Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. 138489November 29, 2001ELEANOR DELA CRUZ, FEDERICO LUCHICO, JR., SOLEDAD EMILIA CRUZ, JOEL LUSTRIA, HENRY PAREL, HELENA HABULAN, PORFIRIO VILLENA, JOSEPH FRANCIA, CARMELLA TORRES, JOB DAVID, CESAR MEJIA, MA. LOURDES V. DEDAL, ALICE TIONGSON, REYDELUZ CONFERIDO, PHILIPPE LIM, NERISSA SANCHEZ, MARY LUZ ELAINE PURACAN, RODOLFO QUIMBO, TITO GENILO and OSCAR ABUNDO, as members of the Board of the National Housing Authority from the period covering 1991-1996,petitioners,vs.COMMISSION ON AUDIT, represented by its Commissioners,respondents.SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,J.:This petition for certiorari1assails the Decision No. 98-381 dated September 22, 1998, rendered by the Commission on Audit (COA), denying petitioners' appeal from the Notice of Disallowance No. 97-011- 061 issued by the NHA Resident Auditor on October 23, 1997.Such Notice disallowed payment to petitioners of their representation allowances and per diems for the period from August 19, 1991 to August 31, 1996 in the total amount of P 276,600.00.Petitioners, numbering 20, were members of the Board of Directors of the National Housing Authority (NHA) from 1991 to 1996. On September 19, 1997, the COA issued Memorandum No. 97-0382directing all unit heads/auditors/team leaders of the national government agencies and government-owned and controlled corporations which have effected payment of any form of additional compensation or remuneration to cabinet secretaries, their deputies and assistants, or their representatives, in violation of the rule on multiple positions, to (a) immediately cause the disallowance of such additional compensation or remuneration given to and received by the concerned officials, and (b) effect the refund of the same from the time of the finality of the Supreme CourtEn BancDecision in the consolidated cases ofCivil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary and Anti- Graft League of the Philippines, Inc. et al, vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, et al.,promulgated on February 22, 1991.3The COA Memorandum further stated that the said Supreme Court Decision, which became final and executory on August 19, 1991,4declared Executive Order No. 284 unconstitutional insofar as it allows Cabinet members, their deputies and assistant to hold other offices, in addition to their primary offices, and to receive compensation therefor.Accordingly, on October 23, 1997, NHA Resident Auditor Salvador J, Vasquez issued Notice of Disallowance No. 97-011-061disallowing in audit the payment of representation allowances and per diems of "Cabinet members who were theex- officiomembers of the NHA Board of Directors and/or their respective alternates who actually received the payments," The total disallowed amount of P276,600 paid as representation allowances and per diems to each of the petitioners named below, covering the period from August 19, 1991 to August 31, 1996, is broken down as follows:"NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY

SCHEDULE OF PAID REPRESENTATION/PER DIEM OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS

For the period August 19,1991 to August 31, 1996

AGENCYMEMBERS OF BOARD OF DIRECTORSAMOUNT DISALLOWED

DOFEleanor del a Cruz (1991-1993)P25,200.00

DTIFederico Luchico, Jr, (1991-1992)36,450.00

DOFSoledad Emilia Cruz (1992-1995)57,300.00

DOLEJoel Lustria (1992)4,500.00

DOLEHenry Parel (1992)2,250.00

DOFHelena Habulan (1993.1994)4,050.00

DOFPorfirio Villena (1993)6,750.00

DTIJoseph Francia (1993-1995)73,500.00

DOLECarmela Torres (1993)4,500.00

DPWHJob David (1993-1994)6,750.00

DPWHCesar Mejia (1993)3,150.00

DOFMa. Lourdes V. Dedal (1993)2,250.00

DTIAlice Tiongson (1994)900.00

DOLEReynaluz Conferido (1994-1995)11,250.00

DOLEPhilippe Lim (1994-1995)4,500.00

DOFNerissa Sanchez (1995)2,700.00

DOFMary Luz Elaine Puracan (1995)1,800.00

DOLERodolfo Quimbo (1995)7,200.00

DOLETito Genilo (1995)14,400.00

DPWHOscar Abundo (1995-1996)7,200.00

P276,600.00"

