BANAT VS COMELEC

586 SCRA 210 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Legislative Department – Party

List System; Proportional Representation; Proper Computation

Statutory Construction – Rule in Interpreting the Constitution – Intent of the Framers vs

Intent of the People

NOTE: This case is consolidated with BAYAN Muna vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 179295).

In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, made

a partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections which was held in May

2007.

In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the

following rules:

1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the

remaining 20% shall come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987

Constitution);

2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners

at least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;

3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%,

then it is entitled to 3 seats – this is pursuant to the2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban

Formula from the case of Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC.

4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than 6%

of the votes cast for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).

The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a party-

list candidate, questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT

averred that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its provision

that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes

cast in the party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule

creates a mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the

Constitution.

BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory,

then with the 2% qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible to

fill the prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a

new computation (which shall be discussed in the “HELD” portion of this digest).

On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the

3 seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major

political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections or is the said elections

limited to sectoral parties.

ISSUES:

I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house?

II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a mere

ceiling.

III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.

IV. How are party-list seats allocated?

V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list

elections.

VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.

HELD:

I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for

legislative districts, there shall be one seat allotted for a party-list representative.

Originally, the 1987 Constitution provides that there shall be not more than 250 members

of the lower house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from legislative districts, and

50 would be from party-list representatives. However, the Constitution also allowed

Congress to fix the number of the membership of the lower house as in fact, it can create

additional legislative districts as it may deem appropriate. As can be seen in the May 2007

elections, there were 220 district representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1

ratio, there should be 55 seats allotted for party-list representatives.

How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:

(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats

Available to Party-List Representatives

Hence,

(220  ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = 55

II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling – meaning, the

number of party-list representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the

members of the lower house. However, it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.

III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to allow

that only party-lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast are qualified for a seat and

those which garnered less than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a

mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment. The Supreme Court

explained:

To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes

cast for the 100 participants in the party list elections.  A party that has two percent of the

votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the

first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability

of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will

repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we

increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get

two percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied

party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.

It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the

full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the

attainment of “the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in

the House of Representatives.”

IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then

it is guaranteed a seat, and not “qualified”. This allows those party-lists garnering less

than 2% to also get a seat.

But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:

1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest

based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total

votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.

3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1,

shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the

additional seats are allocated.

4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included

because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus,

the remaining available seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum seats

reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are

disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of

fractional seats.

In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first

round, all party-lists which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-

percenters) are given their one seat each. The total number of seats given to these two-

percenters are then deducted from the total available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17

party-lists were able to garner 2% each. There are a total 55 seats available for party-lists

hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining seats. (Please refer to the full text of the case for the

tabulation).

The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round,

particularly, in determining, first, the additional seats for the two-percenters, and second,

in determining seats for the party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of the votes cast,

and in the process filling up the 20% allocation for party-list representatives.

How is this done?

Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the

remaining number of seats. The product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the

additional number of seats allotted for the party list – but the 3 seat limit rule shall still be

observed.

Example:

In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which is

7.33% of the total votes cast for the party-list elections (15,950,900).

Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) = number

of additional seat

Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79

Rounding off to the next higher number  is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a two-

percenter which means it has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3

seats. Now if it so happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it will still get 3 seats

because the 3 seat limit rule prohibits it from having more than 3 seats.

Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats, and

there are still unoccupied seats, those seats shall be distributed to the remaining party-

lists and those higher in rank in the voting shall be prioritized until all the seats are

occupied.

V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties

(the likes of UNIDO, LABAN, etc) from participating in the party-list elections.

Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition either from

the Constitution or from RA 7941 against major political parties from participating in the

party-list elections as the word “party” was not qualified and that even the framers of the

Constitution in their deliberations deliberately allowed major political parties to participate

in the party-list elections provided that they establish a sectoral wing which represents the

marginalized (indirect participation), Justice Puno, in his separate opinion, concurred by 7

other justices, explained that the will of the people defeats the will of the framers of the

Constitution precisely because it is the people who ultimately ratified the Constitution –

and the will of the people is that only the marginalized sections of the country shall

participate in the party-list elections. Hence, major political parties cannot participate in

the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.

VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one party shall

dominate the party-list system.

ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC

Facts:

Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and

trans-genders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list organization to public

respondent. However, due to moral grounds, the latter denied the said petition. To buttress

their denial, COMELEC cited certain biblical and quranic passages in their decision. It also

stated that since their ways are immoral and contrary to public policy, they are considered

nuissance. In fact, their acts are even punishable under the Revised Penal Code in its

Article 201.

A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition on Certiorari

under Rule 65 of the ROC.

Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by

using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of

religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional

rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as

constituted violations of the Philippines’ international obligations against discrimination

based on sexual orientation.

In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and

genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly

dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not

among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made

untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to

actual verification reports by COMELEC’s field personnel.

Issue:

WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;

WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal grounds.

Held:

Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the

proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said

sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,

handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be

registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW

Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, “the enumeration of marginalized and under-

represented sectors is not exclusive”. The crucial element is not whether a sector is

specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the

requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be made respecting an

establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our

non-establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality in religious matters.” Clearly,

“governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of

neutrality.” We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the

COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it

noted that government action must have a secular purpose.

Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why

special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to

justify its position that petitioner’s admission into the party-list system would be so

harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.

We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws

flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as

“any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else which shocks,

defies, or disregards decency or morality,” the remedies for which are a prosecution under

the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial

proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand,

requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to

be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket

invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings

and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.

As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental

interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The

denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement

of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial

public interest.

Atong Paglaum, Inc. VS COMELEC

694 SCRA 477 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Legislative Department – Party-List

System

This case partially abandoned the  rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani vs COMELEC and BANAT

vs COMELEC.

Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on Elections

in the May 2013 party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for not being qualified

as representatives for marginalized or underrepresented sectors.

Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave

abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying

the said party-lists.

HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong

Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the

COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned some

principles established in the two aforestated cases. The new guidelines are as follows:

I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters:

1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1)national parties or

organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or

organizations.

2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to

organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and

underrepresented” sector.

3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the

party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political

party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can

participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register

under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party,

and is linked to a political party through a coalition.

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or

lacking in “well-defined political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy

pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are

“marginalized and underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,

indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The

sectors that lack “well-defined political constituencies” include professionals, the elderly,

women, and the youth.

5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the

“marginalized and underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and

underrepresented” sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral

parties or organizations that lack “well-defined political constituencies” must belong to the

sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the

“marginalized and underrepresented,” or that represent those who lack “well-defined

political constituencies,” either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a

track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and

regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or

organizations.

6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some

of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who

remains qualified.

II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the

practice, from participating in the party-list elections. But, since there’s really

no constitutional prohibition nor a statutory prohibition, major political parties can now

participate in the party-list system provided that they do so through their bona fide

sectoral wing (see parameter 3 above).

Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list

elections will encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the

“marginalized and underrepresented” and to those who “lack well-defined political

constituencies.”

Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of

the Constitutional Commission when they were drafting the party-list system provision of

the Constitution. The Commissioners deliberated that it was their intention to include all

parties into the party-list elections in order to develop a political system which is pluralistic

and multiparty. (In the BANAT case, Justice Puno emphasized that the will of the people

should defeat the intent of the framers; and that the intent of the people, in ratifying the

1987 Constitution, is that the party-list system should be reserved for the marginalized

sectors.)

III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for

the “marginalized and underrepresented” or for parties who lack “well-defined political

constituencies”. It is also for national or regional parties. It is also for small ideology-based

and cause-oriented parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies”. The common

denominator however is that all of them cannot, they do not have the machinery – unlike

major political parties, to field or sponsor candidates in the legislative districts but they can

acquire the needed votes in a national election system like the party-list system of

elections.

If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the system

itself unduly excludes other cause-oriented groups from running for a seat in the lower

house.

As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood to

include only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,

handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature

are economically at the margins of society. It should be noted that Section 5 of Republic

Act 7941 includes, among others, in its provision for sectoral representation groups of

professionals, which are not per se economically marginalized but are still qualified as

“marginalized, underrepresented, and do not have well-defined political constituencies” as

they are ideologically marginalized.

TRILLANES vs PIMENTEL Case Digest

ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV v. HON. OSCAR PIMENTEL, SR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT- BRANCH 148, MAKATI CITY, et al. 556 SCRA 471 (2008), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.) 

All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. 

FACTS: On July 27, 2003, more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the resignation of the President and key national officials. After a series of negotiations, military soldiers surrendered that evening. 

In the aftermath of such event dubbed as the Oakwood Incident, petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged with coup d’état before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Four years later, Trillanes remained in detention and won a seat in the Senate. Before starting his term, Trillanes filed with RTC an Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests. 

Trillanes requested to be allowed to attend senate sessions and fulfill his functions as senator. The RTC however denied his motion. Thus, he filed Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court to set aside orders of the RTC. 

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Trillanes‘ case is different from that of the Jalosjos case 

2. Whether or not Trillanes‘ election as senator provides legal justification to allow him to work and serve his mandate as senator 

3. Whether or not there are enough precedents that allows for a liberal treatment of detention prisoners who are held without bail 

HELD: 

No distinction between Trillanes’ case and that of Jalosjos case 

The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in Jalosjos that election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. 

The Constitution provides: All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action. That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d’état cases, both being punishable by reclusion perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is clearly no distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime charged. 

In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner's application for bail and for release on recognizance was denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail or imported from a trial court's judgment of conviction, justifies the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is "regardless of the stage of the criminal action." 

Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense applies equally to detention prisoners like Trillanes or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos. The Court in People v. Hon. Maceda said that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence can not practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention. 

Trillanes’ election as Senator not a legislative justification to allow him to serve his mandate 

The case against Trillanes is not administrative in nature. And there is no "prior term" to speak of. In a plethora of cases, the Court categorically held that the doctrine of condonation does not apply to criminal cases. Election, or more precisely, re-election to office, does not obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioner's electoral victory only signifies pertinently that when the voters elected him to the Senate, "they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action [and] x x x with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison. 

It is opportune to wipe out the lingering misimpression that the call of duty conferred by the voice of the people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints articulated in the Constitution and echoed by jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be harmonized by the overarching tenet that the mandate of the people yields to the Constitution which the people themselves ordained to govern all under the rule of law. The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 membersof the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. x x x Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law. 

Trillanes’ case fails to compare with the species of allowable leaves 

Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders. That this discretion was gravely abused, petitioner failed to establish. In fact, the trial court previously allowed petitioner to register as a voter in December 2006, file his certificate of candidacy in February 2007, cast his vote on May 14, 2007, be proclaimed as senator-elect, and take his oath of office on June 29, 2007. In a seeming attempt to bind or twist the hands of the trial court lest it be accused of taking a complete turn-around, petitioner largely banks on these prior grants to him and insists on unending concessions and blanket authorizations. 

