Consti2 Liberty

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CONSTI 2 LIBERTY OF ABODE AND TRAVEL

[G.R. No. 88211. September 15, 1989.]

FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, F ERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., IRENE M.ARANETA, IMEE M. MANOTOC, TOMAS MANOTOC, GREGORIO ARANETA, PACIFICOE. MARCOS, NICANOR YIGUEZ and PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION(PHILCONSA), represented by its President, CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, petitioners, vs.HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, CATALINO MACARAIG, SEDFREY ORDOEZ, MIRIAMDEFENSOR SANTIAGO, FIDEL RAMOS, RENATO DE VILLA, in their capacity as Secretaryof Foreign Affairs, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Immigration

Commissioner, Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff, respectively,respondents.

SYLLABUS

1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO RETURN TO ONE'S COUNTRY, NOT AMONG THE

RIGHTS GUARANTEED. The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically

guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel.

2.ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO RETURN CONSIDERED AS A GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL

LAW. It is the court's well-considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a

generally accepted principle of international law and under our Constitution, is part of the law of the

land [Art. II Sec. 2 of the Constitution.]

3.ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO RETURN, DISTINCT AND SEPARATE FROM THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL. It is distinct

and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the International

Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]

4.ID.; ALLOCATION OF POWER IN THE THREE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT A GRANT OF ALL THE

POWERS INHERENT THERETO. As the Supreme Court in Ocampo v. Cabangis [15 Phil. 626 (1910)]

pointed out "a grant of the legislative power means a grant of all legislative power; and a grant of the

judicial power means a grant of all the judicial power which may be exercised under the government."

[At 631-632.] If this can be said of the legislative power which is exercised by two chambers with a

combined membership of more than two hundred members and of the judicial power which is vested

in a hierarchy of courts, it can equally be said of the executive power which is vested in one official

the President.

5.ID.; PRESIDENT'S POWER UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION; EXTENT AND LIMITATION.

Consideration of tradition and the development of presidential power under the different

constitutions are essential for a complete understanding of the extent of and limitations to the

President's powers under the 1987 Constitution. Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations

on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered

as within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be

limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is

more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.

6.ID.; PRESIDENT'S RESIDUAL POWER TO PROTECT THE GENERAL WELFARE OF THE PEOPLE; THE

POWERS INVOLVED. The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the general

welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people. To

paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt, it is not only the power of the President but also his duty to doanything not forbidden by the Constitution or the laws that the needs of the nation demand. The

President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with

attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic

tranquillity in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds

of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way diminished by the relative

want of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief provision.

7.ID.; LIBERTY OF ABODE AND RIGHT TO TRAVEL; REQUEST TO BE ALLOWED TO RETURN TO THE

PHILIPPINES; TO BE TREATED AS ADDRESSED TO THE RESIDUAL UNSTATED POWERS OF THE

PRESIDENT. The request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines

cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abodeand the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated

situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is

appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and

correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In

that context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the

part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.

8.ID.; JUDICIAL REVIEW; POWER TO DETERMINE GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR EXCESS OF

JURISDICTION ON ANY BRANCH OR INSTRUMENTALITY OF THE GOVERNMENT. The present

Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry

into areas which the Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political

departments to decide. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission cited by petitioners show

that the framers intended to widen the scope of judicial review but they did not intend courts of

justice to settle all actual controversies before them. When political questions are involved, theConstitution limits the determination to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being questioned.

9.ID.; LIBERTY OF ABODE AND RIGHT TO TRAVEL; DENIAL OF REQUEST TO BE ALLOWED TO RETURN

TO THE PHILIPPINES, NOT A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. We find that from the pleadings filed by

the parties, from their oral arguments, and the facts revealed during the briefing in chambers by the

Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the National Security Adviser, wherein

petitioners and respondents were represented, there exist factual bases for the President's decision.

The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to destabilize the country,

as earlier narrated in this ponencia bolsters the conclusion that the return of the Marcoses at this

time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the State and instigate more

chaos. With these before her, the President cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously

and whimsically in determining that the return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national

interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: dissenting:

1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; ITS PROVISIONS PROTECT ALL MEN, AT ALL TIMES AND

UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES. "The Constitution . . . is a law for rulers and people, equally in war

and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all

circumstances. No doctrine involving more pernicious consequences was ever invented by the wit of

man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of

government." (Ex Parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2; 18 L. Ed. 281 [1866]).

2.ID.; POLITICAL QUESTIONS; OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL DETERMINATION. It is a well-settled

doctrine that political questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent that

power to deal with such questions has been conferred on the courts by express constitutional or

statutory provisions.

3.ID.; ID.; CONSTRUED. It is not so easy, however, to define the phrase political question, nor to


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determine what matters fall within its scope. It is frequently used to designate all questions that lie

outside the scope of the judicial power. More properly, however, it means those questions which,

under the constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to

which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the

government.

4.ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL POWER VESTED EXCLUSIVELY IN THE PRESIDENT OR CONGRESS, BEYOND

PROHIBITION OR EXAMINATION BY THE COURT REQUIRED FOR ITS EXISTENCE. For a political

question to exist, there must be in the Constitution a power vested exclusively in the President or

Congress, the exercise of which the court should not examine or prohibit. A claim of plenary orinherent power against a civil right which claim is not found in a specific provision is dangerous.

Neither should we validate a roving commission allowing public officials to strike where they please

and to override everything which to them represents evil. The entire Government is bound by the rule

of law. The authority implied in Section 6 of the Bill of Rights itself does not exist because no law has

been enacted specifying the circumstances when the right may be impaired in the interest of national

security or public safety. The power is in Congress, not the Executive.

5.ID.; LIBERTY OF ABODE AND RIGHT TO TRAVEL; RIGHT TO TRAVEL INCLUDES RIGHT TO TRAVEL OUT

OF OR BACK TO THE PHILIPPINES. Section 6 of the Bill of Rights states categorically that the liberty

of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law may be impaired only upon a

lawful order of a court. Not by an executive officer. Not even by the President. Section 6 further

provides that the right to travel, and this obviously includes the right to travel out of or back into the

Philippines, cannot be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public

health, as may be provided by law.

6.ID.; POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE NO LONGER UTILIZED BY THE COURT; COURT COMPELLED TO

DECIDE THE CASE UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION. The framers of the Constitution believed that

the free use of the political question doctrine allowed the Court during the Marcos years to fall back

on prudence, institutional difficulties, complexity of issues, momentousness of consequences or a fear

that it was extravagantly extending judicial power in the cases where it refused to examine and strike

down an exercise of authoritarian power. Parenthetically, at least two of the respondents and their

counsel were among the most vigorous critics of Mr. Marcos (the main petitioner) and his use of the

political question doctrine. The Constitution was accordingly amended. We are now precluded by its

mandate from refusing to invalidate a political use of power through a convenient resort to the

political question doctrine. We are compelled to decide what would have been non-justiceable under

our decisions interpreting earlier fundamental charters.

