Conflict in the Somali Region of Ethiopia: Can Education Promote Peace-Building?

8/6/2019 Conflict in the Somali Region of Ethiopia: Can Education Promote Peace-Building?

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Strengthening the humanity and dignity of people in crisis through knowledge and practice

M A R C H 2 0 1 1

Conict in the Somali Region o Ethiopia:

Can Education Promote Peace-Building?

Simon Richards and Gezu Bekele

A report for the BRIDGES Project


2/80Feinstein International Center2

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3/80Conict in the Somali Region o Ethiopia: Can Education Promote Peace-Building? 3

Acknowledgements

This study was unded by Save the Children UK under a contract

rom UKaid rom the Department or International Development.

We especially thank Save the Children UK sta, Mercy Corps, and

Islamic Relie acilitation and organization o the logistics o the trips.

Andy Catley o Tuts University deserves mention or his support.

O most importance, we thank all the Ethiopian people, including the

many government ocials or their patience and openness, who

answered our questions about themselves and their experiences with

education and conict in the Somali Region. There are too many to

list them but you know who you are.

We the authors o this report are solely responsible or any errors in

its contents.



Executive Summary

1. The Task 11

1.1 Introduction 11

1.2 The BRIDGES Project 11

2. Methodology 13

2.1 Locations visited 13

2.2 Stakeholders consulted 13

2.3 Literature review 14

2.4 The challenges o research and analysis 15

3. The Context 16

3.1 Key trends in Somali Region 16

3.1.1 Demographics 16

3.1.2 Livelihoods 16

3.1.3 Changes in the governance environment 16

3.1.4 Changes in other social dynamics 17

3.2 Forces shaping the history o conict in the Somali Region 17

3.3 Current patterns and cultures o governance that impact on the conict dynamics 21

4. The Conicts o the Somali Region 24

4.1 Assessment fndings and broad conict trends 24

4.2 A typology o current conicts 25

4.3 Structural and proximate actors inuencing conict 26

4.4 Conict eatures and dierentiators 33

4.5 Analysis and discussion o typology 33

4.6 Comparison o Adher and Shinile zones 36

5. Education and Conict 38

5.1 The eects o conict on education in Somali Region 38

5.2 The eects o education on conict in Somali Region 41

Contents



6. Recommendations or Education and Conict Transormation

in Somali Region 44

6.1 A two-pronged approach 44

6.2 Application o the typology to education methodologies and delivery mechanisms 44

6.3 Education and the structural proximate causes 45

6.4 Education working In Conict 46

6.5 Education working On Conict 47

6.5.1 Educational content 47

6.5.2 Educational methodologies 49

6.5.3 Education delivery mechanisms 50 6.5.4 Education and state-strengthening 51

6.6 Education and conict prevention, management and resolution 52

6.6.1 Conict prevention 52

6.6.2 Conict mitigation 56

6.6.3 Conict resolution 58

6.7 Further research 58

7. Conclusions 60

Endnotes

Bibliography 66

Appendix 1: Terms o Reerence 73

Appendix 2: Suggested Checklist or Schools and Conict 75

Appendix 3: Emerging Issues that may aect conict dynamics in

the Somali Region in the uture 78



ABBREVIATIONS

ABE Alternative Basic Education

BRIDGES Building Relationships through Innovative Delivery o Growing Education Services

CSO Civil Society Organization

DFID Department or International Development

EFA Education or All

EPRDF Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

MDG Millennium Development Goals

ONLF Ogaden National Liberation Front

OLF Oromo Liberation FrontPCAE Pastoralist Concern Association Ethiopia

PCU Program Coordination Unit

PDP Peace and Development Program

SMC School Management Committee

SCUK Save the Children UK

SCUS Save the Children US

SSDF Somali Salvation Democratic Front

SNM Somali National Movement

TFG Transitional Federal Government

TVET Technical and Vocational Education Training Center



Piloting the Delivery o Quality Education

Services in the Developing Regional States o

Ethiopia, also known as Building Relationships

through Innovative Delivery o Growing

Education Services (BRIDGES), is being

implemented by Save the Children UK, Islamic

Relie, and Mercy Corps in the Somali Region

o Ethiopia. It is a twelve-month project unded

by the UK Department or International

Development (DFID). The purpose o the

project is to strengthen the capability and

commitment o state and non-state actors in

Somali Region to promote peace, security, and

development through the delivery o quality

education. An important aspect o the project is

to generate lessons that might inuence uturestrategies or peace-building and improved

education in the region.

Analytical support to BRIDGES is provided by

the Feinstein International Center, Tuts

University. This support included conict

analyses in Somali Region, ocusing on an

analysis o the causes o conict in Adher and

Shinile Zones, and the ways in which improved

education could contribute to conict reduction.

Key fndings

1. Education is a development priority

Educationiscriticaltoaddressingthe

development needs o Somali Region and is

a much- needed service at this time.

Education, especially at the basic and

primary school level, also has a critical

long-term role in societal and conict

transormation.

Althougheducationisadevelopment

priority, it is probably not the best

instrument to transorm conict, address the

structural and proximate causes o conict,

or bring about stability in the short term. The

assumptions that conict arises rom a lack o

education and development need to be

examined careully, given the overarching,

high-level political drivers o conict in theregion.

Similarly,theassumptionthatfragilityand

stability can be directly and immediately

addressed through strengthening the states

ability to deliver services requires testing and

the collection o evidence over time.

Improved service provisionper seis unlikely

to alter the conict situation signifcantly

without inputs in a range o other areas

including, in particular, the need to address

directly the causes o conict.

Theimpactofconictoneducation

provision is not as signifcant as might be

expected given the prevalence o conict in

the region, but it still has major consequences

or amilies and or the uture o the

education system. Equally, the analysis ound

that except under special, localizedconditions involving land, education is

neither a primary cause o conict, nor a

trigger or violence.

Thendingsaboveindicateaclearneedto

continue to support basic education in the

Somali Region, while also reshaping

expectations on the conict-related

outcomes o improved education.

2. Conict drivers and dynamics

Thedriversofconictareevolvingand

changing in the region, but there are three

basic types o conict that occur in Shinile

and Adher Zones:

- Inter-clan/ethnic conicts

- Those with international regional

dynamics

- Those with inter-regional Ethiopian

dynamics

- Those within the Somali Region

- Intra-clan

- State versus insurgents

Themainstructuralandproximatecauses

that drive these conicts all into three main

groups including:

- Political and governance concerns

- Economic and environmental concerns

- Socio-cultural concerns

Althoughallthreebasictypesofconictare

ound in both Shinile and Adher Zones, thesituation is ar more serious in Shinile Zone.

The levels and intensity o violence that

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY



occur in Shinile are more severe and relate

to complex political dynamics, long-

running territorial issues, and a relatively

homogenous clan composition.

Theroleofbasiceducationasameansto

transorm conict in the short term is

constrained by the disconnects between

limited education and the structural andproximate causes o conict in the region,

and the reality that education programs do

not work directly with those actively taking

part in conict (although they should).

However, education programs still need to

ensure that they adopt a strong and serious

conict-sensitive approach to their work.

Recommendations

1. Conict-sensitive and long-term

approaches to education

The education sector in the Somali Region

should concentrate primari ly on improving

delivery, and more specifcally, on improving

quality. Education should adopt a two-pronged

approach.

First,adoptaseriousconict-sensitive

approach to the sectors work aimed at

eective education delivery in conictenvironments.

Second,methodologiesshoulddeliberately

incorporate a long-term approach and theory

o change aimed at addressing issues that

work on conict. More explicit linkages

with l ivelihoods and the employment

sector, as well as relevance to ways o lie,

should be coupled with a scale-up o the

Mercy Corps work that is specifcally

targeting those who are involved inconict.

