II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS Art. IX, A, Sec. 1Section 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit. (Independent) Constitutional Commissions

● Civil Service Commission● Commission on Elections● Commission on Audit

A. Civil Service Commission1. Composition & Qualifications of Commissioners Art. IX, B, Sec. 1Section 1. (1) The civil service shall be administered by the Civil Service Commission composed of a Chairman and two Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, with proven capacity for public administration, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections immediately preceding their appointment.(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, a Commissioner for five years, and another Commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. Civil Service Commission

● shall administer the civil service● Composition

Chairmantwo Commissioners

● Qualificationsnatural-born35 years of agewith proven capacity for public administrationnot have been candidates for any elective position in the elections immediately preceding their appointment

Art. VII, Sec. 13Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not, during his tenure, be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. Gaminde vs. Commission on Audit, 347 SCRA 655 (YESHA)Thelma Gaminde vs Commission on AuditDecember 13, 2000 FACTS

- The Case: Special civil action of certiorari seeking to annul and set aside two “decisions” of the Commission on Audit (COA)- On June 11, 1993, Petitioner Thelma P. Gaminde was appointed as ad interim Commissioner of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) by then Pres. Ramos for a term expiring Feb. 2, 1999. She assumed office after taking her oath and her appointment was confirmed by Congress.- Before the end of her term, or on Feb. 24, 1998, petitioner sought clarification from the Office of the Pres. as to the expiry date of her term of office. In reply, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (now Associate Justice) Corona, in a letter, opined that petitioner’s term would expire on Feb. 2, 2000 not on Feb. 2, 1999. She thus remained in office after Feb. 02, 1999, relying on the said advisory opinion.- On Feb. 04, 1999, CSC Chairman Alma De Leon, requested opinion from the COA on whether petitioner and her co-terminous staff should continue to be paid their salaries notwithstanding the fact that their appointment had already expired. COA General Counsel issued an opinion that the petitioner’s appointment had indeed expired.- CSC Resident Auditor issued a notice disallowing in audit the salaries and emoluments pertaining to petitioner and her staff, a decision which petitioner appealed to the COA en banc. The appeal was dismissed, COA affirmed the disallowance, and held that the issue of petitioner’s term of office may be addressed by mere reference to her appointment paper which had Feb. 02, 1999 as expiration date. COA also stated that the Commission is bereft of power to recognize an extension of her term, not even with the implied acquiescence of the Office of the President. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, she was again denied; hence this petition. ISSUEWON petitioner Atty. Gaminde’s term of office, as CSCommissioner, expired on Feb. 2, 1999 or on Feb. 2, 2000 HELDIt expired on Feb. 2, 1999. For Commissioners (5 year term) the count is:Feb.02, 1987---àFeb.02, 1992---àFeb.02, 1999---àFeb.02, 2006… Ratio The appropriate starting point of the terms of office of the first appointees to the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must be on Feb. 02, 1987, the date of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution in order to maintain the regular interval of vacancy every 2 years consistent in the previous appointment intervals. Reasoning- The term of office of the Chairman and members of the Civil Service Commission is prescribed in the 1987 Constitution under Art IX-B Sec. 1(2). The 1973 Constitution introduced the first system of a regular rotation or cycle in the membership of the CSC (Art. XII Sec. 1(1), 1973 Consti). It was a copy of the Constitutional prescription in the amended 1935 Constitution of a rotational system for the appointment of the Chairman and members of the Commission on Elections (Art. X Sec. 1, 1935 Consti, as amended). - In Republic v Imperial, it was said that “the operation of the rotational plan requires two conditions: (1) that the terms of the first (3) Commissioners should start on a common date, and, (2) that any vacancy due to death, resignation or disability before the expiration of the term should only be filled only for the unexpired balance of the term.”- Consequently, the terms of the first Chairman and Commissioners of the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must start on a common date, irrespective of the variations in the dates of appointments and qualifications of the appointees, in order that the expirations of the first terms of 7, 5 and 3 years should lead to the regular recurrence of the 2-year interval between the expiration of the terms.- In the law of public officers, “term” of office is distinguished from “tenure” of the incumbent. The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds the office. The term of office is not affected by the hold-over. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent.- Although Art. XVIII Sec. 15 provides that incumbent members of the Constitutional Commissions shall continue in office for one year after the ratification of this Constitution, unless they are sooner removed for cause or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office or appointed to a new term,

what it contemplates is “tenure” not “term.” The term “unless” imports an exception to the general rule. Clearly, the transitory provisions mean that the incumbent members of the Consti Commissions shall continue… for 1 year after ratification of the Consti under their existing appointments at the discretion of the appointing power who may cut short their tenure by reasons the reasons stated therein. However, they do not affect the “term” of office fixed in Art. IX, providing for a 7-5-3 yr rotational interval for the 1st appointees.Decision Term of office expired on Feb. 2, 1999. However, petitioner served as de facto officer in good faith until Feb. 2, 2000 and thus entitled to receive her salary and other emoluments for actual service rendered. COA decision disallowing salaries/emoluments is reversed.Voting 10 Concur, Bellosillo No part., Related to one of the parties, Puno, concur (In the result), De Leon, Jr., Concurring and Dissenting opinionMendoza, Joins De Leon’s dissent

SEPARATE OPINION

DE LEON [concur and dissent] Dissents:-the term of petitioner expired on Feb. 2, 2000 not on Feb. 2, 1999 as explained in ponencia.-the term of the first set of CSCommissioners appointed under the 1987 Constitution commenced on the Feb. 2, 1988 not on the date of its ratification on Feb. 2, 1987. Concurs:-that the salaries and emoluments which petitioner as CSCommissioner received after Feb. 2, 1999 should not be disallowed by COA. 2. Appointment & Term of Office Art. IX, B, Sec. 1Section 1. (1) The civil service shall be administered by the Civil Service Commission composed of a Chairman and two Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, with proven capacity for public administration, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections immediately preceding their appointment.(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, a Commissioner for five years, and another Commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. Civil Service Commission

● Appointmentby the President with the consent of the Commission on AppointmentsNo temporary or acting capacity

● TermChairman: 7 years without reappointmentOne Commissioner: 5 years without reappointmentAnother Commissioner: 3 years without reappointment

3. Appointment of Personnel of Constitutional Commissions Art. IX, A, Sec. 4Section 4. The Constitutional Commissions shall appoint their officials and employees in accordance with law. De Guzman vs. Commission on Elections, 336 SCRA 188 (THERESE)FACTS:

