements of the DefLogEnt workforce must be able to maintain operational capability using off-line / manual processes, or when disconnected from centralised databases.

b. Elements of the workforce will require the ability to rapidly develop and modify software to support data processing, exploitation and dissemination for specific mission and operational requirements. This includes seeking and understanding input from data specialists and legal practitioners to address the practicalities of supply network visibility and IP considerations.

c. To gain advantage from opportunities presented by future manufacturing, engineering and maintenance capabilities (e.g. AM and RAS), the workforce must have personnel that are capable of technical design, modelling and assurance. This will allow the DefLogEnt to generate supply network resilience and additional options for maintenance; noting highly regulated platforms / systems will require collaborative arrangements with OEMs.


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Collective trainingAbility Statement 7: The ADF’s collective training regime must validate the provision of survivable, assured, resilient and adaptive logistics across the cooperation-to-conflict continuum.

4.18 The Logistics Authority, in partnership with the Joint Collective Training Authority (within JOC), must provide regular and realistic collective training (including through live, virtual and constructive simulation) that provides Government and Defence evidence that directed preparedness and operational capabilities can be achieved. Additionally, this training will:

a. incorporate relevant and realistic serials that test both the DefLogEnt and a JTF Commander’s ability to deal with changes to the operational plan as a result of logistics complexity / threats to the generation of logistic effects, and coalition interoperability (where appropriate)

b. stress the capability of the DefLogEnt to ensure ILS arrangements, gaps and opportunities are understood across Defence, and responses can be prioritised based on operation assessment methodologies108

c. complement training and ongoing refinement of common logistic tactics, techniques and procedures across the Groups and Services.


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Major systemsAbility Statement 8: The DefLogEnt must have the authority and capacity to influence the acquisition of major systems.

4.19 The DefLogEnt must perform a greater role in providing consistent and coherent input to the CLC for the acquisition and development of major systems. ILS arrangements within the CLC must be endorsed by the Logistics Authority or authorised representative to ensure all platforms are sustainable, to achieve supply network resilience, joint integration, and iterative introduction into service of new capabilities, especially risk-worthy platforms.109

4.20 This will also ensure ILS arrangements are coordinated across the Groups and Services to support stratified equipment fleets (including legacy, Commercial Off The Shelf [COTS] and emerging / trial platforms and systems) with minimal disruption to common measures across the personnel, collective training, supplies and support FIC.

4.21 The future DefLogEnt must be enabled by an acquisition process that will provide:

a. the adaptability for operational capability to maintain pace with technological developments

b. assurance that systems have through life sustainability

c. a coordinated and transparent approach to industry engagement that promotes long-term partnerships

d. data and information sharing functions that enables predictive analytics (including simulation and testing of contracted support) and supply network visibility.


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Facilities and training areasAbility Statement 9: The DefLogEnt must have the expertise and resources to ensure facilities and training areas remain fit for purpose and at industry standard.

4.22 The DefLogEnt must provide input into the CLC to articulate opportunities and risks associated with infrastructure requirements to support capability. This must include facilities and training areas for DefLogEnt capability needs, and ADF use of national critical infrastructure. This will require ongoing collaboration with E&IG, Strategic Critical Infrastructure and Foreign Investment Branch, as well relevant Federal, State and Territory government departments.

4.23 The DefLogEnt must remain directly engaged with Federal, State and Territory government departments to ensure the suitability of and access to selected national critical infrastructure (e.g. airfields, sea ports, terminals and major arterial roads) to be used for rapid deployment, surge sustainment operations, or mobilisation.

SuppliesAbility Statement 10: The DefLogEnt must ensure supplies are held at the most appropriate nodes, as well as maximising commonality and structural flexibility measures to generate resilience and access confidence.

4.24 To generate resilience and access confidence, the supply network architecture must ensure that:

a. common CIS and logistic processes are implemented to achieve joint integration and make logistic governance as efficient as possible

b. there is sufficient fuel / energy infrastructure (movement, storage and quality control abilities) domestically and across the immediate region to achieve directed tasks


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c. bare and dual use facilities are able to be stood up rapidly in support of operations

d. stock holdings of critical supplies are developed, such that degraded access to, and across, the NSB does not limit the ADF’s operational capability (this includes managing risk arising from the impacts of climate change and extreme weather events on ports, airfields, road and rail networks).

4.25 Further to this, emerging technology must be exploited to:

a. use predicative analytics and logistics intelligence to regularly assess the levels of stock quantities held, and the balance between centralised and distributed storage locations

b. rationalise holdings of supplies by identifying commonalities across different equipment fleets (this will also inform options for alternate suppliers and considerations when upgrading or replacing platforms and systems)

c. expand the use of modularised systems, containerisation and packaging that does not require reconfiguration to increase both velocity at intermodal nodes and aid concealment from adversaries’ ISR

d. targeted increased use of integral manufacturing capabilities (including AM) to produce Class IX items (repair parts) on demand at selected nodes

e. improve resilience and access confidence through supply network visibility and logistics governance.


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SupportAbility Statement 11: Manufacturing, engineering and maintenance activities must be able to utilise new and emerging technology in order to develop resilience and adaptability.

4.26 The DefLogEnt’s integral manufacturing capabilities must be able support the conduct of infrastructure / materiel engineering and maintenance. This includes access to relevant data / IP, raw materials as well as training and education in appropriate design and technical integrity skillsets and certification / assurance (e.g. sea, land and air worthiness) functions.