Conict-sensitive programming

There is a need to adopt a serious conict-

sensitive approach to all education and service

delivery work in the Somali Region aimed at

eective delivery in conict environments,

and including the development o indicators

that ensure a way o measuring impact. In

particular: Workonbothsidesofaconict

particularly across regional boundaries (e.g.,

Aar and Somal i Region as well as

Oromiya)andensureequitable

distribution o resources and inputs and

conduct micro-conict analysis to each

kebele and school situation to understand

the extent to which trauma and conict

need to be addressed.

Dontbuildeducationfacilitiesoncontestedland.

Beverycarefularoundregionalstate

boundaries.

Reducetheriskofconictimpactingon

children and schools.

Forpastoralistcommunitieslivingin

disputed territory, ensure that schools:

- Continue to be mobile and exible.

- Do not ormalize Alternative Basic

Education (ABE) and create permanent

physical structures, but rather upgrade

the school through the provision o

improved school kits that enhances

materials, methodologies, and educational

opportunities instead o structures.

- Assist the community to undertake a risk

mapping exercise in terms o conict

(i.e., are there hotspots that schooling

should avoid such as water points, salt

licks, etc., where conict oten occurs),

coupled with their usual grazing landsand dry and wet season mobility routes.

Where is it appropriate to site a school?

Where is it most sae and yet most

convenient with aci lities or the children

such as water? Where is the school going

to move i an incident occurs? When and

how is it best to relaunch education ater

bloodshed to take into account addressing

and healing trauma?

Foragro-pastoralistcommunitiesinconictwith pastoralists, ensure that schools are

situated as ar rom any potential conict

sites as possible, i.e., at the back o the

settlement.

Commit to long-term change

Adopt a long-term approach and theory o

change aimed at addressing issues that work on

conict through societal change. There is also

a role or education to play as an approach toaddressing state-strengthening through

improving accountability and transparency in



the sector and developing the expectations and

role o community in school governance and

through debates around education and what

constitutes a good education in the region.

This could mean:

Ensuringthatthereisacloserlinkbetween

education and the improvement o

livelihoods and associated skil ls, i.e.,education or lie.

Developingcurriculumcontentthatis

aimed at messages o tolerance and respect

or dierent views and perspectives.

Supportexperientialmethodsoflearning

that consider behavior change models with

respect to conict. This could include the

use o peace clubs in schools, art, and

music, as well as opportunities or cross-

conict stakes in shared l ivelihood

generation.

Identifypossibleopportunitiestopilotthe

use o early childhood education in tackling

tolerance and the ethnic dimension o

conict in the Somali Region.

- Develop a saturation approach to

education that builds a critical mass o

understanding and willingness to change

values and behaviors through components

o non-ormal education and

opportunities o working with women,elders, imams, and other key community

leaders, as well as school children.

- Scale-up the work o Mercy Corps aimed

at those who instigate and are directly

involved in violence.

2. Education to address the impacts o

conict

Education has a key role to play in assistingchildren and adults who have been aected by

violent conict. For example:

Exploretheutilizationofacommunity-

based, psychosocial pedagogy aimed at

healing trauma and countering the

normalization o violence.

Exploretheuseofschoolsassafehavensand

areas o agreed non-violence by al l parties.

Explorewaystocontinuetobuild

intercommunal and interpersonal trust

between conicting groups to encouragemixing and to break down the trends

towards segregation and separation.

3. Future research

Consider constructing an action research

program to be embedded in the Peace and

Development Program (PDP) that explores and

tests the ollowing:

Gatheringandanalyzingtheevidencebase

o the relationship between increased andimproved service delivery and a reduction o

ragility and conict in the Somali Region.

Thedevelopmentanduseofsector-specic

conict-sensitive indicators or the

implementation o primary and ABE schools

and education programs.

Considerationoftheuseofasetofself-

selected (and support around capacity

building and training to achieve the

expected improvements) measurements that

together orm an index around perormance

in the delivery o education at the woreda

level that could be used as the basis or

periodic sel-assessments. This could involve

a number o stakeholders including the

community, students, the School

Management Committee (SMC), and the

government ocials at the local level and the

NGO.

Ananalysisofthelandownershipandland

tenure legislation at ederal and regional statelevels, the available dispute mechanisms,

including both statutory and customary

mechanisms, and the development o a series

o recommendations to improve eciencies

and eectiveness that could be piloted in

dierent locations depending on the

particular circumstances. This piece o work

could include both suggestions to changes in

legislation, policy, and practice that are best

suited to the needs o the dierentstakeholders.

4. Other recommendations

Other suggestions or adapting education

programs to work in a conict environment are

as ollows:

Conict prevention:

Considertheuseofconictpreparedness

plans or those schools that are mostvulnerable to the impact o conict.

Assessthepotentialforconictearly



warning systems to be put in place, ensuring

that schools are an intr insic part o the

system as part o the conict preparedness

plan, possibly involving the SMCs.

Expandtheuseofpublicdiscourse,media,

and public debate to urther develop the

opportunities or good governance to be

modelled within the education sector andestablish norms or other sectors.

Strengthentheopportunitiesforwomento

play a greater role in community aairs and

peaceul coexistence through targeted adult

education and awareness raising, ensuring

there is support or it rom the men.

Pilotanearlychildhoodeducationthat

includes emphasis on ethnic tolerance and

shared histories.

Conict mitigation and management:

BuildandextendontheworkthatSavethe

Children US has pioneered with Pastoralist

Concern Association Ethiopia in Filtu and

Dollo Ado regarding use o mapping o

transhumant routes or the placing o ABEs,

conict hotspots such as water points, as

well as consideration o traditional natural

resource management systems that could

play a role in a broader conict management

system around use o natural resources suchas grazing areas.

Workwithjournalistsandmediaonhowto

report on conict issues, e.g., draw on

examples rom Kenya ollowing the last

round o electoral and ethnic violence.

Lookatincorporatingagreementsforpeace

zones around shared resources into

discussions and negotiations between

pastoralists and between pastoralists and

agro-pastoralist conicts.



1.1 Introduction

This analysis aims to raise understanding o the

specifc types and causes o conict in the Somali

Region o Ethiopia and, in particular, in the

areas where the BRIDGES project is currently

operating, Adher and Shinile Zones. The

analysis aims to identiy and dierentiate

between the conicts that are active or latent in

these areas to consider how the project might try

to address them, and any specifc education

programming options that could be implemented

that wil l assist in the promotion o peace and

state-building in the Somali Region. The

analysis seeks to consider similarities and

dierence between the two areas as well asexplore the regional and international dynamics

that inuence the conict dynamics that are to

be ound in them.

Recommendations are based on a number o

assumptions:

Thatpeace-buildingisacceptedbyall

stakeholders including government, as a

legitimate activity o NGOs when working

in conjunction with the appropriateauthorities.

Thatstakeholdersdowantpeaceandthat,as

reported by the majority o stakeholders,

education is part o the long-term solution to

conict in the region.1

Akeyassumptionisthatthereisspacefor

NGOs to operate and implement the

suggestions that are outlined below.

The success o Mercy Corps in working with a

range o stakeholders and specifcally alongside

the government o Ethiopia suggests that it is

possible to undertake work o this nature

provided that there is strong trust and

relationships with the key stakeholders. Increased

political space, acilitated by the ederal

government and supported by donors, would

increase the ecacy o interventions. It is also

important to note that, like the majority o

writing on the topic o conict, it is recognized

implicitly that conict can be both positive andnegative and when managed can contribute to

positive progress. Al l conict is not bad, but in

this report we are talking about violentconict as

destructive and to be avoided and prevented.

1.2 The BRIDGES project

Piloting the Delivery o Quality Education

Services in the Developing Regional States o

Ethiopia, also known as Building Relationships

through Innovative Delivery o Growing

Education Services (BRIDGES) is being

implemented in the Somali Region o Ethiopia.