-RA 8189 (The Voter’s Registration Act of 1996) was enacted by President Fidel V. Ramos on June 10, 1996.-The petitioners in this case assail the validity of Section 44 of the said Act, which provides: "SEC. 44. Reassignment of Election Officers. - No Election Officer shall hold office in a particular city or municipality for more than four (4) years. Any election officer who, either at the time of the approval of this Act or subsequent thereto, has served for at least four (4) years in a particular city or municipality shall automatically be reassigned by the Commission to a new station outside the original congressional district." -By virtue of the aforequoted provision of law, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) promulgated two resolutions for its implementation, as well as several directives reassigning the petitioners (who are either City or Municipal Election officers) to different stations. Issue: Whether or not Section 44 of RA 8189 is unconstitutional Held: NO. Petition dismissed. Ratio: According to the petitioners, Section 44:a. violates the equal protection clause-Petitioners maintain that there is no substantial distinction between them (City and Municipal Election Officers) and other COMELEC officials. However, the “equal protection clause” of the Constitution permits a valid classification. In this case, the singling out of election officers is done in order to ensure the impartiality of election officials by preventing them from developing familiarity with the people of their place assignment. b. infringes on their security of tenure and unduly deprive them of due process of law-The guarantee of security of tenure under the Constitution is not a guarantee of perpetual employment. It only means that an employee cannot be dismissed (or transferred) from the service for causes other than those provided by law and after due process is accorded the employee. What it seeks to prevent is capricious exercise of the power to dismiss. But, where it is the law-making authority itself which furnishes the ground for the transfer of a class of employees, no such capriciousness can be raised for so long as the remedy proposed to cure a perceived evil is germane to the purposes of the law. c. undermines the authority of the COMELEC to appoint its own officials and employees (IMPORTANT) -As stressed upon by the Solicitor General, Section 44 establishes a guideline for the COMELEC to follow. -Said section provides the criterion or basis for the reassignment or transfer of an election officer and does not deprive the COMELEC of its power to appoint, and maintain its authority over its officials and employees. As a matter of fact, the questioned COMELEC resolutions and directives illustrate that it is still the COMELEC which has the power to reassign and transfer its officials and employees. But as a government agency tasked with the implementation and enforcement of election laws, the COMELEC is duty bound to comply with the laws passed by Congress. -The independence of the COMELEC is not at issue here. There is no impairment or emasculation of its power to appoint its own officials and employees. In fact, Section 44 even strengthens the COMELEC’s power of appointment, as the power to reassign or transfer is within its exclusive jurisdiction and domain. 4. Salary Art. XVIII, Sec. 17

Section 17. Until the Congress provides otherwise, the President shall receive an annual salary of three hundred thousand pesos; the Vice-President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, two hundred forty thousand pesos each; the Senators, the Members of the House of Representatives, the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and the Chairmen of the Constitutional Commissions, two hundred four thousand pesos each; and the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, one hundred eighty thousand pesos each. Art. IX, A, Sec. 3Section. 3. The salary of the Chairman and the Commissioners shall be fixed by law and shall not be decreased during their tenure. 5. Disqualification Art. IX, A, Sec. 2Section 2. No member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any other office or employment. Neither shall he engage in the practice of any profession or in the active management or control of any business which, in any way, may be affected by the functions of his office, nor shall he be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or privilege granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. 6. Impeachment Art. XI, Sec. 2Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. 7. Functions of the CSC Art. IX, B, Sec. 3Section 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the Government, shall establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It shall strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a management climate conducive to public accountability. It shall submit to the President and the Congress an annual report on its personnel programs. Art. IX, A, Sec. 7- 8Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members, any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.Section 8. Each Commission shall perform such other functions as may be provided by law. Lazo vs. CSC, GR No. 108824, September 14, 1994 (ZION)DENNIS LAZO vs Civil Service CommissionEn Banc; September 14, 1994Mendoza Lazo vs CSCFacts:

1. November 11, 1988: CSC received a letter from a certain Efren L. Pagurayan, reporting that petitioner Dennis C. Lazo had boasted to him that he had bought his career service (subprofessional) eligibility from the Civil Service Commission for P7,000.00, P4,500.00 of which had been paid to the examiner and computer programmers in the Manila Office, and P2,500.00 to the Regional Office at Tuguegarao.2. December 18, 19898: CSC ordered investigation.3. July 30, 1990: Regional Office assigned to investigate recommended dismissal of the case for having found that Dennis Lazo was a fictitious character, also no witness to corroborate allegation.4. Not satisfied, the CSC ordered further investigation of the matter. Rechecked of the exam sheets revealed that Lazo’s score was 34.48% and not 76.46% as indicated in his certificate of eligibility.5. July 24, 1991: Regional Office dismissed the administrative case for lack of evidence. July 2, 1992 it revoked his eligibility for being null and void but still dismissed the case6. Lazo asked for reconsideration alleging that he was denied due process and lack of evidence. CSC denied reconsideration. Appealed to the SC alleging the same grounds for reconsideration in CSC.Issue: WON CSC erred when it revoked petitioner’s eligibility.Held and Ratio: Dismissed.1. Under the Constitution, the Civil Service Commission is the central personnel agency of the government charged with the duty of determining questions of qualifications of merit and fitness of those appointed to the civil service. Its power to issue a certificate of eligibility carries with it the power to revoke a certificate for being null and void.2. As a general proposition, in the context of this case, which simply involves the rechecking of examination papers and nothing more than a reevaluation of documents already in the records of the CSC according to a standard answer key previously set by it, notice and hearing was not required. The question before the CSC did not require any evidentiary hearing. Instead, what applied was the rule of res ipsa loquitur. 2 Petitioner could have examined the rechecking of his examination papers and, if he found anything wrong, he could have asked for reconsideration. But, while he filed one in this case, he did not show that his score was really 76.46% 8. Scope of the Civil Service Art. IX, B, Sec. 2Section 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.(2) Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be determined, as far as practicable, and, except to positions which are policy-determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical, by competitive examination.(3) No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law.(4) No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political campaign.(5) The right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees.(6) Temporary employees of the Government shall be given such protection as may be provided by law. Art. XII, Sec. 16Section 16. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created or established by special charters in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic viability. National Service Corp. vs. NLRC, 168 SCRA 122 (1988) (FROI)FACTS:

● Respondent Eugenia Credo was an employee (first as security guard, now as chief of property and records) of petitioner NASECO

● Credo was placed under forced leave for failure to follow memorandum of manager’s memorandum on company’s Statement of Billings Adjustment

While on forced leave, Credo filed a case against NASECO with Labor Arbiter

While on forced leave, NASECO’s Committee of Personal Affairs had a meeting wherein they found out that Credo had offenses (all her offenses involved being rude and sarcastic in front of customers and superior officers) before and recommended Credo’s termination with no benefits

● After forced leave, Credo had a meeting with the boss informing her that there were certain charges against her, asked her to explain her side - she wasn’t able to explain so she got fired

Credo filed supplemental complaint for illegal dismissal with Labor Arbiter● Labor Arbiter: dismissed Credo’s complaint; ordered NASECO to pay Credo separation pay● NLRC: directing NASECO to reinstate Credo to her former position, or substantially equivalent

position, with six (6) months' backwages and without loss of seniority rights and other privileges appertaining thereto, and; dismissing Credo's claim for attorney's fees, moral and exemplary damages.

