CONSIDERING THE PARADIGMATIC FRAME: SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH

APPROACHES RELEVANT TO RESEARCH IN MUSIC THERAPY

JANE EDWARDS, M Mus RMT*

Introduction

Music therapy research literature has broadened inrecent years to include reports of projects which usequalitative methods (Aldridge, 1996; Forinash, 1993;O’Callaghan, 1996a). This movement arguably re-flects asignificant philosophical shift in music ther-apy research from one which is based on a “scien-tific” or quantitative method of inquiry to one whichacknowledges that the quantitative method is onedirection possible within a wider range of ap-proaches to the pursuit and creation of knowledge inthis discipline.

Music therapy is marked by divergence betweenpractitioners as to the way music therapy is imple-mented to serve a patient’s needs, as well as by theperspective of the individual practitioner as to thereasons why the responses of the patient occur(Gfeller, 1995, p. 57). One area of concern for musictherapy researchers is the way in which the underly-ing beliefs of the researcher influence the focus ofparticular research questions (Gfeller, 1995, p. 56).These underlying beliefs have not received extensivediscussion in the literature to date. As Gfeller stated“. . . it is too seldom the case that research directionand methodology have been shaped by philosophicalprinciples” (p. 55).

While the concerns of Gfeller (1995) deal with the

underpinning beliefs about what occurs in practiceand then how this influences research, this paper isconcerned with a somewhat different direction, con-sidering fundamental ideas from within the social sci-ence literature as to how knowledge is created. AsAigen (1995) has explained, qualitative and quantita-tive approaches are not just methods in relation todoing research but rather have contrasting underpin-ning “axioms” which direct the nature and purpose ofthe inquiry. It is proposed that discussion of a range ofparadigms from the social sciences will elucidate fun-damental ideas in music therapy research approaches,while acknowledging that this distinction betweenpractice and research is made here for reasons ofconvenience to the argument rather than from astrongly held view by the author.

This paper, therefore, presents four emergent per-spectives which underpin research in the social sci-ences. While research approaches within the socialsciences are informed from significant movementswithin philosophy, it is beyond the scope of this paperto pursue an in-depth examination of the philosophi-cal writings and informants who developed theseideas. Instead, this paper indicates how a range ofphilosophical ideas have been taken up within thesocial sciences and have significantly influenced re-search directions and approaches. Significant writings

*Jane Edwards is a doctoral student in the Department of Paediatrics and Child Health at the University of Queensland. She is lecturer in musictherapy at the University of Queensland, School of Music, Brisbane, Australia 4072.The author wishes to thank her thesis adviser, Dr. Jim Nixon.

The Arts in Psychotherapy, Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 73–80, 1999Copyright © 1999 Elsevier Science LtdPrinted in the USA. All rights reserved

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in which these approaches have been defined andcompared will be presented.

Research Paradigms: Marking OutOntological Territories

The use of the term “paradigm” is ubiquitous inwritings that discuss the involvement of theory fromthe social sciences in research pursuits (Bruscia,1995; Guba, 1990; Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Peile,1994). While it is acknowledged that the term “para-digm” is “not cast in stone” (Guba, 1990, p. 17),nonetheless, a definition of the use of the term in thispaper is necessary.

Guba (1990) defined a paradigm as “a basic set ofbeliefs that guides action.” In the case of researchtheory in the social sciences, a paradigm is a beliefsystem or frame of reference through which any phe-nomena may be viewed—usually human experienceor behavior. Paradigms involve theoretical dimen-sions but are also total encompassing frameworks, theinfluence of which permeates all dimensions of an“approach.” While theories are understood as belong-ing with the “sphere of abstract knowledge or specu-lative thought,” a paradigm also includes dimensionsof practical application (Concise Oxford Dictionary,1990, p. 862).

The research paradigm exists to describe but notnecessarily explain the viewed information, experi-ence or object and directs the nature and form ofepistemology and method in pursuing a process ofinquiry. This attention to the descriptive rather thanexplanatory function of research paradigms is impor-tant in making distinctions between various ap-proaches’ understanding of the nature of such phe-nomena as objectivity, reality, method and truth.