ANTERO J. POBRE v. SEN.MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGOA.C. No. 7399

VELASCO, JR., J. August 25, 2009

FACTS

After Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago was not considered for the position of Chief Justice by the Judicial and Bar Council, she delivered a speech on the Senate floor and was quoted as saying:

“xxx I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. Iam suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I amnauseated. I spit on the face of Artemio Panganiban and his

cohorts in the Supreme Court. I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in anotherenvironment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots xxx.”

In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 22, 2006, with enclosures, Antero J. Pobre asked the Supreme Court to undertake disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary action against Senator Santiago on the ground that her statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the speaker towards then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and other members of the Court and constituted direct contempt of court.

Senator Santiago, however, invoked Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution explaining that those statements were covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its committee. The purpose of her speech according to her was to bring out in the open controversial anomalies in governance with a view to future remedial legislation.

ISSUE

May Senator Santiago be disbarred or be imposed with disciplinary sanction for her intemperate and highly improper speech made on the senate floor?

HELD

No. A lawyer-senator who has crossed the limits of decency and good professional conduct by giving statements which were intemperate and highly improper in substance may not be disbarred or be imposed with disciplinary sanctions by the Supreme Court.It is true that parliamentary immunity must not be allowed to be used as vehicle to ridicule, demean, and destroy the reputation of the Court and its magistrates, nor as armour for personal wrath and disgust. However, courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members in the manner they perform their functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by member of the Congress does not destroy the privilege. The disciplinary authority of the assembly and the voters, not the courts, can properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in the name of parliamentary immunity.

The Supreme Court agreed with Senator Santiago, it ruled:

The Immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution which provided” “A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned or held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.”

While the Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, it felt that such should not be the last word on the matter. It added:

The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a

member of the Bar, used in her speech and its effect on the administration of justice. To

the Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good

professional conduct. It is at once apparent that her statements in question wereintemperate and highly improper in substance.

WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre against Senator/Atty. Miriam Defensor-Santiago is, comfortably to Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution, DISMISSED.

DANTE V. LIBAN, REYNALDO M. BERNARDO and SALVADOR M. VIARIversus

RICHARD J. GORDONG.R. No. 175352January 18, 2011

FACTS:

Respondent Richard Gordon filed a Motion for Clarification and/or Reconsideration on August 10, 2009 of the Decision promulgated by the Court on July 15, 2009.

In the Decision, the Court held that (1) the respondent did not forfeit his seat in the Senate when he accepted the chairmanship of the PNRC (Philippine National Red Cross) Board of Governors as the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution; and that (2) it declared void the PNRC Charter insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation and consequently ruled that the PNRC should incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation.

In his Motion for Clarification and/or Reconsideration, respondent raises the following grounds: (1) as the issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was not raised by the parties, the Court went beyond the case in deciding such issue; and (2) as the Courts decided that Petitioners did not have standing to file the instant Petition, the pronouncement of the Court on the validity of R.A. No. 95 should be considered obiter.

PNRC filed a Motion for Reconsideration on August 2007, 2009 praying that the Court sustains the constitutionality of its Charter because aside from it was never an issue to this case, its structure is sui generis—while it is performing humanitarian functions as an auxiliary to government, it is a neutral entity

separate and independent of government control, yet it does not qualify as strictly private in character.

Article 12 of Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution states: The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created or established by special charters in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic viability.

ISSUE:

Whether or not it was proper to the Court to have ruled on the constitutionality of the PNRC statute.

HELD:

Petition has merit.

As cited in the case of Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc, the Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the very lismota. It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties. In this case, the parties never raised such issue, hence the Court should not have declared certain provisions of such as unconstitutional.

Gordon’s Motion for Clarification and/or Reconsideration and PNRC’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration or the Decision dated July 15, 2009 are GRANTED. The constitutionality of R.A. 95, as amended, the charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, was not raised by the parties as an issue and should not have been passed upon by the Court. The structure of the PNRC is sui generis being neither strictly private nor public in nature. R.A. No. 95 remains valid and constitutional in its entirety. The dispositive portion of the Decision should therefore be modified by deleting the second sentence.

PNRC does not violate Section 16 of Article 12 of the Constitution as (1) the PNRC is not organized for profit. It is an organization dedicated to assist victims of war and administer relief to those who have been devastated by calamities, among others; (2) it is created in order to participate in the mitigation of the effects of war, as embodied in the Geneva Convention and hence its creation is in compliance with international treaty obligations; and (3) it is a National Society, an auxiliary of the government (sui generis) and is directly regulated by international humanitarian law.

SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO and SEN. FRANCIS S. TATAD, petitioners,vs.

SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and SEN. MARCELO B. FERNAN, respondentsG.R. No. 134577

PANGANIBAN, J. November 18, 1998

FACTS

On July 27, 1998, the Senate of the Philippines convened for the first regular session of the

11th Congress. On the agenda for the day was the election of officers. Senator Francisco S.

Tatad and Senator Marcelo B. Fernan were nominated for the position of Senate President.

By a vote of 20 to 2, Senator Fernan was duly elected President of the Senate.

Thereafter, Senator Tatad manifested, with the agreement of Senator Miriam Defensor

Santiago, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those who

had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the majority while those who voted for him,

belonged to the minority. During the discussion, Senator Juan M. Flavier also manifested

that the senators belonging to the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP -- numbering 7, and, thus, also a

minority -- had chosen Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as minority leader. No consensus

was arrived at during the following days of session.

On July 30, 1998, the majority leader, informed the body that he received a letter from the

7 members of the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP, stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as

minority leader. The Senate President then recognized Senator Guingona as minority

leader of the Senate.

The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before the Supreme Court a petition

for quo warranto alleging that Senator Guingona has been usurping, unlawfully holding and

exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them,

rightfully belongs to Senator Tatad.

ISSUE

1. Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over the petition?

2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?

3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position

of

Senate minority leader?

4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing

Respondent

Guingona as the minority leader?

HELD

First Issue: Court's Jurisdiction

In the instant controversy, the petitioners claim that Section 16 (1), Article VI of the Constitution has not been observed in the selection of the Senate minority leader. They also invoke the Court’s judicial power “to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction” on the part of respondents.

The Court took jurisdiction over the petition stating that it is well within the power and

jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a

violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their

functions and prerogatives.

Second Issue: Violation of the Constitution

Petitioners claim that there was a violation of the Constitution when the Senate President

recognized Senator Guingona as minority leader.

The Court, however, did not find any violation since all that the Charter says is that "[e]ach

House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary." The court held that,

the method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the

exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional

provision.  Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this

Court.

Notably, Rules I and II of the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of

majority and minority leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for

such offices and prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the holders

thereof.  However, such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually extant.  But, in

the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid

of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative

thereto.  On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may

not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature.

Third Issue: Usurpation of Office

For a quo warranto prosper, the person suing must show that he or she has a clear right to

the contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office allegedly usurped or

unlawfully held by the respondent. In this case, petitioners present no sufficient proof of a

clear and indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader. The specific

norms or standards that may be used in determining who may lawfully occupy the

disputed position has not been laid down by the Constitution, the statutes, or the Senate

itself in which the power has been vested. Without any clear-cut guideline, in no way can it

be said that illegality or irregularity tainted Respondent Guingona’s assumption and

exercise of the powers of the office of Senate minority leader.  Furthermore, no grave

abuse of discretion has been shown to characterize any of his specific acts as minority

leader.

Fourth Issue: Fernan's Recognition of Guingona

Supreme Court held that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as Senate

President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader.  The latter belongs

to one of the minority parties in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP.  By unanimous

resolution of the members of this party that he be the minority leader, he was recognized

as such by the Senate President.  Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came

only after at least two Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were liberally

allowed to articulate their standpoints. 

Under these circumstances, the Court believed that the Senate President cannot be

accused of “capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment” or of “an arbitrary and despotic

manner by reason of passion or hostility.”  Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws

or even the rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded

or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts

done within their competence and authority.

The Petition is DISMISSED.

G.R No. 196271 (and other cases consolidated therewith)

Datu Michael Abas Kida vs. Senate of the Philippines Case Digest

FACTS:

Congress has enacted several laws pertaining to the elections in Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 on August 1, 1989 is the organic act that established ARMM wherein a plebiscite was held on November 6, 1990 as required scheduling the first regular elections for the regional offices on a date not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 days after its ratification. Republic Act No. 9054 was passed further amending and refining the basic ARMM structure and resetting the regular elections to the second Monday of September 2001.

Congress then passed Republic Act No. 9140 on June 22, 2001 resetting the first regular elections under RA No. 9054 to November 26, 2001 and setting the plebiscite to ratify RA No. 9054 which was held on August 14, 2001. Republic Act No. 9333 was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the ARMM elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005, and on the same date every 3 years thereafter but unlike RA No. 6734 and RA No. 9054, RA No. 9333 was not ratified in a plebiscite.

Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been on August 8, 2011 but on June 30, 2011, Republic Act No. 10153, entitled “An Act Providing for the Synchronization of the Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with the National and Local Elections and for Other Purposes was enacted. The law resets the ARMM elections from the 8th of August 2011, to the second Monday of May 2013 and every three (3) years thereafter, to coincide with the country’s regular national and local elections. The law also granted the President the power to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) for the Office of the Regional Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor, and the Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office.

Republic Act No. 10153 originated in the House of Representatives as House Bill (HB) No. 4146 which was passed on June 6, 2011 with one hundred ninety one (191) members voting in its favor. The Senate received HB No. 4146 and adopted its own version, Senate Bill (SB) No. 2756 on June 6, 2011 with thirteen senators voting favorably for its passage. On June 7, 2011, the House of Representatives concurred with the Senate amendments and on June 30, 2011, the President signed RA No. 10153 into law. Petitioners assailed the validity of RA No. 10153.

ISSUES:

1.) Whether or not the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections?

2.) Whether or not the passage of RA No 10153 violates Section 26 (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution?

3.) Whether or not the passage of RA No. 10153 requires a supermajority vote and plebiscite

a. Does the postponement of the ARMM regular elections constitute an amendment to Section 7, Article XVIII of RA No. 9054?

b. Does the requirement of a supermajority vote for amendments or revisions to RA No. 9054 violate Section I and Section 16 (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the corollary doctrine on irrepealable laws?

c. Does the requirement of a plebiscite apply only in the creation of autonomous regions under paragraph 2, Section 18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution?

4.) Whether or not the grant of power to appoint OICs violates:

a. Section 15, Article X of the 1987 Constitution

b. Section 16, Article X of the 1987 Constitution

c. Section 18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution

5.) Whether or not the proposal to hold special elections is constitutional and legal?

RULING: The Supreme Court resolved to dismiss the peitions and thereby uphold the constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in toto.

1. Yes, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections

While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections.

The objective behind setting a common termination date for all elective officials, done among others through the shortening the terms of the twelve winning senators with the least number of votes, is to synchronize the holding of all future elections whether national or local to once every three years. This intention finds full support in the discussions during the Constitutional Commission deliberations.

These Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution , all serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local elections, starting the second Monday of May 1992 and for all the following elections.

Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a local election based on the wording and structure of the Consitution.

2.) No, the passage of RA No 10153 does not violate Section 26 (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution because there was a President’s certification exempting both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate reading requirement.

Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states that no bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local elections.