● NASECO: NLRC has no juridisction over NASECO - NASECO is a subsidiary of the National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC), a subsidiary wholly owned by the Philippine National Bank (PNB), which in turn is a government owned corporation

ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Service Law applies to tertiary corporationsHELD/RATIO: YES - NLRC has jurisdiction over such corporations: the Constitution [Art. IX-B, Sec. 2(l)] defines the Civil Service as only those government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters i.e. created by law, by an act of Congress, or by special law AND NOT formed under the General Corporation Code.

taken from records of the Constitutional CommissionNASECO is a government owned and controlled corporation WITHOUT original charter - NLRC and Labor Code applies, not Civil Service Law

Tupas vs. NHA, 173 SCRA 33 (KAT) F: Respondent NHA is a corporation organized in 1959 under the Uniform Charter of Government Corporations. Its shares of stock have been 100% owned by the Government from its incorporation. Petitioner TUPAS is a legitimate labor organization with a chapter in NHA. TUPAS filed a petition for certification election with DOLE. It was denied. HELD: The civil service now covers only govt owned or controlled corporations w/ original or legislative charters, that is those created by an act of Congress of by special law, and not those incorporated under and pursuant to a general legislation.xxxThere is, therefore, no impediment to the holding of a certification election among the workers of NHC for it is clear that they are covered by the Labor Code, the NHA being a govt owned and/ or controlled corp. w/o an original charter. *Alliance of Gov’t Workers vs. Minister of Labor and Employment, 124 SCRA 1 (1983) (KARL) F: Petitioner is a federation of unions in govt-owned corps. and in govt schools. It petitioned the SC for a ruling that PD 851, requiring "all employers... to pay their employees receiving a basic salary of not more than P1,000 a month... a 13th month pay," applies to govt employees HELD: NO. It is an old rule of statutory construction that restrictive statutes and acts w/c impose burdens on the public treasury or w/c diminish rights and interests, no matter how broad their terms do not embrace the Sovereign, unless the Sovereign is specifically mentioned. The Republic of the Phil. as a sovereign cannot be covered by a general term like "employer" unless the language used in the law is clear and specific to that effect. ISSUE 2: May government employees act through a labor federation which uses the collective bargaining power to secure increased compensation for its members? HELD: NO. The terms and conditions of employment in the Govern¬ment including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof are governed by law. And this is effected through stat¬utes or administrative circulars, rules and regulations and not through Collective Bargaining agreements.

Under the present constitution, (1973), GOCC's are now part of the civil service, thus, not allowed to use concerted activi¬ties to get other benefits or higher salaries different from that provided by law and regulation *National Housing Corp. vs. Juco, 134 SCRA 172 (1985) (YESHA) National Housing Corp. v. Juco, 134 SCRA 172 (1985)F: Juco was an employee of the NHA. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal w/ MOLE but his case was dismissed by the labor arbiter on the ground that the NHA is a govt owned corp. and jurisdiction over its employees is vested in the CSC. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision and remanded the case to the labor arbiter for further proceedings. NHA in turn appealed to the SC. ISSUE: Are employees of the National Housing Corporation, a GOCC without original charter, covered by the Labor Code or by laws and regulations governing the civil service? HELD: Sec. 11, Art XIIB of the Constitution specifically provides: "The Civil Service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision and instrumentality of the Government, including every government owned and controlled corporation.The inclusion of GOCC within the embrace of the civil service shows a deliberate effort at the framersto plug an earlier loophole which allowed GOCC to avoid the full consequences of the civil service system. All offices and firms of the government are covered.This consti provision has been implemented by statute PD 807 is unequivocal that personnel of GOCCbelong to the civil service and subject to civil service requirements."Every" means each one of a group, without exception. This case refers to a GOCC. It does not covercases involving private firms taken over by the government in foreclosure or similar proceedings. xxxFor purposes of coverage in the Civil Service, employees of govt owned or controlled corps. whethercreated by special law or formed as subsidiaries are covered by the Civil Service Law, not the Labor Code, and the fact that pvt. corps. owned or controlled by the govt may be created by special charter does not mean that such corps. not created by special law are not covered by the Civil Service.xxxThe infirmity of the resp's position lies in its permitting the circumvention or emasculation of Sec. 1,Art. XIIB [now Art IX, B, Sec. 2 (1)] of the Consti. It would be possible for a regular ministry of govt to create a host of subsidiary corps. under the Corp. Code funded by a willing legislature. A govt owned corp. could create several subsidiary corps. These subsidiary corps. would enjoy the best of two worlds. Their officials and employees would be privileged individuals, free from the strict accountability required by the Civil Service Dec. and the regulations of the COA. Their incomes would not be subject to the competitive restraint in the open market nor to the terms and conditions of civil service employment. Conceivably, all govt owned or controlled corps. could be created, no longer by special charters, but through incorp. under the general law. The Constitutional amendment including such corps. in the embrace of the civil service would cease to have application. Certainly, such a situation cannot be allowed. University of the Philippines vs. Regino, 221 SCRA 598 (THERESE) G.R. No. 88167 May 3, 1993UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES and UP SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS, petitioners, vs.THE HON. TEODORO P. REGINO, Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 84 NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION, Q.C., ANGEL PAMPLINA, and The CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondents.The Solicitor General for petitioner.Araullo, Zambrano, Gruba, Chua Law Firm for private respondent.Facts: Respondent Angel Pamplina, a mimeograph operator at the University of the Philippines School of Economics, was dismissed on June 22, 1982 after he was found guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct for causing the leakage of the final examination questions in Economics 106 under Prof. Solita Monsod.

The UP Board of Regents denied his appeal, so he sought relief from the Merit Systems Board created under PD 1409. Under Section 5(l) thereof, the MSB has the power to "hear and decide administrative cases involving officers and employees of the civil service."UP filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction where it held that administrative matters involving the discipline of UP employees fall under the jurisdiction of the UP Board of Regents (UP vs CA).The motion was denied. MSB exonerated Pamplina and ordered his reinstatement.UP then appealed to the Civil Service Commission, which on November 4, 1987, issued Resolution No. 87-428, sustaining the MSB. 4 The motion for reconsideration was denied on April 13, 1988.On June 10, 1988, the petitioners filed a second motion for reconsideration. This was also denied on August 31, 1988, on the basis of Section 39(b) of PD 807, providing in part that "only one petition for reconsideration shall be entertained" by the Civil Service Commission.Pamplina filed a "Manifestation and Motion for Execution of Judgment" of the Commission, copy of which was received by the Office of the Solicitor General on October 4, 1988. 5 This was opposed by the petitioners, but in an order dated November 7, 1988, the Commission granted the motion. Nevertheless, Pamplina was still not reinstated. UP claimed that the resolutions of the Commission had not yet become final and executory.Pamplina's reaction was to file a petition for a writ of mandamus on November 11, 1988. Judge Teodoro P. Regino of the RTC of Quezon City granted the petition on April 27, 1989. The respondents (herein petitioners) were ordered to immediately reinstate Pamplina.On June 19, 1989, the present petition for certiorari was filed with this Court to seek the annulment of the decision of the trial court.Issue:a. Whether or not the UP Board of Regents has the sole authority to discipline its employeesb. Whether or not UP’s petition for certiorari was filed on timeHeld: No. Petition dismissed.Ratio:a. UP contends that under its charter, Act 1870, it enjoys not only academic freedom but also institutional autonomy. Section 6(e) of the said Act grants the UP Board of Regents the power "to appoint, on recommendation of the president of the university, professors, instructors, lecturers, and other employees of the university, to fix their compensation and to remove them for cause after an investigation and hearing shall have been had." Pamplina was dismissed by virtue of this provision.However, the Civil Service Law (PD 807) expressly vests in the Commission appellate jurisdiction in administrative disciplinary cases involving members of the Civil Service. Section 9(j) mandates that the Commission shall have the power to "hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it in accordance with Section 37 or brought to it on appeal." And Section 37(a), provides that, "The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposititon of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty (30) days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days' salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office." (Emphasis supplied)Under the 1972 Constitution, all government-owned or controlled corporations, regardless of the manner of their creation, were considered part of the Civil Service. 7 Under the 1987 Constitution only government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters fall within the scope of the Civil Service pursuant to Article IX-B, Section 2(l).As a mere government-owned or controlled corporation, UP was clearly a part of the Civil Service under the 1973 Constitution and now continues to be so because it was created by a special law and has an original charter. As a component of the Civil Service, UP is therefore governed by PD 807 and administrative cases involving the discipline of its employees come under the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.b. Petitioners received a copy of the resolution denying their motion for reconsideration on April 22, 1968.In Article IX-A, Section 7, of the 1987 Constitution,it is provided that:. . . Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.The petitioners therefore had thirty days from April 22, 1988, or until May 22, 1988, within which to elevate their case to this Court. They did not do so and instead filed a second motion for reconsideration, which was not allowed under Article IX, Section 39(b) of PD 807. On top of this, the second motion for reconsideration was filed only on June 10, 1988, or 19 days beyond the 30-day reglementary period.