4.27 In partnership with OEMs, future engineering and maintenance functions must be able to fully exploit novel technologies (e.g. RAS, AI and AR) to maximise the operational availability of systems and ensuring the ongoing viability of the capability. These technologies should also be exploited to reduce the direct support required within a deployed setting. This includes:

a. use of remote monitoring (e.g. digital twins) to inform preventive and condition-based maintenance requirements, monitor system status and other predictive analytic functions

b. use of automation / machine cognition to augment, or independently conduct assessments, inspections and classification of systems, platforms, materiel and infrastructure.

Ability Statement 12: The DefLogEnt must be able to use RAS / AI to optimise the planning and execution of all distribution functions (including CASEVAC and cold chain management of Class VIII supplies).


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4.28 Future sustainment support capabilities (teams of personnel, their equipment and or RAS) must have the integral skills, qualifications and variety of platforms to employ distribution methods appropriate to the mission and environment. These capabilities must be complemented by CIS / AI that can fuse data from multiple sensors and present relevant information in a UDOP to generate decision advantage.

4.29 Additionally, this information must enable a Commander to make timely and appropriate decisions. This includes the ability for a Commander to model / simulate a proposed plan to identify areas of risk and systems able to provide options for their treatment (i.e. recommender systems).

IndustryAbility Statement 13: The policies and regulatory framework that govern the DefLogEnt’s engagement with industry and academia must promote innovation and the sharing of ideas for mutual benefit.

4.30 Collaborative industry and academic partnerships with the DefLogEnt, supported by appropriate policies, will enable greater supply network resilience and adaptability. This will be achieved through:

a. secure access to data and IP to generate access confidence, supply network visibility and illumination

b. implementing mutually beneficial structural flexibility in the supply network architecture (including identification of dual use sovereign industry capabilities and enhancing partnerships with coalition industry)

c. increased use of relational contracts to develop agile strategic partnerships based on mutually beneficial outcomes (including contingencies to provide support to operations)


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d. incorporating industry and academic partners in exercises and simulation activities to develop greater understanding of what and how they can contribute in a deployed setting

e. increased resourcing of security organisations to improve the ability for industry and academia to collaborate with the DefLogEnt.


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SECTION 5 – CONCLUSION5.1 In response to a dynamic and shifting strategic environment, including the impact of recent crises exposing the vulnerabilities of global supply networks, Defence no longer has time for gradual adjustment of military capabilities and preparedness. Additionally, the future operating environment will be more complicated, contested and congested. As a result, the conventional practice of generating the majority of logistic effects through single Service / domains must be expanded to a multi-domain approach and be complemented by deliberate decisions about the levels of self-reliance across different commodities and capabilities.

5.2 To facilitate the generation and synchronisation of effects from and across multiple domains, the DefLogEnt must be reformed to focus on commonality across the Services and mutually beneficial collaboration with Logistic System partners. Realisation of this intent will require formalising the DefLogEnt and additional resources for the establishment of a Logistics Authority with technical control. These changes will establish a framework that has the authority and capacity to coordinate the considerable preparedness requirements across the raise, train and sustain cycle, as well as generating increased interoperability with WoG and coalition partners.

5.3 Achieving this reform will require the DefLogEnt to undergo significant cultural, technological and structural change. These changes are necessary to position the DefLogEnt to exploit the raft of emerging and disruptive technologies that will change the way logistic effects are generated out to 2040. Of most significance will be the growing rate of digitised operating systems and proliferation of connected sensors which will lead to an exponential increase in the volumes of, and reliance on, data. The application of big data in the future will offer significant opportunities to improve the generation of logistic effects across manufacturing, distribution and maintenance (the CFL does not examine medical and health support).

a. Future manufacturing capabilities will provide opportunities to generate advantage by increasing the ability to produce a range of items (such as food and ammunition but especially repair parts) in deployed, intermediate and austere locations.


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These additional options will make the supply network more assured and reduce demand on extended sea and air lines of communication. However, wider adoption of future manufacturing capabilities is reliant on more collaborative agreements with industry (particularly around issues of IP and data use to support technical assurance).

b. Big data and advanced analytics will continue to improve the full gamut of distribution functions. This includes: inventory management and awareness of the information network (supply network visibility and illumination) that will provide greater levels of assurance; and improved understanding of the physical network to optimise the movement of personnel / materiel, which in turn will increase resilience and adaptability. Distribution in the future will also significantly benefit from advances in robotics and autonomy by increasing the number of tasks that can be transferred from human to machine, reducing risk to personnel and improving survivability.

c. Robotic and autonomous systems will also have a profound impact on future engineering and maintenance capabilities. Along with the growing number of functions that can be augmented or automated, digitised systems will allow for increasingly accurate predicative analytics and remote monitoring. Additionally, future engineering and maintenance capabilities will benefit from improvements in manufacturing and distribution to provide more survivable and assured platforms and systems.

5.4 Developing the technological literacy of the workforce and balancing the focus of acquisition between exquisite solutions with the affordable and plentiful will ensure the DefLogEnt is positioned to create advantage in the future. Capability acquisition and sustainment must then be supported internally by joint doctrine and common training, processes and procedures; and externally by increased collaboration with Logistic System partners.


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5.5 To achieve these changes this concept details thirteen ability statements aligned to four themes (workforce reshaping and reskilling, force design, capability acquisition and sustainment and interoperability). Key amongst these is the establishment of a technical control authority to synchronise and integrate a formalised DefLogEnt, such that it becomes survivable, assured, resilient and adaptive.