7.ID.; LIBERTY OF ABODE AND RIGHT TO TRAVEL; DENIAL A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. We do

not have to look into the factual bases of the ban Marcos policy in order to ascertain whether or not

the respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion. Nor are we forced to fall back upon judicial

notice of the implications of a Marcos return to his home to buttress a conclusion. In the first place,

there has never been a pronouncement by the President that a clear and present danger to national

security and public safety will arise if Mr. Marcos and his family are allowed to return to the

Philippines. It was only after the present petition was filed that the alleged danger to national security

and public safety conveniently surfaced in the respondents' pleadings. Secondly, President Aquino

herself limits the reason for the ban Marcos policy to (1) national welfare and interest and (2) the

continuing need to preserve the gains achieved in terms of recovery and stability. Neither ground

satisfies the criteria of national security and public safety. The "confluence theory" of the Solicitor

General or what the majority calls "catalytic effect," which alone sustains the claim of danger to

national security is fraught with perilous implications. Any difficult problem or any troublesome

person can be substituted for the Marcos threat as the catalysing factor. It was precisely the banning

by Mr. Marcos of the right to travel by Senators Benigno Aquino, Jr., Jovito Salonga, and scores of

other "undesirables" and "threats to national security" during that unfortunate period which led the

framers of our present Constitution not only to re-enact but to strengthen the declaration of this

right.

D E C I S I O NCORTES, J p:

Before the Court is a controversy of grave national importance. While ostensibly only legal issues are

involved, the Court's decision in this case would undeniably have a profound effect on the political,

economic and other aspects of national life.

We recall that in February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-

violent "people power" revolution and forced into exile. In his stead, Corazon C. Aquino was declared

President of the Republic under a revolutionary government. Her ascension to and consolidation of

power have not been unchallenged. The failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by political leaders of

Mr. Marcos, the takeover of television station Channel 7 by rebel troops led by Col. Canlas with the

support of "Marcos loyalists" and the unsuccessful plot of the Marcos spouses to surreptitiously

return from Hawaii with mercenaries aboard an aircraft chartered by a Lebanese arms dealer [Manila

Bulletin, January 30, 1987] awakened the nation to the capacity of the Marcoses to stir trouble even

from afar and to the fanaticism and blind loyalty of their followers in the country. The ratification of

the 1987 Constitution enshrined the victory of "people power" and also clearly reinforced the

constitutional moorings of Mrs. Aquino's presidency. This did not, however, stop bloody challenges to

the government. On August 28, 1987, Col. Gregorio Honasan, one of the major players in the February

Revolution, led a failed coup that left scores of people, both combatants and civilians, dead. There

were several other armed sorties of lesser significance, but the message they conveyed was the same

a split in the ranks of the military establishment that threatened civilian supremacy over the

military and brought to the fore the realization that civilian government could be at the mercy of a

fractious military.

But the armed threats to the Government were not only found in misguided elements in the military

establishment and among rabid followers of Mr. Marcos. There were also the communist insurgency

and the secessionist movement in Mindanao which gained ground during the rule of Mr. Marcos, to

the extent that the communists have set up a parallel government of their own in the areas they

effectively control while the separatists are virtually free to move about in armed bands. There has

been no let up in these groups' determination to wrest power from the government. Not only through

resort to arms but also through the use of propaganda have they been successful in creating chaos

and destabilizing the country.

Nor are the woes of the Republic purely political. The accumulated foreign debt and the plunder of

the nation attributed to Mr. Marcos and his cronies left the economy devastated. The efforts ateconomic recovery, three years after Mrs. Aquino assumed office, have yet to show concrete results

in alleviating the poverty of the masses, while the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses

has remained elusive.

Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But Mrs.

Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of

government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move

forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.

The Petition

This case is unique. It should not create a precedent, for the case of a dictator forced out of office and

into exile after causing twenty years of political, economic and social havoc in the country and who

within the short space of three years seeks to return, is in a class by itself.


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This petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the Court to order the respondents to issue travel

documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the

implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.

The Issue

The issue is basically one of power: whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the

Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

According to the petitioners, the resolution of the case would depend on the resolution of thefollowing issues:

1. Does the President have the power to bar the return of former PresidentMarcos and his family to the Philippines?

a. Is this a political question?2. Assuming that the President has the power to bar former President Marcos

and his family from returning to the Philippines, in the interest of "national

security, public safety or public health"

a. Has the President made a finding that the return of formerPresident Marcos and his family to the Philippines is a clear and

present danger to national security, public safety or public

health?

b. Assuming that she has made that finding, i. Have the requirements of due process been complied

with in making such finding?

ii. Has there been prior notice to petitioners?iii. Has there been a hearing?iv. Assuming that notice and hearing may be dispensed

with, has the President's decision, including the

grounds upon which it was based, been made known

to petitioners so that they may controvert the same?

c. Is the President's determination that the return of formerPresident Marcos and his family to the Philippines is a clear and

present danger to national security, public safety, or public

health a political question?

d. Assuming that the Court may inquire as to whether the return offormer President Marcos and his family is a clear and present

danger to national security, public safety, or public health, have

respondents established such fact?3. Have the respondents, therefore, in implementing the President's decision

to bar the return of former President Marcos and his family, acted and

would be acting without jurisdiction, or in excess of jurisdiction, or with

grave abuse of discretion, in performing any act which would effectively bar

the return of former President Marcos and his family to the Philippines?

[Memorandum for Petitioners, pp. 5-7; Rollo, pp. 234-236.]

The case for petitioners is founded on the assertion that the right of the Marcoses to return to the

Philippines is guaranteed under the following provisions of the Bill of Rights, to wit:

Section 1.No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without

due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of

the laws.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 6.The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits

prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the

court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of

national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.

The petitioners contend that the President is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the

Marcoses because only a court may do so "within the limits prescribed by law." Nor may the President

impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. They advance the view that

before the right to travel may be impaired by any authority or agency of the government, there must

be legislation to that effect.

The petitioners further assert that under international law, the right of Mr. Marcos and his family to

return to the Philippines is guaranteed.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:

Article 13.(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence

within the borders of each state.

(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to

return to his country.

Likewise, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which had been ratified by the

Philippines, provides:

Article 12

1) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within thatterritory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to

choose his residence.

2) Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.3) The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions

except those which are provided by law, are necessary to protect

national security, public order (order public), public health or morals

or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other

rights recognized in the present Covenant.

4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his owncountry.

On the other hand, the respondents' principal argument is that the issue in this case involves a

political question which is non-justiciable. According to the Solicitor General:

As petitioners couch it, the question involved is simply whether or not

petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and his family have the right to travel and

liberty of abode. Petitioners invoke these constitutional rights in vacuo

without reference to attendant circumstances.

Respondents submit that in its proper formulation, the issue is whether or

not petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have the right to return to

the Philippines and reside here at this time in the face of the determination

by the President that such return and residence will endanger national

security and public safety.