It is a twelve-month project unded by the UK

Department or International Development

(DFID). The project is being implemented in

nine woredas in fve zones. The purpose o the

project is to strengthen the capability andcommitment o state and nonstate actors in

Somali Region to promote peace, security, and

development through the delivery o quality

education or all children contributing to

Education or All (EFA) and the Millennium

Development Goals (MDG) goals. Specifc

objectives include:

1. To improve access to, and the quality and

relevance o, primary education, especially

or pastoral peoples, in selected conict-aected areas o Somali Region.

2. Develop and test strategies or state and

non-state actors to work in partnership to

promote peace-building and state-building

in Somali Region through the provision o

improved education services.

3. To strengthen Somali government capacity

to plan, monitor, fnance, and develop

pedagogic materia ls that promote peace and

relevant primary education services.

4. To learn lessons or the delivery o primary

education services and other basic services

in Somali Region which deliver improved

services and contribute to peace-building.

5. To investigate proposals to accelerate

development o education services proposed

under the Ministry o Federal Aairs

Special Support Programme in the Four

Developing Regions.

The one-year time rame o the BRIDGESproject is a very short period o time to be

considering the application and impact rom

1. THE TASK



these types o issues and the possibility o being

able to draw frm conclusions. The practical

pressures acing start-up, and the very real

diculties o getting a good run-up and some

momentum to the project, mean that emphasis is

oten placed on achieving ambitious progress

targets and short-term perspectives rather than

investing in the long term. A mid-term reviewhad also been undertaken during the period o

this consultancy and will be a useul companion

document or this analysis (Napier and Bekele,

2010). Lessons learned and discussion o issues

encountered rom the pilot is expected to be

utilized to inorm the design o larger

interventions that are in the pipeline, such as the

upcoming multidonor-supported Peace and

Development Programme (PDP).



A team rom Tuts University consisting o an

international team leader with a national expert

undertook the analysis, with logistical support

and technical input rom the consortium

partners. It is important to note that not all

conicts encountered were explored in depth, as

there are many minor conicts that were either

not signifcant, or were historical and had not

resuraced or more than ten years or so.

2.1 Locations visited

Two feld trips were undertaken to Southern

Ethiopia to zones where the BRIDGES project is

being implemented. The frst trip, hosted by

SCUK, ocused on understanding the dynamicsin Shinile Zone and the second, hosted by Mercy

Corps and Islamic Relie, in Adher Zone. The

team was also able to visit Babile and Kebre Baye

and it was hoped that access to Fiq might be a

possibility in the second phase, but unortunately

this was not the case. Sites were selected on the

basis o the ollowing criteria: project

implementation areas; accessibility; and relevance

and proximity to conict issues.

2.2 Stakeholders consulted

Given the sensitive context in Ethiopia

surrounding exploration o issues having a

bearing on conict, the ocus in terms o the

discussions with stakeholders centered natural ly

on the education aspect.

Meetings were held as a matter o courtesy,

protocol, and in order to obtain their

perspective, with government oces at all levelswherever we visited. At each site representatives

o various stakeholder and interest groups were

interviewed and, wherever possible, a range o

actors were consulted (Table 2).

2. METHODOLOGY

Table 1: Locations visited

Shinile Zone Ader Zone Jijiga Zone Other

Adem Woreda Hargel le Woreda Kebre Baya Woreda Gode Town(Oct. 2010) (Feb. 2011) (Feb. 2011) (Feb. 2011)

Mieso Woreda Cherete Woreda Babile Woreda Dire Dawa

(Oct. 2010, Feb. 2011) (Feb. 2011) (Feb. 2011) (Feb. 2011)

Erer Woreda El Kare Woreda Gursum Woreda

(Oct. 2010) (Feb. 2011) (Feb. 2011)

Dembal Woreda Jijiga Town

(Feb. 2011) (Oct. 2010, Feb. 2011)

Table 2: Stakeholders consulted

Government Institutions and Organizations Community Stakeholders

SomaliRegiongovernmentocialsincluding Communityleaders

thefollowingBureausandDepartments: Clanelders

-Education Keyinformants

-BureauofLivestockCropandRural Teachers

Development SchoolManagementCommittees/- Sports and Youth Parent Teachers Associations

(continued on the next page)



The primary methodologies employed

throughout the feld work were:

Open-endedsemi-structuredquestioning

within ocus peer-group discussions (e.g.,

elders, youth, women, etc.). Keyinformantinterviewswiththose

identifed as having a deep knowledge o the

issues and history o the situation, to deepen

understanding and triangulate inormation.

Meetings and discussions were also held with

project sta rom SCUK, Mercy Corps, and

Islamic Relie. Balance in opinion was sought by

consulting with people on both sides o the

conicts, as well as those with more independent

views and not directly involved in the conicts

as a stakeholder.

2.3 Literature review

The ormal published literature was reviewed,

including academic studies covering natural

resource management, conict andgovernance, and socioeconomic issues. The

grey literature on Somali Region was also

reviewed, covering development and

humanitarian reports, baseline assessments,

and project reports produced by Mercy Corps

and SCUK. Additional documents included

government statistics, policy and legal

documents, including regional state

development policies related to pastoralist

areas, and poverty reduction strategy papers.

Government Institutions and Organizations Community Stakeholders

-BorderAairs Opinionleaders

-ProgrammeCoordinationUnit Youth

EthiopianWildlifeConservationAuthority Women

atBabileElephantSanctuary Cattleherder

Woredagovernmentocials,including Traders

-HeadsofAdministration Farmers

-Education Academics

- Security

Ethiopiancommunity-basedorganizations

UNagenciesincluding:

- UNDP

- FAO- UN Department o Saety and Security

- UNICEF

Donors:

- DFID

- USAID

- Danida

- BRIDGES Consortium members:

- SCUK

- Mercy Corps

- Islamic Relie

Table 2: Stakeholders consulted(continued)



2.4 The challenges o research and analysis

A number o chal lenges were encountered

during the analyses that are worth noting, aside

rom the inherent diculties o consulting

dierent interest groups with dierent outlooks

operating within the broader political context.

This context includes the recent introduction othe new CSO legislation that strikes a positive

note by ormally acknowledging the potential

contributions o NGOs to peace-building.

However, the extent to which this recognition is

mirrored by local government ocials aects the

boundaries o NGO activities on the ground.

Challenges have included the ollowing:

Thetimingofthersttripcoincidedwith

the appointment o new government at the

regional and woreda levels. This meant that a

number o key stakeholders were involved in

other activities and consultations, either in

Addis Ababa or in their constituencies, and

so were not available or meetings. In

addition, the level o political activity in the

areas visited on both visits meant that the

visibility and profle o the team was

unortunately enhanced. This may have

aected the degree o candidness and

comort levels o some interviewees. Intwolocations,theleveloftension

between protagonists had very recently

erupted into violence, which meant that

levels o suspicion, ear, and anxiety were

high. Thereore, communities and ocials

did not eel able to discuss issues openly

while ocial investigations were underway

(Aar and Oromiya). Fortunately, the team

was able to address this constraint in the

second phase. Accesstosomestakeholdersandcertain

geographic areas aected by conict were

also dicult and limited, as they were

outside the project areas. The key point here

is that the fndings o the analysis cannot be

extrapolated beyond the areas visited during

the feld work.



3.1 Key trends in Somali Region

As BRIDGES is a pilot project, the consortium

and donors have been interested in better

understanding how the context is changing in

Somali Region, the nature o the main trends

that impact on or reect changes in peoples way

o lie, and how conict dynamics are positioned

within these changes. The trends described

below were identifed by stakeholders during

discussions, and to some extent, this inormation

is supported by the literature. Many o these

trends are inter-related and reinorce each other

as dr ivers or consequences o other changes.

