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CON-QUER-ING
WORLDHUNGER
THE CASE STUDY OF BURKINA FASO
Source: book and original author
CONQUERING WORLD HUNGER
Dedicated to the next generat ion of Burk ina Faso, a country that has been act ive ly f ight ing against and s lowly overcoming hunger and poverty s ince the Burk inabe revolut ion (1983-1987 ) , one of the most profound revolut ions in Afr ica’s h is tory against the propert ied explo i ters at home and abroad.
Typefaces used
Univers: Light/ Light Oblique/ Roman/ Light Condensed Oblique/ Light Ultra Condensed/ Condensed/ Condensed Oblique/ Bold Condensed/ Bold Condensed Oblique. Rockwell: Regular/ Italic/ Bold/ Bold Italic. Letter Gothic Standard: Medium/ Bold.
The editor’s commentaries in the main body of text are in green univers 57 condensed typeface as used in this sentence.
AN INTRODUCTION TO HUNGER
THE BURKINABE REVOLUTION
BURKINABE ECONOMY IN RECOVERY
THE WAR TACTIC
CONQUERABLE
KNOW THY ENEMY FIRST
TAB
LE OF CO
NTEN
TS
19
1
39
1
2
3
306
12
AN INTRODUCTION TO HUNGER
Promoting self-reliance &
empowerment
Food aid?
Flawed market system
Concentration of power and wealth
Hunger in the US
16
11
4
10
16
8
18
14
9
1
WORLD HUNGER AS STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE
THE CAUSE OF HUNGER
THE CAUSE OF POVERTY
PREVENTIVE SOLUTIONS
KNOW THYThe earth’s productive capacities are more than sufficient to provide adequate nutrition for every person, so it cannot be argued that malnutrition is somehow necessary and inevitable.
KNOW THYSahel savanna in SW Burkina
Faso, near Gbomblora on the
road from Gaoua to Batié:
Gbomblora is a department
or commune of Poni Province
in southern Burkina Faso.
Malnutrition is surely one of the most curable
of diseases. The earth’s productive capacities
are more than sufficient to provide adequate
nutrition for every person, so it cannot be
argued that malnutrition is somehow necessary
and inevitable. Since malnutrition generally means
the suffering of unnecessary and avoidable injury
or death, it can be viewed as resulting from a
form of violence. The violence of hunger is slow
and indirect, in contrast to the sort of direct
violence suffered during revolutions and inter-
national wars. It is due not so much to specific
actions of individual persons as to the social
structure in which individuals are embedded.
Tord Hoivik explains the concept of structural
violence in these terms (see figure 1): The defi-
nition of structural violence is based on the
gap between actual and potential conditions. . .
We take violence to mean the loss of life from
external and avoidable causes. Direct violence
has the form of acts directed against specific
individuals. . . . In structural violence, the
loss of life is caused by social conditions. . .
. We can recognize structural violence only at
the collective level, when we observe survival
rates that are too low relative to the resources
available. The cause of structural violence lies
in the social structure itself. When a society’s
means of survival, from clear water to qualified
medical assistance, are concentrated among the
upper classes, the majority of the population
has life expectancies lower than necessary.
In Johan Galtung’s conception of structural
violence, the basic idea is that there is such a
concept as “premature death.” This we know, because
we know that with some changes in social structure,
in general and health structure in particular,
life expectancy can be improved considerably. More
particularly, it may be possible to give to the
whole population the life expectancy of the class
enjoying appropriate health standards, that is, the
“upper classes.” The laevel enjoyed by them would
be an indicator of the potential possibility to
“stay alive” in that society; for all but the upper
classes that would be above the actual possibility
to stay alive. The difference when avoidable, is
structural violence. Premature deaths are attribut-
able not only to malnutrition but also to a host of
other factors including, particularly, sanitation
and health care services. However, it seems reason-
able to estimate that malnutrition accounts for
at least half of all structural violence. This is
especially apparent when we consider that sound nu-
trition can greatly increase an individual’s toler-
ance for poor sanitation or health care conditions.
WORLD HUNGER AS STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE
5
AN
INTRO
DU
CTION
TO H
UN
GER
KNO
W TH
Y ENEM
Y FIRST
Otherwise cited, the contents in the section, ‘World Hunger as Structural Violence,’ are adapted from Thomas Sankara Speaks: The Burkina Faso Revolution, 1983-1987, (New York: Pathfinder publisher, 2007)
We can recognize structural violence only at the collective level, when we observe survival rates that are too low relative to the resources available. The cause of structural violence lies in the social structure itself.
TORD HOIVIK’S CONCEPT OF STRUCTURAL VIOLENCEfigure 1
Structural violences such as premature death. Premature death is attributed to Malnutrition, sanitation, healthcare services.
ACTUAL CONDITION:
more than sufficient resources to provide adequate nutrition for every person.
POTENTIAL CONDITION: FLAWED SOCIAL STRUCTURE
Source: compiled by the editor.
8,611,428
DEATHS PER YEAR
During the most deadly of wars,
World War II, overall casualty rate was 8,611,428 deaths per year.
20,000,000
These numbers show very
clearly that historically
hunger has been far more
devastating than warfare.
There is no escaping the
conclusion that hunger
around the world constitutes
a slow and silent holocaust.
Malnutritioncauses an estimated 10 to 20 million deaths each year.
DEATHS PER YEARDEATHS PER YEAR
THE CAUSE OF HUNGER
Ever since Malthus, poverty and malnutrition have
been “explained” with vague references to overpopu-
lation. In The Good Earth, Pearl Buck showed how
the highly populated China of the 1920s suffered
through extraordinary famine. With an even larger
population now, however, modern China knows very
little malnutrition. If the difficulty is not the
absolute size of the populations of nations, is
the issue really population density? On the whole,
Latin America is rather sparsely populated, but
still it knows extreme and extensive malnutrition.
Is the issue population growth rates? Many contem-
porary analysts are greatly concerned with popula-
tion growth rates and what their consequences will
be in the next few decades, but these rates hardly
account for the extensive malnutrition that is suf-
fered now. In every region except Africa, overall
food production has been increasing at a faster
rate than population growth. People are producers
as well as consumers. It cannot be assumed that
Thomas Robert Malthus (1766-1834)
Malthus was an English scholar, influential in political economy and demography. He thought that the dangers of population growth would preclude endless progress towards a Utopian society: “The power of population is indefinitely greater than the power in the earth to produce subsistence for man.”
there is a fixed amount of food and that with more
people there necessarily must be less for each per-
son. When there is another mouth to feed there is
also another pair of hands to produce. The crucial
question of whether consumption outruns production
depends on many factors that go beyond simple body
counts. If population really is such an impor-
tant factor in explaining hunger and malnutrition,
someone ought to say just how it is important. In
saying that population growth is not the primary
cause of hunger I do not mean to suggest that popu-
lation growth is not a problem. Perhaps the best
understanding is that presented by William Murdoch:
“Rapid population growth and inadequate food sup-
ply have a common origin and a joint explanation,”
or in other words, “rapid population growth does
not cause the food problem—they share common
causes.” These common causes are poverty and
inequality (see figure 2).
Population growth
Population growth
CONVENTIONAL VIEW
BETTER VIEW
Poverty
Poverty
Hunger
Hunger
PERSPECTIVE ON THE ROLE OF POPULATION GROWTHfigure 2
9
“ “
The sources of hunger seem to be well known. By
most accounts the major factors behind food short-
ages are overpopulation, rising affluence, igno-
rance, weather disturbances, arid the shortage of
resources such as land, water, energy, and fertil-
izer. These conventional explanations are often
accepted rather thoughtlessly. How well do these
factors explain hunger in the United States? The
problem in this country is certainly not one
of having too large a population (demand) in
relation to the total amount of land or water
or energy resources (supply). The nation devotes
an enormous amount of money to schooling, so it
would be hard to see how education could be a major
factor. Although not the highest in the world, the
agricultural productivity of the United States,
measured on a per acre basis, is quite good. These
explanations offered to account for hunger else-
where just don’t work for the United States.
The problem in the United States may not be as
serious as it is elsewhere, but it is important
when we face the challenge of explaining hunger.
The problem clearly is not one of total
quantities but one of distribution. Why does this
maldistribution exist? Why is it that with more
than adequate per capita food supplies there is
still extensive malnutrition in the United States?
Hunger in the US
Rapid population growth does not cause the food problem— they share common causes.
These common causes are poverty and inequality.
Surely, the major cause of hunger and malnutrition
everywhere is poverty—it is the primary cause, but
obviously not the only cause. There are varieties
of middle- and upper-class malnutrition, as shown
by common obesity, heart disease, and other ail-
ments, but really widespread malnutrition—chronic
under nutrition—generally comes from not having
enough money to obtain adequate-food; If you have
money you eat well, no matter how fast the popula-
tion around you is growing and no matter how short
the supplies of energy or land or fertilizer. Money
is a good defense even against natural calamities.
Famine in the African Sahel is sometimes explained
by reference to local drought, but if the American
Midwest suffered through comparable weather dis-
turbances, American consumers would suffer no more
than minor inconvenience. If there is a shortage in
U.S. grain supplies, the most serious effects are
likely to be felt in the Soviet Union or in Asia,
not in the United States itself. It is the rules
of the marketplace that decide who gets what to
eat. In our Basic economics courses that seemed
a rather sound system, but there it was implic-
itly assumed that everyone had about the same
amount of money, and that the main differences
among us were differences in tastes. The fact
is that we have enormously, different capacities
to bid for goods in the market place.
