Conference on Illicit Small Arms and Light Weaponstrafficking along the borders ofSudan, Uganda and DR Congo 17 - 21 February 2003Arua, Uganda

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Table of contents

1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 41.1. Background..................................................................................................................................... 41.2. Objectives of the conference .......................................................................................................... 5

2. Presentation of the organising organisations and opening remarks ........................................................ 62.1. Presentation of the organising organisations .................................................................................. 62.2. Opening remarks............................................................................................................................. 7

3. Presentation of the three researches........................................................................................................ 83.1. Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 83.2. Presentation of the research in South West Sudan.......................................................................... 83.3. Democratic Republic of Congo .................................................................................................... 103.4. Uganda.......................................................................................................................................... 143.5. Synthesis of researches ................................................................................................................. 14

4. Arms trafficking and the Nairobi Declaration ...................................................................................... 154.1. International illicit trafficking of arms by George Berghezan of GRIP........................................ 154.2. Nairobi Declaration: mapping the role of civil society by Mr. Francis Wanyina ......................... 17

5. Discussions per sector group ................................................................................................................ 185.1. Group 1: Churches and other religious bodies.............................................................................. 185.2. Group 2: State/Government group................................................................................................ 195.3. Group 3: Civil Society Organisations........................................................................................... 205.4. Plenary discussion ........................................................................................................................ 20

6. Debate on strategies by country............................................................................................................ 216.1. Uganda.......................................................................................................................................... 216.2. Democratic Republic of Congo. ................................................................................................... 226.3. Sudan ............................................................................................................................................ 23

7. final resolutions .................................................................................................................................... 247.1. Recommendations to the religious organisations.......................................................................... 257.2. Recommendations to the NGOs ................................................................................................... 257.3. Recommendations to the government and rebel forces (rule of law) ........................................... 257.4. International appeals..................................................................................................................... 267.5. Appeals to all stakeholders ........................................................................................................... 27

8. Closing session ..................................................................................................................................... 27

AnnexeAnnexe 1 List of participants ..................................................................................................................29

Annexe 2 Small arms proliferation in North West Uganda.....................................................................34

Annexe 3 Proliferation and illicit traffic of small arms and light weapons in the North East of theDemocratic Republic of Congo...............................................................................................63

Annexe 4 Proliferation and trafficking in illicit small arms and light weapons in Yambio, Maridi, Kajo-Keji and Yei River counties, Equatoria, South Sudan.............................................................88

Annexe 5 Transfers of weapons towards the actors involved in the conflict in the Democratic Republicof Congo ...............................................................................................................................118

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1. Introduction

1.1. Background

From 17 to 21 February 2003 a Conference on Illicit small arms and light weaponstrafficking along the borders of the Sudan, Uganda and the Democratic Republic ofCongo was organised in the north-western Ugandan town of Arua. The conference wasorganised under the auspices of Pax Christi Netherlands. The conference concerned theregion of NW Uganda, NE Congo and SW Sudan.

Figuur 1 Central Africa and the region concerned for the conference

The background of the conference goes back to an earlier tripartite meeting betweenUganda, Kenya and Sudan. That conference, in 2001, addressed the issue of the flow ofsmall arms in the pastoralist areas of the border areas of Sudan, North Eastern Ugandaand North-western Kenya. It was a unique conference uniting government officials(national and local), churches and NGOs all pre-occupied with the harassment of smallarms. Although the problems are of a different character, it was obvious that the smallarms problem in the border region of NW Uganda, NE Congo and SW Sudan wasenormous with two of the three countries fallen prey to civil warfare. Therefor, calls were

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made for a similar meeting addressing the same issues. The conference was to be held inArua, NW Uganda, which is centrally located and had the facilities to receive such alarge number.Delegates from Uganda came from the districts of Arua, Yumbe, Moyo and Nebbi plussome national representatives. Delegates from the Democratic Republic of Congo camefrom Bunia, Mahagi, Aru, Isiro and Dungu. Delegates from Sudan came from Kajo-Kejicounty, Yei river county, Maridi county, Yambio county and Ezzo county. From eachdistrict or county came representatives from the local government, from the churches(catholic, protestant and muslim) and from local NGOs. On top of these delegates eachcountry had national representatives. In the case of Uganda that concerned the UgandaHuman Rights Commission, the Uganda Joint Christian Council, the EpiscopalConference of Uganda and the Uganda Action Network on Small Arms (UANSA). In thecase of Congo national representatives came from the national government(representative of the minister of Human Rights) and from the Episcopal Conference ofCongo. In the case of Sudan the SPLA/SPLM and the New Sudan Council of Churcheswas represented. Next to national representatives there were a number of regional andinternational organisations present. We can mention especially FECCLAHA (the tenmember Fellowship of Councils of Churches in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa),AMECEA (the association of member Episcopal conferences of East Africa), IANSA(the International Action Network on Small Arms), SaferAfrica, ICCO, UNAFRI and aresearcher from GRIP in Brussels.

1.2. Objectives of the conference

The objectives of the Conference were as follows: - • produce, present and exchange up to date, well researched information on cross

border flows of small arms• design joint strategies to combat the illicit arms trade and to protect disarmament

initiatives from interference by arms trafficking rings• determine interventions by the international community in support of these strategies.

In pursuance of the first two objectives of the Conference, three organisations from theconcerned countries carried out research in the border areas with the support of PaxChristi Netherlands. The three organisations were CEFORD (Uganda), Justice Plus(DRC) and Larjour Consultancy (Southern Sudan). The three research reports weredistributed and discussed during the conference. The debate on the researches contributedto the definition of strategies for the various actors. GRIP gave a presentation on “Armstrafficking towards the actors involved in the DRC Conflict”. There presentation waswidely discussed and contributed among others to the formulation of interventions by theinternational community. The presentation of GRIP included the entire conflict in theGreat Lakes Region and was not limited to the border region.

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2. Presentation of the organising organisations andopening remarks

2.1. Presentation of the organising organisations

The five organising organisations presented themselves :

Pax Christi was founded at the aftermath of the second world war in Europe. Localcatholic communities concerned with peace saw the need for reconciliation between thepeoples of Germany and France who had been in war with each other for three differentoccasions in the past hundred years. Soon after, Pax Christi sections were founded inmany European countries, today the movement has member organisations in about fortycountries in the world. After the second world war, Pax Christi played an important roleduring the cold war in maintaining contacts on different sides of the iron curtain. Lateron, the placement of missiles in Western Europe was a major topic. It was therefor only alogical step that Pax Christi is now more and more involved in Africa and that the smallarms issues is predominant on it’s agenda. The first conference we organised on this issuewas the Jinja conference on small arms with pastoralist communities in the border regionof Uganda, Kenya and Sudan. A number of researches on small arms proliferation havebeen realised.

CEFORD Director, Simon Amajuru presented Ceford, which is a development NGOworking in West Nile in NW Uganda. He brought in the philosophical dimension byquoting the ancient Chinese sage, Lao Tsu, who had said that:” the superior fightersucceeds without violence…the greatest conqueror wins without struggle” thus layingemphasis on non adversarial and consensual methods in conflict resolution.Mr. Honore Musoko presented Justice Plus. Justice Plus is a Human Rights NGOinvolved in the wartorn region of Ituri. It has been active there for the pas five year and ithas active members in all localities of the district. Justice Plus is involved in juridicalassistance for local people, in human rights investigations and reporting and in peacebuilding. Justice Plus has been active in peace building efforts at the outbreak of the warin Ituri and has been a very prominent activist organisation on human rights violations inthe region.

Mr. Peter Adwok presented Larjour Consultancy. Larjour consultancy started as aconsultancy agency active in southern Sudan. More and more though it became anactivist organisation. Larjour Consultancy and Mr. Peter Adwok have been very active onthe issue of small arms. Larjour Consultancy has been involved in the research in EasternEquatoria and was one of the organisers of the Jinja conference.

Canon Joyce Nima from the Uganda Joint Christian Council gave on behalf of fecclaha arundown on what Churches have been doing at local, national, Panafrican and globallevels to tackle the small arms issue. Her presentation covered the UN Small Arms

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Decade during which the World Council of Churches (WCC) took an active role oncombating small arms. The WCC brought the issue into the All African Conference ofChurches and its constituent members. At the regional level it was FECCLAHA (the tenmember Fellowship of Councils of Churches in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa)who was to assist the national church organisations in defining policies and implementingstrategies. With support from fecclaha the national church bodies like UJCC in Ugandawas able to train the different churches on small arms and to actively participate in thenational focus points. Canon Joyce Nima pointed out that the faith groups have theirparallel structures alongside civil society organisations at all levels. At the global levelthe UN works in concert with the World Council of Churches and IANSA, the sub regionlinks up FECCLAHA and EANSA (the East African Network of Small Arms). Atnational level you have the National Christian Councils dealing with the National FocalPoints. Their activities have mainly revolved around the implementation of the actionpoints developed at the 2001 Jinja Conference and the training of small technicalcommittees to monitor the flow of small arms.

The AMECEA representative, Str. Begonna Inarra for her part explained how theCatholic Church works through its Justice and Peace Commissions in most of thecountries in the region with the exception of Somalia. AMECEA does not cover DRCongo. Within the catholic church DR Congo is part of ACEAC (Association desConférences Episcopales de l’Afrique Centrale). Str. Begonna Inarra is also representingACEAC here.

2.2. Opening remarks

The Deputy Resident Commissioner for Arua opened the conference and welcomed allparticipants. In his opening remarks he expressed his appreciation for the opportunity fordelegations from Sudan, Congo and Uganda to freely share ideas given the fact that thethree countries have close social, political and economic ties. On behalf of the thenMinster of State for Regional Co-operation who was unable to attend due to officialduties outside the country, the Resident District Commissioner for Arua read the UgandaGovernment’s official statement. He pointed to the positive developments registered inNW Uganda in the aftermath of a successful peace agreement concluded with the UgandaNational Rescue Front II which had handed over important arms caches to the State. TheRDC called upon the neighbouring countries to emulate the example. He reiterated hisgovernment’s commitment to the implementation of regional arrangements such as theNairobi and Dar Es Salaam Declarations in addressing the control of small arms and theapplication of measures aimed at the curbing of proliferation and trafficking. He calledfor focus and objectivity in this endeavour that is also a challenge to the reality ofnational borders but which could be tempered with the all embracing ideology ofPanafricanism. Also, human rights are issues across all borders. International networkingand collaboration is therefor of utmost importance. This idea was echoed by the LocalCouncil V Chairman who cautioned that the potential refugee flows would remain athreat to the extent that problems arising from arms trafficking and proliferation are notadequately tackled.

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A senior civil servant for the DRC Ministry of Human Rights, while applauding theinitiative, reminded about the practical aspect in terms of the implementation ofConference resolutions in the interest of sustainable peace and stability. There is a need,according to him, that the illicit trafficking of small arms in the border region and intoCongo is brought to a standstill.Commander Samuel Abu-John Kabashi of the SPLA reiterated that 20 years of conflictsand wars had wrought havoc in the Sudan and it was only proper that demining beundertaken and proliferation checked to restore normalcy to the region.

3. Presentation of the three researches

3.1. Introduction

The three research reports were presented in the following order: • Sudan: “Proliferation and trafficking in illicit arms and light weapons in the border

areas between DR Congo, South Sudan and Uganda.• Democratic Republic of Congo: “Proliferation and illicit traffic of small arms and

light weapons in the Northeast of the Democratic Republic of Congo”• Uganda: “Small Arms Proliferation in the border areas of Uganda”The researches were photocopied and distributed to all participants in the two prevailinglanguages. Each organisation responsible for a research gave a verbal summary of themain data found during the research. Each session was concluded with a plenarydiscussion on the research, it’s findings and the eventual recommendations.

3.2. Presentation of the research in South West Sudan

The Sudan report covered the central and western Equatoria counties of Kajo-Keji, YeiRiver, Maridi, Yambio and Ezzo counties and was undertaken by Larjour Consultancybetween November and December 2002. Protracted conflict and war in landlockedSouthern Sudan has marked the development process, which is typified by poorinfrastructure, a subsistence economy based on rudimentary agriculture and animalhusbandry at the household level augmented by hunting and fishing. This parlous statehas proved to be an enabling environment for all manner of illicit trade within themeaning of national and international legal instruments. The research was carried out as asequel to an earlier survey in 2001 in Eastern Equatoria and whose findings werepresented to the Jinja meeting. Differences and similarities in scope and scale exist between the two areas of Equatoria.In both cases the nature of the illegal trade is such that high-ranking officers in theSPLM/A and Government of Sudan use third parties to engage in the contraband as away of enhancing incomes. However the Western Equatoria study highlights the small-scale individual operations, which also reflects the type of economic activity. Thissituation is different from the picture that emerged from studies in Eastern Equatoriawhere, on function of the intensity of the civil war a larger, more organised traffic on

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small arms is predominant. The more agrarian eastern equatoria is more engaged ingame poaching as opposed to the cattle rustling that calls for the large-scale acquisitionof firearms on the East. The study therefore had four objectives namely to: - • Collect first hand information and gather data on the sources, types and manner of

acquisition of small arms and the trend of proliferation and trafficking;• Identify gun markets, arms traders, routes of transfer and quantities and prices of

small arms and light weapons;• Determine the impact of illicit trade and trafficking in small arms and light weapons

on the local communities;• Ascertain attempts made by the authorities to curb the proliferation and trafficking in

illicit arms and light weapons. The field research revealed that the absence of organised selling points seen in the Westdid not necessarily mean there was no trafficking at all in the four counties with the AK47 featuring prominently due to its easy availability form deserters and others. Armsacquisition was mainly for self-defence given the complete breakdown of law and orderbut also for the purposes of big game poaching.Internal and external factors have played a role in the trade. As internal factors can becited failed military campaigns and the desertion of Government of Sudan garrisontowns. These incidents increased weapons flows from the more northerly regions of Bahrel Ghazal and Upper Nile into western Equatoria. External factors were for example thefall of the Mobutu regime in DR Congo in 1997 which brought widespread desertions ofarmy elements coupled with handovers and sales of small arms to the SPLA and the localpopulation.

The impact of the undisciplined elements combined with the mass desertions from theSPLA have led not only to the depletion of wildlife and dispersal of herds into thecountries neighbouring SPLA-controlled territory but also to the aggravation of thetenuous food security situation. This is mainly due to the clashes between the agrariancommunities and the cattle herding groups. This has in turn raised governance issuesaround law enforcement capacity in terms of policing and arms control by the SPLA inits swathe of territory.

The study then continues with recommendations addressing the security sector, its legalframework and enforcement, the training of personnel, terms and conditions of service,etc. The role of traditional authorities is then discussed. The sensitisation to be carried outby the civil society has a three pronged approach: NGOs, Community BasedOrganisations and religious groups all working towards self reliance, self sufficiency infood and the provision of services in a bid to avert short termist solutions to poverty andinsecurity. The final recommendations appeals to the international, inter African andregional institutions to assist the SPLA in capacity building to enable it to meet thesechallenges in a more adequate manner.

The debate on the report centred on gender by raising queries on the dearth ofinformation in the report on women and child respondents and secondly on the very

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presence of women in the delegation. The international status of the SPLA in the contextof the Nairobi Declaration that has ten States signatories also came up as well as thepresence and activities of SPLA combatants in the Democratic Republic of Congonamely in the Aba area of Isiro and the Garamba National Park. The response wassomewhat inconclusive in that the figure of 90% of victims of violence being women andchildren does not adequately address the gender question especially as the bulk of foodproduction in Africa is a women’s affair. A thorough gender analysis of production andland systems tenure in this agrarian area would have given a clearer picture of the impactof a breakdown in law and order on vulnerable sectors of the population and hence theurgency for a curb on illicit trafficking. The status of the SPLA is that, while it is notrecognised as a sovereign State, it is the de facto power controlling most of Sudan’sborder areas with the Congo, the Central African Republic, Uganda, Kenya and WesternEthiopia. This factor had a bearing in the recommendations made in the paper but mainlyaddressed to the SPLA. Also, it is to be observed that a deeper contextual analysis of theimpact of conflict in general and the illicit trade in particular on the level of developmentin the four counties could have led to more recommendations on the enhanced role of thecivil society and religious organisations.

3.3. Democratic Republic of Congo

The DRC report concerns the actual situation along the borders with Sudan and Uganda.A team made up of religious bodies and human rights organisations from the Ituri andUpper Uele regions covered the areas of Bunia, Aru, Mahagi, Isiro and Dungu-Doruma.It was pointed out from the outset that due to the on going conflict and the resultantinsecurity it was very difficult to realise this survey. Even when it was possible to visitthe different regions, suspicion and hesitation on the part of some of the respondents didnot augur well for the data collection exercise. The dynamics of conflict in the NorthEastern part of the DRC is best understood by the artificial nature of colonial era bordersthat split ethnic groups and clusters. Geographical, historical, socio-economic andcultural factors have therefore come into play in cross border alliances, between local andforeign armed groups. The second factor is the mineral wealth in the area known to havewhetted the appetites of economic and commercial interests. The report delves into thebackground of the conflict over time. From the conflicts between Amin and Obote in theUganda of the 1960s to the refugee influx from neighbouring countries in the aftermathof the Rwanda genocide to the fall of Mobutu. The resultant power vacuum and thegeneral poor governance in the Great Lakes Region has created instability. Amongst theimmediate causes are the political power struggles and the manipulation of externalforces spurred by their respective interests.

According to the findings, the main actors in the conflict are greedy politicians who haveexploited both the internal and external factors. The paper makes a distinction betweenexternal and internal factors that have aggravated the conflict. Aggravating internalfactors include generalised insecurity, uncontrolled arms sales and political immaturity.

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External factors comprise the partiality demonstrated by the international community inthe Great Lakes Region, foreign political and financial interests as well as armed bandsfrom the neighbouring countries. Moderating influences can be discerned in popularresistance militias for self-defence, peace arrangements with combatants and theexploitation of mineral resources that has led in some parts to a resumption in educationalactivity and the payment of civil service salaries. External moderating factors includemediation by certain powers like South Africa and Belgium, the embargo on Congolese“blood diamonds” and the UN peace- keeping force, MONUC. The impact on the population can be observed in terms of trauma and psychosis, violenceand anxiety. The numerous consequences include large populations of internallydisplaced, the proliferation and massive sales of arms, child soldiers, the spread of theHIV/AIDS pandemic, the non observance of human rights arising from the failed statesyndrome and rampant poverty. Undaunted by the dire situation, the local population hasengaged in initiatives to try out peace formulas at several levels in order to mitigateconflict: local militias, pastoral care, land dispute settlements, inter ethnic mediation,conflict resolution through NGOs involving youth, religious leaders, rebel allies andethnic associations.

Figuur 2 Area of research in Congo

Congolese investigated regions

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It was therefore in this context that the team set out to seek answers to the followingquestions:• Who is holding the arms and uses them in the selected border areas?• What are the arms used for: personal and community protection, criminal /rebel

activity or warlords?• Sales outlets.• Measure to control the illicit trade in and the use of small arms.• Strategies to control the proliferation of light arms in order to improve communal

security. The team was working on the hypothesis that factors such as the presence of armedgroups and militias, refugee movements, poaching and the exploitation of naturalresources are contributory to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Mostrespondents were aware of the phenomenon and usage revolved around defence andprotection. Other reasons given ranged from poaching, rebel armies, robberies, rapes andinter ethnic conflicts. Both Congolese and non-Congolese combatants were cited as thosewielding the arms. The findings revealed that approximately 90% of the arms came fromUganda and to a lesser extent Sudan, Rwanda, Western countries, former SovietRepublics, deserters as well as the stock of locally produces weapons like spears. Thearms were sold mainly by Uganda, Congolese Armed Forces, rebels, officers from thenon-Congolese armies, businessmen, western countries, and local manufacturers.

The overall impact has been general insecurity; the destruction of natural resources andwildlife, the non- observance of human rights, roaming armed bands, protracted rebellionand widespread poverty. On control measures, there did seem to be some awareness ofexisting legislation governing the arms trade such as the military penal code and code ofconduct. In the absence of law enforcement given the next to non-existent State authority,impunity and indiscipline reign supreme. The breakdown has also eroded the authority ofcustomary leaders thus rendering impractical any co-operation between the civilian,military and traditional authorities.

At the local level the issue of law enforcement would have to be addressed if controlmeasures are to succeed. This concerns especially border policing. At the national level,the major challenge remains the total cessation of the war, re-establishment of the state,co-operation with the neighbouring countries to facilitate joint border patrols and thepossible involvement of the United Nations. This would entail re-unification andrestoration of State authority, demobilisation of combatants, the return of soldiers to thebarracks, the demilitarisation of civilian areas and collection and disposal of arms. The study then made recommendations to the various levels of governance: local,national, sub regional and international calling for public farewells to arms, sensitisation,good neighbourliness, collective security arrangements in the sub region, the ratificationof international human rights instruments complete with a sub regional human rightspromotion structure culminating in the convening of a sub regional Great Lakes peaceconference. At the international level the study addresses its recommendations towardsthe regulation of the light weapons industry by a specialised UN agency with acorresponding body at the African Union level. It goes on to advocate for the promotion

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of sustainable development to cater for employment and income in developing countriesas well as the transformation of the arms production chains into the manufacture of nonlethal implements.

The second set of recommendations involves short, medium and long-term action thatshould be undertaken on the one hand by the DRC Government and on the other by thepeople of Congo. It calls upon the State inter alia to organise a peace educationprogramme, set up a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, establish stringent smallarms control legislation and to practise good neighbourliness. The people are called uponto join the national reconciliation process to stem inter ethnic strife and root out violence.The third set, to the three countries calls for the marking of all arms used by the securityforces, the setting up of a Joint Military Commission and the signing of a non-aggressionpact. Finally the international community is urged to promote the peace process in theDRC, join the call for a Great Lake Peace Conference and to strategize coherent smallarms and light weapons control measures.

A vibrant debate on the presentation then ensued, reflecting the complexity of actors andinterests in the DRC conflict, incomplete perceptions formed by language differences anddifferent schools of political thought and culture. Observations made ranged from theprescriptive calling for Congolese unity or pointing to the sheer size of the country as afactor in the conflict, to the controversial questioning of Uganda’s presence in the DRCand the role of UPDF officers handling of the various rebel groups. The delegation of theUPC rebel movement, itself at odds with the rest of the Congolese delegates, called formore focus on Ituri. Even the very day Ituri was experiencing intense combat, pittingtransnational alliances against one another. A senior Ugandan official wondered whethera “warrior mentality” arising from “political immaturity” was not at the root of the widerconflict raging in Congo. This touched off a recount of the Rwanda – Uganda clashes inKisangani and the resultant death toll amongst civilians. The audience was reminded ofthe creation of several Congolese armed groups by Uganda: Bemba and his MLC, MbusaNyamwisi of the RCD-Kisangani, Roger Lumbala of the RCD-National and the UPCitself. On a more diplomatic note, there were calls for deeper analyses of foreigninterference in African affairs with special reference to the Great Lakes region. A callwas also maid for a global campaign by civil society, religious groups and governmentsto curb the arms industry.

For his part, the representative of the DRC government was appreciative of the initiative,coinciding as it did with the upsurge of fighting in the Ituri region. He considered ittimely in that eradication would thwart the creation of new militias. In his contributionthe Sudanese representative thanked all three organisations that had carried out theresearch, as this collaborative effort would enable the SPLA to enter into bilateralagreements such as joint border policing and the arrest of illicit dealers.

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3.4. Uganda

The Uganda research report was carried out in the four West Nile districts of Arua,Nebbi, Moyo and Yumbe by CEFORD. West Nile directly borders Southern Sudan andNorth Eastern Congo and the conflicts in these areas overlap and feed into each other.Consequently, the situation in this part of country reflects the recent military and politicaldevelopments involving a cross section of actors from within Uganda and from outside.Either as rebel movements from neighbouring countries, insurgents or as defeated armies.These include the SPLA/M forces , the West Nile Bank Front (WBNF), the UNRF I andII and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). Deserters from the Ugandan military andsecurity services also feature in the equation. As in the first two cases, small arms are purchased mainly for purposes of poaching,robberies, and personal and community protection. There are no open markets in WestNile but arms are sourced alongside the borders with Congo and Uganda using variousforms of transport through the porous frontiers. The impact has been heightenedinsecurity, business losses and displacement for fear of loss of life and property. There isalso a higher incidence of poaching. On mechanisms to combat the scourge, theGovernment has enforced legislation such as the Firearms Act of 1974, instituted bordersecurity meetings and organised joint operations bringing together several arms of thedisciplined services and security organs.

In the debate that followed the presentation of the report, certain grey areas were notedand the presenters called upon to expand on the same. For instance, the recentlyconcluded agreement with the UNRF II could have served as an appropriate case study indemobilisation and reintegration of former combatants to civilian life thus eliminatingone source of proliferation. Indeed a former commander was in the audience. Thisprompted the Government representative in the person of the RDC to take the floor andclarify some aspects of Uganda’s security policy regarding the Local Defence Units thatoperate at the lower levels. It had been pointed out that militarised local units could easilyfall prey to recruitment into lawless bands, an issue closely linked to the terms andconditions awaiting ex servicemen. Further clarification was required for gun controlpolicy and the status of refugees.

The response tended to speak to the rather narrow scope of the paper that seemed to beconfined to gun control without adequately addressing the wider issue of small arms andlight weapons proliferation and trafficking. The fieldwork apparently coincided with thenegotiations between Government and the UNRF thus restricting access but it is to benoted that civil society groups had also worked with the UNRF and that CEFORD couldhave obtained data through networking. The other weakness in the report had to do withgender analysis beyond platitudinous references to the plight of women and children.

3.5. Synthesis of researches

Following the presentation and debates several points of convergence emerged: the smallarms trade is inextricably linked to prevailing socio-economic and political conditions

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making it imperative for Governments in the area to be involved in control exercises. Theelimination of the scourge cannot be complete until the external manufacturers are alsobrought to book and their activities curtailed. In dealing with local people, an inter-generational approach is necessary given the role of elders in African societies as well aslinks with neighbouring ethnic groups. Issues of poverty and democratic governance areimportant if the border areas are to see a return to normalcy. It cannot be overemphasisedthat wars and conflicts in these region must be brought to an end for the good of all andsundry.

4. Arms trafficking and the Nairobi Declaration

4.1. International illicit trafficking of arms by George Berghezan of GRIP

The global ramifications of the local conflicts spawning small arms proliferation in theGreat Lakes Region came out clearly in the presentation by Georges Berghezan of GRIP,an activist research organisation based in Brussels. The outfit works mainly in formerBelgian colonies. Through its networks it traces and exposes the routes used by the armsmerchants. The rapidly evolving scene in the Great Lakes Region is such that data had tobe gathered from the printed media in Europe and the United States, from reports ofinternational organisations and NGOs working in the region, from local sources as wellas from the Internet. The arms movements covered in the paper include licit as well asillicit arms flows as not all the actors were under the UN embargo. It also covered heavyarms. Berghezan showed that arms sales had gone ahead despite the ten year old EU armsembargo on the Congo and despite the code of conduct in which the majority ofEuropean countries had agreed to stop arms deliveries to the countries at war in the GreatLakes.

The paper is divided into two sections. The first one deals with arms transfers to theKinshasa government and its allies, Angola and Zimbabwe and to allied armed factions,such as the Rwandan, Congolese, Ugandan and Burundi groups. The second sectioncovers transfers to the opponents of the Kinshasa government such as the Congoleserebel factions, Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and UNITA. On the first aspect, the list of original suppliers to Kinshasa not only includes Zimbabweand Namibia, but also South Africa. The South African supplies are in contravention ofPretoria’s 1998 decision to ban the sale of lethal arms to all the countries involved in theCongo conflict and henceforth stopped. While the South Africans have adhered to theirdecision, other countries been found out to be involved in the sales. These include Libya,India, Georgia, Burkina Faso. China reportedly delivered arms in exchange for miningconcessions. Israel provided arms and training alongside the South African security firmExecutive Outcomes and North Korea. Apart from arms supplied directly to theZimbabwean troops in the DRC, large consignments have also been transferred in aweapons-for- mines exchange. It gave a boost to Zimbabwe’s newly established armsindustry. As in all arms deals and military matters, nothing is clear-cut. WhereasWhitehall has no official dealings with Harare, blue chip British companies such as

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British Aerospace have exerting pressure for a resumption of arms sales just as the UShas maintained its training programmes in Zimbabwe. To give an illustration of the greyareas between official statements form Western capitals and the goings-on in the shadyworld of arms transactions, Berghezan gave the case of an aircraft registered in Liberia,but belonging to a company run by Scandinavians in Luxembourg, transporting militaryhardware form Bulgaria to Harare for use in the DRC, piloted by an American and aBriton. According to the pilots the sale was organised by a firm in Holland using thepremises of the Scandinavian–run company in Luxembourg! Oil rich Angola has used its resources to build up a formidable air force with armscoming in from Russia, Byelorussia and Slovakia. Small arms from the former East Bloccountries use circuitous routes to reach Luanda. On the high tech side, it is to be notedthat both UNITA and Government have been able to acquire the latest advanced missiletechnology. The complexity of the international and sub regional power play blending into the localscene is well explained in the intricate details of arms deliveries, provenance of traininginstructors and alliances. Kigali has always accused Zimbabwe and Kinshasa of armingits foes, the defeated former Rwanda army and the Interahamwe militia. According toBerghezan, other groups receiving arms include Alir I and II operating in the Kivus fromTanzania. Burundi rebels of the FDD and FNL movements operate from Congo with thesupport of Kinshasa, in concert with local Mai Mai militias, Alir II, the regular Congolesearmy and Zimbabwean forces. Arms supplies reportedly transit though Tanzania whiletraining by the Zimbabweans takes place in Bulawayo. The North Koreans train inLubumbashi. The armed Ugandan group within this alliance are the Allied DemocraticForces (ADF). The Mai Mai have since split into two groups, one pro Kinshasa, the otherpro Kigali. The area has also known the presence of insurgents like CommanderMasunzu, playing the game of shifting alliances. Arms deliveries to Kinshasa’s opponents are no less complicated. From August 1998,heavy consignments from Uganda and Rwanda consisting of aircraft, armoured cars andother heavy weaponry, landed at Goma airport and Kisangani. Light weapons werereportedly parachuted in West Kasai and in Kalemie in Katanga. As the war progressed,light arms ordered from China by Kinshasa were allegedly commandeered by the rebels.More weapons were taken by the rebels as towns fell. Later merchants made their entry:Belgian, Tajik and Kenyan dealers with transcontinental links, British pilots, while smallairlines expanded doing arms runs. The routes were no less tortuous, crossing Tanzaniaand Zambia before warehousing in Katanga. The regular armies in turn supply the localarmed groups in their military alliance. Natural resources including ‘blood diamonds’exchanged for arms constitute another mechanism of arms proliferation.. Arms flows into Rwanda itself involved South Africa from the lifting of the embargo in1995 to the outbreak of the war in 1996. By the outbreak of the second war in 1998,military hardware was coming in from the former East Bloc countries and East Asia.Another source of arms is the war booty from defeated forces. Arms dealers include thenotorious Tajik merchant Bout, Belgians and Lebanese. Not to be left behind, the USreportedly provides training and other forms of logistical support such as naval-basedcommunications from the Atlantic Ocean. On Uganda, it is to be noted that a nascentdefence industry exists with the construction of an arms factory jointly owned by Chineseand South African private and public interests. The light weapons and munitions

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manufactured were said to be intended for the national security forces only. Land but thefactory apparently also supplies Central Africa the Great Lakes area. Equipment has alsocome from the old East Bloc countries ranging from tanks to assault helicopters togetherwith servicing facilities on the ground. Former officers of the apartheid era defenceforces as well as a wide array of small airlines transport not only arms and troops but alsomineral ore. This has put Uganda on of arms traffickers together with Kenya and BurkinaFaso.The presentation also gave a note on Burundi, which had never officially admitted thepresence of its troops in the DRC until the Foreign Minister made an oblique reference inannouncing their withdrawal! Data on arms movements are scanty as the country wasunder an embargo until 1998 but several tons of AK 47 and grenades seized by theUgandans in 1999. With the death of its leader, UNITA may no longer be a majormilitary factor in Southern Africa but it has played a role in the Great Lakes diamonds-for arms deals with Rwanda from 1998. In conclusion, Berghezan noted the fact that researching this area of small arms is noteasy as transactions are shrouded in secrecy with a myriad of players, routes, methods,destinations and interests. Emerging trends like the bartering of natural resources forarms, the establishment of local industries and the en meshment of the region into globalarms networks are a major concern. He does not spare regional and international bodieslike the EU whose potential members from the old Soviet bloc are violating existingcodes of conduct, the lack of initiatives by the AU and the UN as well as the behaviour ofsome major powers like the US which supply arms to the various parties involved in theDRC conflict. A vigorous debate followed with the role of the various stakeholders at certain levelsbeing a major cause for concern. As with the DRC report, remarks were clouded withdefensive positions, which tended to lose sight of the global-local rationale and thusleading to the usual misperceptions. For example, the arms merchants were singled outfor condemnation without their local partners coming out clearly. Questions were raisedas to the role of the Khartoum Government since its links with the arms dealing in theGreat Lakes in general and with Uganda’s rebel movement, the Lord’s Resistance Armyin particular did not feature as prominently as some would have liked. Some criticisedBerghezan for zeroing in on some, not all facets of the Great Lakes conflict, otherquestioned the validity of his sources. He was blamed for a one-sided pacifist globalperspective, and for using sources that were not publicly accessible.

