CONSOLIDATED APIRG/17 CONCLUSIONS Deliverable/ Target ... · 4 UT253 NV-KESOM-MOGDU-DCT-BKK India India to be approached to expedite ... Proposal Date of Proposal Route Description

APIRG/18 – WP/13 Appendix A

29/2/2012

CONSOLIDATED APIRG/17 CONCLUSIONS

Draft

Conclusions

No.

Title of Conclusions Text of Conclusions Follow-up Action To be

initiated by

Deliverable/

Intended

Outcome

Target

Dates

Status of

Implementation

Draft

Conclusion

18/xxxx NATIONAL PBN

IMPLEMENTATION

PLAN

That States,

(a) that have not already done so,

complete their national PBN

implementation plans as a matter of

urgency, using the template at

Appendix C to the report on agenda

item 2;

(b) consider the use of planning tools

provided by the PBN/GNSS Task

Force, as well as project management

software; and

(c) provide updates to Regional Offices.

(This Draft Conclusion is to supersede

APIRG Conclusions 17/47 and 17/48)

30

September

2011

30 Oct

2010

Many States have

still to developed

plans

Continuous

process

Continuous

process

Draft

Conclusion

17/47 NATIONAL PBN

IMPLEMENTATION

PLAN

That States:

(a) Use the Regional PBN

implementation plan template at

Appendix 3.4E to this report ,

for the development of a

national PBN implementation

plan and consider the action

planning provided by the Joint

PBN/GNSS/I Task Forces

Meeting to support planning;

(b) Provide feedback to the ESAF

and WACAF Regional Offices

by 30 October 2010 regarding


29/2/2012

-2-

2

Draft

Conclusions

No.


initiated by

Deliverable/

Intended

Outcome

Target

Dates

Status of

Implementation

progress in the development of

their national plans, indicating

any challenges, if any, that are

delaying the development of the

plan, as well as measures taken

or to be taken to overcome such

challenges; and

(c) Complete their National PBN

plans as soon as possible.

Draft

Conclusion

17/48

PBN

IMPLEMENTATION

TOOLS

That States:

(a) Use project management plans

and implementation action plans

provided by the PBN Task

Force, as well as project

management softwares (such as

Microsoft project or freely

available applications), to

support PBN implementation

activities; and

(b) Carry out a gap analysis using

the project plan template

attached to the report, or similar

approach, in order to more

accurately develop their PBN

implementation plans.


29/2/2012

-3-

3

Draft

Conclusions

No.


initiated by

Deliverable/

Intended

Outcome

Target

Dates

Status of

Implementation

Draft

Conclusion

18/xxxxx

LOWERING OF

RNAV/RNP ROUTES

UM214 AND UM215

That, concerned States States that have

not already done so, be urged to establish

the lowest usable flight level on the

RNAV routes UM214 and UM215 as

flight level 250 for operational reasons.

(This Draft Conclusion is to supersede

APIRG Conclusions 17/51)

ICAO ROs

Lower limit of

FL250

implemented

AIRAC

date of 13

Jan 2011

New Draft

Conclusion

18/xxxx

AFI PBN REGIONAL

PERFORMANCE

FRAMEWORK FORMS

That;

(a) the AFI PBN Regional Performance

Framework Forms are updated as at

Appendix 3X-1 to 3X-3, to the report on

agenda item 3;

(b) noting that the 2009 deadline

established in Assembly Resolution A36-

23 for the completion of State PBN

implementation Plans has passed, States

that have not done so, complete their

national PBN implementation plans as a

matter of urgency.

(This draft Conclusion supersedes

PBN/GNSS TF/1 Draft Conclusion 1/3).

Draft

Conclusion

1/04

DEVELOPMENT AND

IMPLEMENTATION OF

PBN NATIONAL

PLANS

That:

(a) ICAO Regional Offices assess the

PBN plans submitted by the States

against the available global and

regional guidance pertaining to PBN;

and

(b) ICAO should pursue its efforts


29/2/2012

-4-

4

Draft

Conclusions

No.


initiated by

Deliverable/

Intended

Outcome

Target

Dates

Status of

Implementation

towards establishing an effective

PBN programme with a view to

assisting States in overcoming PBN

implementation challenges.

(Deleted in view of APIRG Concl;

17/105 and PBN/GNSS TF/1 Draft

Conclusion 1/01)

Draft

Conclusion

18/xxxx

TRAINING IN

SUPPORT OF PBN

IMPLEMENTATION

That, in order to support the

implementation of PBN in the AFI

Region, AFI Regional Offices organize

seminars/workshops for training of

relevant personnel directly involved in

the implementation of PBN

(This draft Conclusion is to supersede

APRIG Conclusion 17/53)

Organize Seminars and

workshops

ICAO ROs

Seminars and

Workshops

2010-2012

Seminar

scheduled Dec.

2011

Draft

Conclusion

17/53:

TRAINING IN

SUPPORT OF PBN

IMPLEMENTATION

That, in order to support the

implementation of PBN in the AFI

Region:

a) PBN Task Force identify

priority training needs for

implementation for PBN;

b) AFI Regional Offices organize

seminars/workshops for training

of relevant personnel directly

involved in the implementation

of PBN.


29/2/2012

-5-

5

Draft

Conclusions

No.


initiated by

Deliverable/

Intended

Outcome

Target

Dates

Status of

Implementation

Draft

Conclusion

18/xxxx

AFI PBN

IMPLEMENTATION

REGIONAL PLAN

That:

(a) the AFI Regional PBN

Implementation Plan is updated as at

Appendix 4B to the report on agenda

item 4; and

(b) the Plan be included in the AFI Doc

003.

(This draft Conclusion is to supersede

APRIG Conclusion 17/46)

Implementation PBN

Regional plan

Update Doc003

States

ICAO ROs

Updated AFI

Regional PBN

implementation

plan

Updated

Doc003

According

to plan

31Mar

2011

Draft

Conclusion

17/46:

AFI PBN

IMPLEMENTATION

REGIONAL PLAN

That:

(a) The AFI Regional PBN

implementation plan is updated

and endorsed as at Appendix g

3.4D to this report, to more

accurately reflect PBN

implementation goals in

Assembly Resolution A36-23,

guidance in the PBN Manual

(9613), and Regional planning

guidance provided by APIRG;

and

(b) The Regional PBN

Implementation Plan be included

in the AFI Doc 003.


29/2/2012

-6-

6

Draft

Conclusions

No.


initiated by

Deliverable/

Intended

Outcome

Target

Dates

Status of

Implementation

Draft

Conclusion

1/07

IMPLEMENTATION OF

PHASE I OF AFI

GNSS STRATEGY

That AFI States which have not yet done

so:

(a) complete the implementation of

WGS-84 coordinates; and

(b) ensure that all the prerequisites are

met when implementing GNSS

applications for en-route and non-

precision approach (NPA) operations

in accordance with the current Phase

1 of AFI GNSS Strategy, and in

support of PBN operations.

Part (a) of the Draft Conclusion to be

merged with APIRG Concl.17/90 and

17/96.

Part (b) of the draft Conclusion to be

included in GNSS Implementation

Strategy

Proposal for AFI SIP

ICAO ROs

Dakar and

Nairobi.

Assist States

having

difficulties in

WGS-84

implementation

2012

Continuous

Process .

Draft

Conclusion

18/xxxx

REVISED TERMS OF

REFERENCE OF THE

PBN/GNSS TASK

FORCE

That, the terms of reference of the

APIRG PBN/GNSS Task Force are

revised as at Appendix 6A to the report

on agenda item 6.

*Note: ICAO has established the following Strategic objectives for the period 2011-2013

A: Safety: Enhance global civil aviation safety:

B: Security: Enhance Global civil aviation security;

C: Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development of Air Transport: Foster harmonised and economically viable development of international civil aviation that

does not unduly harm the environment.

APIRG/18 – WP/13

Appendix B 29/2/2012

APIRG 15 and 16 Outstanding Routes

Table 1A – Route segments still required, to be implemented by time of APIRG/18

IATA to review the requirements and re-submit the list with supporting details

No Route

Designator

Meeting Country Comment

1. UG402 APIRG15 Algeria, Niger, Burkina Faso, Benin Accelerate Implementation

2. UG404 APIRG15 Morocco, Algeria, Mali, Niger Accelerate Implementation

3. UG629 APIRG15 Morocco, Algeria, Mali, Niger, Nigeria Accelerate Implementation

4. UG981 APIRG15 Niger, Nigeria, Cameroun, Guinea, Gabon Accelerate Implementation

IATA to review & re-submit

5. UM220 APIRG 16 Sudan Review with South Sudan

6. UM365 APIRG 16 Sudan Review with South Sudan

7. UM665 APIRG 16 Sudan Accelerate Implementation

Table 1B – Routes/segments identified by ATM/AIM/SAR SG/12 as no longer required

1 UG403 APIRG15 Algeria, Niger No longer Required

2 UG616 APIRG15 Niger, Nigeria No Longer Required

3 UB525 APIRG 16 Ethiopia, Sudan, Egypt No Longer Required; UT124

4 UL612 APIRG 16 DR Congo, Sudan, Egypt No Longer Required; UG607

Table 2 - Unimplemented Routes/segments developed by PRND WG/1 (2010 ) to be implemented by time of

APIRG/18

No Temp.

Route

Designator

Route Segment Country Comment

1. UT127 TIKAR-MRW Sudan Internal Route structure Review

2. UT151 OXILO-DCT-LAG Nigeria VHF Coverage. To be reviewed in line

with required comms/surveillance

implementation.

3 UT152 MLK-DCT-LAG Sudan Implementation suspended; Suggest use

of UB763

4 UT253 NV-KESOM-MOGDU-DCT-BKK India India to be approached to expedite

implementation. ICAO interregional

coordination support required

5 UT261 BRN-DCT-ATMUL Egypt Awaiting Military Clearance

6 UT263 LUKRO-KAN Nigeria Implementation suspended; Suggest

UH206 via JOS To be reviewed by

Nigeria in line with required comms/

surveillance implementation

APIRG/18 – WP/13

Appendix B 29/2/2012

- 2 -

7 UT271 TLE-MPK Nigeria Implementation suspended; Suggest

UA609 via OPALA To be reviewed by



8 UG402 TMS-DCT-GAO-DCT-TYE Algeria On-going

9 UW900 OZT-GAO-LV (See UG981

APIRG 15)

Nigeria VHF Coverage To be reviewed by



Table 3- New User Preferred Routes

To be implemented by time of APIRG/18

N

o

Route

Designator

Route Segment Country Comment

1. UB533 DAR-Nampula (DV-

VNP)

Tanzania, Mozambique Extension of UB533 NV-VNP

Has been coordinated. Both

States to finalize

implementation.

Implementation January 2012

AIRAC date

2. UTxxx NBO-NDJ (BUN-FL) DR Congo, Chad Previously existed route

3. UG650 NBO-JED (NV-GWZ-

ASM-JDW)

Ethiopia, Eritrea Eretria/Ethiopia co-ordination

4. UTxxx NBO-ALG Sudan, Chad, Libya, Algeria New

5. UT384 DAROT- P4 Mogadishu, Seychelles Re-align to connect T940.

IATA to coordinate with both

States

6. RouteLab 3 ADD-BKK, NBO-BKK NONE in AFI ICAO Asia Region (8 Routes)

7. UQ579 DWA-IMKAT-EKBUL-

MUBAK-TAREM

Eretria, Ethiopia, Kenya,

Uganda

iFLEX route

8. UQxxx NBO-BKO Kenya, Uganda, DR Congo,

Cameroun, Nigeria, Ghana

and ASECNA.

iFLEX route

9. UQxxx IAD (Washington)-ADD Several Countries iFLEX route

Note: IATA agreed to undertake the task of re-assessing current route requirements and will provide an updated list of

priority routes to the Working Group in the form of a package for future implementation in the AFI Region.