Petitioners, through then Chairman Dionisio C. Dela Serna of the NHA Board of Directors, appealed from the Notice of Disallowance to the Commission on Audit7based on the following grounds:1. The Decision of the Supreme Court inCivil Liberties UnionandAnti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc. was clarified in the Resolution of the CourtEn Bancon August 1, 1991, in that the constitutional ban against dual or multiple positions applies only to the members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants. It does not cover other appointive officials with equivalent rank or those lower than the position of Assistant Secretary; and2. The NHA Directors are not Secretaries, Undersecretaries or Assistant Secretaries and that they occupy positions lower than the position of Assistant Secretary.On September 22, 1998, the COA issued Decision No.98-3818 denying petitioners' appeal, thus:"After circumspect evaluation of the facts and issues raised herein, this Commission finds the instant appeal devoid of merit. It must be stressed at the outset that the Directors concerned were not sitting in the NHA Board in their own right but as representatives of cabinet members and who are constitutionally prohibited from holding any other office or employment and receive compensation therefor, during their tenure (Section 13, Article VII, Constitution;Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary,194 SCRA 317)."It may be conceded that the directors concerned occupy positions lower than Assistant Secretary which may exempt them from the prohibition (under) the doctrine enunciated inCivil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary, supra.However, their positions are merely derivative; they derive their authority as agents of the authority they are representing; their power and authority is sourced from the power and authority of the cabinet members they are sitting for. Sans the cabinet members, they are non-entities, without power and without personality to act in any manner with respect to the official transactions of the NHA. The agent or representative can only validly act and receive benefits for such action if the principal authority he is representing can legally do so for the agent can only do so much as his principal can do. The agent can never be larger than the principal. If the principal is absolutely barred from holding any position in and absolutely prohibited from receiving any remuneration from the NHA or any government agency, for that matter, so must the agent be. Indeed, the water cannot rise above its source."Hence, this petition.Presidential Decree No. 757 is the law "Creating the National Housing Authority and dissolving the existing housing agencies, defining its powers and functions, providing funds therefor, and for other purposes." Section 7 thereof provides:"SEC. 7. Board of Directors. -The Authority shall be governed by a Board of Directors, hereinafter referred to as the Board, which shall becomposed of the Secretary of Public Works, Transportation and Communication, the Director-General of the National Economic and Development Authority, the Secretary of Finance, the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of Industry, the Executive Secretary and the General Manager of the Authority.From among the members, the President will appoint a chairman. The members of the Board may have theirrespective alternateswho shall be the officials next in rank to themand whose acts shall be considered the acts of their principalswith the right to receive their benefit: Provided that in the absence of the Chairman, the Board shall elect a temporary presiding officer. x x x {Emphasis ours)It bears stressing that under the above provisions, the persons mandated by law to sit as members of the NHA Board are the following: (1) the Secretary of Public Works, Transportation and Communications, (2) the Director-General of the National Economic and Development Authority, (3) the Secretary of Finance, (4) the Secretary of Labor, (5) the Secretary of Industry, (6) the Executive Secretary, and (7) the General Manager of the NHA. While petitioners are not among those officers, however, they are "alternates" of the said officers, "whose acts shall be considered the acts of their principals".On this point, Section 13, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, provides:"SEC. 13.The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during their tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office."The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not during his tenure be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, Chairmen, or heads of bureaus of offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries."Interpreting the foregoing Constitutional provisions, this Court, inCivil Liberties UnionandAnti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc.,held:"The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution must not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein without additional compensation in anex-officiocapacity as provided by law and asrequiredby the primary functions of said officials' office. The reason is that these posts do not comprise 'any other office' within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials. x x xxxxxxxxxx"To reiterate, the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is not to be interpreted as covering positions held without additional compensation inex-officiocapacities as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of the concerned official's office. The termex-officiomeans 'from office; by virtue of office'. It refers to an 'authority derived from official character merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the official position.'Ex-officiolikewise denotes an 'act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other appointment or authority than that conferred by the office.' Anex-officiomember of a board is one who is a member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and without further warrant or appointment. To illustrate, by express provision of law, the Secretary of Transportation and Communications is theex-officioChairman of the Board of the Philippine Ports Authority, and the Light Rail Transit Authority.xxxxxxxxx"Theex-officioposition being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in the said position. The reason is that these services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his principal office. It should be obvious that if, say, the Secretary of Finance attends a meeting of the Monetary Board as anex-officiomember thereof, he is actually and in legal contemplation performing the primary function of his principal office in defining policy in monetary banking matters, which come under the jurisdiction of his department. For such attendance, therefore, he is not entitled to collect any extra compensation, whether it be in the form of a per diem or an honorarium or an allowance, or some other such euphemism. By whatever name it is designated, such additional compensation is prohibited by the Constitution."xxxxxxxxx(Emphasis ours )Since the Executive Department Secretaries, asex-oficiomembers of the NHA Board, are prohibited from receiving "extra (additional) compensation, whether it be in the form of a per diem or an honorarium or an allowance, or some other such euphemism," it follows that petitioners who sit as their alternates cannot likewise be entitled to receive such compensation. A contrary rule would give petitioners a better right than their principals.1wphi1.ntWe thus rule that in rendering its challenged Decision, the COA did not gravely abuse its discretion.WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.SO ORDERED.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. 88211 September 15, 1989FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., IRENE M. ARANETA, IMEE MANOTOC, TOMAS MANOTOC, GREGORIO ARANETA, PACIFICO E. MARCOS, NICANOR YIGUEZ and PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), represented by its President, CONRADO F. ESTRELLA,petitioners,vs.HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, CATALINO MACARAIG, SEDFREY ORDOEZ, MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, FIDEL RAMOS, RENATO DE VILLA, in their capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Immigration Commissioner, Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff, respectively,respondents.CORTES,J.:Before the Court is a controversy of grave national importance. While ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case would undeniably have a profound effect on the political, economic and other aspects of national life.We recall that in February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent "people power" revolution and forced into exile. In his stead, Corazon C. Aquino was declared President of the Republic under a revolutionary government. Her ascension to and consolidation of power have not been unchallenged. The failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by political leaders of Mr. Marcos, the takeover of television station Channel 7 by rebel troops led by Col. Canlas with the support of "Marcos loyalists" and the unseccessful plot of the Marcos spouses to surreptitiously return from Hawii with mercenaries aboard an aircraft chartered by a Lebanese arms dealer [Manila Bulletin, January 30, 1987] awakened the nation to the capacity of the Marcoses to stir trouble even from afar and to the fanaticism and blind loyalty of their followers in the country. The ratification of the 1987 Constitution enshrined the victory of "people power" and also clearly reinforced the constitutional moorings of Mrs. Aquino's presidency. This did not, however, stop bloody challenges to the government. On August 28, 1987, Col. Gregorio Honasan, one of the major players in the February Revolution, led a failed coup that left scores of people, both combatants and civilians, dead. There were several other armed sorties of lesser significance, but the message they conveyed was the same a split in the ranks of the military establishment that thraetened civilian supremacy over military and brought to the fore the realization that civilian government could be at the mercy of a fractious military.But the armed threats to the Government were not only found in misguided elements and among rabid followers of Mr. Marcos. There are also the communist insurgency and the seccessionist movement in Mindanao which gained ground during the rule of Mr. Marcos, to the extent that the communists have set up a parallel government of their own on the areas they effectively control while the separatist are virtually free to move about in armed bands. There has been no let up on this groups' determination to wrest power from the govermnent. Not only through resort to arms but also to through the use of propaganda have they been successful in dreating chaos and destabilizing the country.Nor are the woes of the Republic purely political. The accumulated foreign debt and the plunder of the nation attributed to Mr. Marcos and his cronies left the economy devastated. The efforts at economic recovery, three years after Mrs. Aquino assumed office, have yet to show concrete results in alleviating the poverty of the masses, while the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses has remained elusive.Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philipppines to die. But Mrs. Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.The PetitionThis case is unique. It should not create a precedent, for the case of a dictator forced out of office and into exile after causing twenty years of political, economic and social havoc in the country and who within the short space of three years seeks to return, is in a class by itself.This petition formandamusand prohibition asks the Courts to order the respondents to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.The IssueTh issue is basically one of power: whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.According to the petitioners, the resolution of the case would depend on the resolution of the following issues:1. Does the President have the power to bar the return of former President Marcos and family to the Philippines?a. Is this a political question?2. Assuming that the President has the power to bar former President Marcos and his family from returning to the Philippines, in the interest of "national security, public safety or public healtha. Has the President made a finding that the return of former President Marcos and his family to the Philippines is a clear and present danger to national security, public safety or public health?b. Assuming that she has made that finding(1) Have the requirements of due process been complied with in making such finding?(2) Has there been prior notice to petitioners?(3) Has there been a hearing?(4) Assuming that notice and hearing may be dispensed with, has the President's decision, including the grounds upon which it was based, been made known to petitioners so that they may controvert the same?c. Is the President's determination that the return of former President Marcos and his family to the Philippines is a clear and present danger to national security, public safety, or public health a political question?d. Assuming that the Court may inquire as to whether the return of former President Marcos and his family is a clear and present danger to national security, public safety, or public health, have respondents established such fact?3. Have the respondents, therefore, in implementing the President's decision to bar the return of former President Marcos and his family, acted and would be acting without jurisdiction, or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, in performing any act which would effectively bar the return of former President Marcos and his family to the Philippines? [Memorandum for Petitioners, pp. 5-7; Rollo, pp. 234-236.1The case for petitioners is founded on the assertion that the right of the Marcoses to return to the Philippines is guaranteed under the following provisions of the Bill of Rights, to wit:Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.xxx xxx xxxSection 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.The petitioners contend that the President is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so "within the limits prescribed by law." Nor may the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. They advance the view that before the right to travel may be impaired by any authority or agency of the government, there must be legislation to that effect.The petitioners further assert that under international law, the right of Mr. Marcos and his family to return to the Philippines is guaranteed.The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:Article 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.Likewise, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which had been ratified by the Philippines, provides:Article 121) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.2) Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.3) The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those which are provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order (order public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights recognized in the present Covenant.4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.On the other hand, the respondents' principal argument is that the issue in this case involves a political question which is non-justiciable. According to the Solicitor General:As petitioners couch it, the question involved is simply whether or not petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and his family have the right to travel and liberty of abode. Petitioners invoke these constitutional rightsin vacuowithout reference to attendant circumstances.Respondents submit that in its proper formulation, the issue is whether or not petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have the right to return to the Philippines and reside here at this time in the face of the determination by the President that such return and residence will endanger national security and public safety.It may be conceded that as formulated by petitioners, the question is not a political question as it involves merely a determination of what the law provides on the matter and application thereof to petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family. But when the question is whether the two rights claimed by petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family impinge on or collide with the more primordial and transcendental right of the State to security and safety of its nationals, the question becomes political and this Honorable Court can not consider it.There are thus gradations to the question, to wit:Do petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have the right to return to the Philippines and reestablish their residence here? This is clearly a justiciable question which this Honorable Court can decide.Do petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have their right to return to the Philippines and reestablish their residence here even if their return and residence here will endanger national security and public safety? this is still a justiciable question which this Honorable Court can decide.Is there danger to national security and public safety if petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family shall return to the Philippines and establish their residence here? This is now a political question which this Honorable Court can not decide for it falls within the exclusive authority and competence of the President of the Philippines. [Memorandum for Respondents, pp. 9-11; Rollo, pp. 297-299.]Respondents argue for the primacy of the right of the State to national security over individual rights. In support thereof, they cite Article II of the Constitution, to wit:Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal, military, or civil service.Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.Respondents also point out that the decision to ban Mr. Marcos and family from returning to the Philippines for reasons of national security and public safety has international precedents. Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, Anastacio Somoza Jr. of Nicaragua, Jorge Ubico of Guatemala, Fulgencio batista of Cuba, King Farouk of Egypt, Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez of El Salvador, and Marcos Perez Jimenez of Venezuela were among the deposed dictators whose return to their homelands was prevented by their governments. [See Statement of Foreign Affairs Secretary Raul S. Manglapus, quoted in Memorandum for Respondents, pp. 26-32; Rollo, pp. 314-319.]The parties are in agreement that the underlying issue is one of the scope of presidential power and its limits. We, however, view this issue in a different light. Although we give due weight to the parties' formulation of the issues, we are not bound by its narrow confines in arriving at a solution to the controversy.At the outset, we must state that it would not do to view the case within the confines of the right to travel and the import of the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in the leading cases ofKent v. Dulles[357 U.S. 116, 78 SCt 1113, 2 L Ed. 2d 1204] andHaig v. Agee[453 U.S. 280, 101 SCt 2766, 69 L Ed. 2d 640) which affirmed the right to travel and recognized exceptions to the exercise thereof, respectively.It must be emphasized that the individual right involved isnotthe right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one's country, a totally distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Humans Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave a country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. The Declaration speaks of the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state" [Art. 13(l)] separately from the "right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." [Art. 13(2).] On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the "right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence" [Art. 12(l)] and the right to "be free to leave any country, including his own." [Art. 12(2)] which rights may be restricted by such laws as "are necessary to protect national security, public order, public health or morals or enter qqqs own country" of which one cannot be "arbitrarily deprived." [Art. 12(4).] It would therefore be inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to one's country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law and, under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.] However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]Thus, the rulings in the casesKent and Haigwhich refer to the issuance of passports for the purpose of effectively exercising the right to travel are not determinative of this case and are only tangentially material insofar as they relate to a conflict between executive action and the exercise of a protected right. The issue before the Court is novel and without precedent in Philippine, and even in American jurisprudence.Consequently, resolution by the Court of the well-debated issue of whether or not there can be limitations on the right to travel in the absence of legislation to that effect is rendered unnecessary. An appropriate case for its resolution will have to be awaited.Having clarified the substance of the legal issue, we find now a need to explain the methodology for its resolution. Our resolution of the issue will involve a two-tiered approach. We shall first resolve whether or not the President has the power under the Constitution, to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. Then, we shall determine, pursuant to the express power of the Court under the Constitution in Article VIII, Section 1, whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcose's to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.Executive PowerThe 1987 Constitution has fully restored the separation of powers of the three great branches of government. To recall the words of Justice Laurel inAngara v. Electoral Commission[63 Phil. 139 (1936)], "the Constitution has blocked but with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government." [At 157.1 Thus, the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines" Art VI, Sec. 11, "[t]he executive power shall bevested in the President of the Philippines" [Art. VII, Sec. 11, and "[te judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law" [Art. VIII, Sec. 1.] These provisions not only establish a separation of powers by actual division [Angara v. Electoral Commission,supra] but also confer plenary legislative, executive and judicial powers subject only to limitations provided in the Constitution. For as the Supreme Court inOcampo v. Cabangis[15 Phil. 626 (1910)] pointed out "a grant of the legislative power means a grant of all legislative power; and a grant of the judicial power means a grant of all the judicial power which may be exercised under the government." [At 631-632.1 If this can be said of the legislative power which is exercised by two chambers with a combined membership of more than two hundred members and of the judicial power which is vested in a hierarchy of courts, it can equally be said of the executive power which is vested in one official the President.As stated above, the Constitution provides that "[t]he executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines." [Art. VII, Sec. 1]. However, it does not define what is meant by executive power" although in the same article it touches on the exercise of certain powers by the President,i.e., the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power, the powers under the commander-in-chief clause, the power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of Congress, the power to contract or guarantee foreign loans, the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the power to submit the budget to Congress, and the power to address Congress [Art. VII, Sec. 14-23].The inevitable question then arises: by enumerating certain powers of the President did the framers of the Constitution intend that the President shall exercise those specific powers and no other? Are these se enumerated powers the breadth and scope of "executive power"? Petitioners advance the view that the President's powers are limited to those specifically enumerated in the 1987 Constitution. Thus, they assert: "The President has enumerated powers, and what is not enumerated is impliedly denied to her.Inclusion unius est exclusio alterius[Memorandum for Petitioners, p. 4- Rollo p. 233.1 This argument brings to mind the institution of the U.S. Presidency after which ours is legally patterned.