Annexes:1. Glossary

2. Acronyms and abbreviations

3. Consultation record


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ANNEX A TOCONCEPT FOR FUTURE LOGISTICS

NOVEMBER 2020

GLOSSARY1. 4D printing ‘entails multi-material prints with the capability to transform over time, or a customised material system that can change from one shape to another, directly off the print bed’.110

2. 4IR (Fourth Industrial Revolution) is ‘a new chapter in human development, enabled by extraordinary technology advances commensurate with those of the first, second and third industrial revolutions. These advances are merging the physical, digital and biological worlds in ways that create both huge promise and potential peril’.111

3. Access confidence is the assuredness of the ADF in its ability to source and obtain items across the supply network at any point in time.112 It relies on a degree of supply network resilience but develops redundancies to source critical goods or services to mitigate against the risk of external factors impacting supply.

4. Adaptability the ‘ability to modify operations in response to challenges or opportunities’.113 Additionally, it is the capacity to ‘adjust supply [network’s] design to meet structural shifts in markets and modify supply network strategies, products and technologies’.114

5. AM (Additive Manufacturing) is the ‘process of joining materials to make parts from 3D model data, usually layer upon layer, as opposed to subtractive manufacturing and formative manufacturing methodologies’.115

6. Anisotropic: of unequal physical properties along different axes. For example, timber is stronger across the grain than along it.

7. ‘Aurora is Defence’s approach to optimising interoperability of the Joint Force at the whole of force level. Its purpose is to ensure the Joint Force is sufficiently interoperable to meet strategic guidance set by government. Aurora is the process that supports the JFA direction on


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Interoperability Needs, derived from strategy and aligned with the Force Design process’.116

8. ‘Black box systems refer to a device, system, or object which can be viewed in terms of its inputs and outputs, without any knowledge of its internal workings’. Any repair, replacement or upgrade requires support from the OEM, rather than being managed through integral means’.117

9. CIS (Communication and Information Systems): ‘An assembly of equipment, procedures and personnel organised to accomplish data transfer and information processing functions. Communication and Information Systems is also the name of a Defence doctrine series and a group of Defence Instructions’.118

10. Classes of supply are a means to divide all military and other items into a standard classification system to aid inventory management, planning and support to operations. They are listed in Table 2 below.119

Class Description

I Subsistence items (foodstuffs and water)

II General stores (clothing, tents, stationery etc.)

III Petroleum, oils and lubricants (includes LPG and hazardous liquids)

IV Construction stores (concrete, timber, sandbags etc.)

V Ammunition (explosive ordnance, pyrotechnics, propellants and fuses)

VI Personal demand items (canteen supplies)

VII Principal items (vehicles, small arms and communications equipment etc.)

VIII Medical and dental stores (includes veterinary stores)

IX Repair parts and components

X Non-military stores (items for materiel support to non-military programs such as HADR)

Table 2 – List of classes of supply


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11. Collaborative advantage describes those benefits that are ‘jointly created, and shared, by teams… within a value chain’.120

12. Competitive advantage is: ‘when [a firm] is implementing a value creating strategy not simultaneously being implemented by any current or potential competitors and when these other firms are unable to duplicate the benefits of this strategy’.121

13. Control: ‘The act of coordinating forces towards outcomes determined by Command. Control is undertaken by elements that integrate the actions of forces necessary to achieve Command intent’.122

14. Critical infrastructure is ‘those physical facilities, supply chains, information technologies and communication networks which, if destroyed, degraded or rendered unavailable for an extended period, would significantly impact the social or economic wellbeing of the nation or affect Australia’s ability to conduct national defence and ensure national security’.123

15. Digital twin is ‘a digital simulacrum of physical, biological or information entities digitally linked (often in near real-time) to the original, supporting predictive analytics, experimentation and assessment’.124

16. Disruptive technologies: ‘Those technologies or scientific discoveries that are expected to have a major, or perhaps revolutionary, effect on… defence, security or enterprise functions in the period 2020-2040’.125

17. ‘Distribution is the operational process of synchronising all elements of the logistics system to deliver the ‘right things’ to the ‘right place’ at the ‘right time’ to support the geographic combatant commander’. It encompasses acquisition, warehousing, inventory management and transportation of materiel and personnel (forward and reverse); as well as the enabling control, information and physical networks.126

18. Emerging technologies: ‘Those technologies or scientific discoveries that are expected to reach maturity in the period 2020-2040; and, are not widely in use currently or whose effects on… defence, security and enterprise functions are not entirely clear’.127


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19. Exquisite solutions: Those platforms or systems that offer premium operational capability and long life-of-type but cannot be readily replaced because of high cost or training requirements.

20. FIB (Force-In-Being): ‘The standing prepared force that provides options to government for future joint force operations’.128

21. Force element ‘is an entity that has the ability to achieve a desired effect within a nominated operational environment within a specific timeframe and for a specified duration. A force element can be a unit, a component of a unit, or an association of units having common prime objectives when employed within an operational environment’.129

22. Force packages ‘are groupings of force elements that can be allocated to joint action to achieve operational effects appropriate to particular tasks in contingencies’.130

23. FORGEN (Force Generation): ‘the process of providing suitably trained and equipped forces, and their means of deployment, recovery and sustainment to meet all current and potential future tasks, within required readiness and preparation times’.131

24. Fundamental Inputs to Capability (FIC). ‘Capability is generated by combining equipment, workforce, organisation, estate, logistics and other systems. In Defence, the standard list of these inputs is’: organisation, command and management, personnel, collective training, major systems, facilities and training areas, supplies, support and industry.132

25. Graphene is a new carbon-based material, discovered in 2004. It has a wide range of extreme mechanical, physical, chemical and electrical properties not found in any other known material.133

26. High-priority partners are those the ADF is striving to achieve interoperability with, whilst ‘other regional partners’ describes those of strategic importance for increased engagement. These terms align with Defence International Engagement Plan guidance, without exceeding the classification of the CFL.