Guba and Lincoln (1994) have urged researchersin the social sciences to consider paradigm assump-tions as vital to the development of practical strategiesof inquiry. They stated, “Paradigm issues are crucial;no inquirer, we maintain, ought to go about the busi-ness of inquiry without being clear about just whatparadigm informs and guides his or her approach” (p.116). Guba and Lincoln (1994) further stated thatresearch paradigms require belief, they are not falsi-fiable and must be taken on trust. They proposed thatthe “advocates of any construction must rely on per-suasiveness and utility rather than proof in arguing theposition” (p. 108).

These nonfalsifiable aspects, which inform a par-adigm, are described as the “ontology” or ontological

position of the paradigm. Potter (1996), in discussingapproaches to qualitative research, has explained on-tology as the beliefs that underpin and guide researchand states that“ . . . all scholars have a position,whether or not they realize it or can articulate it” (p.36). This ontology permeates the actions and the in-terpretations available to the researcher and the widerresearch community. Guba and Lincoln (1994) urgedresearchers in the social sciences to be concerned withunderlying ontology, or belief, and to value the iden-tifying of paradigmatic assumptions in commentingupon and debating perceived differences in researchorientations and practices.

Guba and Lincoln (1994) proposed three questionswhich dominate the nature of what they term “inquiryparadigms:”

1. The ontological question2. The epistemological question3. The methodological question.

These three aspects relating to the structure of aparadigm of inquiry can be defined as:

1. Ontology: What is understood as “reality”?2. Epistemology: What are the ways in which knowing

can be achieved within the frame of this “reality”?3. Methodology: What is the approach to research

practice (the doing of research), including the toolsof method in uncovering information/knowledge?

While not necessarily advocating an hierarchicalperspective to these questions within research ap-proaches, they proposed that “Questions of methodare secondary to questions of paradigm, which wedefine as our basic belief system or world view thatguides the investigator, not only in choices of methodbut in ontologically and epistemologically fundamen-tal ways” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 105). Therefore,explicit ontological foundations stated in discussionsof approaches to research are considered to result ininformed debate as to purposes and value of methodin addressing research concerns or questions. Onto-logical clarity results in an integrated approach toresearch, not one which is merely debated or criticallyassessed on the basis of methodological distinctionsand researcher preferences or experience.

Ontological Traditions Within SocialScience Research

A range of paradigms have significant influence onresearch practices in the social sciences. Four signif-

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icant ontological foundations which inform ap-proaches to research in social sciences are identifiedand described below. These distinctions are particu-larly highlighted in the writings of Guba (1990) andGuba and Lincoln (1994).

1. Positivism: that a natural order exists outside ofindividual experience of events or phenomena andthis natural order can be discovered through sci-entific inquiry. Scientific study must isolate andtest specific phenomena. Laboratory test findingscan be generalized to contexts outside the labora-tory.

2. Postpositivism:that a natural order exists but thatthere are unknowable dimensions to the “truth”which can be revealed though investigation. Mul-tiple perspectives or methods are required toglimpse or approximate the truth of an experienceor event.

3. Constructivism:that the reality experienced is con-structed by the participants/stakeholders in thesubject of the inquiry. Multiple realities exist,“there is no foundational process by which theultimate truth or falsity of these several construc-tions can be determined” (Guba, 1990, p. 26).

4. Critical theory: “ideologically oriented inquiry”(Guba, 1990, p. 23). Knowledge is derived fromthe social context in which values are constructedand enforced.

The four approaches presented here are by nomeans an exhaustive categorization of research ontol-ogies in the social sciences. Peile (1994), for example,categorized a range of paradigms as “positivist,” “in-terpretevist,” “critical,” “ecological” and “creative.” Itmay be argued, however, of all the approaches, thefour outlined above appear to have a highly developedand elegantly expressed discrete view to one another,promising that a discussion of the relative merits ofeach of these might be successfully attempted.

In viewing the categories above, positivism andpostpositivism can be positioned as “empirical,”while constructivist and critical theory perspectivescan be defined as “postempirical.” Positivism andpostpositivism are characterized by approaches whichvalue the discovery of truth as a relevant, constantconcept outside of the self and outside of societalcontexts and prejudices. Postempiricism, by contrast,has been defined as the position that “knowing any-thing for certain, that is, positively or absolutely, isimpossible” (L. M. Smith, 1990, p. 140).

