The Processes of International Negotiation Project Network Newsletter 18/2002

From the PINSteering CommitteeWith the establishment of a newprogram on conflict resolution(CR), the topic is really “back” atIIASA. CR was a cornerstone ofIIASA’s creation in the early 1970s.At that time, the world’s two super-powers, separated by nuclear con-frontation, ideological rivalry, andthe war in Vietnam (in the late 1960sand early 1970s), decided there wasa need to focus on issues with thepotential to develop into new inter-national conflicts, and to cooperatein addressing them before theybecame a problem. Thus from thestart, IIASA’s agenda includedissues of concern to all that couldeither develop into conflicts orbecome spheres of cooperation.

This dichotomy is what thepeople engaged in conflict researchconsider to be one of the pillars ofCR. And it is what drove IIASA’sresearch during the first 20 yearsof the Institute’s existence. With theend of this era, it was assumed thatthe ominous East–West componentof IIASA’s activities would cease

Conflict Management in the 21st Century:New Challenges, Adequate Responses

Last year IIASA signed a memorandum of understanding with the United Nations(UN) Peace University in Costa Rica to carry out research on the managementof international conflicts in a number of specific areas such as water, pollution,food, population, etc. Both institutions have expressed their willingness tocombine forces to deal with these sorts of international security issues, whichuntil recently were ignored by the public and grossly underestimated by govern-ments. IIASA and the UN Peace University have agreed to study this topictogether, with the goal of identifying what can be done to stimulate generalinterest in the management of conflicts in this important area.

(continued on page 2)(continued on page 2)

Conflict management has become anecessity of the modern interna-

tional system. Conflicts are monitored,controlled, and prevented from growingto destructive proportions. They aretreated as a disease rather than as a signof healthy development. Conflictcontrol has become both a diplomatictask and a branch of military strategy.

This attitude was borne into the 21stcentury and may take even more rad-ical forms if developments such as ter-rorism, extremism, and illegal trade indrugs and arms are not brought underfirm legal control. The internationalcommunity has made significantefforts to find solutions to conflictsfrom the past era associated withideological struggle or national self-determination. It must now find waysto deal with new conflicts as theyappear.

This review focuses on identifying,preventing, and resolving conflicts thatare still in the early stages of develop-ment. These are conflicts associatedboth with age-old sources such asinequality, violent change, and coercion,as well as with new developments inhuman activity such as unequal popu-lation growth, transboundary air andwater pollution, and other developmentsthat until recently were mainly thesubject of researchers’ interest but arenow the subject of political action.

The subject of the study is possi-bilities for conflict management in

nontraditional areas where theinterests of individual nations orgroups may collide with those of othernations or groups. This idea has beentranslated into several concepts thathave been adjusted in diplomaticpractice and have become a part of theinternational political sphere. Theymay be roughly labeled as “conflictmanagement,” which includes thefollowing:• Conflict resolution, which looks for

models and mechanisms for solvingexisting conflicts

• Conflict control, which aims at con-trolling the state of conflicts, aboveall the level of violence

• Conflict prevention, which stressesthe avoidance of conflicts in thefutureThis idea of conflict management

is strongly supported by practicalresults from the previous period ininternational relations, including thefollowing:• The end of the Cold War between

the United States and the SovietUnion, their mutual efforts instrategic arms reductions, jointactivities in settling some regionalconflicts, and confidence-building inEurope

• The end of colonization, success inthe resolution of wars of nationalliberation, and the accomplishmentsof nation-building efforts

ContentsFrom the PIN Steering Committee 1

Conflict Management in the21st Century 1

Road Shows in the Middle East 2

Resolving the Toughness Dilemma 4

Negotiating with Terrorists 6

Options for Mongolia 8

The Petersberg Conference onAfghanistan 9

Call for Proposals 11

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• The end of the North–South con-frontation between the rich nationsof the West and the poorer developingnations of the South, and the evolu-tion of the World Trade Organization,one of the strongest elements of thecurrent international system

• The end of the oil crisis of 1974,which followed a major conflict ofinterests between oil consumers andthe producers/exporters of oil, andthe development of the Organization

of Petroleum Exporting Countries(OPEC), a reliable vehicle forconflict resolution through marketregulationThese and similar accomplishments

have played a double role. On the onehand, they have proved the validity ofconflict management as a realistic goalfor policy makers. On the other hand,they have proved the validity of theacademic approach, which rests on thefollowing two pillars:

• Changing attitudes (“We are nolonger enemies”)

• Problem solving (“We are partnersand the problem is our adversary”)While “changing attitudes” is where

politics and propaganda play the mostimportant role in creating conditions forheightened conflict potential and inbreaking the path toward dissolution ofconflicts through confidence building,it is “problem solving” that has becomethe soundest and most acceptable

to bear a shadow of conflict andwould instead be characterized by thespirit of cooperation.

Changes in the outside world, suchas the end of the Cold War, thedisintegration of the Soviet Union,and other related events, have indeedchanged the focus of IIASA’s work.The problems now come fromanother quarter. The development ofa global economy and related poli-tical changes, along with new chal-lenges to security in the form ofterrorism, drugs, and illegal immigra-tion, have shown that the worldstructure still has not acquired therobustness that could help it throughtimes of economic, environmental,and distributional challenges. Theproblem of CR has again proved tobe important.

Why PIN?Over its 16 years at IIASA, the PINProgram has probed the ways to settlecontroversies in different areas ofinternational human activity fromseveral different angles, includingpower, culture, and process. PIN hasbeen working as part of the largerIIASA family, which has concen-trated both on theoretical aspects ofdecision support and on practicalareas where such decisions areimplemented, such as in water andfood supply, threats to the environ-ment, population growth, etc. Closecooperation between the two researchareas has occurred on only a fewoccasions. The rest of the time therealms have remained independent.

Now the situation is changing. Thememorandum of understanding

signed by IIASA and the UnitedNations (UN) Peace University inCosta Rica on the development of CRresearch puts additional emphasis onboth IIASA and PIN. The results ofresearch in different areas of IIASA’straditional agenda must be coordinated,with the ultimate goal of helpinggovernments, international institutions,and nongovernmental organizationslook for optimal solutions to problemsand giving strong arguments in theirfavor.

PIN is a bit closer to this task thanthe other projects at IIASA. It hasknowledge of how to• transfer some of the existing inter-

national issues (economic, techno-logical, and environmental) to anagenda for negotiations,

• arrange an exchange between theinterested parties to avoid conflictsand promote cooperation, and

• achieve a negotiated solution thatcould serve as the groundwork for alonger-term and wider-range co-operative regime (what we call aforward-looking outcome).All these qualities may explain why

PIN was chosen to serve as a “motor”for the CR Program at IIASA. At thesame time, its selection presents twomajor tasks for PIN as a whole:• First, to develop closer relationships

with other IIASA projects, especiallythose that can make importantcontributions to the CR Program,such as the projects on Environmen-tally Compatible Energy Strategies;Transitions to New Technologies;Transboundary Air Pollution;Population; Radiation Safety of theBiosphere; Land Use Change;

Economic Transition and Integra-tion; European Rural Development;Risk, Modeling and Society; andso forth.

