Constitutional Law – First Semester - Amazon S317-18/44... · 1 Constitutional Law – First Semester ... o (2) The Governor in Council may refer to the Court for hearing and consideration

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ConstitutionalLaw–FirstSemester

WHATISCONSTITUTIONALLAW?.................................................................................................................................3

UNWRITTENCONSTITUTIONALPRINCIPLES..................................................................................................................3WHATISAREFERENCECASE?SUPREMECOURTACTRSC1985.....................................................................................................3

ReferencereSecessionofQuebec(1998)2SCR217.....................................................................................................3ReferencereSenateReform(2014)SCC32...................................................................................................................4BritishColumbiavImperialTobaccoCanadaLtd.[2005]2SCR473[CriticismsofUnwrittenPrinciples].....................5BCvChristie2007SCC21..............................................................................................................................................5

CONSTITUTIONALINTERPRETATION.............................................................................................................................5Livingtreedoctrine:.......................................................................................................................................................5Deadtreedoctrine:........................................................................................................................................................5

‘PERSONSCASE’CONSTITUTIONACT,1867S.24.......................................................................................................................6ReferencereMeaningoftheWord‘Persons’inSection24oftheBNA,1867...............................................................6EdwardsvCanada(AttorneyGeneral)[1930]AC123(PC)...........................................................................................6

CONSTITUTIONALARCHITECTURE................................................................................................................................7NationalFederationofIndependentBusinessvSebelius(SCofUS)2012.....................................................................7

MODERNCANADIANFEDERALISM...............................................................................................................................8THEPRIVYCOUNCIL’SEARLYFEDERALISMJURISPRUDENCE............................................................................................................8

CitizensInsuranceCompanyvParsons(1881)7AC96(PC)..........................................................................................8RussellvTheQueen(1882)7AC829(PC).....................................................................................................................9HodgevTheQueen(1983)9AC117PC......................................................................................................................10

THEGREATDEPRESSION+THENEWDEALCASES(P.167-187)....................................................................................11ReferencereTheBoardofCommerceAct,1919+TheCombinesFairPricesAct,1919[1922](PC)...........................11FortFrancesPulpandPaperCompanyvManitobaFreePressCompany[1923]AC695(PC)....................................12TorontoElectricCommissionersvSnider[1925](PC)..................................................................................................12R.SimeonandI.Robinson,State,Society,andtheDevelopmentofCanadianFederalism(Toronto,1990)...............13TheStatuteOfWestminster(1931).............................................................................................................................13HopeforPOGG?[Aeronautics/Radio].........................................................................................................................13AGCanadavAGOntario(LaborConventions)[1937](PC)..........................................................................................14AGCanadavAGOntario(TheEmploymentandSocialInsuranceAct)[1937](PC)....................................................15AGBritishColumbiavAGCanada(TheNaturalProductsMarketingAct)[1937](PC)[POGGrestricted]..................16

PITH+SUBSTANCE(P.207).........................................................................................................................................17K.Swinton,TheSupremeCourtandCanadianFederalism:TheLaskin-DicksonYears1990.......................................17W.R.Lederman,‘ClassificationofLawsandtheBNAAct’1981..................................................................................18CanadianWesternBankvAlberta[2007]....................................................................................................................18RvMorgentaler[1993]3SCR463,107DLR(4th)537................................................................................................19

PITHANDSUBSTANCETEST....................................................................................................................................................20

DOUBLEASPECTDOCTRINE........................................................................................................................................20MultipleAccessLtd.vMcCutcheon[1982]2SCR161.................................................................................................21

ANCILLARYDOCTRINE[OCTOPUSTENTACLE].............................................................................................................22GeneralMotorsofCanadaLtd.CityNationalLeasing[1989]1SCR641*Setsoutancillarydoctrinetest;generalregulationoftrade(s.91(2))......................................................................................................................................22QuebecAttorneyGeneralvLacombe2010SCC38......................................................................................................23

INTERJURISDICTIONALIMMUNITY[CASTLEWALLS]....................................................................................................24CanadianWesternBankvTheQueeninRightofAlberta[2007]2SCR3...................................................................25

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Quebec(AttorneyGeneral)vCanadianOwnersandPilotsAssociation2010SCC39[TestforIJI].............................26Canadav.PHSCommunityServicesSociety,2011SCC44[Insite]...............................................................................27BankofMontrealv.Marcotte,2014SCC55................................................................................................................28

OPERABILITY–THEPARAMOUNTCYDOCTRINE..........................................................................................................28MultipleAccessLtd.vMcCutcheon[1982]2SCR161.................................................................................................29BankofMontrealvHall[1990]1SCR121[purposiveapproach]................................................................................29Rothmans,Benson,&HedgesInc.vSaskatchewan[2005]1SCR188........................................................................30

PEACE,ORDER,ANDGOODGOVERNMENT(P.323-335).............................................................................................31ReferencereAnti-InflationAct[1976]2SCR373,68DLR(3d)452.............................................................................31RvCrownZellerbachCanadaLtd[1988]1SCR401(p.323).......................................................................................32POGGandtheEnvironment:FriendsoftheOldmanRiverSocietyv.Canada(MinisterofTransport)[1992]1S.C.R.3......................................................................................................................................................................................33

PROVINCIALPOWERSOVERECONOMICREGULATION................................................................................................34CarnationCoLtd.vQuebecAgriculturalMarketingBoard[1968]SCR238,67DLR(2d)1.........................................34AGManitobavManitobaEggandPoultryAssociation...............................................................................................35ReAgriculturalProductsMarketingAct,[1978]2S.C.R.1198....................................................................................35

REGULATIONOFNATURALRESOURCES......................................................................................................................36RSimeonandIRobinson,State,Society,andtheDevelopmentofCanadianFederalism.............Error!Bookmarknotdefined.CanadianIndustrialGasandOilLtd.vGovernmentofSaskatchewan[1978]2SCR545,80DLR(3d)449[CIGOL]...36CentralCanadaPotashCo.Ltd.vGovernmentofSaskatchewan[1979]1SCR42,88DLR(3d)609..........................37

GENERALREGULATIONOFTRADE..............................................................................................................................39LabattBreweriesofCanadavAGCanada[criminallawisbroad,butsubjecttoitsconstitutionallimits].................39GeneralMotorsofCanadaLtdvCityNationalLeasing[1989]1SCR641,58DLR(4th)255[*Ancillarydoctrinetest]39

FEDERALPOWERSOVERCRIMINALLAW....................................................................................................................41ReferencereValidityofSection5(a)oftheDairyIndustryAct(MargarineReference)[1949]SCR1,1DLR433.......41RJRMacDonaldInc.vCanada(AttorneyGeneral)[1995]3SCR199,127DLR(4th)1................................................41RvHydro-Quebec[1997]3SCR213,151DLR(4th)32...............................................................................................43ReferenceReFirearmsAct[2000]...............................................................................................................................44ReferencereAssistedHumanReproductionAct,2010................................................................................................45

PROVINCIALJURISDICTIONOVERMORALITY+PUBLICORDER...................................................................................45ReNovaScotiaBoardofCensorsvMcNeil[1978]2SCR662......................................................................................45DupondvCityofMontreal[1978]...............................................................................................................................46WestendorpvTheQueen[1983]1SCR43..................................................................................................................46RioHotelLtdvNewBrunswick(LiquorLicensingBoard)[1987]2SCR59...................................................................47ChatterjeevOntario(AttorneyGeneral)2009SCC19.................................................................................................47

REFERENCERESECURITIESACT2011SCC66...............................................................................................................47

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WhatisConstitutionalLaw?OtherSourcesofConstitutionalLaw

• Pre-ConfederationDocumentso TheRoyalProclamationof1763

• Quasi-ConstitutionalStatuteso TheCanadianBillofRights,S.C.1960,c.44o SupremeCourtAct,R.S.C.1985,c.S-26

• UnwrittenConstitutionalPrincipleso Ex.ThePrimeministerwasnotwrittenabout

• ConstitutionalConventionso Ex.Governorgeneralsignsintolawtheactstheparliamentpasses–conventionssayshemustsignifitispassed

• CaseLaw• ConstitutionalCulture

3BranchesofGovernment:ConstitutionalRules

• Legislativeo [GovernorGeneral,Senate(‘sobersecondthought’),HouseofCommons]o Powertomakelaw(Discuss/passlegislation)

§ Seesections17-57ConstitutionAct,1867• Executive

o Powertoimplementlawo [PrimeMinister,GovernorGeneral,+Cabinet(policy/govern)]

§ Seesections9-16ConstitutionAct,1867• Judicial

o Powertointerpretlaw[superiorcourts]§ Seesections96–101ConstitutionAct,1867

UnwrittenConstitutionalPrinciplesWhatisareferencecase?SupremeCourtActRSC1985

• 53.o (2)TheGovernorinCouncilmayrefertotheCourtforhearingandconsiderationimportantquestionsoflawor

factconcerninganymatter…o OpinionofCourto (4)WhereareferenceismadetotheCourtundersubsection(1)or(2),itisthedutyoftheCourttohearand

consideritandtoanswereachquestionsoreferred…• Controversies?

o Refusingtoanswer:ReferencereSameSexMarriage,[2004]3S.C.R.698

ReferencereSecessionofQuebec(1998)2SCR217Facts:1)Earlycontroversies:Confederation,amendingpowerandthenatureoffederalism

• Atconfederation,anamendingformulawasleftoutoftheConstitutionActof1867o CamefromtheBritishStatute–Britishparliamentchangesito Thinkingin1867-NotinchargeofchangingourownConstitution

2)Quebec’sQuietRevolution• Quebecwasunsuretheconfederationwasworking–notenoughpowerswerebeingheldbyQuebec+toomuchbythe

federalgovernment3)PQandthe1980Referendum

• 1980Referendum–Quebecwantsout• Federalistswin–TrudeausaystheconstitutionwillbechangedtohelpQuebec–hehadinmindtheCharter+the

amendingformula4)PatriationReference,[1981]1S.C.R.753

• Patriationreference–saystheyonlyneedasubstantialmajorityoftheprovinces(Quebecpulledout)5)VetoReference,[1982]2S.C.R.793.

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• Vetoreference–cannotgoaheadwithoutQuebec–howevertheycan(onlyneededthesubstantialmajority)6)MeechLakeAccordandCharlottetownAccord

• MeechLake/Charlottetown–distinctsocietyclauseforasectionoftheconstitutionforQuebec-dealdies7)1995Referendum

• 1995Referendum–secondreferendumo Lostby0.5%tostayinCanadao LiberalgovernmentdecidestohaveareferencecaseaskingwhetheronecanleaveCanada

Issue:• Whetherundertheconstitution,theNationalAssembly,legislature,orgovernmentcaneffectthesecessionofQuebec

fromCanadaunilaterallyDecision:

• IfQuebecleftCanada(itisintheconstitution)thereforeitwouldbeaconstitutionalamendment–looktotheamendingformulaàQuebecneveragreedtotheamendingformula+constitutionchangeof1981

• Therefore,needtobeopenmindedontheconstitutionalvalues–onereasontheyturnedtotheconstitutionprinciples• Theunderlyingprincipleshaveasmuchweighttothemasotherconstitutionalprinciples–theyhavenormative,

substantiveforce–accordingtotheseprinciplestheycanleave(Quebecneveragreedtotheamendingformula+constitutionchange)

Analysis:• Situationsmayarisethatarenotexpresslydealtwithbythetextoftheconstitution

o Constitutionmustevolvenewsituationsandrealitieso Needstobecapableofchange(needsafunctionthatallowsittogoverntheanticipated)

• Constitutiondoesnotforeclosethe(s.52)possibilityofunwrittenprinciples• PreambleoftheConstitutionof1867–hasaconstitutionsimilartothatoftheUK

o ThereisnoBritishConstitutionaldocument–allofBritishlawformstheConstitution(standards,laws,conventions,etc.)

o ThissuggestsCanadaalsohaselementsthatareunwritten• Metaphorsàlivingtree,lifeblood,breathelifeintotheconstitution,architecture• Thereare4fundamental(unwritten)principlesthatarerelevanttoaddressingthequestion:

o Federalism(enablecitizenstopursuegoalsatbothaprovincialandafederallevel)o Democracy(self-government–mustbeaccountabilitytothepublicthroughinstitutions)o Constitutionalismandtheruleoflaw(governmentactionmustabidebyrulesoflaw;constitutionisasafeguard

forrightsandfreedomsagainstlawssubjecttochange)o Respectforminorities

• Theseunwrittenprinciplesleadtotheconclusionthat3mainthingsmusthappenforsecessiontooccur:o 1)Mustbeaclearquestion,2)mustbeaclearmajoritytoanswerthequestion,3)ifthesearemetthenthereisa

dutyfortheentirenationtonegotiateingoodfaith• Situationsmayarisethatarenotdealtwithexpresslybythetextoftheconstitution–itmustevolvetonewsituations

andrealitiesandmustbecapableofchange• Controversiesaboutunwrittenconstitutionalprinciples:

o Theyareopentointerpretation–judicialpower–concernaboutjudgeshavingthismuchpowero Takesawaypowerfromelectedrepresentatives(writtenlaw–legislation)

• Followingthis,theCourtlaysouttwospecifictypesofquestionsthattheywillnotanswer:o 1)questionsthatfalloutsidetheproperroleofthecourts;ando 2)questionsthatfalloutsideoftheCourt'sexpertise:interpretationofthelaw.

ReferencereSenateReform(2014)SCC32ConstitutionAct,1867:s.24TheGovernorGeneralshallfromTimetoTime,intheQueen’sName,byInstrumentundertheGreatSealofCanada,summonqualifiedPersonstotheSenate;and,subjecttotheProvisionsofthisAct,everyPersonsosummonedshallbecomeandbeaMemberoftheSenateandaSenator.

Issue:• CanparliamentunilaterallyimplementaframeworkforconsultativeelectionsforappointmentstotheSenate?Cantheyset

fixedterms?CantheyremoveConstitutionalrequirementsaboutSenators?Analysis:

• ParliamentcannotunilaterallyachievemostoftheproposedchangestotheSenate,whichrequirestheconsentofatleastsevenprovincesrepresentinghalfofthepopulation;abolitionrequirestheconsentofalltheprovinces

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• Internalarchitecture:theindividualelementsoftheconstitutionarelinkedtotheothers,andmustbeinterpretedbyreferencetothestructureoftheConstitutionasawhole;changestheformoversubstance

• PartVoftheConstitutiontellsushowtoamendit–includingwhichchangesParliamentandtheprovinciallegislaturescanmakeunilaterally,whichrequireconsent,andwhichrequireunanimousagreement(thischangeisbeyondthescopeoftheunilateralfederalamendingprocedure)

Decision:• SCCview:TheSenate’sfundamentalnatureofprovidingsobersecondthoughtwouldbesignificantlyaltered–conclude

thatelectionswouldconstituteanamendmenttotheconstitution+requiresubstantialprovincialconsentw/otherighttooptout–wouldalterthearchitectureoftheConstitution

• Inconclusion–theconsultativeelectionwouldamendtheConstitution–theSenatesrolewouldbechangedfromacomplimentarybodyofsobersecondthoughttoalegislativebodyendowedwithapopularmandateinapoliticalarena

• “ThedesirabilityofthesechangesisnotaquestionfortheCourt;itisanissueforCanadiansandtheirlegislatures.“Courtsjobistotellwhatisconstitutionalornot;thisdiffersfrompoliticsandwhatisbestforCanadians–concernistheconstitution(becauseofthelegitimacyofcourtsmakingthesedecisions)courtisdifferentfromlegislaturesbecausetheyarenotelected–wanttomakeadistinctionbetweenpoliticsandlaw.

BritishColumbiavImperialTobaccoCanadaLtd.[2005]2SCR473[CriticismsofUnwrittenPrinciples]• “inaconstitutionaldemocracysuchasours,protectionfromlegislationthatsomemightviewasunjustorunfairproperly

liesnotintheamorphousunderlyingprinciplesofourConstitution,butinitstextandtheballotbox.”• “TheruleoflawisnotaninvitationtotrivializeorsupplanttheConstitution’swrittenterms.”• Herecriticismsareemergingfromunwrittenprinciples–theprimacyofthewrittentextiswhatmattersandnot

unwrittenconstitutionalprinciples.‘TheruleoflawisnottotrivializeorsupplanttheConstitution’swrittenterms’• ‘Protectionfromunjust/unfairlegislationliesnotintheunderlyingprinciplesoftheConstitution,butinitsactualtextand

theballotbox’

BCvChristie2007SCC21• Dounwrittenconstitutionalprinciples(theruleoflaw)provideageneralrighttolegalcounselandaccesstojustice?• Charters.10–everyonehasarightonarrestordetentiontob)retainandinstructcounselwithoutdelayandtobe

informedofthatright• Christie:Constitutionprotectedtherightforeveryonetoaffordalawyer

o Ifcannotafford–governmenthastopay;Ruleoflawdependsonaccesstolegalservices• Startedwiththewrittentext

o Section10:thereisnotarighttostatefundedlawyerso Onlysaysthereisrightduringarrestordetentiono Therefore,thereisnotarighttogeneralcircumstances

• Onlysaysthereisarightduringarrestordetention,thereforenotarightingeneralcircumstances.SpecificityintheConstitutionoverridesthegeneral

ConstitutionalInterpretationLivingtreedoctrine:

• UsedbyJudgeswhofeltatlibertytoextrapolate(drawconclusions)andinterpolate(incorporate)wordsandmeaningswritteninthetextoftheConstitution.FinditnecessarytogivetheConstitutionitstruemeaningandpurpose.

• Maintainlegitimacythroughupdating/keepingupwithsocialchange:Ifsomepartsoftheconstitutionarenolongerpracticed,thentherestofitcanbeseenasillegitimate

• Judicialindependencematters(need/haveabilitytomakeunpopulardecisions)• Donotchangethewords:justinterpretthemtokeepupwithsocialchange

Deadtreedoctrine:• ‘Doctrineoforiginalintent’(JusticeScalia)believesjudgesshouldstickascloselyaspossibletowhattheybelievewas

intendedbytheframers.Consistency.Wouldbeaconstraintonjudicialpower.NotuptojudgestochangetheConstitution(thisisforelectedofficials)–theyaretointerpretit

• Sticktowhattheyframersintended–stability;Constraintonjudicialpower;Consistency;Coverswhatreaderswouldhaveunderstoodthetexttomeanatthattimewhenitwasdrafted

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‘PersonsCase’ConstitutionAct,1867S.24• 24.TheGovernorGeneralshallfromTimetoTime,intheQueen'sName,byInstrumentundertheGreatSealofCanada,

summonqualifiedPersonstotheSenate;and,subjecttotheProvisionsofthisAct,everyPersonsosummonedshallbecomeandbeaMemberoftheSenateandaSenator.

• Atthispointawomanhadneverbeenasenatorandsotheywerenotworriedaboutmakingthedistinctionandputting‘man’

• Governmentlawyerargument:Qualifiedpersons–referstoamorespecificsubset• Whyisitrelevantthatin19thcentury,Britainwomencouldnotholdpublicoffice?• Socleartheframersthatthewordpersonwouldbefinetouseinsteadofmenasawomanhadneverbeenasenatorand

thereforetheywerenotworriedinmakingthedistinction• Framersintention:

o Lawcomesfromthosewhocreateito Framerscreatedit–theintentionmatters,weneedtounderstandwhatthelawistryingtodoo Theintent/meaningofthedraftersmatters

• Judgessaytheydonotcareifwomenareinthesenatebutinabidingbythelaw• Originalism–meaningofthebodiesthatcreateditatthetimetheycreatedit;fixed+unchangeablebyjudicial

interpretation.Ifyoudonotlikethemeaning,thenchangetheconstitution

ReferencereMeaningoftheWord‘Persons’inSection24oftheBNA,1867Issue:

• Doestheword‘persons’insection24oftheBNA1867includefemalepersons?Morespecifically,arewomeneligibleforappointmenttotheSenateofCanada?

Decision:• UnanimousdecisionthatwomenarenoteligibleforappointmentbytheGovernorGeneraltotheSenateofCanada

becausetheyarenot‘qualifiedpersons’Analysis:(Originalismview)AnglinCJC

• Precedent?ThestatuteaffectsthewordSenatorandinsection23pronouns‘he’and‘his’wereused;inCharltonv.Lingsonwhether‘everyman’includedwomenalso,theapplicationforLordBrougham’sActcameup(inwhichhestatedthatallwordsimportingthemasculinegendershallbedeemedandtakentoincludeFemales,andthesingulartoincludetheplural,andviseversa,unlesscontraryastoGenderorNumberisexpresslyprovided)howeverthecourtunanimouslydecidedthatthewordmaninthestatutedidnotincludewomen

• HeretheyusedChorltonv.LingsandconcludedthatthereisacommonlawincapacityofwomentoexercisesuchpublicfunctionsasthoseofamemberoftheSenate

EdwardsvCanada(AttorneyGeneral)[1930]AC123(PC)[DeterminingMeaningofWords]Facts:

• TheappellantsbroughtthecasebeforethecourttohavetheSCCrulethatbasedons.24womencouldbeconsideredcandidatesfortheSenate.Thefirstdecisionwasthewomenwereexcludedfromthemeaningof“persons”.Theword“persons”ins.24doesincludewomeninthePrivyCouncildecision.

Issues:• Whetherthewords‘qualifiedpersons’ins.24oftheBNA1867includeawoman,andwhetherwomenareeligibletobea

memberoftheSenate.Decision:

• ‘Persons’ins.24includesbothmalesandfemales,thereforewomenareeligibletobesummonedandbecomemembersoftheSenate

Analysis:(LordSankey)• WhendeterminingthemeaningofawordinanActmustconsider:• Externalevidence(previouslegislation/decidedcases)

o DistinguishedfromChorlton–alsoshouldnotinterpretBNAActonearlyEnglish/Romanlawo PrecedentfromEnglishlordsandRomanlawo Somearestatutesandsomeare‘statutes’o DifferencebetweenEnglishlawandtheconstitutionthatactuallygovernsacountry

• Internalevidence(derivedfromtheConstitutionitself–specificsectionandothers)o ConstitutionalStatuteitselfo Othersectionselsewhereintheconstitution–wherepersonsareused,vs.whereheisusedo S.21notesthattheSenatebecomposedof72members.Thewordmemberisnotconfinedtomalepersons.