Some writers have tried to present these ap-

proaches along a continuum (e.g., Potter, 1996, p. 36).While the continuum model offers hope and encour-agement that interlinking, rather than adversity,should characterize the pursuit of inquiry with regardsthe parameters of ontology, Bruscia (1995) has sug-gested that the continuum descriptor can be mislead-ing in relation to discussion of paradigm informants(p. 73). These views and approaches to an understand-ing of knowledge and how knowledge is created aremore appropriately positioned discretely rather thaneclectically.

Positivism

Positivism holds the view that reality exists outsidethe individual or community influence. A natural or-der is present in all activities and events. The discov-ery of this natural order is the purpose of research—toarrive at a conclusive truth regarding the reality ofthese activities and events. When scientific method isapplied rigorously, understanding can occur as to cau-sation, the effect one variable or phenomenon canhave on another to cause or create a certain outcome.Prediction, quantification and control are the hall-marks of this approach in epistemological and meth-odological terms.

Positivism in the social sciences borrows directlyfrom scientific method in the physical sciences. Pre-diction and control of the natural world, resulting inincreased knowledge, is the aim of the physical sci-entist and in the same way, the positivist in socialscience research makes a case for “how things reallyare” through approaching human behaviour and ex-perience as predictable and controllable.

Positivism and Postpositivism

The distinction between the positivist and post-positivist approaches is that the positivist is commit-ted to research falsified in a laboratory or near-labo-ratory context, whereas the postpositivist valuesinquiry takes place in real or “natural” contexts wherethe outcomes are not to be generalized from labora-tory to natural setting but rather from natural settingto natural setting.

Lather (1986) has proposed that postpositivism“ . . . allows a search for different possibilities ofmaking sense of human life, for other ways of know-ing which do justice to the complexity, tenuity, andindeterminacy of most of human experience” (p. 259).The postpositivists value multiple testing of a single

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event or phenomenon to elicit a wider range of infor-mation about the phenomenon. This is described asthe “testing of multiple explanatory models for agiven set of data” (Greene, 1990, p. 230).

Constructivism

Schwandt (1994) reviewed the contribution ofGuba and Lincoln (1994) to the development of aconstructivist paradigm. He noted that originally,Guba and Lincoln (1994) titled their approach “natu-ralistic” but then moved to the use of “constructivist,”recognizing that “constructivist, interpretive, natural-istic and hermeneutical are all similar notions” (p.128).

The ontology of constructivism, according to Lin-coln (1990), is that “reality is a social, and, therefore,multiple, construction . . . the aim of constructivistscience is to create idiographic knowledge, usuallyexpressed in the form of pattern theories . . . ex-pressed as working hypotheses, or temporary, time-and place-bound knowledge” (p. 77). Therefore,knowledge is understood as contextual or context-bound. Without reference to the context in whichknowledge is generated, there can be no understand-ing. All researchers must show awareness of the waysin which their own view is context bound and theways in which their experiences and view define anddirect the research gaze.

Potter (1996) has stated“ . . . constructivists . . . donot believe in an objective way of knowing. Construc-tivists believe that scholarly inquiry is conductedfrom a global perspective or world view that shapesthe process of research” (p. 40). Potter has furthersuggested that “Constructivists . . .reject the logicalpositivist view of an objectively real world, believinginstead that the world is subjectively constructed bythe meanings that people assign to observations” (p.40). Constructivists, therefore, create research pro-cesses that are able to capture the interaction betweenpeople, not as a way of categorizing or necessarilydefining that interaction, but rather to capture some-thing of the experience of an event as a discrete andconcurrently intertwined phenomena occurring be-tween two or more people.

Schwandt (1994) proposed that “constructivism”was an everyday thought process for humans. Hestated

. . . constructivism means that human beings donot find or discover knowledge so much as con-

struct or make it. We invent concepts, models,and schemes to make sense of experience, andfurther, we continually test and modify theseconstructions in the light of new experience. (p.126)

Critical Theory

The term “critical theory” is used to describe arange of conceptual and theoretical developments inphilosophy which emerged from the Institute for So-cial Research in Germany, established in 1923, alsoknown as the Frankfurt School (Danforth, 1995). Crit-ical theory developed from a philosophical movementand quickly became influential within sociology andeducation.