• Second, to foster closer coopera-tion between IIASA as a whole(not just the PIN Network, as in thepast) and the UN Peace University.This will be a good test of PIN’sdiplomatic and organizationalskills.In no way does this mean that PIN

will reduce its regular activities. As ofthe last PIN Steering Committeemeeting, in January 2002, PIN hadeight new projects at different stagesof readiness: five manuscripts to bepublished in 2002—the secondedition of International Negotiation(V. Kremenyuk, ed.); Containing theAtom (R. Avenhaus, V. Kremenyuk,G. Sjöstedt, eds); Negotiation Stories(G.O. Faure, ed.); Professional Cul-tures in International Negotiations(W. Lang and G. Sjöstedt, eds); andNegotiation and Escalation (G.O.Faure and I.W. Zartman, eds)—andthree in the editing stage—RiskNegotiations (R. Avenhaus and G.Sjöstedt, eds); Forward-LookingOutcomes (V. Kremenyuk and I.W.Zartman, eds); and a new project onnegotiations in the European Union(F. Cede and P. Meerts, eds). Some ofthese are discussed in greater detailin this issue of PINPoints.

Rudolf AvenhausFranz Cede

Guy Olivier FaureVictor Kremenyuk

Paul MeertsGunnar Sjöstedt

I. William Zartman

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concept for dealing with conflicts in theeyes of rational policy makers, includingthe scientific community.

Problem solving may include tech-nical approaches such as computermodeling, including the MassachusettsInstitute of Technology (MIT) modelused for the United Nations Confer-ence on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)negotiations.

Perspectives on New Conflictsin the International System:Problems of Identification

The end of the Cold War and otherrelated events have contributed to thefurther development of the inter-national system and to its chances forsurvival, and to finding solutions toresidual conflicts. These chances aremagnified by such favorable develop-ments as the continuation of integrativeprocesses (e.g., the World TradeOrganization, the European Union,etc.), the introduction of conflictmanagement mechanisms at the UNand G-8 (e.g., the Miyazaki Initiatives),coalition building in the effort to fightterrorism, etc.

Yet the international system contin-ues to experience pressure from anumber of “subversive” developments:• Residues of unsettled local and

regional conflicts from both the ColdWar and decolonization eras. Untilsuch conflicts are settled, they willcontinue to contribute to heightenedtensions and the continuation ofviolence and illegal activities (armstrade, mercenaries, coups, etc.). Veryoften military interventions areneeded to fight these conflicts.

• Continuing arms races in someregions, including attempts toacquire weapons of mass destruc-tion. Contrary to the hopes of 10 to15 years ago, the proliferation ofarms continues in almost all areasof the world.

• A growing disparity in the economicand social capabilities of nations,leading to state collapse, to gov-ernment failure, or to economic“shocks” that bring the situation tothe verge of social conflict. All thisdevelops as a negative outcome ofglobalization, which in general plays

an outstanding role in forging aglobal human compact.

• Uneven results of technologicalchange in different countries owingto both geographical factors andsocioeconomic developments.It is against these developments that

new areas of potential conflicts mayand should be approached. Theyinclude the following:• Wars over resources: conflicts over

the distribution and use of natural andman-made resources such as energy,water, and raw and processedmaterials. This area is not completelynew, as the history of OPEC andattempts to regulate trade in importantcommodities testify. But it is certainthat the problem of fair distributionof scarce resources, especially inpoverty-stricken areas, will be one ofthe most important areas of potentialconflict in the future.

• Environmental wars: conflicts overanthropogenic degradation offuture living conditions. Attemptsby the international community tointroduce rules of conduct in thisarea (including the UN Conferenceon Environment and Developmentin 1993) have indicated both agrowing understanding of theimportance of avoiding conflicts inthis area as well as the high level ofdifficulties in achieving a durablesolution even when some importantagreements have already beensigned (e.g., the Kyoto Protocol).The risk of further conflicts in thisarea is high. To date, the mecha-nisms for identifying possible linesof conflict and for envisioningpossible means to avoid them or toput them under firm control are farfrom successful.

• Population wars: conflicts followingfrom different aspects of thepopulation growth in some areas ofthe world (accompanied by prob-lems such as unemployment andinadequate housing, social security,health services, etc.) and thegrowing deficit of labor in otherparts of the world. Disparities inpopulation growth and theirconsequences—such as illegalimmigration and racial and inter-community problems—as well as

inadequate attention to populationproblems on the part of internationalorganizations and individual gov-ernments may lead to domestic andinternational conflicts that could beaverted and kept under control ifrelevant mechanisms are workedout.

• Food wars: conflicts originatingfrom unequal food production anddistribution in different areas of theworld and the inadequacy of existingmechanisms for transferring avail-able food from the areas where it isgrown to the areas where it isneeded. Neither current intergovern-mental mechanisms nor commercialmechanisms can adequately addressthese problems. It is even moredifficult to identify future problemsassociated with possible advances infood production in agricultural areaslike Africa and with existingproducers in Europe and NorthAmerica.With respect to the experience in the

area of conflict resolution to date, theseare not insoluble issues. The conflictscan be reduced provided they areappropriately identified, relevantremedies are prescribed, and effectivemechanisms are suggested. This willbe the essence of the new researchprogram.

Victor A. Kremenyuk

Road Showsin the Middle EastThe PIN Road Show planned forJanuary 2002 was postponed as aresult of the events of September 11.The same program is rescheduledfor mid-January 2003, when thePIN Steering Committee will con-duct seminars on aspects of negoti-ation at Tehran University, al-ZahraUniversity, Shahid BeheshtiUniversity, Iran’s Ministry ofCommerce, and the School ofInternational Relations at Iran’sForeign Ministry, and will conducta general seminar on internationalnegotiation on the Caspian Sea.

I. William Zartman

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The two can be refined by carryingthrough the underlying power relationassumption:• Prop. 1b In an asymmetrical nego-

tiation, a party should and will actsoft if the other party acts tough andtough if the other party acts soft,whereas in a symmetrical negotia-tion, a party should and will acttough if the other acts tough and softif the other acts soft.In the analysis of an evolutionarily

stable strategy (ESS) in game theory,when winning exceeds injury, bothowner and intruder will hang tough(escalate), and as the chance of netbenefit rises, the larger party, whetherowner or intruder, will/should either acttough or soft (Hammerstein, 1981:198–199):• Prop. 1c In an asymmetrical nego-

tiation, the party will and should acttough if it is strong (measured bothby size and by net cost of injury), andsoft if it is weak, except whereownership is exercised.In a further development, the intro-

duction of a second (domestic) levelof power shifts the analysis of structureto each party’s two levels (internationalor interparty, and domestic or intra-party): “(1) strength at Level I andweakness at Level II will predict a hard-line strategy…; (2) weakness at bothlevels will also predict a hard line…;(3) strength at both levels will producemixed [strategies] depending on thecosts of non-agreement; and (4) weak-ness at Level I and strength at Level IIwill predict concessions…” (Lehmanand McCoy, 1992: 609–610). Settingaside situation (3) because of itsindeterminacy and its dependence ona different variable, one can say thefollowing:• Prop. 2 A party should and will act

tough if it is weak at the domesticlevel and soft if it is strong at thedomestic level.In behavioral analysis, the hard-liner

expects toughness to lead to softnessand softness to lead to toughness(Nicolson, 1939/1964; Rubin andBrown, 1975; Snyder and Diesing,1977; Bartos, 1987; Goldstein and

Pevehouse, 1997:527; Zartman andRubin, 2000), whereas the soft-linerexpects toughness to lead to toughnessand softness to lead to softness, and there-fore open soft, seeking agreement:• Prop. 3 A party will open and

continue tough in negotiations if ithas a hard-line worldview, and softif it has a soft-line worldview.