**Corwin, in his monumental volume on the President of the United States grappled with the same problem. He said:Article II is the most loosely drawn chapter of the Constitution. To those who think that a constitution ought to settle everything beforehand it should be a nightmare; by the same token, to those who think that constitution makers ought to leave considerable leeway for the future play of political forces, it should be a vision realized.We encounter this characteristic of Article 11 in its opening words: "The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." . . .. [The President: Office and Powers, 17871957, pp. 3-4.]Reviewing how the powers of the U.S. President were exercised by the different persons who held the office from Washington to the early 1900's, and the swing from the presidency by commission to Lincoln's dictatorship, he concluded that "what the presidency is at any particular moment depends in important measure on who is President." [At 30.]This view is shared by Schlesinger who wrote inThe Imperial Presidency:For the American Presidency was a peculiarly personal institution. it remained of course, an agency of government subject to unvarying demands and duties no remained, of cas President. But, more than most agencies of government, it changed shape, intensity and ethos according to the man in charge. Each President's distinctive temperament and character, his values, standards, style, his habits, expectations, Idiosyncrasies, compulsions, phobias recast the WhiteHouse and pervaded the entire government. The executive branch, said Clark Clifford, was a chameleon, taking its color from the character and personality of the President. The thrust of the office, its impact on the constitutional order, therefore altered from President to President. Above all, the way each President understood it as his personal obligation to inform and involve the Congress, to earn and hold the confidence of the electorate and to render an accounting to the nation and posterity determined whether he strengthened or weakened the constitutional order. [At 212- 213.]We do not say that the presidency is what Mrs. Aquino says it is or what she does but, rather, that the consideration of tradition and the development of presidential power under the different constitutions are essential for a complete understanding of the extent of and limitations to the President's powers under the 1987 Constitution. The 1935 Constitution created a strong President with explicitly broader powers than the U.S. President. The 1973 Constitution attempted to modify the system of government into the parliamentary type, with the President as a mere figurehead, but through numerous amendments, the President became even more powerful, to the point that he was also the de facto Legislature. The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back the presidential system of government and restored the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers by their actual distribution among three distinct branches of government with provision for checks and balances.It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to enforce the laws, for the President is head of state as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the President other powers that do not involve the execution of any provision of law,e.g., his power over the country's foreign relations.On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise ofspecificpowers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated,It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive. Thus, in the landmark decision ofSpringer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928), on the issue of who between the Governor-General of the Philippines and the Legislature may vote the shares of stock held by the Government to elect directors in the National Coal Company and the Philippine National Bank, the U.S. Supreme Court, in upholding the power of the Governor-General to do so, said:...Here the members of the legislature who constitute a majority of the "board" and "committee" respectively, are not charged with the performance of any legislative functions or with the doing of anything which is in aid of performance of any such functions by the legislature. Putting aside for the moment the question whether the duties devolved upon these members are vested by the Organic Act in the Governor-General, it is clear that they are not legislative in character, and still more clear that they are not judicial.The fact that they do not fall within the authority of either of these two constitutes logical ground for concluding that they do fall within that of the remaining one among which the powers of government are divided....[At 202-203; Emphasis supplied.]We are not unmindful of Justice Holmes' strong dissent. But in his enduring words of dissent we find reinforcement for the view that it would indeed be a folly to construe the powers of a branch of government to embrace only what are specifically mentioned in the Constitution:The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white. Even the more specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other. ....xxx xxx xxxIt does not seem to need argument to show that however we may disguise it by veiling words we do not and cannot carry out the distinction between legislative and executive action with mathematical precision and divide the branches into watertight compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so, which I am far from believing that it is, or that the Constitution requires. [At 210- 211.]The Power InvolvedThe Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "[t]he prime duty of theGovernment is to serve and protect the people" and that "[t]he maintenance of peace and order,the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy." [Art. II, Secs. 4 and 5.]Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essentially ideals to guide governmental action. But such does not mean that they are empty words. Thus, in the exercise of presidential functions, in drawing a plan of government, and in directing implementing action for these plans, or from another point of view, in making any decision as President of the Republic, the President has to consider these principles, among other things, and adhere to them.Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the President is, under the Constitution, constrained to consider these basic principles in arriving at a decision. More than that, having sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution, the President has the obligationunder the Constitutionto protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the national interest. It must be borne in mind that the Constitution, aside from being an allocation of power is also a social contract whereby the people have surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for the common good. Hence, lest the officers of the Government exercising the powers delegated by the people forget and the servants of the people become rulers, the Constitution reminds everyone that "[s]overeignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." [Art. II, Sec. 1.]The resolution of the problem is made difficult because the persons who seek to return to the country are the deposed dictator and his family at whose door the travails of the country are laid and from whom billions of dollars believed to be ill-gotten wealth are sought to be recovered. The constitutional guarantees they invoke are neither absolute nor inflexible. For the exercise of even the preferred freedoms of speech and ofexpression, although couched in absolute terms, admits of limits and must be adjusted to the requirements of equally important public interests [Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707, October 7, 1981.]To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people. To paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt, it is not only the power of the President but also his duty to do anything not forbidden by the Constitution or the laws that the needs of the nation demand [See Corwin,supra, at 153]. It is a power borne by the President's duty to preserve and defend the Constitution. It also may be viewed as a power implicit in the President's duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed [seeHyman,The American President, where the author advances the view that an allowance of discretionary power is unavoidable in any government and is best lodged in the President].More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President's powers as protector of the peace. RossiterThe American Presidency].The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against external and internal threats to its existence. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way diminished by the relative want of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief provision. For in making the President commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers that follow cannot be said to exclude the President's exercising as Commander-in- Chief powers short of the calling of the armed forces, or suspending the privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpusor declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace, and maintain public order and security.That the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcose's from returning has been recognized by memembers of the Legislature, and is manifested by the Resolution proposed in the House of Representatives and signed by 103 of its members urging the President to allow Mr. Marcos to return to the Philippines "as a genuine unselfish gesture for true national reconciliation and as irrevocable proof of our collective adherence to uncompromising respect for human rights under the Constitution and our laws." [House Resolution No. 1342, Rollo, p. 321.1 The Resolution does not question the President's power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines, rather, it appeals to the President's sense of compassion to allow a man to come home to die in his country.What we are saying in effect is that the request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.The Extent of ReviewUnder the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." [Art. VIII, Sec. 1] Given this wording, we cannot agree with the Solicitor General that the issue constitutes a political question which is beyond the jurisdiction of the Court to decide.The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments to decide. But nonetheless there remain issues beyond the Court's jurisdiction the determination of which is exclusively for the President, for Congress or for the people themselves through a plebiscite or referendum. We cannot, for example, question the President's recognition of a foreign government, no matter how premature or improvident such action may appear. We cannot set aside a presidential pardon though it may appear to us that the beneficiary is totally undeserving of the grant. Nor can we amend the Constitution under the guise of resolving a dispute brought before us because the power is reserved to the people.There is nothing in the case before us that precludes our determination thereof on the political question doctrine. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission cited by petitioners show that the framers intended to widen the scope of judicial review but they did not intend courts of justice to settle all actual controversies before them. When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being questioned. If grave abuse is not established, the Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the official concerned and decide a matter which by its nature or by law is for the latter alone to decide. In this light, it would appear clear that the second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution, defining "judicial power," which specifically empowers the courts to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government, incorporates in the fundamental law the ruling inLansang v. Garcia[G.R. No. L-33964, December 11, 1971, 42 SCRA 4481 that:]Article VII of the [1935] Constitution vests in the Executive the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under specified conditions. Pursuant to the principle of separation of powers underlying our system of government, the Executive is supreme within his own sphere. However, the separation of powers, under the Constitution, is not absolute. What is more, it goes hand in hand with the system of checks and balances, under which the Executive is supreme, as regards the suspension of the privilege, but only if and when he acts within the sphere alloted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether or not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial Department, which, in this respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme. In the exercise of such authority, the function of the Court is merely to check not to supplant the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act [At 479-480.]Accordingly, the question for the Court to determine is whether or not there exist factual bases for the President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines. If such postulates do exist, it cannot be said that she has acted, or acts, arbitrarily or that she has gravely abused her discretion in deciding to bar their return.We find that from the pleadings filed by the parties, from their oral arguments, and the facts revealed during the briefing in chambers by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the National Security Adviser, wherein petitioners and respondents were represented, there exist factual bases for the President's decision..The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that the country is not besieged from within by a well-organized communist insurgency, a separatist movement in Mindanao, rightist conspiracies to grab power, urban terrorism, the murder with impunity of military men, police officers and civilian officials, to mention only a few. The documented history of the efforts of the Marcose's and their followers to destabilize the country, as earlier narrated in thisponenciabolsters the conclusion that the return of the Marcoses at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the State and instigate more chaos.As divergent and discordant forces, the enemies of the State may be contained. The military establishment has given assurances that it could handle the threats posed by particular groups. But it is thecatalytic effectof the return of the Marcoses that may prove to be the proverbial final straw that would break the camel's back. With these before her, the President cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously and whimsically in determining that the return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return.It will not do to argue that if the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines will cause the escalation of violence against the State, that would be the time for the President to step in and exercise the commander-in-chief powers granted her by the Constitution to suppress or stamp out such violence. The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking pre- emptive action against threats to its existence if, though still nascent they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct. Protection of the people is the essence of the duty of government. The preservation of the State the fruition of the people's sovereignty is an obligation in the highest order. The President, sworn to preserve and defend the Constitution and to see the faithful execution the laws, cannot shirk from that responsibility.We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only now beginning to recover from the hardships brought about by the plunder of the economy attributed to the Marcoses and their close associates and relatives, many of whom are still here in the Philippines in a position to destabilize the country, while the Government has barely scratched the surface, so to speak, in its efforts to recover the enormous wealth stashed away by the Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions. Then, We cannot ignore the continually increasing burden imposed on the economy by the excessive foreign borrowing during the Marcos regime, which stifles and stagnates development and is one of the root causes of widespread poverty and all its attendant ills. The resulting precarious state of our economy is of common knowledge and is easily within the ambit of judicial notice.The President has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years and lead to total economic collapse. Given what is within our individual and common knowledge of the state of the economy, we cannot argue with that determination.WHEREFORE, and it being our well-considered opinion that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaTHIRD DIVISIONG.R. No. 153881 March 24, 2003ELPIDIO G. SORIANO III,petitioner,vs.REUBEN S. LISTA, DOMINGO T. ESTERA, ELPIDIO B. PADAMA, MIGUEL C. TABARES, ARTHUR N. GOSINGAN, EFREN L. TADURAN, CESAR A. SARILE, DANILO M. VILDA and HONORABLE EMILIA T. BONCODIN, in her capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management,respondents.CORONA,J.:Before us is a Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court questioning the constitutionality and legality of the permanent appointments, made by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, of public respondents to different positions in the Philippine Coast Guard and their subsequent assumption of office without confirmation by the Commission on Appointments under the 1987 Constitution.The petition impleads Hon. Emilia T. Boncodin in her capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM). Petitioner, Elpidio G. Soriano, filed the instant petition as member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and as a taxpayer.Public respondents were promoted to different ranks in the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) on different dates as follows:Reuben S. Lista Vice Admiral, Philippine Coast GuardDomingo T. Estera Rear Admiral, Philippine Coast GuardMiguel C. Tabares Commodore, Philippine Coast GuardArthur N. Gosingan Commodore, Philippine Coast GuardEfren L. Taduran Naval Captain, Philippine Coast GuardCesar A. Sarile Naval Captain, Philippine Coast GuardDanilo M. Vilda Naval Captain, Philippine Coast GuardElpidio B. Padama Commodore, Philippine Coast GuardPetitioner bewails the fact that despite the non-submission of their names to the Commission on Appointments (CA) for confirmation, all of the said respondent officers of the PCG had assumed their duties and functions. According to petitioner, their respective appointments are illegal and unconstitutional for failure to undergo the confirmation process in the CA. Thus, they should be prohibited from discharging their duties and functions as such officers of the PCG.In the same vein, petitioner opines that there is no legal basis for the DBM to allow the disbursement of the salaries and emoluments of respondent officers of the PCG. Accordingly, he prays that respondent Secretary Boncodin be ordered to desist from allowing such disbursements until the confirmation of their respective appointments by the CA.At the outset, the Court finds petitioner to be without any legal personality to file the instant petition. We have ruled that a private citizen is allowed to raise constitutional questions only if he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government, the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.1In the case at bar, petitioner has failed to clearly demonstrate that he has personally suffered actual or threatened injury. It should be emphasized that a party bringing a suit challenging the constitutionality of an act or statute must show "not only that the law or act is invalid, but also that he has sustained or is in immediate, or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way."2The instant petition cannot even be classified as a taxpayers suit because petitioner has no interest as such and this case does not involve the exercise by Congress of its taxing power.Assumingarguendothat petitioner has the legal personality to question the subject appointments, the petition will nevertheless fail. As aptly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the PCG used to be administered and maintained as a separate unit of the Philippine Navy under Section 4 of RA 5173. It was subsequently placed under the direct supervision and control of the Secretary of the Department of National Defense (DND) pursuant to Section 4 of PD 601. Eventually, it was integrated into the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) as a major subordinate unit of the Philippine Navy under Section 54 of Chapter 8, Sub-title II, Title VIII, Book IV of EO 292, as amended.However, on March 30, 1998, after the aforesaid changes in the charter of the PCG, then President Fidel V. Ramos, in the exercise of his statutory authority to reorganize the Office of the President, issued EO 475 transferring the PCG from the DND to the Office of the President. He later on again transferred the PCG from the Office of the President to the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC).Now that the PCG is under the DOTC and no longer part of the Philippine Navy or the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the promotions and appointments of respondent officers of the PCG, or any PCG officer from the rank of captain and higher for that matter, do not require confirmation by the CA.Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides:Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.It is clear from the foregoing provision of the Constitution that only appointed officers from the rank of colonel or naval captain in the armed forces require confirmation by the CA. The rule is that the plain, clear and unambiguous language of the Constitution should be construed as such and should not be given a construction that changes its meaning.3The enumeration of appointments subject to confirmation by the CA under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is exclusive. The clause "officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain" refers tomilitary officersalone. This is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on the proposed text of said Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Since the promotions and appointments of respondent officers are not covered by the above-cited provision of the Constitution, the same need not be confirmed by the CA.4Accordingly, the Court declares that no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction was committed by respondent officers of the PCG. Their assumption to office as well as the disbursement of their respective salaries and other emoluments by the respondent Secretary of the DBM are hereby declared valid and legal.WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.SO ORDERED.