One of the central tenets of critical theory is thatknowledge is derived within a social context. Theknowledge created can therefore have the function ofsuppressing or oppressing groups within society andfavoring or enhancing the position of other groups. AsFoucault (1995) stated, “The history which bears anddetermines us has the form of a war rather than that ofa language: relations of power, not relations of mean-ing” (p. 68). Therefore, without acknowledgment ofthe social context of meaning and the purposes of themeaning ascribed, there can be no understanding ofthe phenomena viewed or no perspective to the realityof the knowledge according to the critical theory re-searcher in the social sciences.

Adorno (1995), also from the Frankfurt School,has proposed that causality, as put by a view from thephysical sciences, was problematic. In discussing theidea of being able to approach critique of ideology inany transcendent way he wrote:

Through the crudity and severity of the no-tion of causality, it claims to hold up a mirror tosociety’s own crudity and severity, to its de-basement of the mind.. . . In theopen-air prisonwhich the world is becoming, it is no longerimportant to know what depends on what, suchis the extent to which everything is one. (p. 296)

Any view, however, that the Frankfurt School andits contribution to the development of a unified ap-proach that can be swept up under the descriptor“critical theory” is rejected by a number of writersdiscussing the contribution of the critical movement(e.g., Giroux, 1982, p. 20). Kincheloe and McLaren(1994) cautioned that “Critical theory should not be

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treated as a universal grammar of revolutionarythought objectified and reduced to discrete formulaicpronouncements or strategies” (p. 139). Arguably,this treatment should not be afforded any movementor grouping of interrelated principles, however, thepost empirical movements require greater attention tothe use of the terms “critical theory” or “constructiv-ists” as descriptors because of the wide variance inwhat is meant by these terms.

This difficulty in identifying both a research com-munity and a unified research approach characterizesthe postempirical movements. This leads to difficul-ties in trying to define and establish distinctions be-tween approaches because such efforts seem to re-quire a reductionist stance. There is, however, somevalue in trying to draw out some of the features ofeach approach through comparisons between ap-proaches.

Critical Theory and Constructivism

J. K. Smith (1990) has suggested that some of thedistinctions between orientations to research ontolo-gies are related to the differentiation proposed be-tween objective and subjective. He has also suggestedthat within postempirical research approaches, “ob-jective” relates topatterns of reality rather than afixed, structured reality and “subjective” relates to theinner experience of the individual in interaction withthis defined “reality” (p. 180). He stated that “[f]orcritical theory there can be no such thing as objectiveor disinterested, as traditionally defined inquirers andinquiry” (p. 181). This view is shared by the construc-tivists, however, the critical theorists place more em-phasis on the social dimensions of knowledge and theconstructivist on the value of the individual percep-tion in constructing and creating knowledge from ex-perience, whether shared within a community or heldindividually.

Guba and Lincoln (1994) have proposed that nov-ice inquirers receiving training in the paradigms ofcritical theory and constructivism must be helped to“ . . . understand the social, political, cultural, ethnicand gender history and structure that serve as thesurround for their inquiries, and to incorporate thevalues of altruism and empowerment in their work”(p. 115). This emphasis on context and relations ofpower is evident in much of the writings and researchwork of the post empiricists.

Empiricism and Postempiricism

The discussion of the approaches outlined above,which appears in the literature, is characterized by adistinct lack of response to the claims of the postem-piricists by the empiricists. Norris (1997) is an excep-tion to this observation. He has discussed the way inwhich the postempiricists have charged the empiri-cists with faulty knowledge and flawed processes ofinquiry. One way this has been attempted by the pos-tempiricist writers was to cite examples where re-search in science has been in error and the pursuit ofthe error has resulted in confusion and distortion offacts. Norris (1997) considers this claim rampantlyrelativistic and consequently flawed itself.

In discussing the implicit error in arguing that if inone case experimental science has been flawed, thenall cases of experimental science must be flawed.Norris (1997) wrote,“ . . . to view them [ad hoc dis-coveries in science] asrepresentativecases . . . is tofall into a version of that widespread error whichconfuses the context of discovery with the context ofjustification” (p. 2).