It may be conceded that as formulated by petitioners, the question is not a


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political question as it involves merely a determination of what the law

provides on the matter and application thereof to petitioners Ferdinand E.

Marcos and family. But when the question is whether the two rights claimed

by petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family impinge on or collide with the

more primordial and transcendental right of the State to security and safety

of its nationals, the question becomes political and this Honorable Court can

not consider it. cdrep

There are thus gradations to the question, to wit:

Do petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have the right to return to

the Philippines and reestablish their residence here? This is clearly a

justiciable question which this Honorable Court can decide.

Do petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have their right to return to

the Philippines and reestablish their residence here even if their return and

residence here will endanger national security and public safety? This is still

a justiciable question which this Honorable Court can decide.

Is there danger to national security and public safety if petitioners Ferdinand

E. Marcos and family shall return to the Philippines and establish their

residence here? This is now a political question which this Honorable Court

can not decide for it falls within the exclusive authority and competence of

the President of the Philippines. [Memorandum for Respondents, pp. 9-11;Rollo, pp. 297-299.]

Respondents argue for the primacy of the right of the State to national security over individual rights.

In support thereof, they cite Article II of the Constitution, to wit:

Section 4.The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the

people. The Government may call upon the people to defend the State and,

in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions

provided by law, to render personal, military, or civil service.

Section 5.The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life,

liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are

essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.

Respondents also point out that the decision to ban Mr. Marcos and his family from returning to the

Philippines for reasons of national security and public safety has international precedents. Rafael

Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, Anastacio Somoza, Jr. of Nicaragua, Jorge Ubico of Guatemala,

Fulgencio Batista of Cuba, King Farouk of Egypt, Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez of El Salvador, and

Marcos Perez Jimenez of Venezuela were among the deposed dictators whose return to their

homelands was prevented by their governments. [See Statement of Foreign Affairs Secretary Raul S.

Manglapus, quoted in Memorandum for Respondents, pp. 26-32; Rollo, pp. 314-319.]

The parties are in agreement that the underlying issue is one of the scope of presidential power and

its limits. We, however, view this issue in a different light. Although we give due weight to the parties'

formulation of the issues, we are not bound by its narrow confines in arriving at a solution to the

controversy.

At the outset, we must state that it would not do to view the case within the confines of the right to

travel and the import of the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in the leading cases of Kent v. Dulles

[357 U.S. 116, 78 SCt. 1113, 2 L Ed. 2d 1204] and Haig v. Agee [453 U.S. 280, 101 SCt. 2766, 69 L Ed. 2d

640) which affirmed the right to travel and recognized exceptions to the exercise thereof,

respectively.

It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines

to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally

connote. Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one's country, a totally distinct right

under international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal

Declaration of Humans Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the

right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave a country,

and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. The Declaration speaks of the"right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state" [Art. 13(1)] separately

from the "right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." [Art. 13(2).] On

the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the "right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose

his residence" [Art. 12(1)] and the right to "be free to leave any country, including his own." [Art.

12(2)] which rights may be restricted by such laws as "are necessary to protect national security,

public order, public health or morals or the separate rights and freedoms of others." [Art. 12(3)] as

distinguished from the "right to enter his own country" of which one cannot be "arbitrarily deprived."

[Art. 12(4).] It would therefore be inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to

one's country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.

The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights,

which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-considered view that

the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law and,

under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.] However, it isdistinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the International

Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]

Thus, the rulings in the cases of Kent and Haig, which refer to the issuance of passports for the

purpose of effectively exercising the right to travel are not determinative of this case and are only

tangentially material insofar as they relate to a conflict between executive action and the exercise of a

protected right. The issue before the Court is novel and without precedent in Philippine, and even in

American jurisprudence. Cdpr

Consequently, resolution by the Court of the well-debated issue of whether or not there can be

limitations on the right to travel in the absence of legislation to that effect is rendered unnecessary.

An appropriate case for its resolution will have to be awaited.

Having clarified the substance of the legal issue, we find now a need to explain the methodology for

its resolution. Our resolution of the issue will involve a two-tiered approach. We shall first resolve

whether or not the President has the power under the Constitution, to bar the Marcoses from

returning to the Philippines. Then, we shall determine, pursuant to the express power of the Court

under the Constitution in Article VIII, Section 1, whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with

grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the

return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and

decided to bar their return.

Executive Power

The 1987 Constitution has fully restored the separation of powers of the three great branches of

government. To recall the words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission [63 Phil. 139

(1936)], "the Constitution has blocked but with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to

the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government." [At 157.] Thus, the

1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress ofthe Philippines" [Art. VI, Sec. 1], "[t]he executive power shall be vested in the President of the


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Philippines" [Art. VII, Sec. 1], and "[t]he judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in

such lower courts as may be established by law" [Art. VIII, Sec. 1.] These provisions not only establish

a separation of powers by actual division [Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra] but also confer

plenary legislative, executive and judicial powers subject only to limitations provided in the

Constitution. For as the Supreme Court in Ocampo v. Cabangis [15 Phil. 626 (1910)] pointed out "a

grant of the legislative power means a grant of all legislative power; and a grant of the judicial power

means a grant of all the judicial power which may be exercised under the government." [At 631-632.]

If this can be said of the legislative power which is exercised by two chambers with a combined

membership of more than two hundred members and of the judicial power which is vested in a

hierarchy of courts, it can equally be said of the executive power which is vested in one official thePresident.

As stated above, the Constitution provides that "[t]he executive power shall be vested in the

President of the Philippines." [Art. VII, Sec. 1]. However, it does not define what is meant by

"executive power" although in the same article it touches on the exercise of certain powers by the

President, i.e., the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to

execute the laws, the appointing power, the powers under the commander-in-chief clause, the power

to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of

Congress, the power to contract or guarantee foreign loans, the power to enter into treaties or

international agreements, the power to submit the budget to Congress, and the power to address

Congress [Art. VII, Secs. 14-23].

The inevitable question then arises: by enumerating certain powers of the President did the framers

of the Constitution intend that the President shall exercise those specific powers and no other? Arethese enumerated powers the breadth and scope of "executive power"? Petitioners advance the view

that the President's powers are limited to those specifically enumerated in the 1987 Constitution.

Thus, they assert: "The President has enumerated powers, and what is not enumerated is impliedly

denied to her. Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius." [Memorandum for Petitioners, p. 4; Rollo p. 233.]

This argument brings to mind the institution of the U. S. Presidency after which ours is legally

patterned. **

Corwin, in his monumental volume on the President of the United States grappled with the same

problem. He said:

Article II is the most loosely drawn chapter of the Constitution. To those

who think that a constitution ought to settle everything beforehand it

should be a nightmare; by the same token, to those who think that

constitution makers ought to leave considerable leeway for the future play

of political forces, it should be a vision realized.