27. Health Usage and Monitoring Systems ‘record the status of critical systems and components on [platforms] so that the early detection of progressive defects, or indications of them, is possible and thus


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rectification can be achieved before they have an immediate effect on operational safety’.134

28. Immediate region: ranges from the north-eastern Indian Ocean, across South East Asia, to Papua New Guinea and the South West Pacific.135

29. In support of is a support arrangement (a subset of control) used by the ADF where a supporting force element assists ‘another formation, unit or organisation while remaining under the initial command’.136

30. ILS (Integrated Logistic Support) ‘includes the management and technical process through which supportability and logistic support considerations are integrated into the design of a capability and taken into account throughout the life cycle. It is through ILS processes that all elements of logistic support are planned, acquired, tested and provided in a timely and cost-effective manner’.137

31. Integration: ‘Systems, units or forces have the potential to merge and may be interchangeable for a specified period of time’.138

6. Interoperability: ‘Provide services to or from, or exchange information with partner systems, units and forces. Note: The three levels of interoperability are integrated [see above], compatible and de-conflicted’.139

a. Compatible: ‘Systems, units or forces may be able to interact with each other. Note: While they will complement each other, they may only need, and thus be able, to work alongside each other rather than merge’.140

b. De-conflicted: ‘Systems, units or forces can co-exist but not interact with each other, for example, when the equipment or procedures of one nation are incompatible with other nations’.141

7. IoT (Internet of Things) ‘refers to the networked interconnection of everyday objects, which are often equipped with ubiquitous intelligence. IoT will increase the ubiquity of the Internet by integrating every object for interaction via embedded systems, which leads to a highly distributed network of devices communicating with human beings as well as other devices’.142


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32. Joint functions are command, situational understanding, force generation and sustainment, force projection, force protection, force application and information actions.143

33. ‘Last mile logistics can be described as the process of planning, implementing, and controlling efficient and effective transportation and storage of goods, from the order penetration point to the final customer’.144

34. Logistic functions are based on NATO definitions that have been adopted by the ADF. They are: management of the logistics system; planning; development of policy and processes; personnel support services; health services; transport, movements and terminal operations; materiel logistics; materiel engineering and maintenance; supply; and infrastructure maintenance and engineering.145

35. ‘Materiel engineering involves the development and control of the requirements, design, construction, configuration, performance, verification, validation, maintenance and modification of a product. Materiel engineering activities also include the conduct of technical investigations, reviews, and assessment of designs, materiel, incidents and organisations’.146

36. Maintenance covers two doctrinal terms:

a. ‘Maintenance is all action taken to retain materiel in or to restore it to a specific condition. It includes inspection, testing, servicing, classification as to serviceability, repair, rebuilding and reclamation’.147

b. ‘Infrastructure maintenance involves the application of skills, knowledge and actions necessary to retain infrastructure in its approved design configuration (baseline) by the application of a maintenance philosophy, developed in concert with the infrastructure design and operating concept. Maintenance ensures that infrastructure is kept in a condition that enables it to reliably perform the function for which it is designed’. Infrastructure maintenance consists of both preventive and reactive functions.148


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8. ‘Mobilisation is the process of moving from being prepared for a range of generic contingencies to being ready to execute a specific operation. It embodies the commitment by Government to respond to an emerging contingency and may require greater capability and a more comprehensive NSB than is normally available to Defence’.149

37. NSB (National Support Base): ‘encompasses the full range of organisations, systems and arrangements, both formal and informal, that own, control or influence ADF access to, and the use of, capability. Note: In geographical terms, the NSB refers to the Australian nation’.150

38. OPGEN (Operations Generation): ‘the raising and training of forces for the conduct of specified operations’.151

39. Preparedness: ‘The capacity to deliver, within a specified time frame, a force able to accomplish and sustain directed tasks.152

40. Principles of logistics are enduring statements, the relative emphasis on which will vary according to the context. They are: responsiveness, simplicity, economy, flexibility, balance, foresight, sustainability, survivability and cooperation.153

41. ‘Professional mastery is an expression of how individuals apply their skills, knowledge and attitudes to their tasks. It is developed through training, education and experience, and characterises Defence logisticians as a professional group… Professional mastery in logistics is achieved by addressing the scientific aspects of logistics which depend on a body of facts, relationships and rules that can form the basis for calculation, deduction and prediction, within the unpredictable circumstances of operations. Logistics professional mastery, particularly in relation to logistics advice and decision making, also involves the application of military art, consistent with the art of manoeuvre warfare’.154

42. ‘Recovery is the extrication of an abandoned, disabled or immobilised asset and, if necessary, its removal to a maintenance point’.155

43. Resilience is ‘the ability of a system to return to its original state or move to a new more desirable state after being disturbed’. This definition implies flexibility, and given that the desired state may be different from the original, adaptability accompanies it use.156


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44. Relational contracts use a vested methodology to establish a ‘what’s in it for we’ partnership mentality that ‘include many components of a traditional contract but also contain relationship-building elements such as a shared vision, guiding principles, and robust governance structures to keep the parties’ expectations and interests aligned’.157

45. Risk-worthy platforms are smaller and less expensive (including COTS) options, which allow increased numbers to be acquired, and replaced more quickly. As a second order effect, personnel and materiel are then dispersed across multiple platforms, rather than being concentrated in a larger (and more easily targeted) vessel / aircraft / vehicle. A proportion of risk-worthy platforms will also have the option to operate using RAS / AI, reducing the need to expose personnel to threat environments; therefore generating more support options for high-risk missions and creating tactical dilemmas for adversaries.158