Norris (1997) extended his criticism of the ap-proach of the postempiricists to include an attack ontheir adherence to a belief in cultural relativism. Hewarned:

That these notions currently exert such wide-spread appeal is a symptom not only of thepostmodern retreat from values of truth and rea-son but also of the ethical bankruptcy entailedby this slide into an outlook of laissez-fairerelativism. (Norris, 1997, p. 3)

Norris’ (1997) perspective views the ideology of rel-ativism bleakly. His criticism, however, serves tosharpen the distinctions between the empiricists andpostempiricists.

Marking Out Epistemological Territory

Guba (1990) proposed that the epistemology of thepositivist is a “dualist/objectivist” position (p. 20).The positivist epistemology requires the inquirer to bedistant from (or what could also be represented as“objective” in relation to) the observed phenomena.Any contributions from the researcher, for example,knowledge about the desired outcomes of the testingor knowledge about the participant belonging to eithera group receiving an intervention and a group receiv-

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ing a placebo intervention, are thought to influenceand therefore “contaminate” outcomes. Methods ofdiscovering new information are valued for their con-trolling of the environment in which the testing takesplace in order to distill information for an outcomewhich demonstrates the influence of one phenomenaon another given a particular set of circumstances. Itis this “true” result which is to be believed even if itis counterintuitive to the researcher’s expectations ofthe outcomes.

The positivists’ belief position is that there is a“truth” which can be discovered through rigorous sci-entific method. The positivist view is that experimen-tal studies which adopt this method have outcomesthat are trustworthy. An important requirement is thatall elements which could influence the outcome of thestudy are controlled as much as possible and any biasin reporting by observers or participants is not cor-rupted or distorted by knowledge they may have as tothe hypothesis being tested.

The postpositivists also believe there is a truthwhich exists outside of the self but have less faith inthe genuineness of outcomes from studies to be ableto do any more than “approximate” this truth. Guba(1990, p. 23) positions the postpositivist as a “modi-fied objectivist.” The postpositivist position is one ofbelieving that research outcomes approximate orpoint to truth, they are not necessarily representativeof truth in and of themselves.

The epistemology of the Constructivist is one of a“subjectivist,” where the subject and the object areintertwined in what is termed a “monistic” item(Guba, 1990, p. 27). Any reality of knowledge de-rived from examination of this entity is not a result ofan outside view but a view constructed between theactors and participants of the inquiry.

Critical theory approaches also hold a subjectivistepistemology (Guba, 1990, p. 25). Inquiry is consid-ered political; a particular value orientation can dis-enfranchize or empower certain groups and knowl-edge has the function of increasing or decreasingpower to certain groups. Therefore, any epistemolog-ical considerations about the way in which knowledgeis generated and validated (or valued) are referencedto the social and political systems in which they aredeveloped. The goal of much of the research under-taken within a critical theory approach is to empoweror emancipate groups in society who are disen-franchized from the power system, whether political,social or economic (Wolin, 1992, p. 52).

Marking Out Methodological Territory: Qualitativeand Quantitative Approaches

Potter (1996) has positioned qualitative and quan-titative research processes as methodologies ratherthan paradigms or epistemologies. Some music ther-apy literature, by contrast, has discussed qualitativeand quantitative as discrete paradigms (e.g., Bruscia,1995). While qualitative and quantitative have para-digms which inform their epistemology and method,arguably methodology is an appropriate domain forthese approaches to be discussed.

Potter (1996) further defined methods as distinctfrom methodologies. He described methods as“tools—techniques of data gathering, techniques ofanalysis, and techniques of writing” (p. 50). Method-ologies, he claimed, are “perspectives on research;they set out a vision for what research is and how itshould be conducted” (p. 50). He therefore suggestedthat similar methods may serve a range of methodol-ogies.

One of the difficulties in approaching a discussionof qualitative and quantitative approaches is that toooften, qualitative, for some researchers, simply meansresearch in which nonnumerical data is used (e.g.,Macnaughton, 1996). Quantitative research can in-volve nonnumerical data; it is not the presence orabsence of numbers which provides information as tothe methodological orientation. This limiting of qual-itative and quantitative distinctions to enumerationcan mean that researchers comparing their studies inpurely methodological terms might not be aware thattheir ontologies conflict, however similar their meth-odologies may appear to one another. Analysis ofvideos of music therapy sessions, for example, areundertaken differently according to the ontologywhich frames the method of inquiry and the episte-mology which directs the method applied.