We encounter this characteristic of Article II in its opening words: "The

executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of

America." . . . [The President: Office and Powers, 1787-1957, pp. 3-4.]

Reviewing how the powers of the U.S. President were exercised by the different persons who held the

office from Washington to the early 1900's, and the swing from the presidency by commission to

Lincoln's dictatorship, he concluded that "what the presidency is at any particular moment depends in

important measure on who is President." [At 30.]

This view is shared by Schlesinger, who wrote in The Imperial Presidency:

For the American Presidency was a peculiarly personal institution. It

remained, of course, an agency of government subject to unvarying

demands and duties no matter who was President. But, more than most

agencies of government, it changed shape, intensity and ethos according to

the man in charge. Each President's distinctive temperament and character,

his values, standards, style, his habits, expectations, idiosyncrasies,

compulsions, phobias recast the White House and pervaded the entire

government. The executive branch, said Clark Clifford, was a chameleon,

taking its color from the character and personality of the President. The

thrust of the office, its impact on the constitutional order, therefore altered

from President to President. Above all, the way each President understood

it as his personal obligation to inform and involve the Congress, to earn and

hold the confidence of the electorate and to render an accounting to thenation and posterity determined whether he strengthened or weakened the

constitutional order. [At 212-213.]

We do not say that the presidency is what Mrs. Aquino says it is or what she does but, rather, that the

consideration of tradition and the development of presidential power under the different

constitutions are essential for a complete understanding of the extent of and limitations to the

President's powers under the 1987 Constitution. The 1935 Constitution created a strong President

with explicitly broader powers than the U.S. President. The 1973 Constitution attempted to modify

the system of government into the parliamentary type, with the President as a mere figurehead, but

through numerous amendments, the President became even more powerful, to the point that he was

also the de facto Legislature. The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back the presidential system of

government and restored the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers by their actual

distribution among three distinct branches of government with provision for checks and balances.

It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to enforce the laws,

for the President is head of state as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such

positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the

Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It

also grants the President other powers that do not involve the execution of any provision of law, e.g.,

his power over the country's foreign relations.

On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the

exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as

within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be

limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is

more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.

It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor

judicial has to be executive. Thus, in the landmark decision of Springer v. Government of the

Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928), on the issue of who between the Governor-General of the

Philippines and the Legislature may vote the shares of stock held by the Government to elect directors

in the National Coal Company and the Philippine National Bank, the U.S. Supreme Court, in upholding

the power of the Governor-General to do so, said:

. . . Here the members of the legislature who constitute a majority of the

"board" and "committee" respectively, are not charged with the

performance of any legislative functions or with the doing of anything which

is in aid of performance of any such functions by the legislature. Putting

aside for the moment the question whether the duties devolved upon these

members are vested by the Organic Act in the Governor-General, it is clear

that they are not legislative in character, and still more clear that they are

not judicial. The fact that they do not fall within the authority of either of

these two constitutes logical ground for concluding that they do fall withinthat of the remaining one among which the powers of government are


6/29


divided . . . [At 202-203; emphasis supplied.]

We are not unmindful of Justice Holmes' strong dissent. But in his enduring words of dissent we find

reinforcement for the view that it would indeed be a folly to construe the powers of a branch of

government to embrace only what are specifically mentioned in the Constitution:

The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of

black and white. Even the more specific of them are found to terminate in a

penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

It does not seem to need argument to show that however we may disguise

it by veiling words we do not and cannot carry out the distinction between

legislative and executive action with mathematical precision and divide the

branches into watertight compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so,

which I am far from believing that it is, or that the Constitution requires.[At

210-211.]

The Power Involved

The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "[t]he prime duty of the Government is to

serve and protect the people" and that "[t]he maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life,

liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all

the people of the blessings of democracy." [Art. II, Secs. 4 and 5.]

Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the maintenance of peace and order, the protection

of life, liberty and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essentially ideals to guide

governmental action. But such does not mean that they are empty words. Thus, in the exercise of

presidential functions, in drawing a plan of government, and in directing implementing action for

these plans, or from another point of view, in making any decision as President of the Republic, the

President has to consider these principles, among other things, and adhere to them.

Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the Marcoses to return to the

Philippines, the President is, under the Constitution, constrained to consider these basic principles in

arriving at a decision. More than that, having sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution, the

President has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and

advance the national interest. It must be borne in mind that the Constitution, aside from being an

allocation of power is also a social contract whereby the people have surrendered their sovereignpowers to the State for the common good. Hence, lest the officers of the Government exercising the

powers delegated by the people forget and the servants of the people become rulers, the Constitution

reminds everyone that "[s]overeignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates

from them." [Art. II, Sec. 1.]

The resolution of the problem is made difficult because the persons who seek to return to the country

are the deposed dictator and his family at whose door the travails of the country are laid and from

whom billions of dollars believed to be ill-gotten wealth are sought to be recovered. The

constitutional guarantees they invoke are neither absolute nor inflexible. For the exercise of even the

preferred freedoms of speech and of expression, although couched in absolute terms, admits of limits

and must be adjusted to the requirements of equally important public interests [Zaldivar v.

Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707, October 7, 1988].

To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good againstthe exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the President's residual power to

protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the

people. To paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt, it is not only the power of the President but also his duty

to do anything not forbidden by the Constitution or the laws that the needs of the nation demand

[See Corwin, supra, at 153]. It is a power borne by the President's duty to preserve and defend the

Constitution. It also may be viewed as a power implicit in the President's duty to take care that the

laws are faithfully executed [see Hyman, The American President, where the author advances the

view that an allowance of discretionary power is unavoidable in any government and is best lodged in

the President].

More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President's powers as protector of the peace.

[Rossiter, The American Presidency]. The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited

merely to exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State

against external and internal threats to its existence. The President is not only clothed with

extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day

problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquillity in times when no foreign

foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties

in times of peace is not in any way diminished by the relative want of an emergency specified in the

commander-in-chief provision. For in making the President commander-in-chief the enumeration of

powers that follow cannot be said to exclude the President's exercising as Commander-in-Chief

powers short of the calling of the armed forces, or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas

corpus or declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace, and maintain public order and security.

That the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcoses from returning has been

recognized by members of the Legislature, and is manifested by the Resolution proposed in the House

of Representatives and signed by 103 of its members urging the President to allow Mr. Marcos to

return to the Philippines "as a genuine unselfish gesture for true national reconciliation and as

irrevocable proof of our collective adherence to uncompromising respect for human rights under the

Constitution and our laws." [House Resolution No. 1342, Rollo, p. 321.] The Resolution does not

question the President's power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines, rather, it

appeals to the President's sense of compassion to allow a man to come home to die in his country.

What we are saying in effect is that the request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to

the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing

liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly

never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a

matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are

implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect

general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader

discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied. llcd

The Extent of Review

Under the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to determine whether or not there has been

a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or

instrumentality of the Government." [Art. VIII, Sec. 1.] Given this wording, we cannot agree with the

Solicitor General that the issue constitutes a political question which is beyond the jurisdiction of the

Court to decide.