4.2. Nairobi Declaration: mapping the role of civil society by Mr. FrancisWanyina

To underscore this point, Mr Francis Wanyina from the National Focal Point then gave apresentation on the “Nairobi Declaration: mapping the role of civil society”, in itself anapposite response to the vacuum regretted by Berghezan earlier. The Nairobi Declaration,which was signed in 2000, enjoins the states parties to address the issue of small armsand light weapons proliferation in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa. Its mandatecomprises the implementation of regional and international agreements, policydevelopment, collaboration with civil society and the focal points of the membercountries and, ultimately, the setting up of a regional resource centre. Given the important

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role civil society organisations now play in the region and their proximity to thegrassroots population, Wanyina stated that they had a role to play in the mobilisation andsensitisation of the local populace on the issue of small arms. On the monitoring aspect,Canon Joyce Nima expanded on the role of the religious bodies in terms of activitiestaken up so far by FECCLAHA within the ambit of the action plan agreed to in Jinja in2001.Training in monitoring and advocacy has been organised for Church committees inthe Eastern town of Mbale.

5. Discussions per sector group

Over the next two days, the conference broke up into groups. The first day in threenationally mixed ‘sectoral groups’: participants from the churches and church relatedorganisations, participants from NGOs and participants who were working in government(central and Local). The second day the participants split according to their country ofprovenance and formed three multisectoral groups, from Uganda, Congo, and Sudan. The objective of day 2 was to develop a cross-border action plan for the churches, for theNGOs and for government. The objective of day 3 was to develop integrated nationalplan for action in the border regions.

5.1. Group 1: Churches and other religious bodies

Churches and religious organisations resolved in their group discussion that since theirrole is to promote peace, harmony and respect for human life and dignity, they should usean integrated approach. Emphasis was placed more on the need to collaborate with otheractors, especially state officials, non-state actors and CSO.In the presentation of their discussion results, the following were the suggestedrecommendations.Churches and religious groups should lobby and network, mobilise and sensitise thecommunities on the evils and dangers of illegal small arms possession and misusethrough workshops, seminars, conferences, talk shows. Peace education and awarenessraising should be done at grassroots as well as national level.They should strengthen national co-operation among the existing bodies (national churchsecretariats) and regional interdenominational co-operation (all churches).At sub regional level interfaith meetings should be carried out in the three frontierregions.Churches should act as peace negotiator/mediator with government and all rebel forces.The advocacy will be carried out at different levels starting at grass root level.Churches should be represented at peace processes at all levels, national and regional.On networking, churches will have to work together across borders. In working together,they should form partnership, which may include the sharing of resources, information,personnel and development of joint programs.

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Recommendations by the churches to the NGOs :The NGOs should establish a subregional action network on small arms control. Thisshould focus on West Nile region, Southern New Sudan and the eastern DRC. At nationallevel, focal point organisation should be put in place for Sudan and DRC. The subregional network should focus on lobbying and influencing of policies.According to the churches, the governments should look into the question of alternativelivelihoods for people who depend on small arms for economic survival. Thegovernments should develop and implement policies that would ensure collaboration oflocal administrators and armed forces of the three countries dealing with the problems ofproliferation of small arms. Thirdly, they should develop and implement policies toinclude peace education in the school curriculum.

5.2. Group 2: State/Government group

The group comprised politicians, senior civil servants, security forces and leaders of non-state actors from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Southern Sudan and Uganda. Thediscussions centred on weak status of democratic governance in the three countriesleading to conflicts in varying degrees. It was suggested that the danger of armed conflictoverspilling from one country to the next could be addressed bilaterally as has happenedbetween the SPLA and non-state actors in Congo. This diverted the debate to the issue ofthe right of “hot pursuit” which has been the justification for Ugandan presence inCongo. According to the group, states should establish permanent co-ordination centres forcontrol and action on small arms trafficking. The three governments should stopimporting guns, if not, create a code of conduct on small arms as had been with theEuropean countries. They should encourage marking and tracking of recovered arms andmanufacturing of disposable armsThe states should involve NGO/CSO representatives permanently in state securitymeetings in order to curb, among others, illegal import and export of small arms.Information on classified issues should always be availed to develop trust andtransparency. More attention should be given on armed forces deployed in war torn areaswith particular emphasis on shelter and prompt payment of salaries among others. Noarms should be given to militia since they misuse them. Instead there should berestriction on the supply of arms to the militia to provide security to the community andto minimise misuse of arms.There should be a prohibition on the recruitment of children into the army. States shouldbuy off illegal guns among the local community and former owners are resettled. Statesshould honour and observe implementation of protocols and declarations signed on smallarms. The States should also establish security for the people as the first priority to befollowed by disarmament. The governments should launch into proper negotiation withthe rebel groups.

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5.3. Group 3: Civil Society Organisations

This group comprises the humanitarian agencies, Human Rights NGOs, peace groups,NGOs, and researchers.The general comment made by the chairman in his opening statement was that theparticipants concentrated on the question of what concrete steps to be taken jointly byNGOs to reduce arms trafficking. He expressed NGOs willingness to work together(network) and collaborate amongst themselves. He then presented the discussion in thegroup work. In the discussion it was pointed out that hunger and poverty- the underlyingcauses leading rural folk to indulge in the illicit trade must be addressed squarely. TheUNRF II official in attendance recounted the negotiation process with the Kampalaauthorities, which led to their coming to an agreement despite initial misgivings. TheDRC delegation was wholly appreciative of the idea of negotiations with non-state actorsand urged state-actors to adopt a two-pronged strategy of disarmament and total cessationof hostilities.The group suggested to organise regular cross border meetings between NGOs forresources and information sharing. They recommended to build capacity of NGOs bytraining in conflict resolution and management. They also recommended to improvenetworking of NGOs at local, national and international levels by appointing lead NGOsto co-ordinate this process and to form sub regional actor network on small arms in WestNile, East Congo and Southern Sudan. This network should create a plan of action onshort, medium and long term measures in combating small arms trafficking by:• Informing/sensitisation of local communities through media, conference workshops,

talk shows.• Training in conflict prevention and conflict resolutions• Establishing close links with northern NGOs that are active in the field of small arms.In the network the presence of women should be strengthened. The network should lobbylocal and national governments to liase with international bodies and to put in placeappropriate laws and policies to control small arms trafficking.

5.4. Plenary discussion Following the presentation of group reports to the plenary session, the debate centred onthe control mechanisms that can be put in place to curtail the use and misuse of guns incountries like Congo where it is nigh impossible to get some grip on the military activity.How do States devise effective policies to govern the handling of guns in the possessionof the citizenry? Delegates gave suggestions calling upon States to organise security forvulnerable communities, preside over the disarmament process and to enforce regionalagreements like the Lusaka accord. The general consensus was that arms buy-backschemes tended to be counterproductive as rampant poverty would force the erstwhilegun-runners to either take to criminal activities or go underground. Vocational trainingwas considered a better and more sustainable strategy. On the thorny issue of the armsindustry, proposals were made for a taxation regime to be applied to the manufacturersand dealers in a bid to counteract proliferation, an exercise likely to prove quite dicey!

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6. Debate on strategies by country

The three countries represented at the conference met in their respective groups and cameup with recommendations addressed to their respective governments, to the civil societyand to the religious groups.

6.1. Uganda

The recommendations to the Uganda government centred on three major areas:governance and democratisation, negotiations with non- state actors, security sectormanagement and good neighbourliness. The following recommendations were made to the government :1. Eliminate the factors that tend to lead people into rebellions, which among others

include political and economic marginalisation, sectarianism.2. In the case of West Nile region, implement the agreed resolutions between the

government and the UNRFII.3. Take concrete steps to solve current rebellion in the country through dialogue and

reconciliation. Rebel groups are called upon to recognise and accept the benefits ofpeaceful resolution of conflicts and agree to negotiate with government.

4. Enter into an understanding with neighbouring countries or with non state actors, toprevent armed groups and individuals from their respective countries from enteringUganda, by doing the following:- Authorities along the border areas liasing with each other for purposes of ensuringpeace and security- Strict border control especially by deploying security personnel at strategic entrypoints- Arrest and prosecute foreigners who enter Uganda with illegal arms.

5. It was noted that those who desert from the army/LDUs tend to go with their armsand use them illicitly. Taking into account the causes of desertion, the proposed lawon the armed force that is to be tabled in Parliament should address the factors thatlead to desertion from the army and the LDU. The proposed law should also ensurethe following :- Wrong elements are not recruited into the forces- Recruits are properly trained before deployment.- Soldiers/other members of the security forces are paid a living wage and welfare oftheir families are catered for.- Armed forces get regular leave and their deployment should not deprive them ofthis.- Officers respect the rights of personnel under their control.- Disciplinary measures against members of armed forces are not necessarily harsh orviolate their rights.

6. To enhance discipline and morals in the armed forces, chaplains and Muslim teachersshould be part of the armed forces to directly minister to them, as was the case in thepast.

7. Government should instil a spirit of Nationalism and Patriotism among citizens inaccordance with the objectives of the ’95 constitution, through civic education both at

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school and for the general population. This will reduce instances of tribalism anddisgruntlement, which lead to rebellion and negative opposition.

8. A programme of action that encourages people to voluntarily give up illicit arms beput in place.

9. Enforcement of the laws (National and International) on refugees/Aliens is strictlyunder taken, to reduce instances of illicit arms entering the country through them.

10. Introduction of a National identity cards so that aliens/foreigners entering Uganda caneasily be identified.

11. The government should provide effective security in enforcement of law and order insome regions of Uganda where people hold guns as a means of protection.

12. The programme of the National Focal Point (NFP) on small arms should beeffectively supported towards a quick institutional and implementation of a nationalaction plan on small arms and trafficking.

The following recommendations were made to the NGOs, including religious groups :

1. Regional network on illicit small arms should be created for West Nile and otherregions. An action committee to underpin the network should be set up.

2. Civil Society Organisations should lobby, advocate and monitor government actionon control of illicit small arms and should undertake massive civic education of thepopulation on the dangers of small arms proliferation.

6.2. Democratic Republic of Congo.

The delegates before coming up with their recommendations, their discussion focused onthe following issues:• The presence of foreign armies in the DRC and how the Luanda peace agreement of

2000 could be implemented.• The economic and financial objectives that encouraged the proliferation of light

weapons.• The existence of ethnic militias and armed gangs that favours the proliferation of light

weapons and how the inter-ethnic conflicts could be amicably resolved.• The absence of the state to protect the communities and how different bodies could

come forward to see peace in DRC.

A. Recommendations at national levelNational level, recommendations to the government:• To undertake and follow democratic procedures• Unify the army and police• Obtain and ensure key political players put themselves to work• Protect the women who are involved in peace process• Protect civilians and other communities against acts that violet their rights• Humanitarian action should be taken into considerationNational level, recommendations to the civil society:

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• To create a national network on the issues of small arms and light weapon and thisshould be headed by Justice Plus

• To create a trans border local network on the issues of small arms and light weaponstrafficking

• Civil society should continue research on small arms and light weapons trafficking inother areas of Congo

• To carry out lobbying/advocacy activities (sensitisation on effects of small armsproliferation)

• Massive education campaigns at all levels• Mobilise resources for publishing articles on small arms and light weapons• Organise conferences for information sharing• Organise community structure so as to function well• Resolutions reached should be disseminated at all levels

B. Recommendations at subregional level• States to respect the territorial integrity of the DRC• Withdrawals of foreign forces, armed groups and withdrawal of all arms.• Harmonise legislation in the three states regarding issues pertaining to arms

trafficking.• Promote policies of good neighbourhood.• All the three states should stop supporting and creating rebel groups.• Put in place joint commission that would work along the boarder.• Resumption of sub regional co-operation.• Dismantling the Mafia network that exploits the natural resources of DRC.

C. Recommendations at to the international community• International inquiry to come up with reports on violation of human rights and

cannibalism.• Support the local organisation for capacity building and restoration of peace.• Establishment of international structure to regulate manufactures and control of small

arms and light weapons.• Improve revenue for the community.• Convert arms industry for the production of better resources.• Communities should be involved in the peace process. Criminal tribunals to be put in

place.• Recruitment of child soldier should be stopped.• Strengthening the demobilisation of child soldier

6.3. Sudan

The Sudanese delegate in their group discussion looked at the impact of proliferation ofsmall arms and light weapons on the communities living in the war torn zones. Theycritically discussed measures that must be put in place to control the illicit trade in small

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arms and what the civil authority, religious bodies, SPLA/M should do to revert thesituation.

Recommendations toward the SPLA/M :1. The SPLA/M should enhance the sensitisation exercise by allowing civil society, its

own civil authority, the church and women’s groups to campaign on the threat posedby small arms and light weapons.

2. SPLM/A should review and strengthen the rules, regulations and procedurespertaining licensing, movement of arms and storage of surplus arms.

3. The borders and entry points to towns should be well manned by security personnel toensure effective control of small arms and light weapons.

4. Border commission should be set up along the common frontiers as well as taskforces geared towards wildlife conservation.

5. The law enforcement organs should be strengthened. The Civil authority shouldrecruit Police commensurate with national and international standards in order toguarantee maximum protection of the civilian population

6. The SPLA should instil a strong Army code of conduct to promote high standards ofdiscipline.

7. Reinforcement of convention on child soldiers demobilisation and a ban on use ofland mine.

8. As the peace process unfolds, a further recommendation to the SPLA/M called for thepromotion of peace and reconciliation meetings from the grassroots to the nationallevel

Recommendations toward the government of Sudan :• The government of Sudan (GOS) should be involved in the action to stop small arms

and light weapons trafficking and proliferation as they are also manufacturing G3sand AKM 47.

Recommendations toward the civil society :• Efforts should be geared towards the promotion of Peace and Reconciliation

Conferences at boma, county, regional and national levels.• Capacity building of the civil society should be supported to promote effective work

in the area of sensitisation, information sharing and dissemination at all levels• Promote sustainable development and poverty alleviation programs amongst the

communities in an effort to transform the lives of the poor.Recommendations toward the international community :• e international community should exert more effort to end the civil war in the Sudan.

The peace process is currently taking place in Kenya under the auspices of IGAD.

7. final resolutions

The conference achieved its objectives in bringing up recommendations with regards toproliferation and trafficking in illicit small arms and light weapons. The conferencelistened to the report of the drafting committee constituted from the chairpersons and

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rapporteurs. Many useful recommendations were put forward, some of which can providevaluable input for further discussions, others can be implemented by recogniseorganisations. As a definition of SALW we refer to the prevailing UN definition.After discussing the draft, the conference then made some amendments and adopted thefollowing recommendations.

7.1. Recommendations to the religious organisations

1. Establish lobbying networks at all levels (that is, international, regional, national, sub– regional and local) by strengthening co-operation among existing religious bodies.

2. Support, cross-border peace initiative at all levels by means of peace education,interethnic as well as interfaith dialogue, and raising awareness on the dangers ofarms in all aspects; the organisation of interfaith peace – weeks is believed to bevaluable vehicle for such peace initiatives.

3. Foster reconciliation.4. Promote the decommissioning of arms through community based programs, in close

co-operation with concerned stakeholders including traditional leaders.5. Have periodical cross – border interfaith meetings of representatives of all religious

communities present in the concerned cross border region as to strengthen dialogue,exchange information, and decide on joint actions. The ad – hoc interim organisingcommittee shall comprise UJCC, the diocese of Mahagi, and the NSCC.

6. Churches and other religious bodies should act as peace mediators betweengovernment and rebel forces; no government or rebel force should be left out of thispeace mediation.

7.2. Recommendations to the NGOs

1. Have periodical cross-border NGO meetings of representatives of NGOs active oncombating SALW proliferation in order to develop a common agenda. The plenarysession appoints Justice Plus, the Sudan Law Society and CEFORD to be the leadingNGOs in the realisation of these meetings.

2. Establish lobbying networks at all levels (i.e. international, regional, national, sub-regional and local) by strengthening co-operation between NGOs. Again, JusticePlus, the Sudan Law Society and CEFORD were entrusted with this task.

3. Formulate an Action Plan over the short, medium, and long term to address allissues pertaining to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons;

4. Apply gender sensitive tools in the conceptualisation and implementation of all plansand activities.

7.3. Recommendations to the government and rebel forces (rule of law)Recommendations were made to all sides in the conflicts ravaging the sub region. Thesecovered issues ranging from short term security arrangements to addressing the longerterm more fundamental issues of inter-ethnic strife. The three countries were thereforeenjoined to:

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1. Make collaborative efforts geared at acceptance of and compliance with the ArmsTrade Treaty in all three countries and at the harmonisation of existing national lawsto facilitate joint activities like the marking and tracing of all weapons;

2. Ensure discipline in the Armed forces;

3. Provide adequate security to combat small arms proliferation at the national level;

4. Convene regular border meetings involving all stake holders to reinforce mutualcontacts and activities;

5. Establish a tripartite task force to counteract wildlife poaching in the Game Parks andto monitor routes used for small arms trafficking;

6. Engage the work of networks to combat proliferation of small arms and light weaponsat the national and international levels; Where possible local communities should beincluded in acquiring intelligence on illicit traders and traffickers in SALW

7. Apply appropriate measures against dealers, traffickers and middle men identified inthe UN report and in other reports;

8. Promote the use and enforcement of international legal instruments curtailing theproliferation of small arms and light weapons and the international conventionscovering land mines and child soldiers.

7.4. International appeals

Recommendations to the international community:1. Allow unlimited access to humanitarian agencies in conflict areas as to provide

services, that amongst others, contains the combating of SALW- proliferation in allits aspects

2. Impose embargo’s on states as well as on rebel-forces known to be involved in theillicit transfer of SALW

3. The international community should actively support the Ituri Pacification Committee4. Promote pacification of Sudan and the DRC with enhanced attention to DDRRR

(Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration, Resettlement & Reconciliation)including sustaining amnesty to former rebel soldiers

5. Work towards the global implementation of the Arms Trade TreatyRecommendations to the regional community:6. Governments should refrain from supporting each other’s rebel groups and instead

they, together with the rebel forces, should actively engage in peace processes.7. Install a regional UN SALW-clearinghouse, a resource centre, like that established in

Beograd, Serbia.

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7.5. Appeals to all stakeholders

1. Stimulate economical opportunities, by economical livelihood programs as toeradicate ‘subsistence’ illicit trade and traffic in small arms and light weapons

2. Enable interlinking of the established networks as to strengthen each others efforts ofcombating the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in all it’s aspects

3. Stimulate ongoing research to identify those involved in the illicit transfer of smallarms and light weapons.

4. Future research is needed with special attention to (a) the role of the regionalgovernment and other armed forces in the transfer of small arms and light weaponsand (b) links between the looting of natural resources and the proliferation of smallarms and light weapons

8. Closing session

After a word of thanks of Simon Simonse to the participants, the staff of the ChristusCentre and our hosts, the Catholic Diocese of Arua, the conference was closed with aspeech by Mr Thomas Nyalulu Okoth, Resident District Commissioner and a word ofprayer by His Lordship Frederic Drandrua, Bishop of Arua.

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CONFERENCE ON SMALL ARMS TRAFFICKING IN THE BORDER REGIONS OF NW UGANDA, NE CONGO AND SW SUDANCRISTUS CENTRE, ARUA UGANDA, 17 - 21 FEBRUARY 2003

No. Name Title Organisation Adress E-mail Fax Telephone

DELEGATES FROM UGANDA

1 CAPT RICHARD OTTO SELTO 10 WGT MLE UPDF BOX 240 ARUA 773765842 LT. RAMATHAN GIDUDU 409 BDE 10 UPDF BOX 241 ARUA 077-6768663 CAPT PETER AMONE 409 BDE PC UPDF BOX 242 ARUA 077-6498334 TOTIA GILBERT DSBO ARUA POLICE BOX 477 ARUA5 OZUA RICHARD R/CID/NWR POLICE BOX 149 ARUA 075-5972096 MAJ LWASI JAMES 409 BDECO UPDF BOX I ARUA 077-3538487 ROBERT ADRADI PPS PARLIAMENT BOX 1015 KAMPALA 077-6526418 ONZIGA WILLIAM DPC ARUA POLICE BOX 2 ARUA 077-6366649 OPIO ALBERT RESEARCHER NGO BOX 366 ARUA 77863025

10 ANDAMA R. FERUA C/MAN LC 5 ARUA BOX 1 ARUA 077-51557711 SIMON AMAJURU DIRECTOR CEFORD BOX 303 ARUA madraru@yahoo.com 077-66979012 PAUL NYEKO OC.CID ARUA POLICE BOX 2 ARUA 077-35907513 HARUNA SEBI DEP. RDC RDC'S OFFICE BOX 1 ARUA 077-62130414 LT. GABRIEL ATIKU F. SISO ARUA ISO BOX 1 ARUA 077-56044215 DAWIN DAWA DIO INFORMATION BOX 1 ARUA 077-51570816 DENNIS MUBANARI FIN.ADVISOR SNV-UGANDA ARUA 7744291417 GEOFRY ERACH RPC POLICE 149 ARUA 7751503918 CHARLES OMONYO AG. DISO ARUA ISO BOX 840 7767575419 ERIKU ROBERT SECURITY OFFICER ESO 840 ARUA 077-67344420 RAHAMA HASSAN DSR UMSC 474 ARUA 7764795121 TOBIA ALBERT CAMCRAM INFORMATION 1 ARUA 7732056022 KHACFAN THABIT MAYOR AMC ARUA MUNICIPALITY ARUA 077-66779323 OKELLO JM D/OC ARUA PRISONS 196 ARUA 077-37213224 OKOTH NYALULU RDC UGANDA BOX 1 ARUA 7748399925 REV. FR. DR. EMMANUEL YUME CHAIRMAN JPC JPC ARUA DIOCESE 992 ARUA 7762481726 ADRAWA LAWRENCE P.O.JPC JPC ARUA DIOCESE 992 ARUA 077-91444427 Dravu Steven DISO DISTRICT SECURITY28 ANGUZU DICKENS COORDINATOR CEFORD, ARUA OFFICE 303, ARUA anguzudick@yahoo.com 077 442068

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Annexe 1

No. Name Title Organisation Adress E-mail Fax Telephone

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

29 Adrapi Robert for Hon. Anim PERSONAL ASST TO MP Box 105 Arua30 CATHRARINE AKUMU. M RDC RDC MOYO BOX 1 MOYO 077-51699131 LT.IGA WILLIAM AG. DISO DISO MOYO BOX 1 MOYO 077-66582232 DULU ISAAC ABA SEC.SECURITY LC V MOYO BOX 1 MOYO33 REV.SAMUEL BOBOLI PARISH PRIEST CHURCH OF UGANDA BOX 90 MOYO34 IZALE OMEN ALBERT COORDINATOR CEFORD BOX 140 MOYO 077-36315235 ABU EMMANUEL AMALE RESEACHER CEFORD BOX 140 MOYO36 AMBAKU DANIEL BERA RESEACHER CEFORD BOX 140 MOYO 077-85393837 MOGR. TWINO MADRWA EPISCOPEL VICAR CATHOLIC CHURCH BOX 241 MOYO38 REV.CHRISTOPHER ONYUTTI CLERGY NEBBI DIOCESE BOX 27 NEBBI 077-47286339 ODOK PETER WOCENG RDC NEBBI PRESIDENT'S OFFICE BOX 1 NEBBI 077-41952340 OLOYA WILLIAM COORDINATOR CEFORD BOX 164 NEBBI 077-66621641 ODONG EMILIO PROG.COORDINATOR A.F.S.E.D. BOX 144 NEBBI 077-57431542 OCUNGI FRANCIS TONNY RESEACHER CEFORD BOX 144 NEBBI 077-81625943 JURUA ANDREW D/DISO SECURITY BOX 1 NEBBI 077-52877744 AHMED D DOKA RDC YUMBE RDC'S OFFICE BOX I YUMBE 077-31663145 VUNI WELBORN SECURITY LC 5 YUMBE 077-51559446 AYKORU JOYCE MANAGER CPS YUMBE BOX 877 ARUA 7764014447 LT.COL. AMIS AKUAKO GEN.SEC.UNRF II UNRF II BOX I YUMBE 077-39743348 ZUBAIR AGOTRE UNRF II V.SEC. UNRF II BOX I YUMBE 077-57784949 JAMAL ABDI DIO. YUMBE INFORMATION BOX I YUMBE 077-36579450 REV. ATAA SAM PASTOR PARISH PRIEST BOX 103 ARUA51 LT. ADULE ROY PATRICK DISO YUMBE ISO BOX 103 ARUA52 FRANCIS WANGINA ADM. Nat. Focal Point BOX 520 K'LA 077-49296853 EVERLYN NASSUNA ADVOCACY OFFICER CRS UGANDA BOX 30086,K'LA 041-510101 041-26773354 PHILLIP OKIN DEPUTY PROM.OFFICERCRS/ARLPI 077-73248455 HON.NUSURA TIPERU MP YUMBE PARLIAMENT. KAMPALA 075-69659456 DARLIGTON LOKIRA DPC ADOL BOX 25756 2567762649557 CANON JOYCE MIMA HD DEPT. UJCC KAMPALA 34425058 SR.SPECIOZA KABAHUMA NESJPC CJP BOX 2886K'LA59 RICHARD MUGISHA COORDINATOR PWD/UANSA 5460 K'LA 4153071260 AWONGO AHMED DEAN RDC BOX 1 ADJUMANI 077-50547361 HON. JOYO MIDRA MP MOYO PARLIAMENT. KAMPALA62 HON. BETTY PACHUTO MP NEBBI PARLIAMENT. KAMPALA63 ROBERT ADRADI PPS TO HOW MD WOMEN MP BOX 1015

DELEGATES FROM THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC)

No. Name Title Organisation Adress E-mail Fax Telephone

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

64 Missak Kasongo Muzeu Head liaison office Kin Justice-Plus Kinshasa justiceplus@yahoo.fr+243-8801826 +243-9817110065 Arthur Desiré Nkoy Elela Coordinator CEJP-DRC Kinshasa desy.nkoy@voila.fr +243-9842396066 Leonnie Kiangu Assistant Admin. CEJP-DRC Kinshasa lekiangu@yahoo.fr +243-993661267 Olela Okonzi Directeur Cabinet Ministère Droits Humains Kinshasa +243992317368 Olivier Eyenga Liason officer UN-OCHA Kinshasa olivereyanga@undp. 871762904846 +243-993538269 Felix Ntumba Advocacy Officer UN-OCHA Kinshasa felly.ntumba@undp.o 871762904846 +250-855710570 Serge Blais Representative DRC Development and Peace Kinshasa sblais@devp.org +243-81700546571 Ferdinand Djayerombe Vaweka Assistant programs Justice Plus Kinshasa djayerombe@yahoo.fr +243-81509062472 Flory Kayembe Shamba Researcher Group Amos Kinshasa kaflosh@yahoo.fr +243-081994468773 Adia Leti Laic/Catholic Diocese de Mahagi Aru74 Prof. Idring'I A.N. Director Gen Acad ISEAV Aru/Bunia75 Archange Aderibho PETE Secretary Academic ISEAV-ARU Aru76 Kandana Atakiri Member Civil society Aru77 Adreza Apayi Animatrice CERAD Aru78 Archange Angui O.A . Sec. Executive Centre d'Initiative et Creativite Aru79 Ande Litsoa Journaliste Radio Ocean Aru80 Aze Amundha Priest Diocese de Mahagi mahagi 077-85634881 Nico Bintu Notable Alur/Mahagi Mahagi82 Acandra Owila ONG/RIMA Rima Mahagi83 Awacango Clemence Notable CECA/2O Mahagi84 Michel Uzele Kasamba Professor CEUMA Mahagi85 Chome Philippe Professor CDJP Mahagi86 John Adubango President Civil Society Mahagi87 Alworonga Bambula ONG Civil Society Mahagi 077-84809688 Aliango Ukiya OGN/Director CESADEMA Mahagi 077-85634389 Gilbert Tandia Bakonzi Director Centre Resolution Conflicts Bunia crc_beni@yahoo.fr90 Alidor Mwanza Editor La Colombe Plus Bunia 91 Innocent Bakonza Secretary UPC/RC Bunia92 Marie Kanyobayo Member Coordinator Civil Society Ituri Bunia93 Aimé Magbo Human Rights defender Justice-Plus Bunia94 J.B. Lalo Kpasha Human Rights defender CDJP/Bunia Bunia95 Jacqueline Budza Coordinatrice FOMI Bunia96 Petronille Vaweka General secretary FPD Bunia vawekas@yahoo.fr97 Honoré Musoko Kazeza Director Justice-Plus Bunia justiceplus1@yahoo.fr 077-51923698 Alain Makelawa Mputu Member Justice-Plus Bunia alainmputu@yahoo.fr99 Léon Baroani Director Centre Lokole/SFCG Bukavu 25008456093