46. ‘Salvage is defined as the removal of assemblies, sub-assemblies or components from an unrepairable item of equipment for reuse’, including damaged, discarded, condemned or abandoned Allied or adversary materiel such as ships, craft or floating equipment’.159

9. Set the theatre ‘is a continuous shaping activity and is conducted as part of steady-state posture and for contingency or crisis response operations. Set the theatre describes the broad range of actions conducted to establish the conditions in an operational area for the execution of strategic plans’.160 Setting the theatre requires an understating of multi-national capabilities and nurturing relationships with coalition (and potentially industry) partners.161

10. Sovereignty is ‘the independent ability to employ Defence capability or force when and where required to produce the desired military effect’.162

47. Sovereign industrial capability the capability provided by Australian industry that is assessed as strategically critical and Australia must therefore have access to, or control over, the essential skills, technology, IP, financial resources and infrastructure as and when required.163

48. Structural flexibility in supply network architecture is achieved through actions such as: dual sourcing, asset sharing, separating ‘base’


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from ‘surge’ demand, flexible labour arrangements, rapid and dispersed manufacturing, outsourcing and late product configuration.164

49. Survivable: capacity of logistics force elements to prevail in the face of potential or actual destruction of components.165

50. Synchronisation: ‘The arrangement of related and mutually supporting actions in time, space and purpose to maximise their combined intended effects’.166

51. Technical control (techcon): ‘The provision of specialist and technical advice by designated authorities for the management and operation of forces. Notes:

a. CMs exercise techcon and will not normally delegate it. Technical control advice is not included in a delegation of theatre command.

b. CMs exercise techcon through advice to the theatre commander for assigned forces.

c. Techcon advice may not be altered but may be rejected in part or in total by a commander in consideration of operational factors and within their span of command.

d. A commander is accountable for the consequences of rejecting the advice’.167

11. Training and education. ‘Training pertains to mastering practical aspects of a task or job only… Education prepares people to face future challenges and prepares the person for future roles; it prepares beyond the qualification’.168

52. TRL (Technological Readiness Level) is the common measurement system that was originally developed by NASA and is used to define a given project’s maturity, with a 1 being the start of scientific research and a 9 being proven through successful operations.169 The TRLs are listed in Table 3 below.


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TRL Description

1 Basic principles observed and reported

2 Technology concept / application formulated

3 Analytical and experimental critical function / characteristic proof-of-concept

4 Component / breadboard validation in laboratory environment

5 Component / breadboard validation in relevant environment

6 System / subsystem model or prototype demonstration in relevant environment

7 System prototype demonstration in a space environment

8 Actual system completed and “flight qualified” through test and demonstration

9 Actual system “flight proven” through successful mission operations

Table 3 – List of TRLs170

12. UDOP (User Designed Operational Picture) is where ‘the information content is tailored to meet the needs of an individual or community of interest (rather than a bulk broadcast of all information that must be teased apart to extract the relevant pieces and create an effective narrative to support C2 decision processes)’.171


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ANNEX B TO CONCEPT FOR FUTURE LOGISTICS

NOVEMBER 2020

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS4IR Fourth Industrial RevolutionADDP Australian Defence Doctrine PublicationADF Australian Defence ForceADFP Australian Defence Force PublicationADG Australian Defence GlossaryAI Artificial IntelligenceAJOC Australia’s Joint Operating ConceptAM Additive ManufacturingAR Augmented RealityBDAA Big Data and Advanced Analytics C2 Command and ControlC5ISREW Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Cyber, ISR and Electronic WarfareCASEVAC Casualty EvacuationCFL Concept for Future LogisticsCIOG Chief Information Officer GroupCIS Communication and Information SystemsCLC Capability Life Cycle CM Capability Manager(s)COTS Commercial Off The ShelfDefLogEnt Defence Logistics EnterpriseDoD Department of Defence (Australia)DPN Defence Protected NetworkDST Defence Science and Technology (Group)


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E&IG Estate and Infrastructure GroupEMS Electromagnetic SpectrumFIB Force-In-BeingFIC Fundamental Input to CapabilityFOE Future Operating EnvironmentFSP 2020 Force Structure PlanFVEY FOE 2040 Five Eyes Future Operating Environment 2040HADR Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster ReliefILS Integrated Logistic SupportIP Intellectual PropertyIoT Internet of ThingsISR Intelligence, Surveillance and ReconnaissanceJFA Joint Force Authority (the Vice Chief of the Defence Force) JLC Joint Logistics CommandJOC Joint Operations CommandJTF Joint Task ForceME Main EffortMoD Ministry of Defence (United Kingdom)NSB National Support BaseOEM Original Equipment Manufacturer PME Professional Military Education RAS Robotic and Autonomous System(s)RTS Raise, Train and SustainSE Supporting EffortTRL Technological Readiness LevelUDOP User Defined Operational PictureWoG Whole-of-Government


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ANNEX C TOCONCEPT FOR FUTURE LOGISTICS

NOVEMBER 2020

CONSULTATION RECORDAs part of the development phase of the CFL, the author with the assistance of DST, conducted an online survey to gain input from stakeholders. Over 250 responses were received from personnel across the Department of Defence, industry and academic partners.

Additionally the following Defence organisations and individuals provided ongoing input to the development of the concept.