CSC vs. Sojor, 554 SCRA 160 (2008) (ZION) PNOC-EDC vs. Leogardo, 175 SCRA 26 (FROI)Philippine National Oil Company - Energy Development Corp v. Vicente Leogardo, Deputy Minister of Labor Facts:

● Petitoner PNOC-EDC is a subsidiary of PNOC organized under the General Corporation Code● Petitioner filed with Ministry of Labor and Employment for clearance application for dismissal of

Vicente Ellelina, a contractual employee● Petitioner wants Ellelina fired because the latter allegedly committed a crime (alarm or public

scandal): during company XMAS party, because of the refusal of the raffle committee to give him the prize corresponding to his lost winning ticket, he tried to grab the armalite rifle of the Philippine Constabulary Officer outside the building despite the warning shots fired by the latter.

● Clearance was initially granted but was reversed by Respondent Vicente LeogardoIssues:

1. Whether or not Petitioner is covered by the Civil Service Law2. Whether or not Ellelina’s dismissal was justified

Held/Ratio:1. NO. Court affirms ruling in NASECO v. NLRC - only those government owned and controlled

corporations with original charters are covered by Civil Service a. the test in determining whether a government-owned or controlled

corporation is subject to the Civil Service Law is the manner of its creation such that government corporations created by special charter are subject to its provisions while those incorporated under the general Corporation Law are not within its coverage.

2. NO. The dismissal ordered by petitioner was a bit too harsh considering the nature of the act which he had committed and that it was his first offense.

Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System vs. Hernandez, 143 SCRA 602 (KAT) Facts · Several contractual employees of the MWSS filed a complaint before the NLRC for willful failure to pay their wage differentials, allowances, and other monetary benefits.· The defense of MWSS was that it was a GOCC, and therefore the NLRC had no jurisdiction over the case.· Nevertheless, the Labor-Arbiter rendered a decision against MWSS citing that only regular employees are NOT within the NLRC jurisdiction. Since the petitioners were contractual employees, they are still within NLRC jurisdiction. The L-A also stated that the Civil Service Decree applies to employees in government corporation in all matters, except monetary claims, which is a case governed by the Labor Code. Since this is a money case, the NLRC still had jurisdiction.· MWSS filed an certiorari to the SC ISSUE: Are employees of the MWSS covered by the Labor Code or the Civil Service laws? SC:The character of the MWSS as a government-owned or controlled corporation is not contested; it is, in any case, a proposition that cannot be gainsaid. Republic Act No. 6234 created it as a "government corporation to be known as the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System." MWSS is a GOCC created under RA 6234. Employment in the MWSS is governed NOT BY THE LABOR CODE, but by civil service law rules and regulations. Thus, controversies arising from or connected with that employement are NOT RECOGNIZABLE BY THE NLRC. The contention of the L-A that only regular employees are not covered by NLRC, and that non-regular or contractual employees are still covered by NLRC, is sophistical. There is no legal or logical justification for such a distinction. Indeed it is ruled out by the fact that positions in the civil service are classified into

career and non-career. (not by regular or contractual). The other contention of the L-A that monetary claims are still governed by the NLRC/ Labor Code, is even more patently illogical, and deserves no confutation. (confutation!?!) RECAP:1. The MWSS is a GOCC and employment is governed by the CSL, not the Labor Code2. Both regular and contractual employees are covered. There is no distinction.3. NLRC has no jurisdiction over money claims of contractual employees of GOCCs. They are still governed by the CSL, not the Labor Code. Quimpo v. Tanodbayan, 146 SCRA 137 (KARL) Quimpo v. Tanodbayan, 146 SCRA 137 -- Tanodbayan Has Jurisdiction over all Government Owned Firms Regardless of How Organized. F: F. Quimpo filed a complaint w/ the Tanodbayan (TB) charging G. Dimaano and D. Remo, manager and analyst of Petrophil, w/ viol. of RA 3019 for their refusal to pay Quimpo's fees as surveyor. The TB dismissed the complaint, however, on the ground that his jurisdiction extended only to govt owned corps. organized under a special law. Petrophil is a corp. organized under the Gen. Corp. Code; it was acquired by the govt to carry out its oil and gasoline programs. Quimpo filed a petition for certiorari, questioning the decision of the TB. The new TB confessed judgment. ISSUE: WON PETROPHIL is a government owned or controlled corpo¬ration whose employees fall within the jurisdictional purview of the Tanodbayan for purposes of the Anti-graft and Corrupt Prac¬tices Act? HELD: YES. Uphold the Tanodbayan jurisdiction. While it may be that PETROPHIL was not originally "created" as a GOCC, PETROPHIL became a subsidiary of PNOC and thus shed-off its private status. It is now funded and owned by the government as in fact, it was acquired to perform functions related to governmental programs and policies on oil. It was acquired not temporarily but as a permanent adjunct to perform essential government related functions

a. Terms & Conditions of Employment in the Civil Service i. Oath of Allegiance to the Constitution Art. IX, B, Sec. 4Section 4. All public officers and employees shall take an oath or affirmation to uphold and defend this Constitution. Art. XI, Sec. 18Section 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at all times and any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law.

b. Merit System

ii. Appointment of Defeated Candidates Art. IX, B, Sec. 6Section 6. No candidate who has lost in any election shall, within one year after such election, be appointed to any office in the Government or any Government-owned or controlled corporations or in any of their subsidiaries. People vs. Sandiganbayan, 559 SCRA 449 (2008) (YESHA)People of the Philippines vs The Sandiganbayan & Alejandro VillapandoJuly 23, 2008 Facts:

During the May 11, 1998 elections, Villapando ran for Municipal Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan. Orlando M. Tiape (now deceased), a relative of Villapando's wife, ran for Municipal Mayor of Kitcharao, Agusan del Norte. Villapando won while Tiape lost. Thereafter, on July 1, 1998, Villapando designated Tiape as Municipal Administrator of the Municipality of San Vicente, Palawan. A Contract of Consultancy dated February 8, 1999 was executed between the Municipality of San Vicente, Palawan and Tiape whereby the former employed the services of Tiape as Municipal Administrative and Development Planning Consultant in the Office of the Municipal Mayor for a period of six months from January 1, 1999 to June 30, 1999. Solomon B. Maagad and Renato M. Fernandez filed a complaint, and an information charging the two with violation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code [unlawful appointment] was filed before the Sandiganbayan, where Villapando was acquitted. The Sandiganbayan explained that temporary prohibition is not synonymous with absence or lack of legal qualification. In ascertaining the legal qualifications of a particular appointee to a public office, "there must be a law providing for the qualifications of a person to be nominated or appointed" therein. A person who possessed the required legal qualifications (example - educational attainment, civil service eligibility or experience) for a position may be temporarily disqualified for appointment to a public position by reason of the one year prohibition imposed on losing candidates. Upon the other hand, one may not be temporarily disqualified for appointment, but could not be appointed as he lacked any or all of the required legal qualifications imposed by law. In this case, the prosecution did not allege, much less prove that the Mayor’s appointee lacked any of the qualifications imposed by law on the position of Municipal Administrator. The Sandiganbyan held that it was a valid appointment. Hence, this petition by the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, representing the People of the Philippines Issue: WoN Villapando is guilty of unlawful appointment Held: It seems so [court did not categorically say so], but case is remanded to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings Ratio: The Sandiganbayan in disregarding basic rules of statutory construction, acted with grave abuse of discretion. Hence, its decision granting Villapando's Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting the latter [due to its interpretation of “legal disqualification”] is declared null and void. Legal disqualification cannot be read as excluding temporary disqualification in order to exempt therefrom the legal prohibitions under Section 6, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution and Section 94(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991. Both expressly prohibits losing candidates within one year after such election to be appointed to any office in the government or any government-owned or controlled corporations or in any of their subsidiaries. iii. Ban on Holding Multiple Positions Art. IX, B, Sec. 7Section 7. No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including Government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. Art. VII, Sec. 13Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their

tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.cralawThe spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not, during his tenure, be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.c Art. VI, Sec. 13Section 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.c Art. VIII, Secs. 8 (1) (3) and 12Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the Council and shall keep a record of its proceedings.Section 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions. Debulgado vs. Civil Service Commission, 237 SCRA 184 (THERESE) G.R. No. 111471 September 26, 1994CITY MAYOR ROGELIO R. DEBULGADO and VICTORIA T. DEBULGADO, petitioners, vs.CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.FELICIANO, J.:Facts: Petitioner Rogelio R. Debulgado is the incumbent Mayor of the City of San Carlos, Negros Occidental. October 1, 1992: Petitioner mayor appointed his wife, Victoria Debulgado, as head of the Office of General Services of the City Government of San Carlos. Petitioner Victoria was one of three (3) employees of the City Government who were considered for the position of General Services Officer. Before her promotion in 1992, she had been in the service of the City Government for about thirty-two (32) years. She joined the City Government on 3 January 1961 as Assistant License Clerk. October 1, 1992: petitioner Victoria assumed the new post, and commenced discharging the functions, of General Services Officer of San Carlos City and receiving the regular salary attached to that position. December 16, 1992: Public respondent Civil Service Commission = received a letter from Congressman Tranquilino B. Carmona of the First District of Negros Occidental, calling attention to the promotional appointment issued by petitioner Mayor in favor of his wife. The Commission directed its Regional Office No. 6-Iloilo City to submit a report on the appointment of petitioner Victoria.

Thereafter the Commission recalled the approval issued by Director Purita Escobia of the CSC Field Office of Bacolod and disapproved the promotion of Victoria. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, contending that the statutory prohibition against nepotism was not applicable to the appointment of Victoria as General Services Officer. Petitioners also asserted that the Commission had deprived petitioner Victoria of her right to due process by unilaterally revoking her appointment. Petitioner Mayor denies that he had been motivated by personal reasons when he appointed his wife to the new post. He states that his wife was the most qualified among the candidates for appointment to that position, she having worked for the City Government for thirty-two (32) years and being highly recommended by the OIC-Treasurer of San Carlos City. The basic contention of petitioners is that the prohibition against nepotic appointments is applicable only to original appointments and not to promotional appointments. Issue/s:a. Whether or not the prohibition against nepotic appointment applies to promotional appointmentsb. Whether or not the Commission gravely abused its discretion in revoking Victoria’s appointment/Whether or not she had a vested right to it Held: Petition DISMISSED. The prohibition applies to promotional appointments.Ratio:a. The prohibitory norm against nepotism in the public service is set out in Section 59, Book V of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 (also known as E.O. No. 292). Section 59 reads as follows: Sec. 59. Nepotism — (1) All appointments in the national, provincial, city and municipal governments or in any branch or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, made in favor of a relative of the appointing or recommending authority, or of the chief of the bureau or office, or of the persons exercising immediate supervision over him, are hereby prohibited. As used in this Section the word "relative" and members of the family referred to are those related within the third degree either of consanguinity or of affinity. (2) The following are exempted from the operation of the rules on nepotism: (a) persons employed in a confidential capacity, (b) teachers, (c) physicians, and (d) members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines: Provided, however, That in each particular instance full report of such appointment shall be made to the Commission. The restriction mentioned in subsection (1) shall not be applicable to the case of a member of any family who, after his or her appointment to any position in an office or bureau, contracts marriage with someone in the same office or bureau, in which event the employment or retention therein of both husband and wife may be allowed. Section 6 of Rule XVIII, of the "Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and other Pertinent Civil Service Laws," implemented the same. A textual examination of Section 59 at once reveals that the prohibition was cast in comprehensive and unqualified terms. Firstly, it explicitly covers "all appointments", without seeking to make any distinction between differing kinds or types of appointments. Secondly, Section 59 covers all appointments to the national, provincial, city and municipal government, as well as any branch or instrumentality thereof and all government owned or controlled corporations. Thirdly, there is a list of exceptions set out in Section 59 itself, but it is a short list: (a) persons employed in a confidential capacity;