100 Blaise Baise Bolamba President Chrétiens pour la Paix Kisangani

No. Name Title Organisation Adress E-mail Fax Telephone

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

101 Samy Azabho Ariku member Justice-Plus Aru 077-638543102 Emilie Balange V/presidente La Voie des opprimés Isiro103 Gabriel Nzamba President La Voie des opprimés Isiro104 Sr Celestine Sumanende Comm Femmes et Enfant La Voie des opprimés Isiro materdei@inmarsat.ocicnet.net105 Liliane Ahombo Secretary CDJP/Isiro Isiro dioc.isiro@yahoo.fr106 Kongonyesi Abbé Diocese/Dungu Isiro107 Abbé Jean Pierre Gumenote President CDJP Isiro dioc.isiro@yahoo.fr108 Rév. Simon MapalibiI Vice-President CECA/20 Isiro109 Mobari Mavoba Commissaire de disctrict. District Haut-Uélé Isiro110 Obote Siriki Chef coutumier LOGO/FARADYE Isiro

DELEGATES FROM SUDAN

111 CDR. SAMUEL ABU JOHN GOVERNOR SPLM REGIONAL H/QRS112 CDR. JOHNSON JUMA OKOT DEPUTY SPLM REGIONACIVIL ADMINISTRATION, NEW YEI113 LEXON WARI ADMINISTRATION/ SECUSPLM REGIONAL H/QRS114 DAVID BILLY POLITICAL SUPERVISORSPLM YAMBIO COUNTY billypanetus@yahoo.com.au115 CHAPLIAN GWOLO TRADER MOCKY KAJOKEJI116 MICHAEL YOKWE SORO SPLM COUNTY SECRETCANS KAJOKEJI117 FADIL KENYI TETE CHIEF CANS KAJOKEJI118 JOSEPH DUKU YOUTH CANS KAJOKEJI119 JOSEPOHINE SADIA WOMEN CANS KAJOKEJI120 ELUZAI LUMORI YOUTH/ECS CANS KAJOKEJI121 SAMUEL TONY FARMER CANS KAJOKEJI122 JOSEPH TEREKA ELDER CANS KAJOKEJI123 AMOS TABAN PHILLIP INSPECTOR WILD LIFE MARIDI124 REV. CANNON JOHN MAZINDA PRIEST CHURCH ECS125 RICHARD GBINZAKUMBA SPLM CIVIL ADMINISTRATION, NEW MARIDI126 MAMA MONICA RICHARD KHAMA PASTOR CHURCH ECS127 CHARLES WANDI GAMI CHURCH MARIDI128 FAUZIA AGIAGI TASK FORCE GIRLS EDUUNICEF MARIDI129 GLORIA PHILEMONI PCM WHO MARIDI130 CICILIA OBA WOMEN LEADER WOMEN SECRETARIAT ORG'NYEI, E/RNS131 ABE KHAMIS COMMUINTY WORKER SELF EMPLOYED YEI khamisaeg@yahoo.com132 ONESIMO KIRI BAYA POLICE LT. COLONEL POLICE NEW SUDAN POLICE H/QS133 CELETINE PORU ADMINSTRATOR SPLM YEI PAYAM134 JOHN CLEMENT JUDGE SPLM YEI

No. Name Title Organisation Adress E-mail Fax Telephone

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

135 LUKA ACAYE ENGINEER SPLM YEI136 MANOA ALIGO TEACHER/TRADER SPLM YEI137 RAPHAEL AZARO TRADER BUSINESS YAMBIO COUNTY138 CONSTANCE NAKO CHAIRPERSON WOMEN ASSOCIATION YAMBIO COUNTY139 TITUS ISSA CHIEF, COUNTY JUDGE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION, NEW YAMBIO COUNTY140 MODI BAGE MEMBERS WOMEN ASSWOMEN ASSOCIATION YAMBIO COUNTY141 FRANCIS NDAWE TBTP CHAIRMAN SPLM YAMBIO COUNTY142 DR. PETER ADWOK NYABA RESEARCHER LAJOUR CONSULTANCY P.O.BOX 9066 NAIROochaw@kan.co.ke143 JOHN YAPETE RESEARCHER LAJOUR CONSULTANCY P.O.BOX 7575 NAIROtabiajohn@yahoo.com144 CHRISTOPHER CALIB.M RESEARCHER LAJOUR CONSULTANCY C/O 189, ADJUMANI kalibchris@mail.com145 KPIAWUNDU VICTOR RESEARCHER LAJOUR CONSULTANCY C/O 7576, NAIROBI ecskpa@africading.o.uganda146 DAVID BALA RESEARCHER LAJOUR CONSULTANCY YEI

INTERNATIONAL NGOS, ORGANISATIONS

147 SR. BEGONA INARRA JUSTCE COORDINATORAMECEA BOX 21971 begoinarra@wanachi.com148 MR. ANGUS VRQUMART PROJ.COORDINATOR SAFER WORLD 46 GROSUENOR149 M/S SZU HLONGWA DIR DEVELOPMENT SAFER ARFICA 173 BECKET150 LISETTA VANDER WEL POLICY OFFICER ICCO BOX 1512 lissete.van.der.wel@icco.nl151 BERGHEZAN GEORGES RESEACHER GRIP RVE VAN HOORDE 322295 322240152 MARC BARWICK AFRICA DESK PAX CHRISTI INTR. marc@paxchristi.be 32-2-502153 FRANK COORDINATOR EU BOX 5244 K'LA 077-758315154 JOHN KISEMBO DEPUTY DIRECTOR UNAFRI BOX 10590 K'LA 71712000155 JOOST VAN PUIJENBROEK Senior Program Officer PAX CHRISTI po box 19318 Utrecht puijenbroek@paxchristi.nl xx 31 30 2428463156 SIMON SIMONSE Senior Program Officer PAX CHRISTI simonse@paxchristi.nl157 JOHN KISEMBO DEPUTY DIRECTOR UNAFRI BOX 10590 K'LA158 ALIRO OMARA COMMISSIONER UNHCR BOX 4929 K'LA 077-409270159 BART HOREMANS SENIOR OFFICER PAX CHRISTI FLANDRES Italiëlei 98a ANTWERbart.horemans@paxchristi.be +32 (3) 225.10.00

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Annexe 2

SMALL ARMS PROLIFERATION RESEARCHIN THE BORDER AREAS OF UGANDA

A CASE STUDY OF WEST NILE DISTRICTS OF ARUAYUMBE, MOYO AND NEBBI BY CEFORD

NOVEMBER / DECEMBER 2002

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ACRONYMS.

AAH Action Africa HaileADEO Africa Development Emergency OrganisationACORD Agency for Cooperation and Research in DevelopmentAK47 Alexander Kalasnoskov 47 assault riffleBAT British American TobaccoBISO Border internal security organizationCEFORD Community empowerment for rural developmentCoU Church of UgandaCP central policeDISO District internal security orgnizationDPC District police commanderDRC Democratic republic of CongoGISO Gombolola internal security organisationH/Q HeadquarterIO Intelligence OfficerLAP Local administrative policeLC Local councilLDU Local defence unitLMG Light machine gunLRA Lords Resistance ArmyLt LieutenantNGO Non Governmental organizationNRA National resistance armyOC Officer in chargePPU Presidential Protection UnitRDC Resident district commissionerRtd RetiredS/C Sub countySISO Sector Internal Security OfficerSMG Sub machine gunSPC Special police constableSPLA\M Sudan people’s liberation army/movementSSI Semi structured interviewT.C Trading center/Town councilTPDF Tanzanian People’s Defence ForcesUCB Uganda Commercial BankUNLA Uganda national Liberation armyUNRF Uganda national rescue frontUPDF Uganda people defence forceURA Uganda revenue authorityWNBF West Nile Bank Front

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1.0 INTRODUCTION.

Possession and use of small arms by unauthorized and undisciplined persons have beenidentified as the main source of insecurity in West Nile region. The small arms have alsobeen linked to rising crimes; armed robberies, and poaching of wild life in the Nationalparks and game reserves within and those bordering the region. In trying to find probablesolutions to the insecurity situation, this research was carried out along the border regionsof Sudan, Uganda and the Democratic Republic Possession and use of small arms byunauthorized and undisciplined persons have of Congo in November / December 2002.There was need to find the facts about the situation on the ground in the West Nile subregion and find ways of addressing them.Illicit small arms proliferation has also become an issue of international concerntherefore, it is seen the world over as a serious cause of insecurity.

1.1 PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH.

The purpose was to establish the extent of illicit small arms proliferation within the WestNile region and to present the findings to the upcoming International Conference between17th –21st February, 2003 in Arua-Uganda.

The results of the research will enable the respective governments of Uganda,Congo, and Sudan to chart ways to curb the trafficking of small arms within theircommon borders.

1.2 Research objectives.

Collect first hand data from local authorities, community leaders, businessmen, policepersonnel and the army on the sources and causes of arms trafficking in the borderregions of West Nile in Uganda with Sudan and DR Congo.

Collect information on the location of gun markets, the quantity and types of arms andammunitions traded in and the motives for this trade, as well as networks in which thegun traffickers operate.

Determine the impact of illicit arms trade and proliferation on communities and localeconomies in the West Nile region.

Establish attempts made to curb Small arms trafficking in the northwestern Uganda.

Find out the recommendations from the various stakeholders on ways of curbing illicitsmall arms proliferation within the West Nile region.

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2.0 BACKGROUND OF RESEARCH

2.1 Location and Topography

West Nile region lies in the North Western part of Uganda along the Nile River. Itcomprises five districts namely Arua, Nebbi, Moyo, Adjumani and Yumbe. It is borderedby the Sudan in the North, DR Congo to the West and South, Masindi and Gulu districtsto the East.

Moyo district is located in the north eastern part of West Nile. The Nile River forms itssouthern and eastern border, Sudan its northern and Arua and Yumbe districts its westernborder. Until July 1997, the district also encompassed Adjumani district on the southernbank of the Nile River.In total the district covers 2059 sq. km, of which 192 sq. km is rivers, streams andswamps, and 172 sq. km gazetted forests and game reserves. Approximately 78.9% of thedistrict’s land is arable or suitable for cattle grazing.The district’s topography is characterized by low plains and rolling hills along the RiverNile, at 900 meters above sea level, rising in a series of hills and peaks in the northernand north- eastern parts of the district. Mount Otce at 1,500 meters above sea level is thehighest peak in the district. The Nile riverbank rises sharply upwards producing alandscape of plateau interspersed with deep valleys. Drainage occurs towards River Nilethrough series of streams. [Moyo District Profile, CAP, 1994]

Nebbi District is located in North- Western Uganda, between 2030’ and 20 45’ north ofthe Equator, and 30045’ and 31010’east of the Prime Meridian. It is bordered by Aruadistrict to the North, Gulu district to the East, Masindi district to the South east and theDemocratic Republic of Congo to the West and South.It covers a total area of 3,288sq. km (which is 1.2% of the National total area) with aPerimeter of 353km. This is sub-divided as Arable land (62%), Game Reserves(29.1%),Swamps and open water (6.4%), and Forest Reserves (2.8%).Goelogical activities produced a conspicuous morphology in the District. Faulting andRifting along the western arm of the East African rift valley zone extends from Panyimurinto Jukia hills. Up-arching and tilting affected the Okoro uplands, all resulting intodifferences/ variation in Relief with marked ascend towards the DRC. Jonam has flatRelief, Padyere is a raised plateau and Okoro is generally a highland.

Arua and Yumbe Districts are located in the Central and Northern part West Nile. Theyare bordered by Nebbi district to the South, Gulu district to Southeast, the Sudan to theNorth and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to the WestThe two districts approximately lie between latitudes 20 30’ and 30 50’North andLongitudes 300 30’ and 310 30’East.The total land area of the two Districts is 7830 sq.km with Arua covering 5305.93sq.kmand Yumbe 2411 sq.km of which 37sq.km is water bodies and 1,125 sq.km is permanentwetland.Much of Arua District comprises rolling plains, rising from the Nile floor in the riftvalley (600-m above sea level) to the Zaire-Nile water divide (1,200 to 1,400 meters

38

above sea level). The Madi plains are part of the Acholi erosion surface. The Acholisurface (MC Connell, 1955) is classified under the African surface, which cuts acrossfresh solid rock. All the rigolith has been stripped off by erosion.

2.2 The People and their Livelihood

West Nile has a diverse ethnic background comprising of peoples of Nilotic and Sudanicorigin. Refugees form a considerable percentage of the population in all the five districts.The main economic activity is subsistence agriculture.

Nebbi district (then known as South west Nile district until 1979),was gazetted from theformer west Nile district in 1974. The district is a polyglot society in which the variousethnic groupings ( Alur, Jonam, Kebbu, Lendu and lugbara) havediverse historical origins as far back as 1000AD.( Reference; Nebbi District Dev’t Plan,1999-2002)Luo migration in the 18th Century from Southern Sudan (Bar-el- ghazel swampy region)provided the basis for the people in the district.The split at Puvungu, ( Wang lei) and thesubsequent radial movement left a remnant Luo speakers in the area.Inter-marriages, return migration and exchanges with the Sudanic speakers (Madi,Lugbara) who had settled in the area by 1000 AD caused common characteristics. Laterthe Alur Society with Royal regalia and bureaucratic specialisation of duties and socialstratification developed and replaced the egalitarian pre feudal societies.Colonialism found a limited degree of centralisation of society. The semi-segmentary setups had chieftainship at the core of the political and socio economic systems. However,the 1960s demarcation of the boundary did divide the Alur people between Uganda andthe DR Congo.The majority of the population in Nebbi district is of Nilotic origin (98%). Of this 90%are of Alur and Jonam ethnicity. Minority groups in the district include Lendu and Kebbuin Kango, Zeu and Atyak Sub counties. Acholi Labwor in Wadelai, Nyarwanda of tutsiorigin and Nyankole of Hema origin are very sparcely distributed depending on theavailability of grazing land for their pastoral activities.(Nebbi District Three-yeardevelopment plan 1999 – 2002)The population of Nebbi according to the 2002 Population census is 434,512 people,composed of 48% males and 52% Females. This is further stratified in the 3 counties asfollows : 168,677 people in Okoro County, 166,592 people in Padyere County, and99,417 people in Jonam County. ( Uganda population and housing census - 2002)The economy is dependent on Subsistence Agriculture, characterised by small landholdings, simple hand tools, use of traditional low yielding varieties, shifting cultivation,work specialisation by sex and over reliance on family labour, and poor Agronomiccontrol of pests and diseases.Despite the low output due to low productivity, there is also high post harvest loses andrampant selling of food, putting the food security of the district at stake.There is difficulty in marketing, aggravated by the lack of marketing information,fluctuation of farm gate prices, poor transport and marketing infrastructure and limitedaccess to credit facilities. The population along the Lake region and the River basin are

39

mainly Fishermen and since they border the National Park just across the River, theyoften engage in Poaching.

Arua has a total population of 855,055 according to the 2002 population and housingcensus of which 39,888 are refugees where as Yumbe District has a total population of254,407 giving a total population of the two Districts to 1,109,462.The Lugbara, the Madi and Kakwa ethnic communities mainly inhabit Arua whileYumbe District is mainly occupied by the Lugbara who prefer to be identified as Aringa.Refugees from Southern Sudan (90%), Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone andKenya also inhabit Arua District.As for the refugees population, most of those genuinely registered live in the camps.(With a population of 14,435 and 25,453 from Invepi and Rhino camp respectively) Dueto the settlement patterns which, encourages self-reliance and integration into the localcommunities, the homesteads are basically similar. This therefore, makes those interestedin farming activities fully occupied. There are also other categories of refugees whoeither have professional skills or business acumen who are permitted to exploit thoseopportunities outside the camps. By the virtue of the country’s porous borders, some endup not being registered and others join their relatives unofficially. This situation is verydifficult to avoid.The current government policy is to share the social amenities like education and healthfacilities with the local population so as to have them fully integrated into the localcommunities until it would be convenient for one to feel like returning uponnormalization of the situation back home.The bulk (90%) of the population in both Districts is engaged in subsistence Agriculturewith an average of 0.8 ha. Holdings that are often fragmented and scattered, while thosealong the Nile basin do fishing as part of their major occupation. Basically rudimentaryhand tools like the hoes are mainly used. Those residing in thinly populated area like thenorthern areas of Aringa (Midigo, Kei and Romogi) in Yumbe and Ogoko in Arua dohunting as a part time occupation besides farming. Since the farming activities arebasically dependent on rain-fed agriculture, people are virtually redundant during the dryseasons. This has some impact on the populations’ income levels. A small fraction of thepopulation is engaged in petty business and civil service.

Moyo district has a population density of 98 persons per km2 according to the 2002population census. The general population stands at 202,291 with female being 99,305and male 102,986. Of these 27,000 are the Sudanese refugee.[Moyo population censusresults 2002]The majority [90%] of Moyo’s population is involved in agricultural activities, with86.6% of the population involved in some form of subsistence production (Moyo DistrictPlan, 1998). The main crops of the district include sweet potatoes, sorghum, cassava,simsim, groundnuts, finger millet, maize, cowpeas and beans. Most agriculturalproduction is for household consumption.Some household products are usually sold, particularly maize, cassava and simsim.The people also earn their living from activities like charcoal burning, sand mining andsale of firewood. These activities are destructive to the environment; pit sowing is

40

another common activity, which contributes to degradation of the environment. The NileRiver is the main source of fish.

2.3 History of Small Arms Proliferation

Gun trafficking started between 1770s – 1880s in this region. The entire area of Madibecame a source of ivory. During this period, Slave traders from North Africa hadintroduced trade in ivory and slaves leading to the start of insecurity through introductionof firearms by raiders.In the same period, the chief of Atiak, Abucala invited foreigner Jedia under their leaderAgaala to assist him against Cwaa who migrated due to famine and settled at GotLodwong. It was this invitation that led to rivalries and fight among the different tribalgroups, which gave easy accessibility to the spread of superior arms from North Africaright into the interior of pre colonial Madi by the slave traders.The Gondokoro slave traders exchanged guns for captives. Additionally the Madi chiefsacquired small arms from the British and Germans between 1900 – 30s. Among thechiefs were Kibira, Lukere, Kutulungu, and Mateo Kiza. They mostly acquired 175-mmgun and even later on acquired G3. They brought the arms mostly to help them inpoaching elephants to get ivory, protection against wild animals and some got it forprestige [source: A key history of Madi by Alma Rose Ababiku…..page39 ]

In 1971, when Amin came into power militarily, the people from West Nile in generaland Aringa in particular dominated most of the key posts in the army. This was followedby massive recruitment into the army of the youths from both Arua and Yumbe Districtsregardless of qualifications. This therefore, implied that every village had at least someone in the army.

In 1979 with the fall of Amin all the security personnel had free and easy access to thearmouries. Therefore people carried any type of arms they could afford hence the influxof arms within the population. This was then the beginning of rampant armed burglary,high way robberies, raping and fighting in social gathering.

The coming into power of the NRM government in 1986 ushered in the era of the“Kadogos” (child soldiers). This was a very exciting moment for the youths from theWest Nile region in particular to join the UNRF and the West Nile Bank Front rebelsmovements which increased the number of illicit small arms within the region.

3.0 RESEARCH PROCESS

3.1 Pre Field Preparation

Six (6) Researchers had an initial training in Arua, during which they were exposed to themethods to be used during the field activity. This included sharing of experience on asimilar Research previously conducted in the North and North Eastern parts of Uganda,with specific reference to the areas bordering the Sudan and Western Kenya.

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Planning / Support meeting with the CEFORD District Coordinators of MoyoArua and Nebbi with the respective researchers in their districts was done to discussissues of: - Site selection - Developing the respondents list - Development of Interview Guide to be used during the research. - Logistical and Technical support.

3.2 Site Selection:

A number of factors prompted selection of the different sites in which the research wasconducted. In Nebbi the following were considered;Sub counties or Town Councils Bordering War torn Gulu district:With the current insurgency in the Gulu Sub-region, it became an issue to be investigated.The research needed to ascertain if there was any linkage between the insurgency in Guluand the proliferation of illicit small arms in the areas within these administrative units,coupled with the aspect of their bordering the Murchison Falls National Park. Theseincluded Wadelai, Panyango, Pakwach, Panyimur.

Sub counties or Town Councils Bordering the DR Congo being the only country whichshares its international borders with Nebbi District therefore as the scope of the researchemphasized the proliferation of illicit small arms in the border areas of West Nile coupledwith the current civil conflict going on, inclusion of Administrative units or areas on theborder with Congo was inevitable. These included Parombo, Akworo, Erussi, Paidha,Kango, Jangokoro, and Zeu.Internally Located Administrative units / areas with some history of illicit small arms.These particular areas needed to be investigated in order to ascertain facts about thesearms which were either out of circulation now or are still within these areas. Theseincluded , Nyapea, Nebbi , Kucwiny.

In Moyo the area covered by the research borders southern Sudan stretching from Lefori,Logoba, Afoji, Goopi, Pamujo up to Gbari including Nimule area, which are bordervillage entry points for Sudanese refugees.

In Dufile the Paajala Nimule base and Arra extending up to Itoli mountainous areaswhich encouraged the UNRF1 commonly known as ‘oyoro’ and poachers to be basedwithin.Lefori covered Gwere, Mache and Bamure areas, Obongi town and Aliba bito includingItula that host the refugees for Obongi County. These areas were affected by the spilloverof insurgency of WNBF and also area of mixed ethnic groups of the Madi, Kukus andAringa.

In Arua and Yumbe districts the sub-counties considered were those located on theborders with Democratic Republic of Congo and Southern Sudan. In Arua district they

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included Logiri, Vurra Pajulu, Adumi Oluvu, Kijomoro, Oleba, Midia, Kuluba Ludaraand Lobule because of the insurgency situations in the two neighboring countries wherethe infiltration of arms is possible into Uganda; Ogoko and Rhino Camp Sub-counties,because of bordering Ajai Game Reserve where poaching of wild game could involvearms; Rhino Camp and Rigbo sub-counties bordering Gulu District where there is LRAinsurgency currently.In Yumbe District, the Sub-counties covered included Kuru, Kei, Romogi, Odravu,Drajini, Midigo, Apo and Yumbe Town Council. These were chosen due to theprevalence of rebel activities and the great number of ex-combatants in them.

3.2 Meeting with the District Security Committees:

This is a Commitee that handles the Security matters of the districts, chaired by theRDCs. The DISO is the Secretary to this Committee. Members of this Committee includeamong others; the DPC, O/C Station(CP), L.C.5 Security Secretary, Commander LAP,and the O/C Prisons.The meetings were held to develop a shared understanding of the Research, review andupdate the selected sites and respondents, and get the mandate of the SecurityCommittees on the Research since the researchers were not security operatives and therewas need to build confidence in the respondents.

4.0 METHODOLOGY

Various methods were used to collect information during the field work and this includedthe use of SSI, Focus Group Discussions especially with the youths, women groups andbusinessmen, Informal interviews / meetings particularly with respondents from whomwe solicited information without prior introduction of the topic on illicit arms.Observation and Researchers own local knowledge on small arms trafficking in some ofthe areas and secondary data especially from the Police Stations on arms recovery recordsand time trend were also used. Daily reviews were done by the researchers and fieldexercises were reported verbatim.

4.1 Respondents and reasons for their choice:

The respondents included the following and were chosen for specific reasons as given: - Local councilors (LCs I, III and V) because they are the people’s representatives

who are responsible on policy matters. Civil Servants are the people through whom some of these cases including issues

pertaining to misuse of illicit small arms are reported. Security personnel (Army, Police and Prison vigilantes),these are the very persons

charged with the responsibility of enforcing security, which includes acquisition ofsmall arms and hence they are likely to have the records of those apprehended withsmall arms.

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Custom officials were targeted because they are the people concerned with officialexits and entries of goods and services, and they could be knowledgeable of theissues pertaining to the movement of illicit small arms.

Religious leaders because of the role they play in spiritual and moral rehabilitation,they could be a possible source of data since they interact with many members ofthe community.

Elders/opinion leaders are a knowledgeable group about the history of gun cultureamong the communities and how they have been resolving conflicts where armshave been involved.

Ex-service men are potential owners of illicit arms, as per the nature by which mostof them had their services terminated.

Women Groups and their leaders for the reason that in most cases of arms conflict,women become victims of the outcomes in that some end up losing their husbands,relatives while others are raped. So these could be resourceful in terms of the datarequired.

Youth because these are energetic groups of persons who enjoy venturing into riskssuch as the use of arms. The recruitment into rebel forces has attracted many youthshence the need to target them.

Businessmen; to share experiences where criminal activities involving arms occur,as they are usually the potential targets of armed robbery.

Central government because it is knowledgeable about issues pertaining to lawsgoverning the Arms Act, uses and the misuse.

Sudanese refugees and SPLA deserters because some of them are also involved inillicit arms trafficking.

5.0 RESEARCH FINDINGS

5.1 Peoples’ Attitude and Perception Towards Illicit Small Arms

The public in most rural settings are very secretive about guns. Even if they knew thatguns exist with somebody, they do not feel free to talk about it for fear of being attacked.There is a culture of silence about illicit arm’s presence.In Wadelai Sub county, Nebbi district where these guns are used strictly for poaching,according to the code of conduct within the poaching fraternity, it is a taboo to talk aboutguns. If one did so, he or she was cursed to death.In urban settings like Pakwach Town Council, and Trading Centres such as Panyimur andDei, where people are business minded, the public is more open about illicit guns. Theyreadily report the presence of illicit arms once noticed.

An L.C III official of Panyimur had this to say;

‘our people are very security conscious and report any wrongdoers whom we then follow up. Even our boys here don’t like to join the forces, save for those who

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joined during the UNLA Government, and all have died’

5.2 SOURCES

5.2.1 External Sources:

The conflict in the DR Congo has fuelled movement of arms through Nebbi from theSudan. The least controlled army in the DRC often cross into Uganda to rob Businessmenalong the border especially in Nebbi.

The L.C.5 Secretary for Security had this to say;

‘the conflict between the Bagegere and the Lendu in the DR Congo is a source of small arms proliferation. The UPDF supported and armed

one side. This became a loophole for arms trafficking.Uganda became a transit route and the bad relationship betweenthe Sudan and Uganda government has enhanced illicitarms supplies especially from the Sudan to DR Congo’

SPLA deserters and combatants also crossed with their arms into Uganda often unwillingto be checked.

Case study :In 2002 at Oraba custom post an SPLA vehicle carried arms up to the border checkpoint but the officer in charge of the vehicle was aggressive and refused to be checked.He grabbed the soldier on guard by the neck but the police officer on duty intervened

Analysis:

The common men and women do not want this illicit armsBusiness, but the fact that some high profile people whowant to kill and amass quick wealth are the ones involved,these people are silenced to the extent that they would neverdivulge any information regarding this illicit activity amidstthem. This trend should change especially throughsensitization to make them aware of the importance of beingopen about the illicit arms amidst them. This is possible withthe help of the various security structures and instruments inplace.

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and the SPLA officer was arrested and taken to Koboko barracks for furtherexplanation.

Case study:The ambush of a sleeping baby van on Moyo- Yumbe Road where two people werekilled was found to have been carried out by SPLA deserters.Also a box discovered at a Nile coach boarding section in Koboko which wasdiscovered by the L.C 1 Secretary for Security of Apa ward on Dec.7, 2002 containedan AK 47 rifle with 22 ammunitions and the owner was a Sudanese suspected to be anSPLA deserter.

The research findings revealed that when the SPLM government lost Kajokeji County toKhartoum government forces in 1994, the fleeing SPLA forces together with civilianstook refuge in Moyo district with their arms. These refugees were never screened andtherefore moved with their luggage to the camps. Even in the camp, there was norestriction on their movement, which made them cross borders at will. Eventually itincreased trafficking and use of small arms as the refugees sought for their livelihood.This was evidenced by the increased crime rate in the district and eventual arrest ofSPLA deserters with arms.

Further more, 1997 when the SPLA ambushed and destroyed Khartoum governmentmilitary convoy led by Brigadier Ishah Paul at Livolo in the neighboring border area ofKajokaji county, massive arms were recovered by both SPLA forces and some civilians.These arms eventually found their way into Uganda by those who acquired them.

Lastly when Torit town in Eastern Equatorial fell to the Khartoum Government in Sept2002,again there was split in the SPLA forces and so some of the disgruntled groupsmoved into Kajokeji area causing panic which led to NGOs and civilians fleeing forsafety in Uganda of which some SPLA deserters as well crossed heading to the camps.All these incidences concurred with the high increase in the use of arms in the district andeventual arrest indicating a number of arms recovered from them.

A Muslim leader in Nebbi had this to say;

‘In June 2002, a consignment of 2 boxes of guns ( SMGsand LMGs) was intercepted by Police in Paidha Town. These guns were transported from Arua, in a Taxi headed for Congo.Arua does not manufacture guns. These guns are believed to have come from Sudan through some UPDF connection because no serious follow up was done to prosecute the parties involved.’

5.2.2 Rebel groups:

West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) as a result of the fall of Morobo in 1997 to the UPDF,fled in disarray and those who were close to the armouries collected as many guns as theycould carry.

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An old man in Oraba said;

‘As most of the population in Oraba are former rebels of the WNBF and Oraba was their base, the ownership of illegal arms can not be ruled out because as they fled in disarray, some were seen carrying more than three guns. So it is unlikely that all these could have been returned by one

person’

A case in point as reported from Kuru sub county is that an LRA deserter who hadcrossed the Nile with an AK 47 rifle was arrested and handed over to the UPDF detach inYumbe.

UNRF rebels sold guns to willing buyers between the years 1987 and 1989 within theborder areas of Kango and Zeu Sub counties. Prices could not readily be establishedbecause of the discrete nature of the transaction.

