Consti2 1st Batch

8/13/2019 Consti2 1st Batch

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Constitutional Law 2 Cases Assigned for the Case Digest

1. FRANCISCO V.HOUSE OFREPRESENTATIVES GR.NO.160261NOV.10, 2003

Yap

2. MANILA PRINCEHOTEL V. GSIS,GR.NO.122156,FEB. 3, 1997

Vidal Filipino First Policy A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art.

II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision

which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of

supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule

by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-

executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily

exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony

with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more

available. Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the

subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the

natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very wellused the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritageof the

Filipinos the acts of persons distinct from the government are considered "state

action" covered by the Constitution

1. when the activity it engages in is a "public function;"2. when the government is so-significantly involved with the private actor as to make

the government responsible for his action; and,

3. when the government has approved or authorized the action. respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL

CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE

GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST fromselling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD,

and to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL

CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel

Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary

agreements and documents to effect the sale


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3. PAMATONG V.COMELEC,GR.NO. 161872APR.13, 2004

Veloso Elly Velez Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy for President petitioner seeks to reverse the resolutions which were allegedly rendered in

violation of his right to equal access to opportunities for public service

under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of

qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign

and/or are nominated by political parties

There is none. What is recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitationsimposed by law. Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither bestows such a

right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothingin the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an

interpretation of the sort.

The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing,and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to theequal access provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, t he

provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional rightbut

merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of theprovision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts.

4. PHIL. BLOOMINGMILLSEMPLOYEES ORG.V. PBM (51 SCRA189) GR.NO.L-31195 JUN.5,1973

Valendez

In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assemblyoccupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and

vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such priority "gives these

liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions."

believes that the freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peacefulassembly and of petition for redress of grievances are absolute when directed

against public officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the

men and women by whom we shall be governed," even as Mr. Justice Castro relies

on the balancing-of-interests test.

As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights freedom of expression, ofpeaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances over property rights

has been sustained5. ICHONG V.

HERNANDEZ, 101

PHIL. 1155

Trinidad

Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed law was

enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy

posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and freecitizens and country from such dominance and control; that the enactment

clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by

which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future; that the

law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because

sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the

exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because

the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens

already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege;

that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to

us to be plainly evidentas a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but

actually necessary and that in any case such matter falls within the

prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial

department of the Government may not interfere; that the provisions of the law

are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has not

misled the legislators or the segment of the population affected; and that it

cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligationsbecause no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the

police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or anyother conventional agreement.

6. ORGTIGAS & CO.V CA,GR.NO.126102DEC.4, 2000

Stenberg

The Supreme Court denied the petition, ruling: that while as a rule, laws are to be

construed as having only prospective operation, one exception is a law which

involves police power, which could be given retroactive effect and may

reasonably impair vested rights or contracts; that the MMC Ordinance No. 81-01

has been held to be a legitimate police power measure to which the non-

impairment of contracts or vested rights clauses will have to yield; and that

Mathay III in this case is clearly a real party in interest because he holds the lot


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pursuant to a valid lease and it is his building of a commercial structure whichpetitioner seeks to enjoin.

Petitioner Ortigas sold to the Hermosos a parcel of land in Greenhills Subdivision. The

contract of sale provided that the lot will be used for single-family residential building

only and this was annotated at the back of the title of the lot. In 1981, the Metropolitan

Commission enacted MMC Ordinance No. 81-01 reclassifying as a commercial zone the

stretch of Ortigas Avenue from Roosevelt Street to Madison Street. Subsequently in

1984, private respondent Mathay III leased the lot from Hermoso and constructed acommercial building for Greenhills Autohaus, Inc., a car sales company.

Petitioner filed Civil Case No. 4 seeking to enjoin the building by respondent of

structure on the lot and sought the demolition of the commercial structure for havingviolated the terms and conditions of the Deed of Sale.

7. ACEBEDOOPTICAL CO. V.CA, GR.NO.100152, MAR.31,2000

Sibi The Supreme Court ruled that a business permit is issued primarily to regulate theconduct of business and the City Mayor cannot, through the issuance of such permit,

regulate the practice of a profession, like that of optometry.

As hereinabove elaborated upon, the issuance of business licenses and permits by a

municipality or city is essentially regulatory in nature. The authority, which devolved

upon local government units to issue or grant such licenses or permits, is essentially in

the exercise of the police power of the state within the contemplation of the general

welfare clause of the Local Government Code.

The State, through the legislature, has delegated the exercise of police power to local

government units, as agencies of the State, in order to effectively accomplish and carry

out the declared objects of their creation. This delegation of police power is embodied

in the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code

Police power is essentially regulatory in nature and the power to issue licenses or

grant business permits, if exercised for a regulatory and not revenue-raising purpose,is within the ambit of this power. However, the power to grant or issue licenses or

business permits must always be exercised in accordance with law, with utmost

observance of the rights of all concerned to due process and equal protection of the

law.

8. MMDA V. BEL-AIR ASSOC.

GR.NO.135962,MAR.27, 2000

Siao

9. MMDA V. GARIN,GR.NO.130230,APR.15, 2005

Salva Respondent: in the absence of any implementing rules and regulations, Sec. 5(f) ofRep. Act No. 7924 grants the MMDA unbridled discretion to deprive erring motorists

of their licenses, pre-empting a judicial determination of the validity of the

deprivation, thereby violating the due process clause of the Constitution. The

respondent further contended that the provision violates the constitutional

prohibition against undue delegation of legislative authority, allowing as it does the

MMDA to fix and impose unspecified and therefore unlimited fines and other

penalties on erring motorists

hence MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001, authorizing confiscation of

driver's licenses upon issuance of a TVR,

The summary confiscation of a driver's license without first giving the driver an

opportunity to be heard; depriving him of a property right (driver's license) without

DUE PROCESS; not filling (sic) in Court the complaint of supposed traffic infraction,

cannot be justified by any legislation (and is) hence unconstitutional.