The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of

judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally left to

the political departments to decide. But nonetheless there remain issues beyond the Court'sjurisdiction the determination of which is exclusively for the President, for Congress or for the people


7/29


themselves through a plebiscite or referendum. We cannot, for example, question the President's

recognition of a foreign government, no matter how premature or improvident such action may

appear. We cannot set aside a presidential pardon though it may appear to us that the beneficiary is

totally undeserving of the grant. Nor can we amend the Constitution under the guise of resolving a

dispute brought before us because the power is reserved to the people.

There is nothing in the case before us that precludes our determination thereof on the political

question doctrine. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission cited by petitioners show that

the framers intended to widen the scope of judicial review but they did not intend courts of justice to

settle all actual controversies before them. When political questions are involved, the Constitutionlimits the determination to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to

lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being questioned. If grave

abuse is not established, the Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the official concerned

and decide a matter which by its nature or by law is for the latter alone to decide. In this light, it

would appear clear that the second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution, defining

"judicial power," which specifically empowers the courts to determine whether or not there has been

a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government,

incorporates in the fundamental law the ruling in Lansang v. Garcia [G.R. No. L-33964, December 11,

1971, 42 SCRA 448] that:

Article VII of the [1935] Constitution vests in the Executive the power to

suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under specified

conditions. Pursuant to the principle of separation of powers underlying our

system of government, the Executive is supreme within his own sphere.However, the separation of powers, under the Constitution, is not absolute.

What is more, it goes hand in hand with the system of checks and balances,

under which the Executive is supreme, as regards the suspension of the

privilege, but only if and when he acts within the sphere alloted to him by

the Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether or not he has so

acted is vested in the Judicial Department, which, in this respect, is, in turn,

constitutionally supreme.

In the exercise of such authority, the function of the Court is merely to

check not to supplant the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he

has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise

the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act .. [At 479-

480.].

Accordingly, the question for the Court to determine is whether or not there exist factual bases for

the President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses to the

Philippines. If such postulates do exist, it cannot be said that she has acted, or acts, arbitrarily or that

she has gravely abused her discretion in deciding to bar their return.

We find that from the pleadings filed by the parties, from their oral arguments, and the facts revealed

during the briefing in chambers by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the

National Security Adviser, wherein petitioners and respondents were represented, there exist factual

bases for the President's decision.

The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that the country is not besieged from

within by a well-organized communist insurgency, a separatist movement in Mindanao, rightist

conspiracies to grab power, urban terrorism, the murder with impunity of military men, police officers

and civilian officials, to mention only a few. The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses

and their followers to destabilize the country, as earlier narrated in this ponencia bolsters theconclusion that the return of the Marcoses at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the

violence directed against the State and instigate more chaos.

As divergent and discordant forces, the enemies of the State may be contained. The military

establishment has given assurances that it could handle the threats posed by particular groups. But it

is the catalytic effect of the return of the Marcoses that may prove to be the proverbial final straw

that would break the camel's back.

With these before her, the President cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously and

whimsically in determining that the return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national

interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return.

It will not do to argue that if the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines will cause the escalation of

violence against the State, that would be the time for the President to step in and exercise the

commander-in-chief powers granted her by the Constitution to suppress or stamp out such violence.

The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking pre-emptive action against

threats to its existence if, though still nascent, they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct.

Protection of the people is the essence of the duty of government. The preservation of the State

the fruition of the people's sovereignty is an obligation in the highest order. The President, sworn

to preserve and defend the Constitution and to see the faithful execution the laws, cannot shirk from

that responsibility. LLjur

We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only now beginning to recover from the

hardships brought about by the plunder of the economy attributed to the Marcoses and their close

associates and relatives, many of whom are still here in the Philippines in a position to destabilize thecountry, while the Government has barely scratched the surface, so to speak, in its efforts to recover

the enormous wealth stashed away by the Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions. Then, We cannot ignore

the continually increasing burden imposed on the economy by the excessive foreign borrowing during

the Marcos regime, which stifles and stagnates development and is one of the root causes of

widespread poverty and all its attendant ills. The resulting precarious state of our economy is of

common knowledge and is easily within the ambit of judicial notice.

The President has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would

wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years and lead to total economic collapse. Given

what is within our individual and common knowledge of the state of the economy, we cannot argue

with that determination.

WHEREFORE, and it being our well-considered opinion that the President did not act arbitrarily or with

grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at

the present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and

welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.


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[G.R. No. L-62100. May 30, 1986.]

RICARDO L. MANOTOC, JR., petitioner,vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HONS. SERAFIN E.CAMILON and RICARDO L. PRONOVE, JR., as Judges of the Court of First Instance ofRizal, Pasig branches, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, the SECURITIES & EXCHANGECOMMISSION, HON. EDMUNDO M. REYES, as Commissioner of Immigration, and theChief of the Aviation Security Command (AVSECOM), respondents.

SYLLABUS

1.REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; BAIL; PROHIBITION AGAINST LEAVING THE PHILIPPINES, A

NECESSARY CONSEQUENCE THEREOF. A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail

from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail

bond. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the

court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. As we have held in

People v. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935). ". . . the result of the obligation assumed by appellee (surety)

to hold the accused amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the lower court, was to

prohibit said accused from leaving the jurisdiction of the Philippines, because, otherwise, said orders

and processes will be nugatory, and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts from which they issued

does not extend beyond that of the Philippines they would have no binding force outside of said

jurisdiction." Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason,he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts.

2.ID.; ID.; ID.; DEFINED. Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security

required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear

before any court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or

recognizance.

3.ID.; ID.; ID.; OBJECT. Its object is to relieve the accused of imprisonment and the state of the

burden of keeping him, pending the trial, and at the same time, to put the accused as much under the

power of the court as if he were in custody of proper officer, and to secure the appearance of the

accused so as to answer the call of the court and do what the law may require of him.

4.ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT. The effect of a recognizance or bail bond, when fully executed or filed of

record, and the prisoner released thereunder, is to transfer the custody of the accused from the

public officials who have him in their charge to keepers of his own selection. Such custody has been

regarded merely as a continuation of the original imprisonment. The sureties become invested with

full authority over the person of the principal and have the right to prevent the principal from leaving

the state. If the sureties have the right to prevent the principal from leaving the state, more so then

has the court from which the sureties merely derive such right, and whose jurisdiction over the person

of the principal remains unaffected despite the grant of bail to the latter. In fact, this inherent right of

the court is recognized by petitioner himself, notwithstanding his allegation that he is at total liberty

to leave the country, for he would not have filed the motion for permission to leave the country in the

first place, if it were otherwise.