LookingatthesectionsasawholethereisnothinginthosesectionsthemselvesuponwhichtheCourtcould

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concludedefinitelythatwomenaretobeexcludedfromtheSenate.Showsectionsthatdistinguishwhereonlymalesareincluded–s.41referstomales21andupward;againins.84,andagainins.133whereitrefersto‘person’andmustincludefemalesaswell(useofEnglishorFrench)

• TheBNAplantedinCanadaalivingtreecapableofgrowthandexpansionwithinitsnaturallimits.Livingtreedoctrine–iftheyactuallymeant“onlymen”wouldhavesaid“onlymen”–theymeant“qualifiedpersons”whichatthetimewasmen,butcanevolve

Ratio:• Shouldnotcutdownthetreewithnarrowinterpretationàinsteadshouldusealargeliberalinterpretation

ConstitutionalArchitectureNationalFederationofIndependentBusinessvSebelius(SCofUS)2012(Medicaid)

• TheFederalGovernmentcanonlyexercisethepowersgrantedtoit–thattheConstitutionspecificallystateswhichpowersandfunctionstheFederalgovernmentholds,meansthatitdoesnotgrantotherpowers.TheBillofRightmadethisclear–thepowersnotdelegatedtotheFederalGovernmentaretobeheldbythestates

• ‘Policepower’–thegeneralpowerofgoverning,possessedbytheStatesbutnotbytheFederalgovernment.Statesaretogovernthosepowersthataffectpeople’sdailylives;thisalsoprovidesacheckonthepoweroftheFederalGovernment

• Congressmaytaxandspend–givingitinfluenceoverareaswhereitcannotdirectlyregulateo Mayofferfundstothestatesandmayhaveconditionspendingonthoseoffers(suchasadoptedpolicies)

Americanvs.CanadianFederalism• Same:

o Law/politics;federalism(divisionofpowers);spendingpower(Federalgovernmenthasabilitytospendmoneyoutsideofitsjurisdiction);deference(respectforcongress);subsidiarity(localgovernmentisclosetothepeople;responsivetolocalinterests)

• Different:o residualpower:inCanadabothlevelsofgovernmenttakeauthorityfromConstitutionbuttheFederalgetsthe

residualpower;inUS:thepowersnotdelegatedtoFederalGov.areheldbythestates(thestateshavetheresidualpower)

• Notconcernedwiththepolicyofthelaw;butwiththeconstitutionalityofthelawo Notwhetheritisgoodorbad,butwhetherthelawwascreatedconstitutionality

• USSupremeCourtseesdivisionofpowersasalimitationofpower• Subsidiarity:Localgovernmentisclosetothepeople;Responsivetolocalinterests• Spendingpower:Governmenthastheabilitytospendmoney+tospendmoneyoutsideofitsjurisdiction• Deference:Needtobedeferentialtocongress;Needtotakeastanceofrespect• Residualpower:Whereisthepowerthatisnotenumeratedandlisted

o InUSthefederalgovernmentisgivingpowersbyconstitution;stategovernmentshavetheresidualpower§ Thestatesdonotgivethepowers;itisthepeoplethemselves

o InCanadiangovernmentthefederalgovernmentgetstheresidualpower§ Afterbothlevelsaregivenpowers,theleftoverpowerisdeferredtothefederal

Confederation:DebatingtheIntentoftheFramer’s

• Framer’sinterestedincreatingastrong,centralgovernment–why?o Preventwars–civilwarwascausedbytoomanypowersinthestates(bandedtogetherinordertoovertake

centralgovernment)o ModeledoffoftheUKgovernment–onecentralparliamentinLondon–notfederalismo Protectionofminoritygroups–toomuchpowerinlocalgovernmentsmeansthatminoritygroupswillbe

vulnerable• Section92

o Languageisusedtonarrowtherightsoftheprovinceso Section91isnotnarrowed–seeingitbroadlyin‘generalgrantsofpower’

• Powerofdisallowance(section56)o Federalgovernmentcandisallowprovincialactso Ithaseffectivelydiedsinceithasnotbeenusedinsolong;althoughitisstillintheconstitutiono Constitutionalconventions–powerisnottobeabused

• Givenmanyissuesaremissinginbothsection91+92thereisnowsharedresponsibilitybetweenlevelsofgovernmentTheBuildingBlocksofFederalism

• Whatismissingàaeronautics,intellectualproperty,radio

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• Whatoverlapsbetween91+92?àtaxation,marriage,criminallaw/criminalprocedure,property

ModernCanadianFederalism• Expandingroleofgovernment

o Governmentdoesmoretodaythantheycouldhaveexpectedthemtodoin1867• Cooperativefederalism

o Concurrency,Overlap,andSharedResponsibilitieso BlurredLines:National,Provincial,andLocalo Bothlevelsofgovernmentsneedtoworktogetherinordertoachievepolicyoutcomeso Localissuesthatbecomenationalissueso Nationalissuesthatbecomelocal

• Dealingwithsharedjurisdictioniftheriseofthespendingpowero Mightnothavejurisdictiontherebutspendtheirmoneythere.Ex.Education;healthcare;childcare

• Executivefederalismo Agreementsmadeupondifferentlevelsofgovernment,tosortoutissuesofoverlap+messinesso Criticism–limitscitizenparticipationastherearealreadynegotiationshappeningbetweenthedifferentlevelsof

government• Asymmetricalfederalism

o IsCanadaaproductofthis?o Differentrelationshipsbetweenthefederalgovernmentanddifferentprovinceso Ex.HowCanadatreatstheirrelationshipwithQuebec

§ Provincialequality–shouldn’tprovincesbetreatedonanequalbasisFederalismTheory• Advantages

o Nationalunity.Allowsforaprotectionofminorityrights.Efficiencyingivenpowerstosomeprovincialgovernmentssincetheyaredirectlyaffected–allowsprovincialgovernmentstosolvetheirownproblems(someprovincesmayhavedifferentproblemsthanotherones).Separationofpowers–allowsforchecksandbalancesoverthedifferentlevels.Sincetherearesmallerlocalgovernments,peoplefeelmoreinvolved.Diffusionofpowerpreventsnegativeeffectsofhavingallofthepowercentralizedintoasmallgroupofpeople–ex.corruption

• Disadvantageso Confusionbetweenwhohaswhichpowers–inefficiency(Costly–spendingmoneytohave10differentdepartmentsin

10differentprovinces).Nosenseofunity–strainsenseofnationalpurpose.Differentprovincesaredifferent–cannottreatthemthesame

InterpretingtheDivisionofPowers

• 3waystochallengestatutesonthegroundsofadivisionofpowers1) Achallengetothevalidityofastatuteonthegroundsthatitisinitsdominantcharacteristic(or‘pithandsubstance’)in

relationtoamatterbeyondtheenactinglegislature’sjurisdictionandthereforewithintheexclusivejurisdictionofadifferentlevelofgovernment

2) Seekingtolimittheapplicabilityofvalidstatutes–statutemayhavetobelimitedor‘readdown’soitdoesnottouchmattersatthecoreofadifferentlevelofgovernment’sareasofexclusivejurisdiction(interjurisdictionalimmunity)–oftenusedmoretoprotecttheexclusivityofthefederalheadsofpower

3) Seekingtolimittheoperabilityofprovincialstatutes–alawcanbeinoperativeifitconflictswithavalidfederalstatutethatalsoappliesthesamefacts(federalparamountcyrule)

ThePrivyCouncil’sEarlyFederalismJurisprudence

CitizensInsuranceCompanyvParsons(1881)7AC96(PC)Facts:

• Ontarioenactedlegislationaboutfireinsurancepolicies,specifyingasetofconditionstobeapartofallfireinsurancepolicies.Parsonsbroughtanactiontorecovercompensationforlossescausedbyafiretohishardwarestoreto2differentinsurers.InsurersrefusaltopaywerebasedonParson’sfailuretodiscloseinformationrequiredbyconditionsinthepolicy.

• ParsonclaimedthepoliciesdidnotcomplywiththeOntariolegislation.TheinsurersarguethelegislationwasultraviresIssues:

• Whethertheinsurancelegislationwasintravirestheprovince

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Decision:• Actisvalid;decisionforplaintiffupheld

Analysis:(GwynneJ)FederalismTheoryà

• Coordinatefederalism:eachlevelofequallysovereignintheirrespectivespheres• Principleofmutualmodification:Needtoreadthetwosectionstogetherinordertounderstandthemeaningbehindit.

Thereareinstancesthroughoutsections91and92overlapandthereforeitmusthavebeenforeseenthatadefinitedistinctioncouldnotbeattained.Believesitcouldnothavebeenanintentionthatconflictswouldexist,thereforethetwosectionswhichoverlapmustbereadtogethertoarriveatareasonableconstructionofthelanguage

• Specificshouldoverridethegeneral Interpretationofs.92(13) • s.91(18)–specifictypesofcontractswithfederalj–thereforenotallcontracts• Parsonsbelievedcontractsdealwiths.92(13)‘propertyandcivilrights’–specifictypesofcontracts• Ins.94iftherewereanarrowconstructionof‘civilrights’thenthedominionparliamentcouldlegislateinregardstoall

contractsinallprovinces,thereforeextendingtoQuebec,eventhoughtheyaregovernedbytheirownCivilCode• RoleofQuebecLawà‘Civilrights’arealsomentionedinAct14oftheQuebecAct,thatthosewithinQuebecareableto

enjoytheircivilrightsashaddonebefore–theseareusedintheirlargestsenseInterpretationofs.91(2)• GivesParliamentexclusivepowertoregulatetrade+commerce• Here,aninsurancecompanysellstomakeaprofit+itisbynatureacommercialactivity–commerceandthesellingof

insuranceisatrade:Contractsarenotapartoftrade+commerceàitisacivilright• Contractofindemnity(insurance)canhardlybeconsideredtradingcontracts–cannotbe‘tradeandcommerce’(91(2))–

thisisnotusedinanunlimitedsense(orelseotherclassesofsubjectswouldbeunnecessarysuchasbanking,billsofexchangeandpromissorynotes)

• Havetoreadthissectionmorenarrowlyàthereareotherspecificexamplesoftrade+commerceins.91,sowhywouldthosebenecessaryifs.2covereditall(ex.s.91(18)encompassesspecifictypesofcontractsunderexclusivefederalpower)

• Ifprovinces[s.92(13)]havecivilrights,thentheycannotbetradeandcommerce• S.91(2)islimitedtointerprovincial/internationaltrade+generalregulationinallthedominion

Ratio:• Thedominionsauthoritytolegislatefortheregulationoftradeandcommercedoesnotincludethepowertoregulateby

legislationthecontractsofaparticularbusinessortrade(suchasfireinsurance)–thisfallsunders.92(13)–readbroadly• 91(2)has2branches:anytradetakingplaceinter-provinciallyorinternationallyandgeneralregulationoftradeaffecting

thewholeDominion–readmorenarrowly[anyotherbusinessfallswithintheprovinceunders.92(13)]

RussellvTheQueen(1882)7AC829(PC)(TemperanceAct)**originofthePOGGpowerdebate–TheDominiondoeshavepowertotrumpprovincialpowersifthereisanationallycriticalconcernandaneedforuniformlegislationtodealwithitFacts:

• AprivatecitizenbeganacriminalprosecutionagainstRussellundertheCanadaTemperanceActforsellingliquorinviolationofitsterms

• TheCanadaTemperanceAct(1878)wasenactedbytheDominion,whereinbyavoteforlocaloptiontherewouldbeaprohibitingofretailsalesofliquor

• Providedbanningofalcoholsales,butallowedittobedecidedlocallyo Argument:Thismustbeproperty+civilrights(encompassings.92(13))

• Thethreesectionsof92referredtowere9,13,and16Issue:

• WhetherthefederalgovernmenthastheauthoritytoenacttheCanadaTemperanceAct,orwhethertheActfallswithinprovinciallegislation

Decision• FederalgovernmenthastheauthoritytoenacttheAct.TheActdoesnotviolateanyheadsofpowerunders.92

Ratio• ParliamentisallowedtoenactlawsforthegoodofthecountryunderPOGGevenifitaffectsPropertyandCivilRights(s.

92(13)(problematicaspectconsideringpoggisaresidual(ratherthananenumerated)power);anditdoesnotviolates.92(16)becausetheproblemisnotamatterwithinlocaljurisdiction(ex.inpith+substancethelawisnotaimedataspecificprovince)becauseitisauniform

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• ParliamentcanusePOGGtolimitprovincialrights:underthisdecisionthePCruledthatParliamentcouldusePOGGto‘trump’provincialpowersifthereisaneedforuniformlegislationtoaddressanationallypressingconcern[broadreadingofPOGGexpandedbeyonditsoriginalintention?]

Analysis:(SirMontagueSmith)• CourtsaiditwasnotlocalsincetherighttovotewasgiventoeveryareainCanada,notanyspecificones–therefore,a

nationalmatter• Fallsundersafetyormorality–s.91(pogg)

o Concernedwithalcoholasanationalepidemico Poggcannotbeusedforpermanentmatters

• Section9(shop,saloon,tavern,auctioneer,andotherlicensesinordertotheraisingofrevenueforprovincial,local,ormunicipalpurposes)

o TheActinquestioninnotfiscal/oneformakingmoney(aby-productofitdoesdiminishrevenue)• Section13(property+civilrights)

o Hasalegalaspectsimilartopoisonousdrugsandexplosivesubstances(whichcanbedeemedasproperty)howeveralawplacingrestrictionsontheirsaleonthegroundstheuseofthemisdangeroustothepublicandcannotbedeemedalawinrelationshiptoproperty

o Itisapublicorderandsafetyissue–therefore,theselawsdonotbelongtocivilrights• Privycouncilsaysliquorisnotproperty–mustdeterminewhatthelawisinrelationto

o Doesnotmatteritinterfereswithproperty(incidentalinterferenceisnotrelevant/sufficient)o Whenclassifyingneedtounderstandwhatthetruenatureandcharacterofthelawis(thepithandsubstance)

• Section16(generallyallmattersofamerelylocalorprivatenatureintheprovince)o TheconditionthattheActwasprescribedby‘localoption’doesnotconverttheActintoamerelylocalmatter;the

object/scopeisstillgeneraltopromotetemperancethroughouttheDominion

HodgevTheQueen(1983)9AC117PC**doubleaspectdoctrine*Key:thepossibilityofjurisdictionaloverlapwasexpresslyrecognizedasimplicitinthestructureoftheConstitutionof1867*Hodgeconfirmswedonothavehierarchicalfederalism;wehaveautonomousfederalismFacts:

• AchallengetoOntario’sCrooksAct(LiquorLicenseAct1876)whichtransferredthepowersoverliquorlicensingfrommunicipalitiestonewcreatedBoardsofLicensecommissioners(appointed+controlledbytheprovincialgovernment)

• Hodgewaschargedwithallowingbilliardstobeplayedinhistavern,contrarytotheregulationsmadebythelicensecommissionersforToronto

• Hodgechallengedtheactthatitconflictedwithpowerunder91(2)andthatprovinciallegislaturecouldnotdelegatelaw-makingpowerstotheBoardsofCommissioners–argumentbasedondelegatusnonpotestdelegare(adelegatemaynotdelegate)

• Differenttavernkeepermadea3rdchallengethataprovincecouldnotimposeimprisonmentwithhardlaboraspunishment,sinces.92(15)spokeonlyofimprisonment

• ArguedthatinRussell,theParliamenthadcontroloverliquorIssue:

• IsthisActultraviresofthepowersoftheprovince?Decision:

• No–allgroundsdismissedRatio:

• Subjectswhichinoneaspectandforonepurposefallwithins.92,mayinanotheraspectandforanotherpurposefallwithins.91(thedoubleaspectdoctrine):Becausesubjectsfallinbothdomainsdoesnotmeanitisbeingultraviresorwithintheotherdomain,aslongasbothlawscanbeadheredto

• TheDominionandtheprovincesareequalinkind,andeachsupremewithintheirspheres–ProvinciallegislaturesarenotmerelydelegatesorsubordinatesoftheImperial/Dominionparliamentbutenjoyplenitudeofpowerwithinthelimitsoftheirdefinedsubjectmatter

• Assumingaprovinciallegislaturepossessescertainpowers,itispossibletoassumefurtherthatitcanalsodelegatethosepowers

Analysis:LordFitzgerald(PC)

• Thedoubleaspectdoctrine(subjectsforwhichinoneaspectfallinsection92canalsofallin91inanotheraspect)–canregulatetwothingsfromtwodifferentperspectives

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• S.4+5oftheActtendtobemattersofmerelylocalnatureintheProvince+similartothepowersthenbelongingtomunicipalinstitutionsunderthepreviouslyexistinglawspassedbythelocalparliaments(s.92(16))andtheimpositionoffines/penalty/imprisonment(92(15))

• PowersintendedbytheActareregulationsofamerelocalcharacterforthegoodgovernmentoftaverns+topreservemunicipality,peace,andpublicdecency–doesnotinterferewiths.91(2)

• Asalegalmatter–cannotdelegatepowersgiventoyou,unlessexplicitlyallowedtodosowhenonereceivedtheirdelegatingpowers

• Provincesarenotdelegates;theybothhavetheirownspheres–theyareequalandautonomoustoeachother–theyareeachsupremewithintheirspheres

Note:• Example:drinking+drivingcanfallunderbothprovincial+federaljurisdictionàfederalisconcernedwiththecriminal

aspect;provincialistheabilitytooperateacar(92(13))andmattersofalocalorprivatenature(92(16))(impoundcar/jurisdictionoverlicenses)

• Doubleaspectdoctrine:bothlevelsofgovernmentcanregulatethesametopic,justfromdifferentaspects• *92(15)‘Provincescanimposepenaltiesforabreachofprovinciallaw’

THEGREATDEPRESSION+THENEWDEALCASES(P.167-187)ReferencereTheBoardofCommerceAct,1919+TheCombinesFairPricesAct,1919[1922](PC)**Unlessstateofemergencydeclared,mattersthatdealw/individual,localregulationsareunderprovince;POGGjurisdictionunders91restrictedtowartime/temporary/famine/req’dbypogg,notnormalconditions**HaldaneshrinkspoggintoanemergencycaseFacts:

• TheBoardofCommerceActandtheCombinesandFairPricesActwereenactedbytheFederalgovernmentin1919inordertorestrictabusesofbothcombines,mergers,andmonopolies,andthetakingofunfairprofitsorhoardingthe‘necessariesoflife’includingfoodandclothingforthepurposeofunfairlyincreasingprices

• Theboardhadextensivepowerstoinvestigate/makeorders(ex.ceaseoperationsofcombines/orderstorepayunfairprofits),andviolationswereconsideredindictableoffencesforwhichthepenaltywasafineofnotexceeding$1000foreachdayoftheoffenceoraterminprisonnotexceeding2years

• TheresistancetheboardencounteredresultedinthemarrangingareferencetotheSCCtodetermineitsconstitutionalauthorityinthissituation

Issue:• WhethertheCombinesActisvalid?

Decision:• TheParliamentisnotofauthoritytoenactsuchalaw

Ratio:• Criminallawpowerisonlyapplicablewherethesubjectmatterisonebyitsverynaturebelongstothedomainofcriminal

jurisprudence• OnlyundernecessityinexceptionalcircumstancescanthelibertyoftheindividualsberestrictedbyParliament• Poggisavailabletomeetspecialconditionsinwartimeandonatemporarybasis,butnotundernormalcircumstances

Analysis:SCC(splitdecision)• Halfwouldhaveuphelditunder92(2)–andthatprofiteeringissoevil,nooneprovincecouldeffectivelycope;couldhave

alsobeenupheldunderpogg• Halfsayregulationofpricesinastorefallunder91(13)–ifitwerevalid,anystatutecouldfallunderFederalpower–too

broadAnalysis:(ViscountHaldane)

• Herethelawswereconfinedtomorality,leavesouteconomicorsocialills.Federalgovernmentdoesnothavetheabilitytocreatecriminallawsaboutnewbehaviors

• Ifprovincialpowersareadequateinregulatingtheissue,thereisnoneedforthefederalgovernmenttooverridetheirpowers

• Thishasnotbeenenactedunderspecialcircumstances/foratemporarypurpose,buttocontinuewithouttime-limitandtoapplythroughoutCanada

• TheDominioncantrumpprovincialpowersifthereisanationallycriticalconcernandaneedforuniformlegislationtodealwithit(Russell)evenduringtimeofpeaceàcannotinterfereundernormalcircumstances

• Here,theBoardisgiventhepowertoinquireintoindividualcasesandnotmerelyastheresultofapplyingprinciplestobelaiddownasofgeneralapplication

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• Dominioncannotfirstattempttointerferewith92,thenattempttojustifythisbyenactingancillaryprovisions,designedtobenewphasesofdom.Crimlaw.

FortFrancesPulpandPaperCompanyvManitobaFreePressCompany[1923]AC695(PC)**Whenwarisover,basedonclearevidence,mustrepealallinterferinglegislation,oritisultravires;however,theremaybeexceptionswherecertainmeasuresareconcernedwithconsequencesarisingoutofwarandmayproduceeffectsremainingafterwarisover;maybeheldforareasonableamountoftimeFacts:

• (Thiscasesharesthesamesocial/economicbackgroundoftheBoardofCommercecase,butwithdifferentlegislation)• TheWarMeasuresAct(1914)wasenactedbythefederalgovernmentandgavethempowertodowhateverwas

considerednecessaryforthesecurity,defense,peace,order,andwelfareofCanada–limitedtotheexistenceofarealorapprehendedwar,invasion,insurrection

o Underthisacttherewasagovernmentregulationonthepricesofnewsprint–leadingtothecreationofthePaperController(1917)(madetheinitialdecision)andthePaperControlTribunal(whoheardtheappeals)

• TheControllermadeanorderaboutpricesandorderedtheFortFrancescompanytorepaywhateverithadreceivedfromtheManitobaFreePressinexcessoftheseprices

• AnactionwasbroughtbytheManitobaPressCompanywhenFortFrancesrefusedtopay,andboththetrialjudgmentandtheappealaffirmedtheclaim–FortFrancesthenappealeddirectlytothePC

Issues:• Afterthewarisendedatwhatpointdoesthefederalgovernmentcontinuetohavepoweroverpreviouslyprovincial

matters?IstheWarMeasuresActultravires?Decision:

• UpheldunderPOGGsincewartimeconditionsmightstillbeineffect;appealdismissedRatio:

• Thetemporaryexerciseofpowerbythefederalgovernmentcanbeendedaftertheexceptionalcircumstancesceasetoexist,undertherequirementthattheremustbeveryclearevidenceshowingthecrisishaspassed

• Theremaybeexceptionsunderthecircumstanceswherecertainmeasuresareconcernedwithconsequentialconditionsarisingoutofwar,whichmaycontinuetoproduceeffectsremaininginoperationafterwaritselfisover

• POGGavailableincasesof“suddendangertosocialorderarisingfromoutbreakofwar;whennationalliferequirespreservation;exceptionalnecessity”

Analysis:(ViscountHaldane)• Duringthewar(BoardofCommerceAct)/specialcircumstancesallowforaninterferenceandfederalpowermaytrumpà

duringtheseexceptionaleventspogginvolveseffortonbehalfofthewholenation+interestsmaybesubordinated;theoverridingpowersbecomeapplicabletothoseprovincialaspects(powerofprovincenotbeingtakenaway;newaspectsarebeingintroduced)

• Duringwar:publicneeduninterruptedinformationinnewspapers.Needtoensuresupplytoavoidshortage.• BUTthewarisover,andthereisnojustificationforcontinuedexerciseofexceptionalinterferencewhichbecomesultra

vires.Needclearevidencethatcrisishadwhollypassed• Late1919,thewarhaspassed

TorontoElectricCommissionersvSnider[1925](PC)*Snideriswhywehaveprovincialregulationsoflaborstandards(only6%ofemployeesarefederallyregulated)Facts:

• TheIndustrialDisputesInvestigationActwasafederalactthatappliedtomining,transportation,andcommunicationsundertakings,aswellaspublicserviceutilities,andlimitedtothosewithmorethantenemployees

• Ifanemployee/employerwasindisputeabouttheconditionsofwork,theycouldapplytotheMinisterofLaborfortheappointmentofaBoardofConciliationandInvestigation–whosegoalwastoinquireintothedisputeandattempttoeffectasettlement

• AboardwasappointedtoinquireintoadisputebetweentheTorontoElectricCommissionersandsomeofitsemployees,whichresultedinthecommissionersseekinganinjunctionallegingtheactwasultravirestheParliament

• Attrialcourttheclaimwasupheld,thenwasreversedinthecourtofappeal• Courtofappealreasoning:Theactwasvalidunders.91(2)forthereasoningthattodeprivethecityofelectricpoweristo

disturbandhinderthenationaltradeandcommerceandtoendangerpublicpeace,order,andsafetyandunders.91(27)• Courtofappealdissent:UnderPOGGtherearetwogrounds–emergencybranchandmattersofgeneralCanadianinterest

andimportance.Thisactisnotaresponsetoanemergency.Theactplainlyinvadesthespecifieddomainofprovinciallegislation

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Issues:• WhethertheIndustrialDisputesInvestigationAct(1907)wasvalidorwhetheritwasultraviresthefederalgov’t

Decision:• Appealallowed;injunctionallowed;Actwasultraviresthefederalgovernment

Ratio:• Thesituationathandisnotsopressingthatprovincialpowersareinadequatetodealwithit;thefederalgovernmentisnot

authorizedtotrumptheprovincialpowersunders.92unlessthereisapressingconcern(pogg)• Laborrelationsarecivil+localmatter;POGGavailablewhenextraordinaryperiltonationallifeofCanadaasawhole,highly

exceptionalAnalysis:(LordHaldane)

• Poggavailablewhen“extraordinaryperiltothenationallifeofCanada,asawhole”;Suchinstancesare“highlyexceptional”;Russellexplainedasa“menacetothenationallifeofCanadasoseriousandpressingthattheNationalParliamentwascalledontointervenetoprotectthenationfromdisaster.Anepidemicofpestilencemightconceivablyhavebeenregardedasanalogous.”

• ItisobvioustheprovisionsundertheIndustrialDisputesInvestigationAct(whichcouldappointaBoardanywhereinCanada)dealtwithcivilrights;anditwasnotwithinthefederalgovernment’spowertomakethisacriminalmattermerelybyimposingancillarypenalties

• Itisclearthats.91(2)(tradeandcommerce)cannotbereliedonasenablingthefederalgovernmenttoregulatecivilrightsintheprovinces

R.SimeonandI.Robinson,State,Society,andtheDevelopmentofCanadianFederalism(Toronto,1990)

- PrimeMinisterBennett(1930-1935)wasnotworriedaboutconsultingprovincialgovernments,norwasheworriedaboutthedetailsoftheconstitutionaldivisionsofpower–confidentthattheconstitutionalgroundsforhis‘NewDeal’legislationcouldbefoundintheBNAAct

o Aseriesofradiospeechesoutlininga‘NewDeal’forCanadao Majorchangesinnationaleconomicandsocialinstitutions–changesthathadtobebroughtaboutbythefederal

government- ThefocusonfiscalarrangementsmeantduringthefirstphaseoftheDepressiontherewaslittleintergovernmental

discussionoffundamentalreformtothefederalconstitution- AnamendingformulawasonlydiscussedbecauseithadtobedealtwithasapartoftheStatuteofWestminster(1931)

(BritishlawclarifyingthepowersofCanada’sparliament,grantingthemfulllegalfreedomexceptintheareastheychosetoremainsubordinatetoBritain–essentiallyhadtheactofmakingtheDominionssovereignnations)

- WhenKing(1935-1948)waselectedintogovernmenthewasmoreresponsiveofprovincialobjectionsthatBennett’snewlegislationwasanencroachmentonprovincialjurisdictionàwouldnotenactreformsw/ounanimousconsent

- Noamendingformulawasnegotiated–didnothaveunanimousconsent(NewBrunswick)

TheStatuteOfWestminster(1931)[2.(1)TheColonialLawsValidityAct,1865,shallnotapplytoanylawmadeafterthecommencementofthisActbytheParliamentofaDominion.(2)NolawandnoprovisionofanylawmadeafterthecommencementofthisActbytheParliamentofaDominionshallbevoidorinoperativeonthegroundthatitisrepugnanttothelawofEngland,ortotheprovisionsofanyexistingorfutureActofParliamentoftheUnitedKingdom,ortoanyorder,rule,orregulationmadeunderanysuchAct,andthepowersoftheParliamentofaDominionshallincludethepowertorepealoramendanysuchAct,order,ruleorregulationinsofarasthesameispartofthelawoftheDominion.4.NoActofParliamentoftheUnitedKingdompassedafterthecommencementofthisActshallextendorbedeemedtoextend,toaDominionaspartofthelawofthatDominion,unlessitisexpresslydeclaredinthatActthatthatDominionhasrequested,andconsentedto,theenactmentthereof.7.(1)NothinginthisActshallbedeemedtoapplytotherepeal,amendmentoralterationoftheBritishNorthAmericaActs,1867to1930,oranyorder,ruleorregulationmadethereunder.]• **Undernumber4–PCcannolongerpasslawsaboutCanada;stillhavecontrolovertheConstitution

o Couldnotfigureoutanamendingformula–ConstitutionActof1982iswhenthischanges• PCstilloverseeingCanadianlaw

HopeforPOGG?[Aeronautics/Radio]• ReferencereAeronautics[1932]:federaljurisdiction?

o Findsfederaljurisdictionunders.132,s.91(2),andpogg

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§ 132(treaties)becauseCanadawasapartoftheBritishempire;91(2)tradeandcommerce;andpogg[NationalConcernbranch]

• ReferencereRadio[1932]o “Being…notmentionedexplicitlyineithers.91ors.92,suchlegislationfallswithinthegeneralwordsatthe

openingofs.91…”[i.e.pogg]o Exampleoftheresiduaryclauseworkingo Newsubjectmatterthereforemustfallwithintheresiduarycapacityofpogg

§ Callitthe‘gapbranchofpogg’àthereforefallingtofederalregulation*WhenKingcameintopower(1935)hereferredall(6)ofBennett’sstatutestotheSCC(alongwithtwootheracts)thentothePC–theonlystatutesthatweredeterminedasbeingintravireswereTheFarmers’CreditorsArrangementsAct,theCriminalCodeamendments,andtheCanadaStandardprovisionsoftheDominionTradeandIndustryCommissionActLordAtkin:“Whiletheshipofstatenowsailsonlargerventuresandintoforeignwatersshestillretainsthewatertightcompartmentswhichareanessentialpartofheroriginalstructure.”(LaborConventions)

AGCanadavAGOntario(LaborConventions)[1937](PC)*Couldnotusetradeandcommerce(Parsons)andcouldnotusepogg(Snider)*S.132TreatyPowermustadheretothewatertightcompartmentssetoutinss.91+92Background:

• 1930-33àDepression,unemployment(30%),draught• ImmensepressuretoactàinUSRoosevelt’s’NewDeal’

Facts:• AreferenceaboutthevalidityoftheLimitationofHoursWorkAct(8-hourdayand48hoursaweek),theWeeklyRestin

IndustrialUndertakingsAct(restperiodof24hoursforindustrialworkers),MinimumWagesAct(GovernorinCouncilauthoritytoestablishminimumwages)

• In1919,CanadasignedtheTreatyofPeaceasamemberoftheBritishEmpiretosecurehumanconditions;in1930theInternationalLaborOrganizationandtheLeagueofNationsadoptedconventionsabouthoursofwork,minimumwages,anddaysofrest

• InMarch+April1935,thefederalgovernmentratifiedthoseconventionsandenactedthethreestatutestoexplicitlyimplementtreatyobligations

• IntheSCCtherewasa3-3division–wenttothePCIssues:

• Wasthisenactmentofthosestatutesoutsideofthefederalgovernmentsjurisdiction?• Validbasedons.132?Under91/92?Onnationaldimensions?