(b) teachers;(c) physicians; and(d) members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The list has not been added to or subtracted from for the past thirty (30) years. The list does not contain words like "and other similar positions." Thus, the list appears to be a closed one, at least closed until lengthened or shortened by Congress. The original appointment of a civil service employee and all subsequent personnel actions undertaken by or in respect of that employee such as promotion, transfer, reinstatement, reemployment, etc., must comply with the Implementing Rules including, of course, the prohibition against nepotism in Rule XVIII. Section 59, Book V, E.O. No. 292 means exactly what it says in plain and ordinary language: it refers to "all appointments" whether original or promotional in nature. The public policy embodied in Section 59 is clearly fundamental in importance, and the Court has neither authority nor inclination to dilute that important public policy by introducing a qualification here or a distinction there. b. NO. Victoria was afforded an opportunity to be heard when she filed a motion for reconsideration with the Commission and there challenged the disapproval by the Commission. Moreover, because the promotional appointment in favor of petitioner Victoria was a violation of Section 59, it was null and void as being contra legem. A void appointment cannot give rise to security of tenure on the part of the holder of such appointment. The Commission is empowered to take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel actions, e.g., promotions. 15 Such power includes the authority to recall an appointment initially approved in disregard of applicable provisions of Civil Service law and regulations. The recall or withdrawal by the Commission of the approval which had been issued by one of its Field Officers, Director Escobia, was accordingly lawful and appropriate, the promotional appointment of petitioner Victoria being void "from the beginning." The respondent Commission had authority, indeed the duty, to recall on its own initiative the erroneous initial approval of the promotional appointment extended to petitioner Victoria. *CLU v Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1991) (ZION) *Flores v. Drilon, 223 SCRA 568 (1993) (FROI)ROBERTO A. FLORES, DANIEL Y. FIGUEROA, ROGELIO T. PALO, DOMINGO A. JADLOC, CARLITO T. CRUZ and MANUEL P. REYES, v. HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, Executive Secretary, and RICHARD J. GORDON (we’ve read this case before way way back under the appointment powers of the executive) FACTS: On Richard Gordon - then Mayor of Olongapo - being the first chairman of Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority by express provision of law, to wit: Sec. 13 (d) of R.A. 7277 (d) Chairman administrator — The President shall appoint a professional manager as administrator of the Subic Authority with a compensation to be determined by the Board subject to the approval of the Secretary of Budget, who shall be the ex oficio chairman of the Board and who shall serve as the chief executive officer of the Subic Authority: Provided, however, That for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority ISSUE: Whether or not appointment of local elective officials to other government posts unconstitutionalHELD: YES - appointment is unconstitutional.

Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution provides:No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

● affirmation that public office is a full-time job; basic idea is that the ban allows the local executive to focus on his constituents

Lorenzana vs. Fajardo, 462 SCRA 1 (KAT) FACTS: In a verified complaint dated May 27, 2002, complainant alleged that respondent, while employed as Legal Officer V at the Urban Settlement Office in Manila, until his retirement on May 15, 2002, was a member of the People’s Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) of Quezon City, receiving a monthly honorarium of P4,000.00. He was also a member of the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Novaliches Proper, also receiving a monthly allowance/ honorarium. Complainant also alleged that respondent was engaged in the private practice of law, receiving acceptance fees ranging from P20,000.00 to P50,000.00. He lives in a house and lot owned by complainant’s family without paying any rental and refuses to leave the place despite the latter’s demands. HELD: The prohibition against government officials and employees, whether elected or appointed, from concurrently holding any other office or position in the government is contained in Section 7, Article IX-B of the Constitution which provides:“Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or 2employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.” Respondent failed to establish that his primary functions as Legal Officer of the Manila Urban Settlements Office allow his appointment as PLEB member, an exception to dual appointment prohibited by the Constitution and the statutes. Indeed, respondent, in accepting such appointment, has transgressed the Constitution, the Administrative Code of 1987, and the Local Government Code of 1991. Being contra leges, respondent also violated the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Attorney’s Oath. On respondent’s appointment as a member of the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Novaliches Proper, while serving as Legal Officer V of the Manila Urban Settlements Office, we agree with the IBP Investigating Commissioner that the same is in order, being allowed by law. (Sec 406 og the Local Government Code of 1991) In the case at bar, respondent’s appearance as counsel is not merely isolated. Evidence presented by complainant shows that he had an extensive practice of law. While employed as a Legal Officer in the Urban Resettlement Office of Manila, he maintained a law office. The pleadings he signed as “counsel” for his clients filed with the courts indicate his office address as “Room 201 7 JA Building, 244 Gen. Luis St., Novaliches, Quezon City.” WHEREFORE, for accepting employment as a member of the PLEB of Quezon City while concurrently employed as Legal Officer V of the Manila Urban Settlement Office, in violation of the Constitution and the statutes, which in turn contravene his Attorney’s Oath and Code of Professional Responsibility; and by engaging in the illegal practice of law, Atty. Cesar G. Fajardo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective from notice and is REPRIMANDED and WARNED that any repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more severely.

c. Standardization of Pay & Ban on Double Compensation

Art. IX-B, Sec. 13 - Wala nito. Imbento si Sir :)) Art. IX, B, Sec. 5Section 5. The Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation of government officials and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, taking into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for, their positions. Art. IX, B, Sec. 8Section 8. No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept without the consent of the Congress, any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind from any foreign government.cralawPensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect compensation. Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 345 SCRA 553 (KARL)

d. Ban on Partisan Political Activities Art. IX, B, Sec. 2Section 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.cralaw(2) Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be determined, as far as practicable, and, except to positions which are policy-determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical, by competitive examination.cralaw(3) No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law.cralaw(4) No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political campaign.cralaw(5) The right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees.(6) Temporary employees of the Government shall be given such protection as may be provided by law. Trinidad vs. Valle, 105 SCRA 606 (YESHA)Vicente Trinidad vs Judge Gabriel ValleJuly 20, 1981 Facts:Vicente D. Trinidad, former mayor of Iguig, Cagayan, charged Judge Gabriel O. Valle, Jr. of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte with having delivered a speech at a conference of barangay captains in the house of Mayor Proceso Maramag at Iguig, advising them to support the leadership of Maramag (who’s running against Trinidad) and Minister of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile.Judge Valle happened to be in Iguig at that time because he was rendering rural service, he admitted that he delivered a speech in Ilocano but he denied that he favored Maramag. According to his version, he told the barangay captains that because former Mayor Trinidad was allegedly his cousin and Maramag had been his colleague in the fiscal's office, he had no comment to make. Issue: WoN act of the judge constitutes “electioneering” / partisan political activity Held:Yes! Record contains strong indications that he was engaged in partisan political activity! Ratio:Court finds that it was improper or indecorous for Judge Valle to have taken part in the political meeting, he should have realized that his mere presence there would be construed as an endorsement of Maramag as against complainant Trinidad and that such behavior would render him vulnerable to the charge of electioneering. Judge was fined - seven days’ worth of salary.