In Metro Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., we

categorically stated that Rep. Act No. 7924 does not grant the MMDA with police

power, let alone legislative power, and that all its functions are administrative in

nature.

We restate here the doctrine in the said decision as it applies to the case at bar: police

power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power vested by the Constitution

in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome andreasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not


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repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of thecommonwealth, and for the subjects of the same.

Having been lodged primarily in the National Legislature, it cannot be exercised by any

group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National

Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the president and administrative

boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government

units (LGUs). Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers asare conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.

Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to the

MMDA is that given to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules

and regulations in the implementation of the MMDA's functions. There is no grant ofauthority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the

inhabitants of the metropolis.

I. Sec. 5(f) grants the MMDA with the duty to enforce existing trafficrules and regulations.

10.LIM V.PACQUING, 240SCRA 649

Salinas

11.DEPED V. SANDIEGO, 180 SCRA533

Salazar The respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of Bachelor ofScience in Zoology who claims to have taken the National Medical Admission Test 3 times

and failed it 3 times also. When he applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected his

application based on the rule that:

h) A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT. After

three (3) successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT

for the fourth time

whether there is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT

as a condition for admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the

health and safety of the general community, on the other hand

A law does not have to operate with equal force on all persons or things to be conformableto Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution.What the law requires is equality among equals

12.SANGALANG V.IAC, 176 SCRA719

Sabalones

The Mayor of Makati directed Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA) to opening of severalstreets to the general public, after a series of developments in zoning regulations. All butJupiter St. was voluntarily opened. The strong opposition later gave way when themunicipal officials force-opened the gates of said street for public use. The area ceased tobe purely residential. Action for damages was brought against Ayala Corporation and BAVAfor alleged breach of contract, to maintain the purely residential status of the area. Other

similarly situated also filed their respective cases. All were dismissed in the trial court. TheCourt of Appeals affirmed the said dismissals.

we likewise exculpate the private respondents, not only because of the fact that JupiterStreet is not covered by the restrictive easements based on the "deed restrictions" butchiefly because the National Government itself, through the Metro Manila Commission(MMC), had reclassified Jupiter Street into a "high density commercial (C-3)

zone,"64pursuant to its Ordinance No. 81-01. Hence, the petitioners have no cause ofaction on the strength alone of the said "deed restrictions."

Undoubtedly, the MMC Ordinance represents a legitimate exercise of police power. Thepetitioners have not shown why we should hold otherwise other than for the supposed"non-impairment" guaranty of the Constitution, which, as we have declared, is secondaryto the more compelling interests of general welfare. The Ordinance has not been shown tobe capricious or arbitrary or unreasonable to warrant the reversal of the judgments soappealed

13.OPLE V. TORRES,293 SCRA 141

Obani

14.YNOT V. IAC, 148 Monaci There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To
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SCRA 659 llo strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement ofcarabaos from interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984,Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged inviolation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right tobe heard or his right to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A tooutrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. The lowercourt ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order topromote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.

The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power

because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to

the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated becausethe owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and isimmediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authoritiesof the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on

judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is,finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned thereinwho are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.

15. JMMPROMOTIONANDMANAGEMENT,

INC. V. CA, 260SCRA 319

Mier . Assailed is the government's power to control deployment of female entertainers toJapan by requiring an Artist Record Book (ARB) as a precondition to the processing by thePOEA of any contract for overseas employment

Federation of Entertainment Talent Managers of the Philippines (FETMOP), on January 27,

1995 filed a class suit assailing these department orders, principally contending that saidorders 1) violated the constitutional right to travel; 2) abridged existing contracts foremployment; and 3) deprived individual artists of their licenses without due process oflaw.

Thus, after a number of inadequate and failed accreditation schemes, the Secretary ofLabor issued on August 16, 1993, D.O. No. 28, establishing the Entertainment IndustryAdvisory Council (EIAC), the policy advisory body of DOLE on entertainment industrymatters. 9Acting on the recommendations of the said body, the Secretary of Labor, onJanuary 6, 1994, issued the assailed orders. These orders embodied EIAC's Resolution No.

1, which called for guidelines on screening, testing and accrediting performing overseasFilipino artists. Significantly, as the respondent court noted, petitioners were dulyrepresented in the EIAC, 10which gave the recommendations on which the ARB and otherrequirements were basedTo pretend that licensing or accreditation requirements violates the due process clause isto ignore the settled practice, under the mantle of the police power, of regulating entry tothe practice of various trades or professions. Professionals leaving for abroad are required

to pass rigid written and practical exams before they are deemed fit to practice their trade

16.LUCENA GRANDCENTRALTERMINAL V. JACLINER,GR.NO.148339,FEB.23, 2005

Merino JAC Liner, Inc., a common carrier operating buses which ply various routes to and fromLucena City, assailed, via a petition for prohibition and injunction1against the City ofLucena, its Mayor, and the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Lucena before the Regional Trial

Court (RTC) of Lucena City, City Ordinance Nos. 1631 and 1778 as unconstitutional on theground that, inter alia, the same constituted an invalid exercise of police power, an undue

taking of private property, and a violation of the constitutional prohibition againstmonopolies. The salient provisions of the ordinances are:

These ordinances, by granting an exclusive franchise for twenty five years, renewable foranother twenty five years, to one entity for the construction and operation of one

common bus and jeepney terminal facility in Lucena City, to be located outside the cityproper, were professedly aimed towards alleviating the traffic congestion alleged to havebeen caused by the existence of various bus and jeepney terminal

(2) whether the City of Lucena properly exercised its police power when it enacted thesubject ordinances.