Decision:• Eachareconsideredultravires

Ratio:• Thefederalgovernmentcannotmerelybymakingpromisestoforeigncountries,clotheitselfwithlegislativeauthority

inconsistentwiththeconstitutionwhichgaveitbirthàtreatymakingpowersdoesnotbreachthedivisionofthetwogovernments[watertightcompartments]

• IfCanadaincursobligationsandwhenlegislationisconcerned,theymustwhentheydealwithprovincialclassesofsubjectsbedealtwithbythetotalityofthepowers(acooperationoffederalandprovincialgovernments)

• S.132isnotaboutthepowerofCanadatoentertreaties,butabouttreatiestodowiththeBritishEmpireàParliamenthasrighttoengageintreaty,NOTrighttolegislateitintos92

Analysis:• SCC[intravires]usedRadioandAeronauticsReferencestoholdthatthetreatycamewithins.132givingfederal

governmentexclusivepowertoimplementitstermseventhroughsubjectmatterthatwouldotherwisecomewithins.92(likeR+A).Pogggavedominionpowertoimplementthem[TreatyObligations132.TheParliamentandGovernmentofCanadashallhaveallPowersnecessaryorproperforperformingtheObligationsofCanadaorofanyProvincethereof,asPartoftheBritishEmpire,towardsForeignCountries,arisingunderTreatiesbetweentheEmpireandsuchForeignCountries.]

• SCC[ultravires]becausetheconventionswereadoptedbyCanadaonherbehalf;donotcomewithins.132;provincialconsentisnecessaryforthevalidityofatreatyifitcomeswithins.92

Analysis:(PC)AtkinS.132

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• Mustdistinguishbetweenthe1)formationand2)performanceoftheobligationsconstitutedbyatreaty(ins.132onlymakesareferencetoperformance)às.132isnotaboutthepower

o IntheBritishEmpire–formationofatreatyisanexecutiveact,andtheperformancerequireslegislativeactiono Cannotbedisputedthatthecreation(formation)oftheobligationsundertakenintreatiesarethefunctionofthe

executivealoneo ExecutivebodyallowsCanadatoenterintotreaties,althoughParliamentmustpasslawstoimplementthetreaty

(iffallswithinprovincialjurisdiction,thenprovincesmustimplementthem)• In1867theUKneverimaginedCanadawouldhavetreatymakingabilities

o ThissectionisapplicabletotreatiessignedbytheBritishEmpireo Argument(provincial)hereisthatthetreatiesthatCanadaenterintoarenotcoveredins.132

S.91/92• Validunder91/92?SCCsayexemplifyAeronautics+radio.PCsays

o Aeronautics:imposedtreatybtwBEandforeigncountries=notapplicableo Radio:mattersdidnotfallunders91/92=notapplicable

• Thedistributionofpowerisbasedonclassesofsubjects,iftreatydealsw/thatclass=fallunderthatlegislation.Treatymustbowtowatertightcompartmentsof91/92.

Pogg• Notanemergency,cannotcallsomethinganewissueandthereforeallowfed.gov’ttohavecontroloverit• SnideràLaborrelationsarecivil+localmatter;POGGavailablewhenextraordinaryperiltonationallifeofCanadaasa

whole,highlyexceptionalNotes:

• Usetreatiestodetermineuniformitybetweencountries–Eventhoseareasthatareunderprovincialpowerso Provincesdonothavepowertoenterintotreatieso Ifleavethesepowerstoprovincialgovernment,thentherecouldbeissuesofimplementingtreatypromises

• In1867theUKneverimaginedCanadawouldhavetreatymakingabilitieso ThissectionisapplicabletotreatiessignedbytheBritishEmpireo Argument(provincial)hereisthatthetreatiesthatCanadaenterintoarenotcoveredins.132

• Livingtreedoctrineargumento DoesnotallowyoutochangewordsàcannotchangeBritishEmpiretoCanadao Inthepersonscase,thequestionwaswhetherwomenarepersonso Livingtreeisnotapplicablehere

AGCanadavAGOntario(TheEmploymentandSocialInsuranceAct)[1937](PC)*ThelimitsofspendingpowerFacts:

• ThefederalEmploymentandSocialInsuranceActprovidedforcompulsoryinsuranceagainstunemploymentforworkers• TheSCCheldtheactinvalid(4to2)

Issues:• Isthisactvalidunderfederaljurisdiction?

Decision:• EntireActisconsideredultravires• Appealdismissed

Ratio:• Cooperativefederalism(provincesdesignaprogram,createlegislation,federalfundsit)

o Federalspendingpoweràcanspendmoneyoutsideoftheirjurisdiction,howevercannotlegislateoutsidearea• Ifthepithandsubstanceofalegislationinvadescivilrightswithintheprovince(orotherclassesofsubjects)thelegislation

willbeinvalid–otherwisethefederalgovernmenthasaneasypassageintotheprovincialdomain• Thisisaregulationofalocaltrade,notinterprovincial

Analysis:• SCC

o Actdealtwithpropertyandcivilrightss.92(13)becauseitdealtwithinsuranceandbecauseitregulatedcontractsandemployment(Parsons)

• SCCdissento Ataxationmeasureunders.91(3)–therewasnoconstitutionalrestrictionagainstthefederalgovernment

spendingpublicmoneyforthebenefitoftheindividuals• PC

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o 91(3)dealswithpublicdebt+publicpropertyàtheraisingofmoneybysystemoftaxation§ FederalSpendingpower:“theDominionmayimposetaxationforthepurposeofcreatingafundfor

specialpurposesandmayapplythatfundformakingcontributionsinthepublicinteresttoindividuals,corporationsorpublicauthorities”

§ Abilitytoraiseandspendmoneyastheylike(spendingpower)howevercannotcreatelegislationbyusingtheirpowertospendoutsideoftheirjurisdiction

• Donotwanttoincentivizethemtolegislatingoutsideoftheirjurisdiction§ Cannotexpandjurisdictionbyimplementingtreaties/havingtreatymakingpowers–metaphor

o Anactintendedtobepermanent;doesnotrisetolevelofnationalemergency(Snyder);notwar/famine–cannotusePOGG

o Federallegislationmaybeframedinawayastoinvaderightswithintheprovince(orotherclassesofsubjectsgiventothepowersoftheprovince)

AGBritishColumbiavAGCanada(TheNaturalProductsMarketingAct)[1937](PC)[POGGrestricted]*DonotwantParliamenttoexpandtheirjurisdictionunilaterallyFacts:

• PurposeoftheNaturalProductsMarketingActwastoestablishregulationofnaturalproductsforthebenefitofproducersandtoestablisheffectivemarketingarrangementsandtoimposepooling(merging)toequalizepricesinparticularproductsandareas

• Actwaslimitedtoproductswheretheprincipalmarketwasoutsidetheprovinceofproductionandproductsthatwere(insomepart)exported

• [Regulatingprices/sales/traderelationshipsofagriculturalproductsàaboutregulatingatalocallevel;withinprovinces]Issue:

• IsthefederalActultravires?–91(2)or92(13)?Decision:

• Actinvalid;fallsunder92(13);appealdismissedRatio:

• Thefederalgovernmentcannotacquirejurisdictiontodealinthesweepingway(inwhichtheseenactmentsoperate)withsuchlocalandprovincialmattersbylegislatingatthesametimerespectingexternalandinterprovincialtrade;andoftradersandproducersengagedintradewhichisexclusivelylocaltothesameauthority

Analysis:SCC

• Parsons,InsuranceReference,MontrealStreetRailwayo Fromthesedecisionss.91(2)doesnotencompasstheregulationofparticulartradesoroccupationsorofa

particularkindofbusinesso Itdoeshoweverembracetheregulationofexternal/internationaltradeandtheregulationofinterprovincialtrade

• Hodge,LocalProhibitionReferenceo Theenactmentsrelatetolocalandprovincialmattersandthereforearebeyondthejurisdictionofparliamentà

Parliamentcannotacquirejurisdictiontodealinthesweepingwayinwhichtheseenactmentsoperateo Theseenactmentsalsooperatebywayoftheregulationofdealingsinparticularcommodities–thesearenot

generalregulationsoftradeasawhole• BoardofCommerceandSnider

o Wecannotthinkthatsweepingregulationinrespectoflocaltradeisincidentaltotheregulationofexternaltrade/interprovincialtrade

• LocalProhibitionReferenceo Notallmattersthatareofnationalconcerncanberegulatedbythefederalgovernment–onlythosethatarea

matterofnationalconcern‘insuchsense’astobringthemwithinthejurisdictionoftheParliament(difficult/delicatetaskapplyingthisprinciple)

PC• S.92(13)Property+civilrightsàWeunderstandthattheprovisionscovertransactionsinanynaturalproductwhichare

completedwithintheprovince–Eventhoughthereisinterprovincialaspect,itreachesintoregulationofintra-provincialtrade(tradew/inprovinces;completionoftransactionw/inprovince)

• Ifnotbroughtwithinoneoftheclasssubjectsins.91itisbeyondthecompetenceofthefederalgovernment• Cannotbewithins.91(2)–trade+commerce

o Theregulationoftradeandcommercedoesnotallowtheregulationofindividualformsoftradeorcommerceconfinedtotheprovince

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ClassNotes:• Donotwantfederalgovernmenttobeabletoexpandtheirjurisdictionunilaterally• PoggrestrictedàTradeandcommercerestricted–totrueinternationaltrade• Parsonsalsohold–economicactivityatprovinciallevels• P.183àspeaksof‘pogg’bytalkingabout‘generalpower’[ReferringtoRusselandtoFortFrances]

Note:• Subsequenttothisàdecidedweneededourownpower=ENDPRIVYCOUNCIL

AGBritishColumbiavAGCanada[1937]

- TheamendmentstotheCriminalCodeprohibitedtwokindsofconduct:o 1)Sellinggoodsandpricesthatdiscriminatedamongcompetitorso 2)Sellinggoodsatpricesdesignedtoeliminatecompetitors

- BothprovisionsheldvalidintheSCC- Parliamentisnotrestrictedbyanyrulelimitingtheactsdeclaredtobecriminalactstosuchaswouldappearascriminal‘in

theirownnature’DominionTradeandIndustryCommissionAct

- Thisactincluded2majorparts:o 1)Authorizedadministrativeapprovalforagreementsamongbusinessestorestrictunduecompetitiono 2)Establishedanationaltrademark(theCanadaStandard)tobeusedtoidentifyproductsthatcompliedwith

standardssetbythefederalgovernment- SCCfoundbothpartsinvalid(Duff)

o Part1reliedonhisjudgmentinNaturalProductsMarketingReferenceo Thestandardwasnotatrademarkbutacivilrightofanewcharacter–federalgovernmenthasnoauthorityto

createacivilrightofanewkind- PCsaidthesecondpartcouldbeuphelduntils.91(2)

o Shouldbenoreasonwhythefederalgovernmentcouldnotextendthecreationofjuristicrightsinnewfields–iftheycanbebroughtfairlywithintheirclassesofsubjects

FarmersCreditorsArrangements- Establishedadministrativeboardswithpowerstoimposecompromises/extensionsoffarmers’obligationstotheirdebtors- Upheldunders.91(21)–federalpowertolegislateaboutbankruptcyandinsolvency

King’sReign(p.182)- BestexplanationforhisinactivityduringtheDepressionwasnationalunity–believedtheprincipalthreatlayinFrench-

Englishconflicto Federalinactionminimizedfederal-provincialconflictsrelatedtolanguage,howeveritincreasedcriticismfrom

thosewhosawthenationthroughlensesofregion/class- Deemedessentialthefederalgovernmentexpanditsjurisdiction- Agreementthatthesolutiontoeconomic/constitutionalcrisislayinacentralizationoffederalpowers

PITH+SUBSTANCE(P.207)• Analysisofwhatisinthestatuteitselfandwhatisrelevantoutside;lookingatintrinsicevidence,wordingofthestatute

itself,statementofobjectivesandpurposes,aswellasextrinsicevidenceie.Legislative

K.Swinton,TheSupremeCourtandCanadianFederalism:TheLaskin-DicksonYears1990CompetingClassificationsàBrokendowninto3steps

1)Identificationofthe‘matter’ofthestatute- Startingplaceisthestatutorycontext- Purposeofthelegislation–legislativehistory(HANSARD),governmentreportsidentifyingaproblemthattriggeredthe

legislation- Theeffectsofthelegislation- Thedominantformofinquiryisintopurpose–theproblemunderlyingthelegislationwhichthelegislatureistryingto

address2)Delineationofthescopeofthecompetingclasses- Therecanbeoverlappingregulation–the‘doubleaspectdoctrine’–somelawsmayhavebothfederalandprovincial

purposes- Cannotbecomplete‘watertightcompartments’betweenfederalandprovincialgovernments

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- Precedentplaysaroleinconstitutionaladjudication;historymayalsoplayaroleinthedefinitionofclassboundaries3)Adeterminationoftheclassintowhichthechallengedstatutefalls- Precedent/historyonlyassistindefiningtheclassesofpowers,howevertheydonotdeterminewhetheralawshouldcome

withinoneclassratherthananother- Thecourt’sfinaldecisionaboutboundariesandmatterswithinthemisguidedbyfederalismconcerns–beliefsabout

optimalbalanceofpowerbetweenthefederalandprovincialgovernments

W.R.Lederman,‘ClassificationofLawsandtheBNAAct’1981• Theclassesofsubjectsarenotclassesoffactbutclassesoflaw

TheApplicationofSections91and92oftheBNAAct• Thereisanimpossibilityforthemutualexclusionthatwasstrivedforintheconcludingwordsofs.91

o Forexample–thatawillmadebyanunmarriedpersonbecomesvoidoncethatpersonmarrieso Isthisaruleof‘marriage’(s.91(26))orof‘propertyandcivilrights’(s.92(13))–inEngland/Canadiancommonlaw

provincesitoccursin‘WillsActs’asaprovinciallaw,thereforemustbecharacterizedunders.92(13)vs.inPrivateInternationalLaw,EnglishandCanadiancourtsdeterminetheruleaboutmarriagevoidingapre-nuptialwillisdeemedtobeamatrimoniallaw(federallaw)

• Fromtheexamplesabove,determinationofwhichclassificationisusedforagivenpurposemustbemadeonnon-logicalgroundsofpolicyandjusticebythelegalauthoritywiththedutyandpowerofdecisioninthatrespect–aslogicdisplaysequivalentlogicalvalueofallpossibleclassifications–logicdoesnotassistinachoicebetweenthem–itmustbethenaskedwhetheritisbetterforthepeoplethatthisentitybeclassifiedonaprovincialornationallevel

• Judgesmakingthesedecisionsofclassificationmusthavestraightthinking,industry(diligence),goodfaith,andtheabilitytooverlooktheirprejudices

• Judgesrelyonprecedentsofachallengedlaw(staredecisis)–howevertheymustunderstandthechangingconditionsandhowclassifyingfeaturesmayalsochangeàchangingeconomicandsocialconditionswithadifferentmoralclimategivetothelawsnewfeaturesofmeaningbywhichtheymaybeclassified

• ‘Subject-matter’referstomeaning,andyoumustconstruemeaningbeforeyoucantalkaboutsubject-matterandcanonlyknowwhatissubject-matterwhenyouhavesettledmeaning;Mustalsolooktoobject/purposeofthelegislation

• ColourabilityàAlawmaybewordedtomakeitseemlikeitonlyhasprovinciallyclassifiablefeaturesofmeaningandonlywhentheeffectsofthelawareassessedcanoneunderstandadifferentmeaningwhichsuppliesfederallyclassifiablefeatures

• Aruleoflawforpurposesofthedistributionoflegislativepowersistobeclassifiedbythatfeatureofitsmeaningwhichisjudgedthemostimportantoneinthatrespectàisitbetterforthepeoplethatthisthingisdoneonanationalorprovinciallevel[usepolicybackgrounddecisionstodecidewherethingsshouldgo]

• Judgesdonotmerelygettodecidewhetherlawsareunconstitutionalorcharacterizedinthewrongjurisdiction*o Needtostillfollowthewordsoftheconstitutiono Applicationofthetesto Precedent–commonsense

CanadianWesternBankvAlberta[2007] “Itisnowwellestablishedthattheresolutionofacaseinvolvingtheconstitutionalityoflegislationinrelationtothedivisionofpowersmustalwaysbeginwithananalysisofthe"pithandsubstance"oftheimpugnedlegislation… Thisinitialanalysisconsistsofaninquiryintothetruenatureofthelawinquestionforthepurposeofidentifyingthe"matter"towhichitessentiallyrelates….Ifthepithandsubstanceoftheimpugnedlegislationcanberelatedtoamatterthatfallswithinthejurisdictionofthelegislaturethatenactedit,thecourtswilldeclareitintravires.If,however,thelegislationcanmoreproperlybesaidtorelatetoamatterthatisoutsidethejurisdictionofthatlegislature,itwillbeheldtobeinvalidowingtothisviolationofthedivisionofpowers. Todeterminethepithandsubstance,twoaspectsofthelawmustbeexamined:thepurposeoftheenactingbodyandthelegaleffectofthelaw…Toassessthepurpose,thecourtsmayconsiderbothintrinsicevidence,suchasthelegislation'spreambleorpurposeclauses,andextrinsicevidence,suchasHansardorminutesofparliamentarydebates.Insodoing,theymustneverthelessseektoascertainthetruepurposeofthelegislation,asopposedtoitsmerestatedorapparentpurpose….Equally,thecourtsmaytakeintoaccounttheeffectsofthelegislation…. Thefundamentalcorollarytothisapproachtoconstitutionalanalysisisthatlegislationwhosepithandsubstancefallswithinthejurisdictionofthelegislaturethatenacteditmay,atleasttoacertainextent,affectmattersbeyondthelegislature'sjurisdictionwithoutnecessarilybeingunconstitutional.”

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RvMorgentaler[1993]3SCR463,107DLR(4th)537Facts:

• BetweenOctober26andNovember2,1989therespondentperformed14abortionsathisprivateclinic,andwaschargedwith14countsofviolatingtheMedicalServicesAct

• TheMedicalServicesActreceivedRoyalAssentonJune15,1989whichprohibitedtheprivatizationofcertainmedicalservicestomaintainahigh-qualityhealth-caredeliverysystem–andtheMedicalServicesDesignationRegulationincludedabortion.Despitetheseactions,Morgentaleropenedhisclinic

• DuringtrialhearguedtheActandregulationwereofnoforceonthegroundstheyviolatewomen’sCharterrightstosecurityofthepersonandequalityandtheyareanunlawfulencroachmentonthefederal’sexclusivecriminallawjurisdiction

• AcquittedattrialafterthejudgeheldtheActwasinpithandsubstancecriminallaw,andthisdecisionwasupheldbytheappealcourt

Issue:• WhethertheNovaScotiaMedicalServicesActandtheregulationmadeundertheActareultraviresonthegroundthat

theyareinpithandsubstancecriminallaw(s.91(27))Decision:

• AppealdismissedRatio:

• Pithandsubstance:Purpose–relevantintrinsicandextrinsicinformation;Legaleffects–howthelegislationaffectstherightsandliabilitiesofthosesubjecttoitsterms;Matter–determinedbythelaw’sdominantpurpose

• ‘Colorable’legislation–whenthecourtsdeterminethatlegislationonitsfaceaddressesmattersthatarewithinitsjurisdictionbutinpithandsubstanceitisdirectedatmattersoutsideitsjurisdictionà[SopinkaJdidstatethecolourabilitydoctrinewasnotrelevanttohisanalysis]

o TheMedicalServicesActonitsfaceappearedtodealexclusivelywithamatterwithinprovinciallegislativecompetence(deliveryofmedicalservices)butthistitleandstatedpurposemaskeditsrealpurposewhichwastopunishtheprovisionofabortionasapublicevil

Analysis:(SopinkaJ)• Appellantreliesonss.92(7),(13),and(16)–whichgivesprovincialauthorityoverhospitals,propertyandcivilrights,andall

mattersofamerelylocalorprivatenatureClassificationofLaws:Firstidentifymatter,thenassignittoa“classofsubjects”1)Whatis“Matter”–Determinethedominantpurpose• Lookatthepreambleor‘purpose’section;backgroundcontext(‘mischiefrule’–themischieftheyweretryingtoprevent);

whetheritmentionsothersaction/howitworkswiththose;legislativehistory(Hansard)• “Leadingfeatureortruecharacter”oftendescribedaspithandsubstance• Thelegislationsdominantpurpose/aimisthekeytoconstitutionalvalidity• Howthelegislationasawholeaffectstherightsandliabilitiesofthosesubjecttoitsterms–oftenagoodindicatorofthe

purposeofthelegislation2)PurposeandEffect(Legal+Practicaleffects)

A)“LegalEffect”orStrictLegalOperation• Howthelegislationasawholeaffectstherightsandliabilitiesofthosesubjecttoitsterms=indicatespurpose(doesit

createanentitlement;establishasystem;enforceaprohibition)B)Theuseofextrinsicmaterials(Theactual/predictedpracticaleffect)

• Lookbeyondlegaleffecttoinquireintosocialoreconomicpurposeswhichstatutewasenactedtoachieve• OthereffectsàancillaryeffectsthatoccurThecentralfeatureoftheproposedlawwastheprohibitionofDr.Morgentaler’sproposedcliniconbasisofacommonandalmostunanimousoppositiontoabortionclinics

3)ThescopeofApplicableHeadsofPowerA)TheCriminalLaw:Anylawthathasitsdominantcharacteristictheprohibitionofanactivity,subjecttopenalsanctions,fora

publicpurposesuchaspeace,order,security,healthormoralityB)ProvincialHealthJurisdiction:doesconferonNSpoweroverhealthcareinprovincegenerallyie.cost/efficiency,natureof

healthcaredelivery,andprivatizationofmedicalservicesC)TheRegulationofAbortion:subjectforcriminallaw(sincemid19thcentury)bcinterferencew/pregnancyiscriminal

ApplicationofPrinciplestoCaseatBar• Thecentralpurposeanddominantcharacteristicistherestrictionofabortionassociallyundesirablepracticewhichshould

besuppressedorpunished

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• LegalEffect:Thelegislationexpresslyprohibitsperformanceofabortionincertaincircumstancesw/penalconsequences,whichistraditionallycrimlaw.Thepresentlegislationprohibitingtraditionallycriminalconductisaquestionofvalidityonitsface

• ExtrinsicEvidenceo DuplicationofCriminalCodeProvisions:Provinciallegislationhasbeenheldinvalidwhenitcontainslanguagethat

is“virtuallyindistinguishable”fromthatfoundinCode.Butthisdoesnotnecessarilydeterminevalidity,raisesaninference,themoreduplication=thestrongerinferencethatdominantpurposeiscriminal=stronginference

o Background:eventsleadingupsupportassertionthatlegislationdoesnotrelationtoprovincialjurisdictionoverhealth.Strengtheninferencethatimpugnedactdesignedtoservecrimlawpurpose

o CourtofEvents:CatalystforgovactionwasrumouredproposalofMorgentaler’sclinicandthiswasthemischiefitwantedtocorrect

o Hansard:Demonstratesthatprohibitionofclinic=centralconcernofmemberswhospoke,commonoppositionoffree-standingclinic,clinicviewedaspublicevil.NSsubmitsitwasconcernedaboutprivatization,costsandqualityofhealth,andpolicyagainsttiersystemofhealthaccess,butthiswasabsentthroughhansard

o SO:purpose/truenaturerelatetomatterofcrimlaw• SearchingforProvincialObjectives:

o Privatizationconcernswereincidentaltoparamountpurposeo Concernforhealthandsafetyofwomen=norecordtoindicatethatabortionsposedangero Privatizationconcernswerenotbroughtupuntilsecondreadingofacto Noevidenceregardingcost-effectivenessorqualityofmedicalservicesdeliveredatprivateclinico NSproposeagainstsurgeriesoutsidehospital,butwhydidn’tactprohibitsurgeriesgenerallythen?o Ifprovincespolicyweretoprohibitperformanceofanysurgicalproceduresoutsidehospitals,itwouldhavesaidso

(basedonreasoninginWestendorp)o Thefineswerenotmeasureforenforcement,butpenaltiestopunishabortionclinicsasinherentlywrong

Notes:• CautiononusingHansard

o Contradictorystatementsaresaido Wanttojudgethelaw–andnottheopinionsofthosewhocreatedito Shoulditmatterwhattheysaidorwhattheydiddointhecreationofthelegislation

• Colourability:beingmindfulofwhatthelegislationsaysversuswhatitisintendedtodo.Doesthe‘meatandbones’matchthepurposeoftheact.Pithandsubstanceisnotaboutthetheysaythey’redoingbutaboutwhattheyaredoing.