AN
INTRO
DU
CTION
TO H
UN
GER
KNO
W TH
Y ENEM
Y FIRST
Otherwise cited, the contents in the section, ‘The Cause of Hunger,’ are adapted from Thomas Sankara Speaks: The Burkina Faso Revolution, 1983-1987, (New York: Pathfinder publisher, 2007).
There is widespread agreement that hunger is caused
primarily by poverty; unfortunately, however, most
accounts leave it at that.. We really should not
leave the question, satisfied with that explana-
tion. We should go on and try to account for pov-
erty itself. Large or rapidly growing populations
do not adequately explain the incidence of poverty
any more than they explain the incidence of hunger.
Some observers, recognizing that the problem in the
United States is not one of insufficient resources,
point to the unscrupulous activities of individuals
in government or industry, or to bungling, lazi-
ness, and ignorance either among bureaucrats or
among the victims of hunger. While the charges may
be true, hunger in America does not need scoundrels
or incompetents to explain it. Just like the vague
references to ecological limits, those charges do
not provide an adequate explanation. I agree with
Frances Moore Lappe and Joseph Collins, authors
of Food First, who argue that hunger and poverty
are primarily due to the concentration of control
over resources in just a few hands. But why does
this concentration of control exist and persist? In
my judgment, it is the ordinary, normal work-
ing of the prevailing market system that leads
THE CAUSE OF POVERTY
to poverty, and thus to widespread malnutrition
and hunger. It is obvious that the market system
prevents people from getting adequate food if they
are poor. It is not so obvious that the market also
helps to make them and keep them poor. The differ-
ences in our wealth levels are not accidental,
nor are they given by nature. They are certainly
not due simply to differences in our intelli-
gence or in our motivation to work. Many among
those who work the hardest are paid the least.
In her text on Nutrition and the World Food Crisis,
Mary Caliendo says that “faulty marketing systems
are prevalent in many developing nations. Systems
for marketing and the institutions, infrastruc-
tures, and modes of operation are often ineffi-
cient.” This may sound similar to what I am saying,
but it is really very different. Caliendo’s view is
that a defective market system can lead to poverty
and malnutrition. In contrast, I am saying that the
ordinary, normally operating market system leads to
poverty and malnutrition. Caliendo says that “many
parts of the social body suffer when the marketing
system breaks down,” but I say that the social body
suffers when the marketing system operates as it is
supposed to operate.
In the economist’s theoretical free market based
on pure competition, prices are determined by
costs—that is, by the amounts of capital and labor
expended in production. In the real world, however,
prices are determined by the “reciprocal demands of
the exchanging parties.” In other words, it is the
parties’ relative bargaining powers that deter-
mine the terms of exchange. The poor have little
bargaining power. By “market system” or “market
economy” I mean any social system in which economic
outcomes are determined primarily by freely nego-
tiated transactions between independent parties,
uncoerced by government or other regulations. In
a pure or totally free market of the sort that
Flawed market systemeconomists theorize about, prices are deter-
mined entirely by supply-demand relationships,
but these prices can be understood as resulting
from a sort of implicit negotiation process. The
major point of unreality in the idealized free
market is the assumption that all buyers and
sellers are of equal bargaining power. Even if
it were possible to start a market economy with
parties of equal bargaining power, it would not
stay that way. The account is somehow overlooked
by many economists, but the way in which the market
system concentrates power in the hands of some and
impoverishes others is very simple. The elementary
transaction of the market system is the bargain,
11
The market system explains the existence of poverty, and it explains the endless re-creation of poverty.
By circular causation with cumulative effects, a country superior in productivity and income will tend to become more superior, while a country on an inferior level will tend to be held down at that level or even to deteriorate further— as long as matters are left to the free unfolding of market forces.
the negotiated exchange. One’s bargaining strength
depends on the quality of one’s alternatives. Some
people (or companies, or countries) are stronger
than others.’ They have better options. Those who
have greater bargaining strength tend to gain more
out of each transaction than those who have lesser
bargaining strength. Thus, over repeated transac-
tions, stronger parties will systematically enlarge
their advantages over weaker parties. Bargainers
do not move to an equilibrium at which the benefits
are equally distributed, but instead move apart,
with the gap between them steadily widening.
Asymmetrical exchange feeds on itself, making
the situation more and more asymmetrical.
By circular causation with cumulative
effects, a country superior in productivity
and income will tend to become more superior,
while a country on an inferior level will
tend to be held down at that level or even
to deteriorate further—as long as matters are
left to the free unfolding of market forces.
AN
INTRO
DU
CTION
TO H
UN
GER
KNO
W TH
Y ENEM
Y FIRST
CHI
THE FREE MARKET ALLO
LDREN.feed their “the losers can
Many products imported to serve as pet food in
rich countries could have been used for direct
human consumption in poor countries.We know
this food is in very great demand by the fact that
much of the pet food sold in the United States
is actually eaten by people who cannot afford
any better. An educated guess has it that one-third
of the pet food purchased in slums is eaten by
humans, and “pet foods constitute a significant
part of the diet of at least 225,000 American
households, affecting some 1 million persons.”
BETTER THAN
“WS the big winners to
PETSfeed their
CHI
THE FREE MARKET ALLO
Concentration of power and wealthconcentration . . . “ and that “only the biggest
firms can proliferate new products and monopolize
supermarket space.” But we should continue to ask
why? Big firms have a great deal of power, but why
did they get big in the first place? Large corpora-
tions are partly a cause in the system, but they
can also be seen as effects. In my view, the steady
concentration of power in a few large corporations
is a natural and predictable effect of the working
of the economic system. The source of the problems
does not lie in the corporations themselves but
in the underlying economic system that creates and
recreates them (see figure 3). Carol Foreman, shortly
before becoming assistant secretary in the U.S.
Department of Agriculture, said that the problem
“is increased economic concentration in those seg-
ments of the food industry that sell to or buy from
farms . . . “ and suggested that “the solution is
to restore true free enterprise to the food indus-
try.” Free enterprise can be highly productive and
can yield a fair distribution of benefits—so long
as there are many small producers working primarily
for themselves. The difficulty is that such a free
enterprise system will not remain free. Foreman,
with others, fails to see that the market system
itself produces the concentration she wants
abolished. Such systems are not stable; over
time they would not tend toward equity for all
at some middling level.
Many observers attribute high food prices and hun-
ger and malnutrition to the concentrated power and
activities of the giant food conglomerates and mul-
tinational corporations such as Unilever, General
Foods, Ralston Purina, and H. J. Heinz. I think
they are right. But suppose we go further and ask
how these conglomerates came to be formed. Again,
no conspiracies, no white-collar crimes are needed
to explain it. The tendency toward concentration
of power is a natural consequence of the normal
working of the market system. The FAO also has
said there is a need to press to root causes: The
causes of inadequate nutrition are many and closely
interrelated, including ecological, sanitary and
cultural constraints, but the principal cause is
poverty. This, in turn, results from socio-economic
development patterns which in most of the poorer
countries have been characterized by a high degree
of concentration of power, wealth and incomes in
the hands of relatively small elites of national or
foreign individuals or groups.
Where did that concentration come from? In
many poor countries inequality has its roots
in their colonial history. However, if the source
were those historical events alone, their
effects could be expected to diminish over time.
It is quite obvious that the effects of histori-
cal colonialism are being sustained and even
amplified through an ongoing social structure,
a neocolonialism. The core of that structure
is the market relationship.
A flier on the U.S. food industry from Lappe and
Collins’ Institute for Food and Development Policy
(IFDP) poses the question, “Why growing concentra-
tion?” It answers that “advertising contributes to
How do we solve the poverty issue,thus hunger?
Instead, it is inherent in the structure and
dynamics of the market system that it produces
concentrations of power at one end and impover-
ishment at the other, squeezing out the middle.
That squeeze leaves many people hungry.
15
Concentration of power & wealthMarket system
Colonial history
Over populationWealth
Ignorance
Inadequate resources
Corruption
Greed
Poverty Hunger
LARGE CIRCLES: major casual factors leading to hunger.
SMALLER CIRCLES: causes judged to be relatively minor.
MAJOR & MINOR CAUSE OF HUNGER figure 3
AN
INTRO
DU
CTION
TO H
UN
GER
KNO
W TH
Y ENEM
Y FIRST
Otherwise cited, the contents in the section, ‘The Cause of Poverty,’ are adapted from Thomas Sankara Speaks: The Burkina Faso Revolution, 1983-1987, (New York: Pathfinder publisher, 2007).
How do we solve the poverty issue,
PREVENTIVE SOLUTIONS Promoting self-reliance & empowerment
Extension programs designed to help farm-
ers figure out their own answers to their own
problems generally are much more empowering
than programs designed simply to deliver fixed
answers worked out in some remote laboratory.
Direct feeding programs carried on over an ex-
tended period of time are likely to be weakening
to the recipients, destroying their incentive to
provide for themselves.