EN BANCAQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR.,EDGARDO J. ANGARA,JUAN PONCE ENRILE,LUISA P. EJERCITO-ESTRADA,JINGGOY E. ESTRADA,PANFILO M. LACSON,ALFREDO S. LIM,JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, andSERGIO R. OSMEA III,Petitioners, - versus -G.R. No. 164978 Present: Davide, Jr.,C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio Morales,

EXEC. SECRETARY EDUARDO Callejo, Sr.,

R. ERMITA, FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Azcuna,

AVELINO J. CRUZ, JR., Tinga,

MICHAEL T. DEFENSOR, Chico-Nazario, andJOSEPH H. DURANO, Garcia,JJ.RAUL M. GONZALEZ, ALBERTO G. ROMULO, RENE C. VILLA, and Promulgated:ARTHUR C. YAP, Respondents. October 13, 2005x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xDECISIONCARPIO, J.: The CaseThis is a petition forcertiorariand prohibition[1]with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to declare unconstitutional the appointments issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Arroyo) through Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita (Secretary Ermita) to Florencio B. Abad, Avelino J. Cruz, Jr., Michael T. Defensor, Joseph H. Durano, Raul M. Gonzalez, Alberto G. Romulo, Rene C. Villa, and Arthur C. Yap (respondents) as acting secretaries of their respective departments. The petition also seeks to prohibit respondents from performing the duties of department secretaries.Antecedent FactsThe Senate and the House of Representatives (Congress) commenced their regular session on 26 July 2004. The Commission on Appointments, composed of Senators and Representatives, was constituted on 25 August 2004.Meanwhile, President Arroyo issued appointments[2]to respondents as acting secretaries of their respective departments.AppointeeDepartmentDate of Appointment

Arthur C. YapAgriculture15 August 2004

Alberto G. RomuloForeign Affairs23 August 2004

Raul M. GonzalezJustice23 August 2004

Florencio B. AbadEducation23 August 2004

Avelino J. Cruz, Jr.National Defense23 August 2004

Rene C. VillaAgrarian Reform23 August 2004

Joseph H. DuranoTourism23 August 2004

Michael T. DefensorEnvironment and Natural Resources23 August 2004

The appointment papers are uniformly worded as follows:Sir:Pursuant to the provisions of existing laws, you are hereby appointed ACTING SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF (appropriate department)vice(name of person replaced).By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties and functions of the office, furnishing this Office and the Civil Service Commission with copies of your Oath of Office.(signed)Gloria Arroyo Respondents took their oath of office and assumed duties as acting secretaries. On 8 September 2004, Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. (Senator Pimentel), Edgardo J. Angara (Senator Angara), Juan Ponce Enrile (Senator Enrile), Luisa P. Ejercito-Estrada (Senator Ejercito-Estrada), Jinggoy E. Estrada (Senator Estrada), Panfilo M. Lacson (Senator Lacson), Alfredo S. Lim (Senator Lim), Jamby A.S. Madrigal (Senator Madrigal), and Sergio R. Osmea, III (Senator Osmea) (petitioners) filed the present petition as Senators of the Republic of the Philippines.Congress adjourned on 22 September 2004. On 23 September 2004, President Arroyo issuedad interimappointments[3]to respondents as secretaries of the departments to which they were previously appointed in an acting capacity. The appointment papers are uniformly worded as follows:Sir:Pursuant to the provisions of existing laws, you are hereby appointed SECRETARY [AD INTERIM], DEPARTMENT OF (appropriate department).By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties and functions of the office, furnishing this Office and the Civil Service Commission with copies of your oath of office.(signed)Gloria Arroyo

IssueThe petition questions the constitutionality of President Arroyos appointment of respondents as acting secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments while Congress is in session.The Courts Ruling The petition has no merit.Preliminary MattersOn the Mootness of the Petition The Solicitor General argues that the petition is moot because President Arroyo had extended to respondentsad interimappointments on 23 September 2004 immediately after the recess of Congress. As a rule, the writ of prohibition will not lie to enjoin acts already done.[4] However, as an exception to the rule on mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading review.[5] In the present case, the mootness of the petition does not bar its resolution. The question of the constitutionality of the Presidents appointment of department secretaries in an acting capacity while Congress is in session will arise in every such appointment.On the Nature of the Power to Appoint The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the legislature may not interfere with the exercise of this executive power except in those instances when the Constitution expressly allows it to interfere.[6] Limitations on the executive power to appoint are construed strictly against the legislature.[7] The scope of the legislatures interference in the executives power to appoint is limited to the power to prescribe the qualifications to an appointive office. Congress cannot appoint a person to an office in the guise of prescribing qualifications to that office. Neither may Congress impose on the President the duty to appoint any particular person to an office.[8] However, even if the Commission on Appointments is composed of members of Congress, the exercise of its powers is executive and not legislative. The Commission on Appointments does not legislate when it exercises its power to give or withhold consent to presidential appointments. Thus:xxx The Commission on Appointments is a creature of the Constitution. Although its membership is confined to members of Congress, said Commission is independent of Congress. The powers of the Commission do not come from Congress, but emanate directly from the Constitution. Hence, it is not an agent of Congress. In fact, the functions of the Commissioner are purely executive in nature. xxx[9]On Petitioners Standing The Solicitor General states that the present petition is aquo warrantoproceeding because, with the exception of Secretary Ermita, petitioners effectively seek to oust respondents for unlawfully exercising the powers of department secretaries. The Solicitor General further states that petitioners may not claim standing as Senators because no power of the Commission on Appointments has been infringed upon or violated by the President. xxx If at all, the Commission on Appointments as a body (rather than individual members of the Congress) may possess standing in this case.[10] Petitioners, on the other hand, state that the Court can exercise itscertiorarijurisdiction over unconstitutional acts of the President.[11] Petitioners further contend that they possess standing because President Arroyos appointment of department secretaries in an acting capacity while Congress is in session impairs the powers of Congress. Petitioners citeSanlakas v. Executive Secretary[12]as basis, thus:To the extent that the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In such a case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts. Considering the independence of the Commission on Appointments from Congress, it is error for petitioners to claim standing in the present case as members of Congress. President Arroyos issuance of acting appointments while Congress is in session impairs no power of Congress. Among the petitioners, only the following are members of the Commission on Appointments of the 13thCongress: Senator Enrile as Minority Floor Leader, Senator Lacson as Assistant Minority Floor Leader, and Senator Angara, Senator Ejercito-Estrada, and Senator Osmea as members.Thus, on the impairment of the prerogatives of members of the Commission on Appointments, only Senators Enrile, Lacson, Angara, Ejercito-Estrada, and Osmea have standing in the present petition. This is in contrast to Senators Pimentel, Estrada, Lim, and Madrigal, who, though vigilant in protecting their perceived prerogatives as members of Congress, possess no standing in the present petition.