PithandSubstanceTestàTruenatureofthelaw;determinewhichsectionitfitsinto

• 1.Wanttodeterminethedominantpurpose–usinganalyticalsteps(intrinsic/extrinsicevidence)o Intrinsic(textitself):Looktothepreamble(ifthereisone)orthe‘purposesection’;Whetheritmentionsotheracts

–howitworkswiththoseo Extrinsic(outsideofwords):Backgroundcontext–‘mischiefrule’(themischieftheyweretryingtoprevent;

Legislativehistory–Hansardevidence;history/eventsleadinguptoit;policystudies/Canadianreports• 2.Legalandpracticaleffectsofthelaw

o Legaleffects:whatthelawdoes–howthelegislationasawholeaffectstherightsandliabilitiesofthoseindividualseffected–createanentitlement,establishasystem,enforceaprohibition

o Practicaleffect:othereffects(notnecessarilyrights/liabilities)–ancillaryeffectsthatoccuràflowfromthelegaleffects

• 3.Pithandsubstanceconclusiono Statementaboutwhatthepithandsubstanceisoncethisinformationiscanvassed–thisiswhereyouclassify

whetherthelawshouldfallineither91or92§ Scopeoftheapplicableheadsofpower

[Matterisdeterminedbythelaw’sdominantpurpose:“incidentaleffectswillnotdisturbtheconstitutionalityofanotherwiseintravireslaw.”(CWB)]

DOUBLEASPECTDOCTRINEWRLederman‘ClassificationofLawsandtheBritishNorthAmericanAct’1981

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• Courtsdealwiththeoverlappingoffederal+provincialcategoriesbylimitingthegeneralityoftheclassesoflawsby‘mutualmodification’

• Ex.Regulationoftrade+commerceisreducedto‘regulationofinterprovincialandinternationaltradeandcommerce’;andproperty+civilrightsaretoberendered‘property+civilrightsexceptthoseinvolvedininterprovincialandinternationaltradeandcommerce’

• Double-aspecttheory:Whenfederalandprovincialfeaturesofchallengedruleareofequivalentimportance,challengedrulecanbeenactedbyboththeFedandtheProvunderseparateaspects

• Requiresdifferentconduct.Iftheyaremerelycumulativeandnon-conflicting,thenbothrulesmayoperate.Iftheyconflict/callforinconsistentbehavior,federalprevails(DoctrineofParamountcy)andtheprovinciallawisinoperative(notinvalid–mayresumeifthefederallawisrepealed)

“Thedoubleaspectdoctrine,asitisknown,whichappliesinthecourseofapithandsubstanceanalysis,ensuresthatthepoliciesoftheelectedlegislatorsofbothlevelsofgovernmentarerespected.….ThedoubleaspectdoctrinerecognizesthatbothParliamentandtheprovinciallegislaturescanadoptvalidlegislationonasinglesubjectdependingontheperspectivefromwhichthelegislationisconsidered,thatis,dependingonthevarious"aspects"ofthe"matter"inquestion.”–CanadianWesternBank

MultipleAccessLtd.vMcCutcheon[1982]2SCR161*Doubleaspectdoctrineusedoverdoctrineofparamountcy[lawsareofequalimportance;noconflict]Facts:

• TheOntarioSecuritiesAct1970prohibitedinsidertradinginsharestradingontheTorontoStockExchange,andtheCanadaCorporationsAct1970hadalmostthesameprovisions,applicabletocorporationsincorporatedunderfederallaw

• ShareholderactionwasinitiatedagainstinsidersofMultipleAccessLtd,afederallyincorporatedcompany,andtheshareholderinitiatedproceedingsundertheOntarioSecuritiesAct

• TherespondentsarguedthattheOntariostatutecouldnotvalidlyapplytotheircasebecausetheregulationofthetradinginsharesoffederallyincorporatedcompanieswasinexclusivefederaljurisdiction–reliedonparamountcytoassertthattheOntarioprovisionwererenderedinoperativebytheprovisionsoftheCanadaCorporationActthatdealwiththeissue

Issues:• Whetherfedactandprovincialactarebothapplicable?Doesoneneedtobestruckdown?

Decision:• Bothstatutesarevalidandapplicableonthefacts

Ratio:• Thedoubleaspectdoctrineapplieswhenthecontrastbetweentherelativeimportanceofthetwofeaturesisnotsosharp–

whenthepowersofbothheadsofgovernmentareofequalimportancetherewouldseemlittlereasonwhenconsideringvaliditytokilloneandlettheotherlive

• ProvandFed“insidertrading”legislationisequal,noneedtokilloneAnalysis:(DicksonJ)1.AretheprovisionsoftheCanadianCorporatesActultravirestheParliamentofCanadainwholeorinpart?

• ResistregardingthemasredundanttoOnt.Legislation.Mustbeanalyzedonitsown.Also,manyprovincesdonotyethaveinsidertradinglegislation,sostrikingdownfed=potentialgapinpresentregulatoryschemes;provinceswouldhavenoprotection

• DoesthematterinP&Sfallw/inclassesallocatedtoparliament?o Yes–dealswithcompanylawoffederalcompanies,subjectmatterthatisnotw/inexclusivejurisdictionof

provinceso Legislatingfederalcompanies=dominion.(JohnDeerePlowcovWharton1915)underPOGG

§ itwasestablishedthatthepoweroflegislationwithreferencetotheincorporationofcompanieswithotherthanprovincialobjectsbelongsexclusivelytotheDominionParliamentasamattercoveredbypogg

o Extendstomaintenanceofthecompany,whichisdirectlyaffectedbyinsidertradingo Astatutemayfallunderseveralheads.o Securitieslegislationclearlyhasdoublecharacter.Theinsidertradingprovisionshavebothsecuritieslawand

companieslawaspectandwouldadoptdoubleaspectdoctrinetovalidatebothsetsofleg.Provisions• Doctrineapplicablewhenthecontrastbtwtherelativeimportanceofthetwofeaturesisnotsosharp–whenthefedand

prov.characteristicsoflegislationareroughlyequalinimportance,littlereasontokillone/letonlyonelive2.WhetherOntarioprovisionsareinapplicabletoinsidertradingofsecuritiesoffederallyincorporatedcompaniesasperinterjurisdictionalimmunityand/orareinoperativebyoverlappingprovisionsasperfederalparamountcy?Neitherdoctrineapplies.DoubleAspectDoctrine:Bothapplytotheirownspheres.

• Prov:92(13):buyingandsellingsharesonstockexchangeinTorontoissubjecttoprov.Legislation.Protectspeoplewhobuy/sellsharesinopenmarket;contracts;propertyrights

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• Fed:(91(2):regulatecorporationw/nationalbusinessobjective.Protectsshareholdersoffederallyincorporatedcompanies;prohibitharmfulbehavior;pogg:federalgovernmenthasjurisdictionoverincorporationoffederalcompanies

Dissent:(Estey)• The3dissentingjudgesdecidedthatthefederalprovisionswereinvalid,andcharacterizedthelegislationastheregulation

ofsecuritiesfallingwithinprovincialjurisdictionoverpropertyandcivilrightsratherthanasregulationofthefunctionalaspectsofafederallyincorporatedcompany

Notes:• ThedoubleaspectdoctrinehasitsoriginsinHodgevTheQueen(1883)• Inmostcases,thedoubleaspectdoctrineisnotanalyzedinthewayLedermanproposed–usuallyapplicationentailsthe

courtevidencingawillingnesstocharacterizeverysimilarfederalprovincialandfederalenactmentsindifferentwaysandinsuchamannerastoallowcourtstoupholdbothaspectsasvalid

• Ex.LawSocietyofBritishColumbiavMangat–federalallowednon-lawyerstorepresentclientsinproceedingsbeforetheImmigrationandRefugeeBoard,howeveraprovisionintheBCLegalProfessionActdidnotallownon-lawyersto.

o Decidedthatbothfeatureswereofequalimportanceandsoneithershouldbeignoredandparliamentshouldbeallowedtodeterminewhomayappearbeforethetribunalsithascreated

• Courtshaveinsistedthatjurisdictiontopasslawsinrelationtotheregulationoftradeorinrelationtolaborrelationsisexclusiveratherthanconcurrent

ANCILLARYDOCTRINE[OctopusTentacle]NecessarilyIncidental

• Thepithandsubstancedoctrineresultsinalawbeingupheldifitsdominantcharacteristicfallswithintheclassesofsubjectmatterallocatedtothejurisdictionoftheenactinggovernment

o Alawmayhaveanimpactonmattersoutsidetheenactinglegislature’sjurisdictionsolongastheseeffectsremainsecondaryorincidentalfeaturesofthelegislationratherthanitsmostimportantfeature

• Theancillarydoctrineisusedincaseswheretheprovisionbeingchallengedispartofalargerschemeoflegislation–whentheimpugnedlegislationisexaminedinisolationitappearstointrudeintothejurisdictionoftheotherlevelofgovernment

o Ifthelargerschemeofwhichtheimpugnedprovisionispartisconstitutionallyvalidthentheimpugnedprovisionmayalsobefoundvalidbecauseofitsrelationshiptothelargerscheme

o Willdependonhowwelltheoffendingprovisionsareintegratedintothevalidlegislativescheme–ifcloselyrelatedtheywillbedeemednecessarilyincidentaltothevalidschemeandthelawasawholewillbeupheld

AncillaryDoctrine- [Theancillarypowersdoctrineisnottobeconfusedwiththeincidentaleffectsrule.Theancillarypowersdoctrineapplies

where,ashere,aprovisionis,inpithandsubstance,outsidethecompetenceofitsenactingbody.Thepotentiallyinvalidprovisionwillbesavedwhereitisanimportantpartofabroaderlegislativeschemethatiswithinthecompetenceoftheenactingbody.Theincidentaleffectsrule,bycontrast,applieswhenaprovision,inpithandsubstance,lieswithinthecompetenceoftheenactingbodybuttouchesonasubjectassignedtotheotherlevelofgovernment.]

- Ancillarydoctrinetest–GeneralMotorscasewouldbecitedo Savethelawbecauseofthe‘dominanttideofconstitutionaldoctrines’(p.243)o Judgesdonotliketochopoffbranchesoflaw–becauseitprevents/strikesdowndemocraticallyelectedlaws

- Alawcanstillbeconstitutionalifbranchesorpiecesofitarenotwithinitslevel–cansaveitorcanseverthem- Iftoomanypartsofitareultravirestheentirelawcanbedeemedasunconstitutional

o Theworldofoverlapcontrastedwithwatertightcompartmentso Bothlevelsofgovernmentneedtodealwiththesameissueso Howdoespithandsubstanceallowforoverlap?

- Pithandsubstanceoftheoveralllaw/actisinsideitsjurisdictiono Whenaparticularsectionspithandsubstanceisoutsideitsjurisdictiono Thisiswhentheancillarydoctrineapplies–ifthatparticularsectionisultravirescanbesaved

GeneralMotorsofCanadaLtd.CityNationalLeasing[1989]1SCR641*Setsoutancillarydoctrinetest;generalregulationoftrade(s.91(2))Facts:

• CityNationalLeasing(CNL)broughtacivilactionagainstGMallegingthatitsufferedlossesasaresultofadiscriminatorypricingpolicythatconstitutedakindofanti-competitivebehaviorprohibitedbytheCombinesInvestigationAct–GMarguedthats.31.1wasbeyondthejurisdictionoftheparliamentbecausethecreationofcivilcausesofactionfallswithinprovincialjurisdictioninrelationtopropertyandcivilrights

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o S.31.1allowedpeoplewhoareharmedtosueoneanother(provincial–92(13))• [ThisrulingisnotableforitsholdingthattheCombineInvestigationAct(nowtheCompetitionAct)isavalidexerciseofthe

federalpoweroverthegeneralregulationoftradeo Itisalsonotableforsettingoutthegeneralapproachtothenecessarilyincidentaldoctrine]

Issues:• Whentheconstitutionalchallengeisfocusedonasingleprovisionofalargerlegislativescheme,howistheconstitutional

validityoftheprovisiontobedetermined?Decision:

• Actisavalidexerciseofgeneraltradeandcommerceunder91(2)andisfunctionallyrelated,evenifincidentalRatio:

• Stepsintheanalysistodetermineifasingleprovisionisconstitutionalvalidshouldbe:• 1)thecourtshoulddeterminewhethertheimpugnedprovisioncanbeviewedasintrudingonprovincialpowersandifsoto

whatextent• 2)thecourtmustestablishwhethertheactisvalidandiftheschemeisnotvalidthenthatistheend

o Iftheschemeoftheregulationisvalidthenthecourtmustdeterminewhethertheimpugnedprovisionissufficientlyintegratedwiththeschemethatitcanbeupheldbyvirtueofthatrelationship–requiresconsideringtheseriousnessoftheencroachmentonprovincialpowersinordertodecideontheproperstandardforsuchrelationship

Analysis:1. Whetherimpugnedprovisionisintrudingintoprovincialpowers?

• Itdoesencroach–92(13)–importantpowerWhatisthedegreeoftheintrusion?Whatistheseriousnessoftheencroachmentonprovincialpowers?

• 1)Lessintrusivebecauseitisremedialprovision,notsubstantiveinact(itspurposeistohelpenforcethesubstantiveaspectsoftheAct)

• 2)Limitedscopeoftheaction–doesnotcreateageneralcauseofaction;itsapplicationislimitedbytheprovisionsoftheact

• 3)Itiswellestablishedthatfederalcancreaterightsofcivilactionwheresuchmeasuresmaybeshowntobewarranted

2. IstheActValid?• Yes,undergeneraltrade+commerce• CompetitionActconstitutedaschemeofregulationvalidlyenactedbyParliamentpursuantto91(2)

3. Isprovisionconstitutionallyjustifiedbyreasonofitsconnectionw/validleg?(“fittest”)Howwellisitintegratedintothescheme;Howimportantisitfortheefficacyofthelegislation?

Note:It’sabalance:ifimpugnedprovisiononlyencroachesmarginallyonprovincialpowers,thena“functional”relationshipmaybesufficienttojustifyprovision.Ifhighlyintrusive,thenstricterfittestneeded.[theseriousnessoftheencroachmentshouldreflecttheseriousnessofthetestrequiredtoensurethatanappropriateconstitutionalbalanceismaintained]

• Theprovisionintrudes,inalimitedway,ontheimportantprovincialpowerovercivilrights(astricttestsuchas‘trulynecessary’or‘integral’isinappropriate)àWhethertheprovisionisfunctionallyrelatedtotheobjectiveofthelegislationandtothestructure+contentofthescheme

o Necessarylinkbtw.Provisionandact=functionallyrelated;wouldpasswithamore-stricttesto Itisaremedyboundedbyparametersoftheact;isintegratedintothepurposeandunderlyingphilosophyofthe

act;anddoesnotcreateopen-endedprivaterightofactionNote:Inafederalstate,overlapistobeaccommodatedandexpected.Allowforjudicialrestraintinproposingstricttestswhichresultinstrikingdownleg.Bothprovincialandfederalgovernmentshaveequalabilitytolegislateinwaysthatmayincidentallyaffectothergovernment’ssphereofpower.

QuebecAttorneyGeneralvLacombe2010SCC38*Forprovisions(ancillarypowersdoctrine)tobevalid;theymustfurtherthelegislationandnotbesupplementaryFacts:

• Abylawwasaddedbywayofanamendmenttothemunicipality’sgeneralzoningbylaw,forthepurposeofprohibitingtheconstructionanduseofaerodromeswithinaparticularpartofthemunicipalitywhichincludedGobeilLake

• Thisbylawwasenactedaftervigorouslobbyingbytheownersofsummerhomesandotherusersofarecreationallake(GobeilLake)

Issues:

24

• Thevalidityofabylawenactedin1995byamunicipalityinQuebec(Bylaw260)Decision:

• TheamendmentstothebylawdonotmeettherationalfunctionaltestfromGeneralMotors• Therefore,theamendingbylawisnotvalid

Ratio:• Inorderforprovisionstobevalid(ancillarypowersdoctrine)theymustfurtherthevalidlegislativeschemeandnotonly

complimentit• Italsocannotfunctionasastand-aloneprovisionandmustinsteadworktofurthertheobjectivesofthelegislationitis

under;canbeusedtofillinagapthattheoriginallegislationismissingAnalysis:(McLachlinJ)

• P+Sofgeneralzoningby-lawisregulatingtheuseofland(92(13))àitisvalid1. P&S:Amendmentprohibitsconstructionofaerodromesinlakezone,whilepermittingtheirconstructioninotherzones.

P&Sisregulationofaeronautics[legal/practicaleffects;context]–prohibitionofaerodromesonLakeGobeil2. AssignMattertoHeadofPower:aeronauticsfallstofederaljurisdiction(pogg–regulationofairplanes/airports)3. Isitancillary?

a. Howfaristheintrusion–isitamarginalorseriousencroachment?i. Isaprohibitionthemostseriousinterference?

b. Whatistherationalfunctionalreasonforthisintrusion–seemstobethemoreimportantquestioni. Thisbylawfailsontherationalfunctionsideofthetest

1. Ablanketbanofaerodromesacrosstheentiremunicipalitywasnotarationalpurpose–couldhaveonlybannedonvacationareas,anditmayhavebeensavedinthisparticularcase

2. Thisblanketbandoesnotfurthertheobjectivesofthezoninglaw,andthereisalackofconnectionontheareasaffected

c. Conclusion:Amendmentsonface+Impactaredirectedatremovingaviationactivitiesformpartofmunicipality• TheAncillaryPowersDoctrine

o Ancillarypowerswillonlysaveaprovisionthatisrationallyandfunctionallyconnectedtothepurposeofthelegislativeschemethatitpurportedly(actively)furthers–notenoughthatthemeasuresupplementthelegislativescheme

• Applicationoftheancillarypowersdoctrineo Aretheamendmentsvalidbecausetheyareancillarytovalidprovincialprovisions–dotheseamendmentsfurther

thepurposesofthelegislativeschemeormerelysupplementit?§ Aretheamendmentsafunctionalpartofthewhole

o Zoninglegislationhasasitspurposetheregulationoflanduse–functionsbyestablishingzones,orregionswhereparticularactivitiesmaybeconducted,thereforeseekingtoestablisharationalandfairbasisuponwhichlandusersmaypredicatetheirbehavior.Italsomusttreatsimilarareassimilarlyandavoidstand-offprohibitionsàtheunderlyingpurposeistorationalizelanduseforthebenefitofthegeneralpopulace

§ Acloseexaminationofthepurposesandeffectsofthebylaw260revealsitdoesnotfurthertheobjectivesofthezoninglawgenerally

§ Thebylawbanstheuseofaerodromesthroughoutthemunicipalityandnotjustconfinedtovacationareas–thereisalackofconnectionbetweenthenatureoftheareasaffectedandthebanonaerodromes

§ Thebylaw260treatsdifferentparcelsthesamebybroadlybanningwateraerodromesthroughoutthemunicipality,andsimilarparcelsdifferently

§ Itdoesnotfunctionaszoninglegislationbutratherastand-aloneprohibition§ Doesnotfillagaptheoriginalbylawismissing,doesnotremoveorfixaninconsistency,doesnotenhance

thebylawDissent:(Deschamps)

• Dissentedonthebasisthatamunicipalityhaspowersunder92(13)toregulatelanduseinwhatitconsiderstobethebestinterestsofitsresidents–reliedonthedoubleaspectdoctrine

INTERJURISDICTIONALIMMUNITY[CastleWalls]

• Thisdoctrineisintendedtoemphasizeexclusivityofjurisdictionàthereisatensionbetweenoverlap+‘exclusivity’o Comesintoactiontypicallywhenagenerallywordedprovinciallawisclearlyvalidinmostofitsapplicationsbutin

someofitsapplicationsitarguablyoverreaches,affectingamatterfallingwithinacoreareaoffederaljurisdiction

25

• Thisdoctrineprotectscertainmattersthatfallwithinfederaljurisdictionfromtheimpactorinterferenceofotherwisevalidprovinciallaws

• Whenthisdoctrineisinvokedthereisoftena‘readingdown’oftheprovincial/federalstatuteinordertoprotecttheexclusiveoppositelevelfromencroachment

o Readingdown–atechniqueofinterpretationusedtosavestatutesfromconstitutionalchallenge–thewordsofthestatuteareinterpretedtoapplyonlytomatterswithintheenactingbody’sjurisdiction

• Thisdoctrineoriginatedincasesinvolvingfederallyincorporatedcompaniesandfederallyregulatedundertakings–held

thatprovinciallawswouldhavetoberestrictedintheirapplicationiftheywouldhavetheeffectofimpairingthestatusoressentialpowersofafederallyincorporatedcompany

o S.92(10)Federalundertakings–ex.post,airplanes,RCMP,banks,railways,telecommunicationso Whenaprovincialaffectsavitaloressentialpartofthefederalundertakingthenthatprovinciallawdoesnot

apply/inapplicabletothatundertaking§ Doesnotstrikedownthelaw–justdoesnotapplytothefederalworkersàitisinapplicabletothem

• Donotwantprovinciallegislationtoimpairorsterilizetheoperationsofaninterprovincialcommunicationsundertaking• Bell#2

o IJItoapplywhereaprovinciallaw“affectsavitaloressentialpart”offederalundertakings(orviceversa)–provinciallawaffectedminimumwage,BellCanadasaiditcouldnotaffectthembecauseitwasanessentialpartoftheundertaking

o Argumenthereisthatminimumwagesdonotapplytofederalworkers§ Budgeting/allocatingresourcesarefundamentaltohowbusinessesarerun–vitaloressential

CanadianWesternBankvTheQueeninRightofAlberta[2007]2SCR3*Interjurisdictionalimmunitymustimpairacoreareaoftheoppositejurisdiction[changedfrom‘affect’]Facts:

• In2000,AlbertaenactedchangestotheInsuranceActandincludedfederallyincorporatedbankstofallundertheseprovisionsaswelltoensurepeoplehad‘peaceinmind’ininsuranceatbothprovincialandfederallyincorporatedbanks

• ThefederallyincorporatedbankstookactionagainstthisActsayingtheirinsurancewasonlyboundbytheBankActwhichfellunder91(15)oftheConstitutionandthattheInsuranceActwasconstitutionallyinapplicablebyvirtueoftheinterjurisdictionalimmunitydoctrine,orinoperativebyvirtueofthedoctrineoffederalparamountcy

Issue:• Whetherthiscaseshouldbedeterminedbyvirtueofthedoctrineofinterjurisdictionalimmunity?

Decision:• Concludedthereisnoconflictbetweentheprovincialandfederallegislationatissueandthattheprovinciallegislationcan

thereforeoperateinrelationtothebanksinAlbertawhichseektopromote‘peaceofmind’• Appealdismissed• IntheabsenceofpriorcaselawfavoringIJIapplicationtothesubjectmatterathand,acourtproceedingtothe

considerationoffederalparamountcywillgenerallybejustifiedRatio:

• Whentheapplicationoftheprovinciallegislationatissueisnotheldasenoughtoimpaironacoreareaoffederallegislativejurisdiction,thenthedoctrineofinterjurisdictionalimmunityshouldnotbeapplied

o Testchangedfrom‘affects’[Bell]to‘impairs’• Here,promoting‘peaceofmind’ininsuranceisnotseenasenoughtofallwithinthecoreofthefederalgovernment’s

jurisdictionoverbanking• ‘Acourtshouldfavor,wherepossible,theoperationofstatutesenactedbybothlevelsofgovernment’

Analysis:(BinnieandLebel)[WhatisIM?ANDwhywedon’tlikeit]• Thispowerisexclusivebecausetheconstitutionexpresslyspecifiesthis,andthisexclusivitypre-emptsthatofthelegislatures

andtheirgeneralandspecificapplicationinsofarassuchlawsaffectavitalpartoftheirundertaking.• Inpractice,seemstobeinvokedinfavoroffederalimmunityatexpenseofprovinciallegislation;althoughitismeanttobe

reciprocal• Wehaveseenfederalismasputtinggreatemphasisontheinterplaybetweenfederalandprovincialpowers(DicksonCJin

OPSEU)o TheconceptssuchasIJIand‘watertightcompartments’havenotbeenthedominanttideofconstitutional

doctrinesandrathertheundertowagainstthestrongpullofpithandsubstanceandtheaspectdoctrine(weare

26

notunderstandingthepurposeandeffectofthelawbutratherusingthesetojustifywhyonelevelofgovernments’lawshouldoverruleanother)

o Thedominanttideisprincipledintheconcernthatacourtshouldfavortheordinaryoperationofstatutesenactedbybothlevelsofgovernment

• Thesweepingimmunityarguedforbythebanksisnotacceptable.ItexposesdangersofallowingIMtoexceedproperlimitandfrustratesapplicationofP&Sanalysisanddoubleaspectdoctrine

o BroadapplicationcreatespracticalproblemandisinconsistentwithwhatP&S,doubleaspectaredesignedtopromote

o Requiresarbitrarilydefining“core”ofanindeterminatescope.NotcompatiblewithincrementalapproachofCanadianconstitutionalinterpretationàdifficulttodefine,exceptonacase-to-casebasis;Canadianconstitutionalinterpretationfavorsanincrementalapproach

• Effect:lawcannothaveincidentaleffects,despiteabsencesatotherlevels• LegalVacuum:IMdoesnotallowjurisdictiontostepininsituationswherefedhasn’toccupiedthefieldIMdoesn’tallowprovto

apply(thenthere’dbenolaw!)• Thecourtdoesnotfavorintensiverelianceonthisdoctrine,norisitacceptableasfirstrecourseindivisionofpowersdispute[RestrictedApplicationofIM]• InBell:Inorderforlegislationtobeinapplicable,itissufficientthatthestatutewhichpurportstoapplytothefederal

undertakingAFFECTsavitaloressentialpartofthatundertaking,withoutnecessarilygoingasfarasIMPAIRINGofparalyzingit.• Wesayaffectisnotstrongenoughbecausedoesnotimplyadverseimpact.àWhenthelegislationofonegovernment

impairs(Adverselyimpacts)thecorecompetence(vitaloressential)oftheotherlevelofgovernment,thatcoreisplacedinjeopardy[Intheabsenceofimpairment,IMdoesnotapply]

• Qualifiers:appliedwithrestraint,afterP&Sanddoubleaspecthavebeenapplied.Coreisbasedonexistingcaselawthatshowspastapplicationhasbeenconsideredabsolutelyindispensableornecessarytoenablethatjurisdictiontoachievethepurposeforwhichexclusivelegislativejurisdictionwasconferred

• Whatisthecore?• Thebasic,minimumandunassailablecontent”(minimum=necessarytomakethepowereffectiveforthepurposefor

whichitwasconferred)• Claimantsmustlocatethepromotionof“peaceofmind”insuranceatthecoreofbanking.