5.ID.; ID.; ID.; SHEPHERD CASE (C.A.-G.R. No. 23505-R, February 13, 1980) DIFFERENTIATED FROM

CASE AT BAR. To support his contention, petitioner places reliance upon the then Court of Appeals'

ruling in People vs. Shepherd (C.A.-G.R. No. 23505-R, February 13, 1980) particularly citing the

following passage: ". . . The law obliges the bondsmen to produce the person of the appellants at the

pleasure of the Court. . . . The law does not limit such undertaking of the bondsmen as demandable

only when the appellants are in the territorial confines of the Philippines and not demandable if the

appellants are out of the country. Liberty, the most important consequence of bail, albeit provisional,

is indivisible. If granted at all, liberty operates as fully within as without the boundaries of the granting

state. This principle perhaps accounts for the absence of any law or jurisprudence expressly declaring

that liberty under bail does not transcend the territorial boundaries of the country." The faith reposed

by petitioner on the above-quoted opinion of the appellate court is misplaced. The rather broad and

generalized statement suffers from a serious fallacy; for while there is, indeed, neither law nor

jurisprudence expressly declaring that liberty under bail does not transcend the territorial boundaries

of the country, it is not for the reason suggested by the appellate court. Also, petitioner's case is not

on all fours with the Shepherd case. In the latter case, the accused was able to show the urgent

necessity for her travel abroad, the duration thereof and the conforme of her sureties to theproposed travel thereby satisfying the court that she would comply with the conditions of her bail

bond. In contrast, petitioner in this case has not satisfactorily shown any of the above.

6.ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; LACK OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHERE DENIAL OF

MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY WAS PREMISED ON THE FAILURE OF PETITIONER

TO SATISFY THE TRIAL COURT OF THE URGENCY OF HIS TRAVEL. As petitioner has failed to satisfy

the trial courts and the appellate court of the urgency of his travel, the duration thereof, as well as the

consent of his surety to the proposed travel, We find no abuse of judicial discretion in their having

denied petitioner's motion for permission to leave the country, in much the same way, albeit with

contrary results, that We found no reversible error to have been committed by the appellate court in

allowing Shepherd to leave the country after it had satisfied itself that she would comply with the

conditions of her bail bond.

7.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; LIBERTY OF ABODE AND TRAVEL; IMPAIRED BY ORDER OFTHE TRIAL COURT RELEASING PETITIONER ON BAIL. The constitutional right to travel being invoked

by petitioner is not an absolute right. Section 5, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution states: "The liberty

of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court, or when necessary

in the interest of national security, public safety or public health." To our mind, the order of the trial

court releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as contemplated by the above-quoted

constitutional provision.

D E C I S I O NFERNAN, J p:

The issue posed for resolution in this petition for review may be stated thus: Does a person facing a

criminal indictment and provisionally released on bail have an unrestricted right to travel?

Petitioner Ricardo L. Manotoc, Jr., is one of the two principal stockholders of Trans-InsularManagement, Inc. and the Manotoc Securities, Inc., a stock brokerage house. Having transferred the

management of the latter into the hands of professional men, he holds no officer-position in said

business, but acts as president of the former corporation. LexLib

Following the "run" on stock brokerages caused by stock broker Santamaria's flight from this

jurisdiction, petitioner, who was then in the United States, came home, and together with his co-

stockholders, filed a petition with the Securities and Exchange Commission for the appointment of a

management committee, not only for Manotoc Securities, Inc., but likewise for Trans-Insular

Management, Inc. The petition relative to the Manotoc Securities, Inc., docketed as SEC Case No.

001826, entitled, "In the Matter of the Appointment of a Management Committee for Manotoc

Securities, Inc., Teodoro Kalaw, Jr., Ricardo Manotoc, Jr., Petitioners", was granted and a management

committee was organized and appointed.

Pending disposition of SEC Case No. 001826, the Securities and Exchange Commission requested thethen Commissioner of Immigration, Edmundo Reyes, not to clear petitioner for departure and a


9/29


memorandum to this effect was issued by the Commissioner on February 4, 1980 to the Chief of the

Immigration Regulation Division.

When a Torrens title submitted to and accepted by Manotoc Securities, Inc. was suspected to be a

fake, six of its clients filed six separate criminal complaints against petitioner and one Raul Leveriza,

Jr., as president and vice-president, respectively, of Manotoc Securities, Inc. In due course,

corresponding criminal charges for estafa were filed by the investigating fiscal before the then Court

of First Instance of Rizal, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 45399 and 45400, assigned to respondent

Judge Camilon, and Criminal Cases Nos. 45542 to 45545, raffled off to Judge Pronove. In all cases,

petitioner has been admitted to bail in the total amount of P105,000.00, with FGU InsuranceCorporation as surety.

On March 1, 1982, petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a motion entitled, "motion for

permission to leave the country", stating as ground therefor his desire to go to the United States,

"relative to his business transactions and opportunities." 1The prosecution opposed said motion andafter due hearing, both trial judges denied the same. The order of Judge Camilon dated March 9,

1982, reads:

"Accused Ricardo Manotoc Jr. desires to leave for the United States on the

all embracing ground that his trip is '. . . relative to his business transactions

and opportunities.'

"The Court sees no urgency from this statement. No matter of any

magnitude is discerned to warrant judicial imprimatur on the proposed trip.

"In view thereof, permission to leave the country is denied Ricardo

Manotoc, Jr. now or in the future until these two (2) cases are terminated."

2

On the other hand, the order of Judge Pronove dated March 26, 1982, reads in part:

"6. Finally, there is also merit in the prosecution's contention that if the

Court would allow the accused to leave the Philippines the surety

companies that filed the bail bonds in his behalf might claim that they could

no longer be held liable in their undertakings because it was the Court which

allowed the accused to go outside the territorial jurisdiction of the

Philippine Court, should the accused fail or decide not to return.

"WHEREFORE, the motion of the accused is DENIED." 3

It appears that petitioner likewise wrote the Immigration Commissioner a letter requesting the recall

or withdrawal of the latter's memorandum dated February 4, 1980, but said request was also denied

in a letter dated May 27, 1982.

Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the then Court of Appeals 4seeking to annul the orders dated March 9 and 26, 1982, of Judges Camilon and Pronove, respectively,

as well as the communication-request of the Securities and Exchange Commission, denying his leave

to travel abroad. He likewise prayed for the issuance of the appropriate writ commanding the

Immigration Commissioner and the Chief of the Aviation Security Command (AVSECOM) to clear him

for departure.

On October 5,1982, the appellate court rendered a decision 5dismissing the petition for lack of merit.