3.1.1 Demographics

Population growth was noted as a major actor

impacting on al l aspects o lie, but perhaps its

most signifcant aspect is the increasing

concentration and rapid rural-to-urban

population shit taking place. The main reasons

or this movement appear to be improving

transport, communication, electricity, and other

inrastructure, as well as the wish to go to

school, access services, or search or employmentopportunities. People elected as kebele, woreda,

and regional representatives also move their

amilies to town, and there were pastoral

drop-outs and bored youths who also move

looking or a dierent way o lie. This trend was

also putting pressure on social support

mechanisms within the kinship and clan system.

At the personal level, this impacted tremendously

on amilies in town, with demands or assistance

rom rural relatives to look ater children

wishing to continue their schooling.

3.1.2 Livelihoods

Pastoralists noted declining access to rangelands

and increasing arming and land enclosure.

Interestingly, both agro-pastoralists and those

relying only on agriculture previously were

diversiying and had an increasing number o

animals to look ater. This placed increased

pressure on the grazing areas surrounding, orclose to, land being used or agriculture.

Restrictions on mobility were aecting

3. THE CONTEXT

pastoralists as changes in land use, or in some

cases in security, were impacting on seasonal

access to water and pasture. More extreme

climatic variations were consistently reported,

and attributed to climate change, aecting

agriculture and quality o grazing. This is a

complex subject and hard data that documents

changes and impact o alterations in weather

patterns at the micro-level is not available.

Changes in livestock ownership patterns,

commercialization, and composition are also

aecting mobility and which types o grazing are

accessed (Aklilu and Catley, 2010). A good

example o this encountered in the feld was the

increased number o trade camels moving to

Babile market, which has increased the use oBabile Elephant Sanctuary or pasture.

3.1.3 Changes in the governance environment

There were contradictory changes reported

concerning the governance environment and the

generalizations outlined here are not necessarily

reectiveofthesituationinallplaceslocal

situations varied depending on the personnel

involved. On the positive side, there wasincreasing decentralization o government unds

down to the woreda level, which allowed or the

possibility o ar greater accountability and

transparency in the utilization o unds and other

resources. Coupled with this trend was the

increasing capacity o government at lower levels

as sta became better qualifed and were drawn

rom a younger generation with dierent

aspirations, expectations o the world, and

understandings o their jobs. Technical sta were

said to be increasingly recruited on the basis o

their knowledge and qualifcations. Government

sta also noted that there had been a recent trend

o increasing party discipline, leading to

increased government eectiveness. Some

inormants described this trend in relation to

spaces or alternative views and pluralism within

government.

Possibly as a consequence o the ethnic ederal

system, the clan-based approach or apportioningrepresentation and political power was said to be

reinorcing an increasingly politicized ethnicity.



Some inormants argued that this was currently

the only realistic method to ensure political

power-sharing during the transition to a more

democratic political system, providing checks

and balances through this social association.

Other inormants argued that because clans are a

social system o organization, distinctions

between majority and minority viewpoints

become expressed through geographical

coverage, strength, and wealth (also see

Bradbury, 2009).

While ormal government was becoming

stronger in these historically peripheral areas,

there was also a simultaneous, declining

inuence o traditional customary institutions insome clans, which had implications or the

capacity o communities to manage conicts as

well as the cohesion o the community. The

importance o the traditional institutions varied,

being less inuential in the urban areas and more

inuential in the rural environment. This is

expected given the need or social insurance in

areas where the state is less strong and capable o

providing services. Similarly, clan cohesion in

urban centers was reducing at a aster rate in themelting pot o multiclan populations, and as

individual agendas and the inuence o

competition or political power aected internal

clan dynamics. This was reected in the

increasing lack o clarity around who was

authorized to represent a clans perspectives as a

spokesperson and the variety o messages that

were expressed as ormal positions.

3.1.4 Changes in other social dynamics

Discussion o religious trends was also a sensitive

issue given the regional inuence emanating

rom the situation in Somalia, the Yemen, and

the Middle East. Concerns regarding possible

linkages between Islam and instability and

insurgency in Somali Region, coupled with the

past presence o groups such asAl Itihadwith

their religious motivations, increased sensitivity.

This despite the changes that have taken place in

the region, such as: the changed relationshipbetweenAl Itihadand the Ogaden National

Liberation Front (ONLF), with the latter

distancing themselves rom Islamic agendas; as

well as changes in the name, orm, and way that

Al Itihadconducts itsel, including its relationship

with the government o Ethiopia. As a result,

opinions and perceptions were guarded in

discussions and provided mixed messages. Most

people were o the opinion that the avor o

Islam was changing and moving away rom the

Sunni schools o Islam (in particular, the Sharaf

School) mixed with traditional belies, towards

the more conservative Middle Eastern Salaf or

Wahabi interpretations.2 They were also o the

opinion that the social environment was

becoming increasingly religious, with people

becoming more devout and the actual practice o

Islam increasing (e.g., more people prayingregularly together at the work place). Small

indicators such as the more common use o an

Islamic rame o reerence and Islamic terms

within peoples speech were also reported.

An interesting debate was also the use and

inuence okhatacross the region. It appears as

though its use is declining in urban

environments (also see CHF International, 2006)

but possibly increasing in rural areas. The urbandeclineifitisindeedhappeningwas

associated with increasing religious practices in

young educated people, as some considered use

okhatto be un-Islamic. In rural areas,

inuencing actors may be increasing transport

services expanding to more remote villages.

3.2 Forces shaping the history o conict in

the Somali Region

The Somali Region has been beset by

competition and conict between dierent

groups since time immemorial. Contributing

actors that have inuenced the history o

conict in the region include the legacies o

European colonialism and the geo-politics o the

Cold War, as they were expressed in Arica. The

Somali areas o the Horn o Arica have always

been o strategic importance to the countries o

the region, and the ormation o colonial

boundaries ensured that Ethiopia, Kenya, andDjibouti all had substantial Somali populations

living outside o Somalia itsel (including



Somaliland, Puntland, and southern Somalia).

Thereore, the countries have been inextricably

linked, and this is especially true o the

relationship between Ethiopia and Somalia.

During the period o Imperial rule in Ethiopia,

at least two specifc events shaped the current

conict dynamics in Somali Region. In 1935,Italy attacked Ethiopia rom Eritrea, and, partly

in response, members o the Somali Issa clan

were recruited and armed in Somaliland.

However, the Issa then attacked the Aar on the

Allegedhi plain, to gain access to the Awash

River or their livestock. This area is still under

contention now. The other event occurred

during the 1970s and was, reportedly, the

deliberate poisoning o Issa wells by the

Ethiopian army resulting in l ivestock and human

deaths and the Issa and Oromo becoming

enemies (Catley and Iyasu, 2010). These events

reect the deep historical roots o inter-tribal

conicts and clan dynamics, which, over time,

were exacerbated by trends such as landenclosure, commercial use o land, and the

changing political environment. Conict has

continued to the present day with sporadic but

explosive violence as well as smaller dr ip3

deaths and incidents such as livestock raiding.

Some o these incidents have a distinctive pattern

and are relatively predictable.

Table 3: Timeline o conict-related events in and around Shinile Zone

(Source: Catley and Iyasu, 2010)

Time period Events

Early 1900s Migration o Oromo Ittu into Mieso rom western Hararghe highlands, to access

grasslands or livestock production. Ittu were mainly pastoralists at this time.

Construction o the Djibouti-Addis Ababa railway, with Issa rom Djibouti

employed as workers and guards who later occupied areas around the railway in

what is now Shinile Zone.

Imperial Government allocates around 500 ha o land in Mieso to two private investors orEarly 1930s cultivation and livestock production; large pasture lands are enced. Although

armed guards used to protect the area, Ittu and Issa collaborated to destroy the

arms and raided the animals.