Following the Tolentino ruling, the Presidents certification exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate readings requirement and the House of Representatives and the Senate in the exercise of their legislative discretion gave full recognition to the Presidents certification and promptly enacted RA No. 10153. Under the circumstances, nothing short of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the two houses of Congress can justifu our intusion under the power of judicial review;

The petitioners, however failed to provide with any cause of justification for this course of action. Hence, while the judicial department of this Court are not bound by the acceptance of the President’s certification by both the House of Representatives and the Senate, prudent exercise of powers and respect due to co-equal branches of government in matters committed to them by the Constitution, caution a stay of the judicial hand.

In any case, despite the Presidents ceritification, the two-fold purpose that underlies the requirement for three readings on spearate days of very bill must always be observed to enable our legislators and other parties interested in pending bills to intelligently respond to them. Specifically, the purpose with respect

to Members of Congress is 1.) to inform the legislators of the matters they shall vote on and (2) to give them notice that a measure is in progress through the enactment process.

We find, based on the records of the deliberations on the law, that both advocates and the opponents of the proposed measure had sufficient oppotunites to present their views. In this light, no reason exists to nullify RA No. 10153 on the cited ground.

3.) No, the passage of RA No. 10153 does not require a supermajority vote and plebiscite

a. RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 are not amendments to RA No. 9054. RA No 8746, RA No. 8753, and RA No. 9012 were all enacted by Congress to fix the dates of the ARMM elections. Since these laws did not change or modify any part or provision of RA No. 6734, they were not amendments to this latter law. Consequently, there was no need to submit them to any plebiscite for ratification.

From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention of Congress to treat the laws which fix the date of the subsequent ARMM elections as separate and distinct from the Organic Acts. Congress only acted consistently with this intent when it passed RA NO. 10153 without requiring compliance with the amendment prerequisites embodied in Section 1 and Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054.

b. The Supermajority voting requirement is unconstitutional for giving RA No. 9054 the character of an irrepealable law.

Even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 did in fact amend RA No.9054, the supermajority (2/3) voting requirement required under Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 has to be struck down for giving RA No 9054 the character of an irrepealable law by requiring more than what the Constitution demands.

Section 16 (2), Article VI of the Constitution provides that a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business. In other words, as long as majority of the members of the House of Representatives or the Senate are present, these bodies have the quorum needed to conduct business and hold session. Within a quorum, a vote of majority is generally sufficient to enact laws or approve acts.

In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 requires a vote of no less than two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate, voting separately, in order to effectively amend RA No. 9054. Clearly, this 2/3 voting requirement is higher than what the Constitution

requires for the passage of bills, and served to restrain the plenary powers of Congress to amend, revise or repeal the laws it had passed.

Section 18, Article X of the Constitution plainly states that the creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by the majority of the votes case by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose. With these wordings as standard, we interpret the requirement to mean that only amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic Act constitutionally-essential to the creation of autonomous regions i.e., those aspects specifically mentioned in the Constitution which Congress must provide for in the Organic Act require ratification through a plebiscite.

4.) No, the grant of power of the President to appoint OICs is constitutional since during the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to Congress in order to resolve this problem. The options are: 1) to allow the elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over capacity, pursuant to Section 7 (1), Article VII of RA No. 9054, until those elected in the synchronized elections assume office; (2) to hold special elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those elected in the synchronized elections assume office; or (3) to authorize the President to appoint OICs, pursuant to Section 3 of RA No. 10153, also until those elected in the synchronized elections assume office.

As will be abundantly clear in the discussion, Congress, in choosing to grant the President the power to appoint OICs, chose the correct option and passed RA No. 10153 as a completely valid law.

5.) The COMELEC has no authority to order special elections

Tobias vs Abalos, G.R. No. L-114783

December 8, 1994

Facts: Complainants, invoking their right as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, filed a petition questioning the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong." Before the enactment of the law, Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to the same legislative district.

The petitioners contended that the act is unconstitutional for violation of three provisions of the constitution. First, it violates the one subject one bill rule. The bill provides for the conversion of Mandaluyong to HUC as well as the division of congressional district of San Juan and Mandaluyong into two separate district. Second, it also violate Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law. The division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts increased the members of the House of Representative beyond that provided by the Constitution. Third, Section 5 of Article VI also provides that within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in Section 5. Petitioners stated that the division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the minimum population requirement was attained.

Issue:

(1) Does RA 7675 violate the one subject one bill rule?

(2) Does it violate Section 5(1) of Article VI of the Constitution on the limit of number of rep?

(3) Is the inexistence of mention of census in the law show a lack of constitutional requirement?

Rulings: The Supreme Court ruled that the contentions are devoid of merit. With regards to the first contention of one subject one bill rule, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a separate and distinct subject from its conversion into a HUC but is a natural and logical consequence. In addition, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation.

The second contention that the law violates the present limit of the number of representatives, the provision of the section itself show that the 250 limit is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law”. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.

With regards, to the third contention that there is no mention in the assailed law of any census to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into two legislative districts, unless otherwise proved that the requirements were not met, the said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular congressional processes, including due consideration by the members of Congress of the minimum requirements for the establishment of separate legislative district

The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

Phil. Judges Association vs. Prado, 227 SCRA 703

FACTS:

The basicissueraised in this petition is the independence of the Judiciary.

The maintarget of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the Philippine Postal Corporation throughitsCircular No. 92-28. These measures withdraw the frankingprivilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land RegistrationCommission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certainothergovernmentoffices.

The petitioners aremembers of the lowercourtswhofeelthattheir official functions as judgeswillbeprejudiced by the above-named measures. The National Land Registration Authority has takencommoncause with theminsofar as itsownactivities, such as sending of requisitenotices in registration cases, affectjudicialproceedings. On its motion, it has beenallowed to intervene.

The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 (An ActCreating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Definingits Powers, Functions and Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other Purposes ConnectedTherewith) on the groundsthat:

(1) itstitleembraces more thanonesubject and does not expressits purposes;

(2) it did not pass the requiredreadings in both Houses of Congress and printedcopies of the bill in its final form were not distributedamong the membersbeforeits passage; and

(3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.

Sec. 35 of R.A. No. 7354, which is the principal target of the petition, reads as follows:

Sec. 35. RepealingClause. — All acts, decrees, orders, executiveorders, instructions, rules and regulations or parts thereofinconsistent with the provisions of thisActarerepealed or modifiedaccordingly.

All frankingprivilegesauthorized by lawareherebyrepealed, exceptthoseprovided for under Commonwealth Act No. 265, RepublicActsNumbered 69, 180, 1414, 2087 and 5059. The Corporation maycontinue the frankingprivilege under Circular No. 35 datedOctober 24, 1977 and that of the Vice President, under such arrangements and conditions as mayobviateabuse or unauthorizedusethereof.

It is the submission of the petitioners thatSection 35 of R.A. No. 7354 whichwithdrew the frankingprivilege from the Judiciary is not expressed in the title of the law, nor does it reflectits purposes.

The petitionersalsochallengedthe equalprotectionclause.

It is allegedthat R.A. No. 7354 is discriminatorybecausewhilewithdrawing the frankingprivilege from the Judiciary, it retains the same for the President of the Philippines, the Vice President of the Philippines; Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, the Commission on Elections; former Presidents of the Philippines; the National Census and Statistics Office; and the general public in the filing of complaintsagainst public offices and officers

ISSUE:

WON the title of the challengedactviolates the Constitution.

HELD:

In sum, wesustain R.A. No. 7354 against the attackthatitssubject is not expressed in itstitle and that it was not passed in accordance with the prescribed procedure. However, weannulSection 35 of the law as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitutionprovidingthatno person shall "bedeprived of the equalprotection of laws."

The equalprotection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discriminationoffends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonethelessbeenembodied in a separate clause in Article III Sec. 1., of the Constitution to provide for a more, specificguarantyagainstany form of unduefavoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general maybechallenged on the basis of the due processclause. But if the particularactassailedpartakes of an unwarrantedpartiality or prejudice, the sharperweapon to cut it down is the equalprotectionclause.

Wearrive at theseconclusions with a fullawareness of the criticism it is certain to provoke. Whilerulingagainst the discrimination in this case, wemayourselvesbeaccused of similardiscriminationthrough the exercise of ourultimate power in ourownfavor. This is inevitable. Criticism of judicialconduct, howeverundeserved, is a fact of life in the political system thatweareprepared to accept.. As judges, wecannotdebate with ourdetractors. Wecanonlydecide the cases beforeus as lawimposes on us the duty to be fair and ourownconscience gives us the light to be right.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is partially GRANTED and Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Circular No. 92-28 is SET ASIDE insofar as it withdraws the frankingprivilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional trail Courts, the Municipaltrial Courts, and the National Land Registration Authority and its Register of Deeds to all of whichoffices the saidprivilegeshallbe RESTORED. The temporaryrestrainingorderdated June 2, 1992, is made permanent.

Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito [GR L-1123, 5 March 1947] 

En Banc, Tuason (J): 3 concur, 1 concur in separate opinion, 2 dissent in separate opinions, 1 filed separate opinion

Facts: 

Three senators and eight representatives had been proclaimed by a majority vote of the Commission on Elections as having been elected senators and representatives in the elections held on 23 April 1946.

The three senators were suspended by the Senate shortly after the opening of the first session of Congress following the elections, on account of alleged irregularities in their election. The eight representatives since their election had not been

allowed to sit in the lower House, except to take part in the election of the Speaker, for the same reason, although they had not been formally suspended.

A resolution for their suspension had been introduced in the House of Representatives, but that resolution had not been acted upon definitely by the House when the petition for prohibition was filed. As a consequence these three senators and eight representatives did not take part in the passage of the congressional resolution, designated "Resolution of both houses proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance thereto," nor was their membership reckoned within the computation of the necessary three-fourths vote which is required in proposing an amendment to the Constitution. If these members of Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress.

The petition for prohibition sought to prevent the enforcement of said congressional resolution, as it is allegedly contrary to the Constitution. The members of the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines, the Auditor General, and the Director of the Bureau of Printing are made defendants. Eight senators, 17 representatives, and the presidents of the Democratic Alliance, the Popular Front and the Philippine Youth Party.

Issue: 

Whether the Court may inquire upon the irregularities in the approval of the resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution.

Held: 

It is a doctrine too well established to need citation of authorities that political questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal with such questions has been conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or statutory provision. This doctrine is predicated on the principle of the separation of powers, a principle also too well known to require elucidation or citation of authorities. The difficulty lies in determining what matters fall within the meaning of political question. The term is not susceptible of exact definition, and precedents and authorities are not always in full harmony as to the scope of the restrictions, on this ground, on the courts to meddle with the actions of the political departments of the government. If a political question conclusively binds the judges out of respect to the political departments, a duly certified law or resolution also binds the judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born of that respect. If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a political question. The two steps complement each other in a scheme intended to achieve a single objective. It is to be noted that the

amendatory process as provided in section I of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution "consists of (only) two distinct parts: proposal and ratification." There is no logic in attaching political character to one and withholding that character from the other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly political function performed by the Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity and committed to its charge by the Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is even in dependent of any intervention by the Chief Executive. If on grounds of expediency scrupulous attention of the judiciary be needed to safeguard public interest, there is less reason for judicial inquiry into the validity of a proposal then into that of ratification.