Dissatisfied with the appellate court's ruling, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on

certiorari. Pending resolution of the petition to which we gave due course on April 14, 1983 6petitioner filed on August 15, 1984 a motion for leave to go abroad pendente lite. 7 In his motion,petitioner stated that his presence in Louisiana, U.S.A. is needed in connection "with the obtention of

foreign investment in Manotoc Securities, Inc." 8He attached the letter dated August 9, 1984 of thechief executive officer of the Exploration Company of Louisiana, Inc., Mr. Marsden W. Miller 9requesting his presence in the United States to "meet the people and companies who would be

involved in its investments." Petitioner, likewise manifested that on August 1, 1984, Criminal Cases

Nos. 4933 to 4936 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati (formerly Nos. 45542-45545) had been

dismissed as to him "on motion of the prosecution on the ground that after verification of the records

of the Securities and Exchange Commission . . . (he) was not in any way connected with the ManotocSecurities, Inc. as of the date of the commission of the offenses imputed to him." 10Criminal CasesNos. 45399 and 45400 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, however, remained pending as Judge

Camilon, when notified of the dismissal of the other cases against petitioner, instead of dismissing the

cases before him, ordered merely the informations amended so as to delete the allegation that

petitioner was president and to substitute that he was "controlling/majority stockholder," 11 ofManotoc Securities, Inc. prLL

On September 20, 1984, the Court in a resolution en banc denied petitioner's motion for leave to go

abroad pendente lite. 12

Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts which

granted him bail nor the Securities and Exchange Commission which has no jurisdiction over his

liberty, could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.

Petitioner's contention is untenable.

A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a

necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond.

Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and given for the release

of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his

appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance.

"Its object is to relieve the accused of imprisonment and the state of the burden of keeping him,

pending the trial, and at the same time, to put the accused as much under the power of the court as if

he were in custody of the proper officer, and to secure the appearance of the accused so as to answer

the call of the court and do what the law may require of him." 13

The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court

requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. As we have held in People v.

Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935).

". . . the result of the obligation assumed by appellee (surety) to hold the

accused amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the lower

court, was to prohibit said accused from leaving the jurisdiction of the

Philippines, because, otherwise, said orders and processes will be nugatory,

and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts from which they issued does

not extend beyond that of the Philippines they would have no binding force

outside of said jurisdiction."

Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be

placed beyond the reach of the courts.

"The effect of a recognizance or bail bond, when fully executed or filed of record, and the prisoner


10/29


released thereunder, is to transfer the custody of the accused from the public officials who have him

in their charge to keepers of his own selection. Such custody has been regarded merely as a

continuation of the original imprisonment. The sureties become invested with full authority over the

person of the principal and have the right to prevent the principal from leaving the state." 14

If the sureties have the right to prevent the principal from leaving the state, more so then has the

court from which the sureties merely derive such right, and whose jurisdiction over the person of the

principal remains unaffected despite the grant of bail to the latter. In fact, this inherent right of the

court is recognized by petitioner himself, notwithstanding his allegation that he is at total liberty to

leave the country, for he would not have filed the motion for permission to leave the country in thefirst place, if it were otherwise.

To support his contention, petitioner places reliance upon the then Court of Appeals' ruling in People

vs. Shepherd (C.A.-G.R. No. 23505-R, February 13, 1980) particularly citing the following passage:

". . . The law obliges the bondsmen to produce the person of the appellants

at the pleasure of the Court. . . . The law does not limit such undertaking of

the bondsmen as demandable only when the appellants are in the territorial

confines of the Philippines and not demandable if the appellants are out of

the country. Liberty, the most important consequence of bail, albeit

provisional is indivisible. If granted at all, liberty operates as fully within as

without the boundaries of the granting state. This principle perhaps

accounts for the absence of any law or jurisprudence expressly declaring

that liberty under bail does not transcend the territorial boundaries of thecountry."

The faith reposed by petitioner on the above-quoted opinion of the appellate court is misplaced. The

rather broad and generalized statement suffers from a serious fallacy; for while there is, indeed,

neither law nor jurisprudence expressly declaring that liberty under bail does not transcend the

territorial boundaries of the country, it is not for the reason suggested by the appellate court.

Also, petitioner's case is not on all fours with the Shepherd case. In the latter case, the accused was

able to show the urgent necessity for her travel abroad, the duration thereof and the conforme of her

sureties to the proposed travel thereby satisfying the court that she would comply with the conditions

of her bail bond. In contrast, petitioner in this case has not satisfactorily shown any of the above. As

aptly observed by the Solicitor General in his comment:

"A perusal of petitioner's 'Motion for Permission to Leave the Country' will

show that it is solely predicated on petitioner's wish to travel to the United

States where he will, allegedly attend to some business transactions and

search for business opportunities. From the tenor and import of petitioner's

motion, no urgent or compelling reason can be discerned to justify the grant

of judicial imprimatur thereto. Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that

there is absolute necessity for him to travel abroad. Petitioner's motion

bears no indication that the alleged business transactions could not be

undertaken by any other person in his behalf. Neither is there any hint that

petitioner's absence from the United States would absolutely preclude him

from taking advantage of business opportunities therein, nor is there any

showing that petitioner's non-presence in the United States would cause

him irreparable damage or prejudice." 15

Petitioner has not specified the duration of the proposed travel or shown that his surety has agreed to

it. Petitioner merely alleges that his surety has agreed to his plans as he had posted cash indemnities.The court cannot allow the accused to leave the country without the assent of the surety because in

accepting a bail bond or recognizance, the government impliedly agrees "that it will not take any

proceedings with the principal that will increase the risks of the sureties or affect their remedies

against him. Under this rule, the surety on a bail bond or recognizance may be discharged by a

stipulation inconsistent with the conditions thereof, which is made without his assent. This result has

been reached as to a stipulation or agreement to postpone the trial until after the final disposition of

other cases, or to permit the principal to leave the state or country." 16Thus, although the order ofMarch 26, 1982 issued by Judge Pronove has been rendered moot and academic by the dismissal as to

petitioner of the criminal cases pending before said judge, We see the rationale behind said order.

As petitioner has failed to satisfy the trial courts and the appellate court of the urgency of his travel,the duration thereof, as well as the consent of his surety to the proposed travel, We find no abuse of

judicial discretion in their having denied petitioner's motion for permission to leave the country, in

much the same way, albeit with contrary results, that We found no reversible error to have been

committed by the appellate court in allowing Shepherd to leave the country after it had satisfied itself

that she would comply with the conditions of her bail bond.

The constitutional right to travel being invoked by petitioner is not an absolute right. Section 5, Article

IV of the 1973 Constitution states:

"The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful

order of the court, or when necessary in the interest of national security,

public safety or public health."

To our mind, the order of the trial court releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order ascontemplated by the above-quoted constitutional provision.

Finding the decision of the appellate court to be in accordance with law and jurisprudence, the Court

finds that no gainful purpose will be served in discussing the other issues raised by petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby dismissed, with costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.


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[G.R. No. 94284. April 8, 1991.]

RICARDO C. SILVERIO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENIGNO G.GAVIOLA, as Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch I X, and PEOPLE OFTHE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

SYLLABUS

1.REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; BAIL, DEFINED. "Bail is the security given for the release

of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearance

before any court when so required by the Court or the Rules (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as

amended, Rule 114, Secs. 1 and 2).