Another rebel group that brought arms to Nebbi were the ‘Rodo’ boys who wereoperating in Erussi Sub county between 1986-1987, until heavy deployment of NRAflushed them out. It is believed some of the remnants of these arms are still in thecommunity.

5.2.3 UPDF/ LDU deserters:

When the mobile deployment started and soldiers moved from place to place with norest, some became undisciplined and subsequently deserted with arms. For example, aUPDF deserter from Gulu barracks escaped with his gun in 2001 and was involved inlooting and killing innocent civilians at logoba area in Moyo district.Many LDUs deserted the service due to low pay of Ushs. 30.000= per month. Some ofthese people have come home with guns.

According to the Nebbi RDC;‘since mid 2002, LDUs became discontent because of poor condition of service. The army misunderstood the Presidential directive ofrecruiting and using the LDUs as a reserve force, but now theyare used as regular army with very little pay and worked as slaves, therefore, most of these ended up deserting, 40 out of 80 of them with their guns.’

In Kucwiny sub county alone in Nebbi district, over 30 of these deserters now live in thecommunity and are suspected to have their arms. According to the LC 3 Chairman,

‘Government is actually creating rebels by recruiting and training LDUs yet it does nor cater for them properly’

5.2.4 UPDF Commanders / officers:

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Some UPDF commanders and officers in service often give out their guns to thugs to robpeople.

Case study:A one Lt. Milton who was commanding a UPDF (then NRA) detach in Nebbi, between1987-1989 used to order his soldiers to rob people in Parombo, Paidha, Panyimur andErussi. His second in command who hailed from Jangokoro Sub county, revealed allrobberies they had committed, some of which involved killing the victims. He revealedthis as a confession on his death bed.

5.2.5 Soldiers disbanded with subsequent fall of Past Governments and Ex-Servicemen:

With the fall of past Governments of Presidents Amin , Obote and Tito Okello between1979 and 1986, fleeing soldiers brought home a lot of small arms, especially AK 47Assault rifles. Some of the guns were declared and returned to the subsequentGovernments. Others remained within the communities with the Ex- soldiers whodeliberately kept these guns with intentions of using them to make a living or exchangedthem for a bull/ cow as was the case in Parombo in 1979 but some were taken into theSudan by the fleeing soldiers. In Nebbi district alone, there are 939 registered ex-servicemen (Source: List of Ex-servicemen under Nebbi District 2000) and other districts also have their records and thenumber is considerably big. Government had promised them full retirement package butonly 70 of them so far been paid.The remaining group are now agitating to be paid and this could pose a threat to securityincase some had undeclared arms which can be used illegally to earn a living. A civil servant in Zeu sub county Nebbi district had this to say;

‘most of the guns terrorizing people in Zeu here are from former Amin’s soldiers who were of Congolese origin who retreated home with guns.’

According to the L.C 3 of Ogoko Sub county Arua district;‘ There was an instance where an ex-combatantwho moved with an AK 47 rifle lost it to theperson he intended to rob’

5.2.6 Police and other Security Operatives:

Police and other Security operatives such as Special Police Constables (SPCs), Vermincontrollers, Local Defence Units (LDUs) also commonly known as Reserve forces areknown to hire out their guns to poachers for killing Game and to thugs for robberies.The poachers in turn give some specified quantity of meat to the gun owner, and the

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robbers share their loot.A retired Lt. had this to say;

‘Police is perpetuating robberies because they have collaborators with whom they share some of the

robbed items.’

Case Study:In the year 2000, an SPC attached to Wadelai Police Post hired out his gun forpoaching but when spot audit was done by the O/C Post, his gun was found missing.He was summoned to look for it and bring it back. He struggled and traced the gunwith the poachers and retrieved it. From there he was transferred to Nebbi centralPolice Station where he is working up to now.

6.0 USES OF ILLICIT SMALL ARMS

Different categories of people in West Nile acquire and use illicit arms for variousreasons as discussed below:

Livelihood:Illicit arms are used as a means of livelihood through robberies. Bad elements within thecommunities use guns to rob others which loot they resell to get money incase they hadnot got hard cash. For example in Dei trading centre, Panyimur sub county Nebbi district,there were 11incidences of armed robberies in the year 2002 alone in which millions ofshillings was lost.

In Moyo, cases of use of illicit arms to raise funds include the 1998 U.C.B robbery, theCala incident in which a BAT vehicle was attacked and the occupants robbed of Ushs.2mand shop breakages still exist .

Protection:

Analysis:The continued arms struggle in Southern Sudan, the unending ethnic conflict in the DRCongo are the roots of small arms proliferation in West Nile as these events continueto provide constant demand and supply of the arms.The Ugandan Government should give its clear position on the issue of support to therebels fighting the Sudan Government and DR Congo Governments. This is because inmany cases the rebels know that their incursions into Uganda even when armed isnormal although it is illegal because state house supports them. Otherwise, the localcommunity members in the West Nile Region will continue to suffer from this doublestandards Government is trying to play.

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Some people especially businessmen and some individuals’ acquired arms for protection.In Moyo by the year 2000, some businessmen in Upari,Arapi and Gbari, involved inPit- sawing timber and trade in Gold were armed to protect their business interests andthese arms could still be there.In the 1980s businessmen in Paidha, Nebbi district bought guns from fleeing soldiers toprotect themselves. Sometimes these guns were used for settling personal differences.

In Arua and Yumbe, the respondents said that after the overthrow of Idi Amin in 1979,the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) harassed people, raped women, murderedothers and demanded for money in exchange of life. Therefore, people had to acquire orretain guns obtained from the deposed governments for protection.

Poaching:Poachers used the guns mainly for hunting game to get meat as a source of livelihood.These are either ordinary community members, or even security operatives who use theirofficial guns to poach in the park.For example, around the villages neighbouring the Ilingwa- Nimule Game reserve, theUNRF 1 rebels used it their food reserve and for getting income.The poachers also earn their living through this illegal activity.

According to a teacher in Wadelai Sub county, Nebbi district,‘In Mutir and Pakwinyo Parishes alone, there are over 10 AK 47 assault rifles but these guns are kept in the Game Park and only used for Poaching when they need more meat.’

7.0 ROUTING OF ILLICIT SMALL ARMS

The SPLA, some times in uniform always move with their arms from Bamure viaYumbe, Koboko and Oraba.Some of the routes used by these traffickers are along Uganda-Congo boarder from Lia toKoboko via Oluvu and most of these thugs are of mixed nationalities.

Analysis:

The various uses of illicit arms cited within the region points to ways inwhich some people are trying to make a living out of the Poverty situationthey are in. And also the greed that make others think of forceful means tomake ends meet including the use of illicit arms as has been the case withthe business community. The way out of this could be to give the securityoperatives a living wage and to have some affirmative action for enhancingthe livelihood means of the people of West Nile.

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Guns and Ammunitions supplied by former rebels; UNRF entered Nebbi district throughKango and other border areas in Zeu, Jangokoro and Paidha, to DR Congo especially to amarket commonly known as ‘Kudikoka’ which is still active to date.Some of the dangerous routes are from Malia to Otravu trading center. Others identifiedin Logiri were Oliba forest, Ayiga, Koya and Odrua bordering Arua and Nebbi Districts.

In Moyo district criminals involved and SPLA deserters move following the routescommonly used by refugees which include Afoji, Logoba via Moyo town to Lama selfsettled refugees camps occupied by refugees from Kajokaji areas in Sudan. Some movefrom Kajokeji to Ndirindiri via Eria and Palorinya camps. Others pass via MacheChohwe and Munu to Kali camps, Gbari via Erepi airstrip to refugees camps andsettlement of Lama, Kali and Morobi.The routes of Paajala pass via Laropi to Adjumani district heading to the refugees’ campsof Maaji and Mugula.From Mejale to Gwere area via Lefori and direct to Kali and Belameling camps.

8.0 MARKETING.

There are no known open gun markets within the region.In Arua and Yumbe districts for example, despite the fact that various sources of smallarms had been identified, no functional open markets were identified. There used to beone near Kochi River, in 1998, but due to security surveillance, it became defunct.However, the demand for small arms cannot be ruled out. For example in 2002 anindividual was arrested at Koboko with an AK47 assault rifle having 22 rounds ofammunitions. This implied that this individual was possibly a dealer who could havebeen on a mission to some specific target markets.

In Nebbi district no open markets exist but small arms are transported from externalsources mainly the Sudan and DR Congo through the district to external markets notably‘Kudikoka’ in the DR Congo.

So long as the war situation along West Nile boarders especially the ethnic conflicts inthe DR Congo, SPLA/M liberation fight in southern Sudan, the LRA / Kony war againstUganda government continues, the movement of illicit arms in search of markets by thebearers can not be ruled out. This is because some become so desperate that they disposeoff the arms to meet their requirements. Some businessmen also take advantage of thesituation to trade in guns.

The pricing of small arms depend on one’s negotiation ability. At the defunct KochiRiver market in Arua district, an AK47 was sold at 200,000= (Two hundred thousandshillings), while a pistol was at 150,000= (One hundred thousand shillings). The dealersat the above market were mainly SPLA deserters or the “dinka” and the potential buyerswere those Ugandans who had the knowledge of handling arms.

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Sometimes a gun was exchanged for a bull. This also happened in Paidha, Nebbi districtin the years 1979 and 1986 when businessmen bought guns from fleeing soldiers of fallengovernments of Amin and UNLA.In other cases, these arms are hired out and the proceeds shared between the owner andthose hiring, as was the case in Odravu and Oluvu sub-county in Arua where guns werehired at 50,000/= (Fifty thousand shillings) per night.

9.0 MODES OF TRANSPORTATION

There are a number of ways by which the arms were transported;They are wrapped in bales of second hand clothes for instance at the checkpoint nearKoboko Secondary School, during a search of a vehicle that traveled from Sudan with theSudanese travellers, a pistol and an AK47 Riffles were found wrapped in second handclothes, the AK47 was dismantled. The intercepted arms were then taken together withthe owners to the barracks.

Sometimes they are packed in boxes and loaded on buses or taxis. In another incidence atraveler believed to be a Sudanese was intercepted with a box in which a dismantledAK47 Riffle with 22 rounds of ammunitions was loaded on a bus destined for Kampalavia Arua on 7th- Dec.- 2002. The traveller disappeared and abandoned the luggage, whichwas later searched, and the arm handed over to the Central Police Station of Koboko andthereafter it was transferred to Arua Police Station.

They are also carried on bicycles or hidden in jackets while moving on foot.In some cases the guns are dismantled and wrapped in old clothes or sacks to disguisethem for other pieces of luggage. Some are transported in sacks of food, others rolled inmattress / papyrus mat.Some people move with them at night on their backs for fear of being arrested.

Case studyA police officer cited a case where a group of thugs who were moving between Aruaand Congo but resident in Mbaraka were netted after the community watched theirmovement with suspicion. It was discovered that each member of the team carried apart of the same gun dismantled. In this case, a Sudanese was found with the barreland he disclosed that the other colleagues who live in the Democratic Republic ofCongo had other parts of the same gun.

Analysis:The different manners in which these arms are transported forexample by stripping and the parts carried by different persons,wrapping them in bales of second hand clothes make traffickersbeat security surveillance. There is therefore need for trainingsecurity operatives in some specialized skill in tracking illicit arms.

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10.0 ATTEMPTS AT CURBING SMALL ARMS PROLIFERATION:

Instruments in place:

There are laws governing legal acquisition and use of arms by individuals. There is also the Arms Act of 1974 in place to handle those in possession of and

misuse of arms. The Amnesty Act which was enacted by the parliament in 1995. According to

Article 28 Section 10 of the Ugandan Constitution of 1995, “No person shall betried for any criminal offense if the person shows that, he or she has beenpardoned in respect of that offense.”

The Amnesty Act guarantees that, “ a reporter who has participated in theinsurgency or who has assisted insurgency shall not be prosecuted or punished forthose crimes. Section 3(2).”To ensure that these instruments are abided with, sensitization is normally conductedat all levels.

Existing Structures:

At the national level, the army (UPDF), and the police are the ones charged withthe responsibility of protecting the lives and property of the population.

As a result of the Nairobi and Cote De Ivore declaration, Uganda government hasset up a National task Force on small arms which is to draw a national action planwhere an elaborate way of tracking arms incidences are to be formulated. This isto be decentralized to regional level sometime to come.

At District levels, there are the Local Defense Force, Reserve Forces, the DistrictInternal Security Officers (DISOs) and the LC 5 Secretary for Security who areall responsible for the security of the people under their jurisdictions.

At Sub-county level, there are the vigilantes, Local Administrative Police andSecretaries for Security (LC III), GISOs (Gombolola Internal Security Officers.)

At community level, there are Local Councilors (LCs) and elders who normallyhandle issues of conflicts including those involving arms, which they normallyrefer to the police.

Activities aimed at curbing small arms proliferation/ trafficking:

At village levels, the LC I secretaries for security have to register visitors or strangersto the village in terms of why, where from and the duration of their visits.

In Nebbi district culprits have been arrested, sentenced and jailed, and others killedby firing squad.

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According to the former GISO Jonam County;

‘During the days of UNLA there were so many desertersand armed thugs who used to rob people and rapewomen but all these were killed, some by firing squad in Nebbi town.’

Internal Security organs (DISO, GISOs in all Sub counties) investigate illicit gunsand those who have them. The guns are retrieved in a polite manner through dialoguebetween the security operatives and the persons who have them. By doing this, noarrest is effected because some of these arms were innocently acquired.

Office of the RDC in collaboration with Sub county chiefs and the secretaries forSecurity/ Defence often mount operations and recover guns in the hands of ex-servicemen. The same office registers them and receives willfully returned arms.

Police out-posts established in insecurity prone areas like Warr Girls’ S.S, and mostrecently, at Dei trading Centre which had experienced armed robberies on severalocassions.

Cross- border security meetings between Nebbi and DR Congo, especially in theborder district of Mahagi, authorities agreed to jointly handle cases of armedrobberies. It was agreed that Congolese robbers arrested in Uganda are prosecutedhere and Ugandan robbers who rob and run to Congo are brought back to face thelaw.

Routine joint operations by Local Administration Police (LAP), Central Police (CP)and the office of the DISO done around the districts to check wrong doers includingarmed attackers with illicit arms.

The church sensitizes its followers through preaching against illicit small arms.

The Bishop Nebbi Catholic Diocese had this to say;‘as a church we preach against illicit arms in thecommunity because its against the church’s principle on Peace.’

Traditional chiefs around the districts in collaboration with local authorities,Community leaders in places where some people are known to be having theseillicit arms , use ex-servicemen to mount operations to retrieve these arms from theindividuals and sometimes curse the culprits who end up being quite easily capturedor die outright.

Case Study: In 1996 armed people from Mahagi Port in the DRCongo could come to robfishnet from fishermen on Lake Albert on Panyimur side( Nebbi district). However,the practice came to stop because of the involvement of the traditional chief ofPanyimur who intervened by cursing the thugs to death with the authority vested inhim.

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11.0 EFFECTS OF ILLICIT SMALL ARMS PROLIFERATION:

11.1 Economic Aspect:

In most areas, there is a drop in business and many have shifted to safer places simplybecause of rampant armed robberies experienced by Businessmen and the general public.This has retarded the development trend of the upcoming trading centers across theregion.

The loss of valuables including cash to armed robbers from both the business communityand other members of the society has in some cases pushed traders out of business.Meanwhile, other members of the community are forced to abject poverty as a result oflost livelihood means.On the other hand, illicit arms presence in the sub counties of Wadelai and Pakwachwhere Poaching is done, has resulted in lucrative illegal trade in game meat.This is especially in Nebbi and Paidha towns where there is high demand at particulareating joints.An operator of a eating joint in Nebbi town once boasted of buying game meat worthUshs. 300,000= and claimed it would be exhausted just within one week.

The Ajai game reserve in Arua district and other areas where poaching has been verycommon has led to the depletion of most species of the wild game like the elephants,hippos and the famous white rhinos in the areas.

11.2 Social Aspect:

Fear created in the community and as a result most houses in some of the areas are builtwithout windows for fear of attacks. This is a health hazard as a result of limitedventilation.

Nobody talks about illicit arms for fear of either being implicated by relatives of arrestedculprits or attacked.There has been loss of lives of prominent members of the community killed by armedthugs across the region.

Also on some occasions, poachers are engaged in shootouts with Game Rangers in whichsome poachers are killed. There is a known case of five (5) deaths of Poachers fromWadelai Sub county between the months of February and May, 2002.

Active and able bodied community members are disabled or maimed as a result of armedattack.

Case Study:In 1996, there was an armed robbery of a businessman in Angabatrading Center, Akworo Sub county in which Ushs.4m was taken.The businessman’s wife suffered 3 gun shots that damaged one ofher eyes. She now has partial vision and a scarred face.

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Families of arrested and prosecuted illicit gun owners live in misery as the Breadwinner serves jail sentences, sometimes this has led to broken marriages.

11.3 Cultural Aspect:

Poachers have abandoned use of traditional hunting weapons especially Spears,Bows and Arrows in favour of guns. Therefore, a gun culture is developingamong the poaching communities.

Because of the possession of the gun, those who have it have no respect for elders,parents, religious leaders or any authority leading to moral degradation

11.4 Political Aspect

Despite Government’s effort in controlling illicit Arms, people feel that not enough isbeing done in providing security for them. As a result, local leaders are often timeschallenged during elections to address issues of small arms trafficking and robbery.

12.0 RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

12.1 RECOMMENDATIONS:

From Government Sources:

Government should streamline the methods of Arms Registration, Distribution andcontrol because currently it seems there is no serious mechanism in place.

An open UPDF Management be ensured by Government to avoid creating disgruntledfactions within the army as a result of favoritism leading to some of them deserting.

Government to provide better remuneration for the Reserve Forces so that they arecontented with their work and not forced to illicitly use their guns to make a living.

The Ex-servicemen be paid their Gratuity in order to have settled minds so as not toengage in illegal armed activities.Border deployment of soldiers be strengthened to check on illegal armed incursions intothe country from Congo/ Sudan.

The UPDF to effect appropriate punishment to randy soldiers/ officers involved in illicitarms proliferation instead of simply transferring them to new locations .

Government to effect proper training and equip well the Police special branch andInternal Security Department, to make them more active and effective.

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For example, most Police Posts do not have Radio Communication Equipment andtransport. Even office of the DISO begs for Transport from other Departments.

Refugees from the DR Congo be taken to an exclusive place and not allowed to mix withthe locals. They should be thoroughly screened to ensure that they do not come in withguns.

From the Community :

Special Branch and Revenue department to be empowered (financed and equipped) toinvestigate some suspicious Businessmen especially those within the border towns likePaidha, Oraba, Mbaraka and Difule.There is need for the communities to be vigilant and report cases of illicit armsimmediately to security authorities.

Traditional Chiefs:

Chiefs to work directly with the District Security Committee instead of Police in fightingthe spread of illicit arms since Police are slow and known to back some wrong doers.

Strengthening the traditional institutions through provision of security by Governmentsince they play a big role in preventing youths from joining rebel ranks to fightGovernment thus becoming a target of rebel recruiters even though the 1995 constitutionhas removed much of their powers.

The Church:

Border patrols be done by Government to check infiltration of illicit arms into the countryGovernment to use the Church to sensitize the society on the dangers of illicit arms.

Researchers:

There is need to strengthen the relevant laws governing acquisition of arms since the oldlaws no longer meet the challenges of today. One is either charged 3 years’ imprisonmentor simply released on the basis of insufficient evidence. This term needs to be increasedto between 6 to 10 years to allow adequate time for the offender to reform. Informantsthat are associated with crimes involving arms should be protected by ways of avoidingtheir direct exposure rather than passing the information through the government’sintelligent network. There is need to strengthen the different line organs in terms ofexpress power to investigate and the need to administer effective prosecution.

Witnesses to armed related crimes be paid their traveling and subsistence expenses whileassisting to have the issues resolved at all levels of courts.

The police investigating issues pertaining to arms related crimes be fully facilitated,monitored and supervised.

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There is need to rehabilitate, equip and fully staff all the border posts and strictcheckpoints, so as to disarm any unauthorized incoming and outgoing persons.

Roads need to be constructed along the borders with both Congo and Sudan, and securityforces should regularly patrol them.

There is need to establish institutions to provide skills in various fields for the youths inorder to become self-reliant. This should be supported by specific Poverty alleviationProjects, especially targeting the youths, women, the disabled and the ex-combatants.

All Ugandans need to be properly identified with a National Identity Card.

Lodges and Park operators need to be trained on methods of screening clients includingthe use of gadgets for detecting dangerous equipment like arms.

Sensitization of the local community to be carried out about the threat [political,economic, instability in the Southern Sudan] and effects caused by small armsproliferation.

12.2 CONCLUSION

There are no particular open markets in the region for small arms but still noticeable levelof arms trafficking from external sources, mainly the Sudan and some internal sourcesbeing top UPDF brass to external markets in the DR Congo. The army is the greatestsources of small arms and therefore should be controlled.

Policing the borders and bi-lateral agreements alone cannot resolve gun trafficking. Theremust be concerted effort by neighboring governments, non- governmental organizationsand all stakeholders and advocates to effect a ban on illicit small arms movements andthe resolution of the armed conflict both in the southern Sudan and Democratic Republicof Congo. This is a long-term strategy, which is achievable through the efforts of all thestakeholders and ammunition manufacturers of for example the AK47 which is the mostdominant in the research findings.

For an effective control of arms trafficking and proliferation, there is need for theinternational community to intervene and also to cooperate on the views of the localcommunity in addressing the root cause of civil war in the Southern Sudan which hasgreatly contributed to the dispatch of small arms in the region. This is because theSouthern Sudan war is not a war of liberation but a struggle over wealth.

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APPENDIX 2: LIST OF RESPONDENTS - NEBBI:

SUBCOUNTY CHIEFS, L.C EXECUTIVES & CIVIL SERVANTS:

Chairman L.C 3, Panyango S/CSecretary for Finance, Panyango S/CCouncillor, Nyakagei Parish- Panyimur S/CChairman L.C 3- Panyimur S/CDistrict Councillor (Female) for Parombo S/CChairman L.C 3 Wadelai S/CChairman L.C 3 Kucwiny S/CSecretary for Defence –do-Subcounty Chief- ZeuGrade II Magistrate i/c ZeuSub-Accountant, Zeu SubcountyParish Chief, Papoga Parish- Zeu SubcountyDistrict Councillor for Erussi S/C

SECURITY OPERATIVES:

RDC- NebbiDISO- NebbiDeputy DISO- NebbiBISO i/c Goli & PaidhaFemale Local Adm. Police, Pakwach S/CCommandant, Pakwach UPDF Army detachFormer GISO, Jonam CountyActing O/C Police Post, WadelaiPolice Constable, Wadelai Police PostLAP on duty, Panyimur S/C H/QAg.O/C, Panyimur Police PostGISO, JangokoroO/C Warr T.C Police PostO/C Kango Police PostDPC, NebbiPolice Constable, Zeu Police PostGISO, Paidha S/CO/C Parombo Police PostL.C 5 Secretary for Security and Technical ServicesCommander, LAP- NebbiPrison warder, Paidha Prisons

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TRADERS’ ASSOCIATION AND BUSINESSMEN:

Chairman Traders Association, Akela trading center-Pakwach S/CChairman Traders, Pakwach Town CouncilLodge Manager, Panyimur trading centerChairman, Dei trading center, Panyimur S/CVice Chairman, Dei trading center-do-Business, -do-Prominent Businessman Alangi T.C, Kango S/CReknown Businessman & Founder member, Zeu Village Bank

VICTIMS OF ARMED ROBBERIES:

Awanga Celestino, Dei T.CBada George, Businessman Panyimur

CHURCH/ RELIGIOUS LEADERS:

Pastor, Akworo T.CSecretary, Muslim Supreme Council- NebbiBishop Nebbi Diocese (C.O.U)Bishop Nebbi Catholic DioceseParish Priest, Nebbi Cathedral Parish

TRADITIONAL CHIEFS:

Rwoth Okungu, PaidhaRtd, Lt. i/c Security, Kaal Paidha chieftaincy

INDIVIDUALS:

Teacher, Pumit P/S, WadelaiRtd. Civil Servant, Parombo T/CTeacher, Parombo T.C3 Farmers, ParomboTeacher, Zale T.C7Youths, Zale T.CField Extension worker,Erussi S/CCEFORD Nebbi, AccountantFarmer, Lendu Parish- Zeu S/CCustoms/ URA officials, Goli Custom Post.

26

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APPENDIX 3: List of / Categories of respondents in Arua and Yumbe:

Local Councilors.- LC I Secretaries for security. 6- LC I chairpersons. 3- LC III chairpersons. 16- LC IV chairperson 1- LC V chairpersons. 1- LC V secretary for security 2

Central Government.- RDC 2- DISO. 1- SISO. 1

Civil Servants. 3- Sub-county chiefs. 7- Teachers. 1- Parish chiefs. 7

Security Personnel.- Army Officers. 5- Administration Police. 12- Prisons. 1- Vigilantes/LDU. 2- Central police officers 9

Custom Officials.- Custom Officers. 3- Immigration Officers. 2

Religious Leaders.- Catholics 1- Protestants 2- Moslems 4

Elders/Opinion Leaders. 7 EX-service men 3 Women Leaders 7 Youth Leaders/Representatives 5

_____________TOTAL: 114

27

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APPENDIX 4: List of respondents in Moyo.

Respondents personally known to the researchers (friends and relatives)Local councils (LC1,111 and Vs)Sub county and Parish Chiefs)EldersSome District Officials/PoliticiansHeads of NGOs working in the refugees camps (ADEO,ACORD,AAH which is involvedin conflict mitigation and peace resolutions),Camp commandant of refugees camps in Moyo.Business community especially those who undertake cross border business.Religious leadersSome Sudanese refugees of Kuku, Bari and Dinka Origin.SPLA deserters.UPDF/LDU deserters and veterans.Hunters.Laropi ferry operators.Some prisoners involved in related gun robbery cases.The general district security personnel (DISO, DPC, RDC, OC CID, CO, LCV Secretaryfor Defence, GISO, Reserve force and Vigilantees.)

APPENDIX 5:TABLE. I. Types of arms recovered / identified by cartridges found after

arms conflicts.TYPES ARUA YUMBE TOTAL ROUNDS

AK47 9 3 12 112SMG 3 4 7 -G3 2 0 2 -PISTOLS 5 0 5 13HANDGRENADE 2 1 3 -

62

TABLE II. SUMMARY OF CRIMES INVOLVING ARMSQUARTERLY RETURNS.

No. Periods Offense CasesReported

AccusedCharged

NotCharged/

P/A

1.January-April2001/2002

Armed robbery

Murder byshooting

Terrorism

13

4

-

5

1

-

8

3

-

2.April-August2001/2002

Armed robbery

Murder byshooting

Terrorism

19

-

2

7

-

-

12

-

2

3.August-December2001/2002.

Armed robbery

Murder byshooting

Terrorism

12

9

1

1

6

1

11

3

-

Total 60 21 39

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Annexe 3

JUSTICE - PLUSPANEL OF RESEARCH ON THE PROLIFERATION AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC OFSMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS IN THE FRONTIER AREAS BETWEEN

SUDAN, UGANDA AND THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

PROLIFERATION AND ILLICIT TRAFFICOF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS

IN THE NORTH EAST OF THE DRC

Summary Report

by

Flory KAYEMBE SHAMBADésiré NKOY ELELA

Missak KASONGO MUZEU

Kinshasa, January 2003

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INITIALS

A.D. : Aire de Discussion

A.L. : Arme légère

ACIAR : Appui à la Communication et à l’Auto promotion Rurale

AFDL : Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération

ALC : Armée de Libération du Congo

APC : Armée du Peuple Congolais

C.E. : Centre d’Enquête

C.E.J.P. : Commission Episcopale Justice et Paix

CIC : Centre d’Initiative et de Créativité

CRC : Centre de Résolution des Conflits

Fig. : Figure

FOMI : Forum des Mamans de l’Ituri

FPD : Fondation pour la Paix Durable

Gouv. : Gouvernement

HCR : Haut Commissariat aux Réfugiés

ISEAV : Institut Supérieur des Etudes Agronomiques et Vétérinaires

J.P. : Justice-Plus

MLC : Mouvement de Libération du Congo

MONUC : Mission des Nations Unies au Congo

N.U. : Nations Unies

OCHA : Office of Coordination Humanitarian Affairs

ONG : Organisation Non Gouvernementale

P.R. : Panel de Recherche

PAL : Prolifération des armes légères

R.D.C. : République Démocratique du Congo

RCD : Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie

RCD/ML : Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie/ Mouvement de Libération

RCD/N : Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie/National

SPLA : Sudan People’s Liberation Army

UPC : Union des patriotes congolais

UPDF : Ugandan People Defence forces

Z.E. : Zone d’enquête

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I. CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

The problem of the proliferation and illicit traffic of S.A. & light weapons reveals an

obvious interest in the search for a lasting peace. The Panel of Research entrusted with

this study put forward the conceptual and methodological framework of the research in

order to delimit the content, the methodological progression and the tools for the

collection of data.

In preparation for the International Conference on the proliferation and illicit traffic of

light weapons, Pax Christi/Netherlands initiated a project of research in the frontier areas

between the DRC, Uganda and Sudan. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the

research was understaken by three Kinshasa based researchers and several investigators

based in the North East of the DRC, members of different denominational and human

rights organisations in Ituri and Upper Uélé. The Kinshasa based researchers are

members of the following organisations :

1. « Groupe Amos » : Flouy Kayembe Shamba ;

2. « CEJP » : Désiré Nkoy

3. « J.P. » : Missak Kasongo

TERMS OF REFERENCE

The object of the research is the proliferation of S.A. & light weapons in the frontier areas

between Sudan, Uganda and the DR Congo.

This research was carried out in preparation for the International Conference on the

proliferation and illicit traffic of light weapons, to be held in Arua (Uganda) by three

complimentary research teams from the Congo, Uganda, and Sudan.

The conference, mobilizing representatives of local government, security forces, churches

and non government organisations from these three countries, purposes to develop

strategies, for a coordinated action by these three countries and various official on non

official actors, against the increase, use and cross-bonder illicit traffic of S.A. & light

weapons.

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Expected results :

The research tried to answer the following questions :

a. Who holds and uses weapons in many of the selected frontiers communities ?

b. To what end are they using these weapons : personal protection, the protection of

the community, criminal activities, participation in rebel or war lards’ armies, etc ?

c. Arms Markets : How are the weapons obtained ? What is the price ? What benefits

does one gain from the traffic of weapons ? Who are the dealers ? Can one obtain

an estimate of the size of this trade ?

d. What are the measures envisaged in order to control the trading in and use of

weapons, and what is their efficacy ?

e. Based on the research findings, can one identify strategies in order to slow down the

proliferation of light weapons and improve the security of communities ?