NERI VS SENATE COMMITTEE ACCOUNTABILITY PUBLIC OFFICERS, 549 SCRA 77

– Political Law – Constitutional Law – The Legislative Department – Inquiry in aid of

legislation – Executive Privilege

Legislative (Sec 21) & Oversight (Sec 22) Powers

 

In  April 2007, DOTC entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications

Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National

Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of $329,481,290.00

(approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the People’s

Republic of China. The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal.

On the other hand, Joe De Venecia issued a statement that several high executive

officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the

NBN Project by the NEDA.

Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon.

He appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during

which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in

exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed

President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to

accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the

NBN Project, Neri refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege“. In particular,

he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed

up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c)

whether or not she directed him to approve. He later refused to attend the

other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the SBRC averring that the

communications between GMA and Neri is privileged and that the jurisprudence

laid down in Senate vsErmita be applied. The SBRC cited Neri for contempt.

ISSUE: Whether or not the three questions sought by the SBRC to be answered

falls under executive privilege.

HELD: The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory

process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.

The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by

thepresidential communications privilege.

1st, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable

power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with

other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive

agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been

recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.

2nd, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under

the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor,

being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And

3rd, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the

limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere

by an appropriate investigating authority.

G.R. No. 167173 December 27, 2007 STANDARD CHARTERED BANK (Philippine Branch), PAUL SIMON MORRIS, SUNDARA

RAMESH, OWEN BELMAN, SANJAY AGGARWAL, RAJAMANI CHANDRASHEKAR, MARIVEL GONZALES, MA. ELLEN VICTOR, CHONA G. REYES, ZENAIDA IGLESIAS, RAMONA BERNAD, MICHAELANGELO AGUILAR, and FERNAND TANSINGCO, Petitioners,

vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKS, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND CURRENCIES, as

represented by its Chairperson, HON. EDGARDO J. ANGARA, Respondent. Facts: Petitioner Standard Chartered Bank (SCB)-Philippines is an institution incorporated

in England with limited liability and is licensed to engage in banking, trust, and other related operations in the Philippines. Respondent, on the other hand, is one of the permanent committees of the Senate of the Philippines.

On February 1, 2005, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, Vice Chairperson of respondent, delivered a privilege speech entitled "Arrogance of Wealth" before the Senate

based on a letter from Atty. Mark R. Bocobo denouncing SCB-Philippines for selling unregistered foreign securities in violation of the Securities Regulation Code (R.A. No. 8799) and urging the Senate to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in the future.

Acting on the referral, respondent, through its Chairperson, Senator Edgardo J. Angara, set the initial hearing on February 28, 2005 to investigate, in aid of legislation, the subject matter of the speech and resolution filed by Senator Enrile.

Respondent invited petitioners, among others, to attend the hearing, requesting them to submit their written position paper. Petitioners, through counsel, submitted to respondent a letter dated February 24, 2005 presenting their position, particularly stressing that there were cases pending in court allegedly involving the same issues subject of the legislative inquiry, thereby posing a challenge to the jurisdiction of respondent to continue with the inquiry. On February 28, 2005, respondent commenced the investigation.Thereafter, Senator Enrile moved that subpoenae be issued to those who did not attend the hearing and that the Senate request the Department of Justice, through the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, to issue an HDO against them and/or include them in the Bureau’s Watch List. Senator Juan Flavier seconded the motion and the motion was approved.

Respondent then proceeded with the investigation proper. Towards the end of the hearing, petitioners, through counsel, made an Opening Statement that brought to the attention of respondent the lack of proper authorization from affected clients for the bank to make disclosures of their accounts and the lack of copies of the accusing documents mentioned in Senator Enrile's privilege speech, and reiterated that there were pending court cases regarding the alleged sale in the Philippines by SCB-Philippines of unregistered foreign securities.

The February 28, 2005 hearing was adjourned without the setting of the next hearing date. However, petitioners were later served by respondent with subpoenaeadtestificandum and ducestecum to compel them to attend and testify at the hearing set on March 15, 2005.

Hence, the petition for Prohibition (With Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Injunction).

Issue: Whether or not the Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and

Currenciescan conduct investigation against SCB despite criminal and civil case against the latter pending in courts.

Ruling: Yes. The unmistakable objective of the investigation, as set forth in the said resolution,

exposes the error in petitioners’ allegation that the inquiry, as initiated in a privilege speech by the very same Senator Enrile, was simply "to denounce the illegal practice committed by a foreign bank in selling unregistered foreign securities x xx." This fallacy is made more glaring when we consider that, at the conclusion of his privilege speech, Senator Enrile urged the Senate "to immediately

conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, so as to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in the future."

Indeed, the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or a quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative investigation. Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an administrative complaint. Surely, the exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or an administrative investigation.

As succinctly stated in the landmark case Arnault v. Nazareno, “The power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information – which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who possess it.”

Neither can the petitioners claim that they were singled out by the respondent Committee. The Court notes that among those invited as resource persons were officials of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the BangkoSentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). These officials were subjected to the same critical scrutiny by the respondent relative to their separate findings on the illegal sale of unregistered foreign securities by SCB-Philippines. It is obvious that the objective of the investigation was the quest for remedies, in terms of legislation, to prevent the recurrence of the allegedly fraudulent activity.

The intent of legislative inquiries is to arrive at a policy determination, which may or may not be enacted into law. Except only when it exercises the power to punish for contempt, the respondent, as with the other Committees of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, cannot penalize violators even if there is overwhelming evidence of criminal culpability. Other than proposing or initiating amendatory or remedial legislation, respondent can only recommend measures to address or remedy whatever irregularities may be unearthed during the investigation, although it may include in its Report a recommendation for the criminal indictment of persons who may appear liable. At best, the recommendation, along with the evidence, contained in such a Report would be persuasive, but it is still up to the prosecutorial agencies and the courts to determine the liabilities of the offender.

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST VS HON. CESAR PURISIMA (SEC OF FINANCE)

Facts: RA 9335 (Attrition Act of 2005) encourages BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing for a system of rewards and sanctions through a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). This covers all the officials and employees of the BIR and BOC with at least 6months of service regardless of employment status.

The Fund will come from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their revenue targets for the year. This revenue target is determined by the

Development Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC). The incentive or reward will then come from the fund and allocated to the BIR and BOC in proportion to their contribution to the Fund.

Petitioners as taxpayers, challenge the constitutionality of RA 9335. Allegedly there is undue delegation to fix revenue targets to the President for while the law says that BIR and BOC officials may be dismissed from service if their revenue collections fall short of the target by 7.5%, it is not stated what this target is. Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has been delegated to the President without sufficient standards.

Issue: Whether there was undue delegation? Held: The completeness and sufficient standard test determine if the delegation of

legislative power is valid. A law is complete when it sets forth the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented. It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law regarding the acts of the delegate. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate’s authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.

The policy of RA 9335 is to optimize the revenue generation capability and collection of the BIR and BOC. On the other hand, Section 4 of the law delegating to the president to fix revenue targets provide that the revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection expected of the BIR and BOC for a given fiscal year as approved by the DBCC and stated in the Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing (BESF) submitted by the President to Congress. Thus, revenue targets are determined not only by the president. It undergoes a scrutiny by the DBCC.

On the other hand, section7 of the law provides that... “remove from service officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5% with due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of collection... subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and compliance with substantive and procedural due process... the application of the criteria for the separation of an official or employee from service shall be without prejudice to the application of other relevant laws on accountability of public officers...”

Clearly, RA9335 in no way violates the security of tenure of officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC. The guarantee of security of tenure only means that an employee cannot be dismissed from the service for causes other than those provided by law and only after due process is accorded the employee.

Under RA9335, the yardstick for removal is when the revenue collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5% with due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of collection. This standard is similar to inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties which is a ground for disciplinary action under civil service laws. Besides, the removal here is subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and compliance with substantive and procedural due process.

1) Actual case and ripeness – petitioners fail to assert any specific and concrete

legal claim to demonstrate the law’s adverse effect on them. What they have is a general claim that there is a judicial controversy by reason of the enactment of the law.

2) Accountability of public officers – the fear that the BIR and BOC officials will become bounty hunters doing their best only because of the reward is speculative. Public officials enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties. A system of incentives for exceeding the set expectations of public office is not contrary to the concept of public accountability but in fact reinforces one’s dedication to his duty and loyalty to the public service.

3) Equal protection – When things or persons are different in fact or circumstance, they may be treated by law differently. Here, since the subject of the law is revenue generation capability and collection of the BIR and BOC, necessarily, the incentives must also pertain to them. Besides, the law concerns itself only with the BIR and BOC because they have the common distinct primary function of generating revenues for the national government through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.

4) Separation of powers– RA9335 created a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee for the purpose of approving the IRR proposed by certain admin agencies for the implementation of the law. Actually, the Committee has already ceased to exist after it approved the IRR.

A congressional oversight committee does not per se encroach upon the executive power to implement laws. However, to prevents a congressional encroachment beyond the legislative sphere, the Constitution imposes some restraints on congress: 1) it may not vest itself or any of its committees or members with executive or judicial power and 2) when it exercises legislative power, it must follow the single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered procedures specified under the Constitution. Hence, any post-enactment congressional measure (such as the action of the joint congressional oversight committee in this case which approved the IRR) must be confined to scrutiny and investigation only. Any legislative veto undermines the separation of powers of the state. Thus, section12 of RA9335 which grants to the oversight committee the power to approve the IRR (more than just scrutinize and investigate it --- thus, they have the power to veto some of the proposed rules) is unconstitutional.

TOLENTINO v SECRETARY OF FINANCE

G.R. No. 115455 August 25, 1994 MENDOZA, J. FACTS: Republic Act No. 7716 otherwise known as the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT)

Law was drafted in seek of widening the tax based on the existing VAT system and enhance its administration through amending the National Internal Revenue Code.

Suits for certiorari were filed by petitioners Tolentino, et al questioning the constitutionality of the said act. The petitioners contended that R.A 7716 was

passed in such a manner that it did not originate from the House of Representatives and thereby it has not become a law for it has violated several provisions in the Constitution such as, Sec 24 and 26 of Article 2. Tolentino et al also claimed that the bill was not passed by the Senate but was simply consolidated with the Senate version known as Senate Bill 1630 through the Conference Committee to produce the bill and which the president signed into law.

ISSUE: Whether or not Republic Act No. 7716 is procedurally unconstitutional? RULING: No. The Supreme Court held that it is within the power of the conference

committee to include in its reports an entirely new provision that is not found either in House Bill or in the Senate Bill. The court said that the procedural requirements of the constitution have been complied by Congress such that the formal requirements for the enactment of statutes-beyond those prescribed by the Constitution- have been observed and is precluded in the separation of powers. What the constitution implies in the “initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills authorizing increase of public debt, private bills, and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives while the senate is also expected to approach the same problems in national perspective”. This practice of amendment by substitution has always been accepted

Wherefore, the petitions in this case were dismissed.