2.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO TRAVEL RESTRICTED BY CONDITIONS OF BAIL.

The condition imposed upon an accused on bail to make himself available at all times whenever the

Court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction of his right to travel (Manotoc, Jr. v. Court

of Appeals, et al., No. 62100, 30 May 1986, 142 SCRA 149). A person facing criminal charges may be

restrained by the Court from leaving the country or, if abroad, compelled to return (Constitutional

Law, Cruz, Isagani A., 1987 Edition, p. 138).

3.REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; BAIL; A PERSON RELEASED ON BAIL MAY BE RE-ARRESTED;

GROUND. An accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he

attempts to depart from the Philippines without prior permission of the Court where the case is

pending.

4.ID.; ID.; ID.; LIMITATION ON THE RESTRICTION ON THE RIGHT. Article III, Section 6 of the 1987

Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty of travel may be impaired even

without Court Order, the appropriate executive officers or administrative authorities are not armed

with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of "national

security, public safety, or public health" and "as may be provided by law," a limitive phrase which did

not appear in the 1973 text (The Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin G., S.J., Vol. I, First Edition, 1987, p.

263).

5.ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT A LIMITATION ON THE INHERENT POWER OF THE COURT TO USE ALL MEANS TOCARRY THEIR ORDERS INTO EFFECT. Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no

means be construed as delimiting the inherent power of the Courts to use all means necessary to

carry their orders into effect in criminal cases pending before them. When by law jurisdiction is

conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, process and other means necessary to carry

it into effect may be employed by such Court or officer (Rule 135, Section 6, Rules of Court).

6.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts

by preventing his departure from the Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on his right

to travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. The offended party in any criminal

proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It is to their best interest that criminal prosecutions

should run their course and proceed to finality without undue delay, with an accused holding himself

amenable at all times to Court Orders and processes.

D E C I S I O N

MELENCIO-HERRERA , J p:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court praying that the Decision

of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 15827, entitled "Ricardo C. Silverio v. Hon. Benigno

C. Gaviola, etc., et al.," dated 31 January 1990, as well as the Resolution of 29 June 1990 denying

reconsideration, be set aside.

On 14 October 1985, Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 20 (4) of the Revised Securities

Act in Criminal Case No. CBU-6304 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. In due time, he posted bail for

his provisional liberty.

On 26 January 1988, or more than two (2) years after the filing of the Information, respondent People

of the Philippines filed an Urgent ex parte Motion to cancel the passport of and to issue a hold-

departure Order against accused-petitioner on the ground that he had gone abroad several times

without the necessary Court approval resulting in postponements of the arraignment and scheduled

hearings.

Overruling opposition, the Regional Trial Court, on 4 April 1988, issued an Order directing the

Department of Foreign Affairs to cancel Petitioner's passport or to deny his application therefor, and

the Commission on Immigration to prevent Petitioner from leaving the country. This order was based

primarily on the Trial Court's finding that since the filing of the Information on 14 October 1985, "the

accused has not yet been arraigned because he has never appeared in Court on the dates scheduled

for his arraignment and there is evidence to show that accused Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. has left the

country and has gone abroad without the knowledge and permission of this Court" (Rollo, p. 45).Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied on 28 July 1988.

Petitioner's Certiorari Petition before the Court of Appeals met a similar fate on 31 January 1990.

Hence, this Petition for Review filed on 30 July 1990.

After the respective pleadings required by the Court were filed, we resolved to give due course and to

decide the case. Cdpr

Petitioner contends that respondent Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the Trial Court

committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing its Orders, dated 4

April and 28 July 1988, (1) on the basis of facts allegedly patently erroneous, claiming that the

scheduled arraignments could not be held because there was a pending Motion to Quash the

Information; and (2) finding that the right to travel can be impaired upon lawful order of the Court,

even on grounds other than the "interest of national security, public safety or public health."

We perceive no reversible error.

1)Although the date of the filing of the Motion to Quash has been omitted by Petitioner, it is apparent

that it was filed long after the filing of the Information in 1985 and only after several arraignments

had already been scheduled and cancelled due to Petitioner's non-appearance. In fact, said Motion to

Quash was set for hearing only on 19 February 1988. Convincingly shown by the Trial Court and

conformed to by respondent Appellate Court is the concurrence of the following circumstances:

"1.The records will show that the information was filed on October 14,

1985. Until this date (28 July 1988), the case had yet to be arraigned. Several

scheduled arraignments were cancelled and reset, mostly due to the failure

of accused Silverio to appear. The reason for accused Silverio's failure to

appear had invariably been because he is abroad in the United States ofAmerica;


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"2.Since the information was filed, until this date, accused Silverio had never

appeared in person before the Court;

"3.The bond posted by accused Silverio had been cancelled twice and

warrants of arrest had been issued against him all for the same reason

failure to appear at scheduled arraignments.

In all candidness, the Court makes the observation that it has given accused

Silverio more than enough consideration. The limit had long been reached"

(Order, 28 July 1988, Crim. Case No. CBU-6304, RTC, Cebu, p. 5; Rollo, p. 73).

Patently, therefore, the questioned RTC Orders, dated 4 April 1988 and 28 July 1988, were not based

on erroneous facts, as Petitioner would want this Court to believe. To all appearances, the pendency

of a Motion to Quash came about only after several settings for arraignment had been scheduled and

cancelled by reason of Petitioner's non-appearance.

2)Petitioner's further submission is that respondent Appellate Court "glaringly erred" in finding that

the right to travel can be impaired upon lawful order of the Court, even on grounds other than the

"interest of national security, public safety or public health."

To start with, and this has not been controverted by Petitioner, the bail bond he had posted had been

cancelled and Warrants of Arrest had been issued against him by reason, in both instances, of his

failure to appear at scheduled arraignments. Warrants of Arrest having been issued against him for

violation of the conditions of his bail bond, he should be taken into custody. "Bail is the security givenfor the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon

his appearance before any court when so required by the Court or the Rules (1985 Rules on Criminal

Procedure, as amended, Rule 114, Secs. 1 and 2).

The foregoing condition imposed upon an accused to make himself available at all times whenever the

Court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction of his right to travel (Manotoc, Jr. vs. Court

of Appeals, et al., No. 62100, 30 May 1986, 142 SCRA 149). A person facing criminal charges may be

restrained by the Court from leaving the country or, if abroad, compelled to return (Constitutional

Law, Cruz, Isagani A., 1987 Edition, p. 138). So it is also that "An accused released on bail may be re-

arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts to depart from the Philippines without

prior permission of the Court where the case is pending (ibid., Sec. 20 [2nd par.]).

Petitioner takes the posture, however, that while the 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of the

Courts to curtail the liberty of abode within the limits prescribed by law, it restricts the allowable

impairment of the right to travel only on grounds of interest of national security, public safety or

public health, as compared to the provisions on freedom of movement in the 1935 and 1973

Constitutio

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