True preventive solutions to the problem: a. Strategies of increasing self- reliance are strategies of disengagement. b. Strategies of empowerment are designed to enhance the capacities of the weak to deal with the strong so that, over time, the distinction fades away and they instead deal with each other on an equitable basis.
During the Burkina Faso revolution (1983-1987), Thomas Sankara successfully employed a combination of the first and the second strategies to overcome the poverty and hunger in his nation. More on this in the following chapter.
to the purported beneficiaries. Which of these
labels applies depends not only on the general type
of program but also on the concrete contextual
circumstances under which it is carried out.
In short-term emergency situations, however, direct
feeding programs ‘can be strengthening in that they
can help people to “get back on their feet” so that
they can resume providing for themselves. Food aid,
whether in domestic welfare programs or interna-
tional assistance programs, typically is symptom-
atic, curative relief.
Are curative nutrition intervention programs
appropriate under oppressive social condi-
tions? To put the dilemma starkly, if a man is
lying under a crushing weight, do you administer
balms to soothe him and thus make life under that
weight more tolerable? Under what conditions is it
appropriate to help people adapt to systems that
themselves should be substantially changed? Escape
from the dilemma may come from asking in what ways
is it right to make the intolerable more tolerable?
In my view, the answer lies in learning to make the
distinction between interventions that strengthen
and interventions that weaken. Any remedial program
that increases dependence on a bad system should
not be sustained. Programs should be devised that
move away from, rather than reinforce, that system.
To revert to the highway analogy, the solution to
highway congestion is not more highways, but rather
other more congenial alternatives such as bicycle
paths. The solution to the hunger problem does
If one accepts the central argument of this study—
that the major cause of poverty and hunger is the
normal working of the market system, both within
and among nations—then remedies would require
either replacement of the market system with some
other system (such as a planned economy) or adapta-
tion of the market system (with interventions such
as welfare programs). The core of the analysis of-
fered here is not simply that the market system is
flawed but, more precisely, that poverty and hunger
result from unequal power relationships that are an
inherent part of that system.
Strategies of increasing self-reliance are strate-
gies of disengagement a. With increasing self-reli-
ance those who do not like prevailing rules of the
game—set up by others to serve the interest of oth-
ers—opt out and set up their own alternative rules.
Strategies of empowerment are designed to enhance
the capacities of the weak to deal with the strong
so that, over time, the distinction fades away and
they instead deal with each other on an equitable
basis. b. These two strategies are closely intercon-
nected because, as argued earlier, the major de-
terminant of one’s bargaining power is how well off
one would be in the absence of agreement with the
other party. The better off one would be if there
were no agreement, the more demanding one can be in
negotiating the terms of any proposed agreement.
Thus increasing one’s self-reliance can be seen not
simply as an end in itself but as a means of em-
powerment, allowing one to face others with greater
bargaining strength.
All nutrition interventions, as all development
programs are either strengthening or weakening
Thus it follows that true preventive solutions to
the problem require altering power relation-
ships through either disengagement of the weak
from the strong or enhancement of the power of
the weak relative to the strong—or through some
combination of the two.
17
not lie in promoting growth and trade that are
the essence of the market system, but rather it
lies in alternatives to the market system. The
problem of hunger will not be solved by increasing
dependency on market mechanisms but by finding ways
to enhance the power of those who are chronically
undernourished.
Developed countries regularly promote the idea
of a world of interdependence. We are led to
understand interdependence as meaning cooperation—
healthy interactions in trade and other sectors
that work to the benefit of all involved parties.
But interdependence can also mean dominance.
While those at the top of the world like to
think of interdependence as essentially
symmetrical, reflecting horizontal connections,
many others see it as vertical, with
themselves at the bottom. Many fear that
strengthening interdependence means
strengthening the grip of the rich on the poor.
In a situation of asymmetrical interdependence—
that is, dominance—the interacting parties
are very unequal, so that interaction
between them can lead to the more powerful
party’s benefiting substantially more than
the weaker party. The result is exploitation,
not cooperation.
When one finds oneself on the wrong end of a
structure of dominance, one remedy is to detach
from it. More specifically, if it is primarily
the market system that creates and recreates pov-
erty, the poor would be well advised to disconnect
from that system as much as possible. Increasing
independence can be achieved by increasing self-
reliance, and thus reducing one’s vulnerability
to exploitation by others. However, it should be
understood that the goal of self-reliance is not
autarky, isolated self-sufficiency. After self-
reliance is achieved, interaction with others
should be resumed. But then, since the individual
or nation would not depend on those interactions,
it would not have to accept whatever terms were
offered. Increasing self-reliance increases
one’s capacity to say no. That is, in the
exchange relationship, one’s bargaining power
depends on the quality of one’s alternatives.
If you depend totally on the local market for your
food supplies, you must accept the prices presented
to you. However, if you can provide for yourself
in other ways, you can press for better terms in
the market. Even if you do not actually use those
alternatives, the fact that they are available in
the background increases your bargaining power.
The achievement of increasing (not necessarily
total) self-reliance is not the end in itself, but
only a stage in the transition to the achievement
of healthy, equitable, cooperative relationships.
A high level of self-reliance is essential if in-
teractions are to be symmetrical rather than of the
dominant submissive kind that leads to exploita-
tion. We should not arrest development at the stage
of isolated self-sufficiency because we need one
another, materially and psychologically. We become
less than human if we do not interact. Nations,
too, need to exchange resources and services, and
they are mutually enriched through interaction. We
need one another, but on the basis of equality and
mutual respect, and not on the basis of subservi-
ence of one to the other.
As argued earlier, one of the major sources
of inequities is the phenomenon of displaced
decision-making. People suffer because they bear
the consequences of decisions made by others in
the service of others’ interests. The problems
that arise out of the disjunction between produc-
ers’ interests and consumers’ interests vanishes
when the producer and the consumer are the same.
This is the essential political rationale for
For decades, many African nations have been the weaker side of the asymmetrical interdependence– in servitude to European countries’ colonial subjection.
Refer to author’s note on page 50.
Thus the increasing capacity for self-reliance
improves the quality of your relationships in
the marketplace.
AN
INTRO
DU
CTION
TO H
UN
GER
KNO
W TH
Y ENEM
Y FIRST
Food aid typically is not based on any sort of
systematic analysis of the sources of malnutrition.
It does not address the causes. Food aid can be
ineffective or, worse, it can be counter-productive
through its diminishing local incentives to
produce food.
There is another more serious sense in which
food aid can be counterproductive. If the presently
prevailing social system is judged to be
fundamentally unjust, and if food aid and other
ameliorative programs are what permit the system
to continue, then in the long term those
ameliorative programs block needed changes. Band-
Aids can get in the way of radical surgery.
Indeed, ameliorative measures may be undertaken
Promoting self-reliance & empowermentfor precisely that purpose. Large-scale programs
such as the development of high yielding
varieties (HYV) of grains may be undertaken for
similar reasons. The “Green Revolution,” according
to Susan George, was, in fact, an alternative
to agrarian reform, which implies redistribution
of power; it was a means of increasing food
production without upsetting entrenched interests.”
It may be that food aid and welfare programs
are kept just at that minimum level required
to give people a continuing stake in the system
and make them resist temptations to take more
radical measures. In making them more tolerable,
cures may tend to perpetuate problems.
subsistence food production. Increasing self-
reliance in food means increasing emphasis
on local production for local consumption.
This approach may be applied at the regional
level (for example, Southeast Asia) or the
national, state, county, village, family,
or individual levels. In general, the
shorter the exchange loops, the less likely
that there will be extreme concentrations
either of wealth or of poverty.
Otherwise cited, the contents in the section, ‘Preventive Solutions,’ are adapted from Thomas Sankara Speaks: The Burkina Faso Revolution, 1983-1987, (New York: Pathfinder publisher, 2007).
Changes & progresses made
22
34
28
32
BURKINA FASO
THE BURKINABE REVOLUTION
THE COLONIAL ERA
1983-1987
1898-1960
THE BURKINABE REVOLUTION2
TACTICTHE WAR “ “
-Thomas Sankara, the leader of the revolution7
I bring you fraternal greetings from a country whose seven million children, women, and men refuse to die of ignorance, hunger, and thirst any longer.
Thomas Sankara, the leader of the Burkinabe revolution
TACTICTHE WAR
Peaks of Fabedougou, a village
in the Bérégadougou Department of
Comoé Province in south-western
Burkina Faso.
Source: Burkinabé government inforoute communale.
Burkina Faso – also known by its short-form name
Burkina – is a landlocked country in west Africa.
Burkina Faso is divided into thirteen regions (see
figure 4), forty-five provinces, and 301 departments.
The country’s capital is Ouagadougou in Centre
region. Its size is 274,200 square kilometers
(105,900 sq mi) with an estimated population of
more than 15,757,000. Formerly called the Repub-
lic of Upper Volta, it was renamed on 4 August
1984, by President Thomas Sankara, to mean “the
land of upright people” in Mòoré and Dioula, the
major native languages of the country. The inhab-
itants of Burkina Faso are known as Burkinabè.