Research hypotheses

1. The presence of foreign armies may foster the inflow of weapons in the area ;

2. Economic and financial objectives encourage the proliferation of light weapons ;

3. The existence of ethnic militias and armed gangs favours the proliferation of light

weapons ;

4. The inflow of refugees owing to the war might have brought about the proliferation of

weapons ;

5. The inefficient administration of the area may encourage the search of personal safety

to the detriment of the search of collective, safety individuals thus getting weapons

for their own safety ;

6. The evacuation of occupying troops may bring about the proliferation of light weapons

as these are left with the local population ;

7. The use of weapons for poaching purposes causes the circulation of S.A. & light

weapons ;

8. The illicit trade of weapons, simply being lucrative, increases the circulation of light

weapons;

9. The plundering of natural resources causes the traffic and proliferation of S.A. & light

weapons.

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METHODOLOGY AND UNFOLDING OF THE RESEARCH

In order to carry out the research for the collection of data, the DRC’s Panel of Research

prepared a questionnaire which was administered to individuals in the investigation

centres.

The administration of the questionnaire was preceded by the training of 11 researchers

set out as follows

• Aru centre (05 – 06 November, 2002) : three investigating researchers were trained ;

• Isiro centre (08 – 09 November, 2002) : five investigating researchers were trained ;

• Bunia centre (11 – 13 November, 2002) : two investigating researchers were

trained ;

• Mahagi centre (15 – 18 November, 2002) : one investigating researchers weretrained .

The collection of date unrolled in an active and participatory way in the different

investigation areas. It was made through interviews with and administration of the

questionnaire to the target population. In the investigation areas, the investigating

researchers worked in difficult conditions taking into account the difficulties of transport

and the generalised insecurity in the districts of Ituri and Upper Uélé which constitute the

theatre of violent confrontations between armed factions, rebel groups and foreign

armies.

Certain data could not be collected because of the high risk factors noticed by the

researchers on the ground. Certain investigation centres or areas, such as Bunia, Mahagi

and Faradje, could provide only partial date taking into account the local political

situation. The mistrust and hostility of some respondents made data collection arduous.

Owing to harassment, some date could not be conveyed to the Kinshasa centre of

analysis.

The various research date were distributed among the researchers. The researchers then

met for a pooling of the outcomes of their work of analysis, which made it possible to

make a summary of the research results. This analysis occurred from the 2nd to the 25th

of January 2003.

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II. OUTLINE OF THE SITUATION IN THE NORTH EAST OF THE DRC

The North East Area of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, like certain other parts of

the country, is undergoing peculiar, recurring violence caused by a difficult cohabitation

between ethnic groups, and the presence of internal and external armed groups. Certain

groups, at the conquest of power, formed rebel movements and transformed the North

East of the DRC into a battlefield.

Before dealing with the study of the proliferation and illicit traffic of S.A. & light weapons,

we found it useful to make an outline of the situation of the North East of the DRC so as

to understand the geographic, historical, socio-economic and culture factors of the

surveyed area.

Indeed, the region’s demographic dynamics showed that there are cross-border

populations who belong to the DRC, Uganda and Sudan. The play of alliances can be

elucidated on the basis of ethnic, cultural and historical affinities quite real between the

populations of the three countries. As the borders inherited from colonization are only

artificial boundaries naturalness eliminates these borders and facilitates a recognized

permeability of the geographical and politico-administrative boundaries of these countries.

The extreme wealth of the subsoil of Upper Uélé and Ituri justifies the increased interest

of war lords and of the neighbouring countries in this region. If it steals the limelight

from the other parts of the country, it is particularly because of the economic interests

that it represents. This situation is accentuated by the organisation, before the current

war and conflicts, of an intense commercial network between the North East of the DRC,

Sudan and Uganda.

The understanding of the spatial and historical context of Ituri and Upper Uélé helps to

better delineate and the problem of S.A. light weapons which is the object of our

research.

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MAPPING OF CONFLITS IN ITURI AND UPPER UELE(Alliances and counter-alliances)

K

III. PRESENTATION OF DATA BY INVESTIGATION CENTRE

After collection, the date from each investigation centre were analysed. In fact, each

research had to deal with a certain number of questions that were put to the target

population of these centres, and to bring out similarities and differences in terms of

percentage of each question that was asked.

The results of these analyses were presented in a rough way, that is, as the respondents

had formulated them. There is much similarity in their reactions, which makes us say that

these populations were experiencing identical situations as for the plundering of resources

or private or public property, as for the methods of slaughter used by men under arms,

etc.

The trauma is widespread in these regions. The populations ardently wish peace, the

cessation of internal and external hostilities, the restoration of the State and of its

authority on all the expanse of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the efficacious

control of the weapons used by the authorized services, that is, the soldiers, the police,

the intelligence services, the hunters,… licensed to carry weapons. This, in order to make

UPC (Hema)

UPDF

Lendu

APC/RCD-

DRC gov.ALC/MLC

KEYSStrained relationsObscure relationsFriendly relations

SPLA

Sudan gov.

Rwanda gov.

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not only the holders of power but also the Congolese population feel secure because, as

they think, true security is collective, not selective.

Fig. 3. Map of the North East of the DR Congo

IV. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS

This is a summary of similar and particular points stated in the reports from the various

investigation centres.

4.1. GENERAL PERCEPTION OF THE CONFLITS

Description of known conflicts in the different regions that were surveyed andthe possible peace initiatives that are started.

a) In all the areas surveyed and after the analysis, of the date, it comes out that the

conflicts broke out between the years 1960 and 2002. Thus, for 42 years, these

populations have not experienced a stable situation and a true peace. Since the

country’s independence, while passing by the rebellions of that time by Mobutu’s

seizure of power, by AFDL’s rebellion and the current rebellion, these populations

have experienced rebellions, ethnic and tribal wars intensified with the passing time

Investigation Centers

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by the flow of refugees sometimes Sudanese, sometimes Ugandan, and finally

Rwandan.

b) Causes of conflicts

- Remote causesMany respondents refer back to the war which opposed Idi Amin to Obote. Some

others mention the overthrow of the dictatorial regime of the late Mobutu who had

not prepared the succession in order to avoid the work which is being experienced

today. Other respondents finally evoke the massive inflow of refugees from

neighbouring countries, which inflow brought about a generalised insecurity, thus

creating a political space for all the power-and-wealth thirsty opportunists.

The covetousness of foreign powers for the DRC’s riches and their struggle for

geostrategic and political leadership should not be forgotten. The political instability

of the countries of the Great Lakes region and the absence of good governance do

not protect these populations against internal and external conflicts.

- Immediate causesAmong the immediate causes, one quotes the unrestrained quest for power by

Congolese politicians, manipulated by external forces for interests known only to

themselves, and also the permeability of the borders which brings about the

incursions of regular troops, with their allies, in DRC.

c) Main actors of the conflict

The date that were collected reveal that the main actors of these conflicts are notably

the Congolese politicians who prove to be unable to privilege the national interest.

Secondly, the political, economic and financial powers of the Western and American

world who keep on fighting for the control of tour resources and pouring weapons

and ammunition of the post cold war on the market of the Great Lakes Regions, thus

creating Congolese as well as foreign rebel movements.

d) Internal and external factors having accentuated and fed these conflicts.

- Internal factorsAmong the internal factors which fed this conflict, one quotes :

the generalised insecurity into which the population and their property are

plunged ;

the unrestrained rush for wealth ;

the uncontrolled sale of light weapons to civilian populations ;

the political immaturity of Congolese leaders and the lack of a political idea which

characterizes them ;

an undisciplined army with no republican ideal

- External factors

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the policy selectivity of section or partiality practised by the international

community, notably in its intervention in the resolution of conflicts in the Great

Lakes region ;

the political instability due to the choice of leaders by foreigners ;

the covetousness of foreign political, economical and financial powers for the

country’s wealth ;

the incursion of armed gangs from neighbouring countries (Uganda and Rwanda)

which indulged in acts of vandalism.

e) Internal and external factors having attenuated these conflicts

- Internal factors Popular resistance through the organisation of militias for the community’s self-

defence ;

Peace initiatives such as the agreements signed by the belligerents, with the

claimed withdrawal of foreign troops as a corollary ;

The refusal of the population to be subservient to political ideologies ;

Te unchecked plundering of ores and the payment of wages to the State’s

employees, the resumption of school activities in certain areas.

- External factors

the mediation of Belgium, of South Africa and of the USA ;

the embargo on Congolese diamond ;

the presence of the United Nations observers ;

the intervention of the HCR ;

openness towards other people and the fact of agreeing to made concessions ;

f) The experience of these conflicts by individuals and communities :

On the whole, these conflicts have been traumatizing tragic and dramatic for the

people, individuals and communities, a threat to their existence, and have caused

division, the reflex of violence and a psychosis of permanent fear.

g) The consequences are numerous :

Firstly, there is a big surge of displacement of local populations wandering in all

directions, seeking a shelter. These conflicts also resulted in the proliferation and

massive sale of light weapons, voluntary of forced enrolment of minor children in the

army (child-soldiers), the propagation of HIV/AIDS, failure to respect human rights,

the interruption of development activities, the total collapse of the State, the

impoverishment of the population, etc.

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h) Peace initiatives

Opinions vary from area to area in respect to this situation. About 55 % affirm that

there have been some peace initiatives here and there, notably

the people’s self-defense ;

the pastoral ;

the delimitation and demarcation of lands ;

the negotiations between the Alur and the Lendu people ;

MONUC’s intervention ;

The civil society through certain non government organisations took the initiative

to reconcile the conflicting parties, etc.

As for the actors directly or indirectly concerned in these initiatives, the respondents

quotes :

the youth of the area ;

religions authorities ;

the allies of the rebels ;

the officials of tribal friendly societies, etc.

In general, these initiatives did not lead to the expected results of a true and lasting

peace in these areas.

i) Actions to be undertaken for a lasting peace

As for actions that could be undertaken for a lasting peace, the respondents suggest :

the pacification of the country and reconciliation ;

the sensitising and awakening of all the citizens to collective security ;

the demilitarisation of militias ;

the demobilisation of all child soldiers ;

the installation of monitoring services at the frontiers ;

the application of the resolutions of the United Nations on the conflict in DRC ;

the creation of a criminal court for the DRC ;

the reorganisation of the national army and the control of weapons.

Concerning the actors to be implied in these actions, the respondents quote in particular :

the civil society ;

the officials of the parties in conflict ;

the neighbouring countries Heads of State ;

churches ;

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traditional chiefs ;

the Security Council as a decision-making organ of the United Nations

people who care about the common good.

4.2. SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS : CIRCUITS OF ACQUISITION,COST, SOURCES OF SUPPLY, COMMERCIAL FLOW, IMPORTANCE

a) On the whole, the respondents confirm having heard a small arm, which represents

more or less than 86 %. These people define a small arm as a fire arm, which is

portable, dismountable, transportable, and can be handled even by a child aged less

than 15 years. Its use does not require any specialised training.

Among the known types of small arms, the respondents quote inter alia : AK 47,

M16, FAL, CALIBRE 12 and 16, FALLO, GRENADE, g3, UZI, KALACHNIKOV,

REVOLVER, PISTOLET, GRENAGE, FARE, MAUSER 32 and 52, SEMI-LIGHT, 22 LONG,

MAG, UN 30, PUPU, and some non firearms used in these conflicts such as machetes,

knives, spears, arrows, etc.

These weapons are used either for self-defense (personal or collective security) or for

hunting. Other reasons are the following : poaching, intimidation of populations by

rebels, crime, plundering of ores, conquest of power and territories, armed robbery

and rape, inter-ethnic conflicts, etc.

The possession and use of these weapons in the area are attributed to Congolese and

foreign soldiers, to hunters in the park, to refugees, to rebels and their allies, to big

tradesmen, to deserted soldiers, etc.

The data that were collected reveal that the weapons come from various sources.

One quotes :

− Uganda at 90 % according to the respondents ;

− Sudan

− Rwanda

− The West

− Ex Soviet Union countries ;

− Stocks abandoned by deserted soldiers

− Locally manufactured non fire arms.

b) Salesmen and cost :

- Uganda

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- The Congolese armed forces

- The Congolese rebels ;

- The officiers of the armies that are present in the areas

- Businessmen

- Western countries and the USA

- Local manufacturers

- Unidentified people.

The price is a true secrecy of this market. According to the respondents, it is impossible

to estimate the actual cost of the sale of these weapons. Nevertheless, some

respondents indicate that in certain regions they would cost between US $50 and 150 ;

but the majority affirms that one can acquire a weapon by barter or the exchange of

mining products or other (cigarettes, for example).

c) Entry and circuit of these weapons in the various areas

90 % of the respondents indicate that these weapons enter via the frontiers at night,

clandestinely and fraudulently either by bicycle, on foot or by vehicle and dissimulated in

wares allegedly presented as ration for the soldiers. Certain weapons come in by air bags

of coffee. One respondents located at frontier market at Nabiapai, at Kakesa near

Faradje. It is certain that there are other unidentified points of sale all along the frontiers

as everything is done clandestinely and sometimes with the complicity of customs officers.

Uganda and Sudan are quoted among many other large suppliers. The far-off suppliers

that are quoted are the USA, the ex USSR, South Africa. The Ugandan government is

widely quoted for the fact of having supported rebel movements for a long time.

The profiteers of the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons

This trade, as stated by the respondents, certainly benefits those who are practising it in

order to enrich themselves and to perpetuate conflicts in this part of Africa. The

proportion of the benefit is difficult to estimate in terms of percentage ; nonetheless it is

certain that they can buy everything that they need, for example food,… and capital

equipment without feeling the cost of living.

The impact of rebel movements in the proliferation and the illicit sale of light

weapons :

This impact is obvious. One can retain inter alia :

- the insecurity in the area ;

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- the destruction of the fauna and the flora ;

- failure to respect human rights ;

- illicit carrying of light weapons by anybody ;

- continuation of the rebellion ;

- generalized misery, etc.

d) The presence of foreign armies

94 % of the respondents think that the presence of foreign armies contributed to the

proliferation and the illicit sale of these machines. That manifests itself in the flare-up of

acts of violence and the multiplicity of tribal and ethnic militias in these areas, as well as

in the number of deaths that one keeps on deploring today.

e) Opinions vary concerning the commercial flow between the North East of Africa’s

Great Lakes region and Dubaï. Some say that, doubtless, this is at the base of the

proliferation and illicit sale ; some others think that this plague is due to this trade in

as far as the supply in stable convenience goods comes from Dubaï, small arms and

light weapons may also come in to DRC via the same way, dissimulated like any other

ware.

f) 75 % of the respondents opine that the presence of these deadly weapons

enormously contributes to the constitution and the multiplicity of armed gangs and ,

also to the emergence of rebel movements, this can be confirmed by the insecurity

and the installation of people’s self defence organisations and ethnic militias in the

area.

In general, the respondents think that it is impossible to estimate the number of

light weapons held by individuals, communities, and armed gangs in all these

areas. Nonetheless it is believed that there are more or less 2 to 13 thousand

light weapons in circulation particularly since a Lendu chief would have declared

that he had 10.000 well armed men in the bush. May one thus believe that he

has at least 10.000 weapons ? And by extrapolation, we can also say that each

chief of a militia, estimated at 10.000 as in the case of the Lendu chief, would

have the same number of weapons. It should also be noted that the respondents

declare that each adult possesses at least one arm for his protection. One

thereby notices an increasing number of light weapons, difficult to estimate.

The relation between the proliferation of light weapons and the plundering of

natural resources in the conflict areas and the criminalisation of the economy is

quite obvious. The proliferation of small arms and light weapons undoubtedly

fosters the plundering of natural resources and hinders the economic development

of the area.

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Solidarity and coalitions around the proliferation of light weapons :

70 % of the respondents speak of various acts of solidarity and coalitions which are

developed on the proliferation of light weapons, in particular the initiatives of young

people for peace and self-defence, the government and its self reliance, the Hema

people and Ugandan officers, the « DRC » and Rwanda, coalitions between ethnic

groups, etc.

4.3. CONTROL OF THE CIRCULATION OF SMALL ARMS & LIGHT WEAPONSAND PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN AFRICA’S GREAT LAKES REGION

a) 50 % of the respondents claim to be informed of the internal and external legal

provisions which regulate the trade of small arms and light weapons. Among the

provisions that one seems to know one can quote the military penal code and the

military code of conduct which in fact forbid the holding of a firearm by anybody

without the authorization of the competent authority. One indicates the constitution,

which determines useful orientations on this matter. Some other respondents are

unaware of these provisions.

Failure to observe these provisions is due to impunity, institutional instability,

illiteracy, military indiscipline, crisis of authority (the non-existence of the State and

of the unity of command), to the rebellion which is synonymous with insubordination

and finally to the guilty slowness of the United Nations in the application of the

relevant resolutions.

In order to enforce these provisions, it is necessary at first to restore the authority of

the State, to take the needed exemplary sanctions, to institute peace and security

and to ensure a rigorous control of the carrying and use of firearms.

According to the majority of respondents, traditional practices once existed, but

today the traditional authority is ridiculed and has no seizure control of the

possession and use of small arms and light weapons in particular as these illegally

come from everywhere.

These traditional practices are not complied with because the traditional authority is

ridiculed and there is no collaboration between the civilian, military, and traditional

authorities on this matter ; hence the impunity and quest for egotistic interests.

In order to enforce these provisions, it is necessary to :

- restore the traditional authority ;

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- work in collaboration with it ;

- sensitize the population ;

- apply the existing laws ; etc.

Possible measures of control

- to reinforce intelligence services at the frontiers ;

- to regulate the issuing of permits for carrying firearms ;

- to organise a conference on light weapons in the Great Lakes region ;

- repurchase by the State of the weapons held by the civilians,

- institution of democratic regimes in the Great Lakes countries ;

- to disarm illegal holders of small arms and light weapons.

b) To slow down the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, it is necessary to :

- first of all put an end to the war ;

- establish a collaboration on the matter with neighbouring countries ;

- collect stray weapons ;

- involve the UNO in this process ;

- improve the relevant legislations in the three neighbouring countries ;

- organize joint patrols along the borders ;

c) Measures to take in order to collect the weapons currently in circulation from

individuals, communities and armed gangs :

On such measures, the respondents suggest :

- the pacification and the unification of the country and of the public authority ;

- the demobilization of ex combatants ;

- the confinement of soldiers in the barracks ;

- the demilitarization of civilian districts ;

- the collection of weapons in collaboration with the traditional authority.

d) The majority of respondents say yes and no to the question of knowing if it is

possible to disarm rebel movements in this moment of the consolidation of the

achievements of the peace process ; yes if the international community, through the

MONUC, becomes involved in the rigorous control of the supply of weapons and

ammunition to the insurgent chiefs ; no as the peace process has already started but

the army is not unified yet and there is not an administration likely to be mobilized

for this purpose. They also add that it is first of all necessary to cure the wounds

caused by the war, hatred, and xenophobia.

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In order to improve the security of individuals, of communities, and of their possessions in

the current context of the area for thus discouraging the proliferation and possession of

light weapons, the respondents suggest that one should :

- Share power equitably ;

- Reinforce civil and military justice ;

- Sensitize the population on the question of collective security ;

- Deploy well trained, mixed and / or neutral troops,

- Sanction the transgressions.

e) In respect of the infernal cycle of conflicts in the Great Lakes region, the majority of

respondents thinks that it is possible to envisage a conference on peace in the Great

lakes through a meeting of the countries involved, in a place to be agreed upon.

According to the respondents, the following themes would have the priority at such a

meeting :

- Peaceful cohabitation and reconciliation ;

- Regional political and economic integration ;

- Promotion of human rights in the three countries ;

- The construction of a lasting peace for a sustainable development ;

- Democratization and good governance in the official institutions of these

countries ;

- Questions related to regional security.

The respondents suggest the following as essential points which can be the object of the

Agreement on Peace and Collective Security in the Great Lakes Region:

- the securitizing of the common borders;

- the common control of the borders;

- the consolidation of a regional organization of political, economic and cultural

integration;

- commitment to the respect of the borders inherited from colonization;

- creation of a council for reconciliation in the Great Lakes.

Such an agreement can guarantee peace in the Great Lakes region, allow a control of the

circulation of these weapons on each side of the border in particular as these deadly

weapons feed conflicts in these three countries.

As further suggestions on the question of the proliferation of light weapons in connection

with the building of peace in the border area between Sudan, Uganda and the DRC, the

respondents demand that African countries in general, and the Great Lakes countries in

particular develop a culture of peace so as to securitize their respective populations. In

addition, they demand that the international community, in particular the countries that

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manufacture light weapons, should stop supplying the light weapons market in the Great

Lakes countries. They also demand that African countries foster the cooperation and

development so much desired by their populations and the Great Lakes countries should

each year organize meetings meant to assess the problems of development, of the

security of their borders, of the proliferation and of the illicit trade of light weapons, inter

alia.

4.4. VERIFICATION OF RESEARCH HYPOTHESES

1. The presence of foreign armies may foster an inflow of weapons in the area.

The troops of the UPDF (Uganda People’s Defence Forces) have remained present in Ituri

and North Kivu, even after the signing of the Luanda Agreement in August 2002 between

the Congolese and Ugandan governments on the modes of withdrawal of the Ugandan

troops from Ituri. If they are officially present t in Bunia and on the Congolese side of

Mount Rwenzori, at the request of the MONUC and NGO’s and in conformity with the

agreements concluded with the Government in Luanda, the Ugandans came back to Aru

and Mahagi, Rwabisengo (October 20th) on the Semliki river (towards October 26th). One

thousand UPDF soldiers are still in Mutwanga on Lume on the Beni Kasindi – Buera axis.

Many other soldiers (a battalion and a half, according to our local investigators) are

stationed in Kamango, a few kilometres from Watalinga. Many other Ugandan soldiers

crossed the Semliki river border at Rwabisengo to go and protect the oil wells which a

Canadian firm is planning to exploit on Lake Mobutu. On October 31st, a UPDF battalion

stationed in Bunia was deployed from Bunia to Kasese. Colonel SENGAMWENGE, the

UPDF operations commanding officer in Bunia during the August confrontations against

the RDC/ML was sent to Kasese with his battalion. This same battalion came into Congo

via Mutwanga and Kasindi. In Beni, the population was fearing an attack of the town by

this battalion. From the 6th to the 8th of November, an emissary of the pro-UPC Ugandan

Generals, Salim SALEH, quoted in the report of the experts of the United Nations on the

illegal exploitations of the resources of the DRC visited Beni in order to try to convince the

RDC/ML, vaunting the UPC’s new acquisitions in heavy weaponry, to leave the control of

Beni to the UPC. The RCD answered with devastating offensives on the Komanda-Bunia

axis.

The Rwandan support to the UPC in Ituri could be analysed as a response to a possible

presence of the Interahamwe in the area. The Rwandan military instructors at the service

of the UPC quickly swang towards the Hema militia. (July 2000). The Rwandan Officers

used to control the UPC’s military operations. Rwanda would have dropped weapons and

ammunition for weeks on the hills of the Blue Mount at Mandro (August 2002).

2. Economic and financial objectives encourage the proliferation of light weapons.

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The territories where our investigations, unfolded, notably Aru, Mahagi, Isiro, Dungu,

Doruma, Faradje, Tadu, Bunia, Djegu, Ndrele, Igbokolo,… indicate that the various

factions use these places as centers of customs and financial receipts in order to finance

their military campaigns. All the war lords and their allies are fighting for territories rich in,

for example, gold, diamonds, coltan, wood, with the objective of enriching themselves

and continuing to supply these areas with weapons and ammunition.

3. The existence of ethnic militias and armed gangs favours the proliferation of lightweapons.

Inter-ethnic conflicts, in this case, those which opposed the Lendu to the Hema peoples

gave birth to several militias here and there, and these ones are supported by either

Uganda or Rwanda and this effectively encourages the intense circulation of light

weapons in the hands of these militiamen in the North East of the DRC. This situation,

exploited by the neighbouring countries, created other armed gangs of brigands,

assassins and criminals who use their weapons in order to extort the goods of the

population. This makes it difficult for one to know the number of weapons in circulation in

the area.

4. The inflow of refugees owing to the war might have brought about theproliferation of weapons.

The inflow of refugees is also a factor which strongly caused the proliferation of light

weapons in the area. Indeed, the North East of the DRC accommodated a lot of refugees

from Uganda, Rwanda and Sudan owing to the wars in their countries of origin. These

refugees came into DRC with their weapons (dissimulated) and started to resell them so

as to survive and they launched out in this illicit traffic of light weapons either as

salesman, broker or as trader of these deadly weapons.

5. The inefficient administration of the area may encourage the search of personalsafety to the detriment of collective safety, individuals thus getting weapons fortheir own safety.

If the civilian population has a great deal of light weapons, this is due to the fact that the

administration almost no longer exists, and as there is absence of the State or of the

authority of the State, the population does not feel protected, hence the resort to

weapons for either one’s own protection or the protection of the community.

Through the responses to the survey questionnaire, almost all the respondents declare

that they hold weapons for their self-protection vis-à-vis the banditism, criminality, and

violence perpetrated by the rebels, because of rape and massive violations of human

rights. Hence, the requirement and the urgency to securitize everybody before envisaging

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a general disarmament. This is how, for example, everybody claims the restoration of the

authority of the Sate or straightforwardly the institution of the rule of law in DRC so as to

avoid these violences which put an end to the yet sacred life.

6. The evacuation of occupying troops may bring about the proliferation of lightweapons as these are left behind by these foreign troops.

Before leaving these troops were disarmed, but their weapons stayed behind and their

current whereabouts are unknown. We therefore think that they joined the vicious circle

of the proliferation of light weapons.

7. The use of weapons for poaching purposes increases the circulation of lightweapons.

35% of the respondents think that, for poaching purposes, there are weapons which

continue to circulate in the hands of people who are slaughtering the animals in the

parks, of which certain species are in the process of disappearance today, in particular the

white Rhinoceros.

8. The illicit trade of weapons for simple lucrative purposes increase the circulation ofweapons.

The mercantile spirit encourages the proliferation of weapons. According to the data

collected, the sale of weapons is not in itself beneficial but the use made of them by the

holders is.

9. The plundering of natural resources causes the traffic and the proliferation of lightweapons.

Indeed, the mining resources are financing the purchase of weapons, the war itself, the

derisory training of the militia. The important gain drawn from the plundering of natural

resources is feeding the infernal cycle of the war as the sleeping partners are not ready

yet to loosen the grip.

V. STRATEGIES OF FIGHT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

After collecting and sorting out the research data, the Panel of research tried to

summarize and draw from the information that was collected the strategies and

recommendations such as suggested by the respondents. These strategies and

recommendations are destined to various levels of responsibility.

5.1. STRATEGIES

5.1.1. At the local and national level

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To encourage a voluntary handing-over of light weapons in exchange for

agricultural tools and plots of land;

To organise a ceremony of farewell to the weapons collected by burning them

(example, the moratorium on light weapons in Mali);

To carry out public awareness campaigns among the civilian population on the

collective danger to hold a weapon a legal permit for carrying arms;

To resort to coercive measures in the event of the express refusal to abide by the

relevant national legislation;

5.1.1. At the regional level

to reinforced the policy of good neighbourhood between the States of the Great

Lakes region;

to devise mechanisms of collective security in the region;

to restart the political, economic and cultural integration at the regional level for a

sustainable development of the populations of the Great Lakes region;

to install instruments for the control of the traffic and proliferation of light

weapons;

to speed up the democratic processes in progress in the countries concerned with

a view to the institution of the rule of law;

to ratify and implement all the international instruments for human rights with a

view to the promotion of human dignity;

to set up a regional structure for the promotion of human rights;

to organise a regional conference o n peace in the Great Lakes area.

5.1.3. At the international level

to install international instruments of the regulation of the production, trade and

use of light weapons;

to set up a specialized structure of the UNO entrusted with questions of the

manufacture and control of light weapons;

to set up a similar structure at the level of the African Union;

to promote sustainable development in developing countries by means of the

financing of employment and income generating activities among the grass-root

communities;

to prohibit the development of the weapons industry and to transform it into an

industry for the production of essential convenience equipment in order to support

developing countries.

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5.2. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTIONS IN THE SHORT, MEDIUM ANDLONG TERM

5.2.1. To the government of the DRC

to work out a peace education and peaceful conflict resolution training programme

for a good cohabitation at all levels (schools, …)

to set up or crate a truth, peace and reconciliation commission in order to cure the

wounds and traumatisms of the inter-ethnic wars;

to encourage inter-ethic and trans-ethnic marriages in order to consolidate peace

between tribal and ethnic groups;

to accelerate the process of national reconciliation and of the pacification of the

country;

to restore the authority of the Sate on the whole of the national territory and to

restart the process of the institution of the rule of law;

to set up mechanisms for the control of the trade and use of light weapons

through a rigorous legislation;

to maintain good relations with neighbouring countries

5.2.2. To the Congolese populations

To involve themselves in the process of national reconciliation and to put an end

to confrontations between ethnic groups and between communities;

To renounce violence as a means of conflict settlement by promoting peaceful

resolution and dialogue for a peaceful cohabitation;

To voluntarily return weapons in one’s possession and thus decrease the potential

for violence in the communities.

5.2.3. To the three countries

Each of the neighbouring countries should develop a system of weapons

marking/tracking for the weapons used by its security services (the army, the

police force, the intelligence agents) and by licensed civilians;

All the three countries should create a joint military commission for the monitoring

and control of the movements of individuals and their property at the borders;

All the three countries should organise tripartite meetings in order to assess the

work of the aforementioned joint military commission;

The three countries should sign a non aggression pact.

5.2.4. To the international community

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to accompany the current peace process in DRC;

to involve itself in the Organisation of the International Conference on peace in

the Great Lakes;

to devise coherent and efficient strategies of fight against the proliferation and the

illicit traffic of light weapons.

CONCLUSION

The real objective of all these efforts for conflict resolution and peace construction is a

reconciling stem, increasingly deeper, by all the peoples, all the groups that were in a way

or another affected by the conflicts. Peoples, groups and whole communities were

affected and ill-treated by wars and conflicts of all kinds. Their spirit and way of life must

be cured, they must recover their cultural and organisational richness; they must fid

themselves as one nation and develop their forces and capacities in order to reconstruct

their nations and countries.