• Directorate of Joint Logistics Futures, Strategic Logistics Branch (JLC)

• Strategy and Joint Force Branch, Joint and Operations Analysis Division (DST)

• Directorate of Navy Capability Planning, Navy Program Support & Infrastructure Branch (NHQ)

• Directorate of Navy Strategic Logistics, Navy Logistics Branch (NHQ)

• Directorate of Land Force Design, Future Land Warfare Branch (AHQ)

• Directorate of Logistics Plans, Army Logistics Branch (AHQ)

• Directorate of Strategic Design – Air Force, Strategy and Planning Branch (AFHQ)

• Directorate of Future Logistics Capability, Logistics Branch – Air Force (AFHQ)

• Directorate of Defence Preparedness, Force Exploration Branch (FDD)

• Directorate of Defence Mobilisation Planning, Force Exploration Branch (FDD)

• Directorate of C4ISR Design, Capability, Integration, Test and Evaluation Branch (FID)

• Directorate of Force Development and Validation, Capability, Integration, Test and Evaluation Branch (FID)


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• Defence Artificial Intelligence Centre, Information Warfare Division (JCG)

• Directorate of Joint C2, Joint C2 Branch, Information Warfare Division (JCG)

• Military Strategic Plans, VCDF Executive

• Joint Warfare and Operations Branch, Joint and Operations Analysis Division (DST)

• Land Vehicles and Systems Major Science and Technology Capability, Land Division (DST)

• Directorate of Logistic Plans, J1/4 Support Branch (JOC)

• Directorate of Military Strategic Guidance, Military Strategy Branch (SP Div)

• Defence Analysis Directorate, Maritime Analysis Branch (Contestability Div)

• Directorate of Defence Industry Policy and International Engagement, Defence Industry Branch (Defence Industry Policy Div)

• Directorate of Materiel Logistics Services, Materiel Logistics Function (CASG)

• Directorate of ICT Strategy, ICT Strategy Realisation Branch (CIOG)

• Air Commodore Hayden Marshall

• Colonel Stephen Hledik, Director – Australia’s Joint Operating Concept (FDD)

• Colonel David Beaumont, Director – Australian Army Research Centre (AHQ)

• Dr Shane Dunn, Scientific Advisor – Joint, Science Engagement and Impact Division (DST)

• Wing Commander Phillip Sixsmith, Directorate of Personnel Coordination (AFHQ)


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Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 5.0 Joint Planning, 2018 (Link only available on the DPN)

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ENDNOTES1 Ministry of Defence ([MoD] 2019), FVEY FOE 2040, paras 3.39-41 & 3.25-262 Department of Defence ([DoD] 2020a), 2020 Defence Strategic Update, para 2.123 Australian Defence Doctrine Publication (ADDP) 4.0 Defence Logistics, para 1.54 Beaumont (2014), ‘Logistics, Strategy and Tactics: Balancing the Art of War’, p 535 ADDP 4.0, Chap 46 Ibid, para 1.67 Ibid, paras 1.8-98 Ibid, paras 1.14-18. 9 Ibid, para 1.1210 Bury (2020), ‘Conceptualising the quiet revolution: the post-Fordist revolution in

western military logistics’, p 1811 Francis (2008), ‘Supply chain visibility: lost in translation?’, p 182 12 DoD (2020a), para 1.1313 DoD (2020b), FSP, paras 1.7, 4.15, 5.14, 7.1, 7.8, 8.6-7, 8.12-14, chap 9, 10.2, 11.6

and 12.514 MoD (2019), para 2.714 ADDP-D Conflict and War (DRAFT), chap 4, p 915 DoD (2020b), para 8.1316 Baker (2020), Logistics and Military Power: Tooth, Tail, and Territory in Conventional

Military Conflict, p 14517 DoD (2020a), paras 2.1-2.1318 ADDP 4.0, para 1.18h19 Ibid, para 1.1320 MoD (2019); DoD (2016a), AJOC 21 DoD (2019), ADF Concept for Command and Control of the Future Force22 MoD (2019), para 2.723 ADDP 00.2 Preparedness and Mobilisation, para 5.1; DoD (2020b), p 8524 Australian Defence Glossary (ADG)25 ADDP 4.0. para 1.526 Ibid, paras 2.18-1927 DoD (2020a), paras 2.11 and 2.1828 Baker (2020), p 15329 ADDP 3.0 Campaigns and Operations, para 1.2330 MoD (2019), para 3.4131 O’Neill (2019), ‘Mental Models - Part II - Cooperation, Competition and Conflict’; Burr

(2019), Army in Motion: Chief of Army’s Strategic Guidance 2019, p 20, 22 and 55 32 Commander JOC Presentation to Chief of the Defence Force Preparedness Forum

2020, 11 March 2020


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33 Krulack (1999), The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War, p 4; DoD (2020a), paras 2.25-27; DoD (2016c), p 18

34 Ryan (2000), From Desert Storm to East Timor: Australia, the Asia-Pacific and ‘New Age’ Coalition Operations, p 14; DoD (2016b), 2016 Defence Industry Policy Statement, p 5; DoD (2020b), para 9.1; DoD (2020a), para 2.12

35 Cotton and Ravenhill (2011), ‘Middle power dreaming: Australian foreign policy during the Rudd – Gillard governments’, p 2; Australian Naval Institute & Naval Studies Group University of New South Wales (Canberra) (2020), Protecting Australian Maritime Trade, paras 19-21

36 Christopher & Peck (2004), ‘Building the Resilient Supply Chain’, p 937 Seric et al. (2020), ‘Managing COVID-19: How the pandemic disrupts global value

chains’38 Christopher & Peck (2004), p 939 MoD (2019), para 3.2640 DoD (2020a), para 1.1141 Xia et al. (2012), ‘Internet of Things’, p 1101; MoD (2019), para 3.5; DoD (2020b),

para 1.1142 Holloway & Ashcroft (2020), Technical Note - Megatrends for Defence and National