Burkina Faso has a primarily tropical climate with
two very distinct seasons. In the rainy season, the
country receives between 600 and 900 millimeters
(23.6 and 35.4 in) of rainfall; in the dry season,
the harmattan – a hot dry wind from the Sahara –
blows. Three climatic zones can be defined: the
Sahel, the Sudan-Sahel, and the Sudan-Guinea. The
Sahel in the north typically receives less than 600
millimeters (23.6 in) of rainfall per year and has
high temperatures, 5–47 degrees Celsius (41–116.6
°F). Water shortages are often a problem, espe-
cially in the north of the country.
Burkina Faso was populated between 14,000 and 5000
BC by hunter-gatherers in the country’s northwest-
ern region. Farm settlements appeared between 3600
and 2600 BC. What is now central Burkina Faso was
principally composed of Mossi kingdoms. After a de-
cade of intense rivalry and competition between the
British and the French, waged through treaty-making
expeditions under military or civilian explorers,
the Mossi kingdom of Ouagadougou was defeated by
French colonial forces and became a French protec-
torate in 1896. The eastern region and the western
region, where a standoff against the forces of the
powerful ruler Samori Ture complicated the situ-
ation, came under French occupation in 1897. By
1898, the majority of the territory corresponding
to Burkina Faso today was nominally conquered. The
French and British convention of 14 June 1898 ended
the scramble between the two colonial powers and
drew the borders between the countries’ colonies.
BURKINA FASO
23
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Waterfalls at Karfiguela,
a village in the Banfora
Department of Comoé Province
in south-western Burkina Faso.
Lake Dourtenga, in Dourtenga,
departement of Dourtenga,
province of Koulpélogo. 1999
1 0Boucle du Mouhoun
9Hauts-Bassins
8Cascades
7Sud-Ouest
6Centre-Ouest 5
Centre-Sud
4Centre-Est
1 3Est
1 2Sahel
1 1Nord
3Centre-Nord
2Plateau-Central
1Centre
Primary school
in Dourtenga. 2008
Typical street scene in
Quagadougou, Burkina Faso.
Source: United Nations square-by GNU
licence by Helge Fahrnberger
1
4
THIRTEEN REGIONS OF BURKINA FASOfigure 4
25
In the village of Dourtenga,
departement of Dourtenga,
province of Koulpélogo.
February 2004
An aerial view of Ouagadougou
A village pump in BF,08 the
ree nursery is situated next
to the water pump in the
village to make watering.
Balga of Est. February 2010
4
1
13
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On the French side, a war of conquest against lo-
cal communities and political powers continued for
about five years. In 1904, the largely pacified
territories of the Volta basin were integrated
into the Upper Senegal and Niger colony of French
West Africa as part of the reorganization of the
French West African colonial empire. Between 1915
and 1916, the districts in the western part of
what is now Burkina Faso and the bordering eastern
fringe of Mali became the stage of one of the most
important armed oppositions to colonial government,
known as the Volta-Bani War. The French government
finally suppressed the movement. French Upper Volta
was established on 1 March 1919. This move was a
result of French fears of the recurrence of armed
uprising along with economic considerations, and to
bolster its administration, the colonial government
separated the present territory of Burkina Faso
from Upper Senegal and Niger. The new colony was
named Haute Volta. The colony was later dismantled
on 5 September 1932, being split up between the
Côte d’Ivoire, French Sudan and Niger. The decision
to split the colony was reversed during the intense
anti-colonial agitation that followed the end of
World War II. On 4 September 1947, the colony was
revived as a part of the French Union, with its
Market in Banfora, the capital
of the Comoe province. 2006 8
27
Central Market in Bobo-
Dioulasso, the second largest
city after Oagadougou. 2006
9
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previous boundaries. In 1955, under impact of co-
lonial revolution happening around the world, rep-
resentatives from 29 countries of Africa and Asia
held conference in Bandung, Indonesia. A revision
in the organization of French Overseas Territories
began with the passage of the Basic Law (Loi Cadre)
of 23 July 1956. This act was followed by reorgani-
zational measures approved by the French parliament
early in 1957 to ensure a large degree of self-
government for individual territories. Upper Volta
became an autonomous republic in the French com-
munity on 11 December 1958. Full independence from
France was received in 1960.
After gaining independence in 1960, the country
underwent many governmental changes until arriving
at its current form, a semi-presidential repub-
lic. In 1961, it joined nonaligned movement. The
purpose of the organization as stated in the speech
given by Fidel Castro during the Havana Declaration
of 1979 is to ensure “the national independence,
sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of
non-aligned countries” in their “struggle against
imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, racism,
and all forms of foreign aggression, occupation,
domination, interference or hegemony as well as
against great power and bloc politics.” In 1983,
in the midst of political turmoils, Thomas Sankara
led a popular uprising in Burkina Faso, then
Upper Volta, which initiated one of the most
profound revolutions in Afria’s history against
the propertied exploiters at home and abroad.
The revolution lasted for four years and ended in
1987 when Blaise Compaoré betrayed his long-time
friend and ally Thomas Sankara seized power in a
coup d’état with French help. Compaoré has been
the president since, reelected for three times.
Otherwise cited, the contents in the section, ‘Burkina Faso,’ are adapted from “Burkina Faso.” Wikipedia. Wikimedia Foundation.
AINof local assetsand in terms of
DRTAXATION &EXPLOITATION
MIGRATION.The French tax burden destroyed the
foundations of the economic system in which
it operated while simultaneously providing
the colonial administration with the means to
establish a new economy.
The French improved transport and communication
infrastructures and introduced cotton around
1900. But with the introduction of cotton came
the disruption of traditional cultures,
compounding drought and in turn causing famines
and epidemics in 1908 and 1914.
acted as a
COLONIAL ECONOMIC POLICY
both in terms of
AINDR
THE COLONIAL ERA
FRO
M 1898–1960
Because of its limited natural resources and
harsh climate, Upper Volta was relegated to the
back burner of French colonial economic devel-
opment. Until about World War I, the French
were merely a drain on the local economy. Wary
of the potential budgetary consequences of
its colonial advances, France had passed a
law in 1900 requiring that colonial govern-
ments be supported by the colonized. For
local administrators, this meant taxing the
indigenous. Taxation was carried to such an ex-
treme in Burkina that it turned into a system-
atic expropriation of the assets of Africans.
Taxes were first collected in seeds, livestock,
and cowries and later in French francs. Louis
Tauxier reviews the consequences of this level
of taxation: “The Mossi were compelled to re-
sort to trade in order to obtain the French
money they did not have.... To meet this dif-
ficult situation the Mossi now organize small
caravans in the villages, and send the young
men . . . to sell cattle, sheep, goats, asses,
horses, and bolts of cotton. They bring back
with them either French money or kola nuts.”
For lack of administrative resources and income
data, the French resorted to a head tax, ir-
respective of wealth and income, and to an
ad valorem tax on trading caravans that passed
through the colony.
With the creation of the colony of Upper Volta,
Governor Hessling undertook several economic
development projects. Construction boomed in
Ouagadougou to support the new administration:
Roads, government buildings, schools, a hospi-
tal, and a football stadium were built in the
new capital. The commercial production of cot-
ton was also encouraged. But, the exploitation
of Voltaic labor continued, forcing “thousands
of Mossi and other Voltaics [to flee] Ouagadou-
gou and the labor recruiters in the countryside
and [migrate] to the Gold Coast” during the
Hessling years. Increases in taxation contin-
ued as well. The culture of rubber, unsuccess-
ful earlier in the century, was resumed in the
late 1920s, and ground nuts were introduced. In
1930, however, the worldwide recession reached
Upper Volta, and prices for its commodities
collapsed. A drought compounded the crisis in
1931. Deprived of many of their assets and
weakened by emigration, Voltaics fared poorly
in the slump that eventually turned into a full
fledged famine. The administration took stock
of the economic failure of Upper Volta and the
heavy emigration—which betrayed its comparative
labor advantage—and partitioned the colony.
The partition of Upper Volta marked a return to
exploitation at the expense of development. The
main economic reason behind the partition was
the French attempt to redirect the migration
of workers away from the Gold Coast and toward
its own colonies. Cote d’lvoire benefited from
Voltaic labor in agriculture (mostly in cof-
fee and cocoa plantations and in the timber
industry) and for its infrastructure projects
(the port of Abidjan, the railway to Bobo-Dio-
ulasso). Sudan put Voltaics to work on agricul-
ture projects around the Niger River and on the
railway between Bamako and Dakar. Although most
of these projects had used Voltaic labor before
1933, the colony’s partition increased the flow
By forcing people to sell their assets, the French tax burden destroyed the foundations of the economic system in which it operated while simultaneously providing the colonial administration with the means to establish a new economy. The French improved transport and communication infrastructures and introduced cotton around 1900. But with the introduction of cotton came the disruption of traditional cultures, compounding drought and in turn causing famines and epidemics in 1908 and 1914. The French did little to help the Voltaics.