• Prop. 4 A party will open andcontinue tough (but productively) innegotiations if it is a competitive IQtype, and soft if it is a cooperativeIQ type.In the strategic approach, in a

Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (PDG) theresult merely reinforces the ToughnessDilemma, since both parties will acttough (neither concede nor cooperate)and deadlock will result, but a repeatedgame provides a way out of the Dilem-ma (Axelrod, 1980). Other situationsare less determinate. A Chicken Di-lemma Game (CDG) has no predictableoutcome and merely leaves the partiesconsidering their appropriate moves outof the Toughness Dilemma. Otherasymmetrical situations produce simi-lar results (Snyder and Diesing, 1977):• Prop. 5 A party will and should be

tough to open and soft to reward ifits opponent sees itself in a CDGsituation, and soft to open and toughto punish if its opponent sees itselfin a PDG situation.In a process analysis, a number of

economics approaches to negotiationcan be used to analyze the results interms of the process used to establishthem, focusing particularly on thecalculations that underlie concessionmaking. The central analytical variablein these calculations is the parties’security point, or the value of thesituation without an agreement,referring specifically in most cases tothe cost of a strike. Various theoriesindicate that a party concedes if itsstrike cost is greater then its opponent’s(Zeuthen, 1930/1975:135; Harsanyi,1975:257), or than its concession(Harsanyi, 1975:263; cf. Zeuthen,1930/1975:150), or than an acceptabil-ity level (Pen, 1975:136), or if its timecosts are greater than its opponent’s

Concepts in Negotiation: Resolving the Toughness Dilemma

In the first full-length treatment ofnegotiation, François de Callières

(1716/2000:31) expressed his admira-tion of Monseigneur d’Ossat for being“firm as a rock when necessitydemands [and] supple as a willow atanother moment.” Unfortunately, thecardinal never revealed how he knewwhen necessity demanded firmnessand when suppleness was allowed, andso the question has remained un-answered ever since. At the base of thenegotiation process lies this conun-drum, which has prevented anyconclusive effort to provide a simpletheory of negotiation. Referred to asthe Toughness or Negotiator’s Dilem-ma, the question asks, Should one betough, increasing the chances of afavorable agreement but decreasing thechances of any agreement at all, or soft,increasing the chances of agreementbut decreasing the chances of its beingfavorable?

Since this is a dilemma, there is nosolution to the problem as formulated(Bartos, 1974; Snyder and Diesing,1977:212; Lax and Sebenius, 1986:38–41; Goldstein and Pevehouse,1997:516). To allow for a solution,either the problem must be reformu-lated or additional information must beintroduced as an analytical variable. Inthe second case, the answer to thedilemma is, “It depends,” and theindependent variable specifies on whatit depends. Different approaches to theanalysis of negotiation have introduceddifferent variables (Zartman, 1989;Kremenyuk, 2001), some reinforcingand others contradicting each other.

In structural analysis, there are twotypes of power distributions among theparties: symmetrical (equal power) andasymmetrical (unequal power). Twobasic propositions derive from thisanalysis, contradictory in their findings:• Prop. 1 In an asymmetrical nego-

tiation, a party should and will acttough if it is strong and soft if it is weak(Thucydides, 414/1960:V89 [2673]).

• Prop. 1a In an asymmetrical nego-tiation, a party should and will actsoft if it is strong and tough if it isweak.

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(Cross, 1969). Security pointevaluations, like structural analyses,indicate that the weaker party shouldand will act soft to the point wheresymmetry is established, but they givea move-by-move analysis and allow fora shift in the stronger/weaker role fromparty to party:• Prop. 6 In an asymmetrical nego-

tiation, a party will and should actsoft if its security point is lower thana given reference point and tough ifit is higher.A more complex calculation is based

on a comparison of the differencesbetween the security point and theresult of the other’s unilateral con-cession, and between the first party’sand the other’s unilateral concession(Snyder and Diesing, 1977), in whichthe party with the highest critical riskfactor, so calculated, concedes until thecritical risks are equalized, leaving theparties to split the difference to arriveat a Pareto-optimal outcome. Like othersecurity point statements, critical risk isalso a measure of asymmetry, and it tooindicates that the weaker party shouldand will act soft, turn by turn:• Prop. 7 In an asymmetrical nego-

tiation, a party will and should actsoft if its security point, measuredas a critical risk factor, is lower thanthe other’s and tough if it is higher.A different type of process analysis

describes and prescribes optimalbehavior according to the stage of thenegotiation:• Prop. 8 Parties will and should act

tough if they are in the diagnosis ordetailing phase of negotiation, andsoft if they are in the formulationphase in between the two.A different staged process approach

divides negotiation into two phases,before and after the establishment of abargaining zone (where in turn the pre-vious three-phased analysis might fit).This analysis disaggregates theToughness Dilemma into two parts, inwhich the first phase focuses on estab-lishing the possibility of an agreementand the second relativizes that possi-bility into a favorable agreement:• Prop. 9 Parties will and should act

soft in order to establish a bar-gaining zone and tough in order toreach an agreement within that zone.

As analysis moves closer to reality,it recognizes the fact that while someparties may remain hung on the hornsof Manichean behavior, others will tryto escape the Toughness Dilemmausing a little bit of both behaviors. Arefined mixture of toughness andsoftness does not answer the problemof when to blink, but it does covermuch of the more detailed bargainingbetween regular partners. Such anapproach has been termed firmflexibility or flexible rigidity (Pruittand Lewis, 1975; Rubin et al., 1994;Pruitt, 1995). In this approach theindependent variable is less explicit,but in general appears to be theability to conduct the opposite sortof behavior as compensation. Theanalysis meets squarely both the spiritand the letter of the ToughnessDilemma by using its blessed-if-you-do-and-blessed-if-you-don’t nature toovercome its damned-if-you-do-and-damned-if-you-don’t side, indicatingthat parties should be both tough andsoft at the same time:• Prop. 10 A party can and should

remain tough on its important issues/interests if it can compensate withsoftness on less important issues/interests or new approaches.Since, by Homans’ (1961:62) theo-

rem, “the more the items at stake canbe divided into goods valued more byone party than they cost to the other andgoods valued more by the other partythan they cost to the first, the greaterthe chances of a successful outcome(cf. Nash, 1950), the tactical approachto the Toughness Dilemma seizes onthe basic nature of negotiations to seekto create a positive-sum outcome. Theproposition is completely prescriptive,however, and in no way predicts whata party will do.