The Constitutionality of President Arroyos Issuanceof Appointments to Respondents as Acting SecretariesPetitioners contend that President Arroyo should not have appointed respondents as acting secretaries because in case of a vacancy in the Office of a Secretary, it is only an Undersecretary who can be designated as Acting Secretary.[13] Petitioners base their argument on Section 10, Chapter 2, Book IV of Executive Order No. 292 (EO 292),[14] which enumerates the powers and duties of the undersecretary. Paragraph 5 of Section 10 reads:SEC. 10.Powers and Duties of the Undersecretary. - The Undersecretary shall:xxx(5) Temporarily discharge the duties of the Secretary in the latters absence or inability to discharge his duties for any cause or in case of vacancy of the said office, unless otherwise provided by law. Where there are more than one Undersecretary, the Secretary shall allocate the foregoing powers and duties among them. The President shall likewise make the temporary designation of Acting Secretary from among them; andxxxPetitioners further assert that while Congress is in session, there can be no appointments, whether regular or acting, to a vacant position of an office needing confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, without first having obtained its consent.[15] In sharp contrast, respondents maintain that the President can issue appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments even while Congress is in session. Respondents point to Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Section 16 reads:SEC. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.Respondents also rely on EO 292, which devotes a chapter to the Presidents power of appointment. Sections 16 and 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 read:SEC. 16.Power of Appointment. The President shall exercise the power to appoint such officials as provided for in the Constitution and laws.SEC. 17.Power to Issue Temporary Designation. (1)The President may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch, appointment to which is vested in him by law, when: (a) the officer regularly appointed to the office is unable to perform his duties by reason of illness, absence or any other cause; or (b) there exists a vacancy[.](2) The person designated shall receive the compensation attached to the position, unless he is already in the government service in which case he shall receive only such additional compensation as, with his existing salary, shall not exceed the salary authorized by law for the position filled. The compensation hereby authorized shall be paid out of the funds appropriated for the office or agency concerned.(3) In no case shall a temporary designation exceed one (1) year.(Emphasis supplied) Petitioners and respondents maintain two diametrically opposed lines of thought. Petitioners assert that the President cannot issue appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries while Congress is in session because the law does not give the President such power. In contrast, respondents insist that the President can issue such appointments because no law prohibits such appointments. The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent occupant to the office.[16] In case of vacancy in an office occupied by analter egoof the President, such as the office of a department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint analter egoof her choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office.Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint automatically the undersecretary as her temporaryalter ego. Analter ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the President who heralter egoshould be.The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a department secretary is thealter egoof the President, the acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the Presidents confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office of a department secretary, the President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice even while Congress is in session. That person may or may not be the permanent appointee, but practical reasons may make itexpedient that the acting appointee will also be the permanent appointee.The law expressly allows the President to make such acting appointment. Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 states that [t]he President may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service orany other competent personto perform the functions of an office in the executive branch. Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the government service, as long as the President deems that person competent. Petitioners assert that Section 17 does not apply to appointments vested in the President by the Constitution, because it only applies to appointments vested in the Presidentby law. Petitioners forget that Congress is not the only source of law. Law refers to the Constitution, statutes or acts of Congress, municipal ordinances, implementing rules issued pursuant to law, and judicial decisions.[17] Finally, petitioners claim that the issuance of appointments in an acting capacity is susceptible to abuse. Petitioners fail to consider that acting appointments cannot exceed one year as expressly provided in Section 17(3), Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292. The law has incorporated this safeguard to prevent abuses, like the use of acting appointments as a way to circumvent confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.In distinguishingad interimappointments from appointments in an acting capacity, a noted textbook writer on constitutional law has observed:Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from appointments in an acting capacity. Both of them are effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.[18]However, we find no abuse in the present case. The absence of abuse is readily apparent from President Arroyos issuance ofad interimappointments to respondentsimmediatelyupon the recess of Congress, way before the lapse of one year.WHEREFORE, weDISMISSthe present petition forcertiorariand prohibition.SO ORDERED.