It is its reasonableness, not its effectiveness, which bears upon its constitutionality. If theconstitutionality of a law were measured by its effectiveness, then even tyrannical lawsmay be justified whenever they happen to be effective.

17.CITY OF MANILAV. JUDGE

Medallla
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LAGUIO,GR.NO.118127,APR.12, 2005

18.SOCIAL JUSTICESOCIETY V.ATIENZA,GR.NO.156052,FEB.13, 2008

Maderal

19.WHITE LIGHTCORP. V. CITY OFMANILA, GR.NO.122846, JAN.20,

2009

Jumawan

20.MAGTAJAS V.PRYCE PROP.,GR.NO.111097,JUL.20, 1994

Gok-ong

Municipal Ordinance in CDO prohibiting games of chance andprohibiting the use of buildings for illegal gambling. As such, suchordinance was declared void and an ultra vires act by the

Mayor? of CDO as it was clearly contravening an already

existing statute which is PD 1869. Thus, such exercise of adelegated police power through the enactment of a municipalordinance was clearly invalid.

21.MUNICIPALITY OFPARAAQUE V.V.M. REALITYCORP,GR.NO.127820,

JULY 20, 1998

Flores

22.MASIKIP V. CITYOF PASIG,

GR.NO.136349,JAN.23, 2006

Edradan, JR

Judicial review of the exercise of eminent domain is limited to the following areas ofconcern: (a) the adequacy of the compensation, (b) the necessity of the taking, and (c) thepublic use character of the purpose of the taking

"necessity within the rule that the particular property to be expropriated must benecessary, does not mean an absolute but only a reasonable or practical necessity, such as

would combine the greatest benefit to the public with the least inconvenience andexpense to the condemning party and the property owner consistent with such benefit."

the basis for the passage of Ordinance No. 42 s. 1993 authorizing the expropriation,indicates that the intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound Homeowners

Association, a private, non-profit organization, not the residents of Caniogan

"SEC. 19.Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its chiefexecutive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminentdomain for public use, purpose or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the

landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of theConstitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That, the power of

eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has beenpreviously made to the owner and such offer was not accepted: Provided,

further, That, the local government unit may immediately take possession of

the property upon the filing of expropriation proceedings and upon making adeposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fairmarket value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the

property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That, the amount to be paid forexpropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the

fair market value at the time of the taking of the property." CSHcDT


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23.BARDILLON V.BRGY. MASILI OFCALAMBA,GR.NO.146886,APR.30, 2003

Edradan, DR

Accordingly, in expropriation proceedings, the requisites for authorizing immediate entry

are as follows: (1) the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form andsubstance; and (2) the deposit of the amount equivalent to 15 percent of the fair marketvalue of the property to be expropriated based on its current tax declaration. In the instantcase, the issuance of the Writ of Possession in favor of respondent after it had filed theComplaint for expropriation and deposited the amount required was proper, because ithad complied with the foregoing requisites. EcHIDT

24.REPUBLIC V.PLDT, 26 SCRA620

Degamo

All private property capable of ownership may be expropriatedexcept money and choses in action. Even services may be subjectto eminent domain given of course it complies with the requisitesin the exercise of the eminent domain; herein the services ofPLDT to provide connection not only for the government but alsothrough the Bureau of Telecommunications of the government..

25.AYALA DE ROXASV. CITY OFMANILA, 9 PHIL215

Clitar Facts: Plaintiff: Carmen Ayala De Roxas; D: City of Manila and City engineer Robert G. Dieck. Plaintiff owns a property at Escolta, city of Manila, the eastern boundary of which

adjoins the canal of San Jacinto or Sibacon.

Herein plaintiff applied for a license to construct a terrace over the strip o land 3meters width between her main wall of her house and the edge of said canal; Drefused saying that they were to use the same for the wharf/ public way/ easement ofpublic use for the general interest of navigation, flotation, fishing and salvage

(Ordinance 78) in accordance with the law of Waters as well as CC-> Thus, D preventedP from continuing to enjoy the use and of freely disposing of such strip of land.

Issue:

WON such expropriation is with just cause and WON it follows due processRuling:

According to article 349 of the Civil Code, no one shall be deprived of his property,except by competent authority and with sufficient cause of public utility, always after

proper indemnity; if this requisite has not been fulfilled the courts must protect, andeventually restore possession to the injured party.

Under section 5 of the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, no legislation shall be enactedin the Philippine Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or propertywithout due process of law; and the due process of law in order to deprive a person

of his property is, according to the Code of Civil Procedure, reserved to the judicialauthority. The refusal to grant a license or the enactment of an ordinance whereby aperson may be deprived of property or rights, or an attempt thereat is made, withoutpreviously indemnifying him therefor, is not, nor can it be, due process of law.

Considering that the easement intended to be established, whatever may be the objectthereof, is not merely a real right that will encumber the property, but is one tending toprevent the exclusive use of one portion of the same, by expropriating it for a public use

which, be it what it may, can not be accomplished unless the owner of the propertycondemned or seized be previously and duly indemnified, it is proper to protect theappellant by means of the remedy employed in such cases, ,

but a mere act of obstruction, a refusal which is beyond the powers of the city ofManila,because it is not simply a measure in connection with building regulations, but is anattempt to suppress, without due process of law, real rights which are attached to theright of ownership.