October 1935, Italy attacked Ethiopia rom Eritrea and Italian Somaliland. The

Issa were recruited by the Italians and received modern arms and training, which

theyusedagainsttheAfartocontrolpartsoftheAllighediplainakeygrazing

resource or livestock and with access to the Awash River.

Imperial Government gives concessions to oreign and domestic investors along the Awash

1960s River or commercial irrigation, mainly cotton, without consultation orcompensation to the Aar. Some Aar leaders also appropriate land or irrigation.

Pastoralists lose access to large stretches o the river and dry season pastures, with

impacts on livestock.

Imperial Commander o armed orces in eastern Ethiopia encourages Oromo and Aar to

1970-74 attack the Issa; gains rom livestock raids distributed to raiders.

Some Issa youth let the country. Both Issa and Aar very badly aected by drought

and amine, without much assistance rom government. Inant mortal ity o

615/1000 recorded among Issa during the 1974 amine (Seaman et al., 1978). Issa

wells were reported to be deliberately poisoned by army, with livestock and human

deaths; led to Issa and Oromo becoming enemies.




Time period Events

Socialist 1974 land reorm with all land under state ownership. Landlords were dispossessed

Mengistu and land instead allocated to Ittu, leading to a growing trend or private enclosure

1974-1991 o land, i.e., the Ittu became more agropastoral. The Issa resisted the expansion o

cultivation, e.g., organized attacks during the planting and harvesting seasons totry to secure extensive communal grazing land.

Siad Barre regime in Somalia trains the Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF)

in preparation or invasion o Ethiopia. Issa who had previously ed Ethiopia were

organized by Hamud Farah. In 1977 they cooperated with Siad Barre in the war

launched against Ethiopia and rejoined clan members in Ethiopia to fght against

the Oromo and Aar, pushing deeper into Aar areas. Although Ethiopia repels the

invasion in 1978, with Aar support, the Issa occupy settlements along the main

Djibouti road, Gadamaitu and Adaitu. As well as trade and contraband, the Issa use

the settlements as entry points or livestock movements urther north into Aar.

The period is characterized by supply o automatic weapons. The Oromo Ittu were

supplied by the Ethiopian government; Somalia and Djibouti supply the Issa.

In 1984 the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) is established, with leaders

drawn rom the WSLF.

EPRDF and Formation o the Somali Regional State, bordered by Oromiya and Aar Regions,

Regional but with borders in key areas let undefned, e.g., the western edge o Shinile Zone

Autonomy and Aar Region.

From 1991

to 2000 Somali-Oromiya issuesOromiyaandSomaliregionstojointlyadministerMieso woreda, but a dispute emerges over control o Bordede, a customs and tax

collection point connecting the eastern region to the center o the country.

Although an administrative dispute between regions, there was continued violence

between the Issa and Ittu. Somali Region later claims that 21 kebeles, including

Bordede, should al l within its borders. These events led to a reerendum in

November 2004, which allocated 20/21 o the contested kebeles to Oromiya. As a

result the Issa undertook indiscriminate retaliatory attacks on non-Somalis, to

punish the ethnic groups that avoured Mieso administration under Oromiya.

Many people were displaced or lost assets (Ahmed Shide, 2005). Up to 2005,

conict intensifed, with requent incidents o indiscriminate kil lings when ederal

army not present in the area.

Increasing Issa attacks to prevent Ittu use o grazing areas. Ittu expansion o

cultivated land supported by land tenure policy which avored private use o land

or cultivation; urther supported by agricultural development policies c.

supportive property rights or communal grazing land.

Ittu increasingly disarmed, e.g., due to government concerns about their support

to the Oromo Liberation Front. Issa more dicult to disarm due to their mobility

and cross-border access, and within a context o weak control o frearms

prolieration in the wider region. This led to imbalance in terms o physical power,

and made the Ittu more at risk o large-scale or commercial raiding. Issa able to


Table 3: Timeline o conict-related events in and around Shinile Zone(continued)



Time period Events

sell raided stock at local markets or move them across border to Djibouti to avoid

repossession. Income rom sales partly invested in better weapons.

As conict reaches the level o territorial expansion by government entities (the

regions) and dispute between regions or resources, customary institutions less ableto overcome conict.

Aar-Somali regioncontinuedconictsbetweentheAfarandIssa,essentially

resourced-based and around control o grazing resources and access to the Awash

River. The Aar-Shinile Zone border remains unclear and Issa acquire a third

settlement, Undoo, along the Djibouti main road. The occupation o the three

settlements becomes a specifc and intractable point o dispute between the two

regional governments.

1988-1991Somalia civil war and overthrow o Siad Barre. The sel-declared

independent Republic o Somaliland is established in the northwest; the onset oprotracted political instability and humanitarian crises in the south.

1991-1992civil war in Djibouti linked to the representation o the Aar in the

Issa-dominated Djibouti government.

1998-2000Ethiopia-Eritrea war over disputed border, ollowed by long-

running tensions to present day and proxy support rom Eritrea to insurgency

groups in Ethiopia.

2001-2005 The 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US in 2001 lead to shits in the oreign anddevelopment assistance policies o major aid donors, towards aid or security.

Somalia increasingly perceived as harboring Islamic undamentalists.

The US establishes the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) in Djibouti in early

2003 as part o counterterrorism measures; in Ethiopia, activities are conducted

around Dire Dawa (adjacent to Shinile Zone), Gode, and other areas.

Somaliland holds multi-party elections in December 2002 ollowed by presidential

elections in April 2003. A stable system o government continues to evolve which

uses traditional orms o social and political organization with Western-style

institutions o government (Bradbury et al., 2003). Somaliland is not recognized

internationally.

2006-2010 The Transitional Federal Government in Somalia increasingly under pressure rom

the militar ized Islamic Court Union. Ethiopia views the rise o Islamic groups as a

threat to national sovereignty and Ethiopian army moves into Somalia in 2006 to

support the TFG.

In April 2007 the ONLF attacks a Chinese-run oil feld in Abole, Somali Region,

kil ling approximately 65 Ethiopians and nine Chinese nationals. A large-scale

counterinsurgency operation is launched by the Ethiopia, with military operationsocusing in Fik, Deghabur, Warder, Korahe, and Gode Zones, and related

restrictions on humanitarian agencies.



EPRDF and

Regional

Autonomy

From 1991

to 2000(continued)



Time period Events

In June 2008, military clash between Eritrea and Djibouti; French Foreign Legion

and CJTF stil l present in Djibouti.

Ethiopian army ocially starts to withdraw rom Somalia in January 2009.

Shinile ZonenewconictbetweenIssaandagropastoralHawiyain2009overinformal

designation o Mulu town as the administrative center o Mieso-Mulu woreda (Mercy

Corps, 2009b). Mulu is located in the Hawiya area. Access o Issa to Mieso livestock market

curtailed and was still restricted in March 2010 (also see section b. below).

Negotiations continue between Aar and Somali regional governments over the

border demarcation; Aar rejects proposal or the Issa-occupied settlements along

the Djibouti road to be designated a special woreda under Aar Region.

Plans announced to improve the road rom Djibouti via Dewale, through ShinileZone. This would create a main highway or Djibouti-Ethiopia trac through

ocial Issa areas.

In recent times, since 1992, Ethiopia has

intervened in Somalia to greater or lesser extents

trying to inuence power dynamics and, at times,

ensure that Islamists or those with aspirations to

control the Ogaden are weakened. Most recently

the Ethiopian army entered Somalia and had a

presence in Mogadishu or approximately twoyears (2007-2009), supporting the Transitional

Federal Government (TFG). During the late

1970s and early 1980s, the Somali Salvation

Democratic Front (SSDF) and the Somali

National Movement (SNM) used Ethiopia as a

base or insurgencies into Somalia, ollowing

repression ater the Ogaden war. In turn, Somalia

has at times made territorial claims on the Ogaden

region o Ethiopia as well as the Somali-occupied

Northeastern Province o Kenya, with the aim oorming a Greater Somalia. Somalias claims to

the Ogaden led to the Ogaden war o 1977-78,

the legacy o which is stil l very much evident and

inuences clan dynamics to this day in the Somali

Region. For example, the Aar complain that

some o the roots o the current troubles between

them and the Issa are a direct consequence o

movements o people at the end o the Ogaden

war. According to the Aar, the Issa who had

entered traditional Aar lands during the war

ailed to return to their own areas, thereby

creating the disputes over control o land up to the

Awash River.