EUSEBIO B. GARCIA, petitioner-appellant vs.

HON. ERNESTO S. MATA, respondent-appellee

G.R. NO. L-33713

Facts of the Case

Petitioner, who had a total of 9 yrs, 4 mo’s and 12 days of accumulated active service on July 11, 1956, was a reserve officer of AFP until his reversion to inactive status on No. 15, 1960 pursuant to RA 2332.

On July 11, 1956, the date when RA 1600 took effect, petitioner has an accumulated active commissioned service of 10 years, 5 mos and 5 days in the

AFP, and his reversion to inactive status on NO. 15 1960 was neither of cause at this won request, nor after court-martial proceedings;

Petitioner filed a petititon with the offices of the AFP Chief of Staff, The Secretary of National Defense and the President, respectively, but received reply only form the Chief of Staff, as a consequence on September 17, 1969 brought an action for “Mandamus and Recovery of a Sum of Money compelling the respondents to reinstate him in the active commissioned service of the AFP and to readjust his rank, and to pay all the emoluments and allowances due to him form the time of his reversion to inactive status.

The Trial court dismissed the petition and ruled Paragraph 11 of the Special Provisions for the AFP in RA 1600 as invalid, unconstitutional and inoperative; Thus, the herein petition for certiorari to review

Respondent contend that the said the said provision has no relevance or pertinence to the budget in question or to any appropriation item contained therein and is therefore proscribed by Art. VI, Section 19 of the 1935 Constitution tat “No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriation bill unless it related specifically to some particular appropriation therein; and any such provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to such appropriation”

Issue :Whether RA 1600 is valid? Does it contain rider in an appropriation bill?

Held :

SC: The incongruity and irrelevancy are already evident. Section 11 of RA 1600 fails to disclose the relevance to any appropriation item. RA 1600 is an appropriation law for the operation of government while Section 11 refers to a fundamental governmental policy of calling to active duty and the reversion of inactive statute of reserve officers in the AFP.

Hence it was A NON-APPROPRIATION ITEM INSERTED IN AN APPROPRIATION MEASURE, in violation of the constitutional prohibition against RIDERS to the general appropriation act. It was indeed a new and completely unrelated provision attached to the GAA.

It also violates the rule on one-bill, one subject. The subject to be considered must be expressed in the title of the act. When an act contains provisions which are clearly not embraced in the subject of the act, as expressed in the title, such provisions are void, inoperative and without effect.

SECTION 11 is unconstitutional. Garcia cannot compel the AFP to reinstate him.

The Supreme Court DENIED the instant petition and the decision of the lower court dismissing the complaint is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

GUINGONA vs. CARAGUE (GR No. 94571 [April 22, 1991])

FACTS:

1. Petitioners Teofisto Guingona Jr., and Aquilino Pimentel Jr, both Senators of the Philippines, filed a petition before the Constitution seeking the declaration of the unconstitutionality of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 81, Section 31 of PD 1177, and PD 1967, which involve the appropriation of government funds to pay the principal, interests and other charges of foreign and local borrowings of the government.

2. Respondents Guillermo Carague and Rozalina Cajucom are the Secretary of Budget and Management, and National Treasurer, respectively.

3. Petitioners alleged that the 1990 Budget consisting of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 billion for debt service) and of P155.3 Billion appropriated under Republic Act (RA) No. 6841, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, and of P27,017,813,000 for Department of Education, Culture and Sports is unconstitutional, because the same violates Section 5 of Article XIV, and that PDs 81, 1177 and 1967 violate Section 29 (1) of Article VI of the Constitution.

4. Petitioners argued that the aforesaid decrees became functus officio (ceased to exist) when President Marcos was ousted in February 1986, that the legislative power was restored to Congress pursuant to the Constitution, and that, since Congress has not yet enacted a legislation concerning automatic appropriation, the 1990 budget is an administrative act that rests on no law, and hence, cannot be enforced.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the appropriation of P86 billion for debt service a violation of Section 5 of Article XIV of the Constitution?

2. Whether PDs 81, 1177, and 1967 are still operative under the Constitution?3. Whether these PDs violate Section 29(1) of Article VI of the Constitution (undue

legislative delegation)?

RULING:

1. The appropriation of P86 billion for debt service under the 1990 Budget does not violate Section 5 of Article XIV of the Constitution. While Congress is mandated to “assign the highest budgetary priority to education” in order to “ensure that teaching will attract and retain its rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment”, Congress is not deprived of its power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives.

In fact, since 1985, the budget for education has tripled to upgrade and improve the facilities of the public school system, and the compensation of teachers has doubled. The amount set aside for DECS under the General Appropriations Act is

the highest among all department budgets. This is a clear compliance of the constitutional mandate for highest priority to education.

Having the very survival of our economy at stake, Congress, if in the process, appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the share allocated for education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional.

2. Section 3, Article XVIII of the Constitution recognizes that “All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instruction, and other executive issuances not inconsistent with the Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked.” This provision has precisely been adopted by the framers to preserve the social order so that the legislation by President Marcos may be recognized. Such laws remain in force and effect unless they are inconsistent with the Constitution or, are otherwise amended, repealed or revoked.

The aforementioned PDs show the clear intent that the amounts needed to cover the payment of the principal and interests on all foreign loans should be made available when they shall become due precisely without the necessity of periodic enactments of separate laws since both the periods and necessities are incapable of determination in advance.

As explained by the Solicitor General, the effective execution of debt management policies enables the government to take advantage of favorable market conditions.

The argument of petitioners that the said PDs did not meet the requirement and are therefore inconsistent with Sections 24 and 27 of Article VI of the Constitution requiring “all appropriations, bills authorizing increase of public debt” must be passed by Congress and approved by the President is untenable. The framers of the Constitution did not contemplate that existing laws in the statute books including existing PDs appropriating public money are reduced to mere “bills” that must again go through the legislative mills. The only reasonable interpretation of said provisions which refer to “bills” is that they mean appropriation measures still to be passed by Congress.

3. The Court finds that the questioned PDs are complete in all their essential terms and conditions and sufficient standards are indicated therein. The legislative intent of RA 4860 as amended, PDs 1177 and 1967 is that the amount needed should be automatically set aside in order to enable the Republic of the Philippines to pay the principal, interests, taxes and other charges on the loans, credits, or indebtedness incurred when they shall be due, without the need to enact a separate law as the need arises. The purpose of these laws is to enable the government to make prompt payment and/or advances for all loans to protect and maintain the credit standing of the country. Therefore, these laws constitute lawful authorizations or appropriations. The Executive merely complied with its duty to implement the same.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

The Constitution

What is a Constitution?o Written instrument where the fundamental powers of government are established, limited,

defined, and by which these powers are distributed among several departments, for their more safe and usual exercise, for the benefit of the body politic.

o “The Constitution is a living testament and memorial of the sovereign will of the people

from whom all government authority emanates…” – Estrada v. Arroyo Was there ever a time when there was no Philippine Constitution?

o There was a time there was no Phil. constitution (Feb to Mar 1987)

o But protections existed under the ICCPR and UDHR

o One cannot invoke protections under the BOR during this period, because there was no

BOR What is the nature of the preamble?

o It does not give rights and obligations; just identifies author of the Constitution (“we the

sovereign Filipino people”)o It is also the source of clarification on disputed matters, for instance, it has been used in

litigation between Church and State (“imploring the aid of almighty God” – proof that there is no hostility to religion)

o It sets the tone by establishing:

1. A healthy civil society

2. And a democratic republican government What is the rule on amendments and revisions?

o Amendment – small change

Can be proposed either by Congress, Con. Convention, initiative and referendumo Revision – changes the structure of government

Only by Congress or Con. Convention NOT by initiative or referendum

Procedure in proposal of amendments and revisions –o Congress –

¾ vote of all its members Doesn’t say whether jointly or separately:

Because this provision was approved when the Con. Comm. thought we would still have unicameral assembly

Must be voted on separately, because this is the default rule What happens after?

Plebiscite where there is majority vote needed by the electorateo Constitutional convention –

How is a constitutional convention called? 1. By a 2/3 vote of all members of congress OR 2. If not obtained, by a majority vote of all members of Congress, with

question of w/n to call for a convention resolved by the people in plebiscite

What happens after? Plebiscite where there is majority vote needed by the electorate

o Initiative –

There is no valid initiative law yet, based on an SC decision (Defensor-Santiago v. COMELEC)

Is this still correct? The minute resolution on the MR in Lambino v. COMELEC held the

initiative law (RA 6735) to be valid. What are the required votes for an initiative on the Constitution?

12% of total number of registered voter AND 3% of the voters of each district

Viz. For national initiative, just 10% and 3% What is the scope of people’s initiative?

It only applies to amendment, not to revisions of the Constitution. So it cannot apply to sweeping changes like changing from presidential to parliamentary.

Takes effect on the day it was ratified How is it ratified?

o Through a plebiscite, where a majority of votes is needed

Period for ratification?o 60-90 days from sufficiency of petition for initiative

o What is the subject of amendment or revision?

ANYTHING, except those violating jus cogens. Which provisions self-execute? Which don’t?

o Almost all provisions on policy are NON-self-executory

o 1. There is one provision where the SC recognizes an enforceable right: right of people to

balanced and healthful ecology (MMDA v. Concerned citizens, Oposa v. Factoran, LLDA v. CA) N.B. that A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC puts this right into further fruition)

o “Protect and promote a right to health” Sec. 15 is also recognized as executory

Because it is worded almost similarly as Sec. 16 Whereas the other provisions are worded differently “The State affirms…”

o Tondo Medical Center v. CA appeal was made using several provisions in Art. II, but

the SC disclaimed these, saying these are not self-executory provisions

General considerations

What is the scope of national territory?o Components of territory:

A) archipelago (aerial, terrestrial, fluvial) B) all other territories outside archipelago

o Last year: we finally passed a law defining baselines

Straight baselines for the archipelago Imaginary straight lines joining outermost points of the outermost

islands, without appreciable departure from the general configuration of the archipelago

But for territories outside the archipelago, the law considered those as “regime of islands” – each would have their own baselines, and not included in one baseline along with the rest of the archipelago

o What is the archipelagic doctrine?

Archipelagic principle: all waters are considered internal waters State immunity –

o Par in parem non habet imperium

o Extends to:

1. Diplomatic agents 2. UN and its organs 3. Other IOs, if provided

o What is the test to determine if suit is against the State?

Whether it requires an affirmative act from the State, if a decision is rendered against it

o When can there be suit against the State?

1. Waivero When is there consent to be sued?

Express provision of law, or special law Implied: commencing suit or entering into business contract

o What is the extent of waiver?

Waiver does not extend to execution of judgment, just immunity from suit. There has to be a subsequent waiver from execution. But the aggrieved party can sue for mandamus in case the State unjustly refuses to pay.

2. Performance of proprietary acts 3. Equity

The State may be sued if the doctrine of immunity is used to perpetuate an injustice

Ex. does not pay just compensation in expropriation What about suits against government agencies which are incorporated?