----END----

APIRG/18 – WP/13

Appendix C 29/2/2012

AFI ATS ROUTES CATALOGUE (ARRC)

AFI/00X ATS Route Name: Entry-Exit:

Inter-Regional

Cross

Reference

if any

Users

Priority

Originator of

Proposal

Date of Proposal

Route Description States

Concerned

Expected

Implemen-

tation date

Implementation Status ANP Status Action Taken / Required Deadline for

each Action

Flight Level Band:

Potential City Pairs:

Conclusions/Remarks Last updated

AFI/00X ATS Route Name: Entry-Exit:

Inter-Regional

Cross Reference

if any

Users

Priority

Originator of

Proposal

Date of Proposal

Route Description States

Concerned

Expected

Implemen-

tation date

Implementation Status ANP Status Action Taken / Required Deadline for

each Action

Flight Level Band:

Potential City Pairs:

Conclusions/Remarks Last updated

- END -

APIRG/18 – WP/13

Appendix D 29/2/2012

______________________________________________________________________________

Page 1 of 2

PROPOSED REVISED TERMS OF REFERENCE (TOR)

PBN ROUTE NETWORK DEVELOPMENT WORKING GROUP (PRND WG)

A) TERMS OF REFERENCE

1. Review the AFI ATS route network in order to assess its capacity and constraints;

2. Based on the airspace user needs and in coordination with stakeholders (States,

International Organizations, user representative organizations and other ICAO

Regions), AFI Regional Performance Objectives, the Regional PBN Implementation

Plan, as well as related ICAO provisions and guidance material, identify

requirements and improvements for achieving and maintaining an efficient route

network in the AFI Region;

3. Propose a strategy and prioritized plan for development of improvements to the route

network, highlighting:

areas that require immediate attention

interface issues with adjacent ICAO Regions

the implementation of PBN

4. Develop a working depository for route proposals that will be used as a dynamic

reference document for ongoing discussions on routes under

development/modification. In this respect, the TF Working Group should explore the

utility that can be realized from the route catalogue concept/ATS route database;

5. Engage the necessary parties regarding routes under consideration;

6. In coordination with the ARMA, carry out safety assessment of the proposed changes

to the ATS route network;

6. Recognizing that, prior to implementation of new ATS routes or changes to existing

routes, States are to conduct safety assessments in accordance with provisions of

Annex 11 to the Chicago Convention, continue to sensitize States on the importance

of this obligation and need to coordinate with the ARMA;

7. After adoption by the ATM/AIM/SAR SG, or as delegated by the same, submit

completed route proposals for amendment of the Basic ANP Table ATS-1, to the AFI

Regional Offices for processing;

8. Assess the role that may be contributed by a special project for a comprehensive

review of the AFI ATS route network as envisaged by APIRG 15 and make

recommendations, with detailed project description if the role of a project is

confirmed.

APIRG/18 – WP/13

Appendix D 29/2/2012

______________________________________________________________________________

Page 2 of 2

B) COMPOSITION

It is recognized that in order to facilitate the effectiveness of proceedings of the Working

Group, the preferable core size of the Working Group should be about 15 members.

However, that this does not preclude other AFI States from attending proceedings of the

Working Group as necessary, the The PRND Working Group will comprise of:

a) experts nominated by AFI Provider States from both civil aviation entities and

military authorities;

Cape Verde, Ghana (to confirm), Kenya Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Seychelles,

Somalia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zimbabwe

(Agreed at the PRND WG/2 Meeting)

b) ARMA, ASECNA, IATA, IFALPA and IFATCA;

c) representatives from adjacent States and concerned international organizations (on

ad-hoc basis).

C) WORKING ARRANGEMENTS

The Working Group shall:

a) report to the ATS/AIS/SAR ATM/AIM/SAR Sub Group through the PBN TF (or its

successor); and

b) meet as required and at least once a year; and

c) use electronic communication between members as much as feasible.

------END------

APIRG/18 – WP/13 Appendix E

29/2/2012

ARMA/01/01 Page 1 of 5 25 July 2011

AFI RVSM SAFETY POLICY

JULY 2011


29/2/2012


2

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CONTENTS ..………………………………………………………………………… PAGE

SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 3

SECTION 2: RVSM OPERATIONAL APPLICATION ................................................. 3

SECTION 3: AFI RVSM SAFETY MAINTENANCE.................................................... 4

SECTION 4: AFI RVSM MAINTENANCE SAFETY OBJECTIVES .......................... 4

SECTION 5: AFI RVSM MAINTENANCE SAFETY DELIVERABLES ....................... 4

SECTION 6: STATE RVSM NATIONAL MANAGER 5


29/2/2012

3


AFI REDUCED VERTICAL SEPARATION MINIMUM

(RVSM) SAFETY POLICY

1. INTRODUCTION

This document, the AFI RVSM Safety Policy Document, sets out the Safety Policy and the Safety Objectives in order to guide the safe maintenance of the AFI RVSM system in the AFI Region.

The AFI RVSM Safety Policy Document is intended to provide a framework to facilitate the safety regulation process for the maintenance of AFI RVSM.

The AFI RVSM Safety Policy Document provides guidance to States to ensure that safety is continuously met, the aircraft approval process is effective, the target levels of safety are being met, operational errors do not increase and ATC procedures and equipment introduced to manage RVSM remain effective.

2. RVSM OPERATIONAL APPLICATION

The application of AFI RVSM is maintaining the safe vertical separation minimum of, 1000 FT, between adjacent State CAA RVSM Approved aircraft between the Flight Levels FL290 and FL410 inclusive. This provides six additional cruising levels to air traffic, increases the capacity of the Air Traffic Management system and facilitates the task of Air Traffic Services in maintaining a safe, orderly and expeditious flow of traffic. The additional capacity and system benefits of AFI RVSM shall, by facilitating the Air Traffic Control function, also continue to enhance safety benefits.

AFI RVSM shall be applied between State CAA RVSM approved aircraft within the confines of the designated AFI RVSM airspace. Therefore, all operators proposing to operate across the lateral limits of the AFI RVSM airspace shall be required to indicate on Filed Flight Plans their RVSM status i.e. W. Non-RVSM approved aircraft, other than bone fide State aircraft, shall not be permitted to operate within RVSM airspace. Non-RVSM approved State aircraft shall indicate on their Flight Plans, STS: Non RVSM.

Uninterrupted climb through AFI RVSM airspace to FL430 or above by non RVSM approved aircraft will be permitted.

Uninterrupted descent through AFI RVSM airspace from FL430 or above by non RVSM approved aircraft will be permitted

There will be no RVSM Transition Airspace within the AFI Region.

AFI RVSM requires that specific training of aircrew and ATC staff shall be performed to ensure safe RVSM operations. ATC equipment and procedures shall be maintained in such a way that they ensure the maintenance of safe AFI RVSM.


29/2/2012


4

3. AFI RVSM SAFETY MAINTENANCE

This Safety Policy has been established to meet the requirements of ICAO Standards, Recommended Practices, Global best practices and guidance material on managing collision risk consequent to safe AFI RVSM operations.

The following statements define the AFI RVSM Safety Policy:

(i) AFI RVSM applies an explicit, pro-active approach to safety management in maintaining continued safe RVSM operations.

(ii) The responsibility of management for the safe performance of AFI RVSM is recognised. Each States RVSM Program Manager is responsible for the overall management of RVSM within the State. The RVSM National Program Manager is responsible for liaison with the Regulatory Authority and ARMA.

(iii) AFI RVSM shall be conducted in accordance with ICAO provisions, Global best practices and guidelines as applicable.

(iv) 100% of aircraft operating within the designated AFI RVSM airspace shall be RVSM approved excluding bone fide non approved State aircraft;

(v) AFI RVSM shall minimise the contribution to RVSM related incidents by maintaining a safe RVSM system as far as is reasonably practicable.

4. RVSM MAINTENANCE SAFETY OBJECTIVES

AFI RVSM shall not contribute to an increase in incidents or accidents by ensuring that:

(i) In accordance with ICAO SARP’s the management of vertical collision risk within RVSM airspace shall meet the Target Level of Safety of 5 x 10 -9 fatal accidents per flight hour;

(ii) In accordance with ICAO SARP’s, the risk of mid-air collision in the vertical dimension within RVSM airspace, due to technical height keeping performance, shall meet a Target Level of Safety of 2.5 x 10 -9 fatal accidents per flight hour.

5. RVSM SAFETY DELIVERABLES

5.1 Collision Risk Assessment

A Collision Risk Assessment (CRA) shall be carried out annually in order to provide the evidence that the collision risk in RVSM airspace meets the Target Level of Safety required by ICAO.


29/2/2012

5


5.2 Safety Management System Plans

Each State shall ensure that their SMS plan appropriately addresses all RVSM System elements. These elements shall be made available during routine safety audits for review.

6 STATE RVSM NATIONAL MANAGER

The State RVSM National Manager shall facilitate the overall application and maintenance of RVSM in accordance with the AFI RVSM safety policy within the States area of responsibility.

Each State shall ensure that the ARMA has the most current contact details for the nominated State RVSM Manager.

---END---

APIRG/18 – WP/13

Appendix F

20/02/2012

MINIMUM RVSM DEFICIENCIES REPORTING LIST

Page 1 of 1

REDUCED VERTICAL SEPARATION MINIMA (RVSM)

1. AFI/RAN 8

Rec. 5/21

No safety data No contribution to CRA CAAs/ACCs to periodically

submit data to ARMA

Target date: 1/8/2011

2. Annex 6 No records of Approvals/

Withdrawals

2006 RVSM safety reduction in

separation

RVSM Approvals/Withdrawals

to be submitted to ARMA (F2,

F3)


3. Annex 6 No or limited Height

Monitoring

2006 No monitoring of ASE CAAs to comply with Height

Monitoring Plan


Note: ICAO Council definition of a Deficiency:

A deficiency is a situation where a facility, service or procedure does not comply with a regional air navigation plan approved by the Council, or with related

ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices, and which situation has a negative impact on the safety, regularity and/or efficiency of international civil

aviation.

APIRG/18 – WP/13

Appendix G 29/2/2012

_________________________________________________________________________________

1

TERMS OF REFERENCE (TOR) OF THE

AFI AIR TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT/METEOROLOGY (AFI ATM/MET) TASK FORCE

1. Terms of Reference

1.1 Under guidance from ICAO Secretariat:

a) Evaluate the current and future requirements for MET in support of ATM in the AFI Region

and update Regional Air Navigation Plan accordingly and provide guidance material to assist

States to develop MET services to meet these requirements;

b) Assess aviation meteorological services, systems and architecture in the region and how they

can integrate weather information into decision support tools;

c) Review and update the AFI Volcanic Ash Contingency Plan (VACP) and monitor VACP

exercises;

d) Investigate sub-regional exchange of MET information and associated agreements that

facilitate ATM operations particularly over busy routes that overlap different FIRs;

e) Promote coordination between MET and ATM communities in the AFI Region to enhance the

level of understanding of MET requirements and capabilities in support of ATM;

f) Monitor global policy associated with source data and delivery of MET products for ATM;

g) Coordinate with MET/SG and ATM/AIS/SAR/SG on framework for contingency plan for

specific phenomenon including volcanic ash, radioactive cloud, tropical cyclone and Tsunami

with reference to developments made WMO scientific steering committee;

h) Report to the MET/SG Sub-group of APIRG for further co-ordination through the ICAO

Secretariat with other relevant bodies.

1.2 The objective being to improve efficiency of ATM and airlines by providing tailored regional

MET products needed to optimize flight routes in all weather conditions.

1.3 The Benefits will be to increase efficiency – save time and fuel as well as reduce carbon emissions.

2. Work Programme

2.1 The work to be addressed by the AFI ATM/MET Task Force includes:

a) Develop regional MET requirements for ATM by:

conducting MET/ATM meetings (TF meetings, Seminars) to contribute in developing

MET requirements for ATM;

analyzing existing ATM/MET surveys and develop new surveys, when necessary, to

determine regional ATM requirements for MET;

recommending regional MET requirements for ATM to MET/SG Meetings;

Determining regional MET requirements for ATM.