31
of workers and facilitated their administra-
tion by the French. Meanwhile, Upper Volta’s
development remained neglected and hampered by
the depletion of its labor force. In the period
that followed World War II and the re-creation
of Upper Volta, the French renewed their ear-
lier emphasis on general infrastructure and
agricultural development. By 1954 the railroad
from Abidjan reached Ouagadougou. Emigration
continued, however, as employment prospects in
Cote d’lvoire and Ghana still exceeded those
in Upper Volta. Agricultural credit was made
…the exploitation of Voltaic labor continued, forcing “thousands of Mossi and other Vol-taics [to flee] Ouagadougou and the labor recruiters in the countryside and [migrate] to the Gold Coast” during the Hessling years. Increases in taxation continued as well. The culture of rubber, unsuccessful earlier in the century, was resumed in the late 1920s, and groundnuts were introduced. In 1930, howev-er, the worldwide recession reached Upper Volta, and prices for its commodities col-lapsed. A drought compounded the crisis in
1931. Deprived of many of their assets and
weakened by emigration, Voltaics fared
poorly in the slump that eventually turned
into a full-fledged famine.
available, and irrigation works were begun
(including the first studies for the future
Sourou Valley scheme), but cash-crop production
remained at low levels, with annual sales of no
more than 4,000 tons of cotton seed. Livestock
production, in contrast, increased substantial-
ly, making Upper Volta the first West African
producer of meat. The 1950s witnessed the be-
ginning of the industrial exploitation of Pou-
ra’s gold and the setting up of the Service des
Mines. The first studies for the exploitation
of Tambao’s manganese were also undertaken.
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Otherwise cited, the contents in the section, ‘The Colonial Era,’ are adapted from Burkina Faso: Unsteady Statehood in West Africa, (Colorado: Westview, 1996).
THE BURKINABE REVOLUTION
F ROM 19 83 -19 87
The leader of the revolution, Thomas Sankara, was
born in December 1949 in Yako in the center of the
country. When Sankara was getting his training in
Madagascar as a soldier, tens of thousands of work-
ers and students organized mass demonstrations and
strikes in 1972 that toppled the government. The
scope and character of the popular mobilization had
a deep impact on him. It was also in Madagascar
that Sankara first became acquainted with Marxism,
through study groups and discussions with students
from France who had been part of the May 1968 pre-
revolutionary upsurge there. During a subsequent
stay in France in the late 1970s, taking training
as a paratrooper, Sankara scoured bookstores for
revolutionary literature, studying, among other
things, works by communist leaders Karl Marx and
V.I. Lenin. A lieutenant in Upper Volta’s army,
Sankara came to prominence as a military leader
during a border conflict with Mali in December
1974 and January 1975, a war he later denounced as
“useless and unjust.” Over the next several years,
Jailed briefly in 1982 after resigning a government
post to protest the regime’s repressive policies,
Sankara was appointed prime minister in January
1983 in the wake of a coup that made Jean-Baptiste
Ouedraogo the president of the country. Sankara
used that platform to urge the people of Upper
Volta and elsewhere in Africa to advance their
interests against the propertied exploiters at
home and abroad. This uncompromising course led to
growing conflict with proimperialist forces in the
government. In May Ouedraogo had Sankara and some
of his supporters arrested. But, in face of street
protests by thousands, Ouedraogo transferred San-
kara from prison to house arrest. In the following
months, social tensions deepened across the
country, heading toward a political showdown.
On August 4, 1983, some 250 soldiers led by Captain
Blaise Compaore marched from an insurgent military
base in Po to the capital of Ouagadougou. The
regime of Jean-Baptiste Ouedraogo was overthrown
in a popular uprising. Sankara became president
of the new National Council of the Revolution.
Over the next four years the popular revolutionary
government under Sankara’s leadership organized
the peasants, workers, and young people to carry
out deep-going economic and social measures that
curtailed the rights and prerogatives of the
region’s landed aristocracy and wealthy merchants.
They joined with working people the world over to
oppose imperialist domination. Mass organizations
of peasants, craftsmen, workers, youth, women,
and elders were initiated.
Thomas Sankara linked up with other junior
officers and soldiers dissatisfied with the
oppressive conditions in Upper Volta perpetu-
ated by the imperialist rulers in Paris and else-
where, with the support of landlords, business-
men, tribal chieftans, and politicians at home.
33
“ The democratic and popular revolution needs a convinced people, NOT a conquered people, not a people simply enduring their fate.
THE B
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Rally on Orodara
during revolution.
“
Thomas Sankara
“ A NEW PEASANT– serious, aware of his responsibilities,
turning to the future by arming himself with new technology.
Changes & progresses made
Upper volta, 1979. A peasant
cultivates milet using back-
breaking short-handled hoe.
200 volunteers build irrigation
dam near Puahigouya, September
1984, with women carrying stones
over half a mile to men working
at site. Between 1983 and 1987,
32 dams were built, compared to
20 in previous 23 years.
The revolution gives birth to
Tomato harvest, Sourou valley, 1986.
As a result of the creation of a dam
and irrigation system, people were
mobilized in this northern valley to
channel the river.
With broad popular support, the government
abolished tribute payments and compulsory
labor services to village chiefs.
It nationalized the land to guarantee rural
toilers—some 90 percent of the population—access
to the fruits of their labors as productive farmers.
The government launched tree-planting and
irrigation projects to increase productivity
and stop the advance of the desert in the Sahel
region in the north of the country.
The prices peasants received from the government
for basic food crops were increased.
1 .
2 .
3 .
4 .
3
3
“
Thomas Sankara
35BURKINA FASO AT THE TIME OF THE REVOLUTION
POPULATION 7,964,705 (1985) 90% in rural areas
NONAGRICULTURAL WORKERS
40,000 government 20,000 industrial handicrafts & manufacturing 10,000 construction
SURFACE AREA 105,869 sq. mi./ 274,200 sq. km
CAPITAL Ouagadougou
AVERAGE YEARLY INCOME US$150 (1981)
CURRENCY CFA franc During 1983-1987, this fluctuated between 300 and 500 to the US dollar
NATIONAL BUDGET 58 billion CFA francs (1985)
MAIN PRODUCTION & EXPORT GOODS
Cotton, hides and skins, live stocks, shea nut products, gold
ETHNIC GROUPS Over 60, among them: Mossi Peul Gourmantche Curunsi Bissa Samo Lobi Senufo Marka Bobo
53.0% 7.8% 7.0% 6.0% 3.0% 2.0% 2.5% 2.2% 1.7% 1.6%
53.0% 8.8% 6.6%
LANGUAGES SPOKEN Official language: French
Over 60 spoken, among them: Moore Diula Fulfulde
ILLITERACY 92% 98% in rural areas
HEALTH Life expectancy 43.8 years (1980)
Maternal mortality rate 601 per 100,000 live births (1985)
Doctors Nurses Midwives Assistant midwives
1 for every 37,494 (1988) 1 for every 12,366 (1988) 1 for every 28,397 (1988) 1 for every 31,267 (1988)
Infant mortality rate 208 per 1,000 live births (1981)
Refer to number 5 on the next page to see the improvement of the situation during the revolution.
THE B
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figure 5
4
“
Led by Sankara, the Burkinabe Revolution charted
a course of internationalist solidarity with
those fighting oppression and exploitation in
Africa and worldwide.
Sankara championed the fight of the people of
Western Sahara against the occupation of their
country by Morocco and helped lead a successful
fight to admit the Saharawi representatives to
the Organization of African Unity.
He actively organized support, in Africa and
beyond, for the struggle against the apartheid
regime in South Africa and for the Palestinians’
fight to reestablish their homeland.
Sankara campaigned for cancellation of the onerous
debt imposed on semicolonial countries by
imperialist governments and banks.
He spoke in New York City’s Harlem to demonstrate
support for African-Americans’ fight against
racist oppression and for other struggles by
working people in the United States.
It organized massive immunization campaigns,
and made basic health care services available
to millions. By 1985 infant mortality had
fallen from 208 for every 1,000 live births at
the beginning of the decade to 145, and the
accelerated spread of parasite-induced river
blindness had been curbed.
In a country where illiteracy was 92 percent—and
even higher in the countryside—literacy campaigns
in its indigenous languages were initiated.
Steps were taken to combat the age-old subjuga-
tion of women, who were encouraged to organize
to fight for their emancipation.
The government funded public works to build roads,
schools, and housing.
Trusting in the justice of the working class
and peasantry, it set up popular revolutionary
courts to try former leaders and high officials
accused of corruption.
Safe drinking water, three meals a day, a clinic, a school, and a simple plow. These are still elements of an ideal in life that millions of Burkinabe have not yet achieved.
Ceremony on August 4,
1986, in Bobo-Dioulasso,
Houet province, celebrating
third anniversary of
revolution. Banner says,
“Vaccinated children,”
part of the revolution’s
primary health campaigns.
5 .
6 .
7 .
5
8 .
9 .
1 0 .
a .
b .
c .
d .
“
Thomas Sankara
37
4
4
Construction of housing
complex, Ouagadougou, 1987.
A literacy class in Kamboincé,
March 1986. To combat 92 percent
illiteracy rate, the revolution
initiated campaign to teach
reading and writing in main
languages spoken in country.
Revolutionary government
launched “Battle for the Rail-
road” in early 1985, aiming
to link Ougadougou with north.
Here, volunteer government
employees lay track, March 1985.
6
8
8
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““
In August 1987, speaking in Burkina Faso on the an-
niversary of the revolutionary uprising four years
earlier, Sankara emphasized that, “The democratic
and popular revolution needs a convinced people,
not a conquered people—a convinced people, not
a submissive people passively enduring their
fate.” Growing numbers of workers, peasants, and
youth issuing from the ranks of such a people were
becoming involved in social and political life in
Burkina Faso, setting an example that was already
reverberating throughout Central West Africa—far
beyond the borders of that landlocked country.