Security: Stakeholder Perspectives, p 643 NATO Science & Technology Organization (2020), Science and Technology Trends

2020-2040: Exploring the S&T Edge, p 6; DoD (2016a), para 2.42; MoD (2019), para 3.25

44 DoD (2020d), ‘Operation Bushfire Assist 2019-2020’; DoD (2020a), para 1.16; Christopher & Holweg (2011), p 65

45 DoD (2020a), para 2.26; Hernández et al. (2009), ‘A supply chain architecture based on multi-agent systems to support decentralized collaborative processes’, p 131-132; DoD (2020a), para 4.1-2; DoD (2018a), Chap 1; Christopher & Peck (2004), p 68-71

46 MoD (2019), para 3.2647 ADDP 4.0, para 1.1748 DoD (2020c), Defence Enterprise Learning Strategy 203549 DoD (2016c), paras 2.36-48; DoD (2020a), para 1.750 DoD (2020e), CLC Manual, para 1.11; Berger (2019), Commandant’s Planning

Guidance, p 451 Kohn et al. (2020), Client Report - Analysis of Survey Results Supporting

Development of the Concept for Future Logistics, para 2.4.1; DoD (2016c), paras 2.38-48; DoD (2020a), paras 1.7-8

52 Kohn et al. (2020), para 2.4.353 Beaumont (2017), ‘Transforming Australian Army Logistics to sustain the Joint Land

Force’, p 5754 Movement Coordination Centre Europe55 NATO Science & Technology Organization (2020), p 13-1456 Ibid, p 6; Perez-Franco (2018), ‘What will freight and supply chains look like 20 years

from now?’57 Bury (2020, p 19


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58 Mai (2012), ‘Technology Readiness Level’; NATO Science & Technology Organization (2020), p 14

59 NATO Science & Technology Organization (2020), p 14 and 42; Doherty (2020), Quantum Technology: The Defence Imperative

60 NATO Science & Technology Organization (2020), p 7361 Ibid, p 2262 Astro Machine Works (2017), ‘What Is CNC Machining? An Overview of the CNC

Machining Process’; International Organization for Standardization (2015), ISO/ATSM – 52900; Yayla et al. (2020), ‘3D printing technology diffusion: A revolution or an illusion?’, p 494; Hitch (2019), ‘State of 3D Printing 2019: All Grown Up & Ready to Work’; Layton (2020) Surfing the Digital Wave, p 21; Judson (2020), ‘US Army developing process for using 3D printing at depots and in the field’; Tibbits (2014), ‘4D Printing: Multi‐Material Shape Change’, p 118

63 Sarraf (2019), ‘Royal Australian Navy gets ‘world first’ 3D printers’; Pearce (2020), ‘Australian Army trials 3D printing’; Fabre (2020), ‘Logistic team meets the need for speed’

64 World Economic Forum, ‘Fourth Industrial Revolution’; Xu et al. (2018), ‘The Fourth Industrial Revolution: opportunities and challenges’, p 91; Department of Industry, Science, Energy and Resources (2019), Industry 4.0

65 Tumbleston et al. (2015), ‘Continuous liquid interface production of 3D objects’, p 1349; Carbon Inc. (2020), Digital Light Synthesis

66 Zebia (2019), ‘GXN thinks the future of construction could be flying 3D printers’67 Alexander (2020), ‘3D Printing Will Change the Way You Eat in 2020 and Beyond’;

Sertoglu (2020), ‘Scientists 3D print gunpowder substitute, achieve 420m/s bullet velocity’

68 Abdulhameed et al. (2019), ‘Additive manufacturing: Challenges, trends, and applications’, p 21; Tibbits (2014), p 119; Judson (2020); Layton (2020), p 21

69 NATO Science & Technology Organization (2020), p 2370 Ibid, p 105-10671 Ibid, p 10772 Ibid, p 11073 ADDP 4.0, para 5.1574 Bhasin and Clark (2016), ‘How Amazon is creating a robot arms race where it always

wins’; Morgan (2018), ‘5 Examples Of How AI Can Be Used Across The Supply Chain’; Gray (2019), ‘No one behind the wheel: The new workforce driving Australia’s mines’; Thorn (2020), ‘Melbourne medical drone company secures eight-figure investment’; Baker (2018), ‘The American Drones Saving Lives in Rwanda’

75 NATO Science & Technology Organization (2020), p 55; Xu et al. (2018), p 9176 Olsson et al. (2019), ‘Framework of last mile logistics research: A systematic review

of the literature’, p 10; DoD (2019), ADF Concept for Command and Control of the Future Force, p 17; Olsson et al. (2019), p 5, 11 and 13

77 MoD (2019), paras 1.6-7; Holloway and Ashcroft (2020), p 2178 NATO Fuels and Lubricants Working Group (2020), Petroleum Committee Vision on

Future Fuels, para 12


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79 Australian Naval Institute & Naval Studies Group University of NSW (2020), paras 11-12; Harris (2020), ‘Long-term fuel security strategy to form key part of federal budget’

80 The Climate Centre, Actions by countries to phase out internal combustion engines; NSW Government (2020), Net Zero Plan Stage 1: 2020 – 2030; Hutchens (2020), ‘Rio Tinto joins BHP in pledging to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to net zero by 2050’

81 Christopher & Peck (2011), p 7282 Dastin (2020), ‘Exclusive: Amazon rolls out machines that pack orders and replace

jobs’83 Mazure and Wisńiewski (2017), Clarity from above: Leveraging drone technologies

to secure utilities systems, p 5; Salamone (2019), ‘Predictive Maintenance: The Continuous Intelligence Killer App’