APIRG/18 – WP/13

Appendix G 29/2/2012

b) Developing methods to use weather information in decision support tools;

c) Review and update the AFI Volcanic Ash Contingency Plan (VACP) by:

Regularly updating the VACP through new requirements from the IAVWOPSG

Conducting annual VACP exercises or AFI ATM/MET Volcanic Ash Exercises

(VAEX/AFI);

reporting on annual VAEX/AFI to MET/SG meetings.

d) Develop sub-regional exchange of MET information to facilitate ATM operations by:

Encouraging States develop agreements on the exchange of MET information that

provides benefits to ATM operations on sub-regional level;

Encouraging States report developments to MET/ATM TF and MET/SG meetings;

Developing sub-regional exchange of MET information to facilitate ATM operations in

busy routes.

e) Develop regional implementation plan for Meteorological Service for Terminal Area (MSTA)

by:

Monitoring developments of MSTA (pending approval at conjoint ICAO/WMO

Divisional meeting 2014);

Monitoring ICAO Annex 3 developments (requirements for MSTA);

Developing regional implementation plan for MSTA ;

Monitoring regional implementation of MSTA;

Reporting implementation progress to MET/SG.

Developing regional implementation plan for Meteorological Services for the Terminal

Area.

f) Monitor global policies associated with source data and delivery of MET products for ATM by:

monitoring global policies associated with source data and delivery of MET products for

ATM ;

reporting results to MET/SG meetings;

monitor global policies associated with source data and delivery of MET products for

ATM.

3. Composition

3.1 The Task Force is composed of experts from:

a) South Africa, Senegal, France, Kenya, Gambia and Morocco.

b) Representatives of VAAC Toulouse, ASECNA, IATA, IFALPA and WMO are expected to

participate in the work of the Task Force.

---END---

APIRG/18 – WP/13

Appendix H 29/2/2012

Page 1

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION

VOLCANIC ASH CONTINGENCY PLAN

AFI REGION

First Edition - April 2011

THIS DOCUMENT IS ISSUED BY THE WACAF AND NAIROBI OFFICES OF ICAO

UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE APIRG

APIRG/18 – WP/13


____________________________________________________________________________________________________

TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOREWARD ................................................................................................................................................... 3

1. ALERTING PHASE .................................................................................................................................. 6

2. REACTIVE PHASE ................................................................................................................................ 7

3. PROACTIVE PHASE ............................................................................................................................... 8

4. AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL PROCEDURES ............................................................................................ 9

ATTACHMENT A - ANTICIPATED PILOT ISSUES WHEN ENCOUNTERING VOLCANIC ASH .... 13

ATTACHMENT B - ACTION TAKEN BY METEOROLOGICAL WATCH OFFICES (MWO) ............. 15

ATTACHMENT C - ACTION TO BE TAKEN BY THE AFI VAAC IN THE EVENT OF A

VOLCANIC ERUPTION .............................................................................................................................. 16

ATTACHMENT D - PROCEDURES FOR THE PRODUCTION OF MODELLED ASH

CONCENTRATION CHARTS ..................................................................................................................... 17

ATTACHMENT E - EXAMPLE SIGMET, NOTAM, ASHTAM ............................................................... 18

ATTACHMENT F – MAJOR VOLCANOES IN THE AFI REGION ......................................................... 21

APIRG/18 – WP/13


____________________________________________________________________________________________________

FOREWARD

Within and adjacent to the Africa and Indian Ocean (AFI) Region there are areas of volcanic activities

which are likely to affect flight in the AFI Region. The major volcanoes in the region are located in

the following States: Algeria, Cameroon, Cape Verde Islands, Chad, Comoros Island, Democratic

Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, France (Reunion Island), Kenya, Madagascar, Mali,

Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Spain (Canary Islands, Madeira), Sudan, Tanzania

and Uganda. The names of the concerned volcano are listed in Attachment F (source: Smithsonian

Institution).

The AFI Volcanic Ash Contingency Plan sets out standardised guidelines for the alerting of aircraft

when eruptions occur, and procedures to be followed.

Volcanic ash is a hazard for flight operations. Recent encounters with volcanic ash have resulted in

one or more of the following and other problems:

Engine failures and malfunctions;

Subsequent failure of electrical, pneumatical and hydraulic systems;

Blocking of sensors, resulting inter alia in erroneous airspeed indications;

Smoke, dust and/or chemical pollution of cabin air; resulting in the need for aircrews to use

oxygen masks;

Communication problems;

Loss of visibility through cockpit windows.

Regulatory authorities of States of the Operator1, or State of Registry

2as appropriate, should therefore

prescribe appropriate operational procedures for flight crew to be followed in case of operation in or

near airspaces that are contaminated by volcanic ash. Operators are required by ICAO Annex 6 to

assess the risk of operation in volcanic ash and to implement appropriate mitigation measures in

accordance with their Safety Management System as approved by the State of the Operator.

It should be noted that this document is an air traffic management (ATM) contingency plan including

its interfaces with supporting services such as MET and AIS and that the Plan therefore primarily

addresses the Provider States3. Where distinct actions by the Meteorological Watch Offices (MWOs)

are described, these are additional procedures to be considered by MWOs. Where actions by

Volcanic Ash Advisory Centre (VAAC) and Aircraft Operators are described, these are for

clarification only.

Volcanic Ash can also affect the operation of aircraft on aerodromes. In extreme cases, aerodromes

might no longer be available for operation at all, resulting in repercussions on the Air Traffic

Management systems; e.g. diversions, revised traffic flow, etc.

These suggested procedures are not intended to establish or confirm a safe level of ash concentration.

Operation through any area where volcanic ash is forecast is at the discretion of the operator.

NOTE: All modeled ash concentrations are subject to a level of uncertainty relative to errors in

the estimation of the eruption strength.

1 The term “State of the Operator” refers to the role of a Contracting State as the regulatory authority with regard to aircraft

operators having been issued an Aircraft Operator’s Certificate (AOC) by that` State.

2 The term “State of Registry” refers to the State on whose register the aircraft is entered.

3 The term “Provider State” refers to the role of a Contracting State as responsible for the provision of air navigation services

within airspace over its territory and, as agreed by Regional Air Navigation Meeting, within defined airspace over the High

Seas.

http://www.volcano.si.edu/

http://www.volcano.si.edu/

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Considering that a commercial aircraft will travel about 150 km (80 NM) in 10 minutes and that

volcanic ash can rise to flight levels commonly used by turbine-engine aeroplanes in half that time,

timely response to reports of volcanic ash is essential.

It is imperative that information on the volcanic activity is disseminated as soon as possible. In order

to assist the staff in expediting the process in originating and issuing relevant messages (SIGMET,

NOTAM, ASHTAM), a series of templates should be available for different stages of the volcanic

activity. Examples of SIGMET, NOTAM and ASHTAM announcing volcanic activities in the

different stages and operational measures are contained in Attachment E. ASHTAM is promulgated

by service providers in the AFI Region, APIRG/16 Conclusion 16/52 refers.

A list of ICAO registered volcanoes should be available at the international NOTAM office with

volcano name, number and nominal position. The volcanoes in the AFI region are listed in

Attachment F.

In order to ensure the smooth implementation of the contingency plan in case of an actual volcanic

eruption, annual AFI ATM/MET Task Force Volcanic Ash Exercises (VAEX/AFI) should be

conducted.

Terminology

Area of Low Contamination: An airspace of defined dimensions where volcanic ash may be

encountered at concentrations equal to or less than 2x10-3

g/m3.

Area of Medium Contamination: An airspace of defined dimensions where volcanic ash may be

encountered at concentrations greater than 2x10-3

g/m3, but less than 4x10

-3 g/m

3.

Area of High Contamination: An airspace of defined dimensions where volcanic ash may be

encountered at concentrations equal to or greater than 4x10-3

g/m3, or areas of contaminated airspace

where no ash concentration guidance is available.

Note 1: Concentration areas are defined by the MET office co-located with the AFI VAAC:

Toulouse MET Office.

Note 2: “defined dimensions” refers to horizontal and vertical limits.

The response to a volcanic event that affects air traffic has been divided into three distinct phases

described briefly below. Volcanic activity at many locations is continuously monitored by the

scientific community. Furthermore, flight crew are required to report observations of significant

volcanic activity by means of a Special Air Report (Special AIREP). Arrangements are in place to

ensure that such information is transferred without undue delay to the appropriate aeronautical

institutions responsible for subsequent action:

ALERTING PHASE The initial response, “raising the alert”, commences when a volcanic

eruption is expected. Alerting information will be provided by SIGMET,

NOTAM or ASHTAM as appropriate and disseminated to affected aircraft in

flight by the most expeditious means. In addition to the normal distribution

list, the NOTAM/ASHTAM will be addressed to meteorological and

volcanological agencies.

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If it is considered that the event could pose a hazard to aviation, a Danger

Area4 will be declared by NOTAM around the volcanic source. Normally,

clearances will not be issued through the Danger Area.

REACTIVE PHASE The Reactive Phase commences at the outbreak of the volcanic eruption and

entrance of volcanic ash into the atmosphere and mainly pertains to aircraft in

flight. A “Start of eruption SIGMET” will be issued and a Danger Area will

be declared by NOTAM. Clearances will not be issued through the Danger

Area.

PROACTIVE PHASE The Proactive Phase commences with the issuance of the first Volcanic Ash

Advisory (VAA) and Volcanic Ash Graphic (VAG) after completion of

reactive responses. Supplementary modelled ash concentration charts may be

available. The volcanic ash forecasts up to T+18 hours are to be used to

prepare SIGMET. SIGMET shall be issued as soon as practicable but not

more than 12 hours before the commencement of the period of validity, and

shall be valid for up to 6 hours. The T+12 hours and T+18 hours (and further

into the future, if available) volcanic ash forecasts are to be used to prepare

NOTAM/ASHTAM. Significant changes may result in a reversion to a

temporary Reactive Phase situation and unscheduled issuance of VAA, VAG

and ash concentration charts by Toulouse VAAC MET Office, SIGMET and

NOTAM/ASHTAM. As appropriate, Danger Areas will be notified via

NOTAM.

Note that where SIGMET and NOTAM are mentioned in this document, volcanic ash SIGMET and

volcanic ash NOTAM are being referred to.

This document pays due respect to Standards and Recommended Practices in ICAO Annexes, WMO

procedures, and guidance material contained in ICAO documents, including, but not limited to, the

following:

ICAO Annex 3 – Meteorological Services for International Air Navigation; ICAO Annex 11 – Air

Traffic Services; ICAO Annex 15 - Aeronautical Information Services; ICAO Doc 4444 – Procedures

for Air Navigation Services – Air Traffic Management; ICAO Doc 8126 – Aeronautical Information

Services Manual; ICAO Doc 8896 – Manual of Aeronautical Meteorological Practice; ICAO Doc

9691 – Manual on Volcanic Ash, Radioactive Material and Toxic Chemical Clouds; ICAO Doc 9766

– Handbook on the International Airways Volcanic Watch; ICAO Doc 9859 – Safety Management

Manual; ICAO AFI SIGMET Guide; and WMO No.386 Volume I (Manual of Global

Telecommunications System) Part II (Operational Procedures for the Global Telecommunications

System).

4 Wherever this document discusses the possible establishment of Danger Areas, States are not prevented from

establishing Restricted or Prohibited Areas over the sovereign territory of the State if considered necessary by

the State concerned.

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1. ALERTING PHASE

1.1 This phase is characterised by a limited availability of information on the extent and severity

of the volcanic event. The purpose of this phase is to ensure the safety of aircraft in flight and to

promulgate information as a matter of urgency. Regardless of the extent of information available the

alerting phase actions should be carried out for every event.