Vistan vs Nicolas, 201 SCRA 524 (THERESE) A.M. No. MTJ-87-79 September 13, 1991LEONILA A. VISTAN, complainant, vs. JUDGE RUBEN T. NICOLAS, Municipal Trial Court, Pandi, Bulacan, respondent.A.C. No. 3040 September 13, 1991LEONILA ANGELES VDA. DE VISTAN, complainant, vs. ATTY. RUBEN T. NICOLAS, respondent.PER CURIAM:Facts: These consolidated cases were brought by the same complainant, Leonila A. Vistan, against Respondent Judge Ruben T. Nicolas, Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Pandi, Bulacan. Complainant Leonila Vistan charged respondent judge with gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority (for rendering a decision in a criminal case acquitting the accused despite the fact that respondent had not yet ruled on the accused’s written offer of evidence), and immorality (for maintaining an illicit relationship with a woman not his wife with whom he has a child). The case (AM No. MTJ-87-79 ) was initially dismissed for having been moot and academic upon respondent’s resignation from service when he became a congressional candidate in the 1987 elections. Respondent was re-appointed to the service on 9 February 1989 as MTC Judge, this time, of Pandi, Bulacan. Accordingly, AM No. MTJ-87-79 was reinstated. The other case, AC No. 3040, for disbarment of respondent, was filed on 15 May 1987. The charges set forth are basically the same as those in AM No. MTJ-87-79, namely: (1) knowingly rendering an unjust judgment during his tenure as MTC Judge of Guiguinto, Bulacan, in Criminal Case No. 3073; (2) immorality, for cohabiting with a paramour; and (3) violation of election laws. Except for the last charge, the offenses attributed to Respondent are based on the same set of facts. Issue: Whether or not respondent is guilty for violating election laws Held: YES. (The prayer for disbarment is DENIED but respondent Municipal Trial Court Judge, Ruben T. Nicolas, is SEVERELY CENSURED for his gross misconduct in holding himself out as a candidate for an elective office while still a member of the Bench; also DISMISSED from service.) Ratio:Complainant narrated that as early as 10 February 1987, prior to 24 March 1987, or the date set by the Commission on Election (COMELEC) to be the start of the campaign period, and while still an MTJ Judge of Guiguinto, Bulacan, respondent started circulating handbills/letters addressed to electoral constituents in the second district of Bulacan indicating his intention to run for a congressional seat. Respondent admitted having circulated such a letter. He denies, however, that he was electioneering, stating that he was merely voicing out his intention to run for Congressman as a matter of consultation. The Court ruled that respondent had acted improperly when he sent out letters/handbills, manifesting his intention to run as a congressional candidate, addressed to electoral constituents of the second district of Bulacan as early as 10 February 1987, while still the incumbent MTC Judge of Guiguinto, Bulacan, and prior to the commencement of the campaign period on 24 March 1987. Section 45 of Pres. Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Law) clearly states: Section 45. No officer or employee in the Civil Service including members of the Armed Forces, shall engage directly or indirectly in any partisan political activity or take part in any election except to vote nor shall be use his official authority or influence to coerce the political activity of any other person or body. Nothing herein provided shall be understood to prevent any officer or employee

from expressing his views on current political problems or issues, or from mentioning the names of candidates for public office whom he supports: ... In addition, Rule 5.10, Canon 5, of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides: Rule 5.10. A judge is entitled to entertain personal views on political questions. But to avoid suspicion of political partisanship, a judge shall not make political speeches, contribute to party funds publicly endorse candidates for political office or participate in other partisan political activities. For having held himself out as a congressional candidate while still a member of the Bench, Respondent took advantage of his position to boost his candidacy, demeaned the stature of his office, and must be pronounced guilty of gross misconduct. Art. XVI, Sec. 5Section 5. (1) All members of the armed forces shall take an oath or affirmation to uphold and defend this Constitution.(2) The State shall strengthen the patriotic spirit and nationalist consciousness of the military, and respect for people's rights in the performance of their duty.(3) Professionalism in the armed forces and adequate remuneration and benefits of its members shall be a prime concern of the State. The armed forces shall be insulated from partisan politics.No member of the military shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any partisan political activity, except to vote.(4) No member of the armed forces in the active service shall, at any time, be appointed or designated in any capacity to a civilian position in the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations or any of their subsidiaries.(5) Laws on retirement of military officers shall not allow extension of their service.(6) The officers and men of the regular force of the armed forces shall be recruited proportionately from all provinces and cities as far as practicable.(7) The tour of duty of the Chief of Staff of the armed forces shall not exceed three years. However, in times of war or other national emergency declared by the Congress, the President may extend such tour of duty. Cailles v. Bonifacio, 65 Phil 328 (1938) (ZION) *Section 2, Art. XI of the 1935 ConstSection 2. The Auditor General shall examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenues and receipts from whatever source, including trust funds derived from bond issues; and audit, in accordance with law and administrative regulations, all expenditures of funds or property pertaining or held in trust by the Government or the provinces or municipalities thereof. He shall keep the general accounts of the Government and preserve the vouchers pertaining thereto. It shall be the duty of the Auditor General to bring the attention of the proper administrative officer expenditures of funds or property which, in his opinion, are irregular, unnecessary, excessive, or extravagant. He shall also perform such other functions as may be prescribed by law. Santos v. Yatco, 59 OG 548 (1959) (FROI)Alejo Santos v. Yatco (sorry, can’t find original case - just got it from the polifile)FACTS: This is petition for prohibition seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the order of Judge Yatco disallowing thenSecretary of Defense Alejo Santos from campaigning personally for Governor Tomas Martin in the province of Bulacan.The petition was granted for the ff. reasons:HELD/RATIO:

1. The position of department secretaries is not embraced and included within the terms officers and employees in the Civil Service;

2. When Santos, a Nacionalista campaigned for Gov. Martin, a candidate of the Nacionalista Party, he was acting as a member of the Cabinet in discussing the issues before the electorate and defending the actuations of the Administration to which he belongs;

3. The question of impropriety as distinct from illegality of such campaign because of its deleterious influence upon the members of the armed forces, who are administratively subordinated to the Secretary of National Defense and who are often called upon by the COMELEC to aid in the conduct of orderly and impartial elections, is not justiciable by the court.

e. Removal or Suspension only for Cause Art. IX, B, 2 -not sure what this is(3) No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law. De los Santos v Mallare, 87 Phil 289 (KAT)F: Eduardo de los Santos, petitioner, was appointed City Engineer of Baguio on 7/16/46 by the Pres. He then began the exercise of the duties and functions of the position. On 6/1/50, Gil Mallare was extended an ad interim appointment by the Pres. to the same position, after w/c, on 6/3, the Undersec. of the DPW & Communications directed Santos to report to the Bureau of Public Works for another assignment. Santos refused to vacate the office, and when the City Mayor and theother officials named as Mallare's codefendants ignored him and paid Mallare the salary corresponding to the position, he commenced these proceedings. HELD: The provision of Sec. 2545 of the Rev. Admin. Code that the Pres. may remove at pleasure any of the said appointive officers is incompatible w/ the constitutional inhibition that "No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law." We therefore declare Sec. 2545 of the RAC as repealed by the Consti. and ceased to be operative from the time that instrument came into effect. Corpus v. Cuaderno, 13 SCRA 591 (1965) (KARL) FACTS:Marino Corpus, Special Assistant to the Governor of the Central Bank, was administratively charged with dishonesty, incompetence, neglect of duty and violation of the internal regulations of the office. He was suspended by the Monetary Board despite the recommendation of the investigating committee that he be reinstated and there was no basis for actions against Corpus. The Board considered him resigned as of the date of his suspension. Corpus moved for reconsideration but was denied. He filed the petition to CFI of Manila which favored him and declared the Resolution of the Board as null and void. He was awarded P5,000 as attorney’s fees. Both Petitioner and respondent appealed the judgment. Petitioner was appealing the amount awarded to him contending that it was lower than what he has spent for attorney’s fees. While the respondent claimed that an officer holding highly technical position may be removed at any time for lack of confidence by the appointing power who was Governor Cuaderno.ISSUE: Is the lack of confidence by the appointing power be a ground for removing an employee or a public officer?HELD: The Constitution distinguishes the primarily confidential from the highly technical employees, and to the latter the loss of confidence as a ground for removal is not applicable. No public officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for a cause provided by law. Pertaining to the petitioner’s claim for damages, the agreement between a client and his lawyer as to attorney’s fees cannot bind the other party who was a stranger to the fee contract. While the Civil Codeallows a party to recover reasonable counsel fees by way of damages, such fees must lie primarily in the