Check if the charter allows suit (this is a waiver). Otherwise, the general rule is to check if it is performing governmental

or proprietary acts. N.B. so for these entities, the general exceptions hold true

Forms of government and relevant definitions:o “Democratic and republican”

Republican representative of the people Democratic gesture of appreciation for EDSA I

o Differentiate State from government from administration:

State people, territory, government, sovereignty Government system remains the same Administration changes from election to election

o State:

De facto or de jureo Democracy:

We have really not had a parliamentary form of government. Initially, 1973 constitution provided for such, but Marcos never relinquished his supremacy from the rest of the government

What are the relevant principles?o 1. The Philippines renounces war as State policy

We renounce only aggressive war; we allow defensive waro 2. As to applicability of International Law

See International Law noteso 3. Civilian authority is at all times supreme over the military

N.B. Civilian authority, not officials. Symbolized by President being Commander-in-chief of the military

o 4. Compulsory military service by civilians if needed

o 5. Maintenance of peace and order

This is a constituent function, which the State is duty-bound to perform As opposed to ministrant functions which are voluntarily done, and when needed What is the subsidiary principle?

What civilians can do, the government will not doo 6. Separation of Church and State (discussed in Bill of Rights)

o Differentiate principles from policies:

A. Principles: things the country is supposed to live by (first 6 provisions – as laid down here)

B. Policies: guidelines for action – everything else Delegation of power

o What delegating law must possess:

1. Completeness 2. Sufficient standards

o When rules and regulations can have the force of penal law:

1. Delegating statute itself must authorize promulgation of penal regulations 2. Penalty provided by the statute itself 3. Publication in OG or newspaper of GC

Valid delegation:o Abakada v. Executive Sec.: The President’s power in the VAT law to increase the VAT

according to the existence of certain conditions is a valid contingent legislation.o Gerochi v. DENR: the power delegated to the ERB to impose universal charge on

electricity end-users is not undue delegation of power to tax, because its purpose is actually not revenue generation by regulation – thus, police power. Moreover, the delegating law was complete and has sufficient standards.

“Sufficient standards”o Eastern Shipping v. POEA: “fair and equitable employment practices” is a sufficient

standard in POEA requiring MC No. 2 (standard contracts for Philippine seamen)o Tablarin v. Gutierrez: “standardization and regulation of medical education” is sufficient

standard to allow the BME to create standardized medical entrance tests.o RA 9335 (Attrition Act): Deemed valid, even if it allows the BIR and BOC to give awards

to those who surpass BIR targets and sanction those who fall short. Is the setting of the targets unduly delegated to the President?

HELD: No. Because the targets set are based on estimated revenue collection as approved by the DCBB and stated in the BESF submitted by President to Congress – so the President alone does not set the targets.

Outside scope of delegating law:o Cebu Oxygen v. Drilon: RA 6640 decreed a wage increase higher than the agreed-upon

CBA. The DOLE however issued a regulation that the salary increase in the CBA will not be counted in assessing compliance with RA 6640.

HELD: Invalid; added a provision/limitation when none existed in the law.o Tatad v. Sec. of Energy: The Executive considered other factors outside of the two

provided in RA 8180 in deregulating oil prices. HELD: Invalid.

Undue delegation:o People v. Dacuycuy: RA 4670 provides the penalty of “imprisonment, in the discretion of

the court.” HELD: Unconstitutional – undue delegation of legislative power.

o Contra Employers Confederation v. NWPC: Can delegate wage-fixing power to

executive, provided there are sufficient standards.

Legislative Department

Subdivisions:

Legislative power (1)Houses of Congress (2-7)Elections (8-9)Limitations and privileges (10-14)Sessions, officers, internal bodies (15-20)Powers of inquiry (21-22)Matters of competence (23-25)

Legislative power

Where is legislative power vested?o Vested in the Congress: composed of Senate and HOR

o Except: to extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum

What are the kinds of legislative power?o Original: possessed by the sovereign people

o Derivative: delegated to the legislative bodies

o Constituent: power to amend or revise the Constitution

o Ordinary: power to pass ordinary laws

What is the nature of legislative power?o Plenary in nature

o What are the limitations?

1. Substantive (as re: content of laws) 2. Procedural (as to how they are passed) 3. No irrepealable laws

General rule: Cannot be delegated.o What are the exceptions?

1: delegation to local governments 2: delegation to administrative bodies

BUT NOTE: what is delegated to admin agencies is not legislative power but “rule-making power” which is executory in nature

o 1. Filling-up details or

o 2. Contingent legislation

3. Tariff powers to the President 4. Emergency powers to the President, as given by Congress

What are the post-legislation powers of Congress?o Only scrutiny and investigation, to check compliance with law – otherwise, there will be

violation of separation of powers What is the difference in power of legislative and executive as re: abolition of offices?

o Legislative in general holds the power to abolish public offices

o As an exception, the President may inactivate functions of bureaus, departments, and

offices in the executive department only (as part of broad authority to reorganize)

Houses of Congress

Senate

24 memberso 1. Natural born citizen

o 2. On day of election, at least 35 years old

o 3. Able to read and write

o 4. Registered voter

o 5. On the day preceding election day, resident of Philippines for at least 2 years

Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board: Cannot add or subtract from these qualifications. (apply to HOR too – see Maquera v. Borra, where a property bond was disallowed)

Six year term, beginning June 30 Two consecutive terms, maximum

o Voluntary renunciation of office not considered an interruption

o What about involuntary severance?

It is considered an interruption, because it is by operation of law and not voluntary renunciation

HOR

Not more than 250 members unless provided by lawo Now, there are more than 250 members, obviously

o 1. Natural born citizen of the Philippines

o 2. On the day of the election, at least 25 years old

For youth party-list representative, at least 25 and not more than 30 on the day of election

o 3. Able to read and write

o 4. Registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected

o 5. On the day immediately preceding election day, resident for at least 1 year in the district

in which he shall be elected * Obviously for PLs, there is no district requirement just Philippines in general

is requiredo Special requirement for PL representatives?

Must be a bona fide member of the PL he seeks to represent at least 90 days before the election

What does “residence” mean?o Residence requirement actually means domicile.

o Requisites of domicile?

1. Animus manendi 2. Animus non-revertendi.

o Actual physical presence is not enough, as there must be proof of permanence. Merely

leasing a lot in the supposed new domicile and registering as a voter in another place fails to establish this.

Citizenship:o Co v. HRET: Those born of Filipino mothers before Jan. 17, 1973 who elect Filipino

citizenship upon age of majority are considered natural born citizens.o Bengzon v. Cruz: One who lost Filipino citizenship (in this case, joined US army) and

then reacquired Filipino citizenship is still natural-born. But there is a dissenting opinion here.

o Valles v. COMELEC: Mere possession of alien passport or alien certificate of registration

is not automatically a renunciation of Filipino citizenship, which must be express. It is just dual citizenship. Filing of certificate of candidacy is an act of choosing Filipino citizenship. (See section on citizenship for more on dual citizenship)

Three year term, beginning June 30 Three consecutive terms, maximum

o Voluntary renunciation of office not considered an interruption

o QUINTO v. COMELEC:

Filing for candidacy is ipso facto resignation for appointive official, but not elective official

Two types:o District representatives

o Party-list representatives

o (No more sectoral representatives after 1998)

Apportionment of districts:o From provinces, cities, and MM area contiguous, compact, and adjacent (CCA) territory

“As far as practicable” so there can be exceptions for island provinces Gerrymandering is prohibited.

o According to population – uniform and progressive ratio

o At least one representative for:

1. Each city with population of at least 250K 2. Each province Aquino III v. COMELEC: ONLY cities have to comply with the minimum 250K.

In this case, however, proportionate representation was ignored (sadly).o Reapportionment of districts within 3 years after every census return

On creation of new districts:o When a municipality is converted into a city large enough to entitle it to one district,

the incidental effect is splitting the district into two. Does this need census? No. The splitting of districts is by law. No need for plebiscite under Art. X of the Constitution when one district is split

into two, because you are not creating new juridical personalities or dividing the territory per se. There is only a need for plebiscite if you are creating a new Local Government Unit.

o When the increase of districts creates an imbalance, can COMELEC correct the

imbalance by transferring districts? No. The COMELEC must wait for legislative enactment.

o Sema v. COMELEC: Only law can create new legislative districts. So RA 9054, in so far

as it grants ARMM the authority to create provinces and cities which could result in the creation of new legislative districts, is unconstitutional.

Party-list representatives:o 20% of total number of representatives

Banat v. COMELEC: The 2% vote provision to fill in the remaining seats as provided in RA No. 7941 is unconstitutional, as an obstacle to broad representation. The next higher vote getters, regardless of the number of votes, will fill-in the remaining seats.

o What about the three-seat cap?

It’s constitutional. It prevents a party from dominating the party-list system. The constitution does not require absolute proportionality.

Guidelines for PLs in RA 7941:o 1. Must represent marginalized or underrepresented

2. DQ’ed: Religious

N.B.: religious leaders may be representatives; the probation is against religious groups

Advocates violence or unlawful means to seek goal Receiving support from foreign government or organization for partisan election

purposes Violates election laws Untruthful statements in petition Ceases to exist for at least 1 year Failed to participate in last 2 preceding elections (or fails to obtain at least 2% of

votes cast in 2 prior elections CHANGED to failure to obtained a seat in the prior 2 elections

o 3. Must not be indirectly funded or assisted by government

o VC Cadangen v. COMELEC: COMELEC has jurisdiction to determine whether an

organization applying for the party list system represents marginalized sector. It cannot be challenged by certiorari because the decision is based on facts and the SC does not try facts.

Guidelines for PL representatives:o 1. Must not have lost for an elective office in the immediately preceding election

o 2. Five are nominated

o 3. No change in the names or order unless when (as approved by COMELEC):

A. A nominee dies B. He withdraws his nomination in writing C. Incapacitated

o 4. Must be bona fide member of the PL he seeks to represent at least 90 days before

election

Elections

When are elections?

o 2nd Monday of May unless otherwise provided by law

What if there is a vacancy in either house?o Can call special elections:

o But elected Senator or representative only serves the unexpired term

Tolentino v. COMELEC: Congress enacted law declaring that the 13th highest vote getter in the next general elections for Senator will fill-in Guingona’s unexpired term (since he was appointed as VP). This is valid practice, and there need not be any separate call, since the statute filled that purpose and charges voters with information already.

What does RA 6645 (Special Election Law) provide?o There will be a special election if the vacancy happens:

A) at least 1.5 years before the next regular election for Senators B) at least 1 year before the next regular election for members of HOR

o What must be passed:

A) if Congress is in session – Resolution by the concerned house B) if not in session – Certification by the Speaker or Senate President (depending

where vacancy occurs)o What it must contain

1. Declaration of vacancy 2. Calling for special election 45-90 days from date of resolution or certification

Limitations and privileges

There are five: a) salaries, b) arrest, c) financial and business interest, d) other positions, e) prohibited involvements

(A) Salaries

Determined by law No increase in compensation takes effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Senators

and HOR representatives approving the increase What about a decrease?

o Not covered by the prohibition because it only covers increases

Is a new Senator or representative elected through special election entitled to the new salary rate?

o No. The new members are serving the terms of those who approved the increase and are

thus not entitled to the increase. Are emoluments allowed?

o Open question, because the prohibition seems to allow indirect increase in salary (not as

strict as 1935 Constitution). But one may appeal to the spirit of the provision to avoid increases.