1.2 ORIGINATING AREA CONTROL CENTRE (ACC) ACTIONS (eruption in its own flight

information region (FIR))

1.2.1 In the event of significant pre-eruption volcanic activity, a volcanic eruption occurring, or a

volcanic ash cloud being reported which could pose a hazard to aviation, an ACC, on receiving

information of such an occurrence, should carry out the following actions:

a) Define an initial Danger Area in accordance with established procedures, or if no such

procedures have been established the danger area should be defined as a circle with a

radius of 222 km (120 NM). If the eruption has not commenced or if no information on

upper winds is available, the circle should be centred on the estimated location of the

volcanic activity. If the eruption has started and predicted upper wind information is

available, the circle should be centred 111 km (60 NM) downwind from while enclosing

the volcano. The purpose of this initial Danger Area is to ensure safety of flight in the

absence of any prediction from a competent authority of the extent of contamination.

b) Advise the associated Meteorological Watch Office (MWO) and the appropriate

Volcanic Ash Centre (VAAC) (unless the initial notification originated from either of

these entities). The VAAC will then inform the appropriate ACCs.

c) Alert flights already within the Danger Area and offer assistance to enable aircraft to exit

the area in the most expeditious and appropriate manner. Aircraft that are close to the

Danger Area should be offered assistance to keep clear of the area. Tactically re-clear

flights which would penetrate the Danger Area onto routes that will keep them clear.

The ACC should immediately notify other affected ACC’s of the event and the location

and dimensions of the Danger Area. It should also negotiate any re-routings necessary

for flights already coordinated but still within adjacent flight information regions (FIRs).

It is also expected that adjacent ACCs will be asked to reroute flights not yet coordinated

to keep them clear of the Danger Area.

d) Ensure that a NOTAM/ASHTAM is originated. This must provide as precise

information as is available regarding the activity of the volcano. The name (where

applicable), reference number and position of the volcano should be included along with

the date and time of the start of the eruption (if appropriate). It is imperative that this

information is issued by the international NOTAM office and disseminated as soon as

possible.

e) In order to assist the staff in expediting the process of composing the

NOTAM/ASHTAM, a series of templates should be available for this stage of the

volcanic activity. Example NOTAM and ASHTAM are provided in Attachment E.

1.2.2 In addition to sending the NOTAM/ASHTAM and any subsequent NOTAM/ASHTAM to the

normal distribution list, it will be sent to the relevant meteorological agencies after adding the

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appropriate World Meteorological Organization (WMO) header. Example NOTAM and ASHTAM

are provided in Attachment E.

1.3 ADJACENT ACC ACTIONS

1.3.1 During the Alerting Phase aircraft should be tactically rerouted to avoid the Danger Area.

Any ash contamination should be contained within a limited area and disruption to traffic should not

be excessive. Adjacent ACCs should take the following action to assist:

a) When advised, re-clear flights to which services are being provided and which will be

affected by the Danger Area.

b) Unless otherwise instructed, continue normal operations except:

i) if one or more routes are affected by the Danger Area, stop clearing aircraft

on these routes and take steps to reroute onto routes clear of the Danger Area;

and

ii) initiate a running plot of the affected area.

2. REACTIVE PHASE

2.1 This phase commences at the outbreak of volcanic eruption. Major activities of the Reactive

Phase are: Issuance of an eruption commenced SIGMET, eruption commenced NOTAM/ASHTAM

and rerouting of airborne traffic. As appropriate, Danger Areas will be notified via NOTAM. This

phase will last until such time as the Proactive Phase can be activated.

2.2 ORIGINATING ACC ACTIONS (eruption in its own FIR)

2.2.1 The ACC providing services in the FIR within which the volcanic eruption takes place should

inform flights about the existence, extent and forecast movement of volcanic ash and provide

information useful for the safe conduct of flights.

2.2.2 Rerouting of traffic commences immediately or may be in progress if the alerting time has

been sufficient to facilitate activation of the Alerting Phase. The ACC should assist in rerouting

aircraft around the Danger Area as expeditiously as possible. Adjacent ACCs should also take the

Danger Area into account and give similar assistance to aircraft as early as possible.

2.2.3 During this phase the ACC should:

a) Maintain close liaison with its associated MWO. The MWO should issue a SIGMET

message on the extent and forecast movement of the ash cloud based on appropriate

sources of information.

b) Ensure a NOTAM is originated to define a Danger Area.

c) Ensure that reported differences between published information and observations (pilot

reports, airborne measurements, etc.) are forwarded as soon as possible to the appropriate

authorities.

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d) Should significant reductions in intensity of volcanic activity take place during this phase

and the airspace no longer is contaminated by volcanic ash, a NOTAMC cancelling the

last active NOTAM shall be issued stating the cause for cancellation; new ASHTAM

should be promulgated to update the situation. Otherwise, begin planning for the

Proactive Phase in conjunction with the affected ACCs.

2.3 ADJACENT ACC ACTIONS

2.3.1 During the Reactive Phase the adjacent ACCs should take the following action:

a) Maintain close liaison with the originating ACC to design, implement and keep up to

date measures which will enable aircraft to remain clear of Danger Areas.

b) In the event that tactical measures are required, the adjacent ACC should, in cooperation

with the originating ACC, impose such measures. .

c) Maintain a running plot of the affected area.

d) Begin planning for the Proactive Phase in conjunction with the appropriate ACCs

concerned.

3. PROACTIVE PHASE

3.1 The Proactive Phase commences with the issuance of the first VAA/VAG by Toulouse

VAAC after completion of the reactive responses. The VAA/VAG will contain forecasts of the

expected vertical and horizontal extent of the volcanic ash cloud, and its expected movement, at six-

hourly time-steps for the period T+0 to T+18 hours. In addition, the meteorological office co-located

with the VAAC will issue ash concentration forecasts to supplement the VAA/VAG information, at

six-hourly intervals with a nominal validity time of 0000Z, 0600Z, 1200Z and 1800Z which will

define Areas of Low, Medium and High Contamination.

3.2 Following the Reactive Phase, the VAA/VAG and (where available) ash concentration

forecasts should be used to define airspace volumes encompassing the furthest extent of

contamination predicted for that period. These volumes should be used to:

a) publish NOTAM indicating the extent of Danger Areas, indicating which areas of

contamination are included therein;

b) issue SIGMET warning of potential hazard from areas of volcanic ash contamination;

c) publish NOTAM to separately indicate the extent of Areas of Medium Contamination if

not included in a Danger Area.

3.3 Longer term forecasts (i.e. beyond T+6 hours) should be used to generate NOTAM in order to

ensure that adequate information is available to support flight planning. These messages should

differentiate between levels of contamination.

3.4 Operators should use the information published regarding Areas of Low, Medium and High

Contamination to plan their flights in accordance with their regulatory requirements and the service

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that will be provided in the airspace concerned. Operators should be aware that, depending on the

State concerned, Danger Areas may be established to contain an Area of High Contamination, Areas

of Medium/High Contamination, or Areas of Low/Medium/High Contamination.

3.5 The volcanic ash may affect any combination of airspace; therefore, it is impossible to

prescribe measures to be taken for any particular situation. Nor is it possible to detail the actions to be

taken by any particular ACC. The following guidance may prove useful during the Proactive Phase

but should not be considered mandatory:

a) ACCs affected by the movement of the ash should continue to originate

NOTAM/ASHTAM at appropriate intervals. ACCs concerned should continue to

publish details on measures taken.

b) Depending on the impact of the volcanic ash, the appropriate ACC may take the

initiative to organise teleconferences to exchange latest information on the

developments with Toulouse VAAC, ANSPs and MWO’s and operators concerned.

c) During this phase the VAAC should endeavour to assess the vertical extent of the ash

contamination and provide appropriate VAA/VAG to define the contaminated airspace

as accurately as possible. For the purpose of flight planning, operators should treat the

horizontal and vertical limits of the Danger Area to be over-flown as they would

mountainous terrain. Operators are cautioned regarding the risk of cabin

depressurisation or engine failure resulting in the inability to maintain level flight above

the Danger Area, especially where Extended Twin Operations (ETOPS) aircraft are

involved.

d) Any reported differences between published information and observations (pilot

reports, airborne measurements, etc.) should be forwarded as soon as possible to the

appropriate authorities; and

e) When the airspace is no longer contaminated by volcanic ash, a NOTAMC cancelling

the active NOTAM shall be promulgated. New ASHTAM should be promulgated to

update the situation.

4. AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL PROCEDURES5

4.1 If volcanic ash is reported or forecast in the FIR for which the ACC is responsible, the

following procedures should be followed:

a) relay all available information immediately to pilots whose aircraft could be affected to

ensure that they are aware of the horizontal and vertical extent of the ash contamination;

b) if requested, suggest appropriate rerouting to assist flights to avoid areas of known or

forecast ash contamination;

c) When appropriate, remind pilots that volcanic ash may not be detected by ATC radar

systems;

5 This information is adapted from the Manual on Volcanic Ash, Radioactive Material and Toxic Chemical

Clouds (Doc 9691). Refer to this document for full details.

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d) If modelled ash concentration charts are available showing Areas of Low, Medium and

High Contamination, the Provider State may establish Danger Areas. Depending on the

State concerned, the Danger Areas will be established to contain an Area of High

Contamination, Areas of Medium/High Contamination, or Areas of Low/Medium/High

Contamination;

e) In the absence of ash concentration guidance, the entire area of forecast volcanic ash

should be considered as an Area of High Contamination, for the purposes of applying

ATC procedures, until ash concentration guidance is available;

f) Normally, ATC should not provide a clearance for an aircraft to enter or operate within a

Danger Area. Assistance to enable an aircraft to exit a Danger Area in the most

expeditious and appropriate manner should be provided;

g) If the ACC has been advised by an aircraft that it has entered an area of ash

contamination and indicates that a distress situation exists:

i) consider the aircraft to be in an emergency situation;

ii) do not initiate any climb clearances to turbine-powered aircraft until the

aircraft has exited the area of ash contamination; and

iii) do not attempt to provide vectors without pilot concurrence.

4.2 Experience has shown that the recommended escape manoeuvre for an aircraft which has

encountered volcanic ash is to reverse its course and begin a descent (if terrain permits). However, the

final responsibility for this decision rests with the pilot.

5. GENERAL GUIDANCE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF ATS CONTINGENCY PLANS

FOR VOLCANIC ASH6

5.1 In a contingency plan relating to volcanic ash certain steps need to be taken to provide a

coordinated and controlled response for dealing with an event of this nature. Responsibilities should

be clearly defined for the manager in charge, supervisors and Air Traffic Controllers (ATCOs). The

plan should also identify the officials who need to be contacted, the type of messages that are to be

created, the proper distribution of the messages and how to conduct business.

5.2 ATCOs need to be trained and be made aware of the potential effects if aircraft encounter

unsafe levels of volcanic ash.

5.3 Some particular points of guidance are as follows:

a) Volcanic ash clouds may extend for hundreds of miles horizontally and reach the

stratosphere vertically;

b) Volcanic ash may block the pitot-static system of an aircraft, resulting in unreliable

airspeed indications;

c) Braking conditions at airports where volcanic ash has recently been deposited on the

runway will affect the braking ability of the aircraft. This is more pronounced on

runways contaminated with wet ash. Pilots and ATCOs should be aware of the

consequences of volcanic ash being ingested into the engines during landing and taxiing.

6 This information is adapted from the Manual on Volcanic Ash, Radioactive Material and Toxic Chemical

Clouds (Doc 9691). Refer to this document for full details.

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For departure it is recommended that pilots avoid operating in visible airborne ash;

instead they should allow sufficient time for the particles to settle before initiating a take-

off roll, in order to avoid ingestion of ash particles into the engine. In addition, the

movement area to be used should be carefully swept before any engine is started;

d) Volcanic ash may result in the failure or power loss of one or all engines of an aeroplane;

and

e) Airports might have to be declared unsafe for flight operations. This might have

consequences for the ATM system.