I. William Zartman

ReferencesAxelrod, R., 1980, Prisoner’s dilemma, Jour-

nal of Conflict Resolution, XXIV(1):3–26.Bartos, O., 1974, Process and Outcome in

Negotiations, Columbia U. Press.Bartos, O., 1987, How predictable are

negotiations?, in I.W. Zartman, ed., The 50%Solution, Yale U. Press.

Cross, J., 1969, The Economics ofBargaining, Basic.

de Callières, François, 1716/2000, On the

Matter of Negotiating with Princes,Houghton Mifflin & ESSEC/Institut deRecherche et d’Enseignement sur laNégotiation en Europe (IRÉNÉ).

d’Ossat, Arnaud, 1698, Lettres deMonseigneur d’Ossat, Boudot.

Goldstein, J., and Pevehouse, J., 1997,Reciprocity, bullying and internationalcooperation, American Political ScienceReview, LXXXI(3):515–529.

Hammerstein, P., 1981, The role ofasymmetries in animal contests, AnimalBehavior, XXIX(3):193–205.

Hammerstein, P., 1982, The asymmetric warof attrition, Journal of Theoretical Biology,LXXXXVI(4):647–682.

Harsanyi, J., 1975, Approaches to thebargaining problem before and after thetheory of games, in O. Young, ed.Bargaining, U. of Illinois Press.

Homans, C., 1961, Social Change, HarcourtBrace.

Kremenyuk, V., ed., 2001, InternationalNegotiation: Analysis, Approaches, Issues,2nd ed., Jossey-Bass.

Lax, D., and Sebenius, J., 1986, The Manageras Negotiator, Free Press.

Lehman, H.P., and McCoy, J.L., 1992, Thedynamics of the two level bargaining game,World Politics, XXXXIV(4):600–644.

Nash, J., 1950, The bargaining problem, inO. Young, ed., Bargaining, U. of IllinoisPress.

Nicolson, H., 1939/1964, Diplomacy, Oxford.Pen, J., 1975, A general theory of bargaining,

in O. Young, ed., Bargaining, U. of IllinoisPress.

Pruitt, D.G., 1981, Negotiation Behavior,Academic.

Pruitt, D.G., 1995, Flexibility in conflictepisodes, in D. Druckman and C. Mitchell,eds, Flexibility in International Negotiationand Mediation, The Annals, 542:100–115.

Pruitt, D.G., and Lewis, S.A., 1975, Develop-ment of integrative solutions in bilateralnegotiations, Journal of Personality andSocial Psychology, XXXI(4):621–633.

Rubin, J.Z., and Brown, B., 1975, The SocialPsychology of Bargaining and Negotiation,Academic.

Rubin, J.Z., Pruitt, D.G., and Kim, S.H.,1994, Social Conflict, McGraw-Hill.

Snyder, G., and Diesing, P., 1977, Conflictamong Nations, Princeton U. Press.

Thucydides, 414/1960, The History of thePeloponnesian War, Galaxy.

Zartman, I.W., 1989, In search of commonelements in the analysis of the negotiationprocess, in F. Mautner-Markhof, ed.,Processes of International Negotiations,Westview.

Zartman, I.W., and Berman, M., 1982, ThePractical Negotiator, Yale U. Press.

Zartman, I W., and Rubin, J.Z., eds, 2000,Power and Negotiation, U. of MichiganPress.

Zeuthen, F., 1930/1975, Economic warfare,in O. Young, ed., Bargaining, U. of IllinoisPress.

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Negotiating with Terrorists• The impossibility of recognizing the

hostage-taker as a legitimate coun-terpart (states still have to negotiate,but do so “unofficially”)

• Trust as a mechanism that has noplace in such a setting and cannotbe built up and implemented

• The issue of the safety of thenegotiators themselves when theymust work within a hostile context

• The importance of third-partyintervention such as from the media,families of the hostages, etc.These various elements make it

extremely difficult to conceive of thenegotiation as a win–win game. Theformal structure of the problem ismuch more adequately representedby a concave curve describing thezone of possible agreements ratherthan the usual convex curve settingthe stage for a Pareto-optimal result.Consequently, it becomes very un-likely that a situation will be built upin which everyone meets his or herown needs.

The crushing responsibility thatfalls on the shoulders of the nego-tiators introduces an unusual level ofstress. Hostage-takers play a lot withthis aspect by pointing out that thelives of the “guests” are in the handsof their counterparts, and that ifanything dramatic happens it will betheir fault.

This type of negotiation normallyentails complex management ofpublicly disclosed information.Formally there is no negotiationbecause no state can stoop so low asto enter into discussions with aterrorist group. However, one has todo something to protect the lives ofthe hostages, and there is a morallegitimacy to “interacting” with thehostage-takers if not to negotiatingwith them. The double language thatis thus produced can be applied to agreat variety of issues. Usually noconcessions are made officially andthe final deal is not made publicbecause often the country involvedmust make concessions that, ifknown, would create problems for itwith other countries or with its own

public. Here, more than in any othersituation, the iceberg principleapplies.

Basic Types of Negotiation

One of the most significant criteria todistinguish among subcategories ofnegotiations with terrorists is the natureof the context. Hostage-takers may actin either a friendly context or a hostilecontext. Negotiators who must dealwith them usually adopt totally dif-ferent strategies and sometimes evenvery contrasted goals. In the case of acontext friendly to the terrorists, thepressure is on the negotiators inter-vening to free the hostages becausethey have little room to maneuver, asthey do not control the negotiationenvironment. They can be subjected toharassment, attrition, threats, or othercoercive tactics. They may even fearfor their own lives. Cases can endtragically for the negotiators if they arenot officially protected or if the otherside does not care about the possiblepunishment. As soon as one side hasabsolutely nothing to lose, it becomesextremely difficult to keep some powerbalance in the negotiation process.

In the case of hostage-takersoperating in a hostile environment, thefishbowl theory applies. The means ofaction that can be used by the hostage-takers are much more limited. Theyface a much higher risk and usuallyput much more pressure on thehostages. They also often resort to themedia to amplify their claims, usingthem as a megaphone for theirpropaganda. To show their commit-ment, they may also, for instance, killa hostage. If we consider the overallsituation and the way in which thesecases are usually handled, negotiationbecomes only one of the variousmeans used to free the hostages.Negotiators maintain continuous com-munication with the hostage-takers tocollect information on them, theirresources, and their external allies,thus depriving the terrorists of sleepand exhausting them in order toreduce their ability to analyze any new

Transgressing basic universal valueshas been an ongoing temptation

for people who want to achieve a lotwith little means. Generating distress,terror, or panic is a powerful meansto increase one’s leverage and createa new situation. Terrorism is the wordmost commonly used to describe thisaction, but in reality it is just asituation in which an unethical tool isused for what the perpetrators believeto be ethical ends. Now, if we considerthe September 11 tragedy, it is by nomeans a negotiation but a faitaccompli for the time being and athreat for the future. Punishing theculprits is certainly a necessaryinitiative, but preventing such eventsfrom occurring again is also a basicrequirement. Negotiation is among thevarious tools that can be used, even ifterrorists can be categorized as themost unlikely negotiators. Researchhas already contributed to sheddinglight on some aspects of what can beviewed as a highly uncertain andcomplex activity (Waugh, 1982;Baldwin, 1986; Faure, 1988; Hayes,1991).