The Somalis in the region are predominantly

pastoralists, and many observers have noted that

over the past hundred years or so, pastoralists

needs have not been reected or well represented

in national policy, or protected in legislation. In

the Somali context, there are many

contradictions between a centralized, or even areasonably decentralized state, and a pastoral

culture that create the conditions or conict

(Bradbury, 2009). Regional international

relations also play a role in shaping orces on the

ground. At the higher level, Egypt and its Arab

all ies have seen Somalia as a counterweight to

Ethiopian regional control and its power over the

waters o the Nile. The long-running and bitter

conict between Eritrea and Ethiopia has also

inuenced dynamics in the peripheral areas oEthiopia, particular in Gambella, Somali

Region, and the southern areas where the

Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) were active, with

Eritrea prosecuting its war through proxies.

3.3 Current patterns and cultures o

governance that impact on the conict

dynamics

The ethnical ly-based ederal system o

government in Ethiopia has been a unique

approach and bold endeavor in Arica,

attempting to address the ethnic diversity o a


2006-2010(continued)



large population within a state constitution and

ramework. Interpretations around its intent are

varied and depend on perspectives. This

governance system and the way that it operates

in practice has, like all systems, its pros and cons.

On the one hand, it allows or the expression o

cultures and reects cultural norms and diering

ways o doing business across the country, to beincorporated under a national umbrella. At its

best it can be seen as a system that enables the

large and diverse ethnic groups, encompassed

within the country o Ethiopia, the optimum

opportunity to determine directions and govern

themselves at the regional level, within a broader

system.

In Somali Region, the overriding cultural

imperative that imposes itsel on society and

dominates power relationships at the regional

level is the clan structure. In order to ensure that

marginalization and the creation o a disgruntled

section o society are limited, ormal systems o

political representation could enable, directly or

indirectly, a system o clan-based proportional

representation. Should such a system evolve, it

would strengthen the clan hand and encourage

a culture whereby clans believe that they have

entitlements and rights to resources and

opportunities based purely on their clanmembership. Such a system would undermine a

culture o meritocracy, whereby, or example,

the best person or a job is appointed and would

undertake that appointment or the broader good

o all, no matter what their clan. This system,

should it exist, may also risk the al location o

senior government jobs and ministr ies becoming

a continuous juggling act, aimed at ensuring that

the balance o power between the clans is

roughly maintained and no one eels excluded. Itwould require attention to two urther variables,

the numbers o appointments rom the clans and

the careul distribution o the dierent ministries

given their relative importance, budgets, and

relationships with ederal government.

Thus in certain situations, state-building and the

interests o the state and peace-building at local

levels could be contradictory processes that

operate against each other. Although the state

may provide security and law enorcement,within the context o regional power relations it

may also try to maintain certain ethnic groups

(within the state) at a disadvantage or o

balance. These groups may be regarded as a

threat to central control, based on perceived or

actual involvement in resistance to the state, and

because they may also have experienced the state

as an instrument o oppression.

Similarly and linked to the above point, in theevent o direct or indirect support to clan-based

representation, it might not be in the states

interest to allow individuals to build up a strong

power base. In turn, this would lead to instability

because o a high turnover o senior government

ocials and the short-term perspectives o these

ocials. These arrangements would hinder the

development o long-term institutional memory,

and provide incentives or individuals to

maximize personal and clan benefts as rapidly as

possible. There have been approximately twelve

Regional Presidents appointed in the Somali

Region since the overthrow o the Derg,

compared to the three or our Presidents

appointed in each o the other regions over the

same time period.

At the woreda level in Somali Region, a system

o proportional representation would create a

situation in which the largest majority clan

within a woreda would obtain most o the keypositions available. This in turn would encourage

clans to claim ownership o lands and, where

possible, ensure dominance in terms o physical

numbers and so urther increase their political

power and access to resources. This situation

would become particularly apparent when

administrative boundaries were disputed

between regions due to the mixed ethnicity o

the population. For example, i an area was

populated by approximately 50% Oromos and50% Somalis, then both regional governments

could claim the right to administer the area. One

way to address these claims would be via a local

reerendum, organized by a ederal body, and

ensuring that voting was ree and air. The

oversight o such a process would also need to

monitor unusual inuxes o people into one area,

which would potentially increase the number o

voters on that side. Any actual or perceived

unairness in the voting arrangements could have

long-term implications or peace anddevelopment, with people opting not to live in

areas governed by an administration that was



perceived to hold power ollowing an unair

process. There might also be knock-on eects in

other areas, with people becoming reluctant to

engage in new reerendums.

Under ethnic ederalism, and perhaps many

other systems o ormal governance, the overlay

o administrative boundaries onto a clan/tribalstructure within a broadly pastoralist region can

work against traditional systems o tolerance and

mutual sharing o resources. This is because

control o the land and its resources, and a

strong physical presence, ensures political

representation and power which in turn, allows

or the power over resource allocation. The

ability to resolve boundary disputes is also

constitutionally hampered as, although the

original creation o regional state borders was a

ederal decision, reshaping o the borders

depends on agreement between regions and such

agreement can be dicult to reach (Vaughan and

Tronvoll, 2003).

Figure 1. Somali Region o Ethiopia

A urther element o the clan dynamics in Somali

Region is the huge importance o the Ogadeni clan

and how they are governed. The Ogadeni clan is

the largest in the region and has elements that

support the ONLF, with their respective woredas

being the arena where the insurgency is being

played out. The ederal government has taken great

care to ensure that important posts at the regionallevel, and increasingly at the ederal level, are

occupied by Ogadeni people to demonstrate that

the clan is able to participate ully in the national

governance structure. This undermines any

positions that the ONLF may take regarding the

extent o their political marginalization and also

allows the government to reach out more positively

to the diaspora who may be supporting the ONLF,

be it fnancially or morally. Given the size and

isolated nature o Ogadeni areas, plus the strict

access control by the Ethiopian government, it is

dicult to gauge the extent to which government

appointees o Ogadeni origin are able to represent

the needs o their constituents.

(Source: UNOCHA)



4.1 Assessment fndings and broad conict

trends

This analysis can be considered as a snapshot o the

conict situation in specifc areas o Somali Region

over the past ew months. Undoubtedly there are

dynamics pertinent to each conict that require

more time (and trust rom inormants) to uncover.

Based on both the October 2010 and February

2011 consultations, the overall situation in Shinile

Zone in early 2011 was quite tense. Many people

were weary rom the hostilities o the past ew

years, and despite relatively low but persistent levels

o violence, they were somewhat relieved by the

uncertain reduction in open conict. Morepositively there appears to be progress with the

peace process between the Hawiye and Issa in the

Zone, with an agreement reportedly being signed

between the Ugas (traditional leaders) o the two

clans and the content o the agreement starting to

be disseminated at the community level. However,

in all places visited in the Shinile Zone, an

underlying nervousness about the uture was

evident, and the risk o urther conict seemed to

be high. It is worth noting, however, that the tragicand relatively large-scale battles are easily recalled,

whereas the persistent drip o killings (one or two

people at a time), sadly, seems to be an almost

accepted condition, except at the local level,4 and

does not attract the same kind o attention. For this

reason, it was dicult to ascertain whether the

situation was actually getting better or worse. In

contrast, the situation in Adher Zone was more

stable and, in general, people were not so

concerned about the possibility o conict, except

in the area o Shakiso where a latent border conict

exists.