5.4 The ACC serves as the critical communication link between the pilot, dispatcher and

meteorologists during a volcanic eruption. During episodes of volcanic ash contamination within the

FIR, the ACC has two major communication roles. First and of greatest importance is its ability to

communicate directly with aircraft en route which may encounter the ash. Based on the information

provided in the volcanic ash SIGMET and VAAs and working with MWO, the ATCOs should be able

to advise the pilot of which flight levels are affected by the ash and the projected trajectory and drift

of the contamination. Through the use of radio communication, ACCs have the capability to

coordinate with the pilot alternative routes which would keep the aircraft away from the volcanic ash.

5.5 Similarly, through the origination of a NOTAM/ASHTAM for volcanic activity the ACC

can disseminate information on the status and activity of a volcano even for pre-eruption increases in

volcanic activity. NOTAM/ASHTAM and SIGMET together with special AIREPs are critical to

dispatchers for flight planning purposes. Operators need as much advance notification as possible on

the status of a volcano for strategic planning of flights and the safety of the flying public. Dispatchers

need to be in communication with pilots en route so that a coordinated decision can be made between

the pilot, the dispatcher and ATC regarding alternative routes that are available. It cannot be

presumed, however, that an aircraft which is projected to encounter ash will be provided with the

most desirable route to avoid the contamination. Other considerations have to be taken into account

such as existing traffic levels on other routes and the amount of fuel reserve available for flights

which may have to be diverted to other routes to allow for the affected aircraft to divert.

5.6 The NOTAM/ASHTAM for volcanic activity provide information on the status of activity of

a volcano when a change in its activity is, or is expected to be, of operational significance. They are

originated by the ACC and issued through the respective international NOTAM office based on the

information received from any one of the observing sources and/or advisory information provided by

the Toulouse VAAC. In addition to providing the status of activity of a volcano, the

NOTAM/ASHTAM also provides information on the location, extent and movement of the ash

contamination and the air routes and flight levels affected. NOTAM can also be used to limit access

to the airspace affected by the volcanic ash. Complete guidance on the issuance of NOTAM and

ASHTAM is provided in Annex 15 — Aeronautical Information Services. Included in Annex 15 is a

volcano level of activity colour code chart. The colour code chart alert may be used to provide

information on the status of the volcano, with “red” being the most severe, i.e. volcanic eruption in

progress with an ash column/cloud reported above flight level 250, and “green” at the other extreme

being volcanic activity considered to have ceased and volcano reverted to its normal pre-eruption

state. It is very important that NOTAM for volcanic ash be cancelled and ASHTAM be updated as

soon as the volcano has reverted to its normal pre-eruption status, no further eruptions are expected by

volcanologists and no ash is detectable or reported from the FIR concerned.

5.7 It is essential that the procedures which the ACC personnel, including supporting services

such as MET and AIS should follow during a volcanic eruption/ash cloud event described in the

foregoing paragraphs are translated into the local staff instructions (adjusted as necessary to take

account of local circumstances). It is also essential that these procedures/instructions form part of the

basic training for all MET, ATS and AIS personnel whose jobs would require them to take action in

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accordance with the procedures. Background information to assist the ACC or Flight Information

Centre (FIC) in maintaining an awareness of the status of activity of volcanoes in their FIR(s) is

provided in the ICAO monthly International Airways Volcano Watch (IAVW) website at:

http://www2.icao.int/en/anb/met-aim/met/iavwopsg/Pages/default.aspx under Worldwide Weekly

Volcanic Activity Reports webpage. The major AFI volcanoes are listed in Attachment F.

http://www2.icao.int/en/anb/met-aim/met/iavwopsg/Pages/default.aspx

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ATTACHMENT A - ANTICIPATED PILOT ISSUES WHEN ENCOUNTERING VOLCANIC

ASH

1. Air Traffic Controllers (ATCOs) should be aware that flight crews will be immediately

dealing with some or all of the following issues when they encounter volcanic ash:

a) smoke or dust appearing in the cockpit which may prompt the flight crew to don oxygen

masks (could interfere with the clarity of voice communications);

b) acrid odour similar to electrical smoke;

c) multiple engine malfunctions, such as stalls, increasing Exhaust Gas Temperature (EGT),

torching, flameout, and thrust loss causing an immediate departure from assigned

altitude;

d) on engine restart attempts, engines may accelerate to idle very slowly, especially at high

altitudes (could result in inability to maintain altitude or Mach number);

e) at night, St. Elmo's fire/static discharges may be observed around the windshield,

accompanied by a bright orange glow in the engine inlet(s);

f) possible loss of visibility due to cockpit windows becoming cracked or discoloured, due

to the sandblast effect of the ash;

g) cockpit windows could be rendered completely opaque; and/or

h) sharp distinct shadows cast by landing lights as compared to the diffused shadows

observed in clouds (this affects visual perception of objects outside the aircraft).

2. Simultaneously, ATC can expect pilots to be executing contingency procedures. This may

include a possible course reversal and/or an emergency descent.

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ATTACHMENT B - ACTION TAKEN BY METEOROLOGICAL WATCH OFFICES

(MWO)

IN THE EVENT OF A VOLCANIC ERUPTION7

1. On receipt of information of a volcanic eruption and/or the existence of volcanic ash, the

MWO will:

a) Notify, if necessary, the AFI VAAC (Toulouse) designated to provide VAA/VAG for the

FIR for which the MWO is responsible that a volcanic eruption and/or ash has been

reported. In the event that the MWO becomes aware, from a source other than an ACC,

of the occurrence of pre-eruption activity, a volcanic eruption or ash from any other

source , the information will be passed with all available relevant details on the extent,

forecast movement and concentration of volcanic ash immediately to the ACC and to the

designated VAAC;

b) Reported differences between ash encounters by aircraft and the information published in

VAA/VAG, SIGMET or NOTAM/ASHTAM received by an ACC shall be made

available as soon as possible to the respective MWO, preferably in the form of an

AIREP. The MWO will relay the information to the respective originators of the

published information;

c) Notify adjacent MWOs designated to provide SIGMET that a volcanic eruption and/or

ash cloud has been reported, provide available relevant details on the extent, forecast

movement and (if known) concentration of volcanic ash. In the event that any other

MWO becomes aware of the occurrence of volcanic ash cloud from any source other

than the VAAC, the information should be passed immediately to the VAAC and any

adjacent MWO(s) downstream of the moving ash cloud;

d) As soon as practicable, advise the ACC and the VAAC whether or not the volcanic ash is

identifiable from satellite images/data, ground based or airborne measurements or other

relevant sources;

e) Issue SIGMET relating to the horizontal and vertical extent of volcanic ash cloud and its

expected movement (provided in the VA from Toulouse VAAC) for a validity period of

up to 6 hours. The SIGMET shall include an observed (or forecast) position of the ash

cloud at the start of the period of validity, and a forecast position at the end of the period

of validity. The SIGMET should be based on the advisory information provided by the

VAAC. Include in the SIGMET distribution list the two Regional OPMET Databanks

(RODBs) in Dakar and Johannesburg (Pretoria RODB). As well as inter-regional

distribution, the RODBs will ensure dissemination of the SIGMET to all the VAAC, the

London World Area Forecast Centre (WAFC) and the AFI Bulletin Compiling Centres

(BCC);

f) provide information to assist with the origination of NOTAM by ACCs and maintain

continuous coordination with ACCs, adjacent MWOs and the VAAC concerned to

ensure consistency in the issuance and content of SIGMET and NOTAM/ASHTAM; and

g) provide, if possible, regular volcanic briefings, based on the latest available ash

observations and forecasts, to ACCs, Airport Operators and aircraft operators concerned,

giving an outlook for beyond T+12 hours.

7 This information is adapted from the Handbook on the International Airways Volcano Watch (IAVW) (Doc

9766). Refer to this document for full details.

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ATTACHMENT C - ACTION TO BE TAKEN BY THE AFI VAAC IN THE EVENT OF A

VOLCANIC ERUPTION8

1. On receipt of information from a MWO or any other source, of significant pre-

eruptive/eruption activity and/or a volcanic ash cloud observed, the VAAC should:

a) Initiate the volcanic ash computer trajectory/dispersal model in order to provide advisory

information on volcanic ash trajectory to MWOs, ACCs and operators concerned;

b) Review satellite images/data and any available pilot reports of the area for the time of the

event to ascertain whether a volcanic ash cloud is identifiable and, if so, its extent and

movement;

c) Prepare and issue advisories on the extent, and forecast trajectory, of the volcanic ash

contamination in message format for transmission to the MWOs, ACCs and operators

concerned in the VAAC area of responsibility, and to the two Regional OPMET Data

Banks (RODB) in Dakar and Pretoria. As well as inter-regional distribution, the RODBs

will ensure dissemination of the advisory to all VAACs, the London World Area

Forecast Centre (WAFC);

d) Monitor subsequent satellite information or other available observations to assist in

tracking the movement of the volcanic ash;

e) Continue to issue advisory information (i.e. VAA/VAG), for validity periods T+0, T+6,

T+12 and T+18 hours after data time, to MWOs, ACCs and operators concerned at least

at 6 hour intervals, and preferably more frequently, until such time as it is considered that

the volcanic ash is no longer identifiable from satellite data, no further reports of

volcanic ash are received from the area and no further eruptions of the volcano are

reported; and

f) Maintain regular contact with other VAACs and meteorological offices concerned, and,

as necessary, the Smithsonian Institute Global Volcanism Network, in order to keep up to

date on the activity status of volcanoes in the VAAC area of responsibility.

8 This information is adapted from the Handbook on the International Airways Volcano Watch (IAVW) (Doc

9766). Refer to this document for full details.

APIRG/18 – WP/13


____________________________________________________________________________________________________

ATTACHMENT D - PROCEDURES FOR THE PRODUCTION OF MODELLED ASH

CONCENTRATION CHARTS

1. The following procedures are to be applied by the meteorological office of a Provider State,

having accepted, by regional air navigation agreement, the responsibility for providing a VAAC

within the framework of the International Airways Volcano Watch (IAVW).

2. All VAA and VAG information issued by a meteorological office under designation as a

VAAC within the framework of the IAVW shall be prepared in accordance with ICAO provisions.

3. Additionally, where feasible, the meteorological office may issue modelled ash concentration

charts and corresponding coordinate data files at 6-hourly intervals showing the different ash

concentrations for the validity periods T+0, T+6, T+12 and T+18 hours after data time. These charts

will show forecast ash distribution in terms of Areas of Low, Medium and High Contamination and be

published at the same time, and with the same validity periods, as the VAA/VAG described above.

Updated charts and data files should be distributed prior to the end of the validity time of those

previously distributed.

4. These data may be used by Provider States to prepare SIGMET, NOTAM/ASHTAM and to

establish Danger Areas as appropriate.

APIRG/18 – WP/13


____________________________________________________________________________________________________

ATTACHMENT E - EXAMPLE SIGMET, NOTAM, ASHTAM

Guidance on WMO headers referred to in Alerting Phase, paragraph 1.2.2 refers can be found in

WMO No.386 Volume I (Manual of Global Telecommunications System) Part II (Operational

Procedures for the Global Telecommunications System)

NOTAM Offices are reminded that ASHTAM (or NOTAM for volcanic ash) should be distributed via

AFTN to their associated MWO, the SADIS Gateway and all the VAAC, in accordance with

guidelines contained in ICAO Doc 9766 Chapter 4 paragraph 4.3.