These processes of cure and reconstruction require a lot of time and effort, will, and

diffidence. They also require particular competences. Once again, our international

partners can play a decisive and vivifying role in this long process so as to approach,

examine and integrate a very painful history and to help to consider the future with hope

and optimism. If we, as peace seeders, in the name of our Christian Faith, must find an

inner force to commit ourselves in what is really a demanding ministry, then the problems

of a spirituality for conflict resolution and peace construction are capital.

The people that we live with and work for in situations of conflict are our brothers and

sisters, spiritual beings with their precise spiritual needs. What we are saying and share

with them, the way in which we accompany them in the search for well-being cannot

consist of meaningless sentences. That will be nothing for a help, neither for them, nor

for us.

These words come from the book of Micah: “what God requires of you is to act with

justice, to live with tenderness and to humbly walk about with your God (Micah 6:8).

“To act with justice”: this means to identify and transform unjust structures. This means

to commit oneself vis-à-vis all the problems of social injustice so that the quality of

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people’s life, especially that of the most stripped, that of the poor and the lunatic may be

improved.

“To love with tenderness” relates to our mutual relations. The way in which we are in

relation with one another as a people, the way in which we help the others, the way in

which we build the human community along with them, the understanding and the

decisions that we take in community as brothers and sisters.

“To humbly walk about with your God” helps us to concentrate on the taking of

responsibilities of ourselves and for what we are and do; that relates to our growing as

human beings, humble and loving one’s fellow human beings, a part of this growth as

human beings maintains before our eyes the dimension of justice that is present in all our

life. If we live and work along with the others, starting from this spirituality, we can

become those people who experience inner peace more, people living in peace and in

harmony with others, with THE ONE WHO IS and with all the creation, people enabled to

promote this spirit of peace in others.

“The proliferation and illicit trade of small and light weapons” in the border areas between

Sudan, Uganda and the DRC is really a complex and stimulating topic, which challenges

and must challenge each girl and each son born to the continent in general and to the

Great Lakes region in particular. It is already a step that we have started together to

reflect on possible strategies and solutions in order to put an end to or otherwise at least

reduce the intensity of the circulation of these deadly weapons in our respective

countries. As for us, DRC researchers, the thinking is that the findings of the research

carried out by our countries will lead to a mobilization and a sensitising of our respective

leaders so that they in their turn should mobilize and sensitise our respective populations

for a common action.

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Fig. 4. Routes of the illicit traffic and proliferation of small and light weaponstowards the North East of the DR Congo

KEYS

Route of weapons traffic

Investigation center

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ANNEXE 4

LARJOUR CONSULTANCY

Report of the Research on

PROLIFERATION AND TRAFFICKING IN ILLICIT SMALL ARMS ANDLIGHT WEAPONS IN YAMBIO, MARIDI, KAJO-KEJI AND YEI RIVER

COUNTIES, EQUATORIA, SOUTH SUDAN

November – December 2002

Larjour ConsultancyP. O. Box 906600100 NairobiKenyaTelephone: 254 2 21 00 99E-mail: ochaw@iconnect.co.ke

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1. BACKGROUND

South Sudan has been exposed to firearms since the European scramble for Africa.Indeed, without the firearms it would not have been possible to subdue its various anddifferent ethnic communities, particularly those communities found with centralizedsystem of governance and had standing armies e.g. the Zande and, the Shilluk Kingdoms,who put up spirited resistance for their freedom.

Sudanese laws permitted licensed private ownership of certain types of firearms e.g.pistols, Mk2, MK4 and Mk5. While types like Mk10 and automatic weapons e.g. Stengun, Bren, G3 were reserved only for government service e.g. Police, Prison Warders,Wild Life Forces and the Military. It is worth mentioned that licensed private ownershipwas contingent on good behaviour certificate. The situation of war, therefore, enabledunlicensed ownership of guns, particularly in South Sudan.

The contemporary history of firearms movements in Equatoria is linked to mutiny of the1st company of the Southern Corps of the Sudan Defence Force [SDF] on August 18th,1955, which marked the beginning of the armed conflict between the three southernprovinces of Bahr el Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile, on the one hand and the Arabdominated northern provinces on the other. The defeated SDF soldiers melted into thecommunities with their firearms, which then were merely Short Guns, Mk5 and Mk10,and few automatic weapons e.g. G3, pistols, etc. This was the first wave of large-scalearms movement in South Sudan in general and Equatoria in particular.

The second wave of large-scale movement of firearms in Equatoria was linked to theintensification of the war with the formation of Anya-nya Land Freedom Army in theearly sixties. The military regime pursuing a programme of arabisation and islamisationof the southern provinces decreed changes that provoked quick reaction. Turning Sundaya working day provoked general strike throughout southern Sudan. This dismissed officeworkers, students and others swelled the ranks and file of the Anya-nya and the quest forfirearms and other weapons ensued. Indeed, this coincided with the rebellion in theCongo following the assassination of its first Prime Minister, Patrick Lumumba. Some ofthe weapons, indeed automatic weapons, shipped to the Congolese revolutionaries foundtheir way into Equatoria and the rest of South Sudan.

By the time of Addis Ababa Agreement in March 1972, South Sudan was awash with allkinds of firearms and weapons. The main sources then remained principally Congo,where the mercenaries recruited by the Congolese government had taken up to sale ofexcess weaponry to the Anya-nya who came into Congo from different parts of SouthSudan. It is strongly believed that Iddi Amin, the Ugandan Army Commander ditchedsome arms to Anya-nya, while large caché of weapons were supplied by Israel.

These weapons and firearms were not all collected following the Addis AbabaAgreement and the absorption of the Anya-nya into the Sudanese national army and otherdisciplined forces [military, police, prison warders, wildlife forces]. The ex-freedom

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fighters, particularly those not absorbed melted back into the communities with theirweapons.

The violent overthrow of the Ugandan dictator in 1979 and the migration en masse of theremnant of his army into Equatoria was the second wave of large-scale movement offirearms into South Sudan. This coincided with the growing political unrest in theSouthern Region. The May regime was in deep political and economic crisis manifestedin rising crime rate and robberies, inter-, and intra-ethnic animosities and conflicts wereon the rise triggering an arms race and escalation of conflict. Mutinies in the barracksbecame frequent, as the absorbed Anya-nya officers and men resisted transfer to thenorth. Bands of Anya-nya2 were formed in Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal. Thetrafficking in firearms and weapons started in earnest as communities braced themselvesin anticipation of war. Indeed, the eruption in 1983 and the formation of the SudanesePeople’s Liberation Movement/Army [SPLM/A] came against this background.

The SPLA entered east bank and central Equatoria in December 1985 in the wake of itsgeneral mobilisation and recruitment of Equatorians. This marked the third wave oflarge-scale movement of weapons, mainly AK47, PKM, RPG7 and other Sovietmanufactured weapons. Till then, Equatoria in general had hitherto remained quiet buttense. The military garrison in Kajo-Keji had just rebelled and deserted.

The SPLA front shifted to Equatoria in 1987 with the liberation of Kapoeta. By 1990,most of rural Equatoria had fallen to the SPLA. The Government of Sudan tried in vain toroute out the SPLA from Equatoria by fanning up hysteria against the Dinka.Nevertheless, Torit, Nimule, and other smaller garrison towns fell into the hands ofSPLA. The Sudanese army in them were dispersed, surrendered or moved en masse intoUganda sometimes leaving large cache of weapons. The campaigns of Brigadier IsaiahPaul [1989] in central and western Equatoria were all defeated and dispersed leavinglarge caché of arms on the ground. Most of these arms fell into the hands of the civilpopulation.

The period between 1992 and 1995/6 marked a sharp decline in SPLA strength inEquatoria due to splits and internecine fighting with a corresponding shift in the balanceof forces in favour of the GoS. The SPLA lost garrisons along the Yei-Kaya corridor.Kajo-Keji changed hands. There was massive displacement of the civil populationprincipally into Uganda where refugee camps were set-up in West Nile District.However, internally displaced people’s camps were established in Bamurye,Mangalotore, Kerwa, and others. The Uganda rebel groups mainly the LRA [east bank],West Nile Bank Front, UNLF II and Allied Democratic Forces [ADF], all supported bythe NIF government established camps in Yei and Kajo-Keji counties adding to moreinstability in the area.

In a major counter offensive, the SPLA in a series of strategic battles recaptured in 1997the whole of central Equatoria, Lakes Region and part of northern Bahr el Ghazal. Theroutes between central, western Equatoria and Bahr el Ghazal opened up, making it easy,

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more than any time before, for the cattle mongers to trek their herds from Lakes and partsof Bahr el Ghazal to markets in northern Uganda.

2. INTRODUCTION

Western and Central Equatoria comprising Tambura, Ezzo, Yambio, Maridi, Yei andKajo-Keji Counties border Uganda to the south, DR Congo to the west and CentralAfrican Republic to the northwest. The Nile-Congo water divide, a prominent physicalfeatures, runs along the western boundaries of the counties. The area is well drained, andreceives the highest amount of rainfall per year to support rich tropical forest.Physiography, sociology and economics combine to make the area the most agriculturallyproductive area in South Sudan.

The people that inhabit this part of south Sudan namely: the Zande and Balanda inTambura, Esso and Yambio Counties; Avukaya, Zande, Baka, Mundu and Moru, inMaridi County; Makaraka, Pojulu, Kakwa, Keliku and Lugbwara in Yei River County;and Kuku in Kajo-Keji, are predominantly agrarian communities, although fewindividuals possess livestock e.g. cows, goats and sheep. The life styles and socialorganization of the people in western and central Equatoria contrast widely with thecommunities in east bank, who are predominantly agro-pastoral and pastoralist. Thecommunities in west bank Equatoria engage in hunting small games using nets, traps andother individual methods. Until very recently, few people possessed licensed firearms.The situation changed with the eruption of war, and many started acquiring firearms,which they now use for poaching prohibited big games like elephants, rhinos, giraffesand buffalos.

The war led to almost total break down of law and order through out area manifested in,armed robbery, rape and murder. The brutalisation of the civil population by the army,particularly the deserters returning from the front line, and the failure of the authorities toprovide sufficient security has prompted many people to seek and acquire firearms thustrigger the arms race and the trafficking in illicit small arms and light weapons.

2.1 Defining the problem

The problem posed by small arms and light weapons has reached dangerous proportionsnearly in all parts of South Sudan, but more specifically among the sedentary agrariancommunities in western and central Equatoria. The possession and use of firearmswithout training, regulations, guidelines, procedures for acquisition by undisciplinedpersons, and in the context of general lawlessness defeats couldn’t have been disastrous.

The acquisition of firearms by the civil population started much earlier in the war whenSPLA exchanging rifles [automatic or otherwise] for the food rations. Passing through acivil population, some of them hostile particularly in Upper Nile, the SPLA ditched outrifles as gifts or in exchange for bulls and heifers. In some areas the civilians joined

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SPLA column on a combat assignment in the hope that they could collect weapons leftbehind by the enemy, which in most cases they got. In some areas, the civilians attackedand killed deserting solitary SPLA soldiers to rob their weapons.

Between 1993 and 1994, the SPLA laid off (pensioned) from its ranks several hundredofficers and men, largely from Dinka Bor. Depending on the rank, each SPL A officerwas given a number of automatic and semi-automatic rifles, mainly G3, AKM orRemington rifles. They were permitted to sell the weapons to the civil population, mainlyto the Toposa, Didinga and Boya. This latter became a paradigm of warding off officersand men seeking financial assistance. It was easier for them to give a rifle or ammunitionin assistance than cash. This was due to the high demand for weapons by the Toposa,Boya and Didinga, who were ready to exchange an AKM or G3 rifle for a number ofbulls or heifers. The bulls and heifers were then sold to livestock traders, who in turntransported them to livestock markets in Kenya [Lokichoggio] or Uganda [Koboko, Aruaor Gulu]. The commercialisation and hence criminalisation (abuse) of SPLA gunassistance programme began in earnest1.

The desertions, splits and internecine fighting within the SPLA and its splinter groupsfurther exacerbated the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Equatoria. EastBank Equatoria became the scene of intense fighting between 1992 and 1995 leading topassing large cache of arms into the hands of civilians. The brutalisation,dehumanisation and excessive cruelty to the civilians presumed to be supporters of theopposing factions accelerated the breakdown in law and order, erosion of traditionalsocial values and the authority that enforced them. The result was random use of firearmseven in settling minor scores that hitherto used to be mediated with traditional weapons:spears, sticks, etc.

Automatic weapons once in use with rage don’t discriminate between gender, age andsocial relations. In communities even in war where killing a child, women or an elderwas anathema have been eroded by the sub-culture of the gun. Further, sometimesbecause of the use of the automatic weapon one killed somebody one did not knowbefore, unlike in the traditional warfare in which the victim and the culprit knew eachother. The destruction cause by the AK47 could be massive and indiscriminate that manylives are lost in a single contact. This generates bitterness and the urge to vengeance andcounter vengeance leading to the escalation of the conflict.

2.2 This research work

This research work, which started in 2001 in East Bank Equatoria, has been undertakenwith funding from Pax Christi Netherlands. The study which is now part of the threecountry [Sudan, DR Congo and Uganda] strategy comes in the framework of itsworldwide campaign for reduction and control of small arms and light weapons, andcomprehensive disarmament in communities affected by endemic warfare.

1 Report of the study carried out in east bank Equatoria in 2001.

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2.2.1 The Objective of the study

The study objectives include the following: -

2.2.1.i to collect first hand information and gather data on the sources, types, andmanner of acquisition of small arms and the trend of proliferation andtrafficking;

2.2.1.ii to identify gun markets, arms traders, routes of transfer, and the quantitiesand prices of small arms and light weapons;

2.2.1.iii to determine the impact of illicit trade and trafficking in small arms andlight weapons on the local communities and local economy; and

2.2.1.iv to ascertain attempts made by the authorities to curb the proliferation andtrafficking in illicit small arms and light weapons.

2.2.2 Methodology

The research kicked off with 2-day training workshop in Arua attended by the Sudaneseand Ugandan researchers. This was followed by a two-months field study in which thefour researchers travelled to their respective counties, where they engaged in datacollection, interviews and meetings with the different social and administrative groups.

The information and data gather were tabulated, analysed by the individual researcher.The results were then presented in a three-day debriefing workshop in Arua. The gapswere identified and the researchers told to revise their notes.

2.2.3 Constraints

Researching on the proliferation and trafficking in small arms and light weapons is amatter of great concern to all the stakeholders, be they politicians, administrationauthorities in a locality, security personnel, criminals, or ordinary civilians. More oftenthan not, it is not easy to collect information and obtain data within a short time even fora researcher who hails from the locality.

The constraints that faced the study in the five counties of central and western Equatoriainclude: -

• Most respondents requested anonymity thus shading doubt on the credibility ofthe information divulged.

• Most interviewees, whether they were local people or the idps, were suspiciousabout the intentions of the research. They believed their weapons would beconfiscated and therefore were very reluctant to give information.

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• Some respondents demanded money as a condition for giving interview. Therepeated humanitarian assessments in the area has bored many particularly henthey don’t see the results of these studies.

• The SPLA authorities in some counties were sceptical and did not want tocooperate with the interviewers. In one county the research was refused toconduct the study on account that the SPLM County Secretary [Commissioner]was absent.

• There is very little documentation in the counties. The absence of organised tradein small arms proved difficult to investigate the trade itself.

3. RESEARCH FINDINGS

The study in the four counties yielded results, which confirm the fact that there isproliferation, trafficking and illicit trade of small arms and light weapons in many partsof western and central Equatoria.

3.1. Yambio and Ezzo Counties

SPLA liberated Yambio County in 1990 without any serious fighting with the enemy.Indeed, in the words of the former GoS Commissioner of Yambio, ‘I helped in theliberation of Yambio by ordering an organised withdrawal of my forces.’ This means thatthe small arms and light weapons now circulating in the county came as a result of thewar in Zaire in the wake of the demise of the former dictator Mobutu.

The research as revealed that the numbers of firearms in Yambio county rose from usedto be about sixty licensed firearms in 1989 to over five hundred according to the table 1below.

Table 1. Quantity and types of firearms acquired by people in Yambio County.

Types of FirearmsS/No.

PayamPistol MK

4MK 5 MK

10G 3 AK 47

1. Yambio 27 9 13 35 24 182. Nabiapai 3 6 7 26 16 143. Sakure 2 3 6 18 12 124. Nzara 5 2 8 15 18 155. Rangu - - 3 17 13 76. Nadiangere - 5 10 22 30 487. Bangasu 2 - 3 14 19 13

TOTAL 38 25 50 147 132 127 Source: Victor Kpiawandu Edward

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3.1.1 The Source of small arms in Yambio Count.

The study has revealed that most of the MK rifles [MK4, MK5] were among thoselicensed by the Sudan Government. Most of them are worn out and usually withoutammunitions. The MK10 were used by and could be attributed to the Police and PrisonWarders who melted into the population when the SPLA over ran Yambio in 1990.However, the study opines that the origin of G 3 and AK47 rifles can be traced to thefollowing sources:

• The Sudanese Army, which when it was routed out of western Equatoria left lotsof arms and ammunitions to which the local civil population helped itself. TheSPLA neither collected, licensed these guns nor provided rules and regulations forthe use of these arms.

• The remnants of Zaire Army based in Dungu, Dorima, Niangara, Bitima,Bangadi, and Ngirima who fled into the county after the fall of the regime inCongo. Those who failed to surrender their guns to the SPLA sold them to thecivil population.

• SPLA deserters either returning home from fronts, or those frustrated with thesituation at home sold their rifles and took off to the neighbouring countries forrefuge. There were some isolated cases revealed by the study that some SPLAofficers acted as gun traffickers.

• The cattle and other traders travelling from Bahr el Ghazal carry firearms, most G3 and AK 47, ostensibly for protection. However, after selling their cattle theydispose of their firearms in the county.

From table 1 above, it can be deduced that, G 3 and AK47 are popular rifles in Yambioand other neighbouring county. This is attributable to the easy availability of theirrespective ammunitions, which unlike MK 10 or MK4 are usually obtainable, at a cost,from the SPLA stores.

3.1.2 Routes of illicit firearms movement in Yambio County.

Map 1 below demonstrates the routes followed by the traffickers in small arms and lightweapons. The arrows indicate as if Yambio town were the market in which the firearmswere sold. There are no market gun markets in the county. The transaction betweenbuyers and sellers is undertaken in a clandestine way and between individuals, who oncethey have identified their respective interests seal their agreement usually without a thirdparty.

Only the panya routes from Bahr el Ghazal continue to supply Yambio County with illicitsmall arms and this is mainly due to the movement of cattle traders, while the routes fromCongo have long run out of their supplies. Bicycles are most effective means of transport

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of small arms in the county and beyond. Most of the smugglers move on foot to evade theauthorities.

The prices of firearms in Yambio are very low compared to east bank prices. An AK 47rifle costs between LS 20, 000 and LS 40, 000, while a G 3 costs LS 15, 000 to LS 30,000; a pistol LS 60, 000 to LS 80, 000 and munitions cost LS 25 a piece. There istherefore little economic motivation for run running.

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3.1.3 Causes of firearms acquisition and the trigger for trafficking.

In the past, the Zande acquired firearms mainly for poaching of games to compensate forlack of livestock and domestic source of meat. However, it has now become fashionablefor the Zande to acquire firearms not only for hunting purposes, but more now for self-protection and security of the family and property.

The break down of law and order and the failure of the authorities to prevent the rampantlooting, armed robbery, extortion, rape, murder, etc., at the household level has causedsuch fear among the population that each family head to yearn to acquire a rifle for theprotection of the family dignity and integrity.

Linked to above are the intra-communities animosities, which have started to mushroomin Yambio. Following the liberation of Yambio many cattle owning communities, mainlyDinka from Bor and Bahr el Ghazal have settled in the county. Sometimes they drivetheir cattle into gardens and this has been a source of tension that triggers the need toacquire firearms.

The SPLA is a volunteer army. They have no remunerations and therefore individualsocial needs may outweigh an SPLA soldier’s security responsibility resulting in laxity.This explains some of the allegation that some SPLA personnel sell or turn a blind eye tothe sale of firearms by others.

3.1.4 Impact of small arms on the Zande people.

The Zande people demonstrate subdued patience and quiet, which is nothing but bottledup prolonged oppression, subjugation and exploitation. Some people have perceived thisas docility and cowardice leading them sometimes to rub the Zande on the wrong side,which prompts hostile and violent reactions.

The widespread presence and use of firearms has had negative impact on the Zandepeople. There is general decline in morality and ethical behaviour in Zande land and as aresult there is a rise in criminal offences. The Zande revere their in-laws that a Zandeman would do anything, which would please his mother or father in-laws. This customhas now broken down complete as could be illustrated by the shocking murder of thewife of the ECS Bishop of Yambio, late Bishop Zindi, in 1997 by her son-in-laws.

The Zande as a result of excessive dehumanisation and brutalisation at the hands of thesoldiers mainly coming from outside the county are quickly becoming militarised andthere is hysteria against the Dinka cattle owners and traders in Yambio generatingnegative centrifugal ethnic tendencies among the Zande that any slight offence isinterpreted in ethnic colours.

Another negative impact linked to insecurity due to proliferation of small arms has to dowith the reluctance to return home by the Zande people who have sought refuge in

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Central African Republic following the liberation of Yambio. A returnee from a camp inCAR had this to say:

[People] are eager to come home, but when they hear about the lootings, killingsand other barbaric acts committed by unruly gun holders they get discouragingand don’t think of coming back.

There is apparent lack of schools and other facilities that engage young people. As aresult most young people are attracted to gun trotting, as that is the most exciting activity.

3.1.5 Efforts by the Authorities to curb the proliferation of small arms and lightweapons in Yambio County.

The SPLM/SPLA is the de facto government in the New/South Sudan. In YambioCounty, the study reveals that the SPLM authority, the county civil administration, thepolice and other security forces are exerting efforts to curb the menace of small arms. TheMilitary Intelligence and the Public Security are the agencies entrusted with the task ofarms control and address the arms related crimes in the county.

These noble efforts however, are hampered by dearth of economic and financialresources. However, the SPLA authorities have taken strenuous measures and it is worthnoting that between 1991 and 2000, thirteen people were executed by firing squads and11 others are still serving long-term prison sentences for arms related crimes as part ofthe authorities’ contribution to curbing the proliferation of small arms and light weaponsin Yambio County.

3.2 MARIDI COUNTY

Maridi County borders Yambio County to the west, Rumbek County to the north, Mundriand Yei Counties to the east, and the DR Congo to the south. This position makes Maridicentral to any movements of firearms as all the routes to the west, north, east and southpass through it [see map 2]. The Mundu, Baka, Avukaya, Moru [kodo] and Zande ethniccommunities inhabit Maridi County.

The study revealed that there is proliferation and trafficking in illicit small arms and lightweapons in Maridi County. However, this fact is not reflected in the table below. This isattributed to reluctance of the respondents to divulge information [fear of theconsequences] and lack of proper recording in the county [administrative dysfunction].

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Table 2 Types, quantities, source, traders/buyers and prices of small arms inMaridi County

Types of FirearmsSerialNo.

PayamPistol MK4 Mk5 MK10 G 3 AK47

1 Ibba - - - - 3 82 Maruko 5 - - - 10 203 Mambe - 54 Maridi 6 4 135 Landili 106 Kozi

9Source: John Yepeta Tabia

From the above table it is clear that Madoro, Mambe, Wiribadi, Suke, Yamba and Rasuluhave been marked out as suspected areas of gun trafficking. This correlates with the factthat these areas lay close to the game parks either in Congo [Gamba National Park] or inthe Sudan [Southern National Park], see map 2. This is because most of the firearm hasto be tested before bought and the park is only place to do that without attracting thewrath of the authorities.

The information gathered indicated that only G3 and AK47 rifles are popular. Theirprices range from LS 25, 0002 to LS 60, 000 for an AK 47 rifle, while the G 3 rifle costsbetween LS 15, 000 and LS 20, 000 a piece, while a pistol costs between LS 80, 000 andLS 60, 000. It has also been noted that insecurity in the area prompted many people tolook for firearms.

Map 2. Location of Maridi County

2 LS [Sudanese Pound] is equivalent to 2 Ugandan Shillings, while US dollars exchanges for LS 400. InKhartoum one US dollar costs LS 2, 600 official rates.

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Source: John Yepeta Tabia Photo: P. A. Nyaba

3.2.1 Sources of firearms

As mentioned above, Maridi County is a transit field for most of the small arms and lightweapons, as it lies in the crossroads between Sudan and DR Congo and between thecounties in western, central Equatoria and Bahr el Ghazal. The study has shown that thedirection of flow of illicit arms is southwards from Bahr el Ghazal, which itself could bea transit point for small arms and light weapons from Upper Nile.

Most of the small arms and light weapons: AK47, G3, and pistols found in the county aretraced SPLA sources, either stolen directly from SPLA stores or brought in by deserters.The SPLA offensive, which witnessed the liberation of central Equatoria left large cacheof arms, some of which have found their way into civilians’ possession. There is noindication of any Congolese soldiers having crossed into the county in 1997 in the wakeof the demise of Mobutu.

3.2.2 The motivations for firearms acquisition.

The SPLA initial entrance into, and administration of, western Equatoria wascharacterised by excessive brutality, forceful appropriation of property including people’s

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wives and daughters. This generated bitterness and hatred in the civil population, andwhich they directed at certain communities.

Photo 1. The grave of the 20 year old civil murdered by a soldier

Photo by John Yepeta Tabia

The insecurity continued to simmer in Maridi but reached its highest pitches with thelarge waves of deserters that pass through the area in 1998 and again in 2002. In fact, the2002 desertions caused such destruction that it prompted action on the part of theRegional Authorities but then the damaged had been done and the confidence of thepopulation in the authorities and security personnel has been irreversibly shaken.

The failure of the local administrative and security personnel to punish criminal activitiesby some armed gangs roaming villages robbing, raping and even murdering innocentpeople enraged the population. In the course of this research, two unfortunate incidencesoccurred in Maridi County.

The first occurred in Nabanga about 42 miles west of Maridi town. A young man rapedyoung girl at gunpoint. The authorities took no immediate action. The second casehappened Maridi town itself, which houses the county authorities. A soldier shot 20-year-old young man in his own house. The man died of his wounds but the police took steps toarrest the culprit only after two days. In the funeral [photograph 1 above], the bereavedtalked ill on the local authorities. One of the family members was quoted as saying, ‘itwould be better for one to buy a gun for own protection instead of waiting for theauthorities.’

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Hunting and poaching for games is another factor that drives people to acquiringfirearms. In the past, people used nets, traps, bows and arrows to hunt. But the war andexcessive use of the gun have driven away the wildlife that people have to travel for daysto access the animals. The photo 2 below shows a number of poachers arrested by SPLA.

Photo 2. A group of poachers arrested by SPLA wildlife forces

Photo by John Yepeta Tabia

Note the G 3 rifles displayed in the foreground. The SPLA has adopted a zero tolerancefor poaching. In short concern for household insecurity occasioned by the large numberof armed gangs triggered the arms race among the civil population in Maridi County.

3.2.3 Impact of small arms on the civil population

Like in most of western and central Equatoria, small arms and light weapons in MaridiCounty have had a disruptive and destructive impact on the individuals and on thecommunity relationship reflected in their tense interactions. As a result of repeatedprovocations e.g. rape, armed robbery, uncompensated murders, destruction of crops andproperty particularly by armed cattle herders in the county without official action to curbthem have led the people to put their security and law into their own hands. This hasgradually militarised the society.

The communities traditional value system is apparent being eroded by this culture of thegun. The elders, the medicine men/women, the chiefs are slowly becoming irrelevant asthe gun trotting gangs roam the villages threatening people’s lives and property.

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This heightened insecurity directly affects agricultural production in Maridi County.People spend much of their time and resources worrying about their personal and familysecurity instead of tending to their gardens and fields, as a result food security at thehousehold level is impaired rendering the children and elderly vulnerable to malnutritionand disease.

3.2.4 Efforts by authorities to curb the menace of small arms

The SPLM/A laws are straightforward about security and the inviolability of the personalsafety and freedoms. However, the local administrative and security authorities’ responseto rising gun related crime in Maridi County particularly those involving rape and murderhas been disgustingly slow. Several factors particularly lack of training of the police,dearth of financial resources – the police are not paid, etc., contribute inadvertently to thissad situation.

YEI RIVER COUNTY

Yei River County shares boarders with Uganda in the south, D R Congo in the west,Maridi County in the northwest, Mundri, Juba in the north and Kajo-Keji County in theeast. The Yei – Kaya road is the lifeline that links Yei County to the rest of central andwestern Equatoria and Bahr el Ghazal. Most commerce and trade traffic from and towestern Equatoria, Bahr el Ghazal and even parts of Upper Nile ply this road.

The Kakwa, Pojulu, Lugbwara, Makaraka and Keliku ethnic communities, who arepredominantly sedentary agrarian communities, populate the county. Because of the warand displacement of populations, other ethnic communities, particularly from Bahr elGhazal and Upper Nile have settled in parts of Yei River County.

3.3.1 Sources and types of small arms and light weapons

The study confirms that there is proliferation and trafficking in illicit small arms and lightweapons in the county. However, the gun running is not very extensive as in east bankequatoria. The source of small arms and light weapons have been identified and linked tothe large scale military operations and movements in the county since early sixties:

• The first war was fought with weapons brought in from Congo. Being a neighbourof Congo Yei River County witnessed movements of Anya-nya forces from eastbank Equatoria, Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal. Lots of arms caché remainedwith the local civil population after the peace agreement and the absorption of theAnya-nya in 1972.

• The demise of Ugandan dictator Iddi Amin and the withdrawal of remnant of hisarmy into South Sudan was an important source of arms in Yei and otherneighbouring countries.

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• The arrival of the SPLA in 1989 and the recruitment into the SPLA ranks and fileof youths was another source of small arms in the county.

• The routing out in 1997 of the Sudanese army and the allied Uganda rebels ofADF, WBBF, UNLF II from Kaya, Basia, Morobo and all the delaying elementson the Kaya-Yei road, left large amounts of arms and ammunitions, some ofwhich found their way to the possession of civilians in the county.

• The cattle herders and traders who trek their cattle to Equatoria and northernUganda coming with firearms ostensibly for security on the way, they eventuallysell these guns to the local inhabitants.

• The SPLA either serving officers or deserters has been identified as the mainsource of ammunitions and such personal weapons like pistols, AK47, etc. Someof them operate from idp camps in the neighbouring counties.

3.3.2 Markets, routes and means of transportation

There study revealed that there are no established and regular markets in Yei County. Thetransaction is usually done through a middle person who knows both the dealer and thebuyer. The negotiation and exchange is undertaken clandestinely, except in Garambanational Park, where it is open but dangerous for all. Only SPLA personnel can transporttheir gun openly, otherwise all others have to carry their wares either on foot or obbicycle but concealed.