During the analysis we classifed the range o

conicts based on their underlying causes (type,

structural, and proximate causes) to identiy patterns

o conict and any linkages between them and their

relationship with education. A number o striking

observations were deduced, as detailed below.

The undamental drivers o conict are changing:Conicts arise rom a number o contributing

actors, oten operating simultaneously. While

many o the actors in the Somali Region have

remained constant over time, there have been

signifcant changes in the way that they are

perceived, and in their relative importance.

Stakeholders reported that the primary cause o

conicts has changed. In the past, protagonists

explained conict by reerence to the need to access

resources such as grazing and water. While resource

access issues are still important proximate actors

and triggers, an underlying cause o conict has

now become the ownership o these resources, rather

than simply their use and access to them. In turn,

ownership is partly determined by ormal

institutional arrangements, e.g., government

policies and legislation. In the most serious recent

conicts in the areas visited, the drivers o conictwere land ownership and related governance issues.

Impact on education: The number o schools

consistently and directly aected by conict in the

project areas appeared to be low. This was

unexpected given the overall level o violence that

was evident in Shinile, and to a lesser extent, in

Adher. It appeared that conict was not one o the

defning actors that inuenced accessibility, levels

o enrolment, or retention o students, as explainedurther below. However, one important caveat is

the situation in the areas that are subject to the

ONLF insurgency movement that were not visited.

Long-term approach: Within the context o the

education sector and its ability to transorm

conict, a long-term approach is required in the

Somali Region that aims at shaping the broader

social environment positively, given that specifc

causes o the conicts observed are not within the

direct realm o education. To this end and in order

to eect change as rapidly as possible, education

programs should adopt a saturation approach to

those aected by conict and address the needs o

youth, women, and elders, as well as government

institutions, in peace education.

The legacy o the Ogaden war: The analysis revealed

how the Ogaden war caused a prolieration o arms

and the disruption o lives and the displacement o

people into new areas outside o their previoustraditional range. This continues to cause tensions

and violence in some parts o the region.

4. THE CONFLICTS OF SOMALI REGION



Politicization o ethnicity: The majority o recent

serious conicts have a strong ethnic dimension

due to the politics o ethnicity. Governance

systems, and especially the issue o regional state

boundaries, suraced as a dominant theme when

considering conict causality and potential

solutions.

Conict conduction: The resolution or temporary

abeyance o hostilities between two antagonists can

provide an opportunity or one or both to

concentrate their attentions on a third party or

other conict instead.5 In Somali Region, the

picture and data are not comprehensive or accurate

enough to consider whether this conict

conduction is an issue. However, it was noted bysome inormants that pressures on one clan

boundary were impacting on relationships, land

ownership, and resource access at the interace with

a dierent clan. For example, the pressure rom the

Issa moving north and creating tensions along the

Aar border then spills over, and the Aar at times

then press on the Oromos (Kariyu tribe) as an

involuntary coping mechanism to access grazing

(Catley and Iyasu, 2010). When some conicts are

very active, this can also have the opposite eect oreducing the intensity o another conict. For

instance, it was noted that the AarOromo

conict reduced in intensity as the IssaHawiye

conict, coupled with its relationship to the

Oromos, had increased in intensity.

The urbanrural relationship: An interesting

alternative orm o conict conduction is the

interaction between clans and its expression in rural

and urban environments. One inormant in Jijiga

called this experience reerred pain and others

agreed with the general eect when describing

conict. They observed that tensions between clans

might be expressed as, a cold war taking place in the

towns and cities while a hot war takes place outside o the

towns. They also noted that violence in rural areas

was aected, and sometimes instigated (although

specifc examples were not given), by leaders and

the political dynamics in the urban environment.

The converse inuence rom rural areas to the

urban environment was not an issue. This is mostlikely because tolerance and the ability o two

competing clans to live alongside each other within

a town, without tensions being expressed violently,

is inuenced by dynamics such as the presence o

security orces, a dilution eect o the issue with

other clans, and people all around to soten and

buer the interace between antagonistic clans.

There is also the common interest in ensuring

continued access to the resources that a amily

needs, such as health, education, etc. This dynamic

deserves more attention and observation to

understand what is occurring and how

programming in either the towns or outside o

them can then inuence the conict dynamics and

prevent the expression o conict through violence.

Bufer zones: Another notable eature o Shinile

Zone was that conicting communities outside othe urban environment were hardly interacting at

all. Instead there were buer zones created, and

these were either imposed by the ederal military

along the AarSomali Region borders, or

alternatively, sel-imposed. These buer zones were

coping mechanisms, introduced as conict

reduction methods to prevent violence where

conicts are too hot and the environment

consequentially not secure. As short-term

temporary methods they are important, but need tobe reviewed within the context o longer-term

solutions and reconciliation eorts. Buer zones

positively reduce violence and interactions between

conicting parties. However, they may also reduce

opportunities or peace-building eorts and the

potential positive inuence o education programs,

by reinorcing segregation and distance and

inhibiting communication between the conicting

parties. This means that suspicion and ill-inormed

attitudes about the other side are dicult to

break down, and the possibility o building a new

trust and relationship based on experience in school

(or instance,) impossible. Attitudes will be

inormed by societal inuences rom outside

school, with no alternatives presented through the

school place.

4.2 A typology o current conicts

There are various ways to classiy conicts in the

Somali Region. Some academics and practitionersclassiy conict by way o lie types, e.g., herder-

herder, agro-herder, etc. (Hagmann, 2003). An



alternative approach considers the dierent root

causes o conicts. However, this option can be

problematic because most conicts have multiple

causes, and these usually have a constantly

changing emphasis and relevance to the conict.

The way o lie approach (as with most models)

has the drawback that it can oversimpliy the issues

at stake.

For these reasons, our analysis used a broad

approach to classiy conict that also indicates the

likely (or potential) scale and severity o the

conict. It also provides an intuitive implication o

the degree to which there is a likelihood o

escalation o conict ollowing an initial trigger

occurrence.

There are three broad types o conict that are

signifcant in the region using a two-layered basis

or initial typology classifcation. There is an

inevitable overlap between these and some conicts

all into more than one classifcation.

Theprimarylayerofclassicationisthatofthe

major identity o the actors or protagonists.

Thesecondarylayeristhatofthegeographical

reach o the conict.

Afurtherlayercanbeincludedconsideringthe

basic ways o lie o the conicting parties.

Their livelihoods also shape the potentialresponses that can be brought about by

education.

Other threads that dierentiate the conicts include

the current key inuences shaping them, but as

these are changing (or dierent acets become more

important at dierent times), they are not used as

defnitive dierentiators within a classifcation

system.

4.3 Structural and proximate actors

inuencing conict

The main contributing actors or proximate

causes o the dierent conicts encountered in

the two zones can be grouped under three

main headings:

Politicalandgovernanceconcerns- Political opportunism and the

exploitation o ethnic and cultura l

dierences

- Competition between and breakdowns

in the relationships between Regional

Administrations

- Unresolved border or land ownership

disputes between neighboring groups

- Unclear political wil l to administer

justice or mediate disputes

- Limited capacity to manage disputes

peaceully

- Biased access to and al location o

government resources and projects rom

regional sectoral bureaus on a clan basis

(perceivedbutnopracticalexamples

were given)6

Economicandenvironmental

concerns

- Competing land use systems: pastoralistversus cultivation

- Competition over scarce grazing lands

or water points (with increased pressures

caused by drought)

Socio-culturalconcerns

- Erosion o customary laws and the

authority o elders and chies

- Deliberate margina lization o minority

ethnic groups

7

- Incompatibil ity in the systems ound

between dierent sets o customary

laws,8 exacerbated by limited

communication channels between the

ethnic groups

For the purposes o creating Tables 4 and 5,

these causes have been summar ized under a

ew major headings to al low ease o navigation

in the Tables.