1. SIGMET

WVUK02 EGRR 180105

EGGX SIGMET 2 VALID 180105/180705 EGRR-

EGGX SHANWICK OCEANIC FIR VA ERUPTION MT KATLA PSN N6337

W01901 VA CLD OBS AT 0100Z N6100 W02730 - N6100 W02230 - N5800

W01730 - N5630 W02000 FL200/350 MOV SE 35KT FCST 0705Z VA CLD

APRX N5800 W02000 - N5730 W01200 - N5500 W00910 - N5430 W01530

- N5800 W02000=

Note: PSN replaces LOC as per Amendment 75 to Annex 3 (applicable 18 November 2010)

2. NOTAM alerting pre-eruptive activity

(A0777/10NOTAMN

Q) BIRD/QWWXX/IV/NBO/W/000/999/6337N01901WXXX

A) BIRD B) 1002260830 C) 1002261100 E) INCREASED VOLCANIC

ACTIVITY, POSSIBLY INDICATING IMMINENT ERUPTION, REPORTED FOR

VOLCANO KATLA 1702-03 6337.5N01901.5W ICELAND-S. VOLCANIC

ASHCLOUD IS EXPECTED TO REACH 50,000 FEET FEW MINUTES FROM

START OF ERUPTION.AIRCRAFT ARE REQUIRED TO FLIGHT PLAN TO

REMAIN AT LEAST XXXNM CLEAR OF VOLCANO AND MAINTAIN WATCH FOR

NOTAM/SIGMET FOR AREA.

F) GND G) UNL)

Note: XXX is a distance established by the Provider State in accordance with paragraph 1.2.1

a)

3. NOTAM establishing Danger Area after initial eruption (A0778/10 NOTAMR A0777/10

Q) BIRD/QWWXX/IV/NBO/W/000/999/6337N01901WXXX

A) BIRD

B) 1002260900 C) 1002261200

E) VOLCANIC ERUPTION REPORTED IN VOLCANO KATLA 1702-03

6337.5N01901.5W ICELAND-S. VOLCANIC ASHCLOUD REPORTED REACHING

FL500. AIRCRAFT ARE REQUIRED TO REMAIN AT LEAST XXXNM CLEAR OF

VOLCANO AND MAINTAIN WATCH FOR NOTAM/SIGMET FOR BIRD AREA.

F) GND G) UNL)

Note: XXX is a distance established by the Provider State in accordance with paragraph 1.2.1

a)

APIRG/18 – WP/13


____________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. NOTAM establishing Danger Area to include Area of High [or High/Medium or

High/Medium/Low] Contamination

(A0503/10 NOTAMN

Q)EGGN/QWWXX/IV/NBO/AE/000/350

A) EGPX B) 1005182300 C) 1005190500

E) TEMPORARY DANGER AREA HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED FOR VOLCANIC ASH

AREA OF HIGH CONTAMINATION IN AREA 5812N00611W 5718N00216W

5552N00426W 5629N00652W

F) SFC

G) FL350)

5. NOTAM to define Area of Medium Contamination for which a Danger Area has not

been established

(A0207/10 NOTAMN

Q) EUEC/QWWXX/IV/AE/000/200

A) EIAA B) 1005190700 C) 1005191300

E) VOLCANIC ASH AREA OF MEDIUM CONTAMINATION FORECAST IN AREA

5243N00853W 5330N00618W 5150N00829W

F) SFC

G) FL200)