• Lookatwhattheframersintended‘banking’tomeanàtherearecorenotionsofbankingwehavetoholdonto• Thepromotionofpeaceofmindinsurancecanhardlybesaidtobevitaloressentialto“banking”

• ClaimantmustdemonstratethatlegislationIMPAIRScorecompetenceofundertaking–basedonexistingcaselawinpastapplicationhasbeenconsideredabsolutelyindispensableornecessarytoenablethatjurisdictiontoachievethepurposeforwhichexclusivelegislativejurisdictionwasconferred(can’taddnewcompetence)

Notes:• CourtsdonotliketouseIJI

o BynotusingIJIwedonothavetodeterminethecorefeatureofbankingo Wantoverlap/concurrencybetweenthetwolevelsofgovernmento Centralization–tendstofavorthefederalgovernmento Wanttouseitonlyinalimitedway[notacceptableasfirstrecourseindivisionofpowersdispute]–preferP+S,

doubleaspect,andparamountcy• BecauseofthosereasonsCourtslimititsscope

o Changestestfromaffectstoimpairso ‘Ingeneral’limittodecidedcases-Needstobepriorcaselawo Preferpithandsubstanceandparamountcy

Quebec(AttorneyGeneral)vCanadianOwnersandPilotsAssociation2010SCC39[TestforIJI]Facts:

• TworesidentsofQuebecbuildairstriponanagriculturallottheyowned–underthefederalAeronauticsActtheconstruction/operationofanairfieldforprivateaviationisnotsubjecttoarequirementofpriorpermission[registrationisoption–ifdopubliccanlandthere–theyregisteredit]

• Unders.26oftheprovincialPreservationofAgriculturalandAgriculturalActivitiesActthisviolatesuseofagriculturallandfornon-agriculturalfunction[withoutauthorizationfromtheCommission]–wereorderedtodemolishthestrip

• Challengedthats.26wasultravires/inapplicableasitaffectedthelocationofaerodromes(IJI)orinoperativebyconflictingwithfederallaw(paramountcy)

Issues:• Doess.26interferewith/impairthefederalpoweroveraeronautics(IJIdoctrine)

27

Decision:• Thedoctrineofinterjurisdictionalimmunityisapplicableinthiscaseasthelocationofaerodromesliesatthecoreofthe

federalcompetenceoveraeronauticsands.26impingesonthiscoreinwaythatimpairsthisfederalpowerRatio:(IJITest)

• 1)Doestheprovinciallawtrenchesontheprotected‘core’ofafederalcompetence• 2)Ifso,thentodeterminewhetherthelaw’seffectontheexerciseoftheprotectedfederalpowerissufficientlyseriousto

invokethedoctrineofIJI[Thetesttodeterminehowseriousaninterferencemustbe,iswhethertheprovinciallawimpairsthefederalexerciseofthecorecompetence(CanadianWesternBank)]

o MustbeseriouslyorsignificantlyrestrictingtofederalpoweràIfyes,thenlawisinapplicablebyvirtueofIJIAnalysis:

• DominantpurposeoftheentireprovincialActwasthepreservationofagriculturallandandthereforeintravires–theaerodromeswasincidentalinterferencethereforethelawisstillintravires

Doess.26trenchontheprotectedcore?• AeronauticshasbeenheldtoamatterofnationalimportanceandhencesupportedunderPOGGpower–extendingfrom

operationofaircrafttotheoperationandregulationofthedesign/locationofairports• Airportsandaerodromestogetherconstituteanetworkoflandingplacesthatfacilitateairtransportationandensuresafety

–thereforeitisunderstoodthatthefederaljurisdictionoveraeronauticsencompassesthepowertodeterminethelocationofaerodromes

• Todeterminewhetherapowerliesataprotectedcore,wemustdetermineifthesubjectcomeswithintheessentialjurisdiction–the‘basic,minimum,andunassailablecontent’ofthelegislativepowerinquestion

o InCanadianWesternBankitwasheldthatIJIshouldbereservedforsituationsalreadycoveredbyprecedent• Hereprecedentisavailable–thecourthasheldthelocationofaerodromeslieswithinthecoreofthefederal

aeronauticspowero InJohannesson,thecourtheldthatthelocationofaerodromesisanessentialandindivisiblepartofaeronauticso Long-standingprecedentestablishesthatwhereaircraftmaytakeoffandlandisamatterprotectedbythe

doctrineofIJI,theretheActinquestiontrenchesonthecoreofthefederalaeronauticspower[interprovincial/nationallyconnected]

Doess.26unacceptablyimpairafederalcorecompetency?• Doestheapplicationoftheprovinciallegislationimpairthepowerofparliamenttoregulatetheestablishmentofprivate

aerodromes?• S.26doesimpairthefederalpowertodecidewhenandwhereaerodromesshouldbebuilt,asitprohibitsthebuildingof

aerodromesonagriculturallandswithoutpriorauthorization–andtheeffectmaybetopreventthebuildingofanewaerodromeorrequiredemolitionofanexistingone

• Takingthepoweroutofthehandsofonegovernmentandhandingittoanotherisacorefeatureofimpairment• Thedoctrineoffederalparamountcywouldallowparliamenttooverrideprovincialzoninglegislationforestablishing

aerodromes,howeverthisActwouldseriouslyaffectthemannerinwhichthepowercouldbeexercisedasparliamentwouldhavetolegislateforeachspecificlocationofparticularaerodromes

Dissent:(Deschamps)• Agreeprivateaerodromelocationsfallwithinthecoreoffederaljurisdiction,howeverformulatedthe‘impairment’

questiondifferentlyandaskedwhetherapplicationofthatlegislationwouldimpairtheactivityofsmall-scaleaviation–thereforewoulddeterminethatallowings.26toapplyinthecircumstanceswouldnotimpairtheactivityofsmall-scaleaviationandthattherequestedimmunityshouldnotbegranted

Canadav.PHSCommunityServicesSociety,2011SCC44[Insite]“Insummary,thedoctrineofinterjurisdictionalimmunityisnarrow.ItspremiseoffixedwatertightcoresisintensionwiththeevolutionofCanadianconstitutionalinterpretationtowardsthemoreflexibleconceptsofdoubleaspectandcooperativefederalism.Toapplyitherewoulddisturbsettledcompetenciesandintroduceuncertaintiesfornewones.Quitesimply,thedoctrineisneithernecessarynorhelpfulintheresolutionofthecontestherebetweenthefederalgovernmentandtheprovincialgovernment.”[*AttemptatreversingIJItoapplytoprovinciallaw;renderingthefederaloneinapplicable]

• DoesthecriminalcodeapplyinsidetheInsite?o Maybefederalcriminalprovisionscannotgetinsidethishealthcarefacility

• Heldthefedlawisvalid,buttreatmentservicesinnotacorecompetencyforprovincialjurisdictionoverhealthcare• EssentiallythecourtrespondedwiththeideaagainthattheydonotlikeIJI

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BankofMontrealv.Marcotte,2014SCC55• Interjurisdictionalimmunityoperatestopreventlawsenactedbyonelevelofgovernmentfromimpermissiblytrenchingonthe

“unassailablecore”ofjurisdictionreservedfortheotherlevelofgovernment.• Whileinterjurisdictionalimmunityremainsanextantconstitutionaldoctrine,thisCourthascautionedagainstexcessivereliance

onit.Abroadapplicationofthedoctrineisintensionwiththemoderncooperativeapproachtofederalismwhichfavors,wherepossible,theapplicationofstatutesenactedbybothlevelsofgovernment.Assuch,thisCourtinCanadianWesternBankheldthatthedoctrinemustbeapplied“withrestraint”and“shouldingeneralbereservedforsituationsalreadycoveredbyprecedent”.Wenotethatthereisnoprecedentforthedoctrine’sapplicationtothecreditcardactivitiesofbanks.

• Intherarecircumstancesinwhichinterjurisdictionalimmunityapplies,aprovinciallawwillbeinapplicabletotheextentthatitsapplicationwould“impair”thecoreofafederalpower.Impairmentoccurswherethefederalpoweris“seriouslyorsignificantlytrammel[ed]”,particularlyinour“eraofcooperative,flexiblefederalism”

OPERABILITY–THEPARAMOUNTCYDOCTRINE

• InCanadatheconstitutionissilentontheissueofhowtodealwiththeoverlapandconflictbetweennationalandprovinciallawswiththreeexceptions:

o S.95oftheConstitutionActof1867–recognizesagricultureandimmigrationasareasofconcurrentjurisdictionandprovidesthatprovinciallawsshouldhaveeffectonlytotheextentthattheyarenot‘repugnant’toanyActofParliament

o S.92A,addedbyconstitutionalamendmentin1982,confersonprovinciallegislaturesaconcurrentpowertoenactlawsinrelationtotheexportofnaturalresourcestootherprovinces,subjecttotheparamountcyoffederallegislationinthecaseofconflict

o Section94Aaddedbyamendmentsprovidesforconcurrencyinrelationtoold-agepensionsandsupplementarybenefitsbutprovidesaformofprovincialparamountcybystatingthatnofederallaw‘shallaffecttheoperationofanylawpresentorfutureofaprovinciallegislationinrelationtoanysuchmatter’

• Paramountcy:Ajudiciallycreatedrulefillingthegaponhowtodealwithoverlap/conflictmodelledontherulefoundins.95

o Providesthatincasesofconflictthefederallawisparamountandtheprovinciallawisinoperativetotheextentoftheconflict

o Thisdoesnotmakeaprovinciallawinvalid,itsoperationissimplysuspendedtotheextentthatitconflictswithfederallegislation[Ifthefederallawisappealed,theprovinciallawmayre-operateasbefore]

• Keyissueishowtodeterminewhetherconflictexistsbetweenthetwolevelso Usethe‘expressconflict’or‘impossibilityofdualcompliance’test

§ Anarrowreadingofconflictwhichallowsforbothfederalandprovinciallawstooperateunlessitisimpossibleforthosesubjectto,orresponsibleforgivingeffectto,thetwolegislativeschemestocomplywithboth

o The‘coveringthefield’testor‘negativeimplications’doctrine§ Broadreading–holdsaprovinciallawinoperativewheneverithasanimpactonamatteralready

regulatedbyavalidfederallawo Canalsodefineitasanincompatibilityoflegislativepoliciesorobjectives

§ FocusisontheintentionofthelegislaturethatenjoysthebenefitofparamountcyParamountcyTest:

1) Bothlawsvalid?[MultipleAccess]a. Inpithandsubstanceisitvalid?b. Doesthedoubleaspectdoctrineapply?

2) Isthereconflict/inconsistencybetweenthelaws?[Hall]a. Isitimpossibletocomplywithboth?b. DoesProvincialfrustratefederalpurpose?

Ratios:• McCutcheon:iftherearetwolawsthatconflict,thenthefederalparamountcyprincipleapplies.Duplicationisnotenough.• Hall:Ifthepurposeofthelawfrustratesintent,thentotheextentofthefrustrationoccursthenitisofnoforceoreffect• Rothmans:Ifthepurposeofthelawfurtherstheintent(althoughitismoreonerous)anditispossibletocomplyw/both,

thenbothcanexist

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MultipleAccessLtd.vMcCutcheon[1982]2SCR161*Rejectionofthecoveringthefieldtest;duplicationw/oconflictisnotenough[impossibilityofdualcomplianceneeded][Citedfordeterminingthevalidityofthetests]Facts:

• Ont.SecuritiesActprohibitedinsidertradinginSharestradingontheTorontoStockExchange,andtheCanadaCorporationsActhadalmostthesameprovisions,applicabletocorporationsincorporatedunderfederallaw.ShareholderinitiatedproceedingsagainstMAundertheOnt.SA’s.MAreliedonparamountcytosaytheprovincialActwasrenderedinoperativesinceMAwasfederallyincorporated[advantageousasthefederalAct’slimitationperiodhadexpired]

• BothAct’sintravirestotheirrespectivelevelsofpowerIssues:

• IstheOntariolegislationrenderedinoperativetotheextentthatitoverlappedwithvirtuallyidenticalprovisionsofthefederalact?

Decision:• No–notrenderedinoperativebecausethedoubleaspectdoctrineapplies

Ratio:• Duplicationwithoutactualconflictorexpresscontradictionisnotenoughtoinvokethedoctrineofparamountcyandto

renderotherwisevalidprovinciallegislationinoperativeàTwothingsdoingthesamethingisthe‘ultimateinharmony’• Ifimpossibletocomplywithboth,thenparamountcyapplies[impossibilityofdualcompliance]

Analysis:(DicksonJ)• HenryJ(trial)tookanarrow(modern)approachtotheconflictwiththeresultofleavingtotheprovincesamplelegislative

roomo Approach(proposedbyMartlandJinSmithvTheQueen)thatactsmightbepunishableunderbothprovisionsand

thereforetheprovisionsoverlap,howeverwhenthereisnoconflictinthesensethatcompliancewithonelawinvolvesbreachofanother,itwouldthenappeartheycanoperateconcurrently

o Believeddoubleliabilitywouldbeavoidedbycooperationbetweenadministratorsandtheordinarysupervisionofthecourtsoverduplicationofproceedingsbeforethem

• JusticeMorden(appeal)adoptedtheolderviewthattheauthoritiesestablishoneoftheimplicationsoffederalparamountcytobethatprovincialduplicativelegislationissuspendedandinoperative

o Lederman–ifbothlevelsareduplicates,theneverysituationcoveredbyoneislikelycoveredbytheother,andthereisnoprovincialroomleft,givenfulloperationofthefederallaw

• DicksonJ(SCC)–Thereisnotrueinconsistencyinthecaseofmerelyduplicateprovisionssinceitdoesnotmatterwhichstatuteisapplied–thelegislativepurposeofParliamentwillbefulfilledregardlessofwhichstatuteisinvoked

o Duplicationwithoutactualconflict/contradictionisnotenoughtoinvokethedoctrineofparamountcyandtorenderotherwisevalidprovinciallegislationinoperative=harmoniousduplication

o Conflict=impossibilityofdualcomplianceàonesaysyes,othersaysno[hightest;difficulttoachieve]

BankofMontrealvHall[1990]1SCR121[purposiveapproach]*IfcompliancewithprovincialstatutefrustratesParliament’slegislativepurpose,thendualcomplianceisimpossibleFacts:

• Hallwasafarmerandcontractedloansfromabankandinreturngrantedthebankasecurityinterestonapieceoffarmmachinerypursuanttowhatwasthens.88ofthefederalBankAct(nows.178)[Intravires–federalcontrolsbanks]

• Halldefaultedonhisloanandthebank,pursuanttotheprovisionsoftheBankAct,seizedthepieceofmachineryandbroughtanactiontoenforceitsrealpropertymortgageloanagreement

• Thebankdidnotfollowtheproceduresestablishedunders.27intheLimitationsofCivilRightsAct,whicharethatfailuretogivethemandatorynoticeofintentiontoseizeresultsintheterminationofthesecurityinterestandthereleaseofthedebtorfromfurtherobligations[Intravires–provincialcontrolscivillimitationsandpropertyandcivilrights]

• IntheQBthechamberjudgedecidedthatthebankdidnothavetocomplywiththeprovinciallegislation,howevertheappealcourtreversedthatdecision

Issues:• Whethertheprovinciallegislationwasrenderedinoperativebecauseofaconflictwithfederallegislation

Decision:• Appealallowed–Parliament,underitspowertoregulatebanking,hasenactedacompletecodethatdefinesandprovides

fortherealizationofasecurityinterestàThereisnoroomleftfortheoperationoftheprovinciallegislationandthereforeitshouldbeconstruedasinapplicabletotheextentthatittrenchesonvalidfederalbankinglegislation

• Ss.19-36oftheLimitationofCivilRightsActareinoperativetosecuritytakenpursuanttoss.178and179oftheBankActRatio:

30

• IfcompliancewithprovincialstatutefrustratesParliament’slegislativepurpose,thendualcomplianceisimpossibleAnalysis:

• McCutcheontestforconflict:Itthereanactualconflictinoperation?• [Frustrationofpurposeisaconflictthatshouldtriggertheparamountcydoctrine]• 1.ExamineProvincialLegislation/purpose:ajudgemustdeterminewhen,andifasecurity/articleistobeseized–

procedureislaidoutforacreditortofollowtotakepossessionofhissecurity• 2.ExamineFedLegislation:Assignedthebankanimmediaterighttoseizeandsellthosegoods,subjectonlytothe

conditionsrequiredbytheBankact.• Thereisactualconflictbeforethem.Compliancewithfedentailsdefianceofprovincialcounterpart.Cannotrequirebankto

defertoprovinciallegislation=displaceintentofparliament.• Dualcomplianceisimpossiblewhenapplicationofprovincialstatutefrustratesparliamentsleg.Purpose.(whichistohavea

uniformbankingsystemacrossCanada)• Parliamenthasmadeacompletecodeandthereisnoroomleftforprovincial.Thatlegislationshouldbeconstruedas

inapplicabletotheextentthatittrenchesonvalidfederalbankinglegislation.Notes:

• Dualcomplianceispossiblebygivingnoticebeforeseizingsecurities–cancomplywithbothbutthepurposeofthefederalActisfrustratedwhentheprovincialActisadheredto

Rothmans,Benson,&HedgesInc.vSaskatchewan[2005]1SCR188*Purposeofonefurthersintentofanother+cancomplywithboth;bothcanexistFacts:

• ParliamentenactedtheTobaccoActin1997ands.19prohibitsthepromotionoftobaccoproductsandtobacco-relatedbrandelementsexceptasauthorizedelsewhereintheActoritsregulations;s.30(1)providesthatanypersonmaydisplay,atretail,atobaccoproductoranaccessorythatdisplaysatobaccorelatedbrandelement;s.30(2)furtherprovidesthatretailersmaypostsignsindicatingtheavailabilityandpriceoftobaccoproducts

• In2002theTobaccoControlActcameintoforceinSK,ands.6ofthatActbansalladvertising,display,andpromotionoftobacco/relatedproductsinanypremiseswherepersonsunder18arepermitted[More-strictstandardthanwhattheTobaccoActimposed]

Issues:• CanbothAct’sbecompliedwithatthesametime?Oriss.6oftheSKActsufficientlyinconsistentwiths.30ofthefederal

ActastorenderitinoperativeDecision:

• Noinconsistencybetweentherelevantprovisionsofthetwoactsandthereforenottoberenderedinoperative;purposeoffederalActisnotfrustratedbythecompliancewiththeprovincialAct

Ratio:• IfthepurposeoftheActfurtherstheintent(althoughitismoreonerous)anditispossibletocomplywithboth,theyboth

canexistAnalysis:(MajorJ)

• Examinationofthecharacterofs.30oftheTobaccoAct(Fed.)o Clearthatthepurposeandeffectistodefinewithgreaterprecisiontheprohibitiononthepromotionoftobacco

productscontainedins.19o S.30didnotgrantretailersapositiveentitlementtodisplaytobaccoproductso TheTobaccoActisdirectedatapublichealthevilandcontainsprohibitionsaccompaniedbypenalsanctionsà

TheTobaccoControlActalsohasasimilarpurpose,butitmore-strictCanapersonsimultaneouslycomplywiths.6oftheTobaccoControlActands.30oftheTobaccoAct?

• ItisobviousthatapersoncancomplywithbothActso Byadmittingnooneunder18onthepremisesorbynotdisplayingtobacco/tobacco-relatedproducts

• TheTobaccoControlActsimplyprohibitswhatParliamenthasoptednottoprohibitinitsownlegislationandregulations• Foranimpossibilityofdualcompliancetoexist,s.30wouldhavetorequireretailerstodowhattheTobaccoControlAct

prohibits–todisplaytobaccoortobacco-relatedproductstoyoungpersonsDoess.6oftheTobaccoControlActfrustratedparliament’spurposeinenactings.30oftheTobaccoAct?

• BoththegeneralpurposeoftheTobaccoAct(toaddressanationalpublichealthconcern)andthespecificpurposeofs.30(tocircumscribethegeneralprohibitionsetoutins.19)remainfulfilled

• Namely,s.6oftheTobaccoControlActseemstofurtheratleast2statedpurposesoftheTobaccoActo Toprotectyoungpersonsfrominducementstousetobaccoproductsandtoprotectthehealthofyoungpersons

byrestrictingaccesstotheproducts

31

PEACE,ORDER,ANDGOODGOVERNMENT(p.323-335)• Sincethe1930s,thedistinguishingfeatureofthemoderninterpretationofpogghasbeenthere-emergenceofthenational

concerndoctrine–whichwasfirstintroducedbyLordWatsonintheLocalProhibitioncaseo Usingitinaformthatallowsforfederallegislationinsituationsofnationalconcernapartfromemergencies

• ThenationalconcerndoctrinewasgivenamodernformulationbyViscountSimoninAGOntariovCanadaTemperanceFederation[1946]àaffirmingRussell‘ThetruetestmustbefoundintherealsubjectmatterofthelegislationifitsuchthatitgoesbeyondlocalorprovincialconcernorinterestsandmustfromitsinherentnaturebetheconcernoftheDominionasawholethenitwillfallinthecompetenceoftheDominionParliamentasamatteraffectingpeace,order,andgoodgovernment’

o UsedtoreaffirmthevalidityofRussellandalsorejectthatRussellwasbaseduponafindingthattemperanceconstitutedanationalemergency

• Thenationalconcerndoctrine[issueswithnationaldimensions]assetoutinCanadaTemperanceFederationwasappliedtovalidatefederallegislationintwocasesdecidedbytheSupremeCourtinthe50sand60s

o 1)InJohannessonvRuralMunicipalityofWestSt.Paul[1952]–[aeronautics]§ Acaseinvolvingthecontrollingofthelocationofairports–themajorityreferredtothedoctrineas

supportingfederallegislativejurisdictionwithrespecttothewholefieldofaeronauticso 2)InMunrovNationalCapitalCommission[1966]

§ TheSupremeCourtunanimouslyupheldtheNationalCapitalActonthebasisofthefederalpoggpowerànationalcapitalregionasa‘singlematterofnationalconcern’

• GapbranchàIfnotcoveredunderprovincialpowers,federalcanstepino TheRadioReferenceusedtheopeningwordsins.91tosuggestthatitauthorizesfederallegislationtosubject

mattersnotexplicitlyassignedtoeitherlevelofgovernment[Gapbranch]o JonesvAGNewBrunswick[1975][gapbranch]

§ IssuewastheOfficialLanguagesActwhichprovidedforequalstatusofFrenchandEnglishinfederalinstitutions

§ Legislationwasunanimouslyupheldonthebasisthatfederalinstitutionsare“clearlybeyondprovincialreachandthereforefallwithintheopeningwordsofs.91becauseoftheresiduarypower”

• Emergencybrancho FortFrancis;BoardofCommerce

• Theuncertaintyaboutthepoggscopeo ReferencereAnti-InflationAct–thisActwasdraftedinawaythatallowedthefederalgovernmenttoargueits

validityundereitherthenationaldimensiondoctrineortheemergencydoctrine

ReferencereAnti-InflationAct[1976]2SCR373,68DLR(3d)452*EmergencydoctrineFacts:

• (Trudeauenactsprice/wagecontrol–zap)• TheAnti-InflationActestablishedasystemofprice,profit,andincomecontrols–appliedtoprivatesectorfirmswithmore

than500employees,membersofdesignatedprofessions,constructionfirmswithmorethan20employees,andotherprivatesectorfirms–alsotopublicsectorifagreementwasmadew/province

Issues:• Whetherthisactissupportableunderpoggasanemergencyor‘crisis’legislation?

Decision:• Actisvalidforpogganddoesnotinvadeprovinciallegislativejurisdictionduetoitstemporarynature

Analysis:(Laskin)• Thegeneralpowerintheopeningsectionof91(pogg)isfedbyotherenumeratedfederalpowersconsideredtobe

paramount[Includetherelationtotheregulationoftradeandcommerce,inrelationtobankingandtheissueofpapermoney,inrelationtointerest,totheraisingofmoneybyanymodeofsystemoftaxation,andtotheborrowingofmoneyonpubliccredit;underCanadaTemperanceCase[economiccrisissufficientenoughtowarrantintervention]

• 1.Didactcontradictcontentbecauseitexcludedprovincialpublicsectorfromscope,notwithstandingthatitisframedastemporarymeasure?