Therefore, we hereby command the defendants, the city of Manila, and Robert G. Dieck,as city engineer, or whomsoever may now be acting as such, to immediately issue alicense in favor of the plaintiff herein, Doa Carmen Ayala de Roxas, to construct theterrace as aforesaid in accordance with the plan and specification as per Exhibit A, thesaid defendants to pay the costs of these proceedings. So ordered.

26.PEOPLE V.FAJARDO, 104PHIL 44

Cinco

27.NATIONAL Capahi Facts:


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POWER CORP. V.GUTIERREZ, 193SCRA 1

P: National Power Corp (NPC) = a government owned and controlled entity investedwith the power of eminent domain for the purpose of pursuing its objectives, whichamong others is the construction, operation and maintenance of electric transmissionlines for distribution throughout the Phil.

D: Spouses Misericordia Gutierrez = owner of said land which the transmission lineshave to to pass -> such land as classified to be partly commercial and partly agricultural

= with therefore the value of P5 per sq. m.

Herein, construction of 230 KV mexicoLimay transmission lines have to pass by Dsland. The only controversy at hand is the reasonableness and adequacy of thedisturbance or compensation fee of the expropriated properties.

P: Simple right of way easement transmits no rights except that of the easement. Fullownership is retained by private respondents and that they are not totally deprived ofthe use of the land. They can continue planting the same agricultural crops except thosethat would result in contact with the wires. Thus, P says that if they pay the full market

value, then full transfer of ownership is the logical equivalent.

Issue:WON the acquisition of the right of way easement falls within the purview of the power ofeminent domain.

Ruling:The foregoing facts considered, the acquisition of the right of way easement falls within

the purview of the power of eminent domain.

"Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in thetaking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the

expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears whysaid power may not be availed of to impose only a burden uponthe owner of condemned property, without loss of title and

possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, throughexpropriation, be subjected to an easement of right-of-way."

In the case at bar, the easement of right-of-way is definitely a taking under the power ofeminent domain. Considering the nature and effect of the installation of the 230 KV

Mexico-Limay transmission lines, the limitation imposed by NPC against the use of the landfor an indefinite period deprives private respondents of its ordinary use.

28.REPBULIC V.CASTELVI, 58SCRA 336

Calder

on

29. CITYGOVERNMENTOF QUEZON CITYV. ERICTA, 122SCRA 759

Calang Facts: P: City of Government of Quezon City R: Himalayang Pilipino Sec. 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64: ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT,

MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OF BURIAL

GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QC "Sec. 9.At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall beset aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have beenresidents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death,

P wrote to R regarding the enforcement of such ordinance. P: Taking of property as valid and reasonable exercise of police power and that the land

is taken for public use and is intended for the burial ground of paupers. -> authorizedunder its charter in exercise of local police power..

R: Taking or confiscation of property is obvious bec. The questioned ordinancepermanently restricts the use of property such that it cannot be used for any reasonablepurpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property.

Issue:Is Sec. 9 of the ordinance a valid exercise of police power?

Ruling:

There is nothing in the above provision which authorizes confiscation or aseuphemistically termed by the respondents, 'donation.'


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"It will be seen from the foregoing authorities that police power is usually exercised inthe form of mere regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or property for thepromotion of the general welfare. It does not involve the taking or confiscation ofproperty with the exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscateprivate property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and order

and of promoting the general welfare as for instance, the confiscation of an illegallypossessed article, such as opium and firearms.

"It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964of Quezon City is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives aperson of his private property without due process of law, nay, even withoutcompensation."

There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent ofthe total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupersand the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of thepeople. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from aprivate cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation.Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes theburden to private cemeteries

When the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177 (q)that a Sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for the burial of the dead in such placeand in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply authorizes the city toprovide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct

public cemeteries. This has been the law and practice in the past. It continues to thepresent. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation

30.REYES V. NHA,GR.NO.147511JAN.20, 2003

Caging Facts: P: owners of the lot; they are a lot ))dismissed the complaint for forfeiture of rights R: NHAfiled separate complaints for the expropriation of sugarcane lands with the

stated public purpose of expropriation for the expansion of the DasmarinasResettlement Project to accommodate the squatters who were relocated from theMetropolitan Manila area.

P: No compensation yet, that R had not relocated squatters from Manila on theexpropriated land thus violating the state public purpose; low cost housing units ascontrary to the stated public purpose.

RTC Ruling: NHA not deemed to have abandoned public purpose for which subjectproperties were relocated; NHA pursued public purpose upon entering into a contract

with Arceo Cruz for construction of low cost housing.

Issue:

WON NHA violated its public purpose for such expropriation and thus making it tenable toforfeit NHAs rights and interests.

Ruling:

The act of respondent NHA in entering into a contract with a real estate developer forthe construction of low cost housing on the expropriated lots to be sold to qualified low

income beneficiaries cannot be taken to mean as a deviation from the stated publicpurpose of their taking. Jurisprudence has it that the expropriation of private land forslum clearance and urban development is for a public purpose even if the developed

area is later sold to private homeowners, commercials firms, entertainment and servicecompanies, and other private concerns

Petitioners cannot insist on a restrictive view of the eminent domain provision of theConstitution by contending that the contract for low cost housing is a deviation from the

stated public use. It is now settled doctrine that the concept of public use is no longer

limited to traditional purposes. Here, as elsewhere, the idea that "public use" is strictlylimited to clear cases of "use by the public" has been abandoned. The term "public use"has now been held to be synonymous with "public interest," "public benefit," "publicwelfare," and "public convenience."

We likewise do not subscribe to petitioners' contention that the stated public purposewas abandoned when respondent NHA failed to occupy the expropriated lots byrelocating squatters from the Metro Manila area. The expropriation judgment declaredthat respondent NHA has a lawful right to take petitioners properties "for the public use

or purpose of expanding the Dasmarias Resettlement Project." The taking here isabsolute, without any condition, restriction or qualification

When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple unconditionally, either by the


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exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the

land, and the public use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different

use, without any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the

former owner."