6. ASHTAM alerting pre-eruptive activity

VALI0021 LIRR 01091410

ASHTAM 005/10

A) ROMA FIR B) 01091350 C) ETNA 101-06 D) 3744N01500E

E) YELLOW ALERT

J) VULCANOLOGICAL AGENCY

7. ASHTAM alerting eruptive activity

VALI0024 LIRR 01151800

ASHTAM 015/10


E) RED ALERT F) AREA AFFECTED 3700N01500E 3900N01600E

3800N001700W SFC/35000FT G) NE H) ROUTES AFFECTED WILL BE

NOTIFIED BY ATC J) VULCANOLOGICAL AGENCY

8. ASHTAM alerting reduction in eruptive activity

VALI0035 LIRR 01300450

ASHTAM 025/10


E) YELLOW ALERT FOLLOWING ORANGE J) VULCANOLOGICAL AGENCY

APIRG/18 – WP/13


____________________________________________________________________________________________________

APIRG/18 – WP/13


____________________________________________________________________________________________________

ATTACHMENT F – MAJOR VOLCANOES IN THE AFI REGION

Volcano Name Volcano Type Volcano Status Location

1 TAHALRA VOLCANIC FIELD Pyroclastic cones Holocene Algeria

2 ATAKOR VOLCANIC FIELD Scoria cones Holocene Algeria

3 MANZAZ VOLCANIC FIELD Scoria cones Holocene Algeria

4 IN EZZANE VOLCANIC FIELD Volcanic field Holocene Algeria-Niger border

5 CAMEROON Stratovolcano Historical Cameroon

6 TOMBEL GRABEN Cinder cones Holocene Cameroon

7 MANENGOUBA Stratovolcano Holocene Cameroon

8 OKU VOLCANIC FIELD Stratovolcano Holocene Cameroon

9 NGAOUNDERE PLATEAU Volcanic field Holocene Cameroon

10 LA PALMA Stratovolcanoes Historical Canary Islands

11 HIERRO Shield volcano Radiocarbon Canary Islands

12 TENERIFE Stratovolcano Historical Canary Islands

13 GRAN CANARIA Fissure vents Radiocarbon Canary Islands

14 FUERTEVENTURA Fissure vents Holocene Canary Islands

15 LANZAROTE Fissure vents Historical Canary Islands

16 FOGO Stratovolcano Historical Cape Verde Islands

17 BRAVA Stratovolcano Holocene Cape Verde Islands

18 SAO VICENTE Stratovolcano Holocene Cape Verde Islands

19 TARSO TOH Volcanic field Holocene Chad

20 TARSO TOUSSIDE Stratovolcano Holocene Chad

21 TARSO VOON Stratovolcano Fumarolic Chad

22 EMI KOUSSI Pyroclastic shield Holocene Chad

23 LA GRILLE Shield volcano Holocene Comore Island

24 KARTHALA Shield volcano Historical Comore Island

25 KARISIMBI Stratovolcano Potassium-Argon Democratic Republic Congo-Rwanda border

26 VISOKE Stratovolcano Historical Democratic Republic Congo-Rwanda border

27 MAY-YA-MOTO Fumarole field Fumarolic Democratic Republic of Congo

28 NYAMURAGIRA Shield volcano Historical Democratic Republic of Congo

29 NYIRAGONGO Stratovolcano Historical Democratic Republic of Congo

30 TSHIBINDA Cinder cones Holocene Democratic Republic of Congo

31 ARDOUKOBA Fissure vents Historical Djibouti

32 GARBES Fumarole field Pleistocene- Djibouti

33 BOINA Fumarole field Pleistocene- Djibouti-Ethiopia border

34 JALUA Stratovolcano Holocene Eritrea

35 ALID Stratovolcano Holocene Eritrea

36 DUBBI Stratovolcano Historical Eritrea

37 NABRO Stratovolcano Holocene? Eritrea

38 ASSAB VOLCANIC FIELD Volcanic field Holocene Eritrea

39 GUFA Volcanic field Holocene Eritrea-Djibouti border

40 DALLOL Explosion craters Historical Ethiopia

41 GADA ALE Stratovolcano Holocene Ethiopia

42 ALU Fissure vents Holocene Ethiopia

43 DALAFFILLA Stratovolcano Historical Ethiopia

44 BORALE ALE Stratovolcano Holocene Ethiopia

45 ERTA ALE Shield volcano Historical Ethiopia

46 ALE BAGU Stratovolcano Holocene Ethiopia

47 HAYLI GUBBI Shield volcano Holocene Ethiopia

48 ASAVYO Shield volcano Holocene Ethiopia

49 MAT ALA Shield volcano Holocene Ethiopia

50 TAT ALI Shield volcano Holocene Ethiopia

51 BORAWLI Stratovolcano Holocene Ethiopia

52 AFDERA Stratovolcano Holocene? Ethiopia

53 MA ALALTA Stratovolcano Holocene Ethiopia

54 ALAYTA Shield volcano Historical Ethiopia

55 DABBAHU Stratovolcano Historical Ethiopia

MAJOR VOLCANOES IN THE AFI REGION

APIRG/18 – WP/13


____________________________________________________________________________________________________

APIRG/18 – WP/13


____________________________________________________________________________________________________


56 DABBAYRA Shield volcano Holocene Ethiopia

57 MANDA HARARO Shield volcanoes Historical Ethiopia

58 GROPPO Stratovolcano Holocene Ethiopia

59 KURUB Shield volcano Holocene Ethiopia

60 MANDA GARGORI Fissure vents Anthropology Ethiopia

61 BORAWLI Lava domes Holocene Ethiopia

62 DAMA ALI Shield volcano Historical Ethiopia

63 GABILLEMA Stratovolcano Holocene Ethiopia

64 YANGUDI Complex volcano Holocene Ethiopia

65 AYELU Stratovolcano Holocene Ethiopia

66 ADWA Stratovolcano Holocene Ethiopia

67 HERTALI Fissure vent Holocene Ethiopia

68 LIADO HAYK Maars Holocene? Ethiopia

69 DOFEN Stratovolcano Holocene Ethiopia

70 FENTALE Stratovolcano Historical Ethiopia

71 BERU Volcanic field Holocene Ethiopia

72 KONE Calderas Historical Ethiopia

73 UNNAMED Pyroclastic cones Holocene Ethiopia

74 BOSET-BERICHA Stratovolcanoes Holocene Ethiopia

75 BISHOFTU VOLCANIC FIELD Fissure vents Holocene Ethiopia

76 UNNAMED Fissure vents Holocene Ethiopia

77 SODORE Pyroclastic cones Holocene Ethiopia

78 GEDAMSA Caldera Holocene Ethiopia

79 BORA-BERICCIO Pumice cones Holocene Ethiopia

80 TULLU MOJE Pumice cone Anthropology Ethiopia

81 UNNAMED Fissure vents Holocene Ethiopia

82 EAST ZWAY Fissure vents Holocene Ethiopia

83 BUTAJIRI-SILTI FIELD Fissure vents Holocene Ethiopia

84 ALUTU Stratovolcano Radiocarbon Ethiopia

85 O'A CALDERA Caldera Holocene Ethiopia

86 CORBETTI CALDERA Caldera Holocene Ethiopia

87 BILATE RIVER FIELD Maars Holocene Ethiopia

88 TEPI Shield volcano Holocene Ethiopia

89 HOBICHA CALDERA Caldera Holocene? Ethiopia

90 CHIRACHA Stratovolcano Holocene? Ethiopia

91 TOSA SUCHA Cinder cones Holocene Ethiopia

92 UNNAMED Cinder cones Holocene Ethiopia

93 KORATH RANGE Tuff cones Holocene? Ethiopia

94 MALLAHLE Stratovolcano Holocene? Ethiopia/Eritrea

95 SORK ALE Stratovolcano Holocene? Ethiopia/Eritrea

96 MANDA-INAKIR Fissure vents Historical Ethiopia-Djibouti border

97 MOUSA ALLI Stratovolcano Holocene Ethiopia-Eritrea-Djibouti border

98 MEGA BASALT FIELD Pyroclastic cones Holocene Ethiopia-Kenya border

99 NORTH ISLAND Tuff cones Holocene Kenya

100 CENTRAL ISLAND Tuff cones Holocene Kenya

101 SOUTH ISLAND Stratovolcano Historical Kenya

102 MARSABIT Shield volcano Holocene? Kenya

103 THE BARRIER Shield volcano Historical Kenya

104 NAMARUNU Shield volcano Tephrochronology Kenya

105 SEGERERUA PLATEAU Pyroclastic cones Holocene Kenya

106 EMURUANGOGOLAK Shield volcano Radiocarbon Kenya

107 SILALI Shield volcano Ar/Ar Kenya

108 PAKA Shield volcano Ar/Ar Kenya

109 BOGORIA Shield volcano Pleistocene-Geysers Kenya


APIRG/18 – WP/13


____________________________________________________________________________________________________


110 KOROSI Shield volcano Holocene Kenya

111 OL KOKWE Shield volcano Holocene Kenya

112 NYAMBENI HILLS Shield volcano Holocene Kenya

113 MENENGAI Shield volcano Tephrochronology Kenya

114 HOMA MOUNTAIN Complex volcano Holocene Kenya

115 ELMENTEITA BADLANDS Pyroclastic cones Holocene Kenya

116 OL DOINYO EBURRU Complex volcano Holocene Kenya

117 OLKARIA Pumice cones Radiocarbon Kenya

118 LONGONOT Stratovolcano Anthropology Kenya

119 SUSWA Shield volcano Holocene Kenya

120 CHYULU HILLS Volcanic field Anthropology Kenya

121 HARUJ Volcanic field Holocene Libya

122 WAU-EN-NAMUS Caldera Holocene? Libya

123 AMBRE-BOBAOMBY Volcanic field Holocene Madagascar

124 NOSY-BE Cinder cones Holocene Madagascar

125 ANKAIZINA FIELD Cinder cones Holocene Madagascar

126 ITASY VOLCANIC FIELD Scoria cones Radiocarbon Madagascar

127 ANKARATRA FIELD Cinder cones Holocene Madagascar

128 MADEIRA Shield volcano Radiocarbon Madeira

129 TIN ZAOUATENE VOLCANIC FIELD Volcanic field Holocene Mali

131 TODRA VOLCANIC FIELD Cinder cones Holocene Niger

132 BIU PLATEAU Volcanic field Holocene? Nigeria

133 PITON DE LA FOURNAISE Shield volcano Historical Reunion Island

134 SAO TOME Shield volcano Holocene? Sao Tome and Principe

135 JEBEL MARRA Volcanic field Radiocarbon Sudan

136 KUTUM VOLCANIC FIELD Scoria cones Holocene? Sudan

137 MEIDOB VOLCANIC FIELD Scoria cones Holocene Sudan

138 BAYUDA VOLCANIC FIELD Cinder cones Radiocarbon Sudan

139 JEBEL UMM ARAFIEB Shield volcano Holocene? Sudan

140 OL DOINYO LENGAI Stratovolcano Historical Tanzania

141 KILIMANJARO Stratovolcano Holocene Tanzania

142 MERU Stratovolcano Historical Tanzania

143 IGWISI HILLS Tuff cones Holocene Tanzania

144 UNNAMED Pyroclastic cone Holocene Tanzania

145 SW USANGU BASIN Lava domes Holocene Tanzania

146 NGOZI Caldera Radiocarbon Tanzania

147 IZUMBWE-MPOLI Pyroclastic cones Holocene Tanzania

148 RUNGWE Stratovolcano Radiocarbon Tanzania

149 KYEJO Stratovolcano Historical Tanzania

150 FORT PORTAL Tuff cones Radiocarbon Uganda

151 KYATWA Tuff cones Holocene? Uganda

152 KATWE-KIKORONGO Tuff cones Holocene Uganda

153 BUNYARUGURU Maars Holocene Uganda

154 KATUNGA Tuff cone Holocene Uganda

155 BUFUMBIRA Cinder cones Holocene? Uganda

156 MUHAVURA Stratovolcano Holocene Uganda-Rwanda border


- END -

APIRG/18 – WP/13

Appendix I 5/3/2012

_____________________________________________________________________________________________

Page 1 of 3

AFI STRATEGY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF

NEW ICAO FLIGHT PLAN FORMAT AND SUPPORTING ATS MESSAGES

Recognizing that:

The Global Air Traffic Management Operational Concept (Doc 9854) requires information

management arrangements that provide accredited, quality-assured and timely information to be used

to support ATM operations;

ATM Requirement 87 in the Manual of Air Traffic Management System Requirements (Doc 9882)

provides that 4-D trajectories be used for traffic synchronization applications to meet ATM system

performance targets, explaining that automation in the air and on the ground will be used fully in order

to create an efficient and safe flow of traffic for all phases of flight;

The amended ICAO Flight Plan and associated ATS Message formats contained in Amendment 1 to

the Fifteenth Edition of the PANS ATM (Doc 4444, applicable 15 November 2012) have been

formulated to meet the needs of aircraft with advanced capabilities and the evolving requirements of

automated air traffic management systems;

The complexities inherent in automated computer systems preclude the adoption of a single regional

implementation date and transitions to the new flight plan format will therefore occur in accordance

with the declared transition period described in this document.

All States shall implement all provisions of Amendment 1 to the Fifteenth Edition of the PANS ATM

(Doc 4444, applicable 15 November 2012).

APIRG/17 established the AFI FPLT TF under Decision 17/61 to facilitate and guide the transition

and implementation.

The AFI implementation of Amendment 1 to the PANS-ATM shall:

a) Ensure that all States and airspace users implement all the provisions of Amendment 1 from 15

November 2012, not just selected aspects of the Amendment;

b) Acknowledge that States, having taken all practical efforts to fully implement all the Amendment

1 provisions in accordance with guidelines, are obliged, in event of any non-implemented

provisions, to inform ICAO about the “significant difference” in accordance with established

ICAO procedures by 30 June 2011 and publish such difference in their State AIPs. However, that

such action may not be taken before interested stakeholders including international organizations

have been given an opportunity to intervene in pre-empting the “significant difference.”

Note: The “significant difference” in this context does not relate to Standards and the obligation

imposed by Article 38 of the Convention. It however, relates to provisions of Annex 15 to the

Convention, inter alia, under section 4.1 thereof, regarding publication of significant differences

between State practices and SARPs and procedures.

APIRG/18 – WP/13

Appendix I 5/3/2012

_____________________________________________________________________________________________

Page 2 of 3

c) Ensure that, from 15 November 2012, all States and airspace users accept and disseminate the

‘NEW’ flight plan and associated ATS message formats only, and transmission of ‘PRESENT’

flight plan is forthwith discontinued.

Note: In the context of the implementation, ‘PRESENT’ refers to the existing flight planning and ATS

message formats as defined in the current version of the PANS-ATM and ‘NEW’ refers to the amended

provisions as contained in Amendment 1 to the PANS-ATM.

The AFI transition to the PANS-ATM Amendment 1 provisions shall:

a) Comply with the regional guidance provided by APIRG’s FPLT TF;

b) Preserve global consistency in implementation by basing implementation activities, to the extent

possible, on Guidelines 1 to 6 as described in the ICAO guidance material circulated under cover

of State Letter AN 13/2.1-09/9, dated 6 February 2009;

c) Ensure that the FPLT TF undertakes coordination to facilitate harmonization with implementation

in neighbouring regions;

d) Ensure that State specific constraints are reduced, if not eliminated;

e) Declare a transition period from 1 January 2012 until 14 November 2012, comprising;

• 1 January to 31 March 2012 - ANSPs software delivery and internal testing,

• 1 April to 30 June 2012 – ANSPs implementation, and

• 1 July to 14 November 2012 at 23:59 – airspace users testing and implementation.

f) Encourage States:

• To commence with implementation process as soon as practical, and not await the

transition period;

• Not to implement ‘NEW’ capability before the commencement of the ANSPs external

testing and implementation period;

• Insofar as possible, to complete ANSP implementation of ‘NEW’ capability by the end of

the ANSP’s external testing and implementation period.

g) Recognizing the risk to automated systems of having all airspace users simultaneously

commencing ‘NEW’ on the common implementation date (15 November 2012), encourage users

to take full advantage of the airspace users testing and implementation period to ensure operational

readiness of flight planning systems;

h) Encourage States (ANSPs) and airspace users to coordinate appropriate implementation

methodologies in order to ensure a staggered migration of airspace users to ‘NEW’ during the

airspace users testing and implementation period (i.e. 1 July – 14 November 2012);

i) Encourage States (ANSPs) and airspace users to immediately commence preparations to

implement Amendment 1 provisions in accordance with the declared transition period and report

progress to the Regional Offices quarterly (i.e., January, April, July and September).

APIRG/18 – WP/13

Appendix I 5/3/2012

_____________________________________________________________________________________________

Page 3 of 3

j) Require States to keep the Regional Offices updated on of scheduled transition dates;

k) Require States to make necessary preparations in order to accommodate up to 120 hours prior to

Estimated Off Blocks Time (EOBT) as of 15 November 2012; and

l) Require that States retain capability to simultaneously support ‘PRESENT’ and ‘NEW’ provisions

(flight plan and ATS message format) from the activation of their ‘NEW’ capabilities until the end

of the transition period (i.e. until and inclusive of 14 November 2012), at which point transmission

of ‘PRESENT’ shall be discontinued.

----END-----

APIRG/18 – WP/13

Appendix J 5/3/2012

______________________________________________________________________________________

Page 1 of 2

AFI FLIGHT PLAN TRANSITION TASK FORCE (FPLT TF)

Proposed Revised Terms of Reference (TOR)

Terms of reference:

1) Conduct a comprehensive review of Amendment 1 to the Fifteenth Edition

of the PANS ATM (Doc 4444, effective 15 November 2012) in order to identify, study

and address implementation complexities arising from the adoption of amended PANS

ATM Chapter 4, Chapter 11, Appendix 2 and Appendix 3 provisions relating to the

ICAO Flight Plan and associated ATS Message formats;

2) Collect and analyze information on the status of AFI ANSP flight plan

processing systems including ongoing upgrades to such systems;

3) On the basis of the above, and in accordance with relevant additional

ICAO provisions and the SP AFI/8 RAN Recommendation 6/5, develop a coordinated

AFI transition strategy and plan with associated timelines to enable the streamlined

coordinated implementation of the amended Flight Plan and ATS Message provisions

contained in Amendment 1 to the Fifteenth Edition of the PANS ATM; and

4) Periodically review the status of preparedness and propose solutions.

Considerations:

In addressing these terms of reference, the Task Force should consider, inter alia, the

following aspects:

a) Likelihood that changes within the systems in the AFI Region could differ

from systems in other ICAO Regions and accordingly provide

recommendable Regional action with global goals;

b) Inter and intra regional issues;

c) Impact on inter-system co-ordination messaging;

d) Impact on non-automated flight plan processing systems;

e) Systems that transition early will need to be capable of handling both

“NEW” and “PRESENT” instruction sets;

f) Inter-system exchanges need to take account of differing automation

capabilities in order to avoid excessive message rejection;

g) Establishment of an Information Management system to track

implementation timelines for various States/systems;

h) Management of Repetitive Flight Plans;

i) Implications for presentation formats, including paper & electronic flight

progress strips;

j) Impacts to users (flight planning systems etc);

APIRG/18 – WP/13

Appendix J 5/3/2012

______________________________________________________________________________________

Page 2 of 2

k) Appropriately timed withdrawal of existing State or Regional specific

requirements to ensure consistency with new (global) instruction set; and

l) Existing ICAO guidance material.

Membership

Core members:

ATM specialist and systems engineering experts (CNS) from AFI States and

ANSPs with existing and planned automated flight plan processing systems

ASECNA, IATA, IFALPA, IFATCA,

Note:

Algeria, Kenya, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Sudan and Tanzania have

offered their expertise as core members.

Other members

AFI States and ANSPs other than the above

Expertise from States, ANSPs outside the AFI Region that may be invited by the

Task Force based on beneficial inputs they may contribute

Note:

Industry participation including systems providers, if required, is to be included

under responsibility of State delegations. The Task Force may however, invite

specific expertise from international organizations and relevant aviation industry

entities (including vendor organizations) in order to enhance information

available for the Task Force to progress its work. Such invitations shall be

managed to exclude promotion of commercial interests.

Reporting

The Task Force shall report progress to the AFI ATM/AIM/SAR Sub-Group in

coordination with CNS Sub-Group. However, owing to the limited time available for

planning and in some cases acquisition of systems, valuable planning information

emanating from the Task Force may, after coordination with Secretary of APIRG be

provided to States without waiting for forthcoming meetings of the AFI ATM/AIM/SAR

Sub-Group.