On October 15, 1987, Capt. Blaise Compaore led a
military coup serving the interests of those—
at home and abroad—whose property and class
domination were threatened by this deep-going
revolutionary mobilization. Sankara and twelve
of his aides and bodyguards were assassinated
and the revolutionary government destroyed.
Thomas Sankara has himself become a symbol
for millions of workers, peasants, and youth
throughout Africa especially, who recognize in
the Burkinabe Revolution—and in its continuing
political heritage—a source of political ideas
and inspiration for the battles for genuine
liberation on the continent.
We have built schools, clinics, roads, dams, enlarged our fields, done reforestation, and provided housing. Each Burkinabe feels
that wielding power is now his business.
Meeting of a Committee for
Defense of the Revolution
in Ouagadougou neighborhood,
August 1985. The CDRs aimed
to mobilize workers, farmers,
and youth to work together
to build a new society.
Otherwise cited, the contents in the section, ‘The Burkinabe Revolution,’ are adapted from Thomas Sankara Speaks: The Burkina Faso Revolution, 1983-1987, (New York: Pathfinder publisher, 2007).
Thomas Sankara
Economic growth amid poverty
Food Crops
Evolving Patterns of Livestock Production
A Small Country with Large Ambitions
42
42
48
42
46
50
THE ONGOING BATTLE FOR SELF-SUFFICIENCY
UNDERSTANDING BURKINA’S PERFORMANCE
BUKINABE ECONOMY IN RECOVERY3
ER-CONQUDespite its poverty and limited size, Burkina’s economy is somewhat better balanced and has been growing on average faster than that of many of its wealthier neighbors. In the 1980s alone Burkina’s real gross domestic product (GDP) grew at an average of 4.2 percent a year.
ER-ABLEChildren of Dourtenga,
a village of Dourtenga, province
of Koulpélogo. February 2004
CONQU
THE ONGOING BATTLE FOR SELF-SUFFICIENCY
IND
EPEND
ENCE–
POST REVO
LUTIO
N
Since independence, and despite the progressive
diversification of its output, Burkina has in fact
remained an agricultural economy, providing a
livelihood for the majority of the population but
also constraining the country’s development within
the erratic limits of land and weather. Indeed, the
performance of the agricultural sector had been
mostly disappointing until the mid 1980s. It began
the 1960s with low productivity, little integration
with other sectors, and few modern inputs. Most of
the cultivable land was fallow or uncultivated, and
the system functioned in near autarky, with on farm
consumption the rule and farmers purchasing few ag-
ricultural products. Although production grew over
time, its average annual increase of 2.2 percent
from 1965 to 1986 remained below population growth.
The situation changed in the 1980s. According to
the World Bank, the agricultural sector grew by
4.3 per their importance has been growing. Live-
stock, used primarily for exports and as a store
of wealth, consists of nearly 3 million cattle,
9.5 million sheep and goats, and more than 22
million poultry.
Burkina’s main food crops are rain-fed millet
and sorghum, whose short cycles and resistance to
drought are well adapted to the region’s brief and
erratic rainy seasons. These two cereals are used
in the preparation of to—a puree that, accompanied
by vegetable sauce and occasional meat or fish,
is the basis of most meals—and dob, the tradi-
tional sorghum beer. Output of millet and sorghum
has grown steadily since before independence,
despite competition for land from cash crops,
which has restricted the area given over to
millet and sorghum and shortened the length of
fallow, especially in the Mossi plateau. Produc-
tion averaged 560,000 tons in 1948-1957, 800,000
tons in 1961-1964, and 1 million tons in 1977-1981.
From 1981 to 1991 the average annual output was
Food crops
With a per capita gross national product (GNP)
between $200 and $300, Burkina is among the poorest
countries on earth. It is also a small economy in
absolute size, its GNP less than half of 1 per-
cent of that of the United States in 1992. Relying
mostly on the production of cereals for local con-
sumption and exports of gold and cotton, it has few
other resources than its work force, employed at
about 90 percent in an agricultural sector highly
dependent on erratic rainfalls. Yet despite its
poverty and limited size, Burkina’s economy is
somewhat better balanced and has been growing on
average faster than that of many of its wealth-
ier neighbors. In the 1980s alone Burkina’s real
gross domestic product (GDP) grew at an aver-
age of 4.2 percent a year. Minus a 2.6 percent
annual population growth rate, Burkina actu-
ally recorded annual per capita growth of 1.6
percent, a remarkable performance not only for
West Africa but by overall sub-Saharan African
standards. Although these statistics hide a bumpy
business cycle with dramatic year-to-year fluctua-
tions, data from the early 1990s suggest a continu-
ation and possible improvement of this performance.
1.418 million tons, with a substantial upward trend
from 1985 onward (see figure 6). The steady upward
trend in output continued in the early 1990s to
reach more than 2 million tons. Recent productiv-
ity increases are in marked contrast to the first
two decades of independence, when productivity
was estimated to have improved by only 25 percent
overall.
The production of rice has not experienced the
same record of growth. Average annual production
amounted to 17,000 tons in 1948-1957 and 33,000
tons both in 1961-1964 and 1977-1981. From 1960 to
1980 the yield per hectare increased by only about
15 percent. Furthermore, unlike millet and sorghum,
rice stagnated in the 1980s, with an average pro-
duction slightly below 33,000 tons for the period
Economic growth amid poverty
43
BU
RKINA
BE ECO
NO
MY IN
RECOVERY
1981-1991, forcing Burkina to remain an importer
of Asian rice. Output growth seemed, however,
to have resumed at the end of the decade:
The average production for 1988-1991 amounted
to 43,500 tons.
Maize is grown primarily by households on land that
surrounds their compounds and is usually consid-
ered an adjuvant cereal. Its production, too, has
grown steadily since the early 1980s, climbing
from 98,000 tons in 1980 to 296,000 tons in 1991.
Yams, sweet potatoes, cassava, and other fruits and
vegetables are usually grown on small individual
plots, and production estimates are unreliable and
hard to come by.
Despite the progress and modernization of the last
decade, Burkina’s cereal sector remains inward-
looking, subsistence-based, and technologically
backward. Only a small fraction of output is
marketed, and there is little exchange with other
sectors of the economy, both in terms of output
sales and input purchases. There even seems to be
little exchange within villages, for most compounds
consume what they themselves have produced. lac-
queline Sherman showed that in the Mossi region of
Manga, “a relatively market-oriented area, fami-
lies sell an average of only about 11 percent of
the sorghum, millet and rice they grow [and] buy
grain equivalent to about 6 percent of what they
produce.” In addition, technological development,
which has affected the cash-crop sector, has by-
passed most cereal farmers who still use the daba,
the traditional hoe, as their only tool. This lack
of market integration and technological progress
increases the vulnerability of cereal farmers,
who end up excessively dependent on their own
local conditions and crops.
The overall climatic deterioration from inde-
pendence to the mid-1980s no doubt accounted
in part for the relatively poor performance of
agriculture over the same period. A study by the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD) reckons that a national rainfall index
equal to 111 on average between 1960 and 1965 had
plunged to 91 between 1975 and 1980, and a World
Bank index of per capita food production fell from
100 in 1965-1967 to 84 in 1975, dragging the daily
caloric intake per head down to 93 percent of need
at the end of the 1970s. The situation stabilized
and actually improved following the 1983-1984
drought. Given available data, I estimate that the
rainfall index averaged 93 between 1980 and 1989,
and the World Bank contends that the food pro-
duction index improved by 20 percent since 1980.
This comes as no surprise in view of recent output
figures. Total cereal production reached 2 million
tons for the first time in 1988, more than twice
its 1980 volume. In the 1991-1992 campaign
a record harvest of 2.2 million tons was reached,
and in 1993-1994 a new peak was again achieved
at 2.5 million tons.
Nevertheless, in good as in bad years, the
overall food production picture hides
substantial regional differences. The regions
of Yatenga, Ouagadougou, and the north are
usually in deficit, while the west and southwest
experience frequent surpluses, and the east
and southeast hover around self-sufficiency.
Unfortunately, poor infrastructure often
prevents the redistribution of excess output;
as a result, the government has to resort
to food aid and food imports.
Food aid, most of it in the form of cereals,
increased from around 28,000 tons per year (2.5
percent of domestic production) in the mid-1970s
to 73,000 tons a year (4.6 percent of domestic
production) in the mid-1980s before contracting
to 44,000 tons (2 percent of domestic production)
in the early 1990s. The high level of aid of the
mid-1980s, in the wake of the drought of 1983-1984,
illustrates how food inflows tend to continue even
during surplus years, as donor reaction typically
lags behind the actual drought situation. Food
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imports follow the same pattern: They increased
by 37 percent, from CFAFr 32,051 in 1984 to CFAFr
43,921 in 1985, although the latter year witnessed
a good harvest. Food aid is either freely
distributed (with the potentially perverse
consequence of depressing the local market
prices and acting as a disincentive for farmers)
or sold at subsidized or full-market prices.