EN BANC[G.R. No. 132601.October 12, 1998]LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO,petitioner, vs.THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE and THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, THE EXECUTIVE JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY AND THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 104,respondents.D E C I S I O NPER CURIAM:On June 25, 1996, this Court affirmed[1]the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of rape of the 10 year-old daughter of his common-law spouse and the imposition upon him of the death penalty for the said crime.Petitioner duly filed a Motion for Reconsideration raising mainly factual issues, and on its heels, a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raising for the first time the issue of the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659[2](the death penalty law) and the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of rape.On February 7, 1998, this Court denied[3]petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration with a finding that Congress duly complied with the requirements for the reimposition of the death penalty and therefore the death penalty law is not unconstitutional.In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the mode of execution of the death penalty from electrocution to lethal injection,[4]and passed Republic Act No. 8177, AN ACT DESIGNATING DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION AS THE METHOD OF CARRYING OUT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 81 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED BY SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659.[5]Pursuant to the provisions of said law, the Secretary of Justice promulgated the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 ("implementing rules")[6]and directed the Director of the Bureau of Corrections to prepare the Lethal Injection Manual.[7]On March 2, 1998, petitioner filed a Petition[8]for Prohibition, Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin respondents Secretary of Justice and Director of the Bureau of Prisons from carrying out the execution by lethal injection of petitioner under R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules as these are unconstitutional and void for being: (a) cruel, degrading and inhuman punishmentper seas well as by reason of its being (b) arbitrary, unreasonable and a violation of due process, (c) a violation of the Philippines' obligations under international covenants, (d) an undue delegation of legislative power by Congress, (e) an unlawful exercise by respondent Secretary of the power to legislate, and (f) an unlawful delegation of delegated powers by the Secretary of Justice to respondent Director.On March 3, 1998, petitioner, through counsel, filed a Motion for Leave of Court[9]to Amend and Supplement Petition with the Amended and Supplemental Petition[10]attached thereto, invoking the additional ground of violation of equal protection, and impleading the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 104, in order to enjoin said public respondents from acting under the questioned rules by setting a date for petitioner's execution.On March 3, 1998, the Court resolved, without giving due course to the petition, to require the respondents to COMMENT thereon within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from notice, and directed the parties "to MAINTAIN thestatus quoprevailing at the time of the filing of this petition."On March 10, 1998, the Court granted the Motion for Leave of Court to Amend and Supplement Petition, and required respondents to COMMENT thereon within ten (10) days from notice.On March 16, 1998, petitioner filed a Very Urgent Motion (1) To clarifyStatus QuoOrder, and (2) For the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order expressly enjoining public respondents from taking any action to carry out petitioner's execution until the petition is resolved.On March 16, 1998, the Office of the Solicitor General[11]filed a Comment (On the Petition and the Amended Supplemental Petition)[12]stating that (1) this Court has already upheld the constitutionality of the Death Penalty Law, and has repeatedly declared that the death penalty is not cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment; (2) execution by lethal injection, as authorized under R.A. No. 8177 and the questioned rules, is constitutional, lethal injection being the most modern, more humane, more economical, safer and easier to apply (than electrocution or the gas chamber); (3) theInternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rightsdoes not expressly or impliedly prohibit the imposition of the death penalty; (4) R.A. No. 8177 properly delegated legislative power to respondent Director; and that (5) R.A. No. 8177 confers the power to promulgate the implementing rules to the Secretary of Justice, Secretary of Health and the Bureau of Corrections.On March 17, 1998, the Court required the petitioner to file a REPLY thereto within a non-extendible period of ten days from notice.On March 25, 1998, the Commission on Human Rights[13]filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and/or Appear asAmicus Curiae[14]with the attached Petition to Intervene and/or Appear asAmicus Curiae[15]alleging that the death penalty imposed under R.A. No. 7659 which is to be implemented by R.A. No. 8177 is cruel, degrading and outside the limits of civil society standards, and further invoking (a) Article II, Section 11 of the Constitution which provides: "The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights."; (b) Article III of theUniversal Declaration of Human Rightswhich states that "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person," and Article V thereof, which states that "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."; (c) TheInternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in particular, Article 6 thereof, and theSecond Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Aiming At The Abolition of the Death Penalty; (d) Amnesty International statistics showing that as of October 1996, 58 countries have abolished the death penalty for all crimes, 15 countries have abolished the death penalty for ordinary crimes, and 26 countries are abolitionistsde facto, which means that they have retained the death penalty for ordinary crimes but are considered abolitionists in practice that they have not executed anyone during the past ten (10) years or more, or in that they have made an international commitment not to carry out executions, for a total of 99 countries which are total abolitionists in law or practice, and 95 countries as retentionists;[16]and (e) Pope John Paul II's encyclical, "Evangelium Vitae."In a Resolution dated April 3, 1998, the Court duly noted the motion.On March 27, 1998, petitioner filed a Reply[17]stating that (1) this Court is not barred from exercising judicial review over the death penaltyper se, the death penalty for rape and lethal injection as a mode of carrying out the death penalty; (2) capital punishment is a cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment; (3) lethal injection is cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment, and that being the "most modern" does not make it less cruel or more humane, and that the Solicitor General's "aesthetic" criteria is short-sighted, and that the lethal injection is not risk free nor is it easier to implement; and (4) the death penalty violates theInternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rightsconsidering that the Philippines participated in the deliberations of and voted for theSecond Optional Protocol.After deliberating on the pleadings, the Court gave due course to the petition, which it now resolves on the merits.In the Amended and Supplemental Petition, petitioner assails the constitutionality of the mode of carrying out his death sentence by lethal injection on the following grounds:[18]I.DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING A CRUEL, DEGRADING AND INHUMAN PUNISHMENT.II.THE DEATH PENALTY VIOLATES THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, WHICH IS PART OF THE LAW OF THE LAND.III.LETHAL INJECTION, AS AUTHORIZED UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8177 AND THE QUESTIONED RULES, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT IS AN UNNECESSARY AND WANTON INFLICTION OF PAIN ON A PERSON AND IS, THUS, A CRUEL, DEGRADING, AND INHUMAN PUNISHMENT.IV.REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8177 UNDULY DELEGATES LEGISLATIVE POWER TO RESPONDENT DIRECTOR.V.RESPONDENT SECRETARY UNLAWFULLY DELEGATED THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS DELEGATED TO HIM UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8177 TO RESPONDENT DIRECTOR.VI.RESPONDENT SECRETARY EXCEEDED THE AUTHORITY DELEGATED TO HIM UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8177 AND UNLAWFULLY USURPED THE POWER TO LEGISLATE IN PROMULGATING THE QUESTIONED RULES.VII.SECTION 17 OF THE QUESTIONED RULES IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING DISCRIMINATORY AS WELL AS FOR BEING AN INVALID EXERCISE BY RESPONDENT SECRETARY OF THE POWER TO LEGISLATE.VIII.INJUCTION MUST ISSUE TO PREVENT IRREPARABLE DAMAGE AND INJURY TO PETITIONER'S RIGHTS BY REASON OF THE EXISTENCE, OPERATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE AND EQUALLY INVALID AND IMPLEMENTING RULES.Concisely put, petitioner argues that R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules do not pass constitutional muster for: (a) violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, (b) violation of our international treaty obligations, (c) being an undue delegation of legislative power, and (d) being discriminatory.The Court shall now proceed to discuss these issuesinseriatim.I. LETHAL INJECTION, NOT CRUEL, DEGRADING OR INHUMAN PUNISHMENT UNDER SECTION 19, ARTICLE III OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.The main challenge to R.A. 8177 and its implementing rules is anchored on Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution which proscribes the imposition of "cruel, degrading or inhuman" punishment."The prohibition in the Philippine Bill against cruel and unusual punishments is an Anglo-Saxon safeguard against governmental oppression of the subject, which made its first appearance in the reign of William and Mary of England in 'An Act declaring the rights and liberties of the subject, and settling the succession of the crown,' passed in the year 1689.It has been incorporated into the Constitution of the United States (of America) and into most constitutions of the various States in substantially the same language as that used in the original statute.The exact language of the Constitution of the United States is used in the Philippine Bill."[19]"The counterpart of Section 19 (1) in the 1935 Constitution reads: 'Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel and inhuman punishment inflicted.'xxx In the 1973 Constitution the phrase became 'cruel or unusual punishment.'The Bill of Rights Committee of the 1986 Constitutional Commission read the 1973 modification as prohibiting 'unusual' punishment even if not 'cruel.'It was thus seen as an obstacle to experimentation in penology.Consequently, the Committee reported out the present text which prohibits 'cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment' as more consonant with the meaning desired and with jurisprudence on the subject."[20]Petitioner contends that death by lethal injection constitutes cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment considering that (1) R.A. No. 8177 fails to provide for the drugs to be used in carrying out lethal injection, the dosage for each drug to be administered, and the procedure in administering said drug/s into the accused; (2) R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules are uncertain as to the date of the execution, time of notification, the court which will fix the date of execution, which uncertainties cause the greatest pain and suffering for the convict; and (3) the possibility of "botched executions" or mistakes in administering the drugs renders lethal injection inherently cruel.Before the Court proceeds any further, a brief explanation of the process of administering lethal injection is in order.In lethal injection, the condemned inmate is strapped on a hospital gurney and wheeled into the execution room.A trained technician inserts a needle into a vein in the inmate's arm and begins an intravenous flow of saline solution.At the warden's signal, a lethal combination of drugs is injected into the intravenous line.The deadly concoction typically includes three drugs: (1) a nonlethal dose of sodium thiopenthotal, a sleep inducing barbiturate; (2) lethal doses of pancuronium bromide, a drug that paralyzes the muscles; and (3) potassium chloride, which stops the heart within seconds.The first two drugs are commonly used during surgery to put the patient to sleep and relax muscles; the third is used in heart bypass surgery.[21]Now