Are allowances allowed?o Yes since these do not constitute salary. The only limit is moral.

(B) Arrest

1. Senators and reps privileged from arrest for all offenses punishable by not more than six yearso When does this privilege apply?

While Congress is in session – thus, not during recess Whether regular or special, whether legislator is actually attending it or not

2. No member can be questioned or held liable in any other place for any speech/debate in Congress or any committee

o This is protection from other forums apart from Congress itself.

o Protects against libel suits, BUT NOT against disciplinary authority of Congress.

o What does “Speech or debate” cover?

Includes utterances made in performance of official functions (speeches, statements, votes cast, bills introduced, etc.)

o When does this privilege apply?

Congress need not actually be in session. (So compare with Arrest, where there is need for session)

o What is the extent of protection?

Extends even to agents of assemblymen, provided the agency consists of assisting the legislator.

o Pobre v. Defensor Santiago: Miriam Defensor Santiago was berating the SC as idiots,

but she was held to have been protected by parliamentary immunity, although the SC said she crossed the limits of decency and good conduct.

(C) Financial and business interests connected with bill

When does this limitation apply?o All Senators and representatives, upon assumption of office

What must they do?o 1. Make full disclosure of financial and business interests

o 2. Notify the house concerned of potential conflict of interest

From filing proposed legislation Wherein they are authors

N.B. THEREFORE, they are not prohibited from introducing bills that have conflicts with their interest, as long as they disclose

(D) Other positions

1. First prohibition: o No senator or HOR rep may hold any other office or employment in:

Gov, any subdivision, agency, instrumentality, including GOCCs and subsidiaries During term

o Or else, forfeit his seat

o Liban v. Gordon: Gordon, upon assuming position as Phil. National Red Cross chair, did

not forfeit his seat because PNRC is a private corporation, albeit performing public functions. It is not among the prohibited positions.

2. Second prohibition: o Cannot be appointed to:

1. Office created during term elected 2. Office whose emoluments were increased during term elected

o This is an absolute prohibition, unlike the first prohibition, where he can accept the other

office, but has to just forfeit his seat.

(E) Prohibited involvements

May not personally appear as counsel before:o 1. Any court of justice

o 2. Electoral tribunals

o 3. QJ bodies

o 4. Admin bodies

Cannot be involved in any, if granted by Gov, any sub, agency, instrumentality, GOCC, subsidiary:

o 1. Contract

o 2. Franchise

o 3. special privilege

Cannot intervene in any matter, before any office of government for pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to on account of his office

Puyat v. De Guzman: A congressman cannot buy nominal amount of shares in a corporation in a suit before the SEC and appear in “intervention.” This is a circumvention of the constitutional policy.

Sessions, officers, and other internal bodies

Session

Regular session:o Once a year, on fourth Monday of July

Unless other time fixed by lawo Continues to be in session for such number of days as it may determine

o UNTIL 30 days before opening of its next regular session

o (Exclude: Saturday, Sunday, legal holiday)

Special session:o Can be called by the President at any time

o When the legislature is in recess

Officers

Constitutional officers – elected by majority of its members:o 1. Senate President

o 2. Speaker of the House

Each house chooses other officers as deemed necessary Santiago v. Guingona: Tatad, the loser in the election for Senate President wanted to assume

minority leader position. But Guingona assumed it. Filed Quo Warranto case.

o HELD: The Senate has prerogative to choose how to elect other officers apart from the SP

and SotH. So the Court cannot de-proclaim Guingona. Arroyo v. De Venecia: If what was violated was a mere internal rule of the house, the SC cannot

take jurisdiction. The house can waive compliance with its own rules.o Exceptions:

1. When what was violated is a Constitutional provision OR 2. Persons other than members of the legislature are affected.

Internal order

Majority of each house quorum to do businesso Don’t count those outside the country because they are beyond the coercive jurisdiction of

each House Smaller number:

o 1. May adjourn from day to day

o 2. May compel attendance of absent members according to house rules

Disciplinary provisions:o Each house may determine rules of proceedings

Osmena v. Pendatun: The disciplinary action taken by Congress against a member is not subject to judicial review because each House is the sole judge of what disorderly conduct is.

o Punish members for disorderly behavior

o How does a house suspend or expel a member?

1. Need 2/3 concurrence of all members 2. Suspension cannot exceed 60 days

Paredes v. Sandiganbayan: The suspension here is different from that under RA 3019, the latter of which is preventive while in this provision, it is punitive (and internal).

Journal rules:o 1. Published from time to time

Except parts affecting national securityo 2. Yeas and nays recorded at request of 1/5th of members present

o What if there is conflict between extraneous evidence and the journal?

The journal is conclusive upon the courts.o What if there is conflict between the journal and an enrolled bill?

The enrolled bill prevails, due to respect given to a co-equal branch of government.

o What is the exception to the above matter?

When the Senate President withdraws his signature from the enrolled bill, then the journal prevails.

o What if an enrolled bill conflicts with the journal on a matter required by the

Constitution to be placed in the journal? Open matter

There will also be a record of proceedings

During sessions, cannot do the ff without the consent of the other house:o 1. Adjourn for more than 3 days

o 2. Hold session in any other place than that in which the two houses are sitting

Electoral tribunals

Two ETs:o 1. SET

o 2. HRET

What is their Jurisdiction?o Sole judge of all contests relating to election, returns, and qualifications of members

(ERQ) Composition?

o 9 members each

o 3 of whom: Justices of SC (designated by CJ)

Senior justice is chairmano 6 members from the Senate or HOR, respectively

Based on proportional representation of political parties and party-list organizations

What is an election contest?o The defeated candidate challenges the qualification and claims the seat of a proclaimed

winner.o There must be an election contest for the ET to have jurisdiction.

When does a case pass from COMELEC to ET?o When a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office.

o Lazatin: After this point, COMELEC rules do not apply anymore, but the ET rules.

What is the Supreme Court jurisdiction over ET?o When there is GADALEJ.

o Bondoc v. Pineda: When a party expelled a member who disclosed that he was not

voting for the party candidate in an election contest, the SC invalidated the expulsion, saying that it impaired the ET’s prerogative to be the sole judge of election contests.

o Garcia v. HRET: There is no GADALEJ when the ET dismisses a case for failure to pay

cash deposit required by the HRET rules. Since the nature of the case is sensitive, it follows that there must be strict compliance with internal rules.

Is the ET’s jurisdiction limited only to Constitutional qualifications?o No.

o It includes even statutory qualifications. This is the consequence of being the “sole

judge.” Abbas v. Senate: Contest sought DQ of Senators sitting in SET. But even if there are replaced,

the replacements would face the same challenge. No other body can replace the SET’s function. So they have to nonetheless discharge their functions.

Limkaichong v. COMELEC: Alleged irregularity in proclamation will not divest HRET of its jurisdiction. The ET would have to decide as well whether the proclamation was valid or not.

Abayon v. COMELEC: The COMELEC decides whether the party-list organization is qualified to join the party-list system. But it is the HRET that can decide whether the party-list representative is qualified.

Commission on Appointments (CONA)

Function of the CONA?o Function: to check and balance presidential appointments

o The CONA acts on all appointments submitted to it within 30 session days of Congress,

from submissiono For positions required to be confirmed by the CONA

Composition (25):o 1. Senate President (ex-officio chairman)

o 2. 12 Senators

o 3. 12 HOR representatives

Representation chosen based on proportional representation of the parties (and party-list system)o Daza v. Singson: The party need not be registered. If there are changes in the party

alignment, then the CONA must always reflect these changes.o Coseteng v. Mitra: Mere endorsement by eight other members cannot count in favor of

Coseteng, the only member of KAIBA who won that election (0.4%). There must be at least 8.4% representation to win a seat in the CONA (for the HOR), under that election.

o Guingona v. Gonzales: No need to complete all 12 seats for a house. So in this case

where one party only had 1 representative in the Senate, this would entitle the party to 0.5 seats. There is no such thing as a half seat.

o Drilon v. Speaker: The two houses have primary jurisdiction on who should sit in the

CONA. This includes determination of party affiliation and number of party members for purpose of determining proportional representation.

Rules on voting:o Majority vote

o Chairman does not vote, except if there is a tie

On ETs and CONA

When constituted?o Constituted within 30 days after Senate and HOR have been organized

o When are the Senate and HOR organized?

Upon election of the SP or SOH When does the CONA meet?

o Only when Congress is in session

o At call of chairman or majority of members

o What if the Congress is not in session?

Then this is when there are ad interim appointments

Records and books of account

What is required for these books?o 1. Preserved and open to the public

In accordance with lawo 2. Audited by the COA

Publishes annually an itemized list of amounts paid to and expenses incurred for each member

Inquiry powers

Sec 21: inquiries in aid of legislation

What is the purpose of Sec. 21?o To obtain information for legislation

o EO creating the PCGG included a proviso that none of its members may be

compelled to provide information or act as witness before any of the government bodies. Is this valid?

No. It is repugnant to this power. It was repealed by the 1987 constitution. Can Congress punish for contempt?

o Yes. This power to do so exists until the legislature’s final adjournment, because this

power is for the preservation of the legislative body Can courts prohibit Congress from requiring respondents to appear before it?

o No.

What is “in aid of legislation”?o Easy to comply with this in Phils. since our legislature possesses plenary powers

o Each question separately need not be material to proposed legislation – it is the totality of

information gathered that is pertinento BUT SEE Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon: The court rules that the investigation was

not in aid of legislation because Enrile’s speech did not suggest any contemplated legislation.

COMMENT: this seems to be an overstepping of the Court’s bounds, because it cannot second-guess the intent of Congress based on a single speech.

The main principle here: it must be in aid of legislation, not in aid of prosecution

Who may be summoned?o Anyone, except:

1. President 2. SC Justice

o Even a department head who is an alter ego of the President may be summoned.

The rights of persons appearing in or affected by inquiries shall be respected apply the Bill of Rights

o Ex. Right against self-incrimination

Does the filing of a criminal case divest the legislative of power to conduct the inquiry?

o No. The inquiry is not in the nature of a criminal prosecution. Also, cannot invoke in

general right against self-incrimination because the process is not to impute liability per se (although they may invoke this right for specific questions).

Garcillano v. HOR: The rules of the Congress in inquiries in aid of legislation must be published according to the Civil Code provisions on publication. The requirement of publication is expressly stated in Art. VI, Sec 21.

De la Paz v. Senate: Violation of internal procedures of Senate cannot be, as a general rule, subject to judicial supervision since “Each house shall determine the rules of its proceedings.” The exceptions are when there is arbitrary and improvident use of power, which ultimately denies due process.