Negotiating with terrorists is anextremely difficult task, as one canimagine. On some occasions it meansputting one’s own life at risk. In allcases it means accepting interactionwith counterparts whose methodsand values are totally rejected. It canbe viewed as a situation that usuallyrequires resorting to negotiation, orat least establishing a kind ofdiscussion in order to save the livesof hostages.

Freeing Hostages

A hostage-taker is someone whoappropriates the lives of others by vio-lent means, intending to use them asa currency of exchange. Such asituation carries very specificattributes:• Dramatic stakes to manage; namely,

human lives• Positions on both sides of an abyss

reflecting the values opposing bothparties

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events occurring and to lower theirlevel of vigilance. Sometimes theyfind ways to sow dissension amongthe hostage-takers, or at least to lowertheir expectations. The final goal inthat case may be an armed inter-vention that does not exclude thekilling of the terrorists.

Analytical Dimensions

Such a complex, uncertain, and dra-matic type of negotiation combinesthree different types of rationality:structural, cultural, and psychological.At the strategic level, there is a relativeincompatibility between objectivesand means. Parties to the conflict arecaught in a lose–lose game in whichthe only satisfaction becomes to inflictmore suffering or casualties on theother side than one must suffer one-self. Within such a situation, hidden orovert violence prevails at the negotia-tion table and it appears impossible toapply the bicycle theory to the process.The means used are not the mostsuitable for reaching an agreement;rather, they are more appropriate tomaking war than to establishing somekind of (even extremely limited)cooperation.

For the negotiators working to freethe hostages, two constraints conflictwith each other: getting the hostagesfree and deterring other terrorists fromtaking more hostages. There is no wayto free hostages without givingsomething to the hostage-takers. At thesame time, such an action works as anincentive for more acts of this type.Thus a second dimension—time—isintroduced. Clearly, measures taken todeal with short-term issues contradictinitiatives dealing with longer-termgoals. One should not reward thetaking of hostages, but at the sametime, if the prisoners are slaughteredby the terrorists, the negotiators maybe held responsible.

At the intercultural level, manyelements make it very difficult to reachany agreement. National cultures un-doubtedly play a role, especially North/South views, but usually the terroristgroup has developed a culture of itsown that in many ways is incompatiblewith any national or global culture.

Often such a culture has been estab-lished as a fortress to defend the groupand justify its actions, and does notallow any room for dialogue or evenlistening. What is at stake are the highlyconflicting visions of the world by bothparties and the set of values on whichthey base their attitudes and justifytheir behaviors. Very often identityproblems arise on the terrorist side,making communication impossible.Channels of communication that havebeen established to help the negotiationprocess are simply used as means ofverbal war.

The psychological level makeshostage negotiations dramaticallydifferent from any other type ofnegotiation, even the most competitiveones. Psychotic trends may prevail,such as megalomaniacal attitudes,paranoid behavior, or suicide-orientedactions. Megalomaniacal constructsarise in the terrorist group from theimpression that they are discussingdirectly with a government and thatthey may be able to make a countrysubmit to their demands. This type ofsituation gives an overwhelming senseof power and increases the self-imageto such an extent that it becomes ahopeless task to bring the hostage-takers back to reality. Paranoidattitudes result from a Manicheanvision of the world, with good and evilcaught in a fight to the death. Theirapproach leaves no room for acompromise in such a setting, as itwould mean betraying the missionthey believe they must accomplish.Suicide-oriented conduct is imple-mented with the idea of eitheraccomplishing an altruistic sacrificeor playing out the great “scenario ofthe end” on a smaller scale. Thealtruistic sacrifice shows an extremelystrong identification of the memberwith his or her group or a pathologicalweakening of the personality as such.Orchestrating the “scenario of the end”is a way to implement, on a smallerscale, the prophecy of the end of theworld. This is usually done orattempted in closed places, such as ahouse or an airplane, in whichhumankind is punished and redeemedby the fire of hell.

Concluding Comments

With its psychological aspects,negotiation with terrorists is one of themost unusual and at the same timeprobably the most difficult types ofnegotiation. The dramatic issues atstake make it quite a unique if not anenviable job, and put their mark on thenegotiator forever. One of the majordifficulties arises from the fact thatthere is most often an absolute incom-patibility of the goals and values putforward by both parties. This incom-patibility is accentuated because thesituation makes it impossible to forgetabout values because they stand asethical pillars for a party who has towork in an extreme situation. At thesame time it seems to be quitenecessary to keep them to the side ifone wants to move on.

The complexity of the task comesfrom the multidimensional aspect ofthis type of negotiation. One has to playseveral instruments at the same timewith no ready-made sheet musicavailable. However, dealing withterrorists is only a limited action.Terrorism is no more than a traumatictool. One has to solve the problem thatis at its roots and the fundamentalissues that lie behind it have to beaddressed at some point. Unfortunatelyfor humanity, if not for research,negotiation with terrorists is anexpanding activity that has beenpromised a great future despite the wisesilence of the media on most of thecases occurring in this world.

Guy Olivier Faure

ReferencesBaldwin, D.A., 1986, Bargaining with airline

hijackers, in I.W. Zartman, ed., The 50%Solution, Doubleday, New York, NY, USA.

Faure, G.O., 1988, Negotiating to freehostages: A challenge for negotiationsupport systems, in M. Shakun, ed.,Evolutionary Systems Design, PolicyMaking under Complexity, Holden-Day,Oakland, CA, USA: 219–246.

Hayes, R.E., 1991, Negotiations withterrorists, in V. Kremenyuk, ed.,International Negotiation, Jossey-Bass,San Francisco, CA, USA.

Waugh, W.L., 1982, International Terrorism,Documentary Publications, Salisbury, NC,USA.

8

The phenomenon of clashes betweencivilizations is not new. Cultures

with more advanced technologies havealways clashed with those that laggedbehind in certain areas. The success ofthe Mongols in history was largely dueto their new organizational technology,which allowed them to triumph oversurrounding tribes and states. The otherstates might have been more culturallyrefined, but they lacked the new mobilemanagement of armed forces—forcesthat had fought against one anotheruntil Chinggis Khan arrived as a medi-eval chief executive officer.

The Mongolians see Chinggis Khanas a national hero, but his victims mighthave had a less positive view of him.One culture’s hero can be the wrathof God to another. Thanks to thehighly successful organization of their“company,” the Mongols managed todominate the Chinese, Persians, andRussians. Why they were not success-ful with the Egyptians and Japanese isanother matter. It probably had to dowith overstretching: the technologyworks, but has its limits. At the end ofthe day, the Mongols were unable toprotect themselves against the Mingdynasty in Mongolia itself.

In more recent times, the UnitedStates, having learned from the war inVietnam and from the Soviet experi-ences in Afghanistan, has been carefulnot to overstretch in its “management”of the Taliban government, workingclosely with the Northern Alliance andother internal and external allies. It isinteresting to note that it asked its NorthAtlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)allies to invoke Article Five of theNorth Atlantic Treaty, but never usedthe opportunities NATO might haveprovided them.