First, under the expropriation judgment the payment of just compensation is not subjectto any condition. Second, it is a recognized rule that although the right to enter uponand appropriate the land to public use is completed prior to payment, title to theproperty expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full

payment of the just compensation

31.FILSTREAM INTLINC. V. CA, 284SCRA 716

Barrit

32.MANOSCA V. CA,252 SCRA 412

Parado The National Historical Institute declared the 492 square meter parcel ofland owned by Petitioner as a national historical landmark, because itwas the site of the birth of Felix Manalo, the founder of Iglesia ni Cristo.The Republic of the Philippines filed an action to appropriate the land.Petitioners argued that the expropriation was not for a public purposeand that such expropriation was contrary to Section 29(2), Article VI, ofthe 1987 Constitution which would require an application of public fundsfor religious purposes.

33.NATL POWERCORP V. SPS.CHIONG, GR.NO.152436, JUN.20,2003

Hipe

34.EPZA V. DULAY,148 SCRA 305

Rudas

35.BELEN V. CA, 195SCRA 59

Barrit A small portion of land measuring a hundred (100) square meters, more or less, belongingto the Manotoc Services, Inc. was leased to Pedro M. Belen. That piece of land is known as

Lot No. 10, Block 18 and is situated at Sunog Apog, Tondo, Manila. 1 On it stood a housebuilt by Belen.

Part of the land came to be occupied by Alfredo Juliano and his family in the early part of1978. A fire then happened. Juliano bought a house standing thereon, not belongingto Belen, and moved in without the latter's knowledge. 2 On learning of this, Belen had atalk with Juliano, and they came to an agreement that Juliano could continue staying on

the land temporarily and would pay one-half of the rental to Manotok Realty, Inc. Later afire razed both Belen's and Juliano's houses to the ground. Belen told Juliano not to build

anything on the land any more. However, on Juliano's pleas, Belen acceded to Juliano'scontinued stay on the land on the explicit condition that his occupancy should not belonger than two and a half (2 1/2) years. 3 When Juliano failed to leave the premises after

the stipulated term despite demand, Belenbrought suit in the Metropolitan Trial Courtsometime in September, 1982, 4 and succeeded in obtaining judgment dated September 5,1984,

The decision rendered on June 26, 1985, 6 was made to rest on the expropriation of theManotok Estate effected by Presidential Decree No. 1670, which such declared that by

virtue of the decree, Manotok Realty, Inc. ceased to be the owner of the land, includingthe lot leased to Belen, and could not interfere with the possession, administration,control and disposition of the National Housing Authority (NHA)

Issue: whether Manotok Realty, Inc., petitioner's lessor, has retained ownership of thelot in question, the expropriating law invoked by private respondent (PD 1670)notwithstanding.

Ruling:Presidential Decree No. 1670, together with a companion decree, numbered 1669 which attempted to expropriate by similar legislative fiat another property, the so-called"Tambunting Estate" was struck down by this Court as "unconstitutional and therefore,null and void,"The decrees do not by themselves, provide for any form of hearing or procedure by which


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the petitioners can question the propriety of the expropriation of their properties or the

reasonableness of the just compensation. Having failed to provide for a hearing, theGovernment should have filed an expropriation case under Rule 67 of the Revised Rules ofCourt but it did not do soIn effect, the properties under the decrees were 'automatically expropriated.' Thisbecomes more evident when the NHA wrote the Register of Deeds and requested her tocancel the certificate of titles of the petitioners, furnishing said Register of Deeds only withcopies of the decrees to support its request.

PD 1670 being void ab initio,all acts done in reliance thereon and in accordance therewithmust also be deemed void ab initio,including particularly the taking of possession of theproperty by the National Housing Authority and its attempts to convert the same into ahousing project and the selection of the beneficiaries thereof.

36.MANILAELECTRIC CO. V.PINEDA, 206SCRA 196

Caging private respondents Teofilo Arayon, Sr., Gil de Guzman, Lucito Santiago and TeresaBautista are owners in fee simple of the expropriated property situated at Malaya, Pililla,

Rizal.

On October 29, 1974, a complaint for eminent domain was filed by petitioner MERALCOagainst forty-two (42) defendants with the Court of First Instancefor the purpose ofconstructing a 230 KV Transmission line from Barrio Malaya to Tower No. 220 at Pililla,

Rizal, petitioner needs portions of the land of the private respondents consisting of anaggregate area of 237,321 square meters. ,

the respondent court stressed in said order that "at this stage, the Court starts to appointcommissioners to determine just compensation or dispenses with them and adopts thetestimony of a credible real estate broker, or the Judge himself would exercise his right toformulate an opinion of his own as to the value of the land in question. Nevertheless, if he

formulates such an opinion, he must base it upon competent evidence. The petitionerstrongly maintains that the respondent court's act of determining and ordering thepayment of just compensation to private respondents without formal presentation ofevidence by the parties on the reasonable value of the property constitutes a flagrantviolation of petitioner's constitutional right to due process. It stressed that respondent

court ignored the procedure laid down by the law in determining just compensationbecause it formulated an opinion of its own as to the value of the land in question withoutallowing the Board of Commissioners to hold hearings for the reception of evidence.

On the other hand, the respondents agree with the judge in dispensing with the Board ofCommissioner.

Issue: whether or not the respondent court can dispense with the assistance of a Board ofCommissioners in an expropriation proceeding and determine for itself the justcompensation.