Purpose:bringingbusinessesw/intheactwhichareofstrategicimportancetothecontainmentandreductionofinflationinCanada

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Reasonablepolicytoallowprovincestocontractintoprogramunderownadminifthatwastheirpreference.Co-operativefederalismallowed(BoardofCommerce)Addingprovisionstoincludepublicsectorsdoesnotindicatetheydidnotactwithurgency

• 2.Isfederalcontentionassistedbypreamble?Preamble:inflation=matterofseriousnationalconcern,necessarytorestrainprofitmargins,prices,etc.PreambleissufficientlyindicativethatParliamentwasintroducingafar-reachingprogrampromptedbyviewofseriousnationalconditionPreambleisabase,butnotenoughtodecidevalidityon

• 3.Doesextrinsicevidence/judicialnoticebackitup?Thesocialandeconomicpolicyandhencegovernmentalandlegislativejudgment.Notcourttodecideiftherewasnationalemergency,buttodecideiftherewasrationalbasisthatsupportsparliamentsassertionthattherewasanationalemergencyCourtdidhaverationalbasisforregardinganti-inflationactasmeasuretotemporarilynecessarytomeetsituationofeconomiccrisisimperilingwellbeingofCanadaandrequiringparliament’sinterventionIfthereisaclearfactintheworldjudicialnoticewillbetakenevenifnotputinfrontofthem

• 4.IsitatenableargumentthatexceptionalcharactercouldbelenttothelegislationbeyondthatoflocalorprovincialconcernsbecauseParliamentcouldreasonablytakeviewthatitwasnecessarymeasuretofortifyactioninotherareasoffederalauthority,suchasmonetarypolicy?

Thefactthatinflationhasbeenrising,inflationisamonetaryphenomenonandthatmonetarypolicyisw.infedjurisdiction,allowsparliamentofCanada,inthesecircumstances,toactovermonetarypolicy

• Parliamententitled–inflation=monetaryphenomenon/monetarypolicyisinexclusivefederaljurisdiction;trade+commerce;sobyusingpoggfederalgovernmentisproceedingfromfederallegislativepowerbases

Dissent:(Beetz)• [Startingpremises]TheActandtheGuidelinesdirectlyinterferewithclassesofmatterswhichhavebeenheldtocome

withinexclusiveprovincialjurisdiction–propertyandcivilrights,andthelawofcontract;andthisinterferenceisnotincidentalbutonalargescale

• [Problemsw/gaptheory]IfthecontainmentandreductionofinflationgoesbeyondlocalprovincialconcernandfallswithinpoggthenParliamentcouldmovetopreventorcontrolanyotherefficientmethodreasonablyconnectedwiththecontrolofinflation[salaries,wages,tuition;inventories/rationfoodàanythingtopreventhoardingprofits]

• [Hypotheticalconsequences]Agreesthatinflationwastheoccasion/reasonfortheenactmentoftheAct,howevernotthatinflationisthesubject-matter/truecharacteristicsoftheActàclearlyalawrelatingtothecontrolofprofitmargins,prices,dividends,andcompensation

• PropertyandcivilrightsarethepithandsubstanceoftheAnti-InflationActandParliamentcannot,asidefromnationalemergencyorfromconstitutionalamendment,fightinflationwithpowersexclusivelyreservedforProvinces

• DisagreethattheNationalConcernDoctrineandtheEmergencyDoctrineamounttothesameo NationalConcernappliesifcertainheads(ex.Aeronautics)wereaddedtothecategoriesofsubjectmattersunder

s.91whenitisfoundbytheCourtsthataclassofsubjectsnotenumeratedineithersectionsandisnotofamerelylocalnature–thiseffectonceappliedispermanent

o TheEmergencyDoctrineallowsParliamenttomakelawsincrisisbutislimitedbythetemporarynatureofthecrisis

• Ifthispowerisuseditmustbeexplicitandnotleaveanypartsuptointerpretation–ifoverridingaprovincialpower,theremustbeasignalthatisactingpursuanttoitsextraordinarypower

o Testofexplicitness:Whatisrequiredisanindication/proclamationinthetitle,thepreamble,orthetextwhichcannotleaveanydoubt,giventhenatureofthecrisis,thatthefederalgovernmentaimstoactonthebasisofthatpower

• [Degreeofunity]àDistinctiveness,singleness,andindivisibilityNotes:

• HowBeetzdissentbecamethelawàArgumentsaboutnationalconcernbecomesthelawinZellerbachandalsoanEmergencyActispassedwhereifthegovernmentistooperateunderemergencypowersitmustdosoexplicitly

RvCrownZellerbachCanadaLtd[1988]1SCR401(p.323)*Problemsw/nationalconcerndoctrine;provincialinabilitytestFacts:

• Validityofs.4(1)ofthefederalOceanDumpingControlAct,whichprohibitsdumpingofanysubstanceatseaexceptinaccordancewithitstermsandconditionsofapermit;therespondentcarriesonloggingoperationsonVancouverIslandandmaintainsalogdumponawaterlotleasedfromtheprovincialCrownforthepurposeoflogboomingandstorage

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• TheonlypermittherespondenthadwasonetodumpatasiteinJohnstoneStrait(2.2milesfromwherethewood-wastewasdumped)

• Thetrialcourtfounds.4(1)ultraviresanddismissedthecharges;thecourtofappealdismissedtheappealIssues:

• Istheactultraviresinregulatingofdumpingofwasteinwaterswithinaprovince?Decision:

• Notultravires–probleminvolvesfederalcompetenceandissavedbynationaldimensiondoctrineAnalysis:(LeDain)• Purpose:regulatedumpingofsubstancesatseainordertopreventvariouskindsofharmtomarineenvironment.(Actappears

tofulfillinternationaltreatyobligations)o Howevernotexpresslystatedintheact,onlyreferencesweremade

• CZsaysthereisnofederaljurisdictiontocontroldumpinginprovincialwatersofsubstancesnotshowntohavepollutanteffect• AGsayactissinglematterofnationalconcern,orpoggdimension:preventionofoceanandmarinepollution.CZsaysto

prohibitdumpingofANYsubstance=noinaccordancewithpurpose• LeDain–purpose:directedtocontrolregulationofmarinepollution.NecessarytopreventANYdumpingsubstancewithout

permitsothatauthoritycandeterminebeforedumpingoccurs,whetherithasanadverseeffectonthemarineenvironment.• LeDain–s.91:seacoastandinlandfisheriesisnotsufficientbyitselftosupportconstitutionalvalidityofAct.Nojustification

foundinS.91.• Nationalconcerndoctrine:(p.326)

o 1.Separateanddistinctformnationalemergencydoctrine[emergencybranch]–whichistemporaryo 2.Appliestobothnewmatters,andmatterswhichexistedatconfederationofalocalorprivatenature,butin

absenceofnationalemergency,becomemattersofnationalconcerno 3.Musthavesingleness,distinctiveness,andindivisibilitythatclearlydistinguishesitfrommattersofprovincial

concernandascaleofimpactonprovincialjurisdictionthatisreconcilablew/thefundamentaldistributionoflegpoweràcannotbebroadcategoriesw/toomanyelements(ex.Environment);mustbecarefullydefinedandasingleissuethatotherissuesarenotflowingfrom

o 4.Provincialinabilitytest–§ Isitreconcilablewiththefundamentaldistributionoflegislativepower?§ Relevanttoconsiderwhatwouldbetheeffectonextra-provincialinterestsofaprovincialfailuretodeal

effectivelyw/controlorregulationoftheintra-provincialaspectsofthematter.Necessarytofillthegapofprovincialpowers

• Nationalconcerndoctrineappliesbecause:1) Interprovincialregulation:Federaljurisdictiontolegislateforpollutionofprovincialwatersappliesbecauseit

reducestheriskthatcitizensofoneprovincewouldbeharmedbynon-cooperationofanotherprovince.2) [Distinguishable]Marinepollutionhasitsowncharacteristicsthatdistinguishitfromfreshwaterpollution3) [Single/Indivisible]:Marinepollutionbyoceandumpingisaseparateformofwaterpollution

Dissenting:(LaForest):• Onlyalocalmatter,notanemergencyrequiringgraveproportionsthatdisplaceordinarydivisionsofpower.Prohibitionnot

linkedtopurpose:becauseprohibitsANYdumping.• Environmentfallsundermixedjurisdiction• Thechallengethenforthecourts,willbetoallowthefederalgovernmentsufficientscopetoacquititselfofitsdutiesto

dealwithnationalandinternationalproblemswhile respectingtheschemeoffederalism• DoesnotmeetSDItest[insufficientlydiscrete]–Marinewatersarenotwhollyboundedbythecoast–canextend

upstreamintolongrivers–withoutaclearlimit,handingtoomuchpower;Thelinebetweensaltandfreshwatercannotbedemarcatedclearly;Pollutionoftheoceanisnotconfinedtopollutionemanatingfromsubstancesdepositedinwater

• Fedcannotregulatealocalindustrytocontroloceanpollution–canonlyregulateactivitiesonanindustryfallingwithinfederalpower

POGGandtheEnvironment:FriendsoftheOldmanRiverSocietyv.Canada(MinisterofTransport)[1992]1S.C.R.3.

• Environmentalregulation:classicexampleofdoubleaspect“IagreethattheConstitutionAct,1867hasnotassignedthematterof"environment”toeithertheprovincesorParliament.Theenvironment,asunderstoodinitsgenericsense,encompassesthephysical,economicandsocialenvironmenttouchingseveraloftheheadsofpowerassignedtotherespectivelevelsofgovernment.”

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“ItmustberecognizedthattheenvironmentisnotanindependentmatteroflegislationundertheConstitutionAct,1867andthatitisaconstitutionallyabstrusematterwhichdoesnotcomfortablyfitwithintheexistingdivisionofpowerswithoutconsiderableoverlapanduncertainty”.• Theenvironmentisnotadiscreteconstitutionalsubject• Thequestionisnot‘wheredoestheenvironmentfall’–thequestionis‘whetherthelegislationhasfootingintheother

jurisdiction’àDependingonwhatthelaw’sdominantcharacteristicisPOGGSummedUpEmergencyBranch

• Temporaryinscope• Flexibleinnature:authorityextendsasfarasisnecessarygiventheemergency• Applicableinwar• Potentiallyavailableinsocialoreconomicemergencies–ReAnti-InflationReference

GapBranch(newmatters)andNationalConcern(mattersthathavesincebecomenationalconcern)• Usuallyapermanentadditiontos.91• Subjectsmustpossess• nationwideimportance

o singleness,distinctivenessandindivisibility–asdeterminedbythe“provincialinabilitytest”[CrownZellerbach]

PROVINCIALPOWERSOVERECONOMICREGULATIONCarnationCoLtd.vQuebecAgriculturalMarketingBoard[1968]SCR238,67DLR(2d)1*Incidentaleffectsdonotdetermineconstitutionality–whatmattersiswhatthelegislationis‘inrelationto’*RegulationofproductioninprovinceFacts:

• TheMarketingBoardwascreatedthroughtheprovisionsoftheQuebecAgriculturalMarketingActandwasempoweredtoapprovejointmarketingplans,andtoarbitrateanydisputearisinginthecourseofcarryingoutajointmarketingplan

• TheActprovidedthat10ormoreproducersofagriculturalproductscouldapplytotheMarketingBoardforapprovalofajointplanforthemarketingofoneormoreclassesoffarmproductsiftheplanwassupportedbyavoteofatleast75%innumberandvalueofallproducersconcerned

o BoardmadeofQuebecdairyfarmerso Responsiblefornegotiatingcontractsw/corporateclient’slikeCarnationMilko NowCarnationmustbuyitfromaboard(reducestheirbargainingpower)

• PriceimposedinQuebechaseffectondistributionofproductinothermarkets.Productisshippedoutofprovince=Fedpower:Inter-provincialtrade

• Theappellant(Carnation)believestheordersmadebytheBoardareinvalidbecausetheyenableittosetapricetobepaidbytheappellantforaproductthemajorportionofwhichwillbeusedforexportoutofQuebec–andtheybelievethisconstitutess.91(2)theregulationoftradeandcommerceandthereforethesettingofpricesbytheboardisultravires

• Quebec–P+Sàpurposewastodealwithsale/purchaseofmilkinQuebec–nottheinterprovincialaspectsIssues:

• WhethertheQuebecAgriculturalMarketingBoardhadinfringedontheexclusivelegislativepowersofParliamentunders.91(2)toregulatetradeandcommerce

Decision:• TheBoardmerelyhadsomeeffectuponthecostofdoingbusinessinQuebecofacompanyengagedininterprovincialtrade

–butthisisnotsufficientenoughtomaketheordersinvalid• Inthiscase,theordersunderquestionwerenotdirectedattheregulationofinterprovincialtrade,theydidnotassert

directlytocontrolortorestrictsuchtrade,andtherewasnoevidencethattheydidcontrolorrestrictit;purposewastoimprovebargainingpositionforQuebecproducers[sale/purchaseofmilkinQuebec]

• AppealdismissedRatio:

• Mustdistinguishbetweentheeffectsofthelegislationandwhetheritwasmadeinrelationtotheregulationoftradeandcommerce,basedoneachcase’sownfactsàNeedtodeterminethetypeofcontrolthatisbeingenabledandwhetheritisinterprovincialormainlyconfinedtotransactionstakingplacewithintheprovince

• Incidentaleffectsdonotdetermineconstitutionality–whatmattersiswhatthelegislationis‘inrelationto’Analysis:(Martland)

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• ThecreationoftheQuebecCarnationCompanyMilkProducer’sBoardandempoweringittonegotiateonthebehalfofmilkproducersforthesaleoftheirproductstotheappellantisanalogoustothecreationofacollectivebargainingagencyinthefieldoflaborrelations

o Thepurposeoftheorderwastoregulate(onbehalfofQuebecproducers)theirtradewiththeappellantforthesaletoitoftheirmilkinQuebec;theobjectwastoimprovetheirbargainingposition(92(13)+(16))

o Mostprovinciallegislationgoverninglabordisputesdoesnotseemtorequirenegotiationthrougharbitration,howeverthereisnodoubtthatthiswouldbeconstitutional

• ThetwootherordersmadebytheMarketingBoardweretheproperpricestobepaidtotheproducerso Thepricedeterminedbytheordershavingbearingupontheappellant’sexporttradeisunquestionableasit

affectsthecostofdoingbusiness,butlaborcostsaffectthecostofdoingbusinessofanycompanywhichmaybeengagedinexporttradeandtherewouldbelittledoubtastothepoweroftheProvincetoregulatewagerateswithinaProvince

o Itisnotthepossibilitythattheseordersmight‘affect’theappellant’sinterprovincialtradewhichshoulddeterminetheirvalidity,butratherwhethertheyweremadeinrelationtotheregulationoftradeandcommerce

• AsintheOntarioReference–‘onceastatuteaimsatregulationoftradeinmattersofinterprovincialconcern’itisbeyondthecompetenceofaProvincialLegislature

• Agreesthatatradetransactioncompletedinaprovinceisnotnecessarilysubjectonlytoprovincialcontrol,howeveralsoholdstheviewthatthefactthatsuchatransactionincidentallyhassomeeffectuponacompanyengagedininterprovincialtradedoesnotnecessarilypreventitsbeingsubjecttosuchcontroloftheProvince

AGManitobavManitobaEggandPoultryAssociation*Marketing/controllingsaleofgoodsfromoutsidecomingintoprovince=ultraviresFacts:

• OntariohasasurplusofcheapeggsandQuebechasasurplusofcheapchicken.Thesurplusproducerswereinterestedinthemarketofneighboringjurisdictions.Theproducersinthesejurisdictionswerenotthrilled–theymadeaboard(ofOntarioproducers)thatsetsapricefloorforsaleofchickensinOntario;givingpreferencetoproductscomingfromwithinprovince(sothatOntarioproducersofchickensdonotsuffergreatlossesbycompetingw/Quebec).

• MirrorimageinQuebec.OntariofarmermustselleggsthroughQuebecboard,restrictedbyfloorprice.• Result:[adverseeffectsonfarmersfromotherprovinces]ManitobaislosingaccesstotwomarketsineasternCanada.

Manitobastartsitsowncarboncopyscheme–askedforareference(SCC)togetaprecedentfromCanadasayingthatitsschemewasunconstitutional.ThenCanadamuststrikedown2otherschemes.

• SchemeàOnlythroughtheManitobaEggProducers’MarketingBoardthatanyeggscouldbesoldorofferedforsaleregardlessofwheretheywereproduced;forthecontrolofmarketingofextra-provincialeggsinManitoba

Issue:• IsthereadistinctionbetweenCarnationcaseandthiseggmarketingscheme?Inpithandsubstanceistheeggmarketing

schemeisdifferentthanthemilkmarketingschemeinCarnation?Decision:

• Manitoba’sschemeisunconstitutional(sosucceedingettingdecisionfromSCC)Ratio:

• UnlikeCarnationthedominantpurposeoftheschemeistoregulateorcontroltheflowofagriculturalgoodsfromoutsidecomingintotheprovince.Trend:Productionofgood=localmatter,butMarketing/Saleofgood=raiseconcernsofinterprovincialtrade

Analysis:• Isthisschememeanttoregulateproductionw/inManitobaortoregulatetrade?

Flowoftrade:• Itisaimedtorestrictorlimitthefreeflowoftradebtwprovinces.Theschemegoesbeyondprovincialauthoritybecauseit

concernsgoodscomingfromoutsideprovinceàUnlikeCarnationcase,whichregulatesproduction• Thepurposewastolimitcheapeggsfromcomingintotheprovince–madedirectlyinrelationtotheregulationof

interprovincialtradeànotonlyaffectsinterprovincialtrade;wasmadeinrelationtoito Carnationincidentallyaffectedinterprovincialtradebutwasmadeinrelationtothesale/purchaseofmilkintra-

provincially• Production:Thepurposeisnottheregulationofproduction

ReAgriculturalProductsMarketingAct,[1978]2S.C.R.1198.[responsetoeggscheme]

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Themarketingofagriculturalproducts=bothlocalandinterprovincialaspects.Mustnegotiateframeworktogetherwithprovincialandfederaltomakeconstitutionalscheme

• productionandmarketingquotaso Regulationofproduction=provincialo Marketing=federalmatterifmarketbeyondprovince

• Affectvcontrolo Qualitativedistinctionbetweenlegislationthat“affects”inter-provincialtradevs.legislationto“control”inter-

provincialtrade• Asaresult:Encourageco-operativefederalism

o ThesecourtdecisionspushfederalandprovincialgovernmentstoworktogetherRatio:Bothlevelsfed/provincesdevelopedintegratedschemethatdealswithproductionquotasandmarketingofagriculturalgoodsw/inCanada.Courtswanttofosterthistypeofcooperativearrangement.Bestbalanceofpower?Onethatisnegotiatedbybothparties

REGULATIONOFNATURALRESOURCES

• sees.92(5)àprovincialjurisdictiondealswithtimber• s.109à

o Onlytalkingabouttheprovincesreferencedtointhesection(109)o Atsigningtheseprovincesagreedtofederalcontrolofnaturalresources–afteramendment,evenplayingfieldo Cannotuselivingtreeargumenttochangethewordsàcanonlyuseittointerpretthem

• 1905àAlbertajoinedthereforedoesnotgetjurisdictionovermines+mineralsuntilaftertheNaturalResourcesTransferAgreements

• NationalResourcesTransferAgreements,1930• CanadianIndustrialGasandOilv.GovernmentofSaskatchewan,[1978]2S.C.R.545

o WhyadifferentresultfromCarnation?• CentralCanadaPotashv.GovernmentofSaskatchewan,[1979]1S.C.R.42–“production”vs.“pricefixing”• sees.92A

CanadianIndustrialGasandOilLtd.vGovernmentofSaskatchewan[1978]2SCR545,80DLR(3d)449[CIGOL]Facts:

• Theprovinciallegislationwasenactedfollowingthesharpriseinthepriceofoilontheworldmarketwhichoccurredin1973

• First,productionrevenuesfromfreeholdlandsweresubjectedtoa‘mineralincometax’whichwas100%ofthedifferencebetweenthepricereceivedatthewell-headandthebasicwell-headprice

• Second,allpetroleumandnaturalgasinallproducingtractswithintheProvincewereexpropriatedandsubjectedtoa‘royaltysurcharge’àThewell-headvalueforthepurposesofroyaltysurchargeisthehigherofthepricereceivedatthewell-headandthepriceperbarrellisted

• TheconsequencesofthisapplicationisthatthegovernmentofSKwillacquirethebenefitofallincreasesinthevalueofoilproducedabovethesetbasicwell-headpricefixedbythestatute

• 98%ofallcrudeoilproducedinSKisdestinedforexporteithertoEasternCanadaortheUS• (Inpractice–everytimethepriceofoilgoesup,SKgetsthebenefit)• ThevalidityofthestatuteswaschallengedbytheappellantàTheywereunsuccessfulinseekingtoobtainadeclarationof

theirinvalidityatbothtrialandonappealIssues:

• Thelegislationalsorelatestotheregulationofinterprovincialandinternationaltradeandcommerce,amatteroverwhichthefederalParliamenthasexclusivepowerunders.91(2)

Decision:• ThestatutoryprovisionsandtheRegulationsandordersenactedandmaderelatingtothemineralincometaxandthe

royaltysurchargeareultraviresoftheprovinceofSK;AppealallowedRatio:

• Sfixespricetobechargedforoilatwellhead(locatedinprovince).Regulatingpricetobechargedatapoint–andthatpointisw/inprovince.Carnationinvolvedpointofsalebtw.Cow/tankertrucks.Purpose:tomaximizethereturnforSaskatchewancitizens.Thisisapublicresource,andtheprofitsshouldbeenjoyedbypublicnotoilcompanies.Effecthas

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substantialeffectonexportmarkets.Sask.Tryingtofixthepriceforacommodityofwhich98%isbeingsoldoutsideprovince.

Analysis:(MartlandJ+6)• Practicallyalloftheoiltowhichthemineralincometaxortheroyaltysurchargebecomesapplicableisdestinedfor

interprovincialorinternationaltrade• TheeffectofthelegislationistosetafloorpriceforSKoilpurchasedforexportbytheappropriationofitspotential

incrementalvalueininterprovincialandinternationalmarkets,ortoensurethattheincrementalvalueisnotappropriatedbypersonsoutsidetheprovince

• Theactualpurposeofthelegislationistodrainoffsubstantialbenefitsthatwouldhaveaccruedtotheproducersduetothesuddenandunprecedentedpriceofcrudeoil[colorable]

• Inbothoftaxandtheroyalty,theMinisterisempoweredtodeterminethewell-headvalueoftheoilwhichisproducedwhichwillgovernthepriceatwhichtheproduceriscompelledtoselltheoil–ontheexportsalesofacommoditythathasalmostnolocalmarketinSKàThisinvolvestheregulationofinterprovincialtradeandtrenchesupons.91(2)

• ThisisnotsimilartoCarnationCo–theeffectoftheregulationswastoincreasethecostofmilkpurchasedbyCarnationinQuebecandprocessedthere,mostlyforsaleoutsideQuebec

o InCarnation,thelegislationindirectlyaffectedtheexporttradeinthesensethatitscostsofproductionwereincreased,howeveritwasdesignedtoestablishamethodfordeterminingthepriceofmilksoldbyQuebecmilkproducerstoapurchaserinQuebec,whoprocesseditthere

o Inthiscase,thelegislationisdirectlyaimedattheproductionofoilforexportandhastheeffectofregulatingtheexportpricesincetheproduceriscompelledtoobtainthatpriceonthesaleofhisproduct

• P+SofthelegislationàtocontrolinternationaltradeDissent:(Dickson+1)[notcolorable]

• LanguageofthestatutesdoesnotdiscloseanintentionoftheProvincetoregulate,control,orimpedemarketingorexportofoilfromSKàalsobecausetherearenoobstaclestothefreemovementofgoods[asinManitobaeggs]

• Thereisalsonoextraneousevidencetoformthebasisofanargumentthatthelegislationinitseffectregulatedinterprovincialorinternationaltradebecauseproduction/exportofoilincreasedafterthelegislativeschemewasimplemented

• Consumerswereunaffected–onlywaytoaffectthemwouldhavebeentofreezethepriceofoil• BelievesSKhadalegitimateandreasonableinterestofitsowntoadvanceinenactingthelegislationinquestion,andthe

effectontheextra-provincialtradeinoilisindirectlyandincidentaltothemanifestrevenue-producingobjectofthelegislation

Notes:• In‘ResourceTaxationandtheSCC’itwasnotedthatthereasoningbehindtheindirecttaxationwasthatthetaxispaidby

thepurchaser(andthatthisisanattempttoregulatetradebecausethepurchaserisaconsumer),andbecausethepurchaserisanon-residentoftheprovince–therefore,thecourtreasonedthattheproducerhasnotbornethetax

• However,Martland’sdecisionwasthattheappellantwasentitledtorecoveryofthesumspaidofthemoniescollectedwithoutlegalauthority–theproducersareentitledtotaxmonieswhichtheyhavenotpaid

CentralCanadaPotashCo.Ltd.vGovernmentofSaskatchewan[1979]1SCR42,88DLR(3d)609Facts:

• Saskatchewaninstitutedapotashpro-rationingschemein1969,whenalmostallpotashwassoldoutsidetheprovince,withabout64%goingtotheUS[toincreasepricestointernationalmarkets]

• Theschemecontrolledproductionthroughlicenses,whichpreventedCentralCanadaPotashfromfulfillingoneofitscontracts[Settingminimumprices]

• Thetrialjudgefoundtheregulationsultravires,howevertheappealjudgeupheldtheirvalidityIssues:

• WhethertheSKpro-rationingschemecontrollingtheproductionofpotash,establishedpursuanttotheMineralResourcesActisultravires?