Cooperation and confrontation havealways been the buzzwords in rela-tions between states. Internationalrelations are just that: trying tocooperate despite—or better, becauseof—opposing interests and values.International politics is about theconvergence of interests and about the

handling of emotions. Let us notforget that even the state has itsemotions, as embedded in its nationalsymbols and heroes. This emotionalside has often been overlooked byWestern cultures, but it is a centralfeature in Eastern cultures. Conse-quently, the relations between therepresentatives of states from Westand East have often been damaged bya lack of respect for the integrity ofthe other state, or the honorablerepresentative of that state.

Confrontation can materialize inmany ways, but tackling the combina-tion of confrontation and cooperationthrough the lens of cooperation canonly be managed in a few—mainlypeaceful—ways. Humans have alwaysused negotiation as a tool in settlingconflicts. Adam and Eve negotiated onthe apple but found that negotiationswith the Supreme Being were noteffective in reaching a mutually satis-factory solution on the question ofParadise. International negotiation isthe rule in conflict management today,and the use of violence is seen as anexception to that rule (however, beforethe 19th century, war was the rule andnegotiation the exception in settlingproblems between states).

International negotiation is one ofthe most effective tools for problemsolving for small countries likeMongolia and the Netherlands. 1

Certainly there are differencesbetween the two countries. WhileMongolia has to handle two big neigh-bors, the Netherlands has to handlethree. On the one hand, it is easier toplay two countries off each other thanit is to play three against one another;on the other hand, two countries havemore opportunities to ally against athird. In other words, while there is ashort-term tactical advantage indealing with two stronger opponents,it is strategically much more difficultto sustain this tactical advantage overthe long term.

Apart from other factors, this mightexplain why the Netherlands is seeking

long-term alliances with its powerfulfriends (if you have such friends youno longer need enemies) in the formof the negotiation network called theEuropean Union, whereas Mongoliatends to enter into ad hoc coalitions.The Netherlands tries to limit thepowerful by drawing as many smallpowers into the network as possible.Maybe this could be an option in theAsian heartland as well. It would meandrawing in Central and East Asianstates, most notably the republics ofKazakhstan and Korea. This fits moreor less into the “third neighbor theory,”as these countries are not too far awaygeographically or too different ethni-cally and linguistically.2

As globalization progresses andworld interdependencies grow, ascooperation becomes of ever greaterimportance and conflicts becomemore likely, international negotiationbecomes an ever more valuable toolfor small states in their confrontationswith more powerful ones. Stablenegotiation networks are in the interestof the less powerful. After all, usingmilitary land or sea forces is no longeran option for Mongolia and theNetherlands. This leaves internationalnegotiation as the main tool in theseemingly unavoidable process ofregionalization and globalization.3

Happily, the application of thisdevice is more effective for smallpowers than for large ones. A recentstudy by the PIN Steering Committeeshows that negotiations betweenunequal powers are likely to producemore relative benefits for the smallerstates. The lesser power gets more outof the process than one would expecton the basis of a comparison betweenthe power resources of the contendingparties. In other words, the situationalpower of the small state is often ofmore relevance than the structuralpower of the larger state.

Salacuse (2000) draws somelessons for practice on the basis ofnine case studies. He has 10 lessonsfor “the weak”: 4

The Negotiating Power of Small States in a Globalizing World:Options for Mongolia

9

01. To increase your power, buildrelationships with appropriatethird parties.

02. The importance of power innegotiation may not be so muchthe reality of it as the perceptionof it.

03. Aggregate (overall) power is notas important as issue-specific(situational) power in a givennegotiation.

04. Getting the stronger side’s atten-tion at the highest level is oftenthe first step to increasing power.

05. The stronger side’s size andcomplexity offer opportunitiesfor increasing power in thenegotiation.

06. Positions taken by the strongerparty in other arenas can some-times be used to increase powerin a given negotiation.

07. The power value of a specificresource changes over time, sowaiting for the appropriatemoment to act can increasepower.

08. Power can be augmented bytaking initiatives in negotiation.

09. Power can be increased byunderstanding and exploiting theinternational context in whichthe negotiation is taking place.

10. Power can be increased to theextent that an increased commit-ment to a negotiated settlementof the dispute can be fostered inthe leadership of the strongerside.

In other words, it is important for asmall state such as Mongolia to takethe initiative (lesson 8) in establishing(lessons 1, 4, and 10) something like adurable Organization for Security andCooperation in Asia along the lines ofthe OSCE in Europe (which also in-volves the United States and Canada),thereby creating a cooperative spirit inthe Asian heartland, which is of theutmost importance to Asia as a whole(lesson 9). Creating such an organi-zation is an old issue in Asia becauseof North American involvement, but itmight be worthwhile to explore arevival of the subject. Of course, thereis still the option of pressing for mem-bership in the OSCE itself, but theAsian heartland seems to be too far

from Europe to make the OSCE aneffective option for the Mongolianstate.

A much more valuable alternative isthe Shanghai Cooperation Organiza-tion. At present it is still a superficialcooperative agreement between China,Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan,Kyrghyzstan, and Tadjikistan dealingwith border and some economic issues.It is well known that the Mongolianshave reservations about joining thisnew setup. But the organization hasgreat opportunities for growth as aregional security and economic entity.For Mongolia to exclude itself wouldbe a major mistake, as the countrywould become unnecessarily isolatedfrom its natural small-state allies andits natural big-state “brothers” (if youhave brothers and sisters like this, youdon’t need any other family). There isa saying: “If you can’t beat them, jointhem.” Can anybody imagine whatdamage the Netherlands would haveinflicted on itself had it remainedoutside the European Union becauseof its negative experiences with theGermans?

One might say that this is themultilateral framework to be cocreatedand used by the Mongolian state tosecure and develop its own position inAsia and in the world. However, to besuccessful in this, Mongolia’s diplo-mats will have to be trained to beeffective in their behavior and in theirwritten and oral communication to dealwith procedures, processes, parties,and positions.5

In conclusion, Mongolia muststrengthen its capacity for training itsdiplomats and other civil servantsworking with the outside world. Itshould use existing resources, bothwithin Mongolia itself—for example,the School of Foreign Service and theSchool of Management—as well asabroad—such as the Moscow StateInstitute of International Relations(MGIMO) and the Clingendael Insti-tute. But what is even more importantis Mongolia’s willingness to follow apolicy of further integration into thepolitical, security, and economicnetworks and organizations of Eurasia,notably the Shanghai CooperationOrganization.

Both multilaterally and bilaterally,planning is important for diagnosingMongolia’s strengths and weaknessesin the international arena, as well asthose of the other party in a givensituation (lesson 3). It is also importantfor studying an opponent’s overallpolicy (lessons 5 and 6), as well as foridentifying the appropriate moment tostart negotiations (lesson 7). Theperception of strength is a point whereMongolia has a natural advantage.Thanks to Chinggis Khan and hiscrew, some nations still perceiveMongolia as being quite powerful(lesson 2). This is what we could callthe “long shadow of the empire”power. Indeed, states that were oncean empire are often more assertivethan one would expect based on theirrank order today (e.g., the Ethiopians,Iranians, Portuguese, Dutch, British,and French).