Ruling: are Sections 5 and 8 of Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court

"Section 5.Upon the entry of the order of condemnation, thecourt shall appoint not more than three (3) competent anddisinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and report tothe court the just compensation for the property sought to betaken. The order of appointment shall designate the time andplace of the first session of the hearing to be held by thecommissioners and specify the time within which their report is

to be filed with the court.

Respondent judge, in the case at bar, arrived at the valuation of P40.00 per square meteron a property declared for real estate tax purposes at P2.50 per hectare on the basis of a"Joint Venture Agreement on Subdivision and Housing Projects" executed by A.B.A. Homesand private respondents on June 1, 1972. This agreement was merely attached to themotion to withdraw from petitioner's deposit. Respondent judge arrived at the amount ofjust compensation on its own, without the proper reception of evidence before the Boardof CommissionersIn an expropriation case such as this one where the principal issue is the determination ofjust compensation, a trial before the Commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties


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to present evidence on the issue of just compensation

this Court is convinced that the respondent judge's act of determining and ordering thepayment of just compensation without the assistance of a Board of Commissioners is aflagrant violation of petitioner's constitutional right to due process and is a gross violationof the mandated rule established by the Revised Rules of Court. Petition granted.

37.REPUBLIC V.SANTOS, 141SCRA 30

Calang

38.LANDBANK V. CA,249 SCRA 149

Calderon

39.ASSOC. OF SMALLLANDOWNERS V.SEC. OFAGRARIANREFORM, 175

SCRA 343

Capahi

40.NATL POWERCORP V. CA, 254SCRA 577

Cinco In 1978, National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR), took possession of a 21,995 squaremeter land which is a portion of Lot 1 of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-116159 situated inMarawi City, owned by Mangondato, and covered by Transfer Certificate Title No. T-378-A,under the mistaken belief that it forms part of the public land reserved for use byNAPOCOR for hydroelectric power purposes under Proclamation No. 1354 of the President

of the Philippines dated December 3, 1974.

In 1979, when NAPOCOR Started building its Agus I (HE Hydroelectric Plant) Project,Mangondato demanded compensation from NAPOCOR. NAPOCOR refused to compensateinsisting that the property is public land and that it had already paid "financial assistance"to Marawi City in exchange for the rights over the property.

Mangondato claimed that the subject land is his duly registered private property coveredby Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-378-A in his name. A decade after, NAPOCOR accededto the fact that the land in dispute belongs to Mangodato.NAPOCOR's National Power Board (hereafter NAPOCOR's board) passed Resolution No. 90-225 resolving to pay Mangondato P100.00 per square meter for only a 12,132 square

meter portion of the subject property plus 12% interestper annumfrom 1978. However,in the August 7, 1990 board meeting, confirmation of said resolution was deferred to allowNAPOCOR's regional legal counsel to determine whether P100.00 per square meter is thefair market value. Many valuations were made CHECK NALANG NGADTO)) KAPOY :p

Issue: WON the reckoning period for the market value of the property be during thetaking, which herein NAPOCOR contends to be around 1972, or during the filing of the

complaint which is in 1992.

Ruling:

It should be reckoned from the filing of the complaint. There are guidelines in determiningwhen is actual taking (check book); and it can be seen that NAPOCOR has not complied

with these requisites that will allow the proclaimed year of 1972 to be the actual taking.For therein, there was even still the dispute on the ownership of land. It was only in 1990when NAPOCOR acceded to the fact that indeed Mangodato owns such parcel of land. And

it was further only in 1992 when NAPOCOR undertook expropriation proceedings for suchdisputed land. Thus, it is then that the market value of the property is reckoned from, fromthe filing of the complaint.

In the instant case, petitioner effectively repudiated the deed of sale it enteredinto with the private respondent when it passed Resolution No. 92-121 on May 25,1992 authorizing its president to negotiate, inter alia, that payment" shall beeffected only after Agus I HE project has been placed in operation". It was onlythen that petitioner's intent to expropriate became manifest as private


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respondent disagreed and, barely a month after, filed suit

41.CITY OF CEBU V.SPS. DEDOMA,GR.NO. 146091,JUL.28, 2008

Clitar City of Cebu expropriated the lots of the herein respondents for a public purpose, i.e., forthe construction of a public road which shall serve as an access/relief road of GorordoAvenue to extend to the General Maxilum Avenue and the back of Magellan InternationalHotel Roads in Cebu City.Respondents, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint because the

purpose for which their property was to be expropriated was not for a public purpose butfor benefit of a single private entity, the Cebu Holdings, Inc. Regardless of such, after pre-trial, the parties executed and submitted to the trial court an Agreement 4 wherein theydeclared that they have partially settled the case and in consideration thereof they agreed

City of Cebu, herein petitioner, filed a petition for review of certiorari with regards to thecase for eminent domain, which fixed the valuation of the land subject thereof on the basisof the recommendation of the commissioners appointed by it. Petitioner questioned theland valuation asserting that just compensation should be determined as of the date of the

filing of the complaint, which in this case should be 17 September 1993, and not at thetime the property was actually taken in 1994.respondents maintained that the trial court decided the case on the basis of the

agreement of the parties that just compensation shall be fixed by commissionersappointed by the court; that the petitioner did not interpose any serious objection to thecommissioners' report; hence, it was estopped from attacking the report on which thedecision was based.

Issue: WON the reckoning point of the market value of the property be determined fromthe filing of the complaint, thus in accordance with Sec 4 Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, or

from its actual taking, in accordance with Sec 19 RA 1760?

Ruling: Section 19 of Republic Act No. 7160, which expressly provides that justcompensation shall be determined as of the time of actual taking. The petitioner hadmisread the Court's ruling in the above-mentioned case. The Court did not categorically

rule in that case that just compensation should be determined as of the filing of thecomplaint. The Court explicitly stated therein that although the general rule in determiningjust compensation in eminent domain is the value of the property as of the date of the

filing of the complaint, the rule "admits of an exception: where the Court fixed the value ofthe property as of the date it was taken, and not at the date of the commencement of the

expropriation proceedings.