Faced with uncertain weather and crops,
Burkina’s farmers have developed strategies
of income diversification and risk prevention.
Thomas Reardon, Peter Matlon, and Christopher
Delgado have shown how rural people generate
“purchasing power in non-cropping occupations,”
later using that revenue to purchase food,
especially during the season immediately
preceding harvest, when shortages are most severe.
Reardon and his colleagues found the following
distribution of sources of income for Sahelian and
Sudanian households, respectively: agriculture 23
percent and 56 percent; livestock 22 percent and
6.3 percent; local nonfarming income (crafts,
services such as dob brewing, and commerce) 25
percent and 14 percent; non local, nonfarm income
(including temporary migrants’ remittances) 22.6
percent and 16.8 percent; transfers from abroad 7.8
percent and 7.6 percent (of which 4.2 percent and
0.1 percent in food aid and 1.9 percent and 6.8
percent in remittances from permanent migrants).
In other words, there is more than farming and
herding to Burkina’s farmers and herders.
Faced with uncertain weather and crops,
Burkina’s farmers have developed strategies of income diversification and risk prevention.
45CEREAL OUTPUT & COMMERCIAL PRODUCTION OF MAIN CASH CROPS
FOOD CROPS (THOUSANDS OF TONS)
GDP % GROWTH (CALENDAR YEAR)
figure 6
500
0
0
1,000
Millet & Sorghum
Maize
Rice (paddy)
1,500
2,000
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
15.7
9.8
-2.1-1.2
2.2
4.4
1.7 1.2
6.1
-0.4
1.3
4.8
RevolutionBefore revolution Post revolution
1,025
1,2621,188
1,0941,130
1,580
1,875
1,632
2,092
1,939
1,774
2,216
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Evolving Patterns of Livestock ProductionNext to cotton, livestock is the second most
important agropastoral commodity. It was once
Burkina’s major export but currently comes in third
place behind cotton and gold. Yet exports of live
animals still account for between 4 percent and
10 percent of all export revenue. In addition,
hides and skins contribute about 5 percent a year
to total exports. The dwindling importance of
livestock as an export has resulted from several
factors, including the surge in cotton and gold
output, the effects of drought on animal survival
rates (it takes two years to replenish a herd after
a drought), and the progressive sedentarization and
transformation of the formerly nomadic Peul herders
who traditionally managed livestock production.
Recessions in the regional markets (such as Cote
d’lvoire and Ghana, where virtually all livestock
is exported on hoof) and competition from Latin
American (mainly Argentinian) meat and subsidized
European meat have also hurt Burkina’s livestock
industry.
Apart from being an export commodity, livestock
also serves as a form of saving and investment,
as it grows and reproduces, weather permitting.
It is rarely eaten but rather sold in poor years
in order to purchase cereal. The traditional ar-
rangement for cattle herding has been for sedentary
farmers such as the Mossi, Bissa, and Gurmanche to
entrust their cattle to the seminomadic Peul herd-
ers. In exchange, all the milk produced by the cows
becomes the property of the Peuls, who also receive
small annual gifts and cash payments when they han-
dle the sale of an animal. The advantages to both
the Mossi and the Peuls are numerous. For both,
there are the benefits of specialization (the Peuls
are experienced herders and the Mossi able agricul-
turalists whose labor force is better used farm-
ing). Contracting-out herding also allows the Mossi
to keep the number of cattle they own secret “from
both neighbors and government tax collectors.”
Finally, the Mossi usually arrange for the herds to
be pastured in their fields after the harvest, ob-
taining thereby natural fertilizer. For the Peuls,
the first advantage is ownership of the milk, which
they use as a source of food and as a source of
income (Peul women sell milk and milk products such
as yogurt on local markets). By paying the Peuls
in milk, the Mossi are guaranteed against misuse of
their cattle; the care of the livestock becomes as
important for the herders as it is for the own-
ers. The addition of the cattle from the Mossi to
the Peul herds induces decreasing marginal costs
and thus represents little extra effort. The Peul
also benefit from the annual gifts (mostly food and
clothing), and the cash payments compensate for the
additional work of selling a Mossi’s cow.
Observers of Burkina’s rural life, however, have
noticed that this pattern of herding has been
changing since the 1970s. Today the Mossi are
more likely to let their own children herd their
cattle or to entrust it to other Mossi farmers who
have larger herds and more experience. The Mossi
selection of their own family members and people
from the same ethnic group suggests that the Mossi
have felt the need for additional monitoring. This
evolving pattern coincides with an increased
distrust between Mossi and Peuls. Mossi now
complain about “the destruction of crops by cattle
who accidentally enter into fields or gardens.”
Although it is legally the responsibility of the
herder to pay for the damage, “in fact, owners of
cattle involved are expected to, and do make sig-
nificant contributions to such settlements.” This
was not a problem until population pressure on
the Mossi plateau reduced the area available
for grazing and transhumance and increasingly
sedentarized the Peuls, making the traditional
herding contract less attractive for the Mossi.
If the Peuls are going to remain around the village
all year, the Mossi may as well have their chil-
dren take care of the cattle. Since the children
share the family’s interest in keeping the crops
47
safe, they are likelier to supervise the animals
more carefully, limiting crop destruction. Another
reason the practice of Peul herding has changed may
be related to the increase in droughts since the
early 1970s and the resulting need for the Peuls
to maintained a very moderate level of foreign
debts, their burden on the economy remaining
quite bearable. Its average debt per capita in
the 1980s amounted to $72 as against $403 for the
rest of UMOA countries and $240 for Africa in gen-
eral (see Table 4.4). Its total external debt had
reached $956 million or 35 percent of GNP in 1991,
whereas many African countries have a level of
indebtedness well over 100 percent of GNP.
On average, in the second half of the 1980s debt
servicing amounted to 8.5 percent of exports of
goods and services, representing thus a limited
toll on export revenue. One reason Burkina has
managed to keep a low level of indebtedness is
that it has avoided white elephant development
projects—those heavy in capital requirements and
poor in economic returns. Another reason is that
its low-income status has allowed it to benefit
from a high level of grants and very concession-
al loans in its development aid. In the 1980s
grants made up an average of 77 percent of total
disbursed gross official development assistance.
The main bilateral donors and creditors are
France (with an average annual disbursement of
$55.7 million), Germany ($27.8 million), the United
States ($26 million), the Netherlands ($24.1
million), and Italy ($14.1 million). Most disburse-
ments from multilateral agencies come from the
World Bank ($18.6 million), the European Community
($16.9 million), and the United Nations Development
Program (UNDP) ($10.6 million).
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Otherwise cited, the contents in the section, ‘The Ongoing Battle for Self-sufficiency,’ are adapted from Burkina Faso: Unsteady Statehood in West Africa, (Colorado: Westview, 1996).
UNDERSTANDING BURKINA’S PERFORMANCE
In view of the economic burden in Burkina’s colo-
nial past, its apparent cultural bias against sav-
ings, accumulation, division of labor, and techno-
logical innovation, its poor climate, few natural
resources, and landlocked situation, it seems a bit
of a miracle after all that its economy has been
performing relatively well—and certainly better and
more consistently than those of similar countries.
It is the paradox of growth amid poverty.
Some explanations for this are to be found in
institutional constraints, which have prevented
successive governments from going astray with their
fiscal and monetary policies. Burkina’s participa-
tion in the UMOA, the Franc Zone branch for West
Africa, has imposed a fiscal and monetary disci-
pline that has benefited the country’s public fi-
nances. Yet this variable cannot by itself account
for Burkina’s record, as other UMOA countries,
especially Senegal and Cote d’lvoire, have experi-
enced dramatic economic imbalances.
Another possible factor lies in Burkina’s very
poverty. With few resources, there have been fewer
opportunities for mistakes and indebtedness. Cote
d’lvoire had a more promising future than Burkina
in the 1960s and 1970s because it had greater natu-
ral resources. In the 1990s, however, the “Ivorian
miracle” has turned sour amid commodity price col-
lapse and foreign debt. In Burkina the impact of
the fall in the price of cotton in the 1980s was
only as bad as the importance of cotton revenue—
quite weak in comparison to cocoa and coffee in
Cote d’lvoire.
Third, just as culture augured ill for the develop-
ment potential of the peoples of Burkina, culture—
albeit another dimension of it—may hold part of
the answer of the paradox of growth amid pover-
ty. There is no quantitative or systematic data to
support this claim, but anecdotal evidence—starting
with the colonial labor policy—abounds in favor of
national attributes of hard work, probity,
and managerial competence.
These qualities of order and discipline are cer-
tainly exceptional assets . . . Burkina has managed
to avoid most of the major investment and manage-
ment errors which in many African countries have
led to large-scale disasters. Yet the problem with
using cultural explanations for economic perfor-
mance is accounting for the origins of the cultural
features in question.
The Burkinabe capacity for hard work may have its
origins in the harshness of their environment,
where subsistence and survival can never be taken
for granted. A possible explanation for its mana-
gerial competence could be found in the Mossi’s
experience with statehood and public account-
ability, which is a trademark of good gover-
nance. The checks and balances of the Mossi system
In its 1989 economic memorandum on
Burkina, the World Bank was atypically
generous with praise: Wherever they may
come from, foreign missions visiting
Burkina invariably report being favorably
impressed by the quality of public sector
management, the competence of the offi-
cials in charge, the reliability of accounting
documents, the regularity with which such
documents are produced and, consequently,
the speed with which an update of the current
situation can be obtained. Other character-
istics of Burkina are its sense of realism,
its determination to avoid prolonged budget
deficits, and the government’s capacity to
respond rapidly and decisively to threats
of financial slippage....