1. Inter-clan Conicts

I. Those with international regional

dynamics

II. Those with inter-regional Ethiopian

dynamics

III. Those within the Somali Region

2. Intra-clan

3. State versus Insurgents

Box 1: Fundamental types o conict in

the Somali Region


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Confi cti nthe

Somal i Regi ono Ethi opi a:CanEducati o

nPromotePeaceBui l di ng?

27

Table 4: Typology o conicts in Shinile Zone


Protagonists Geographic Confict Livelihood Policy and Main Drivers o

Extent o Confict Institutional the Conficts

Infuences Environment9

State Versus International OLFGoE N/A Identity

Insurgents Political margina

Inter-clan/ Regional AfarIssa Pastoralist/ - Weak mechanisms for resolving Land ownership ethnic Group International Pastoralist regional state border disputes. Access to resourc

Dynamics - Weak police and judiciary. (in part icular the

- Clan system undermining meritocracy. Awash River)

- Social norms governing the acceptance Administrative bo

of violence. Identity

Issa Pastoralist/ - Contradictory legal/policy arrangements Land ownership

Gedabursi Agro-pastoralist governing land and water ownership. Access to resourc

- Tendency for land control to be vested

in those who farm, rather than those

who graze livestock.

- Weak police and judiciary.

- Governance system that supports

clan-based politics.

- Social norms governing the acceptance

of violence.

Inter-Regional AfarIssa Pastoralist/ - Weak mechanisms for resolving Land ownership

Ethiopia Pastoralist regional state border disputes. Access to resourc

Dynamics - Weak police and judiciary. (in part icular the

- Governance system that supports Awash River)

clan-based politics. Revenge/payback

- Social norms governing the acceptance Administrative bo

of violence.


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Table 4: Typology o conficts in Shinile Zone (continued)




Infuences Environment

Inter-clan/ Inter-Regional HawiyeIssa Agro-pastoralist/ - Contradictory legal/policy arrangement s Land ownership

ethnic Group Ethiopia Pastoralist governing land and water ownership. Access to resources

(continued) Dynamics - Tendency for land control to be vested in Administrative powe

(continued) those who farm, rather than those who Political involvemengraze livestock. Revenge/payback

- Weak mechanisms for resolving regional

state border disputes.





of violence.

AfarOromo Pastoralist/ - Contradictory legal/policy arrangements Land ownership

(W. Hararghie) Agro-pastoralist governing land and water ownership. Resource use

- Tendency for land control to be vested in and access

those who farm, rather than those Livestock theft

who graze livestock. Administrative bord

- Weak mechanisms for resolv ing regional Revenge/pay back






of violence.


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Confi cti nthe



29

Table 4: Typology o conicts in Shinile Zone (continued)





Inter-clan/ Inter-Regional IssaOromo11 Pastoralist/ - Tendency for land control to be vested in Land ownership

ethnic Group Ethiopia (W.Hararghie) Agro-pastoralist those who farm, rather than those who Access and use

(continued) Dynamics graze livestock. of resources

(continued) - Weak mechanisms for resolving regional Political opportunstate border disputes. and exploitation

- Weak police and judiciary. of ethnic

- Social norms governing the acceptance differences

of violence. Administrative bo

Hawiye Agro-pastoralist/ - Weak mechanisms for resolving regional Political opportun

Oromo Agro-pastoralist state border disputes. and exploitation

- Weak police and judiciary. of ethnic

- Social norms governing the acceptance differences

of violence.

Within the Issa Pastoralist/ - Tendency for land control to be vested Land ownership

Somali Gedabursi Agro-pastoralist in those who farm, rather than Access to resourc

Region those who graze livestock. Administrative po



of violence.


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Table 4: Typology o conficts in Shinile Zone (continued)




Inter-clan/ Inter-Regional Hawiye Agro-pastoralist/ - Contradictory legal/policy arrangements Land ownership

ethnic Group Ethiopia Issa Pastoralist governing land and water ownership. Access to resources

(continued) Dynamics - Tendency for land control to be vested Administrative powe

(continued) in those who farm, rather than Political involvementhose who graze livestock. Revenge/payback

- Weak mechanisms for resolving

regional state border disputes.





of violence.

Intra -Clan Localized Gedabursi Agro-pastoralist/ - Contradictory legal/policy arrangements Land ownership

within Somali Gedabursi Agro-pastoralist governing land and water ownership.

Region - Weak police and judiciary.


of violence.

IsaaqIsaaq Agro-pastoralist/ - Contradictory legal/policy arrangements Land ownership

(Jijiga12) Agro-pastoralist governing land and water ownership. Land enclosure



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Confi cti nthe



31

Table 5: Typology o conicts in Adher Zone


Protagonists Geographic Confict Livelihood Policy and Drivers o



Inter-clan/ Regional Degodia Pastoralist/ Access to resourc

ethnic Group International Garre Pastoralist Livestock theft

Dynamics (Kenya is the

international

dynamic)

Inter-Regional Hawiye Agro-pastoralist/ Weak mechanisms for Political opportun

Ethiopia Oromo Agro-pastoralist resolving regional state the exploitation of

Dynamics border disputes. differences

Boundary dispute

Magarre Agro-pastoralist/ Weak mechanisms for resolving regional Boundary dispute

Dhaweed/ Agro-pastoralist state border disputes. Identity linked to

Oromo

Within the Sheikash Agro-pastoralist/ Governance systems that support Identity

Somali Region Ogaden Pastoralist clan-based politics. Power representa

DuubeAfgab Agro-pastoralist/ Tendency for land control to be vested Land

Pastoralist in those who farm, rather than those

who graze livestock.

Afgab Pastoralist/ Contradictory legal/policy arrangements Water points

Garumarre Pastoralist governing land and water ownership.

AfgabGerrire Agro-pastoralist/ Contradictory legal/policy arrangements Water Points

Agro-Pastoralist governing land and water ownership.


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Table 5: Typology o conficts in Adher Zone (continued)

Protagonists Geographic Confict Livelihood Policy and Drivers o



Inter-clan/ Within the Afgab-Dhaweed Agro-pastoralist/ Contradictory legal/policy arrangements Political power

ethnic Group Somali Region Agro-Pastoralist governing land and water ownership. Resources

(continued) (continued) Tendency for land control to be vested Livestock theft

in those who farm, rather than those whograze livestock.

Governance system that supports


Intra -Clan Localized Gulbul Agro-pastoralist/ Tendency for land control to be vested in Revenge

within Somali Gulet Agro-Pastoralist those who farm, rather than those

Region (Afgab who graze livestock.

sub-clans )

Other Localized within Wildlife Pastoralist/ Contradictory legal/policy arrangements Resources

National Park Community Pastoralist governing land and water use and

(Babile) ownership.

Weak mechanisms for resolving regional


Along Riverine Resett lement Pastoralist/ Tendency for land control to be vested in Land

Areas Agriculturalist those who farm, rather than those who Water

graze livestock.



4.4 Conict eatures and dierentiators

There are a number o issues that aect the

nature o dierent conicts and the potential

programming responses. This section discusses

these issues with an education programming

response in mind. The issues are inter-related

and sometimes mutually reinorcing, and,thereore, should be considered as a bundle o

ingredients.

Seriousness and intensityconict status: How

hot, active, or serious the conict is can be an

indicator o whether it is appropriate or not to

engage in implementing an education program.

From a conict-reduction perspective, these

serious types o conict might be a priority, and

thereore the arena in which they occur should

be targeted. It may also mean that those living in

the conict area have their right to education

constrained. On the other hand, very active

conicts are likely to have a more signifcant

negative impact on an education p

Documents

Conflict in the Somali Region of Ethiopia: Can Education Promote Peace-Building?