42.REPUBLIC V. CA,GR.NO.146587,JUL.2, 2002

Degam

o

Petitioner instituted expropriation proceedings on 19 September 1969 before the Regional

Trial Court ("RTC") of Bulacan, situated along MacArthur Highway, Malolos, Bulacan, to beutilized for the continued broadcast operation and use of radio transmitter facilities for the"Voice of the Philippines" project.More than 9 years after the institution of the expropriation proceeding, the RTC rendereda judgment ordering herein petitioner to pay the respondent just compensation for theexpropriated lots.5 years after such decision was made, defendants filed a case to instituteclaims for the unpaid just compensation. In the meantime, President Joseph EjercitoEstrada issued Proclamation No. 22, 2transferring 20 hectares of the expropriatedproperty to the Bulacan State University for the expansion of its facilities and another 5hectares to be used exclusively for the propagation of the Philippine carabao. Theremaining portion was retained by the PIA.This time, the Santos heirs, opposing the manifestation and motion, submitted a counter-motion to adjust the compensation from P6.00 per square meter previously fixed in the1979 decision to its current zonal valuation pegged at P5,000.00 per square meter or, inthe alternative, to cause the return to them of the expropriated property.

Issue: WON respondent Luis Santos may claim for the return of his expropriated propertydue to non-payment of the petitioner after almost 5 years after the expropriationproceeding.

Ruling:

where the recovery of possession of property taken for public use prayed for by theunpaid landowner was denied even while no requisite expropriation proceedingswere first instituted. The landowner was merely given the relief of recoveringcompensation for his property computed at its market value at the time it was taken

and appropriated by the State.
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Verily, private respondents, although not entitled to the return of the expropriated

property, deserve to be paid promptly on the yet unpaid award of just compensationalready fixed by final judgment of the Bulacan RTC on 26 February 1979 at P6.00 persquare meter, with legal interest thereon at 12%per annum computed from the date of

"taking" of the property, i.e., 19 September 1969, until the due amount shall have beenfully paid.

43.REPUBLIC V.VICENTE LIM,GR.NO. 161656,JUN.29, 2005

Edradan, DR

In the present case fifty-seven (57) years have lapsed from the time the Decision in the

subject expropriation proceedings became final, but still the Republic of the Philippines,herein petitioner, has not compensated the owner of the property.the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) instituted a special civil action for expropriationwith the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu, docketed as Civil Case No. 781, involving Lots932 and 939 of the Banilad Friar Land Estate, Lahug, Cebu City, for the purpose ofestablishing a military reservation for the Philippine Army. Lot 932 was registered in thename of Gervasia Denzon under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 14921 with an areaof 25,137 square meters, while Lot 939 was in the name of Eulalia Denzon

In the interim or on November 9, 1961, TCT Nos. 23934 and 23935 covering Lots 932 and939 were issued in the names of Francisca Valdehueza and Josefina Panerio, respectively.Annotated thereon was the phrase "subject to the priority of the National AirportsCorporation to acquire said parcels of land, Lots 932 and 939 upon previous payment of areasonable market value."

On July 31, 1962, the CFI promulgated its Decision in favor of Valdehueza and Panerio,holding that they are the owners and have retained their right as such over Lots 932 and939 because of the Republic's failure to pay the amount of P4,062.10, adjudged in theexpropriation proceedings. However, in view of the annotation on their land titles, theywere ordered to execute a deed of sale in favor of the RepublicOn May 19, 1966, this Court rendered its Decision affirming the CFI Decision. It held thatValdehueza and Panerio are still the registered owners of Lots 932 and 939, there havingbeen no payment of just compensation by the Republic. Apparently, this Court foundnothing in the records to show that the Republic paid the owners or their successors-in-interest according to the CFI decisionMeanwhile, in 1964, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to Vicente Lim, hereinrespondent On August 20, 1992, respondent Lim filed a complaint for quieting of titlewiththe RTC; it rendered its decision in favor of Vicente Lim.

Issue: WON the Republic has retained ownership of Lot 932 despite its failure to pay

respondent's predecessors-in-interest the just compensation therefor pursuant to thejudgment of the CFI rendered as early as May 14, 1940. If not, can non-payment of just

compensation of the Republic after more than 50 years allow the respondents

predecessors-in-interest to recover possession of such expropriated lots?

Ruling:

One of the basic principles enshrined in our Constitution is that no person shall bedeprived of his private property without due process of law; and in expropriation cases, an

essential element of due process is that there must be just compensation wheneverprivate property is taken for public use.just compensation embraces not only the correctdetermination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment for

the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation

cannot be considered 'just.'" In jurisdictions similar to ours, where an entry to theexpropriated property precedes the payment of compensation, it has been held that if the

compensation is not paid in a reasonable time, the party may be treated as a trespasser abinitio. 8

this Court mandated the Republic to pay respondent's predecessors-in-interest the sum of

P16,248.40 as "reasonable market value of the two lots in question." Unfortunately, it didnot comply and allowed several decades to pass without obeying this Court's mandate.Such prolonged obstinacy bespeaks of lack of respect to private rights and to the rule oflaw, which we cannot countenance. It is tantamount to confiscation of private property.

"Title to property which is the subject of condemnationproceedings does not vest the condemnor until the judgment
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fixing just compensation is entered and paid, but the condemnor's

title relates back to the date on which the petition under theEminent Domain Act, or the commissioner's report under theLocal Improvement Act, is filed.