Sec 22: executive privilege/oversight function (“question hour”)

Heads of departments may appear on any matter pertaining to their departmentso But with due deference to separation of powers, Department Heads, who are alter egos of

the President, may not appear without permission of the President.o This provision does not apply to any one else with Cabinet rank, if not Department Heads.

o N.B. Quick and dirty rule: just Department Heads

Who initiates?o 1. Upon own initiative of the department head, with consent of President OR

o 2. Upon request of either house

What does “request” imply? That Sec. 22 is NOT mandatory and compulsory

Written questions submitted to SP/SOH 3 days before scheduled appearanceo Interpellations not limited to written questions

o But may cover matters related thereto

What if security of State or public interest is affected?o The President must state it in writing, and

o Appearance can be in executive session

Executive privilege really applies to Sec. 21 (because this is the mandatory provision, whereas Sec. 22 is merely optional – more on this in Art. VII)

o Only the President may invoke this. If it is invoked by some other person, there must be

proof that he or she has Presidential authority.o Coverage:

1. State secrets 2. Informer’s privilege 3. Generic privilege for internal deliberations

o SC has final say to determine if privilege covers the matter.

o Puno’s dissent the SC seemed to have guessed Neri’s intent through guesswork.

Matters of legislature’s competence

State of war

Requirements to declare a State of war:

o 1. Joint session but

o 2. Separate vote

o 3. 2/3 vote of both houses

Emergency powers to President:o In times of war or other national emergency:

o Congress may by law authorize President to exercise powers necessary to carry out

declared national policyo For limited period and subject to restrictions

o When it ends:

1. By resolution of Congress 2. Upon next adjournment

N.B.: “existence of state of war” means that we renounce aggressive war as national policyo But the executive may lodge war even without a declaration of the state of war. The

power to make war is with executive.

Origination clause

What bills must originate from the HOR?o 1. Appropriation, revenue, or tariff bills

o 2. Bills authorizing increase of public debt

o 3. Bills of local application

o 4. Private bills

But Senate may propose or concur with amendments N.B. HOR just initiates, but the senate may completely replace it. As long as the idea comes from

HOR. The bill is the only one that must be originated, but not the law. The Senate can even “anticipate” the house bill, provided the HOR bill was filed prior to the Senate

version.

Appropriations

Is a bill that creates an office and appropriates money for it an appropriations bill?o No. The primary and specific aim must be the allocation of sum of money, and not just

incidental. Congress may not increase appropriations recommended by President for executive branch No provision or enactment embraced in general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to

some appropriation thereino Provision or enactment limited to the appropriation to which it relates

o Garcia v. Mata: An example of a rider is the Appropriations Act of 1956-7, which

contained a prohibition for reserve officers called for tour of active duty for more than 2 years in a 5 year period.

Procedure for approving appropriations for Congress: same procedure as for other departments and agencies

Requirements for Special appropriations bills:o 1. Must specify purpose for which it is intended

o 2. Supported by funds actually available (certified by National Treasurer) OR raised by

revenue proposal Transfer of appropriations:

o General rule: no law passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations

o Exception: The following may (by law) be authorized to augment any item in the general

appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items in their appropriations:

1. President 2. Senate President 3. SOH 4. CJ 5. Heads of Con-Comm.

o Demetria v. Alba: A law allowing the President to transfer funds was declared

unconstitutional because it did not state that these must be savings from other items in his respective appropriations

o This list is exclusive.

Discretionary funds:o Appropriated for particular officials

o Must only be disbursed for public purpose

o And supported by vouchers and subject to guidelines under law

Automatic renewal of prior year’s appropriation bill if at the end of a fiscal year, Congress fails to pass the GAB

o Remains in effect until the GAB is passed

Passage of laws

What is the “one subject rule”?o Every bill must only embrace one subject which shall be expressed in the title.

o This is a mandatory requirement.

o Purposes of this rule?

1. To prevent hodge-podge or log-rolling legislation 2. To prevent surprise or fraud 3. Fair appraisal to the people

o How is the rule interpreted?

Liberally – allow if title is general and all provisions are germane to this general subject

o Tio v. Videogram Regulaory Board: Act Creating Videogram Regulatory Board included

30% tax on gross receipts on video transactions. HELD: Valid, not a rider. Taxation is sufficiently related to regulation of video

industry.o Phil. Judges Association v. Prado: Act creating Phil. Postal Corp., defining powers,

functions, responsibilities, regulation of industry, other purposes included removal of judges’ franking privileges.

HELD: Valid, not a rider. Sufficiently related (but violated EPC).

o Tobias v. Abalos: Act converting Mandaluyong to HUC of Mandaluyong included

resulting conversion of city into congressional district. HELD: Valid.

o Banat v. COMELEC: RA 9369, which speaks of poll automation, contains substantial

provisions dealing with manual canvassing of election returns. HELD: Valid.

How does a bill become law?o 3 readings on separate days

When can there be 3 readings on one day only? Public calamity or emergency as certified by President

Printed copies given to members 3 days before its passageo First reading:

Read the title Pass to Bicameral Conference Committee

o Second reading:

Entire text read, Debates held, Amendments introduced

o Third reading:

No amendment allowed Take vote immediately thereafter Yeas and nays entered in journal

Presentation of bill to Presidento How does the president signify approval?

1. Signing the bill 2. No action in 30 days. Thus, there is enactment by inaction on the President’s

end. No such thing on legislative side.o What happens if it is rejected?

Vetoed, return to originating house, with objections. Objections are entered in house journal.

What is the process of reconsideration, where the legislation can override a Presidential veto?

2/3 approval on originating house, then sent along with objections to the other house.

2/3 approval of other house becomes law Must yeas and nays be recorded?

Yes.o Must the President veto the entire bill?

Yes. What is the exception?

Appropriation, revenue, or tariff bills. The President can exercise “item veto.”

What are the exceptions to the exception? 1. Doctrine of inappropriate provisions

2. Executive impoundment Three cases when the Constitution requires yeas and nays to be recorded:

o 1. Last and third readings of a bill

o 2. Upon 1/5 members’ request

o 3. Re-passing a bill over Presidential veto

What is a Bicameral Conference Committee?o Extra-constitutional creation

o Intended to resolve conflicts between house and Senate versions of bills

o Tolentino v. Sec. of Finance: the Conference Committee may draft a bill which contains

provisions not found on either bill Vetoes:

o General rule: no item veto (only for ART bills)

o Invalid veto: deemed without effect

o Can an “item veto” be done within a section?

Yes. “Item veto” does not mean the President can only veto an entire section. He can veto within a section, as long as there is a subject and a tax rate (that is an item).

o What is the doctrine of “inappropriate provisions”?

The President may veto riders in an appropriation bill, even if it is not an appropriation or a revenue item.

o What is “executive impoundement”?

Refusal of the President to spend funds allocated by Congress for a purpose. The court did not pass upon this question, but simply relied on the inappropriate provisions doctrine.

Taxes

Characteristics of taxation:o 1. Uniform and equitable.

Not intrinsic, but geographical uniformity; also, EPCo 2. Progressive system of taxation.

Tax rate increases as tax base increases Congress may authorize President to fix within specified limits:

o 1. Tariff rates

o 2. Export and export quotas

o 3. Tonnage and wharfage dues

o 4. Other duties or imposts within framework of national development program of

government Can the power to tax be delegated to the executive?

o Yes. Power to tax is legislative, but Sec. 28(2) allows Congress to delegate it to the

President. The President is bound by conditions set by Congress. This is an exception to the rule of non-delegability.

What are specially exempt from property taxation?

o Land, buildings, and improvements that are actually, directly, and exclusively used for

religious, charitable, or educational purposes. Ex. Charitable institutions, churches and appurtenances, mosques, non-profit

cemeterieso NOTE: These are only property tax exemptions

No law granting tax exemption can be passed without concurrence of majority of all members of Congress

General limit to power to tax: must be for public purposeo Planters v. Fertiphil: LOI 1465, a piece of martial law legislation, imposed a P10 capital

contribution for each sale of a bag of fertilizer until adequate capital is present to make PPI, a private company, viable. HELD: invalid, because it was not for a public purpose.

Money

No money paid out of treasury except pursuant to appropriation made by law Limitations on appropriations?

o 1. Must be for public purpose.

o 2. No public money/property appropriated, applied, paid, employed to religious sects or

religious personnel EXCEPT when such person is assigned to:

1.Armed forces 2. Penal institution 3. Government orphanage 4. Government leprosarium

What is the rule on special funds?o Money collected on tax levied for special purpose must be paid for that purpose only

o What if they are not used or the purpose is fulfilled or abandoned?

Transferred to general funds of the governmento Is the OPSF a special fund?

No, because it was not pursuant to the power to tax. It was pursuant to police power.

Is a law requiring automatic reappropriation for foreign debts invalid because there is no fixed amount?

o No. It is valid. The amount can be fixed by the simple act of looking into Treasury books.

Is a continuing appropriation law valid?o Yes. The law does not require yearly or annual appropriation.

Philconsa v. Enriquez: CDF/Pork barrel was approved by SC, stating that the Congress already specified uses of the power, and power given to the executive officials was merely recommendatory, subject to President’s approval. (Fr. B doesn’t like this.)

Misc

Can the Congress increase appellate jurisdiction of the SC? o No, unless there is SC advice and concurrence.

Ex. OMB Act directly allowed appeals from OMB to SC was unconstitutional.

Can the law grant title of nobility or royalty?o No.

Initiative and Referendum:

What can the people do pursuant to this power?o 1. Directly propose and enact laws

o 2. Approve and reject any act or law or part thereof passed by Congress or local

legislative body What are the types of initiative?

o 1. Initiative on the Constitution

12%-3%o 2. Initiative on Statutes (national legislation)

10%-3%o 3. Initiative on Local Legislation

See local government Requires for petition for national initiative?

o 1. Signed by at least 10% of total number of registered voters

o 2. Represented by at least 3% of registered voters of each leg. District

o 3. Petition must be registered with COMELEC

What if it’s an initiative on the Constitution?o 1. It must be 12% of all registered voters

o 2. Represented by at least 3% of registered voters of each leg. District

o 3. And only once every 5 years

And then?o All registered voters vote on the proposition forwarded

What cannot be the subject of initiative?o 1. Petition embracing more than 1 subject

o 2. Statutes involving emergency powers specially vested in Congress by the Constitution

cannot be subject of referendum until 90 days after effectivity RA 6735 Initiative and Referendum Law

Summary of Congressional voting requirements:

3/4 vote 2/3 vote Majority vote 1/3 vote 1/5 vote

Proposing amendments or revisions to the Constitution (one house, then the other, all

Suspension of a member by his respective house (all members)

Election of SP and SOH, by their respective houses (all smembers)

Passing articles of impeachment (House of Representatives alone)

To record yeas and nays (members present)

members)Calling a Constitutional convention

Constitutional convention, if 2/3 vote is not met (all members), and thereafter the question re: calling is resolved in a plebiscite

Declaration of State of war (joint session, but separate vote)

Commission on appointments, both voting and to convene (if the Chairman doesn’t call for meeting)

Overriding Presidential veto (originating house, then the other)

Law granting tax exemption (all members, not just those present)

Revoking proclamation of President of martial law or suspension of privilege of WHC (joint vote)Extension of period of martial law or suspension of privilege of WHC (joint vote)Granting amnestyPresident declares that he can discharge duties, but the Cabinet says otherwiseValidating a treaty (only Senate)Deciding to impeach an officer (Senate)Confirming the appointee as new VP is the present one dies (each house votes separately)