One should always keep in mind thatsmall countries have some advantagesover big ones. For example, they areoften non-threatening (power ofinnocence), which might foster a goodatmosphere (relational power) andtherefore a willingness on the part ofthe bigger country to concede morethan necessary (the ability to make thebigger power feel guilty because of itssize). The lines of communicationwithin the small country are shorter(coordinative power) and the numberof issues at hand might be smaller(transparency power) than in the bigcountry. This will enhance the effec-tiveness of the smaller party. Thesmaller party might be willing toinvest more, especially if a centralpriority is at stake, and could thereforebe more successful in the end(mosquito power).

These issues should be analyzedthoroughly. It can be argued that agood way to begin such an analysis isby enlarging the Planning Departmentof the Mongolian Ministry of ForeignAffairs beyond its current modestsetup, as well as by supporting thecreation of an independent think tankon international relations that shouldwork in close cooperation with estab-lished institutions in Mongolia andabroad.

Paul Meerts

10

Notes1Pfusterschmid-Hardtenstein (2001) givesdata on Mongolia and the Netherlandscompared with the other 192 states of theworld. On population Mongolia ranks 133,the Netherlands, 57; on territory Mongoliaranks 18, the Netherlands, 132; on grossnational product Mongolia ranks 145, theNetherlands, 14. In other words, a country is“small” because of a mixture of severalfactors; it can still be large in certain separateareas—such as Mongolia in terms of territoryand the Netherlands in economic terms.Bayasakh (2000) states that “Mongolia is stillgeopolitically important, for both Russia andChina as a buffer and for the rest of the worldas a SOMP [states other than major powers]country.”2Bayarkhuu (1999) asserts that Mongoliawill avoid the pitfall of depending on asingle power, although it should be addedthat this has happened in the past, whenMongolia had no alternative pathway. Now,however, the two-partner option seems to bethe most obvious choice; but, as has beensaid before, it is much safer to have at leastone extra option, if not more. See Bayarkhuu(2001b) for research on the Central Asian(“Turanian”) option. See Bayarkhuu (2001a)for analysis of other, wider Asian optionsfor Mongolia.3Barkman (1999) discusses the sometimesopposing and sometimes converging trends

of regionalization and globalization and theireffects on Mongolia’s internal situation andits external position.4See also Zartman and Rubin (2000) forconclusions on symmetry and asymmetry ininternational negotiations. Their lessons areas follows: (1) equal power does not lead tomore effective negotiation than unequalpower; (2) parties do not function moreeffectively when there is a small, rather thana large, total amount of power in the system;(3) stronger parties typically attempt todominate the exchange with their lesspowerful counterparts; (4) weaker partiesrespond not by acting submissively, but byadopting appropriate counter-strategies oftheir own; and (5) negotiating parties areeffective to the extent that they adjust theirbehavior to the relative power of the otherside. In lesson (4) they describe 16 tacticsused by weaker states: appeals to commoninterests, solutions to common problems,pairing positions, appeals to relationships, useof rules, appeals to higher authority, use ofintermediaries, appeals to principle, co-optionof external forces, efforts to seize opportunemoments, attention to details, coalitions withother parties, links to internal factions, joiningone’s enemy’s enemy, use of public opinion,and resorting to unconventional violence(insurgency and terrorism).5Meerts (2000) analyzes specific policies thatwould create a more favorable internationalposition for Mongolia in general.

The Petersberg Conference on Afghanistan as aNegotiating Experience

ReferencesBarkman, U.B., 1999, Die mongolisch–

japanische Beziehungen (1996–1998)—Die Mongolei zwischen Globalisierungund Regionalisierung, in Japan 1998/99—Politik und Wirtschaft , Institut fürAsienkunde, Hamburg:129–159.

Bayarkhuu, D., 1999, A new world order inthe Asia-Pacific region: A Mongolianperspective, World Affairs, 3(4):105.

Bayarkhuu, D., 2001a, Asia Pacific, RajivGandhi Institute for ContemporaryStudies, New Delhi.

Bayarkhuu, D., 2001b, New Central Asia, TheInstitute for Strategic Studies, Ulaanbaatar.

Bayasakh, K.J., 2000, Mongolia andRussia—China on the eve of the newmillennium, China Report, 36(1):81.

Meerts, P., 2000, Mongolia in the world, inAltan Argamj, 3(166):87–88.

Pfusterschmid-Hardtenstein, H., 2001,Kleinstaat Keinstaat?, Boehlau Verlag:211–217.

Salacuse, J.W., 2000, Lessons for practice,in I.W. Zartman and J.Z. Rubin, eds, Powerand Negotiation, U. of Michigan Press:258–269.

Zartman, I.W., and Rubin, J.Z., 2000,Symmetry and asymmetry in negotiation,in I.W. Zartman and J.Z. Rubin, eds, Powerand Negotiation, U. of Michigan Press:272–285.

The tragic events of 11 September2001 triggered a robust response by

the United States and its allies, whojoined forces in a new coalition againstinternational terrorism. In a swift andstunning military operation, US andNorthern Alliance forces were able todislodge the Taliban from their positionof power in Kabul and to dismantle theterrorist network of the al Qaeda organ-ization of Osama bin Laden. Themilitary strikes were preceded byintensive diplomatic efforts by theUnited States in order to obtain thesupport of key states in Central Asia,which accepted the use of theirterritory by the military forces of theUS-led coalition in the war againstterrorism on Afghani soil. In their ownright, the negotiations, hastily con-ducted on various continents to prepare

the ground for the subsequent militaryoperation, deserve a thorough studyfrom the point of view of negotiationtheory. Historians and politicalscientists alike are called upon toanalyze this part of the story once thedust has settled over the debris of theTaliban regime and the al Qaedapresence in Afghanistan.

Another challenge of no less interestto the advancement of the theory ofinternational negotiation in this contextis the Petersberg Conference onAfghanistan, which was convenedimmediately following the Taliban’souster from Kabul. The Conference,held on the Petersberg near Bonn, wassuccessfully concluded on 5 December2001 by an agreement that laid thegroundwork for the post-Talibanpolitical future of Afghanistan.

Viewed from the angle of negoti-ation theory, the successful PetersbergConference is noteworthy for manyreasons:• The framework of the negotiations

itself presents some parallels toother recent political settlements(e.g., Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor)whereby the interested “big powers”(e.g., the United States, the UnitedKingdom, Germany, France, Russia)used the United Nations (UN) as aninstrument, but kept their decisiveinfluence over the conference’scourse and outcome. In a way thebig powers played the roles of bothmidwife and godfather to thePetersberg agreement.

• The Afghani participants at the con-ference, carefully chosen by theinterested big powers as politically

11

relevant, were put in a junior posi-tion. The representatives of thepolitical factions supplanting theTaliban regime were allowed toquarrel vociferously among them-selves. However, at the end of theday, given the political and economicpressure from the United States, theyhad no choice but to accept theconcept of the accord imposed onthem by the international community(i.e., the big powers plus the UN).

• The UN and its special repre-sentative for Afghanistan, LakhdarBrahimi, were given a catalyst rolein the whole exercise. Once thesituation on the ground haddeveloped to a point the UnitedStates determined was ripe for a

Call for Proposals:A New PIN Project on Quantitative Approaches

to International Negotiations Analyses

political settlement, the contributionof the UN was welcomed to“legitimize” the agreement. In thisway the UN, as the worldwideorganization encompassing thetotality of the international com-munity of nations, participated in thedecisive stages of the diplomaticmarathon.