84 DoD (2020a), para 1.11; Holloway and Ashcroft (2020), p 1485 NATO Science & Technology Organization (2020), p 8; SKYbray (2019), Health and

Usage Monitoring Systems; NSW Government (2019), Emerging Technology Guide: Digital Twin; NATO Science & Technology Organization (2020), p 49

86 Cachada et al. (2018), ‘Maintenance 4.0: Intelligent and Predictive Maintenance System Architecture’, p 146

87 NATO Science & Technology Organization (2020), p 4988 Brown et al. (2007), ‘Prognostics and Health Management A Data-Driven Approach

to Supporting the F-35 Lightning II’, p 189 Rolls Royce (2019), ‘The snakes and bugs helping you go on holiday’90 ADFP 4.2.3 Logistic Planning for Operations, Glossary and Annex 4F, paras 7 and 1791 MoD (2019), paras 1.5-7 and 1.15; Ritchie & Roser (2018), Energy; Holloway and

Ashcroft (2020), p 21 and 31; DoD (2020a), para 1.1792 DoD (2020a), paras 1.17-18, 2.13 and 3.2993 MoD (2019), para 1.5; DoD (2020a), paras 2.16-18; Ashurst & Beaumont (2020)94 DoD (2018a), 2018 Defence Industry Capability Plan, paras 1.1-2 and 1.15; DoD

(2020a), para 4.2; DoD (2020c), para 1.5i95 Vitasek (2016), ‘Relational Contracting On The Rise With The Success Of The

Australian Navy’96 Kohn et al. (2020), para 2.2.297 DoD (2020a), paras 4.10-16; DoD (2020b), paras 9.10, 9.16, 9.26, and 9.32-33 98 Beaumont (2014), p 5699 DoD (2020f), Preparedness Management Policy, para 1.6; DoD (2020a), para 1.13100 DoD (2020f), para 1.15101 DoD (2020b), para 8.14102 ADDP 4.0, para 2.3a103 DoD (2020b), para 1.7104 Holloway and Ashcroft (2020), p 32-33105 Schedyer (2019), ‘Exclusive: U.S. Army will fund rare earths plant for weapons

development’; Bagshaw (2020), ‘Australia’s race against China’s ‘rare earths weapon’’


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106 Department of Industry, Innovation and Science (2019), Australia’s Critical Minerals Strategy, p 3

107 Baker (2020), p 153108 Joint Doctrine Centre (2016), Joint Doctrine Note 1-16 – Operation Assessment109 Beaumont (2014), p 57; Baker (2020), p 154-55; Berger (2019), p 4 and 10-11110 Tibbits (2014), ‘4D Printing: Multi-Material Shape Change’, p 118111 World Economic Forum112 Kohn et al (2020), para 2.3.1113 Friday (2018), Collaborative Risk Management and Supply Chain Resilience, p 153114 Xiang-yu & Xiang-yang (2008), ‘Creating the Resilient Supply Chain: The Role of

Knowledge Management Resources’, p 3115 International Organization for Standardization (2015)116 DoD, Aurora117 Holloway and Ashcroft (2020), p 14118 ADDP 6.0 Communication and Information Systems, Glossary119 DDP 4.3 Supply, para 1.15 and Table 1.1120 Dyer (2000), p vii121 Barney (1991), p 102122 DoD (2019), para 9123 Department of Home Affairs – Critical Infrastructure Centre, Safeguarding Critical

Infrastructure124 NATO Science & Technology Organization (2020), p 8125 Ibid, p 6126 Australian Defence Force Publication (ADFP) 4.2.2 Distribution Support to

Operations, Chap 1127 NATO Science & Technology Organization (2020), p 6128 ADG129 DoD (2020f), para 1.26130 Ibid para 1.27131 ADG132 DoD (2020e), para 1.5133 NATO Science & Technology Organization (2020), p 105134 SKYbray (2019)135 DoD (2020a), para 2.2136 ADDP 00.1 Command and Control, p 5-15 and 5-16137 ADDP 4.0, para 5.15138 ADG139 Ibid140 Ibid141 Ibid


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142 Xia et al. (2012), p 1101143 ADDP-D, chap 4, p 9144 Olsson et al. (2019), p 10145 ADDP 4.0, para 1.15146 ADDP 4.5 Materiel Engineering and Maintenance, para 1.6147 Ibid, para 1.19148 ADDP 4.6 Infrastructure Engineering and Maintenance, para 1.18149 ADDP 00.2, para 5.1150 ADG151 Ibid152 ADDP-D, chap 4, p 1153 ADDP 4.0, para 1.18154 Ibid, paras 1.16-17155 ADDP 4.5, para 1.33k156 Christopher & Peck (2004), p 2157 Frydlinger et al. (2019), ‘A New Approach to Contracts’158 Berger (2019), p 4159 ADFP 4.2.3, Annex 4F, para 7b and Glossary p xii160 Army Doctrine Publication 4-0 Sustainment (2019), para 2-18161 Perna (2015), ‘Setting the Theatre: Planning Today Provides Options for Tomorrow’,

p 2162 DoD (2018a), para 1.15163 Ibid, p 17164 Christopher & Peck (2011), p 72165 ADDP 4.0, para 1.18h166 ADDP 5.0 Joint Planning, Glossary 167 ADDP 00.1, p 5-14168 DoD (2018b), The Australian Joint Professional Military Education Continuum, p 49169 Mai (2012)170 Ibid171 Mulgund & Landsman (2007), User Defined Operational Pictures For Tailored

Situation Awareness, p 2-3

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