Table 3 Types and quantities of small arms in Yei County since 1972S/N. Type of

gun.Estimated numberof guns

Cost inSudanese Pound

123456

G 3AK 47UziStelinM4Pistol

12,0002000100250150500

400 £200 £50 £50 £75 £180 £

Source: Davil Bala

3.3.3 Motivation for acquiring firearms

Rising insecurity in the county, whether on the roads or in the households is the mostimportant factor that now motivates illegal acquisition of firearms. NGOs’ vehicles areambushed on the way to Yei and their properties looted. Even SPLA and SPLM

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functionaries3 are not immune to this lawlessness. Some people purchase firearms just forprestige.

Hunting and poaching, as an economic activity is another motivation particularly inborder areas and in the Garamba National Park. The wildlife meat is costly and manylocal hunters make fortunes from selling wild meat.

Looters and robbers find it a lucrative business to way-lay NGOs and traders’ vehicles asthey get away with lots of cash. They therefore are part of buying and selling of illicitarms in the county.

Some people who lost relatives to gun trotting gangs or murdered by individual theyknow also seek revenge, and for this reason will save some money to buy a rifle.

3.3.4. Impact of illicit arms on the life and property in Yei County

The negative impact of the guns on the lives of people in Yei County can’t beoveremphasized. Apart from the wanton lost of life, the people are slowly becomingmilitarised shedding their traditional values and customs. The sense of forgiveness andtolerance is giving way to violence, vengeance and criminal behaviour.

The traditional authority has been completely eroded by the subculture of the gun. Thishas encouraged tribal animosities and conflicts. Accidents are cast in a different light,which usually evokes tribal sentimentality and solidarity.

The failure of the administrative and security personnel to protect the people againstcriminal gangs has consequently eroded the people’s confidence in the authorities and asa result triggered arms race in the county.

The people are discouraged from engaging developing themselves and the communitye.g. stocking livestock and poultry, or constructing decent homes or impressive buildings.Thus a visitor to Yei, Lainya, and other towns in the county will get the impression as ifthe battle for the liberation of these towns had just ended a few hours ago.

3.3.4 Control measures instituted by the authorities

The SPLA authority and the SPLA laws prohibit the illegal possession of firearms.Nevertheless, trafficking in small arms and light weapons, and gun related crimescontinue unabated to be committed against innocent persons.

The study has revealed that the authorities have imposed stringent measures that apply toall irrespective of ethnicity or position. A number of persons have been executed byfiring squads for gun related offences and some including the former commissioner ofKajo-Keji are jailed in Yei prison. 3 The SPLM Spokesman, Dr. Samson Kwaje travelling from Kaya to Yei was ambushed and his propertiestogether with some of the important guests visiting were looted.

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3.4 KAJO-KEJI COUNTY

Kajo-Keji County borders Juba County to the north, Yei County to the west, MagweCounty to the east and Uganda to the south. It is subdivided into 5 (five) administrativeunits/Locations known as Payam. These are Liwolo, Kangapo II, Kangapo I, Live andNgepo respectively. There are four, internally displaced person camps: Bamurye,Mangalotore, Keriwa, and Limi in the county.

The overall population of the county is estimated at 123,800 consisting of indigenous84,403 and 38,403 internally displaced. Kajo-Keji is inhabited solely by the Kuku whoare predominantly an agrarian community, although some of them keep few cattle. Thestudy examined the complexity of the situation in Kajo-Keji revealed the following facts:

3.4.1 Sources, perpetrators and routes of small arms proliferation in Kajo-Keji.

The history of small Arms movement in Kajo-Keji dates back to the first war. Anya-nyafighters from east bank Equatoria used Kajo-Keji as a corridor for transit from Congowhere they exchanged their elephant tusks for arms and ammunitions. The Kuku werealso involved and many of them joined the ranks of Anya-nya Land freedom Army. Mostof these arms were not collected after the 1992 peace agreement but remained in thehands of the veterans.

The second wave of arms movement in the county came in the wake of the overthrow ofthe Uganda dictator, Iddi Amin Dada. The elements of Amin’s army passed throughKajo-Keji County and most of the weapons remained.

The mutiny of GoS garrison in Kajo-Keji [Mandari garrison] in 1985 was also anothersource of arms in the county. This was augmented by the arrival of the SPLA in thecounty and recruitment of Kuku youths and veteran Anya-nya fighters.

The defeat and dispersion, on the Kaya – Keri – Midigo – Mijale - Mangalotore road, ofIsaiah Paul’s massive military offensive of 1989/1990 aimed at reinforcing the GOSforces in Mundari barracks [Kajokeji] then under siege by the SPLA left lot of guns andammunition in the hands of the civil population.

The small arms and light weapons originate from the idps camps, or from outside thecounty e.g. the cattle traders and even SPLA who come under the guise of going for‘mission’. Some of these arms cross into Aringa County in Uganda, or are crossed toNimule in the east bank where gun markets are open.

In an interview SPLA senior officer confided having given an ISO Officer his Star pistol.A senior officer’s gun got stolen. He did not report to the relevant authority, but after

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sometimes he was able to secure another. An indication that guns can be obtained easilywithout let or hindrance.

Some Dinka cattle traders were arrested on the way trekking their cattle to Gulu for sale.A non commissioned officer (NCO) was arrested while trying to sell a gun. Interestinglyhe was later released upon intervention of his senior officer.

Table 5 Perpetrators of small arms trafficking in Kajo-KejiSettlements Origin (Perpetrators) Destination

Mangalotore (Dinka Bor, SPLA Desertersand Officers)AK47, G3

Mijale, Koboko, Kampala,Moyo, Bibia + Loki

Keriwa (Dinka, SPLA Deserters &Officers) AK 47, G 3

Ditto

Bamurye (Dinka, SPLA Deserters &Officers) AK 47

Ditto

IDPC

Limi (Bari & SPLA Deserters).AK 47

Nimule (Sudan), Moyo(Uganda)

Indigenous Kajokeji (Kuku)AK 47, G 3, MK 10, MK 5

Yei (Sudan), Juba (Sudan

3.4.2 Factors contributing to proliferation and trafficking in Kajo-Keji County

The research conducted established that the following factors have contributed in oneway or the other to the proliferation and trafficking in small arms and light weapons inKajo-Keji County.

The war of liberation and the struggle for freedom and human dignity, which began morethan four decades ago. The result has been the breakdown of law and order. In thestruggle for liberation and justice, excesses not commensurate with liberation ideologye.g. deliberate and unprovoked brutalisation and marginalisation by the SPLA alienatedand embittered the Kuku people e.g. the arrest, detention and trail by a General CourtMartial of Fred Wani, while still a recruit in 1990, his imprisonment, denial of medicalattention when he fell sick and his subsequent death in Boma; the unexplained murder ofIde Emmanuel Ginda in Nimule in December 1995; the assassination of Captain HenryLeju Loboro in Kajokeji by an errant SPLA Non-commissioned Officer (NCO); themysterious arrest of Assistant Commander, Pitia Diliga Ilario in Kampala in 1996, andlater transferred to Masaka military barracks under UPDF detention until his death; thearrest and detention of the ex-commissioner of Kajokeji county Commander, James JankaDuku and three (3) other officers. They have been languishing in prison in Yei armygarrison for three (2) years to date; the murder of Lobiju Monikolok and many otherincidences have left bad memories for the Kuku people and are counted as one of thefactors that triggered arms race in the county.

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The forceful conscription of civilians into the SPLA and the consequent inability of themovement to meet their basic needs (food and health) have resulted into desertions. Thedeserters wreck havoc on the civil population raping, robbing, and killing simply becausethey carry guns. A senior SPLA Commander urged the civil population “to shoot to killand just report the gun to the headquarters… I asked you to show up for militarytraining, but you refused. What did you expect me to do?” Coming from a highly placedperson in the county authority, this smacks of extreme frustrations, especially whenconfronted with cases of murder, rape and looting committed by SPLA soldiers fromother ethnic groups.

3.4.3 Impact of illicit small arms the communities and the environment

The negative impact is not only restricted to the illicit arms but also to the military,whether they are regular or rebels. The lumbering for timber in Kajo-Keji County by asenior UPDF officer in connivance with SPLA authorities can only be explained in terms‘power of the barrel of the gun’. This was done against the protest of the local civilianowner.

The easy availability of illicit small arms in the communities resulted in indiscriminatekilling of wild animals. Not only that but some unscrupulous people use gunpowder forharvesting honey from the beehives in the process many bees are killed, the honeybecomes adulterated, the bees’ eco-system is destroyed – a destruction of theenvironment.

The availability of illicit firearms in the idps camps is the source of animosity betweenthe Dinka Bor [who populated these camps], who refuse to be under the jurisdiction ofthe county authorities, and local civil population on the one hand and the civil authorityon the other hand.

Agricultural activities are brought to a bare minimum because people have been forced tocultivate near homesteads. They are scared of being attacked if they ventured far. Theyalso robbed of their implements by those with guns. The illicit small arms proliferationand trafficking has led to the increased incidence of murder leaving large numbers ofwidows, orphans, elderly and disabled are often neglected, traumatized and live in abjectpoverty.

The existence of substantial quantity of illicit firearms in the country has sparked offinter-border conflicts, since the majority of perpetrators hail from other regions they seemnot bothered of the international implication.

3.4.4 Efforts at curbing the proliferation and trafficking in Kajokeji County.

Kajo-Keji County unlike other areas under the administration of the SPLM/A in centralEquatoria has had the misfortunate of housing internally displaced persons hailing fromBor. Most of those responsible for armed offences and who have been reported weremainly from Bor. Most of the senior SPLA and Police officers in the county all hail from

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Bor as a result very little if anything is done to correct the situation. When a Bor officerwas murdered, ostensibly in revenge for some of the atrocities in the county committedby Bor people, it cost the County Commissioner his position and unspecified jail term. Itwill be difficult to curb the proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons in Kajo-Keji until a regime of justice prevails in the county and the New Sudan.

4.0 ANALYSIS OF THE RESEARCH FINDINGS

Proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the hands of undisciplined andunauthorized persons is ubiquitous in South Sudan. Everywhere, the focus for thestruggle is to acquire a gun for self-defence, vengeance, and looting. This morepronounced among the pastoralist and nomadic communities. This proliferation apartfrom some of these localised considerations is also driven and sustained by factors ofmore general dimensions. These include:

• The civil war that has lasted twenty years with no end in sight. The war is beingfought outside its initial ideological and political context. Leaders have loggedthemselves into the comfort of a war economy and demonstrate less and lessconcern for the plight of the people. The ethnicisation of the internal politicalcontradictions within the SPLM/A due to differential power relationships leadingto internecine fighting at different levels: clan, ethnic and regional. Indeed, theproliferation of small arms and light weapons owe its perpetuation to some ofthese localized inter-, and intra-ethnic conflicts.

• Linked to war is the massive displacement of communities particularly fromUpper Nile. The conflict in Upper Nile in the wake of the Nasir declaration andsplit within the ranks and file of SPLM/A triggered the attack on Bor and Kongorthat led to migration en masse of the Bor people and their livestock to Equatoria.The presence of Bor cattle camps in parts of Equatoria [Mundri, Maridi, Yei andKajo-Keji Counties] has been the source of tension with communities in thecounties].

o The tensions heightened as a result of: destruction of crops as a result ofheavily Dinka herders deliberately driving their cattle into the gardens andbrutalising sometimes shooting to death any protestors.

o The Dinka Bor communities either in the camps for internally displacedpersons or the towns don’t subscribe to the county authorities. They insiston having parallel administrative system, or administration within anadministration, which borders on arrogant contempt of their hostcommunities.

o Most of the police and operational senior SPLA officers in Equatoria areDinka. These sometimes cover up the crimes committed by their kins oropenly siding with them in event of disputes with Equatorians. This has

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seriously tinted the image of the SPLM/A as a national liberationMovement in the eyes of ordinary Equatorians.

• The inability of SPLM/A - the sole political authority in the liberated areasestimated at about six hundred thousand sq KM with a population of more thanfour million people, to construct functional state institutions and instruments oflaw and order, and to formulate a comprehensive political programme for social,economic and cultural revitalization and rational utilization of the vast naturalresource potentials in agriculture, animal resources, water and aquatic life andenergy resources, forestry, wildlife, mineral and the enormous human resources,completely under-utilized due to obstinate emphasis on militarism, accounts forthe confused state of affairs in the liberated areas.

• The pigheaded intransigence demonstrated by the Arab dominated northernpolitical elite and its regimes not to recognize and accept the people of SouthSudan to exercise their inalienable right to self-determination, and a negotiatedpeaceful resolution of the Sudanese conflict is an important factor that has led tothe escalation of the conflict and its prolongation. Indeed, it is the perpetual stateof war and the resultant general state of lawlessness that is responsible for theproliferation of small arms and light weapons including the growing illicittrafficking.

• Economic decline as manifested by the growing general pauperisation of thepopulation subsequential to prolonged dependence on external resource inhumanitarian and relief assistance, which did not address poverty reduction anderadication. The changing climatic regimes have led to erratic precipitationpatterns caused droughts in some places and floods in others, resulting in pooragricultural outputs and heightened the people’s vulnerability to endemic foodinsecurity even in areas that hitherto were self-sufficient in food production.

Against the background in South Sudan and other regional factors, a study of theproliferation of small arms and light weapons, and more importantly, the illicit trade andtrafficking of these weapons across different countries, regions, counties, villages andeven ethnic communities with the view of curbing or controlling is rendered morecomplex by other factors of global dimensions, which render impossible theimplementation of even the most rational of the recommendations of such studies.

The Great Lakes Region and the Great Horn of Africa are in a state of political flux,endemic wars and acute insecurity that affect the livelihood of millions of people. Statesundermine the sovereignty of the other through over and covert support to the rebelsand/or dissidents. The uneasy situation between Sudan and Uganda, Congo and Uganda,Rwanda and Uganda and Rwanda and Congo stand out boldly over all diplomaticniceties. It will not be surprising therefore, that small arms and light weapons - thesubject of this study, will continue to proliferate and traded, legally or illegally, in their

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realms. This is principally because of the lack of political will to curb the proliferationdespite the establishment of regional instruments for curbing the proliferation4.

The study in western and central Equatoria continues a similar work started in east bankEquatoria in 2001. It targeted Ezzo, Yambio, Maridi, Yei and Kajo-Keji Counties tocapture the movement, call it trafficking, of small arms and light weapons within,between and across their respective boundaries to D R Congo and Uganda.

The data turned out by the study reveal that there is indeed trafficking of, and trading inillicit arms in western and central Equatoria. The guns involved are mainly G3 and AK47, which are used by the Sudanese Army and the SPLA. The access to ammunitions isthe determinant factor in the price of the rifle. It turned out that most of the ammunitionscame from the SPLA stores and point to the involvement of some senior SPLA officersand functionaries in the illicit trade.

The scale and quantities of arms involved, however, don’t compare with those in eastbank Equatoria, which is business like and involves wider national [Sudan] andinternational networks [Kenya, Uganda and beyond5]. But, the urge among members ofthe hitherto peaceful sedentary agrarian communities in western and central Equatoria toacquire a gun is now equally as strong as among the pastoral communities in the eastbank.

In east bank Equatoria, cattle rustling and competition over the shrinking water andpastures resources were identified as the driving forces for arms race among thecommunities. Illicit trading and trafficking in small arms and light weapons was only animportant by-product of this arms race. In western and central Equatoria, it is the growinginsecurity at all levels and ethnic sensitivities that drive the quest for arms. The twofactors feed on each other to generate bitterness and hatred among the communities in amanner that seem to suggest a total failure on the part of the authorities to find solutions.

This is illustrated by the madness of violence, rape of men and pregnant women, armedrobbery of property, murder and the general havoc on the civil population that happenedto be on the way of SPLA deserters returning to Zandeland and Bahr el Ghazal inSeptember and October 2002, which underwrite and seem to reinforce this ethnicsensitivities and intolerance that has gripped the whole area.

Speaking about insecurity as the overriding factor for the small arms proliferation inwestern and central Equatoria, it is imperative to answer the question why the SPLAfailed to control the situation; or in another way is the SPLA not capable of instituting 4 The Nairobi Declaration on the problem of the proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons in theGreat Lakes region and the Horn of Africa, March 2000; Coordinated Agenda on the problem of theProliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa,November 2000; Implementation Plan of the Coordinated Agenda for Action on the problem of theProliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa,November 2000.5 Proceeding of the ‘International Conference on Small Arms Trafficking in the border regions of Sudan,Uganda and Kenya: Determining the Issues and Setting the Strategies.’ Jinja, Uganda November 2001.

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good governance in the areas it controls. It entered and liberated western Equatoria in1989/90, except for Mundri County, which was liberated only in 1997. The twelve or soyears, is long a time enough to enable the building of administrative, judicial and securityinfrastructure capable maintaining stability, social justice and security.

Whatever may be said about this failure of historical dimension, the problem must besought at the strategic levels of the Movement. It has more to do with the political will toengage the people in genuine liberation. Many people joined the SPLM/A because of itsliberation agenda. Once this ceased to be reflected in the actions of the leaders, thecombatants and the political cadres of the Movement, a sense of betrayal and shatteredhopes set in. It seemed to have overwhelmed the people and the combatants as well.What we characterised above, as ‘ethnic sensitivities’ is indeed a backlash of thisfrustration and lost of hope among the people.

The absence of a clear political agenda that engenders people’s empowerment generatesthe feeling of haplessness in face of brutalisation and dehumanisation meted out by SPLAsoldiers together with the imposition on them of incompetent and corrupts leaders. Thus,it is not surprising that the average persons perceive the problem as being the Dinkapeople. Nearly every Dinka is treat with extreme suspicion; they are seen as over lords ornew oppressors [SPLA commanders, soldier, the police chiefs, judges, and the cattleherders who drive their cattle to destroy crops in gardens, etc.]. This jumble of accidents,deliberate actions and ethnic prejudices create confusing mixtures that make it impossibleto disentangle myths, fiction and imaginary fears from truths.

Looking at the data of gun related incidences, and the unsavoury sentiments expressed bysome respondents to the study against the SPLM/A authorities, which have becomesynonymous with the Dinka people, it is clear that there is deep-seated anger and hatredbottled up in the people for a long time. This was not out of fear but for the sake of peaceand harmony in the region.

Most of these sentiments were sincerely and courageously voiced in the EquatoriaRegional Congress in November 2002, and in the emergency consultative meeting forEquatoria region held by senior SPLM and SPLA officers in Yei between 4th and 6th

December 2002. It is hoped that the implementation of their resolutions may provide abreather to peacefully transform this potentially volatile situation. Therefore, theSPLM/A leaders who attended these two important meetings must live up to theirresponsibility and take stringent measures to curb irresponsible actions on the part of itsofficers and functionaries, otherwise the situation may deteriorate further and make futuresolution impossible.

The calm nature of the people inspires optimism. The fact that there are no open gunmarkets in the area; and that firearms transactions are undertaken clandestinelydemonstrate that law is still embedded in their collective memory. This is a social capitalthe SPLM/A authorities should utilise for normalising the situation and to providesufficient security.

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4.1 The general impact of small arms proliferation on western and central Equatoria.

The impact of small arms and light weapons on sedentary agrarian communities inwestern and central Equatoria transcend personal, clan, community and ethnic levels ofsociety. The most discernable manifestations are:

• Heightened insecurity led to enormous lost of life, property and the erosion ofmorals, ethics and traditional value system and the authority that enforced thosevalues. The resultant lawlessness gave opportunities to criminal elements to takeadvantage of the chaos to help themselves to the property of their neighbours andthose of the international humanitarian agencies operating in the area, impactingnegatively on their performance, quality and delivery of services.

• Increased ethnic tensions between Equatorians [hitherto considered peaceful andtolerant], which have never been recorded in recent history. There is heightenedmistrust of ethnic communities from other regions particularly the cattle herdingDinka communities in or outside the internally displaced people’s [IDPs] camps.This tension and hatred is exacerbated by Dinka refusal to subscribe to localcounty administration and the arrogant manner with which they drive their cattleto destroy the crops of their host communities6.

• Wanton rape of women and young girls usually at gunpoint led to abortions andmiscarriages. Stigmatisation and traumatisation of the victims of rape; somevictims have preferred to commit suicide and take their lives. More than being aquestion of personal dignity, the clash of reality of the SPLA soldier they perceiveas selfless volunteers for the just cause of the South and their image as rapists,looters and murderers was too much for them.

• Sharp increase in occurrences of sexually transmitted diseases [STDs] and moredangerously the HIV/AIDS. This is a serious matter particularly in communitiesthat have not been conscientised to the dangers of HIV/AIDS.

• Destruction of the environment through depletion of natural faunal species. Mostwild life and big games have been deplete or have migrated as a result ofexcessive use of firearms to Congo and other parts of south Sudan. Children inwestern and central Equatoria grow up without the knowledge of such animalslike the elephant, rhinos, giraffe, etc. Some SPLA use bombs and explosive, TNT,mines, and hand grenades, to fish in the rivers. The fish, especially ones can’twithstand the strong vibrations caused by the explosions and therefore die.

• The gradual and steady militarisation of society as a result of proliferation ofsmall arms and light weapons is slowly resulting in the changes of collectiveattitudes to aggression and perception of the actual enemy. Because of hatred and

6 It will be recalled that the Dinka don’t practice agriculture and have been depending on the humanitarianassistance provided by the international agencies.

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bitterness instilled into the hearts of people by some irresponsible behaviour, itmay be difficult for South Sudanese to achieve their political aspiration forindependence. The logic is that if the communities can’t live harmoniously now inthe course of the struggle against the common enemy in the form of the north,how would they behaviour if left along to themselves.

4.2 The political causes of proliferation of small arms must be addressed.

The study identified insecurity as force majeure or force motif for small armsproliferation. But insecurity itself is principally a political category, which means itscauses are political. Hence the proliferation of small arms no matter where and how is inprinciple and political matter, being a symptom, not cause of a political malaise. It can,therefore, only be addressed by political methods.

Speaking about symptom, the cause must be sought internally within the SPLM/A, itspolitical dispensations, the dysfunctional administrative set up, the bogus appointments topolitical positions which carry with them no substantial powers, while some personsclose the H/Qs exercise excessive powers without substantial authority. The bitternessexpressed by Equatorians alluded to above have much to do with the realisation that theirpositions no matter are just token. This is because the military wield and exercise power.Therefore, being appointed a governor or county commissioner means really nothing, asthe real authority and power lies with the military commander at that particular level.

What incenses the Equatoria is their haplessness. The separation between the civil andmilitary administration has not been effected. The Dinka hold nearly all the seniorpositions in the Army and the Police in western and central Equatoria. This in order ofthings, where merits and experience in appoints has been replaced by military seniority,the Equatorians feel disadvantaged, and any other opportunity whether it is trainingopportunity, scholarships for children, it is usually the Dinka chosen, not just by theirsheer numbers but by right. Their haplessness therefore translates into envy, suspicion,bitterness, and hatred of anything to do with the Dinka, as it has come in the responses.

The causes of proliferation of small arms have deep political roots. The Equatoriansshould feel they are part of the state formation in South Sudan. They want to theirnumbers promoted to positions of authority in the Army, police and other disciplinedforces. The present state of affairs in western and central Equatoria where nearly all frontand brigade commanders and police chiefs are hail from the Dinka nationality while theirmost senior officers have been demobilised to civilian position or transferred to theeastern fronts has become a matter of concern and must be addressed. In fact one of therespondents alleged that the situation is reminiscent of the pre-war dispensation in Juba,which triggered Kokora among the Equatorians7.

The SPLM/A top brass should demonstrate sensitivity to the concerns not only of theEquatorians but every south Sudanese. Some of the small nationalities feel threatened by 7 As we were writing this report, rumours were making the rounds that one senior Equatorian SPLM officerhad threatened to resigned if the Dinka were not forced to go back to their counties.

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the political behaviour of the larger nationalities. This sums up the causes for insecurity.When the concerns and aspirations of a people are ignored or suppressed or when theauthorities become unresponsive, the people will have not interest in maintaining securityand harmony.

The Equatorian SPLM Regional Congress and the Yei meeting in December of theSPLM/A top brass in Equatoria have correctly diagnosed the problem. For instance, thedesertion within the ranks of the SPLA and the havoc the soldiers caused on their wayhave been linked to the management of the army in the front and the lack of politicaleducation, their forceful conscription and brutalisation during recruitment; similarly thepresence of Dinka internally displaced who don’t recognise the authority of theEquatorian over them has been diagnosed. This now requires political decisions toameliorate the situation.

5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The proliferation of small arms and light weapons and their impact on the communityrelations in western and central Equatoria have political dimensions which can only beignored at serious risks. These are linked to the condescending ethnic attitudes andperceptions that translate into marginalisation of other ethnic groups in the decision-making processes.

The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons must be controlled through measures,which first and foremost must include the disciplining of the SPLA soldier [officers,political commissars and men] through political education and orientation to theprinciples and objective the liberation war. This will help isolate and define the criminalelements in this trade.

The study identifies the failure of the SPLM/A as the sole political authority in the NewSudan to formulate policies that promote the principles of social justice, equality,transparency, accountability and practice of democracy in the New Sudan as beingresponsible for the confused state of affairs. There is urgent need for the SPLM to makefunctional the National Executive Committee as the executive wing its power linked tothe regional and county levels.

In conclusion, the study makes the following recommendations:

• A complete separation of the civil and military administration as come in theresolutions of the SPLM First National Convention 1994. The practice of Frontand Brigade Commands interfering in county administration and management ofresources should be stopped. The counties should operate on budgets based ongenuine expenditures approved by the County Liberation Councils.

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• The SPLA should institute a strong ‘Military Police’ to control the movement ofthe SPLA soldiers. The soldiers not on the move to the battle field/frontlinesshould have their guns stacked in the military barracks. The SPLM administrationshould find ways of resolving some of the immediate social domestic needs of thesoldiers in order to minimise looting and use of force to acquire their needs, orunnecessary sales of guns and ammunitions.

• Institution a justice system accessible at anytime to all the people without favouror fear. Linked to this, should be the restoration of the authority of the traditionalleaders e.g. chiefs, clan elders and others, and provided with enough authority toeasily identify and apprehend criminals in their communities.

• Recruitment in the counties and preferable from the sons and daughters of thearea, and training of strong police force and incorruptible security agents. Thisshould be linked to this is the building an inventory of all the guns with theassistance of the chiefs and community elders have them registered and laterembark on the process of disarmament; the storage of these guns in secured placesto prevent stealing or abuse by those responsible for them

• Conscientisation of both civilians and the army about the dangers of trafficking inillicit arms and its insecurity linkages. A programme of awareness raising throughcivil education be undertaken with the assistance of the indigenous NGOs,Community based organisations, the Church and all other stakeholders. Thisshould be linked to the programme of socio-economic development and povertyeradication.

• The SPLM to formulate a policy that aims at sustainable socio-economicdevelopment, poverty reduction and eradication. Build and promote internalmarket linked to the markets in the neighbouring countries through the freemovement of farm commodities and manufactured goods.

• The SPLM to also institute a ‘Truth and Reconciliation Commission’ at thecounty level to help the process of healing, reconciliation and peace in the area,and which will promote peace exchanges with other parts of South Sudan. TheChurch through the New Sudan Council of Churches to assist in this process.

• Fair and equitable representation of ethnic groups in the appointments anddeployments of military, police, and political positions. Appointment of FieldCommanders must be based on merits and performance. There should be a cleardefinition of the powers of the national/regional/county political authorities.

• The county administration to be empowered to control and supervise theinternally displaced people’s camps, which are the centre of conflicts and tensionswith the local communities.

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• Citizens of the New/South Sudan, whether displaced by war and other calamities,by right can reside anywhere within the borders of South Sudan. However, and inorder to minimise tensions and conflicts, they are expected to fall under thejurisdiction and administration of the host county/ payam etc., and should not bepermitted to set up their own administration parallel to the existing county orpayam administration.

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ANNEXE 5

TRANSFERS OF WEAPONS TOWARDS THE ACTORSINVOLVED IN THE CONFLICT IN DRC

Presentation by Georges Berghezan, Arua conference, February 2003

INTRODUCTION

At the end of 2002, the GRIP published a study on the transfers of weapons towards the parties involved in

the war of DRC, as inventoried since the beginning of the war in 1998. The viewpoint adopted in this study

is very different from that of the field investigations by the Sudanese, Ugandan and Congolese teams. Our

research was essentially based on European and North American print media, the reports of international

organizations and NGO’s, and on various sources accessible via the Internet. Nonetheless, we have included

information collected from local sources, basically South Kivu and in Bujumbura. On the other hand, we did

not restrict ourselves to small and light weapons only, so the transfers of heavy weapons were equally

counted. All the transfers quoted are not necessarily illegal because, among the protagonists in the

Congolese conflict, only the UNITA, the Interahamwe and ex-FAR are under UN embargo. But, none of the

European Union countries, or associate countries (in all, the great majority of European States) cannot

legally deliver weapons to the parties in conflict in the Congo. A “code of conduct” forbids the supply of

weapons to countries at war and, in addition, Congo-Zaire has for more than ten years been under European

Union embargo. Finally, in the course of this presentation, I shall, given our geographical situation, focus on

transfers of weapons toward the East of the Congo and the neighbouring countries, what is frequently called

the Great Lakes Africa. But, first of all, I will give an outline of the transfers of weapons towards the

Kinshasa regime and its allies.

Transfers of weapons towards the DRC’s government and its allies

a) Towards Kinshasa

Most of the deliveries of weapons to the DRC come from Zimbabwe. At the onset of the conflict, Namibia

and South Africa also used to deliver weapons to Kinshasa. Let us note that in 1998 Pretoria decided to ban

the sales of “lethal” arms to all the countries implicated by the conflict in DRC, and it seems to keep to its

decision. It was also a question of deliveries of weapons from Libya, India, Georgia, from an unidentified

Arab country and, recently from Burkina Faso, one of the hubs of the traffic of weapons in Africa. Official

sources in Kinshasa confirmed the existence of a contract, amounting to several million dollars, on the

Chinese government. In exchange, a mining concession would have been granted in joint venture to a

Chinese firm and a Congolese semi-public enterprise.

According to the investigations of the UNO, the monopoly of the sale of diamonds granted by Kinshasa in

2000 to International Diamond Industries (IDI), an Israeli company, would have had a double motivation: to

quickly obtain fresh cash in order notably to purchase weapons, and to have access to Israeli weaponry,

military instructors and intelligence, given the “special connections” of Dan Gertler, IDI’s executive, with

“certain Israeli generals”. The transmission would never have yielded the expected fruit: only 3 million

dollars on the expected 20 millions were paid up to Kinshasa and no military equipment would have been

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delivered. In addition, the monopoly involved a serious increase in diamonds smuggling, and was broken

shortly after the death of L. D. Kabila.