• The Petersberg agreement, as thehistoric landmark in the unfoldingof the Afghanistan conflict, must beviewed as a dynamic rather than astatic settlement. Setting the basisfor a new political beginning inAfghanistan, the agreement pro-vides mechanisms for the establish-ment of a new Afghani government,for the elaboration of an Afghani

constitution, and for the preparationof parliamentary elections to be heldwithin two years. Although thenegotiating process on the reestab-lishment of political life inAfghanistan is gradually shiftingfrom the international to thedomestic level, there is no doubt thatfor some time to come concurrentinternational efforts will be neededto support the democratic develop-ment of this war-torn country.

The interaction of domestic politicalplayers in Afghanistan with theirinternational counterparts thus contin-ues to be a challenging subject for thetheory and practice of internationalnegotiations.

Franz Cede

Why does almost all the researchon international negotiations

over the past 20 years make no use offormal theory, despite statements likethat of Young (1999) that “theprincipal tool for analyzing nego-tiations is the theory of games”?Indeed, a large amount of formal(although sometimes mathematicallydemanding) analysis of negotiation ingeneral is available, centered on someparadigmatic models like Nash’sbargaining scheme (1950) or Stahl’s(1972) and Rubinstein’s (1981)sequential models. Yet case studies ofimportant international negotiationsuse only the most elementary gametheory concepts (called proto-game-theory models by O’Neill [1994]),which means that concepts but noformal derivations have been used sofar.

The state of the art was characterizedthree years ago by the controversy sur-rounding the role of formal models—notably rational choice models—inpolitical science in general that waspublished in the journal InternationalSecurity in 1999. On the one hand were

political scientists like Walt whoclaimed that formal models havecontributed little to the progress ofpolitical theory as a whole; on the otherhand were exponents of formal theorysuch as Buena de Mesquita, Morrow,Zagare, and others who vigorouslydefended their points of view. Thelength of this discussion—more than100 printed pages centering on thethree criteria for scientific work (logicalconsistency and precision, degree oforiginality and creativity, and empiricalvalidity)—indicates that there areproblems indeed.

Our project will deal only with thatsection of political science defined byPIN’s mission. We seek insights intothe questions formulated by HowardRaiffa as early as 1991, as well asproposals for their solution:• How can rational choice theorists be

induced to make greater efforts torender their abstract concepts andresults more understandable andplausible—or “user-friendly”—topolitical and social scientists notwell trained to work with formalmodels?

• What can be done to encouragesocial scientists to use quantitativeapproaches—not only elementaryapproaches, but mathematicallymore advanced ones as well—intheir analyses of real-worldnegotiations problems?

• How can practitioners such aspoliticians and diplomats be madeinterested in and subsequently betaught to apply formal models oftheir more important problems, orat least to have formal modelsdeveloped and studied by theirexperts?We, the two editors of the proposed

project, representing our communitiesof scientists using the full range ofquantitative and non-quantitativemethods, are looking for approxi-mately 12 academics and practitionerswilling to write a substantial chapterof 20 to 30 pages dealing with thequestions raised above from the pointof view of specific models.

We invite proposals for contributionsbefore September 2002, although thiscall for proposals will remain openuntil the agenda is filled. The proposals

12

will be discussed by the PIN SteeringCommittee at its October meeting.Authors will receive more detailedinformation thereafter and will beasked to submit their chapters beforeJune 2003 and to present their chaptersat the PIN summer conference.

All correspondence should bedirected to

Ms. Ulrike NeudeckPIN NetworkIIASAA-2361 Laxenburg, AustriaPhone: +43 2236 807 267Fax: +43 2236 71313E-mail: neudeck@iiasa.ac.at

Rudolf AvenhausI. William Zartman

PIN BooksInternational Negotiation: Analysis, Approaches, Issues, 2nd Edition, V.A.Kremenyuk, editor, 2002, Jossey-Bass Inc. Publishers, San Francisco, CA, USA.ISBN 0-7879-5886-7

Preventive Negotiations: Avoiding Conflict Escalation, I.W. Zartman, editor,forthcoming, Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., Lanham, MD, USA.ISBN 0-8476-9894-7 (cloth) ISBN 0-8476-9895-5 (paper)

Power and Negotiation, I.W. Zartman, J.Z. Rubin, editors, 2000, The University ofMichigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI, USA.ISBN 0-472-11079-9

International Economic Negotiation. Models versus Reality, V.A. Kremenyuk,G. Sjöstedt, editors, 2000, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, Cheltenham, UK.ISBN 1-84064-167-3

Negotiating International Regimes: Lessons Learned from the United NationsConference on Environment and Development (UNCED), B.I. Spector, G. Sjöstedt,I.W. Zartman, editors, 1994, Graham & Trotman Limited, London, UK. (Now asubsidiary of Kluwer Academic Publishers.)ISBN 1-85966-077-0

International Multilateral Negotiation: Approaches to the Management ofComplexity, I.W. Zartman, editor, 1994, Jossey-Bass Inc. Publishers, San Francisco,CA, USA.ISBN 1-55542-642-5

International Environmental Negotiation, G. Sjöstedt, editor, 1993, SagePublications, Newbury Park, CA, USA.ISBN 0-8039-4760-7

Culture and Negotiation. The Resolution of Water Disputes, G.O. Faure, J.Z.Rubin, editors, 1993, Sage Publications, Inc., Newbury Park, CA, USA.ISBN 0-8039-5370-4 (cloth) ISBN 0-8039-5371-2 (paper)

Processes of International Negotiations, F. Mautner-Markhof, editor, 1989,Westview Press, Inc., Boulder, CO, USA.ISBN 0-8133-7721-8

ReferencesNash, J., 1950, The bargaining problem,

Econometrica, 18:155–162.O’Neill, B., 1994, Game theory models on

peace and war, in R. Aumann and S. Hart,eds, Handbook of Game Theory, Vol. 2,North-Holland:995–1053.

Raiffa, H., 2002, Contributions of appliedsystems analysis to internationalnegotiations, in V. Kremenyuk, ed.,International Negotiation, Jossey-Bass,2nd ed. (1st ed. 1991).

Rubinstein, A., 1981, Perfect equilibrium ina bargaining model, Econometrica ,50:97–110.

Stahl, I., 1972, Bargaining Theory, EconomicResearch Institute, Stockholm, Sweden.Young, H.P., ed., 1991, NegotiationAnalysis, U. of Michigan Press.

Young, H.P., 1999, International Security,23(4).

The Processes of International Negotiation Project

Copyright © 2002International Institute forApplied Systems AnalysisA-2361 Laxenburg, Austria

Telephone: +43 2236 807 267Telefax: +43 2236 71313

E-mail: neudeck@iiasa.ac.at

Managing Editor: Victor A. Kremenyuk

IIASA is a nongovernmental,international research institution

sponsored by scientific organizationsfrom 17 countries.

IIASA has member organizations inAustria, Bulgaria, China,

Czech Republic, Finland, Germany,Hungary, Japan, Kazakhstan,Netherlands, Norway, Poland,

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United States of America.