_____

APIRG/18 – WP/13

Appendix K-1 8/2/2012

AFI REGIONAL PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES/NATIONAL

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES FOR PBN

AFI REGIONAL PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES/NATIONAL PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

OPTIMIZATION OF THE ATS ROUTE STRUCTURE IN EN-ROUTE AIRSPACE

Benefits

Environment reduction in gas emissions

Efficiency

Safety ability of aircraft to conduct flight more closely to preferred trajectories

increase in airspace capacity

facilitate utilization of advanced technologies (e.g., FMS-based arrivals) and ATC decision support

tools (e.g., metering and sequencing), thereby increasing efficiency

Strategy

Short term (2010)

Medium term (2011-2015)

ATM OC

COMPONENTS TASKS

TIMEFRAME

START-END

RESPONSIBILITY

STATUS

AOM En-route airspace 2008

develop regional implementation

plan

2008-2009

AFI PBN TF Completed

develop regional action plan 2009-2010 AFI PBN TF Completed

establish collaborative decision

making (CDM) process 2010 States Continuous

develop airspace concept based on

AFI PBN regional implementation

plan, in order to design and

implement a trunk route network,

connecting major city pairs in the

upper airspace and for transit

to/from aerodromes, on the basis of

PBN, e.g. RNAV 10 and RNAV 5,

and taking into account

interregional harmonization

2009-2012 AFI PBN TF/States In progress

harmonize national and regional

PBN implementation plans 2010-2016 AFI PBN TF/States On-going

develop performance measurement

plan 2010-2012 States In progress

formulate safety plan 2010-2012 States

To be

developed

publish national regulations for

aircraft and operators approval

using PBN manual as guidance

material

2010-2011 States To be

developed

identify training needs and develop

corresponding guidelines 2010-2011 States In progress

identify training programmes and

develop corresponding guidelines 2010-2011 AFI PBN TF/States in progress

formulate system performance

monitoring plan

2010-2011 AFI PBN TF/States

To be

developed

APIRG/18 – WP/13


implementation of en-route ATS

routes 2010-2012 AFI PBN TF/States In progress

monitor implementation progress

in accordance with AFI PBN

implementation plan and State

implementation plan

2010 and beyond AFI PBN TF/States On-going

APIRG/18 – WP/13


AFI REGIONAL PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES/NATIONAL PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES OPTIMIZATION OF

THE ATS ROUTE STRUCTURE IN TERMINAL AIRSPACE

Benefits

Environment

Efficiency

Safety

reduction in gas emissions

ability of aircraft to conduct flight more closely to preferred trajectories

increase in airspace capacity

improved availability of procedures

facilitate utilization of advanced technologies (e.g., FMS based arrivals) and ATC decision support

tools (e.g., metering and sequencing), thereby increasing efficiency

Strategy

Short term (2010)

Medium term (2011-2015)

ATM OC

COMPONENT

S

TASKS TIMEFRAME

START-END RESPONSIBILITY STATUS

AOM Terminal airspace 2008

develop regional implementation plan 2009 AFI PBN TF Completed


develop State PBN implementation plan 2009 (see

note1) States

In progress

(X States have

completed )

establish collaborative decision making

(CDM) process 2010 States In progress

develop airspace concept based on AFI

PBN roadmap, in order to design and

implement an optimized standard

instrument departures (SIDs), standard

instrument arrivals (STARs), holding and

associated instrument flight procedures, on

the basis of PBN and, in particular RNAV 1

and Basic-RNP 1

2009-2012 PBN TF/States In progress

develop performance measurement plan 2010-2012 States In progress

formulate safety plan 2010-2012 States To be developed

publish national regulations for aircraft and

operators approval using PBN manual as

guidance material

2010-2011 States To be developed

identify training needs and develop

corresponding guidelines 2010-2011 States In progress

identify training programmes and develop

corresponding guidelines 2010-2011 AFI PBN TF To be developed

formulate system performance monitoring

plan 2010-2012 AFI PBN TF/States In progress

develop a regional strategy and work

programme implementation of SIDs and

STARs

2009-2012 AFI PBN TF/States In progress

monitor implementation progress in

accordance with AFI PBN implementation

roadmap and State implementation plan

2010 and

beyond AFI PBN TF/States On going

Linkage to GPIs GPI/5: performance-based navigation; GPI/7: dynamic and flexible ATS route management; GPI/8: collaborative airspace design and management; GPI/10: terminal area design and management; GPI/11: RNP and RNAV SIDs and STARs; GPI/12: FMS-based arrival

procedures.

APIRG/18 – WP/13


OPTIMIZATION OF VERTICALLY GUIDED RNP APPROACHES

Benefits

Environment

Efficiency

Safety

reduction in gas emissions

increased accessibility to aerodromes, including continuity of access

increased runway capacity

reduced pilot workload

availability of reliable lateral and vertical navigation capability

Strategy

ATM OC

COMPONENTS TASKS

TIMEFRAME

START-END RESPONSIBILITY STATUS

AOM Terminal airspace 2008

develop regional implementation

plan 2008 – 2009 AFI PBN TF Completed


develop State PBN

implementation plan 2009 (*) States In progress

establish collaborative decision

making (CDM) process 2010 States In progress

develop airspace concept based

on AFI PBN implementation

plan, in order to design and

implement RNP APCH with

Baro-VNAV or LNAV only (see

note 1) in accordance with

relevant Assembly resolutions ,

and RNP AR APCH where

beneficial

2009 – 2012 AFI PBN TF/States In progress

develop performance

measurement plan 2010-2012 States In progress

formulate safety plan 2010-2012 States To be

developed

publish national regulations for

aircraft and operators approval

using PBN manual as guidance

material

2010-2011 States To be

developed

identify training needs and

develop corresponding guidelines 2010-2011 States In progress

identify training programmes and

develop corresponding guidelines 2010-2011 AFI PBN TF/States

To be

developed

implementation of APV

procedures 2010 - 2016 AFI PBN TF/States In progress

Formulate system performance

monitoring plan 2010-2012 AFI PBN TF/States in progress

linkage to GPIs GPI/8: collaborative airspace design and management; GPI/10: terminal area design and

management; GPI/11: RNP and RNAV SIDs and STARs; GPI/12: FMS-based arrival procedures

(*)States that have not already done so should complete their national PBN implementation plans as soon as possible.

Note 1: where altimeter setting does not exist or aircraft are not suitably equipped for APV

- END -

APIRG/18 – WP/13


AFI REGIONAL PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES/NATIONAL

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES FOR SEARCH AND RESCUE (SAR)

ESTABLISHMENT OF SUB-REGIONAL SAR ARRANGEMENTS

Benefits

Efficiency cost-efficient use of accommodation and RCC equipment on a shared basis

and Safety service provision more uniform across a geographic area defined by risk

proficient services provided near and within States with limited resources.

harmonization of aviation / maritime procedures

inter-operability of life-saving equipment

development of a pool of experienced SAR mission coordinators skilled across both aviation and

maritime domains thus reducing coordination and fragmentation

Strategy

ATM OC

COMPONEN

TS

TASKS TIMEFRAME

START-END

RESPONSIBILITY

STATUS

N/A conduct AFI Regional SAR workshop every year ICAO

establish collaborative decision making

process

Collaboration between states

Networking process by setting up a

website; nominate a focal point within

ICAO to manage the website

Nominate a focal point within each

state/organization to coordinate SAR

issues

2011 – 2012 ICAO

/States Not started

develop needs assessment and gap

analysis

conduct self audits

2011 – 2012 APIRG/STATES Not started

develop regional action plan to resolve

the deficiencies 2011 – 2012 APIRG/STATES Not started

conduct regional SAR Administrators

training and SAR Mission Coordinators

training

2011 – 2012 ICAO Not started

determine regional and sub regional

organisation, functions and

responsibilities, accommodation and

equipment needs.:

2011 – 2012 APIRG/ STATES Not started

produce draft legislation, regulations,

operational procedures, letters of

agreement SAR plans and safety

management policies for regional SAR

provision using IAMSAR manual as

guidance.

2010 – 2012 APIRG Implementation on

a continuous basis

APIRG/18 – WP/13


determine future training needs and

develop training plans and conduct

training as required

2010 –

permanent APIRG/STATES

Implementation on

a continuous basis

develop SAR plan

alerting procedures

resource databases

interface procedures with aerodrome

emergency procedures and generic

disaster response providers

RCC check lists

staffing, proficiency and certification

plans

preventive SAR programmes

quality programmes

education and awareness programmes

in-flight emergency response

procedures

2011 – 2012 States Not started

conduct SAR exercises required.:

-National

-Multinational

2012 -

Permanent States Not started

monitor implementation process As appropriate ICAO/States Not started

linkage to

GPIs N/A

Notes: 1.Enablers: Regional Organizations like SADC, ECOWAS, CEMAC, EAC etc.

2. The Task Force has identified the following groups of RCCs as potential base for regional/subregional SAR

close co-operation e.g: SAR exercise, training, meetings etc…:

Casablanca, Canarias, Dakar, Roberts, Sal,

Algiers, Asmara, Cairo, Tripoli, Tunis

Accra, Brazzaville, Kano, Kinshasa, Ndjamena, Niamey,

Addis, Entebbé, Khartoum, Mogadishu, Nairobi

Southern Africa States

Antananarivo, Mauritius, Seychelles

3. All work requires close cooperation with all States affected, ICAO, IMO, Cospas-Sarsat and other worldwide

bodies as require.

-END-

APIRG/18 – WP13

Appendix K-3

5/3/2012

Performance Objectives

ATM PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

REGIONAL PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE - IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW ICAO FPL

PROVISIONS BY 15 NOVEMBER 2012

Benefits

Environment reduction in fuel consumption and reduction of carbon emissions

Efficiency ability of air navigation service providers t make maximum use of aircraft capabilities

ability of aircraft to conduct flights more closely to their preferred trajectories

facilitate utilization of advanced technologies thereby increasing efficiency

increase airspace capacity

optimized demand and capacity balancing through the efficient exchange of information

Safety enhance safety by use of modern capabilities onboard aircraft

enhance the success of SAR operations

generally enable PBN and other advanced navigation capabilities

Strategy

Short term (2010-2012)

ATM OC

COMPONENTS TASKS

TIMEFRAME

START-END

RESPONSIBILITY

STATUS

AUO

SDM

plan the transition arrangements to

ensure that the changes from the

current to the new ICAO FPL form

occur in a timely and seamless

manner and with no loss of service

2009-June 2011

States

Ongoing

Complete

ensure that the capabilities of local

systems are fully adaptable to the

changes envisaged in the new FPL

form

2010 to

June 2012

States

Ongoing

Not

completed

ensure the ability of FDPS’s to

parse information correctly to

guarantee that misinterpretation of

data does not occur

2010 to

June 2012

States

Ongoing

Not

completed

analyze each individual data item

within the various fields of the new

flight plan form, comparing the

current values and the new values

to verify any issue regarding the

provision of service by the flight

planning facility itself or

downstream units

2010 to

June 2012

States

Ongoing

Not

completed

ensure that there are no individual

State peculiarities or deviations

from the flight plan provisions

2011

2012

States

Ongoing

APIRG/18 – WP13

Appendix K-3

5/3/2012

ensure that the accepting ATS

Reporting Office accepts and

disseminates all aircraft

capabilities and flight intent to all

the downstream ACCs as

prescribed by the PANS-ATM

provisions

2012

States

Ongoing

in order to reduce the change of

double indications it is important

that any State having published a

specific requirement(s) which are

now addressed by the amendment

should withdraw those

requirements in sufficient time to

ensure that aircraft operators and

flight plan service providers, after

15 November 2012, use only the

new flight plan indications

2010-2012

States

Ongoing

inform on the implementation

status to the ICAO regional offices

on an ongoing basis

2010-2012

States

Ongoing

keep the Flight Plan

Implementation Tracking System

(FITS) up to date based on the

information provided by the States

2010-2012

ICAO Regional

Offices

Ongoing

linkage to GPIs

GPI/5 RNAV and RNP (Performance-based navigation)

GPI-12 Functional integration of ground systems with airborne system

GPI/18 Aeronautical Information

________

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