. . .Although the right to appropriate and use land taken for a canal is complete at the timeof entry, title to the property taken remains in the owner until payment is actually made.

Note: There are 2 stages in an expropriation:1) Thefirst is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to

exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in thecontext of the facts involved in the suit.

2) Thesecond phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with thedetermination by the court of "the just compensation for the property soughtto be taken." This is done by the court with the assistance of not more thanthree (3) commissioners

Lastly, to complete expropriation proceeding, just compensation should be paid.the

doctrine that "non-payment of just compensation (in an expropriation proceedings) doesnot entitle the private landowners to recover possession of the expropriated lots."However, the facts of the present case do not justify its application. It bears stressing thatthe Republic was ordered to pay just compensation twice, thefirst was in the

expropriation proceedings and the second, in Valdehueza. Fifty-seven (57) years havepassed since then.We cannot but construe the Republic's failure to pay just compensationas a deliberate refusal on its part. Under such circumstance, recovery of possession is inorder We thus rule that the special circumstances prevailing in this case entitlerespondent to recover possession of the expropriated lot from the Republic.

44.NATL POWERCORP. V. CA,GR.NO.106804,AUG.12, 2004

Edradan, JR

Petitioner National Power Corporation ("NPC") is a public corporation created to generategeothermal, hydroelectric, nuclear and other power and to transmit electric power

nationwide.4 NPC is authorized by law to acquire property and exercise the right ofeminent domain.

Private respondent Antonino Pobre ("Pobre") is the owner of a 68,969 square-meter land("Property") located in Barangay Bano, Municipality of Tiwi, Albay. The Property is covered

by TCT No. 4067 and Subdivision Plan 11-9709

On 23 October 1979, the trial court ordered the expropriation of the lots upon NPCs

payment of P25 per square meter or a total amount of P207,790. NPC began drillingoperations and construction of steam wells. While this first expropriation case was

pending, NPC dumped waste materials beyond the site agreed upon by NPC with Pobre.The dumping of waste materials altered the topography of some portions of the Property.

NPC did not act on Pobres complaints and NPC continued with its dumping.

Third was on 1 September 1979, when NPC filed its second expropriation case against

Pobre to acquire an additional 5,554 square meters of the Property. This is the subject ofthis petition. NPC needed the lot for the construction and maintenance of NaglagbongWell Site F-20, pursuant to Proclamation No. 7396 and Republic Act No. 5092On 10 December 1984, Pobre filed a motion to dismiss the second complaint forexpropriation. Pobre claimed that NPC damaged his Property. Pobre prayed for just

compensation of all the lots affected by NPCs actions and for the payment of damages.

Issue: WON in such expropriation case, the plaintiff has the right to dismiss the complaintfor eminent domain.

Ruling: Section 3 of Rule 67 required the defendant to file a single motion to dismiss wherehe should present all of his objections and defenses to the taking of his property for thepurpose specified in the complaint.24In short, in expropriation cases under Section 3 ofRule 67, the motion to dismiss took the place of the answer

In expropriation cases, there is no such thing as the plaintiffs matter of right to dismiss the

complaint precisely because the landowner may have already suffered damages at the

start of the taking. The plaintiffs right in expropriation cases to dismiss the complaint has

always been subject to court approval and to certain conditions. 28 The exceptional rightthat Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court conferred on the plaintiff must beunderstood to have applied only to other civil actions. The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
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abrogated this exceptional right.

The power of eminent domain is subject to limitations. A landowner cannot be deprived ofhis right over his land until expropriation proceedings are instituted in court. 30 The courtmust then see to it that the taking is for public use, there is payment of just compensationand there is due process of law.However, when the defendant claims that his land suffered damage because of the

expropriation, the dismissal of the action should not foreclose the defendants right to

have his damages ascertained either in the same case or in a separate action

Ordinarily, the dismissal of the expropriation case restores possession of the expropriatedland to the landowner.42 However, when possession of the land cannot be turned over tothe landowner because it is neither convenient nor feasible anymore to do so, the onlyremedy available to the aggrieved landowner is to demand payment of just compensation

the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that when private property is rendered uninhabitable by anentity with the power to exercise eminent domain, the taking is deemed complete. Suchtaking is thus compensable.We have held that the usual procedure in the determination ofjust compensation is waived when the government itself initially violates proceduralrequirements.48NPCs taking of Pobres property without filing the appropriateexpropriation proceedings and paying him just compensation is a transgression ofprocedural due process. WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for lack of merit. NPC to payAntonino Pobre P3,448,450.

45.MACTAN-CEBUINTL. AIRPORTAUTHORITY V.CA, GR.NO.139495, NOV.27,2000

Flores wherein the issue to be resolved is whether the abandonment of the public use for whichLot No. 941 was expropriated entitles CHIONGBIAN to reacquire it.

It depends upon the character of the title acquired by the expropriator, whether it be theState, a province, a municipality, or a corporation which has the right to acquire property

under the power of eminent domain. If, upon the contrary, however, the decree ofexpropriation gives to the entity a fee simple title, then, of course, the land becomes theabsolute property of the expropriator, whether it be the State, a province, or municipality,

and in that case the non-user does not have the effect of defeating the title acquired bythe expropriation proceedings. DCATHSWhen land has been acquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally, either by the

exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no r ights in the land,and the public use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use,

without any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the formerowner.

The terms of the judgment are clear and unequivocal and grant title to Lot No. 941 in feesimple to the Republic of the Philippines. There was no condition imposed to the effectthat the lot would return to CHIONGBIAN or that CHIONGBIAN had a right to repurchasethe same if the purpose for which it was expropriated is ended or abandoned or if theproperty was to be used other than as the Lahug airport
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