Decision:• Appealwithrespecttoconstitutionalvalidityallowed,declarationofinvaliditybytrialjudgerestored

Ratio:• SchemeinwhichSask.wantedtoregulateproductionofpotash(Setpricechargedinforeignmarkets).Hassubstantial

controloverpotash,andhowitpullsthoseleverseffectpricechargedabroad.Struckdown:pricefixing.Pithandsubstanceeffectsextra-provincialmarkets/interprovincialtrade=dominionpower(s91.2)

• S.91.2TradeandCommerce:InterprovincialtradeandTradewithforeigncountries(Parsons)• S.91.2TradeandCommerce:GeneralregulationofTrade(Parsons)

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Analysis:(Laskin)• ‘Production’vs‘pricefixing’

Production• Theonlymarkettheschemeshadanysignificanceinwastheexportmarket,astherewashardlyanySKmarketforthe

mineral• Thisisnotabouttheproductionofalocalgood–butaboutthepriceofexportofalocalcommodity• Extra-provincialmarkets/internationaltrade=s.91(2)

PriceFixing• WhatisevidentfromthePotashConservationRegulationswasthatthegovernmentofSKwantedtoregulatethe

marketingofpotashthroughthefixingofaminimumsellingpriceapplicabletothepermittedproductionquotas• TherewasnoconcludedtransactionsofsaleandpurchaseintheprovinceasinCarnation;itwasoutofprovinceand

offshoresalesthatweretheprincipalobjectsofthelicencesanddirectiveso Thedocumentaryevidenceprovesthis–thedirectivestatedthepurposewasforconsumptionwithinorwithout

SK• CJCulliton–believedthatnaturalresourcesandthemineralwealthoftheprovinceweresubjecttoprovincialregulatory

controlaloneandthatproductioncontrolswerematterswithinexclusiveprovincialauthorityo AdmittedbyallthatthePotashindustrywasfacingproblemsandifnotsolvedwouldhaveadetrimentaleffectof

theindustryandProvince–thereforethepotashindustryhadtherighttoseekassistancefromwhateverGovernmenthadthepowertoassist;sincenaturalresourcesareexclusivelywithintheprovince,theindustryturnedtotheprovince,whichimplementedcontrolledproductionandestablishedminimumprices–inpithandsubstancetheseprogrammesweredirectedtoamatterwithinprovincialjurisdiction

o Ifnot,thentherighttocontrolpotashproductionandminimumpricesrestswiththefederalgovernment–howeverthefederalgovernmentdoesnothavethepowertocontroltheproductionofpotashortosetaprice,thereforeiftheseprogrammesareheldtobeultraviresthenitisbythedeterminationofthevalidityoftheultimateeffectsoftheprogrammesandnotbytheirtruecharacterandnature

• DonotagreewithCullitonthattheconsequenceofinvalidatingtheprovincialschemeistomovetothefederalgovernmenttocontrolproductionsofmineralsintheProvinceandthepricetobecharged

o Theconstitutiondoesnotdeterminethatlegislationheldtobeinvalidinaprovincemaybevalidlyenactedbythefederalgovernment

• Thesituationisdifferentwhereaprovinceestablishesamarketingschemewithpricefixingasitscentralfeature–ithasbeenheldthattheProvincedoesnothavecontroloverthemarketingofprovincialproductsininterprovincialorexporttrade

• AsintheCanadianIndustrialGas,andmayalsobesaidofpotashthatthe‘legislationisdirectlyaimedattheproductionofpotashdestinedforexportandithastheeffectofregulatingtheexportpricesincetheproduceriscompelledtoobtainthatpriceonthesaleofhisproduct’

• Whengovernmentsactingoodfaith,ashere,toinvokeauthoritytorealizedesirableeconomicpolicies,theymustunderstandtheyhavenoopen-endedmeansofachievingtheirgoalswhenthereareconstitutionallimitationsonthepowerunderwhichtheypurporttoenact

• Thecourtswillapproachthetaskofappraisaloftheconstitutionalityofsocialandeconomicprogrammeswithsympathyandregardforconsequencesofholdingthemultravires,howeveriftheappraisalresultsinaclashwiththeconstitutionthentheymustbeheldultravires

NotesonProprietaryRights

• InthePotashcase,referencewasmadetothefactthatSKwasactinginaregulatorycapacityratherthanasaproprietorNoteonSection92(A)

• 92(a)wasaddedin1982togranttheprovincesadditionalpowersovernaturalresourceso ToauthorizeprovincestolegislatefortheexportofresourcestootherprovincessubjecttoParliament’s

paramountlegislativepowerintheareaaswellastoallowindirecttaxationinrespectofresourcessolongastheydonotdiscriminateagainstotherprovinces

• 92A(2)wouldnothavechangedCanadianIndustrialGasandOilandPotash–becausethatwasinternationalexport(retainedunder92A(3))àChangehere,exporttootherpartsofCanada(thisusedtobeinterprovincialtrade)

NoteonOffshoreMinerals• Alsouncertaintyaboutthecoastalprovincestocontroltheexplorationforandexploitationofnaturalresourcesincoastal

waters• ReferencereOffshoreMineralRightsinBCdecidedthatthecoastalwatersofBCwerewithinfederaljurisdiction

o Thefederalgovernmenthadtherightsofownershipunderpoggandhadtherighttoexploreandexploitresourcesonthecontinentalshelfbeyondtheterritorialsea

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• InReAGCanitwasdecidedthatthewatersbetweenthemainlandofBCandVancouverIslandwerewithinprovincialjurisdictionastheyhadbeenincludedinthecolonyofBCatthetimeofitscreationandthereforeformedpartoftheprovincewhenitenteredconfederation

• ReferenceretheSeabedandSubsoiloftheContinentalShelfOffshoreNewfoundlandheldtherighttoexploreforandexploitmineralsonthecontinentalshelfwaswithinfederaljurisdictionunderpoggbecauseNFhadnojurisdictionoveritatthetimeitenteredConfederation

GENERALREGULATIONOFTRADE

LabattBreweriesofCanadavAGCanada[criminallawisbroad,butsubjecttoitsconstitutionallimits]*Cannottarget‘singleindustry’under‘generaltradeandcommerce’Facts:

• ThefederalFoodandDrugsActregulatedthecontentofavarietyoffoodanddrugproducts• Section6:whereastandardhasbeenprescribedforfood,nopersonshalllabel,package,sell,oradvertiseanyarticlein

suchamannerthatislikelytobemistakenforsuchfood,unlessthearticlecomplieswiththeprescribedstandard• Labattmarketed‘speciallitebeer’whichexceededthemaximumallowablealcoholcontent,thereforetheychallengedthe

validityoftheActandregulations• Localbeerbeingmadeandsoldlocally–interferingwitheconomictradewithinaprovince–Parsonssaidthisisprovincial

Issue:• Atissueherewereregulationsprescribingminimumandmaximumalcoholcontentforbeermarketedas‘lightbeer’

Decision:• TheCourtsplit6to3findingtheActandregulations,astheyappliedtomaltliquorsandbeer,ultravires

Ratio:• Thefederalgovernmentcannotenactlawstargetinga‘singleindustry’withlocalcharacterunders.91(2)’s‘generaltrade

andcommerce’branchAnalysis:

• Thefederalgovernmentsoughttojustifyitunderthetradeandcommercepower,andinadditionreliedonitscriminallawandpoggpowers

• TheCourtheldthatthefirstbranchofParsons,givingthefederalgovernmentpoweroverinterprovincialandforeigntrade,wasnotapplicablehereastheimpugnedregulationwasconcernedwiththeproductionandlocalsale

• Notwiththecontrolandguidanceoftheflowofarticlesofcommercethroughthedistributionchannels• Itisnotinrelationtotheexportofthiscommodity–majorityoftheproductisnot• AlsocouldnotbejustifiedunderthesecondbranchofParsons,thegeneraltradepower• Whatclearlyisnotofgeneralnationalconcernistheregulationofasingletradeorindustry• Theimpugnedprovisionswereconcernwiththeproductionprocessofasingleindustrythatwassubstantiallylocalin

character• Alsonobasisincriminallaworpogg• Wasnotdirectedattheprotectionofhealthorpreventionofdeception;therewasnomatterofnationalconcern

GeneralMotorsofCanadaLtdvCityNationalLeasing[1989]1SCR641,58DLR(4th)255[*Ancillarydoctrinetest]Facts:

• Section31.1createsacivilcauseofactionforcertaininfractionsoftheAct• S.31.1Anypersonwhohassufferedlossordamageasaresultof

o A)ConductthatiscontrarytoanyprovisionofPartV,oro B)ThefailureofanypersontocomplywithanorderoftheComissionoracourtunderthisAct

• Maysueforandrecoverfromthepersonwhoengagedintheconductorfailedtocomplywiththeorderanamountequaltothelossordamageprovedtohavebeensufferedbyhim,togetherwithanyadditionalamountthatthecourtmayallownotexceedingthefullcosttohimofanyinvestigationinconnectionwiththematterandofproceedingsunderthissection

• [Acivilcauseofactioniswithinthedomainofprovincestocreate]• GMmanufacturersautomobilesandtrucks;CityNationalLeasingleasesacrossCanadafleetsofautomobilesandtrucksin

competitionwithothernationalfleetleasingcompanies;CNLpurchasesmostofitsvehiclesfromfranchisedGMdealersbutdoesnotpurchasefromGMdirectly;CNLreceivedinterestratesupportofferedbyGM;duringthistimetheyallegedGMhadalsobeenpaying‘preferential’interestsupporttocompetitorsofCNL;itisfurtherallegedthattheexclusionofCNL

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fromthepreferentialinterestratesupportwasapracticeofpricediscriminationcontrarytos.34(1)(a)oftheAct(cannotgivepreferentialpricingwhendealingwiththesameproducts)givingCNLanactionunder31.1

Issue:• Theconstitutionalvalidityofs.31.1oftheCombinesInvestigationAct(CompetitionAct)• Cans.31.1beupheldbyvirtueofitsrelationshipwiththeCombinesInvestigationAct

o Istheactvalidundertradeandcommercepower(91(2));andis31.1integratedwiththeActinsuchawaythatittooisintraviresunder91(2)–generaltradeandcommercebranch

• (Couldtherebeapossibilityinusingpoggasaback-upbranch)Decision:

• Found31.1tobeintraviresthefederalparliament• TheentireActisintraviresundersection91(2)(underthesecondbranchofthatpower)thepowerovergeneraltradeand

commerce• S.31.1isconstitutionallyvalidbyvirtueofbeingfunctionallyrelatedtotheAct–itisanintegralpart,well-conceived

componentoftheeconomicregulationstrategyfoundintheAct• Wouldpassboththefunctionallyrelatedtest(propertestforlimitedintrusion)andalsothenecessarilyincidentaltest• Appealdismissed

Ratio:• ThisActisacomplexschemeofcompetitionregulationaimedatimprovingtheeconomicwelfareofthenationasawhole,

itoperatesunderaregulatoryagency,itisdesignedtocontrolanaspectoftheeconomythatmustberegulatednationallyifitistobesuccessfullyregulatedatall

• Useof5factorstodetermineifitfallsunder“general”tradeandcommerce.Mustjustifythemoncasebycasebasis(usethefacts).

Analysis:(Dickson)• Thiscomesunders.92(13)–needtousethegeneralregulationoftrade• 2branchesofs.91(2)sinceParsons

o Poweroverinternationalandinterprovincialtradeandcommerceo PowerovergeneraltradeandcommerceaffectingtheCanadaasawhole

• ItisunderthesecondbranchthatCNLwishtoupholds.31.1• Thetruebalancebetweenpropertyandcivilrightsandtheregulationoftradeandcommercemustliesomewherebetween

anallpervasiveinterpretationofs.91(2)andaninterpretationthatrendersthegeneraltradeandcommercepowertoallintentsvapidandmeaningless

• FromMacdonaldvVaporCanadaLaskinCJdetermined3hallmarksofvalidityforlegislationunderthesecondbranchofthetradeandcommercepower

1. Theimpugnedlegislationmustbepartofageneralregulatoryscheme2. Theschememustbemonitoredbythecontinuingoversightofaregulatoryagency3. Thelegislationmustbeconcernedwithtradeasawholeratherthanwithaparticularagency(Labatt)

• TwofactorswereaddedtotheseinCanadianNationalTransport(DicksonJ)o 4.Thelegislationshouldbeofanaturethattheprovincesjointlyorseverallywouldbeconstitutionallyincapableof

enactingprovincially(incapableofprovincialenactment)o 5.Thefailuretoincludeoneormoreprovincesorlocalitiesinalegislativeschemewouldjeopardizethesuccessful

operationoftheschemeinotherpartsofthecountryo (**Last2–provincialinabilitytest)

• These5factorshelpensuretheenactmentisoneofanationaleconomicconcernandnotjustacollectionoflocalones–helpdistinguishbetweenmattersrelatingtotradeandcommerceandthoseofamorelocalnature–helpprotectprovincialjurisdiction[Non-exhaustivelist–justfactorstoconsider(acontextual,analysisbasedlist)]

• Ancillarydoctrinetestisapplied[Determinedtheimpugnedprovisionencroachedonprovincialpowers,butthattheencroachmentwaslimited]

ThesecondstepistoestablishwhethertheActcontainsaregulatoryschemeThevalidityoftheregulatoryscheme

• UsingtheCanadianNationalTransportationcriteria1. Whethertheregulatoryschemeoperatesundertheoversightofanagency2. WhethertheActisconcernedwithtradeingeneral3. Whethertheprovinceswouldbeconstitutionallyincapableofenactingcombineslegislation4. Whetherthefailuretoincludeoneormoreprovincesorlocalitieswouldjeopardizethesuccessfuloperationofthe

Act• Ifitisvalid,thenistheprovisionsufficientlyintegratedw/schemethatitcanbeupheldbyvirtueofthatrelationship?(look

atseriousnessofencroachmentonprov.Powers)

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• Thepresenceofawell-orchestratedscheme(manypartstoit)ofeconomicregulationisapparentonexaminationoftheAct;itisinevidencethroughouttheentireAct

• Thepurposeistoeliminateactivitiesthatreducecompetitioninthemarketplace–theentireActisgearedatachievingthisobjective

• ItisclearthattheDirectorexercisesasignificantdegreeofcontrolovertheoperationoftheCombinesInvestigationAct• Thenext3criteriaarealsomet–theyallshareacommontheme–indicationsthattheschemeofregulationisnationalin

scopeandthatlocalregulationwouldbeinadequate• Competitionisoneofcrucialimportanceforthenationaleconomy

o Competitionpolicycanbeseenasensuringthatthedifferingregionaladvantageswillaccruetothenationasawholeintermsoflowerprices,betterqualityandvariety,andincreasedopportunitiesforCanadians

• ThisActispartofalegislativeschemeaimedatdeterringawiderangeofunfaircompetitivepracticesthataffecttradeandcommercegenerallyandisnotlimitedtoasingleindustry,commodity,orarea[Needabalanceofthepowersbetweenfederalandprovincialjurisdiction]

• Yes,s.31isaremedialprovision.ItdoesnotcreateageneralcauseofactionbutratheronelimitedbytheAct.Parliamentisconstitutionallyallowedtocreaterightsofcivilactionwhentheyarewarranted.s.31issufficientlyrelatedtothevalidfederalschemeoftheAct.

FEDERALPOWERSOVERCRIMINALLAW

ReferencereValidityofSection5(a)oftheDairyIndustryAct(MargarineReference)[1949]SCR1,1DLR433*Narrowsthescopeofwhatiscriminal–3rdPadded=“Publicpurpose”Facts:

• Section5(a)oftheDairyIndustryAct(FederalAct)states:nopersonshall,importintoCanada,oroffer,sell,orhaveinhispossessionforsale,anyoleomargarine,margarine,butterine,orothersubstituteforbutter,manufacturedwhollyorinpartfromanyfatotherthanthatofmilkorcream

Issues:• Whethersection5(a)oftheDairyIndustryActisultraviresoftheParliamentofCanadaeitherinwholeorinpartandifso

whatparticularorparticularsandtowhatextentDecision:

• Althoughtheprohibitionofmanufacturing,possession,andsaleofmargarinewasultraviresParliament,theprohibitionofimportationcouldbeupheldunderthefederalgovernment’spowertoregulateforeigntrade

• ULTRAVIRESRatio:

• Federalcriminallawpowerisunderstoodinrespectoftheneedtoidentifytheevilorinjuriouseffectatwhichapenalprohibitionwasdirected–mustdeterminewhetherthelegislation(inP+S)hasanunderlyingcriminalpublicpurpose,notonethatfallsinprovincialjurisdiction[publicpeace,security,order,health,morality]

Analysis:(RandJ)• Theissuedependsonthevalidityofthecontentionthatthisisaprovisionofcriminallaw• Acrimeisanactwhichthelawforbids;wecanlookforsomeevil,injurious,orundesirableeffectuponthepublicagainst

whichthelawisdirected–thiseffectmaybesocial,economic,orpoliticalinterests• Istheprohibitionenactedwithaviewtoapublicpurposewhichcansupportitasbeinginrelationtocriminallaw?• [Publicpeace,security,order,health,morality]–HOWEVERthesedonotappeartobetheobjectofparliamentaryaction

here• Theobject–iseconomic(attemptingtoregulateproperty);andthelegislativepurposeistogivetradeprotectiontothe

dairyindustryintheproductionandsaleofbutter–TheDairyIndustryActisclearlyaimedtotheregulationoftheDairyIndustryàToforbidthemanufactureandsaleforthisendisprimafacietodealdirectlywiththecivilrightsofindividualsinrelationtoparticulartradewithintheprovinces(92(13))[ifonlyuse2Pscouldencroachonprovincialjurisdiction]

o [benefitingonegroup(DairyIndustry)againstcompetitors]• Tousethisasasupportforthelegislationintheaspectofcriminallawwouldmeanthefederalgovernmentbyforbidding

themanufactureorsaleofparticularproductscouldnotonlyinterdictasubstantialpartoftheeconomiclifeofonesectionofCanadabutdosoforthebenefitofthatofanother

• Inpithandsubstance,thelegislationhereisaimedatregulatingthedairyindustry

RJRMacDonaldInc.vCanada(AttorneyGeneral)[1995]3SCR199,127DLR(4th)1[Qualificationaddedtocriminallawàaslongasit’snotemployedcolourably]

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Facts:• ThepurposeTobaccoProductsControlAct1988wastoprohibitalladvertisingandpromotionoftobaccoproductsoffered

forsaleinCanada,withanexemptionforadvertisingofforeigntobaccoproductsinimportedpublications;italsorequiredthedisplayofunattributedhealthwarningsonalltobaccoproductsandprecludedmanufacturersfromputtingotherinformationontobaccoproducts.Violationconstitutedanoffencepunishablebywayofsummaryconvictionorindictment,withpenaltiesrangingfromafinenotexceeding$2000or6-monthsimprisonmentto$300000and2years

• Twotobaccocompanieschallengedtheconstitutionalityofthelegislationseekingdeclarationsthatitwasultraviresasanintrusionintoprovincialjurisdictionoveradvertisinggroundedins.92(13)and92(16)

• Trialjudgefounditultravires;CourtofAppealconcludeditwasintravires[underpogg]notundercriminallawpowerIssues:

• WhethertheTobaccoProductsControlActisultraviresthefederalgovernmentDecision:

• Legislationisintraviresundercriminallawpower;AppealdismissedRatio:

• Tocreatecriminallegislationwithrespecttohealthisbroad,whatisrequiredisthatthelegislationmustcontainaprohibitionaccompaniedbyapenalsanctionandmustbedirectedatalegitimatepublichealthevil

o Aslongasitisnot‘colorable’thenitisvalidcriminallawAnalysis:(LaForestJ)

• Thecriminallawpowerisplenaryinnatureandthiscourthasalwaysdefineditsscopebroadly;andhasbeencarefulnottofreezethedefinitionintimeorconfineittoafixeddomain

• Takingintoaccountthebroaddefinition,thepithandsubstanceiscriminallaw–itisclearthatthelegislationwastoprohibitadvertisementoftobaccoproducts,thepromotionoftobaccoproducts,andthesaletobaccoproductswithoutprintedhealthwarnings

• IntheMargarineReferenceattentionwasdrawntotheneedtoidentifytheevilorinjuriouseffectatwhichapenalprohibitionwasdirectedàHere,theeviltargetedbyParliamentisthedetrimentalhealtheffectscausedbytobaccoconsumption–thisisapparentins.3’s‘purpose’clause–preventionofsomethingthatkillspeople

o TheconcernhereistheprotectionofCanadiansfromthehazardsoftobaccoconsumption• Giventhisfact,ParliamentcanvalidlyemploycriminallawtoprohibittobaccomanufacturesfrominducingCanadiansto

consumetheseproducts• ‘Health’isnotanenumeratedheadundertheConstitutionAct,however(Schneider)healthisanamorphoustopicwhich

canbeaddressedbyvalidfederalorprovinciallegislation,dependingonthecircumstancesonthescopeornatureofthehealthproblem

• (Margarine)Tocreatecriminallegislationwithrespecttohealthisbroad,allthatisrequiredisthatthelegislationmustcontainaprohibitionaccompaniedbyapenalsanctionandmustbedirectedatalegitimatepublichealthevil

• Thereisnoevidenceofanulteriormotive–ifwantedtocontroltheindustryasanindustrywouldhaveenactedprovisionsrelatedtoquality,pricing,laborrelations

• ThisdiffersfromMargarine,wheretheprohibitionwasnotreallydirectedatcurtailingapublicevilbutwasinP+Saimedattheregulationofthedairyindustry

• ItisclearthatParliamentcouldprohibitthemanufactureandsaleoftobaccoproductsconsideringthattheyconstituteadangertopublichealth[howevernotapracticalpolicyconsideration],thereforeitfollowsthattheymayalsovalidlylegislatetoprohibittheadvertisementoftobaccoproducts–thesameeffectisbeinglegislated–theprotectionofCanadiansfromharmfulanddangerousproducts

• TheP+SiscriminallawforthepurposeofprotectingpublichealthandthatParliamenthasauthorityunders.91(27)toenactthislegislation

o ‘Anaffinitywithatraditionalcriminallawpurpose’unnecessary§ Wantroomforexpanding(livingtree);valuesmaychange

Dissent:(MajorJ)• AgreesabouttheplacingofwarningsontobaccoproductshoweverdoesnotagreethatParliamentundercriminallaw

powersisentitledtoprohibitalladvertisingandpromotionoftobaccoproductsandrestrictuseoftobaccotrademarks‘o Theremustbeanaffinitywithtraditionalcriminallaw

• Onlyprohibitingsome–65%oftobaccoadscomefrominternationalmarkets• Disagreethatpersuadingthepublicusingadvertisementconstitutescriminalconduct• Legislationthatprohibitsadvertisingofaproductthatislegalandlicensedlacksacriminalpublicpurposeandthereforeis

ultravires

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RvHydro-Quebec[1997]3SCR213,151DLR(4th)32Facts:

• Hydro-QuebecwaschargedwithviolationofaninterimordermadebythefederalMinisteroftheEnvironmentrestrictingitsemissionsofPCBs.TheorderwasmadeunderpartIIoftheCanadianEnvironmentProtectionActwhichestablishedaprocessforregulatingtheuseoftoxicsubstances.HydroQuebecclaimedthetwosectionsoftheAct(34+35)thatwerecrucialtothemakingoftheinterimorderandthereforetothechargeswereultravires.Thefederalgovernmentattemptedtosupporttheactunderpoggandcriminallawpowers.