In August 1998, mercenaries from the South African firm Executive Outcomes would have been present at

the time of the retracting of the Inga dam in April 2000 the Kinshasa public television presented members of

the FAC’s 10th special infantry Brigade trained by North-Korean instructors, some of whom were seen by the

TV spectators. In exchange for the trainings of its troops, the DRC’s government would have granted to the

People’s Democratic republic of Korea a mining concession, very rich in uranium, near Shinkolobwe

(Katanga).

Let us add that it is by the means of a Belgian manufactured weapon that Rashidi Mizele would have

assassinated President Kabila on the 16th of January 2001.

Finally, in order to close this section on a more positive note, let us mention that a destruction of more than

one thousand firearms occurred in Kinshasa on the 30th of April 2002. They had been surrendered by the

Rwandan rebels who were fighting along with government troops, in the framework of their demobilization

and disarmament provided for by the Lusaka agreements.

b) Towards Zimbabwe

In spite of the scarce information at our disposal, it is probable that important quantities of weapons were

delivered to the FAC by Harare, in addition to those destined to the Zimbabwean troops stationed in DRC.

The white Zimbabwean businessmen, John Bredenkamp and Billy Rautenbach, would have played a key role

in the transfers of weapons toward the DRC, as well as in the mining exploitations of Katanga.

A new phenomenon in Sub-Saharan Africa: Zimbabwe is providing itself with a weapon industry. The

Zimbabwe Defence Industries (ZDI), a State firm, produces ammunition and land mines and would be

searching for investors. It is for this purpose that pop star Michael Jackson visited the country in November

1998. According to an official American report, the ZDI provided Kabila’s forces with about 250 million

dollars worth of weapons during the “first war”. Kinshasa would have pledged to refund the ZDI with the

incomes from its future mining production. Zimbabwean army officers in DRC would, against retribution,

take responsibility for the transport of weapons to the Congo.

This fully developing industry does not prevent Zimbabwe from being still dependent on its usual suppliers

Russia and China and, up to the onset of the conflict, South Africa.

Great Britain, Harare’s other traditional supplier, seems to have stopped all deliveries since 1998 although

the firm British Aerospace, relayed by Prime Minister Blair, puts pressure for a resumption of the sales of

weapons. In January 2000, the British government authorized the exportation, toward Zimbabwe, of spare

parts for the Hawk fighters manufactured by British Aerospace, but the transaction was blocked some

months later. The United States maintains military training programmes for Zimbabwean armed forces, as is

the case for the armies of many African countries. By way of justification, the Pentagon and the State

Department used to put forward in particular, the necessity to counterbalance the connections of

Zimbabwean leaders with China.

On the other hand, an investigation by Saferworld a British NGO and the Guardian, a daily paper reveals the

large number of actors involved in the illicit transactions of weapons. At the beginning of November 1999 a

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707 Boeing aircraft registered in Liberia and belonging to the Air Cargo Plus company administered by two

Luxembourg based Scandinavians, transported military equipment from Burgas (Bulgaria) to Harare, whence

it was transferred to Kinshasa by a 76D Ilyushin aircraft, so as to be used by the Zimbabwean forces in DRC.

In order to emphasize the complexity of the problem, let us also note that the B707 aircraft was hired by the

Belgian branch (at Ostend, when the aircraft departed empty) of the British firm Air Charter Service (ACS),

and flown, by an American and a Briton, and that the transaction was organised by the Transbalkan Cargo

Service company, based in Amsterdam (Netherlands) and using ACS’s Ostend premises. ACS claims to have

been misled by the Dutch firm and, according to military experts, the exported equipment might have been

Bulgarian Igla portable missiles system. Another transaction with destination the ZDI, using the same

channel, but with equipment from Slovakia, was scheduled in March 2000.

Let us finally note that Zimbabwe and its ZDI were involved, in 1999, in the weapons network notably used

by embargoed entities, such as Liberia’s government and Sierra Leone’s Revolutionary United Front (RUF).

This network would have been led by trafficker Leonid Minin, an Israel based Ukranian citizen, presently

imprisoned in Italy.

c) Towards Angola

Thanks to its oil reserves, some of which were mortgaged, Angola is in the leading group of their African

countries that devote most of resources to the army. In the course of the recent years, Russia, Bielorussia

and Slovakia provided its air force with planes and helicopters. T-72 tanks would have been delivered by

Bielorussa in 1999.

Concerning the manufacture of weapons, a 1999 meeting was devoted in particular to the construction of

several weapons factories by Portugal in its former colonies. Although there was no precision as to the

countries in which these factories should be built, Angola’s military needs and the fact that this meeting took

place in Luanda tend to indicate that Angola should be one of the beneficiaries.

At least up to 1998, South Africa used to sell weapons to Angola. Let us remind one that Luanda

collaborated for several years with the South African “Executive Outcomes” firm, providing aircraft and pilots

for planes and helicopters, as well as intelligence and strategic planning operations, in order to protect the

country’s mining and oil installations against UNITA’s attacks. Even if it announced the end of its activities

for the 1st of January, “Executive Outcomes” was a link in the large chain controlling a great part of Africa’s

mining resources.

“Military Professional Resources Incorporated” (MPRI°, the American competitor of “Executive outcomes”,

tried apparently without success to make up for the departure of the South African firm, with the Clinton

administration’s active support. The warming of relations between the Clinton administration and Angola was

also confirmed by the official announcement of the beginning of a small military cooperation programme.

On the other hand, according to a report published by “Global Witness”, a British NGO, close links would

connect the Bush administration, in particular its oil lobby, to the Luanda authorities. That would take the

form of an intense collaboration not only on oil and financial matters, but also on military issues. According

to a former representative of UNITA in the United States, Jonas Savimbi’s assassination on the 22nd of

February 2002 was made possible by the technical support offered by “Brown & Root”, a firm related to Dick

Cheney, the current American Vice-President. If this information is confirmed, it would be an additional sign

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of the total change of American diplomacy in respect of the Angolan question. Indeed, when he was the

Defence Secretary in the administration to the current President’s father, Cheney used to be a relentless

supporter of UNITA.

Concerning small and light weapons, let us note that, in February 2001, the Canary Islands Spanish

authorities intercepted a cargo flying the Georgian flag, but belonging to an Ukranian company. Inside the

ship, bound for Luanda, 20000 boxes were uncovered, concealing 636 tons of weapons, of which 7.62 mm

ammunition. Finally, let us note that the UNO’s humanitarian organisations were worried, around the middle

of 2001, about the appearance of new generations of high technology missiles on both the government and

the UNITA sides.

d) Towards the other factions allied to Kinshasa or fighting the same enemies

- The Rwandan armed groups

Since the onset of the conflict, the Rwandan authorities have accused Zimbabwe and Kinshasa of supporting

the ex-FAR and Interahamwe present in DRC.

At present, the Rwandan Hutu groups active in DRC seem to have regrouped in the Army for the Liberation

of Rwanda (ALIR), subdivided into ALIR I and ALIR II. According to MONUC’s estimations, ALIR I would

include 4000 to 6000 armed men, the majority of whom are the members of the ex-FAR and Interahamwe

who fled Rwanda after the 1994 genocide. Active in Kivu, it is equipped with small arms and gets support

from Kinshasa. An Antonov 12 aircraft would have regularly parachuted supplies to it, in particular on the 1st

and 3rd of May 2001.

ALIR II would include numbers similar to those of ALIR I, but its members would be younger and would not

have taken part in the genocide. It would be deployed in South Kivu and in Katanga and would be better

equipped than ALIR I. In addition to the traditional AK-47 and other guns, it would have at its disposal

Katyusha and higher calibre mortars, some of which were seized y the Rwandan army. According to the

latter, ALIR II is operating in close collaboration with the FAC and Burundi’s FDD. It would have recruited

men in Tanzania and would receive weapons through Kinshasa organised parachutings.

- The Burundian armed groups

Also active in Burundi, the Forces for the Defence of Democracy (FDD) and the National Forces for the

Liberation (FNL) are present in DRC. If FNL’s activity in Congo seems to be weak and not very documented,

the FDD would include 3000 to 4000 men in this country and would be arms connection with supplied in

weapons by Kinshasa and its allies. They would have at their disposal small and light weapons and mortars

up to the 107 mm calibre and would have the Mai-Mai, ALIR II, the FAC and the Zimbabwean army. Another

channel of supply is Zambia, where two senior intelligence officials were arrested and charged with traffics

of weapons and ammunition towards the FDD via the port of Kigoma (Tanzania). According to a former

Burundian minister of Energy, the FDD troops would be regularly trained in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe. This

country’s involvement n the supply of weapons and “experts’ advice” was confirmed by a group of experts of

the UNO, who specifically state that the FDD are trained by the Zimbabwean army, and perhaps by North

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Korea, in Lubumbashi. Finally, let us note that, at the beginning of 2002, Kinshasa pledged to stop its

support to Burundian insurgents.

- The Ugandan armed groups

Of the six Ugandan armed groups mentioned in the Lusaka Agreement of July 1999, only the Allied

Democratic Front (ADF) would still be active at the beginning of 2002. It would have at its disposal from 200

to 300 men, without heavy weaponry and deployed close to the Ugandan border.

In Province Orientale, ADF would have concluded an alliance with the Lendu Tribe, who are to the Hema

Tribe, armed by Kampala.

In April 2001, President Museveni announced his intention to withdraw his troops from DRC, justifying it by

ADF’s military defeat.

- The Congolese armed groups

Here we are picking up the various Mai-Mai groups active in the East of the Congo, at the origin, fighting the

foreign occupation of the DRC. Some of them would receive from Kinshasa military and logistic support, but

some rallied to Kigali or sank into armed crime. Towards the middle of 2001, General François Olenga, the

leader of one of these groups affirmed that he had “captured a Rwandan military plane transporting

weapons to the East of the Congo”. The aircraft’s forced landing occurred near Fizi (South Kivu) and the

RCD denied that it was transporting weapons. The Mai-Mai equally get supplies from black market circuits

and RCD and Rwandan soldiers who would sell their ammunition. They also would have secret relations with

Middle East countries in the hope of obtaining weapons in exchange for natural resources.

Finally, Commandant Masunzu’s rebellion, active since the beginning of 2002 in the South Kivu, seems to be

amply supplied in weapons taken from the Rwandan army. Masunzu’s is an officer who deserted from the

RCD, having staged, along with other Banyamulenge (Congolese Tutsi), an armed rebellion against the

Rwandan army and the RCD. He seems to have set up an alliance with some Mai-Mai groups.

Transfers of weapons towards the opponents of the Kinshasa government

a) Towards the Congolese rebels

The transfers of weapons towards the rebellion from Kigali and Kampala were massive at the beginning of

the war in August 1998, though it has often been difficult to determine which faction was the beneficiary

thereof, or if they were destined for the Rwandan or Ugandan armies in DRC. Thus, according to Amnesty

International, some twenty unidentified planes used to land on each day of September 1998on the Goma

airport, unloading there, in addition to Rwandan and Ugandan troops, military equipment, of which

armoured vehicles and heavy weapons. Some months late, an other air ballet was noticed in the East of the

Congo and over Kisangani where, during the first three weeks of the year 1999, not less than 1800 tons of

military equipment, of which T-5 tanks, would have been dispatched from Uganda by large capacity jets.

These aircrafts would equally parachute small and light weapons and ammunition at the North of Mbuji-Mayi

(Eastern Kasaï) and in the surroundings of Kalemie (Katanga).

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It equally seems that the rebels, or Uganda, succeeded in diverting military equipment destined for the FAC.

In fact, 315 tons of small and light weapons, explosives and ammunition ordered by Kinshasa from China

just before the onset of the « second war » arrived in Dar-es-Salam, then were sent to Uganda and

dispatched to Goma. The rebels also got their supplies from the enemy’s stocks, in particular, at the time of

the capture of Kindu by the RDC in 1998 and that of Dongo by the MLC in September 2000.

But, there’s hardly any doubt that the essential of the supplies of the RCD and of the MLC in weapons, by

road or airway, come from Rwanda and Uganda. Via their sponsors, the Congolese insurgents largely

appeal to the international networks of arms dealers. Thus, at the onset of the conflict, the British company

« Sky Air Cargo » run by Syed Nagvi, and « Occidental Airlines » of Belgian national Ronald Rossignol

loaded weapons in Bratislava (Slovakia) and delivered them in rebel territory, in particular, on the Goma and

Kisangani airports. A British pilot declarer that he had delivered new AK-47 assault rifles and their

ammunition, in Kisangani. The planes, belonging to the Congolese companies « Planet Air » and « New

goma Air », were registered in Swaziland and used to take off from Kigali or Entebbe. The same aircrafts

equally used to help with the transport of UNICEF’S medical equipement and officials.

The links between the networks of Tadjïk national Victor Bout and the Congolese rebels were equally

established. Thus, an Antonov belonging to « Centrafrican Airlines », a company founded by Bout and run

by Belgian national Ronald De Smet, crashed at Pepa (Katanga) in April 2000, hilling tens of Rwandan

officiers and soldiers who were on board. Based in Bangui (Central African Republic) and thus separated

from the territories held by jean-Pierre Bemba by the Ubangui river only, De Smet was working, at the time

of Mubutu, as a pilot for the rebel chief’s father, businessman Bemba Saolona. Furthermore, the close ties

between the MLC, Bangui and Bout were noticed by a group of experts of the UNO. On the other hand,

another accomplice of Bout’s, Kenyan national Sanjivan Ruprah, arrested in February 2002 in Brussels for

money laundering, was the brother-in-law of the current RCD leader, Adolphe Onusumba, and he used to be

active in the diamands trade in Kisangani, after having a close acquaintance of controversial Liberian

president Charles Taylor’s.

Recently, weapons would have been sent via Zambia and Tanzania up to Molero (Katanga) where they were

stored then distributed to Congolese rebels. During their transit on Tanzanian territory, these weapons

would have been escorted by this country’s soldiers. Even after the withdrawal of their troops, Uganda and

Rwanda were accused of delivering weapons to their protégés. Thus, the troops of the UPC (a dissidence

from the RCD-ML) would be supplied in weapons and ammunition by parachuting carried out by Rwandan

planes. The Ugandan army would have captured an important stock of this equipment.

On the other hand, the Ugandan army, accused of supplying weapons to both the Hema and the Lendu, the

two ethnic groups fighting each other in the Ituri, would have delivered each week of the end of 2002 ten

containers of fire arms in this district, where on would already count one million and a half such weapons in

circulation. Finally, the Kinshasa government accused Libya os supplying the MLC with small and light

weapons, ammunition and heavy weaponry.

According to official Ugandan sources, the weapons captured from the FAC would generally be given to the

MLC and to the RCD-ML. These movements are equally supported in men and military training by Uganda.

As for the RCD, it obtained support from Angolan UNITA which supplied in particular a SAM-16 anti-aircraft

battery, and its personnal as from January 1999. In order to pay for the weapons and medicines for its

soldiers, it sells or exchanges the gold and diamonds extracted in the territories under its control. According

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to harere based sources, the presence of white American mercenaries supporting the Congolese rebels in

the artillery and communications fields would have equally been noticed.

b) Towards Rwanda

In spite of a partial withdrawal, the Rwandan People’s Army (APR) is controlling, with the support of the

RCD, nearly a third of the Congolese territory. From the time of the lifting which it was under up to 1995,

the new Rwandan leadership mainly depended on South Africa in order to equip its armed forces. These

transfers of weapons, at the possible exception of « non-lethal » equipment, seem to have been suspend

after the onset of the « second war » of RDC, even if South Africa continued to maintain friendly relations

with Rwanda.

Recently, Kigali acquired an air force, in particular, of Russian MI-17 assault and Mi-24 helicopters obtained

in 1998 and of MIG-21 fighters purchased from the « former Eastern Bloc countries. »

The troops would be equiped with combat uniforms originating the former German Democratic Republic, and

massive contributions in weaponry from East Asia would have been noticed by a UNO’s investigation

commission.

Another source of weapons would be the takings carried out on the enemies. Thus, according to a Rwandan

diplomat in Brussels, the Zimbabwean defeat at Pweto at the end of 2000 allowed the AOR to amass enough

weapons to make war « during 5 years ». The contraband circuits very probably were also made use of :

the recurring presence of arms dealers, of whom Tadjik national Victor Bout, Belgian national Jacques

« Kiki ». Lemaire and Lebanese national Imad Kabir, in Kigali was observed by the UNO’s investigators, and

Bout would have become one the main supplies of UNITA after the Rwandan leaders had put them in

contact. Let us recall that, as early as August 1998, an alliance was sealed between Kigali and Angolan

rebels, allowing UNITA to operate in the areas occupied by Rwanda in DRC, and to sell its diamonds in

Kigali, after APR’s withdrawal, at the outset of the war, from the areas of Angola controlled by Savimbi’s

troops.

Another Rwanda’s major military support was but the United States of America through programmes such as

the « Joint Combined Exchange Training » (JCET), the « Enhanced International Military Education and

Training » (E-IMET), both equally implanted in several other African countries, and the « Rwanda

Interagency Assessment Team » (RIAT). When he « second war » broke out, American staff assigned to

these military training programmes, in particular members of the « Green Berets » special unit, were present

in Rwanda Information equally mentioned the support of two American battleships in the Atlantic Ocean at

the time of the Rwandan offensive in the West of the DRC in the first month of the « second war ». These

slips would have ensured the communication between Kigali and the base of Kitona which the APR had just

captured.

We have no indication relating to the continuation of the RIAT or JCET programmes after 1998, but our

information allows us to suppose that a form of military cooperation continues to unite the United States and

Rwanda. In a joint report of the State Department and the Defence Department to the Congress in March

2000, a budget of more than 1.3 million USD was forecast for the 2000 fiscal year for the IMET programme,

and an apportionment titled « Non security assistance, unified command commitment activities » in favour

of Rwanda. The justification of this assistance was the « prevention of a repetition of the genocide » of

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1994. According to sources, the military assistance would mainly come from the Pentagon’s « special

budget », escaping the control of the Congress. According to some others, it would be a combination of

official and secret programmes, planned and administered by the US Special Operations Command and the

Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA). They would involve the participation of « private military firms » of the

type of the MPRI which tried to impose itself in Angola. An American base, built by « Brown et Root » a

company connected with Vice President Cheney, would even have been set up near Cyangungu, at the

proximity of the Congolese border. Its role would be to train APR troops and to supply them with logistical

support for their operations in DRC.

On the other hand, in January 2001, as early as the investiture of President Bush, his Rwandan counterpart

Paul Kagame travelled to Washington in order to request the renewal of the military programmes granted by

the Clinton administration, programmes including military training for counter insurrection and for

psychological warfare. In the same year, Kagame made a three weeks « private visit » to the United States.

A delegation of senior Rwandan officials made an official visit to Washington at the beginning of February

2002. Some APR’s officers who participated in the visit would have been involved in various traffics, in

particular that of weapons.

We do not have accurate information relating to the deliveries of American weapons to Rwanda, even if in

June 1999, Kigali and the « Northrop Grumman Corporation « concluded a contract on the supply to an

ARSR-70 air surveillance radar and connected installations. That is typically a double use asset, both military

and civilian. The radar became operational in May 2000. Finally, the United States would have delivered to

Rwanda, at an unspecified date, ammunition and ultra-modern communication equipment.

As to training sessions, in addition to these provided by Washington, let us note Kenya and Rwanda signed

in 2000 an agreement whereby nairobi would train the APR, assisted by Western instructors and strategies,

of whom 150 would have been present at the Bukavu airport at the end of 1999. Israel would train, in anti-

insurrection fight, the pilots of the Mi-24 helicopters purchased in 1998. On the other hand, in 2002, it was

equally a question of thousands of Erythrean, or Somali, mercenaries dispatched by the APR, via Bujumbura,

to the North East of the DRC.

As for the financing of the Rwandan intervention in DRC, RCD’s leader Onusumba declared , in the presence

of Kagame who approved, that it was assured by the taxes on raw materials levied by his movement. Let us

finally signal that the Rwandan army is accused, by the representatives of the Civil Society of the East of the

Congo, of being the main source of the black market of small and light weapons, the AK-47 notably, in the

region.

C) Towards Uganda

Like Zimbabwe, Uganda developed an important weapons industry. The mainly concerned firms are the

« Nakasongola Arms Factory », belonging to Chinese private and public interests, the « Saracen », belonging

to the « Strategy Resources Corporation », connected with the South Africa « Executive Outcomes »,

supplying the Ugandan security forces. The most important, the « Nakasongola », or still the « National

Enterprise Corporation », was built with the assistance of a Chinese firm, and produces small and light

weapons as well as ammunition. Through Kampala declared that it had stopped producing land mines in

1995, there are allegations that the factory still produces them and sells them in Central Africa and in the

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Great Lakes region. A local firm was equally set up in order to repair and produce spare parts for some sixty

or so T-55 tanks acquired Ukraine in 1998.

Concerning these T-55 tanks, originally coming perhaps from Rumania or Bulgaria, let us note that they

would have reached Kampala in bad condition, would have been purchased at 750.000 US D each, and

would have been meant to equip a rebellion which active in the Congo. The kingpin in this transaction

seems to have been retired Amos Golan, the trafficker and retired Israeli Colonel. Close to Ugandan

authorities, Golan and his « Silver Shadow » firm were equally suspected of having tried, without success, to

sell 20 Cresh Republic’s Tatra trucks and of having effectively organised the sale of 6 Russian MiG-21

fighters, equally received in deplorable condition. Congin from Poland, three of these aircraft were sent to

Israel in order to be modified and so meet the most up-to-date specifications of the MIG-29 fighters.

At the beginning of 2002, the Minister of Finance still had to pay 20 million USD for these transformations.

The other three MIG fighters are in Uganda and are periodically flown by expatriates for tests.

Uganda equally acquired Russian-made Mi-24 assault helicopters through the « Consolidated Sales

Corporation », which also supplied Rwanda with aircrafts of the same type. The Mi-24 and MIG-21 fighters

are or were trained in Israel. The 16 months training of each of the 13 MIG pilots sent to that country

would have cost about 1 million USD.

On the other hand, military and intelligence firms based in South Africa were, at least at the onset of the

conflict, involved in a support to the « Tutsi bloc » made up Uganda, Rwanda and Congolese rebels. This

network would be in the Rends of former members of the South African army and right wing extremists, of

whom businessman Johan Niemoller, and would have been organised, in particular to the benefit of

Kampala, a transaction relating to the delivery of several armoured personnel carriens manufactured by the

South Africa firm « Reumech ».

In order to send its soldiers and their supply into DRC, Kampala resorts to various private airlines. Thus, the

Swiss « Aviation Support and Trading Organisation » (AVISTO) was hired by the government in order to fly

its C-130 Hercules for its military transports in the Congolese territory. The UPDF would hire planes

belonging to « VR Promotions Ltd » in order to carry its military supplies to the Congo. The Congolese firms

« Planet Air » and “New Goma Air”, registered in Swaziland, seem to have been equally involved in the

transports of small and light weapons in DRC. The UNO’s report on the illegal exploitation of Congo’s

resources equally pointed at “Air Alexander”, “Air Navette”, and “Uganda Air Congo”, without explicitly

accusing these companies of transporting weapons, but made one notice in other respects that aircrafts

departing from or arriving at Entebbe indiscriminately carry ores, agricultural products, troops and

ammunition. Some of these planes would belong to Viktor Bout, whereas Amnesty International quoted

Uganda “among the well known countries” illicitly trading in weapons, confirming information contained in

an official American report published in July 2001, and describing Uganda as one of the main African centres

of the traffic of weapons, beside Tanzania, Kenya and Burkina Faso.

For anecdotal evidence, let us signal that the tribulations of a Belgian trafficker by the first name of Jan,

were in the news in Kampala. He had imported, in 2001, 60 old Volvo and Scania trucks to be sold to a rebel

group in DRC. His son would have been abducted on Congolese territory and released against a 1 million

USD ransom. The trucks were later parked and repainted in khaki, at Kasese (West of Uganda) and “Jan”

tried, at the beginning of 2002, to sell them to the Ugandan army at 2.85 million USD. Some sectors of the

UPDF would have been very reluctant to such a purchase, owing to the condition of the vehicles.

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The military commitment of the United States beside the Kampala authorities is rather more serious. At least

up to 1997, Uganda benefited from the “Joint combined Exchange Training” (JCET) and “African Crisis

Response Initiative” (ACRI) training programmes, in particular in support to its fight against the ADF rebel

group. This assistance would have been reduced after the intervention in DRC. Nonetheless, the American

and Ugandan armies, as well as Kenyan and Tanzanian troops, would have had to hold in August 2002, the

MEDFLAG 2002 exercise, the greatest American military training session in Uganda in several years. It had to

mobilize more than 250 medical and logistics specialists from the American air force, navy and army.

Prepared by the US military command in Europe, it had to train Ugandan military units to the rescue and

medical support of wounded combatants.

Following the serious deterioration of its relations with Kigali, Uganda in October 2001, asked the British

government to authorize an important increase in its military budget in order to “counter an eventual

aggression” by Rwandans. Kampala would like to purchase new tanks and aircrafts, artillery, and to train

more pilots and officers for the UPDF which in July 2001 started a new recruitment campaign. President

would wish to see the military budget rise form 113 million USD to 252 million USD in three years. This

budget does to probably include the monies which the MLC pays up to the Ugandan army and officers in

DRC.

c) Towards Rwanda and/or Uganda

As it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between the weapons delivered to the Congolese rebellion and

those in supply to the Rwandan and Ugandan armies occupying the DRC or , to a lesser extent, between

those intended Zimbabwe and those of the Kinshasa government, the final destination of the weapons on

the way to Uganda was sometimes controversial, in particular because the weaponry imported by Rwanda

via the Indian Ocean ports often transit by Kampala before reaching the country of a Thousand Hills.

Thus, enormous quantities of weapons arrived at the Tanzanian port of Dar-es-Salaam toward the end of

1998 and the beginning of 1999. Not fewer than 90 assault tanks were delivered at the end of November

1998. A Greek ship unloaded 80 tons of portable missile launchers in December 1998. In January 1999,

another ship delivered 6 tanks, 5000 anti-tank missiles and 5000 anti-aircraft missiles, 5000 automatic rifles,

1000 grenade launchers and 2000 boxes of ammunition. The ship would have been North Korean and the

weapons were unloaded in the presence of a senior official of the Rwandan intelligence services, then sent

to Mwanza (on the Tanzanian shore of Lake Victoria) and to Kampala. But the delivery to Uganda would

have been simulated at Kigali’s request, because of the good relations between Tanzania and Uganda.

The deterioration of relations between Kigali and Kampala had at least the effect of clarifying the identity of

the true recipient of the weaponry recently delivered in the area.

d) Towards Burundi

Bujumbura has never officially admitted the presence of its army in DRC, if not implicitly at the beginning of

2002 when its foreign Affairs Minister announced the withdrawal of its troops from this country Information

on the transfers of weapons toward Burundi is scarce enough, especially since a regional embargo, notably

on weapons, was lifted only in the course of 1998.

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Let us note however that 560 tons of weapons, un particular grenades and Kalashnikov machines, imported

from china by Burundi’s Ministry of Defence, were seized by the Ugandan army tat the border, in October

1999, owing to the absence of the Ugandan government’s authorization for transit on its territory.

Observers noticed in the course of 2001 that the army “considerably reinforced its heavy weaponry in

anticipation of imminent and joint FDD & FNL attacks”. Let us finally note that a personality of both Belgian

and Burundian nationalities well known in the traffic of weapons, Mathias Hitimana, was appointed as the

Minister of Energy and Mines of the transition government on the 31st of October 2001. According to

rumours, he would have been at the origin of the acquisition, by the Army of Burundi, of Chinese

Kalashnikov guns towards the beginning of 2002.

e) UNITA

At last, a word on the UNITA, which has not been particularly examined because of the recent death of

Jonas Savimbi and of the cessation of fightings in Angola. Let us nonetheless note that it was the object of a

study in a preceding report by the GRIP and that it was undoubtedly by far Africa’s best armed rebel group.

For a long time it had been supported by the former South African regime and by Mobutu, and from 1998, it

managed to establish new channels for the traffic of weapons and diamonds thanks to Rwanda.

CONCLUSION

Based on public sources, this study is inevitably incomplete: on one hand, the greatest discretion generally

surrounds this type of transfers, mainly if they are illegal; on the other hand, research in this field cruelly

suffers form lack of means. small and light weapons are particularly difficult to trace, as they are often

displaced form a theatre of conflicts to another by a multitude of small scale dealers, who benefit from the

porosity of borders and who do not hesitate to bribe those who are supposed to guard the said borders. Let

us recall that, in Central and Southern Africa, the stocks of weapons “inherited” from the cold war and from

apartheid now equip the parties at was in several countries, as well as numerous rebel or criminal groups,

thanks to the arsenals originally located in South Africa, Mozambique and Angola, even in Somalia.

Furthermore, the important stocks of weapons accumulated by the former members of the Warsaw Pact, as

well as their present day disproportionate capacities of production, have enabled numerous African

countries, often involved in conflicts, to acquire relatively sophisticated weaponry at reasonable prices.

Several States that supply, applicants for membership of the EU, thus violate the Code of conduct on the

exportations of weapons to which they have rallied.

We equally notice the emergence of worrying trends in the region under study. There is fist of all a close

connection between the exploitation, often illegal, of DRC’s natural resources and the purchases of weapons

by all the parties to the conflict. On the other hand, one notices the development of a local small and light

weapons industry, in particular in Zimbabwe and in Uganda. This evolution raises the problem of the

granting of licences in sensitive zones by certain industrialized countries. Then, the parties at war, but

apparently mainly Rwanda, Uganda and their Congolese allies, largely resort to international weapons

trafficking networks, of which those of the famous Victor Bout. In addition, beside Eastern Europe, countries

such as China or North Korea, hardly trouble themselves with moral precepts as to the flow of their military

equipment toward the region, often supplying the two warring camps. That acutely raises the issue of a

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mandatory embargo on weapons destined for the countries and factions implicated in the Congolese conflict,

a measure which the UNO’s Security Council should take.

Finally, one can but regret the lack of initiatives by institutions such as the OAU and the UNO, the

indifference of the majority of Western medias vis-à-vis a tragedy of such an extent and a behaviour for the

least ambiguous of certain great powers, in particular the United States. The latter seems to have tolerated,

encouraged or supported the triggering of the insurrection, continues to train the armies of several warring

parties and has never put its important pressure to bear in favour of the restoration of peace and of the

respect for the territorial integrity of the DRC.