49
together with the practice of large-scale public
administration over several centuries may have laid
the groundwork for today’s relatively efficient
and responsive public service and government. In a
shorter-run perspective, the personal austerity
and ethics of Presidents Lamizana and Sankara
have set powerful examples.
In addition, whether “democratic” or dictatorial,
Burkina’s regimes have always entertained a measure
of popular participation that has increased public
accountability. Before committing to the struc-
tural adjustment program with the World Bank, for
example, the government brought together some 2,000
delegates from political parties, trade unions,
and other social and professional groups (includ-
ing agricultural producers and traditional group-
ings, such as churches and ethnic authorities)
in May 1990 to answer the question, “Does Burkina
need a structural adjustment program?” Delegates
voted in favor of a program that would not reduce
the overall wage bill, and the conference gave the
government a mandate to continue negotiations with
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) “while preserving the major gains of the
people.” Negotiations led to the signature in March
1991 of a structural adjustment facility (SAF)
with the IMF for an amount of $31 million to be
disbursed in three installments, conditional upon
program implementation, and in June it embarked
on a World Bank-sponsored structural adjustment
program worth $80 million. The SAF’s targets were
a GDP rate of growth of 4 percent, an inflation
of no more than 4 percent, the elimination of all
fiscal arrears, and a reduction in the current ac-
count deficit. The World Bank program concentrated
on public resource management and private-sector
incentives. Although the growth and inflation tar-
gets of the SAF were met, the government did not
successfully address the issue of fiscal arrears,
and the IMF did not disburse more than the first
tranche of its SAF. On 1 April 1993, however, it
approved a $67 million enhanced structural adjust-
ment facility (ESAF) for 1993-1995 to replace the
SAF on more generous terms.
In view of Burkina’s performance, the question can
be raised whether Burkina’s economy actually was
in need of such structural adjustment. After all,
Burkina’s past record was in line with the IMF
growth and inflation targets and the program rep-
resents a major increase in indebtedness. Indeed,
total gross foreign aid disbursements jumped from
$354 million in 1990 to $447 million in 1991 and
$462 million in 1992. Although grants increased
in a similar proportion to total disbursements
(maintaining a grant-to-total-disbursement ratio
of 75 percent for the 1990-1992 period), the abso-
lute value of loans rose quite significantly. Thus
overall indebtedness increased as a result of the
adoption of the structural adjustment program. In
fact, the decision to accept a program arose from
pressure from three directions. First, the World
Bank and the IMF themselves put considerable pres-
sure on most African governments to embark on these
flagship programs, and Burkina was no exception.
Indeed, the authors of the 1989 economic memoran-
dum, initiated by the bank, make no secret that it
was written from the perspective of leading toward
adjustment lending. Second, the Compaore govern-
ment’s more liberal fiscal policies had triggered
the problems of arrears accumulation. Finally,
under the Sankara government the country had been
relatively starved of foreign capital inflows, and
there was a domestic demand for money. It is not
necessarily an unreasonable contention that Burkina
could have got rid of its arrears and reduced its
fiscal and foreign imbalances without resorting to
the mixed blessings of adjustment lending. But that
is the topic of another book.
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A Small Country with Large AmbitionsThe boldness and radicalism of Thomas Sankara’s
foreign policy contributed much to putting his
country on the map in the early 1980s. From a dull
and marginal nation at the periphery of the world,
Burkina became the new child prodigy of anti-
imperialism, Third World pride, and development.
For the first time, it broke out of the francophone
circle as Sankara traveled the world and caught the
attention of the media. Before he died, Sankara was
nearing the international status of Ghana’s Kwame
Nkrumah, Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere, and Congo’s
Patrice Lumumba. His most important speeches had
been translated into English and published in the
United States.
Although his domestic policies contributed to the
world’s renewed interest in Burkina, it was most
of all his self-confident and provocative atti-
tude in foreign affairs that drew attention. Yet
upon closer scrutiny, it appears that CNR foreign
policy changed quite dramatically around the end of
1985, moving away from bold statements of indepen-
dence and velleities to export the revolution and
toward more pragmatic positions of cordial rela-
tions with Western donors and regional conservative
powers. This shift in foreign policy paralleled
an alteration of the domestic dimensions of the
revolution, characterized by Sankara’s attempt to
open up his increasingly isolated regime. Sankara
on the World Scene only hours after his seizure
of power, Sankara proceeded to revolutionize his
country’s foreign relations. His first step was to
accuse France of having sponsored both the CSP-2
regime and his imprisonment at the hands of his
army nemesis Some’ Yorian on 17 May 1983. President
As cited on page 17: Increasing independence can be achieved by increasing self-reliance, and thus reducing one’s vulnerability to exploitation by others. However, it should be understood that the goal of self-reliance is not autarky, isolated self-sufficiency. After self-reliance is achieved, interaction with others should be resumed.
Ouedraogo’s dismissal of Prime Minister Sankara
and his arrest on 17 May had indeed coincided with
the visit to Ouagadougou of President Mitter-
rand’s adviser for African affairs, Guy Penne, who
departed the next day. Supporters of the CNR have
ever since alleged that Penne came to encourage and
supervise this forcible political transition. The
CNR also frequently singled out the United States
for its “imperialism,” its support of Israel, and
its failure to sanction South Africa for its system
of apartheid. Because it, too, considered itself a
liberation movement, the CNR strongly identified
with the PLO, leading to Burkina’s concern with the
Middle East crisis.
To spread his message, Sankara took to every
available international platform, not least the
General Assembly of the United Nations, where his
speech of October 1984 garnered him many Third
World supporters. Although Sankara’s rhetoric
made him popular among some, it alienated those
he blasted. Official Development Assistance (ODA)
from France fell from $43.5 million in 1983 to
$26.8 million in 1985 and bounced back only when
the CNR became tamer and more cooperative in 1986
and 1987. The United States also grew weary of
Burkina’s rhetoric and its somewhat provocative
displays of friendship with Cuba and Libya.
Unfortunately for Burkina, the countries whose
policies it endorsed (such as Libya, North Korea,
Albania, and Yugoslavia) compensated little
for the drop in assistance from Western donors.
Libya, most notably, repeatedly failed to deliver
on its promises of financial assistance.
Otherwise cited, the contents in the section, ‘Understanding Burkina’s Performance,’ are adapted from Burkina Faso: Unsteady Statehood in West Africa, (Colorado: Westview, 1996).
“ For the popular masses,
INDEPENDENCE was
A V ICTORY over foreignoppression and exploitation.
“
Thomas Sankara
As we studied the successfu l groundwork of Burk ina Faso coping wi th the nat ional level of hunger and poverty, we shal l a lso not lose hope for the wor ld as i t s tands against wor ld hunger. Chi ldren of the next generat ion are wai t ing for us to take act ion. F i rs t s tep is to be at tent ive to the current s i tuat ion. Educate yoursel f and the ones around you. Then, spread the good news that
hunger is vincible for the people who ceaselessly fight against it.
Primary sources
Prairie, Michel, ed. Thomas Sankara Speaks: The Burkina Faso Revolution, 1983-1987. Second ed. New York: Pathfinder, 2007.
Kent, George. The Political Economy of Hunger: The Silent Holocaust. New York: Praeger, 1984.
Englebert, Pierre. Burkina Faso: Unsteady Statehood in West Africa. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996. Nations of Modern World: Africa.
Photo sources
Thomas Sankara. Bwak. “Thomas Sankara – the Leader Who Became a President and Remained a Leader.” Web. 15 Apr. 2012. p.20 <http://www.clubafrica.info/?p=30>
Drought. S, Mohd. “Drought Facts.” www.giglig.com. 9 May 2011. Web. 15 Apr. 2012. p. 31 <http://www.giglig.com/environment/drought-facts>
Various photos. “Burkina Faso.” Wikipedia. Wikimedia Foundation. Web. 15 Apr. 2012. p. 3, 22-27, 41 <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burkina_Faso>
designed & edited by Soo Kim 2012
Copyright © All pieces reproduced in this issue are under prior copyright by the creators or by contractual arrangements with their clients.
Manufactured in the United States of America/ printed in the Communication Design studio of Samfox School of Design & Visual Arts at Washington University in St. Louis.
Every reasonable attempt has been made to identify owners of copyright. Direct all inquiries regarding the content of this book to: [email protected]
Special thanks to George Kent, the author of The Political Economy of Hunger, one of the primary sources for this book, and also to Jean Ziegler, the author of La faim dans le monde expliquée à mon fils (world hunger explained to my son) for inspiring me to put this book together.
57
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T H E S U C C E S S F U L S T O RY O F B U R K I N A FA S O , a country that has been act ive ly f ight ing against and s lowly overcoming hunger and poverty s ince the Burk inabe revolut ion (1983-1987 ) , one of the most profound revolut ions in Afr ica’s h is tory against the propert ied explo i ters at home and abroad.