• OnceaprioritylistedsubstanceisfoundtobetoxictheMinistersoftheEnvironmentandHealthmayrecommendaddingittotheListofToxicSubstances;whereafederal-provincialadvisorycommitteehastheopportunitytoprovideitsadvice,andthesubstancemaybeaddedtothelist–s.34providesfortheregulationofsubstancesontheListofToxicSubstanceincludingcivilandcriminalpenalties;whereasubstanceisnotontheListandwheretheMinistersbelieveimmediateactionisnecessary,s.35allowsforthemakingof‘interimorders’withoutgoingthroughtheusualprocedure

Issues:• Whethers.34+35oftheActareultraviresthefederalgovernment

Decision:• TheimpugnedpiecesoflegislationareintravirestheParliamentunders.91(27)

Ratio:• EnvironmentalprotectionishandedtoRandJ’slistofpublicpurposes[MargarineReference]• Wearedealingwithprohibitionsaccompaniedbypenalsanctions,notconcernedwithwhetherthesemayincidentally

affectpropertyandcivilrightsbutwhethertheprohibitionsaredirectedatapublicevilAnalysis:(LaForest)

• Environmentcanbecontrolledbyboth–samewithhealth• Didnotwanttodealwithpoggargument–nationalconcerndoctrine• Bettertoputenvironmentalprotectionincriminallawratherthanpogg–underpoggtherewouldbe‘profoundissues

respectingthefederalstructureofourConstitution’wouldbehandingovertheentire‘regulationoftoxicsubstances’tofederalgovernment;cannotmerelyregulateastheyseefit–haveamore-narrowfieldtoregulateincriminallaw(fitwithin3P’s)

• OnlyonequalificationhasbeenattachedtoParliament’splenarypowerovercriminallaw(RJRMacDonald)–thatiscannotbeemployedcolourably–mustlookintothepurposeofenactingthelegislationinordertodeterminethis

• PollutionisanevilthatParliamentcanlegitimatelyseektosupress• Theprotectionoftheenvironmentisamajorchallenge–itisaninternationalproblemandrequiresactionbythe

governmentatalllevels• Thepurposeofcriminallawistounderlineandprotectourfundamentalvalues–thestewardshipoftheenvironmentisa

fundamentalvaluetooursociety• ThenationalconcerndoctrineoperatesbyassigningfullpowertoregulateanareatoParliament–criminallawdoesnot

workthisway–ratheritseekstopreventevilsfallingwithinabroadpurposebyusingprohibitions–aimedatabroadareatoensureitisnotacolorableattempttodealwithaprovincialarea

o Thisdoesnotprecludeprovincesfromexercisingpowerstoregulateandcontrolpollution–canalsoworkwithfederalgovernment

• Purposeofthesections:partIIdealswiththecontroloftoxicsubstancesthatmaybereleasedintotheenvironmentundercertainrestrictedcircumstancesthroughprohibitionswithlegalsanctions

• Intention:toaffectonlythosesubstancesthataredangeroustotheenvironment• Thebroadpurpose+effectofpartIIistoprovideaprocedureforassessingwhetheroutofthemanysubstancesthatmay

potentiallyfallwithins.11thatsomeshouldbeaddedtotheListandthentodeterminewhethertoprohibittheuseofthissubstance–thereisaneedforabroaddefinitionof‘toxic’(itisstillboundbythesubstancesbeingtoxic)

• Thisprohibitionisenforcedbypenalsanctionandisundergirdedbyavalidcriminalobjective• Provincecannothaveexclusivepowersunderproperty+civilrightstocontroltheenvironmentinamannerthatprevents

ParliamentfromexercisingtheleadershiproleexpectedofitanditsroleinprotectingbasicvaluesofCanadians• Regulationsareneededinordertoenforceprohibitions

Dissent:• Nothingintheactsuggeststhat‘toxic’istobedefinedbyancriteriaotherthanthosegivenins.11andthereforeifthis

substance(whichcouldessentiallybeanything)posesarisktohumanhealth/lifeortotheenvironmentthenitqualifiesastoxicandmaybethesubjectoffederalregulation

• Therefore,believetheP+Stobetheregulationofallsubstancewhichmayharmanyaspectoftheenvironmentwhichmaypresentadangertohumanlife

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• Believetheseprovisionsaremoreanattempttoregulateenvironmentalpollutionthantoprohibitit,thereforeextendingbeyondthescopeofcriminallaw(distinguishingbetweenthe2ismoreanartthanascience)

• Havealegitimatecriminalpurposebutarenotintendingtomerelyprohibitpollution,buttoregulateit• Alsothereareregulatorybodiesandtheyarebeinggivendiscretiontodealwithsubstancesbasedontheirexpertiseon

whethertheyareharmfulornotharmful–seemsregulatory• S.34isnotancillarytoexistingprohibitionsanditisnotprohibitoryinnatureitself;thereisnooffenceuntilan

administrativeagencyintervenes• Donotprohibittoxicsubstancesbutcontrolthemannerinwhichthesesubstanceswillbeallowedtointeractwiththe

environment–thereisnogeneralprohibition• Nationalconcernbranchinpogg–legislationfailedonthesingleness,distinctiveness,andindivisibility

ReferenceReFirearmsAct[2000]Facts:

• In1995,thefederalgovernmentpassednewguncontrollegislation–theFirearmsActwhichamendedexistingcriminalcodeprovisions,establishedacomprehensivelicensingsystemforthepossession/useoffirearmsandanationalregistrationsystemforallfirearmsàFailuretocomplywasmadeanoffenceundertheCriminalCode

• Newscheme–regulationofallfirearms;regulationoflicenceconditions• AlbertaCourtofAppealchallengedtothefederalgovernment’spowertoenacttheguncontrollawàschemewas

regulatory(regulatingproperty)ratherthancriminallegislation–becauseofthecomplexityofthelegislationandthediscretiongiventothechieffirearmsofficer

• ThefactthattheActiscomplexdoesnotdetractfromitscriminalnature• Doesnotgivethefirearmsofficerunduediscretion–theoffencesarenotdefinedbyanadministrativebody,theyare

clearlystatedintheActIssue:

• Doesthefederalgovernmenthavethepowertoenacttheguncontrollaw?Decision:

• Yes.Courtofappealupheldthelegislation;whichwasconfirmedonappealtotheSCCAnalysis:

• SCCdecision(2steptest–pithandsubstance;isitappliedunderahead)o ThelawinP+Sisdirectedtoenhancingpublicsafetybycontrollingaccesstofirearmsthroughprohibitionsand

penalties§ Looknotatefficacyorpolicyoflaw–whatdoesthelawsay/whatareitsdominanteffects§ Notsubjecttoadiscretionaryscheme§ Regulatinggunsasdangerousthingsandnotasproperty§ Somemorallawsareabouttherightsofsociety–notrightsorwrongs

o Thelawsregulatoryaspectsaresecondary(incidental)toitsprimarycriminalpurposeo Theintrusionintoprovincialjurisdictionoverproperty+civilrightsisnotsoexcessiveastoupsetthebalanceof

federalism• Tobevalidcriminallaw–publicpurposemustbeconnectedtoaprohibitionbackedbyapenalty

o TheFirearmsActprohibitsthepossessionofafirearmwithoutaregistrationcertificate,sodidtheCriminalCode–theseprohibitionsarebackedbypenalties

• Guncontrolwasalsodistinguishedfromprovincialregulatoryschemesfortheregistrationofmotorvehiclesandlandtitles–becauseoftheinherentlydangerousnatureoffirearms

o Provinciallegislaturesregulatemotorvehicles,notasdangerousproducts,butasitemsofpropertyandasanexerciseofcivilrights

• Theprimaryusesofcarsandfirearmsarefundamentallydifferento Cars=transportation;dangertopublicisanunintendedandincidentaleffecto Firearms=areinherentlydangerous–apressingsafetyriskinmanyifnotalloftheirfunctions

• TheActisnottoregulategunsasitemsofproperty–insurance/permissiblelocationsofusearenotregulated,howevertheaspectsofguncontrolrelatedtothedangerousnatureoffirearmsare

• Anappropriatebalancemustbemaintained–[asaffirmedinReferencereSecessionofQuebec]o Guncontrollawdoesnotupsetthebalancebecauseitseffectsonpropertyrightswereincidental–theActdidnot

hindertheabilityoftheprovincestoregulatethepropertyandcivilrightsaspectsofgunso Guncontrolhasbeenasubjectoffederallegislationsinceconfederation

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ReferencereAssistedHumanReproductionAct,2010• 2004–regimepassedbyParliamentregulatinguseofassistedhumanreproduction• Courtsaysanumberofpracticesareprohibited(i.e.Cloninghumans);someareprohibitedwithoutalicense(i.e.need

license/certainenvironments/requirements);Establishedmechanismtooverseeregulation+licensingofscientificacts• Quebecargumentssayingthisisultravires:

o Regulatinghospitalsisaprovincialmannero Regulatingscientificpracticeinhospitalsisnotaprohibitiono Propertyandprofessionsarebeingregulated–doctorsareregulatedbytheprovinces(Parsons–provinces

regulateprofessions)• Majority–McLachlin

o DeterminingP+SoftheentireAct–determineifprovisionsthatarenotintravirescanbesavedbytheancillarydoctrine–determinedtheseweresavedanddeemedintravires

o Parliamentmayvalidlyemployregulationsaspartofacriminallawprovidedtheytargetalegitimatecriminalpurpose–RJRMacDonald;Hydro-Quebec

• Dissent:o Toofarremovedfromsupressinganevil–similartodissentinRJRMacDonaldo Notcriminalenough–cannotbebasedonconsistencyorefficiencyo Disagreementcontinuesbetweenregulationandcriminallawpower

PROVINCIALJURISDICTIONOVERMORALITY+PUBLICORDER• 92(13)–provinceshavepoweroverproperty+civilrights• Asaresultofs.92(14)theprovinceshavejurisdictionovertheadministrationofjusticeintheprovince(includingprovincial

policing)alongwiththefederaldelegationtoprosecuteCriminalCodeoffences• Federalgovernment(throughconditionallegislation)hasalsodraftedcriminallawsinwaysthatallowthemtobeshapedby

theprovincestorespondtolocalconditions• Thereisalsojudicialrecognitionofconcurrentprovincialjurisdictioninmattersthatmayalsobethesubjectofcriminallaw

o S.92(15)allowstheprovincestoenactpenalsanctions,butthepowerisunderstoodasanancillaryone–useofthemtoenforceprovincialregulationschemesthatarevalidlyanchoredelsewhereins.92powers

• 92(16)–generallyallmattersofamerelylocalorprivateNatureintheProvince

ReNovaScotiaBoardofCensorsvMcNeil[1978]2SCR662Facts:

• TheNovaScotiaTheatresandAmusementsActandtheregulationsenactedunderitestablishedasystemforlicensingandregulatingtheshowingoffilms.Theregulationsrequiredthatallfilmsbesubmittedtotheprovincialcensorboardpriortotheirexhibitionwiththeboardhavingthepowertoalloworprohibittheshowingofthefilm,orallowshowingwithdirectedchanges

• Sanctionforthebreachwasamonetarypenaltyandrevocationofatheatre’slicense• AftertheBoardbanned‘LastTangoinParis’aprivatecitizensoughtdeclarationthattheprovisionsandtheregulations

wereultravirestheprovinciallegislatureIssues:

• WhethertheprovisionsandregulationsoftheactareultravirestheprovinciallegislatureDecision:

• Actisnotultravires;validunder92(13)andperhaps92(16)Ratio:

• Legislationwhichauthorizestheestablishmentandenforcementofalocalstandardofmoralityisnotnecessarilyaninvasionofthefederalcriminalfield;moralityisnotexclusivetocriminallaw

Analysis:(Ritchie)• WhentheAct+Regulationsarereadasawholeitisfoundthattheyareprimarilydirectedtotheregulation,supervision,

andcontrolofthefilmbusinesswithinNovaScotiaincludingtheuseandexhibitionofthefilms• Therefore,theimpugnedprovisionsareenactedforthepurposeofreinforcingtheauthorityvestedinaprovincially

appointedboardtoperformthetasksofregulation–includingtheauthoritytopreventexhibitionoffilmsthathavebeenrejectedasunsuitableforviewingbyprovincialaudiences

• Legislationistheexerciseofprovincialauthorityovertransactionstakingplacewhollywithintheprovince• Whethertheprovinceisabletoregulatetheexhibitionanddistributionoffilmswithinitsownboundarieswhichare

deemedunsuitableforlocalviewingongroundsofmorality

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• TheActisnotconcernedwithcreatingacriminaloffenceorprovidingforitspunishment,butratherregulatingabusinesswithintheProvincetopreventexhibitionintheatresonthegroundsitfailstoconformtolocalstandardsofmorality

• Legislationwhichauthorizestheestablishmentandenforcementofalocalstandardofmoralityisnotnecessarilyaninvasionofthefederalcriminalfield;moralityisnotexclusivetocriminallaw

• Evenifitwascriminalitisstillpreventativeratherthanpenal–allowedunderBedardvDawson• InP+Sisdirectedtowardspropertyandcivilrightsandthereforevalidunders.92(13)–mayalsobeviewedasamatterof

localandprivatenatureintheProvince(92(16))sincethestandardsfromoneareatoanotherforwhatisacceptableonmoralgroundmayvary(Secessionreference–recognizingdiversity)

Dissent:(LaskinCJC)• Determiningpublicviewingoffilmsonconsiderationsthatmayextendbeyondpublicmoralityandincludepolitical,social,

religious• Thedeterminationofwhatisdecent,obscene,morallyfitforpublicviewingforart,films,liveperformancesiswithinthe

exclusivepowerofthefederalgovernmentundercriminallawpower• Federalpowerinrelationtocriminallawextendsbeyondmoralityandiswideenoughtoembraceanti-socialconductor

behavior• Thisisacasewhereprovinciallyauthorizedtribunaldefinesanddetermineswhatislegallypermissibleandwhatisnot–

thisisadirectintrusionintocriminallaw• Whenalicenseewhodisobeyedtheorderisatriskofcancellationofhislicenseandofapenalty–thereforecannotsaythat

nooffenceiscreated

DupondvCityofMontreal[1978]*Regulatingalocalmatter

- CityofMontrealpassedabylawprohibitingparadesorothergatheringsthat‘endangertranquility,safety,peace,orpublicorder’andanordinanceprohibitingpublicgatheringsifthoughttoendangersafety,peace,orpublicorder–thepenaltieswerefinesandimprisonment

- Thisbylaw/ordinancewerefoundtobeintraviresasaregulationofthemunicipalpublicdomainasalocalmatter–thepreventativecharacterwasemphasized

o Stillregulatingfromaprovincialhead–localmatter(92(16))- Laskindissentedhereaswell–mini-criminalcode[concernedaboutfreespeech]

WestendorpvTheQueen[1983]1SCR43Facts:

- Westendorpchargedwithbeingonthestreetforthepurposeofprostitutionincontraventionons.6.1(2)ofaCalgarybylaw

- Bylawwasmainlyconcernedwithuseofcitystreetsincludingsolicitationprovisions–penaltieswerefinesandimprisonmentaccordingtothegravityoftheinfractions;itwasamendedtoadds.6.1whichdealtwithprostitution(also6.1(3)–cannotapproachanotherforthepurposeofprostitution)–thefines/imprisonmentwereheftierforthesesections

- Reasoning–prostitutesoftencollectingroupswhichareasourceofannoyanceandembarrassmenttothepublicIssues:

- Does6.1invadefederalauthorityinrelationtocriminallawthereforemakingitultraviresDecision:

- Appealallowed;6.1invadesfederalauthorityinrelationtocriminallawàultraviresAnalysis:(Laskin)

- 6.1standsasanintrudedprovision–itiscompletelydifferentfromprecedingsections.Ifwantedtodeal‘controlofthestreets’wouldhavetodealwiththecongregationofpersonsonthestreetsunrelatedtowhattheyweresaying/doing.Hereitisactivatedonlybywhatapersonsays/doesinrelationtoofferingsexualservices–thereisnoviolationbycongregatingorobstructingbutbytheofferofsexualservices.Thisprohibitioniswhatmakesitinherentlycriminal.

- Acolorablelaw--thisisanobviousattempttocontrolorpunishprostitution–thereisnoenumeratedprovincialheadofpowerwhichthisprovisionisattemptingtoregulate–nothingtodowithpropertyortheinterferencewithpublicproperty

o Thereisnovalidprovincialpurposeforwhichthelawisregulating- Aprovincecannottranslateadirectattackonprostitutionintostreetcontrolthroughtherelianceonpublicnuisance- Herethereisanoverreachingwhichoffendsthedivisionofpowers

WhatisthedifferencebetweenWestendorpandDupond?

• SCC:thisisnotamatterofprotectingpropertyorlocalornature(asinDupond),thisisprohibitingingeneralcommunicationsforthepurposesofprostitution.Thislookslikeclassicuseofcriminallaw.Prohibitingatypeofbehavior

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thatmembersofsocietyfindoffensive.Itisnotcreatingadisturbance,orunderminingpublicorder.Itiscontrarytopublicmorality.

RioHotelLtdvNewBrunswick(LiquorLicensingBoard)[1987]2SCR59**Doubleaspectdoctrine

- SCCupheldprovisionsoftheLiquorControlActwhichgavetheBoardthepowertoattachconditionstoliquorlicensesregulatingandrestrictingthenatureandconductofliveentertainmentinlicensedpremises.

- Alicensewasissuedtoahotelownerrestrictingnudeperformances–hearguedtheissuerelatedtopublicmoralityandthereforefellwithinthejurisdictionoffederalparliamentunder91(27)becausetheCriminalCodehadenactedseveralprovisionsrelatingtopublicnudity

- SCCconfirmedprovincesabilitytoprohibitnudeentertainmentaspartoftheliquorlicensenotwithstandingrelatedprovisionsoftheCriminalCode

- Thislegislationhasapurposeentirelydifferentfromthatsoughttobeservedbycriminallaw–hastodowiththetypesofentertainmentavailableasamarketingdeviceforthesaleofliquorwithintheprovince–‘doubleaspectdoctrine’

- ThislegislationprimafacierelatestopropertyandcivilrightswithintheProvinceandtomattersofapurelylocalnature–itisonlyseekingtoregulatetheformsofentertainmentthatmaybeusedasmarketingtoolsbyownerstoboostalcoholsales–thereisoverlapbutnodirectconflictanditispossibletocomplywithboththisandcriminalcodeprovisions

- HereitispartofaregulatoryschemeforthesaleofliquorinNewBrunswick

ChatterjeevOntario(AttorneyGeneral)2009SCC19- IssuewastheconstitutionalityofOntario’sCivilRemediesAct(CRA)whichauthorizestheforfeitureofproceedsofunlawful

activity.Itdoesnotrequireallegation/proofthatthepersoncommittedacrime,propertymaybeforfeitedonabalanceofprobabilitiesifitdemonstratedthatthepropertyconstitutedtheproceedsofcrimeingeneral

- Thepolicearrestedtheappellantbecausedidnothavefrontlicenseplateandfoundawarrantforabreachofprobationandwhensearchinghiscarincidentaltothearrestfoundmoney($29000)anditemsassociatedwithillicitdrugtradeandasmellofmarijuanabutnodrugs–hewasneverchargedwithanyoffencerelatingtothedrug-relatedactivity,howevertheyappliedforforfeitureoftheseizedmoneyundertheCRA

- AsstatedinCanadianWesternBank‘acourtshouldfavor,wherepossible,theoperationofstatutesenactedbybothlevelsofgovernment’

- TheCRAwasenactedtodetercrime(bothgovernmentscanpursue)andcompensatevictims(provincialcompetence)o Crimeimposeshugecostsonprovincialtreasuries–ifprovinceshavetobearthecoststothecommunityof

criminalbehavior,theyshouldbeabletousedeterrencetosuppressit- P+Sittomakecrimeunprofitable,tocaptureresourcestaintedbycrime,andtocompensateprivateindividuals/public

institutionsforthecostsofpastcrime–thesearevalidprovincialobjects(notcolorable)–itisaboutpropertynotpunishingcriminalconduct

ReferencereSecuritiesAct2011SCC66Facts:

• ThisActcreatesasingleschemegoverningthetradeofsecuritiesthroughoutCanadasubjecttotheoversightofasinglenationalsecuritiesregulator

• CanadaandOntariobelieveitcanbeupheldunderthegeneralbranchof91(2);however,AlbertaandQuebecbelieveitisamatterfallingwithins.92(13);otheropponentssayunder92(16)

• ThisisanareaofclassicprovincialjurisdictionIssues:

• DeterminewhethertheSecuritiesActfallswithinthelegislativeauthorityoftheParliamentofCanadaDecision:

• No–theActisnotvalidunderthegeneralbranchofthepowertoregulatetradeandcommerceunders.91(2)Analysis:

• Canadahasshownthataspectsofthesecuritiesmarketarenationalinscopeandaffectthecountryasawhole–howeverconsideredinitsentiretytheproposedActischieflydirectedatprotectinginvestorsandensuringthefairnessofcapitalmarketsthroughtheday-to-dayregulationofissuersandotherparticipantsinthesecuritiesmarket–thesemattershavelongbeenconsideredlocalconcernssubjecttoProvinciallegislationoverpropertyandcivilrightswithintheprovince

• Afundamentalprincipleoffederalismisthatbothfederalandprovincialpowersmustberespected,andonepowermaynotbeusedinamannerthateffectivelyevisceratesanother–ratherabalancemustbestruckwhichallowsboththefederalParliamentandtheprovinciallegislaturestoacteffectivelyintheirrespectivespheres

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o Parliamentcannotregulatethewholeofthesecuritiessystemsimplybecauseaspectsofithaveanationaldimension

• ThepreambleoftheActstatesthatitsimmediatepurposeistocreateasingleCanadiansecuritiesregulator–s.9statestheunderlyingpurposesaretoprovideinvestorprotection,tofosterfair,efficientandcompetitivecapitalmarkets,andtocontributetotheintegrityandstabilityofCanada’sfinancialsystem

o TheActincludescertainrequirements.,duties,civilremedies,andregulatoryandcriminaloffencespertainingtosecurities

o Singlesetoflawspertainingtosecurities,undertheoversightofasinglenationalregulator• TheactdoesnotseektounilaterallyimposeaunifiedsystemofsecuritiesregulationforthewholeofCanada–itallows

provincestooptin,thehopebeingthatallormostwillFederalGovernmentPosition

• ViewtheActasaconstitutionalexerciseofgeneralpowertoregulatetradeandcommerce(91(2))–believeitdoesnotinvokeotherheadsofpower

• DonotcontendthatprovisionsoftheActthatmightbeviewedasfallingwithinprovincialpowersarevalidbecausetheyareancillarytotheexerciseoffederalpowers

• Securitiesmarketshaveevolvedandthishasgivenrisetorisksandconcernsthatcanonlybedealtwithonanationallevel–thisbringsthesemarketswithinthegeneraltradeandcommercepower

ProvincialPosition(AB,QB,MB,NB)• TheschemeoftheActfallsundertheprovincialpowerorpropertyandcivilrightsandalsotrenchesonthejurisdictionover

s.92(16))–mattersofamerelylocalorprivatenature(regulationofcontracts,property,andprofessions)• BelievetheActisthinlydisguisedasanattempttoregulateaparticularindustry(thesecuritiesindustry)

ProvincialPosition(BC,SK)• Donotopposetheideaofanationalsecuritiesregulatoraslongasitisachievedinamannerthatrespectsthedivisionof

powers–believefederal-provincialcooperationwouldbethebestwaytoachievesecuritiesregulationPurpose:

• TocreateasingleCanadiansecuritiesregulator• Toprovideinvestorprotection;tofosterfair,efficient,andcompetitivecapitalmarkets• TocontributetothestabilityandintegrityofCanada’sfinancialsystem

Effects:• Direct:establishafederalsecuritiesregulationscheme–wantsallprovincestoeventuallyjoin–andasonceasufficient

numberoptinthecurrentregulationschemeswillbeeffectivelydisplaced• Tobeincludedintheregulatoryscheme,provincesmustsuspendtheirownsecuritieslaws-thiswillproducefollow-

througheffectswhicharetosubsumetheexistingprovincialschemesgoverningsecuritiesunderthefederalregulationscheme

• Theeffectoftheprovisionsistoduplicatelegislationschemesenactedbyprovinciallegislaturesexercisingtheirjurisdictionoverpropertyandcivilrightsunders.91(13)

o HOWEVER–duplicationofprovincialprovisionsdoesnotmeanthatthereisnofederalaspectthatcansupporttheAct–Canadasaysitincludesprovisionsthatgobeyondprovincialpowers–controllingsystemicrisks(‘dominoeffect’riskswithachainofnegativeeconomicconsequences)

MainThrust:• Toregulate,onanexclusivebasis,allaspectsofsecuritiestradinginCanadaincludingthetradesandoccupationsrelatedto

securitiesineachoftheprovinceswhichcanbeprotectinginvestorsandensuringthefairnessofthemarketsthroughtheregulationofparticipants

UsingtheGMTesttodetermineifActfallsunderGeneralTrade+Commerce:• Thefirst2areclearlymet–regulatoryscheme/bodyunderoversightofaregulator• Ifweanswerthenext3affirmativelythenthedoubleaspectdoctrineisachieved• 3:Itdoesgobeyondaparticularindustryandengagestradeasawhole(manybusinesseshavetrades/stocks);however,it

alsoreachesbeyondthesemattersanddescendsintothedetailedregulationofallaspectsoftradinginsecurities(aprovincialmatter);thefactsdonotsupportCanada’sassertionthattheareaofeconomicactivityhastransformedsomuchthatitnowfallstoberegulatedunderadifferentheadofpower–concludethatday-to-dayregulationofsecuritieswithintheprovincesremainsamatterofpropertyandcivilrights

• 4:Addressestheconstitutionalcapacityoftheprovincestoenactasimilarschemeinconcert;becauseprovincescouldalwayswithdrawfromaninterprovincialschemethereisnoassurancethattheycouldeffectivelyaddressissuesofnationalsystemicriskandcompetitivenationalcapitalmarketsonasustainedbasis–theprovincestogetherlacktheconstitutionalcapacitytosustainaviablenationalschemeaimedatnationalgoalssuchasmanagementofsystemicriskorCanadawidedatacollection–provincescannotmanagesystemicrisk;onlyfederal

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o However,Canadagoesbeyondthesemattersandisattemptingtoregulateallaspectsofsecurities;includingallaspectsofcontractsforsecuritieswithintheprovinces,allaspectsofpublicprotectionandprofessionalcompetencewithinprovinces–thisActoverreachesthelegislativeinterestofthefederalgovernment

• 5:BecausetheActisconcernedwithday-to-dayregulation,theproposedActwouldnotfailifaprovincedeclinedtoparticipate;theopt-infeaturealsocontemplatesthepossibilitythatnotallprovinceswillparticipate–weighingagainstCanada’sargumentthatthesuccessofthelegislationrequiresallpartiesparticipate

DoestheActaddressamatterofnationalimportanceandscopegoingtotradeasawholeinawaythatisdistinctanddifferentfromprovincialconcerns?

• No–theActregulatescontracts+propertymatterswithineachprovince;theprovisionsoftheActthatrelatetheconcernsofcontrollingtheCanadiansecuritiesmarketasawholemaybevalidontheirown,howevertheycannotextendlendconstitutionalvaliditytothefullextentoftheproposedAct

o P+Sisabouttheday-to-dayregulationofsecuritieso Cannotregulateinawaythatwouldundermineprovincialjurisdiction

• Jurisprudenceacknowledgesthatsecuritiesregulationmaypossessfederalaspects,ithasgenerallyviewedbasicsecuritiesregulationwithinprovincesasalocalmatterofpropertyandcivilrights

Ratio:• Economicimportanceandpreservingthecharacterofthesecuritiesmarketmaysupportfederalinterventionthatis

differentfromwhattheprovincescando,howevertheydonotjustifyawholesaletakeoveroftheregulationofthesecuritiesindustry

• Itisnottheincidentaleffectsthatareofquestionforvalidity,ratherthemainthrustthatgoesbeyondthefederalpowerNotes:

• AcooperativeapproachallowingaschemethatrecognizestheprovincialnatureofsecuritiesregulationwhileallowingParliamenttodealwithgenuinelynationalconcernsremainsavailable–howeveritisnottheCourttosuggestthewayforwardbysuggestinganalternativescheme,buttheycannotethegrowingpracticeofresolvingthisproblemwithseekingcooperativesolutions