Potter (1996) noted the inclination for quantitativemethods to be described as different, or even adver-sarial, in relation to qualitative methods. He suggestedthat the literature indicates a disposition for a “strawman” argument to be established through the qualita-tive researcher stating what it is that a quantitativeresearcher does or represents and then attacking thisrepresentation of the quantitative approach (p. 266).Potter (1996) claimed that these descriptions fre-quently provide “caricatures” of scientific methodwhich can be easily refuted, apparently demonstratingthe superiority of the qualitative methodology.

Potter (1996) noted the tendency of qualitative re-

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searchers to define their research approach and statedthat this was an important requirement for qualitativeresearch because“ . . . with many key terms there isno established common usage of technical termswithin the field” (p. 252). Potter (1996) also sug-gested that qualitative research has been representedas a new and expanding field of research, however,this claim was attributed by Potter to the way in whichqualitative researchers have tended to define their ap-proach as different to other practitioners even whilesubstantial similarities could be identified.

Potter (1996) further criticized aspects of the qual-itative research literature for the way it portrays a“rising dominance myth” (p. 269). In this view it isimplied or stated that a revolution is occurring inways of undertaking research and that eventuallyquantitative methods will be superseded by qualita-tive methods. He suggested that the perceived growthin qualitative methods may be a result of the changesand developments in uses of definitions of qualitativeresearch rather than in a rising appeal and use of thesemethods.

Music Therapy Literature: A Brief Comment

The music therapy literature evidences a balancebetween the qualitative and quantitative methodolo-gies as approaches to research (O’Callaghan, 1996b;Wheeler, 1995). Qualitative and quantitative method-ologies are, however, arguably esoteric conceptswithout reference to the associated epistemology andontology to which the researcher adheres. While mu-sic therapy research writings have evidenced an ex-citing move toward a wider range of methodologies,there has been little attention given to the paradigmassumptions which support the approach taken.

Peile (1988), a social work researcher, has advisedthat

choice between research methods should not bemade merely on the basis of epistemologicalarguments, but . . . should also be based on thecompatibility of the research method with theresearcher’s own preferred paradigmatic as-sumptions or worldview, and these should bemade explicit so that they can be challenged. (p.8).

The call for the explication of ontologies in discussingresearch methods is timely for music therapy re-searchers to consider. Researchers may need to con-

sider that the arguments with other discipline specificresearchers may break down unless ontologies aremade explicit and discussed.

What has traditionally been viewed as “quantita-tive research” in the music therapy literature is argu-ably postpositivist because of its concern with thenatural setting and multiple testing. What has beenconsidered “qualitative research” is also able to bepositioned within the postpositivist paradigm.

How the constructivist orientation can inform awider range of research undertakings and the ways inwhich a critical theory approach can emphasize val-ues of emancipation for participants in researchthrough the outcomes generated needs further specu-lation. Curtis (1990), for example, approached thetopic of women’s professional life with the view ofempowerment for workers, but arguably, there is littleresearch in music therapy to date that is so clearlyable to be positioned within an emancipatory frame.

Conclusion

Guba (1990) proposed that what he termed “con-ventional” positivism has been met by the three alter-nate paradigms of “postpositivism,” “constructivism”and “critical theory,” each jostling for a share of thesupremacy afforded positivism within the researchcommunity. He suggested that a perspective, whichviews each as meritorious, is possible within the de-bate about which is the preferred paradigm. He con-cluded that the outcome of the paradigm dialogue,that is a discussion of the merits of each paradigm,will result in the emergence of a new, superior para-digm in the future; one which will“ . . . not be acloser approximation to truth; it will simply be moreinformed and sophisticated than those we are nowentertaining” (p. 27).

It is proposed that the paradigmatic distinctionsespoused by Guba and Lincoln (1994) may assistmusic therapists to be clearer about the research par-adigm, which informs inquiry work undertaken. Therole of ontology, epistemology and methodologywithin paradigmatic assumptions regards the processof creation and valuing of knowledge is an importantconsideration for music therapy researchers. Whilesuch a discussion may seem esoteric at this stage ofmusic therapy research, further exploration of the cur-rent state of play to explicate underlying paradigmaticassumptions will further strengthen and enliven theapproaches available in the broadening field of musictherapy research.

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