discretion of the trial court. Decision appealed affirmed by the Supreme Court. Ingles v. Mutuc, 26 SCRA 171 (1968)(YESHA)Ingles v. Mutuc, 26 SCRA 171 (1968)F: Plaintiffs herein are civil service eligibles, holding positions under the Office of the President. About the second week of January, 1962, plaintiffs received a communication from Executive Sec. Mutuc advising them that their services in the government were terminated. They appealed to the President but said appeal was denied. They filed an action against the Exec. Sec. alleging that they had been removed from office without just cause and without due process. Defendant, on the other hand, averred that the positions which plaintiffs were then occupying were primarily confidential in nature and therefore, their appointments were subject to removal at the pleasure of the appointing power. ISSUE: W/N plaintiffs are occupying positions which are primarily confidential and therefore are subject toremoval at the pleasure of the appointing authority. HELD: NO. The fact that the plaintiffs held office for the "president's Private Office" under subdivision entitled"private secretaries" and that they handled "confidential Matters" even if they only performed clerical work donot make them officers and employees occupying highly confidential offices. There is nothing in the items of theplaintiffs (who were clerks and secretaries) to indicate that their respective positions are "primarily confidential" in nature. The fact that they handled at times "confidential matters" does not suffice to characterize their positions as primarily confidential. No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided for by law and since plaintiffs positions were protected by this provision, their removal without cause was therefore illegal. Adapted.xxxOfficer holding position primarily confidential in nature; Statement in De los Santos v. Mallaredeclared as mere obiter. The assumption that an officer holding a position w/c is primarily confidential innature is "subject to removal at the pleasure of the appointing power," is inaccurate. This assumption isevidently based upon a statement in De los Santos v. Mallare to the effect that "three specified classes of positions policy determining, primarily confidential and highly technical are excluded from the merit system and dismissal at pleasure of officers and employees appointed therein is allowed by the Consti. xxx. This was, however, a mere obiter, bec., the office involved in said case that of City Engineer of Baguio didnot belong to any of the excepted classes, and, hence, it was not necessary to determine whether its incumbents were removable or not at the pleasure of the appointing power. What is more, said obiter, if detached from the context of the decision of w/c it forms part, would be inconsistent w/ the constitutional command to the effect that "no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law" and it is conceded that one holding in the Govt a primarily confidential position is "in the Civil Service." Meaning of "term merely expires"; Distinguished from "removal" and "dismissal."Whenan incumbent of a primarily confidential position holds office at the pleasure of the appointing power, and thatpleasure turns into displeasure, the incumbent is not "removed" or "dismissed" from office histerm merely "expires," in much the same way as an officer, whose right thereto ceases upon expiration of the fixed term for w/c he had been appointed or elected, is not and can not be deemed "removed" or "dismissed" therefrom, upon the expiration of said term. The main difference bet. the former primarily confidential officer and the latter is that the latter's term is fixed or definite, whereas that of the former is not prefixed, but indefinite, at the time of his appointment or election, and becomes fixed and determined when the appointing power expresses its decision to put an end to the services of the incumbent. When this event takes place, the latter is not "removed" or "dismissed" from office his term merely "expired."

Cristobal v. Melchor, 78 SCRA 175 (THERESE) G.R. No. L-43203 July 29, 1977JOSE C. CRISTOBAL, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ALEJANDRO MELCHOR and FEDERICO ARCALA, defendants-appellees.MUÑOZ PALMA, J:Facts: Jose C. Cristobal, a third-grade civil service eligible, was formerly employed as a private secretary in the President’s Private Office, Malacanang, Manila. January 1962: The then Executive Secretary Amelito Mutuc, by means of a letter dated January 1, 1962, informed plaintiff that his services as private secretary were “terminated effective today”. A similar letter was addressed by Secretary Mutuc to some other employees in the Office of the President. The dismissed employees appealed to the President by means of letters dated January 3, 1962 and January 26, 1962 for a reconsideration of their separation from the service. In a letter dated February 27, 1962, their request for reconsideration was denied by Secretary Mutuc, acting by authority of the President. March 24, 1962, five of the employees who were separated (not including the herein plaintiff) filed a civil action before the Court of First Instance of Manila against Secretary Mutuc and the cash disbursing officer of the Office of the President praying for reinstatement and the payment of their salaries effective as of January 1, 1962, entitled "Raul R. Ingles. et al vs. Amelito R. Mutuc et als." The Supreme Court which reversed the dismissal of their complaint and declared their removal from office as illegal and contrary to law, and ordered their reinstatement and the payment of their salaries from January 1, 1962 up to the date of their actual reinstatement. While the civil action filed by Raul R. Ingles, et als. was still pending in the Court of First Instance of Manila. the dismissed employees who filed said action were recalled to their positions in the Office of the President, without prejudice to the continuation of their civil action, With respect to the other employees who were not reinstated, efforts were exerted by Secretary Mutuc to look for placements outside of Malacañang so that they may be re-employed. The herein plaintiff was one of those who had not been fortunate enough to be reappointed to any positions as befits his qualifications. After the SC decision in Mutuc, Cristobal wrote several letters addressed to the Office of the President requesting reinstatement. The Office of the President, however, denied all these requests. Cristobal thus filed an action in the Court of First Instance-Manila praying for his reinstatement. The trial court dismissed the complaint based on Section 16 of Rule 66 of the Rules of Court which expressly provides that an action against a public office or employee may not be filed for the plaintiff's ouster from office unless the same is commenced within one year after the cause of the ouster, or the right of the plaintiff to hold such office or position arose. Since Cristobal failed to bring the action until after the lapse of 9 years, the triacl court held that his case was now barred by laches. Issue: Whether or not Cristobal was barred by laches for failure to file the complaint within a year from dismissal Held: NO. Cristobal is reinstated in the Office of the President or some other office as may befit his qualifications. Ratio:Laches: is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. The essence of laches is not merely lapse of time. It is essential that there be also acquiescence in the alleged wrong or lack of diligence in seeking a remedy. In this case, Cristobal sought reconsideration of his separation from the service. Although he did not join in the Ingles vs Mutuc court action, he continued to

press his request for reinstatement during the pendency of the case. In fact Secretary Mutuc assured him that he would work for his reinstatement. The continued promise not only of Mutuc but of the subsequent Secretaries led Cristobal to wait for his reinstatement, such reinstatement however, never having been acted upon. It would thus be the height of inequity if after Cristobal relied and reposed his faith and trust on the word and promises of the former Executive Secretaries, the court would rule that he had lost his right to seek relief because of the lapse of time.Cristobal, just like the Plaintiffs in the Ingles v Mutuc case, was not holding an office characterized as "highly confidential", he was performing purely clerical work although he handled "confidential matters" occasionally. He is therefore protected in his tenure and may not be therefore removed without just cause. He is entitled to backwages for five years although he had been dismissed for nine years, applying by analogy the award of backwages in cases of unfair labor practice. Griño vs. Civil Service Commission, 194 SCRA 458 (ZION) Samson vs. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 654 (FROI)MARCIAL F. SAMSON, City Mayor of Caloocan City, THE CITY TREASURER, THE CITY AUDITOR, both of Caloocan City, and HERMOGENES LIWAG v.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, CFI-RIZAL and FELICIANO C. TALENS FACTS:

● Feliciano Talens (civil service eligible) was appointed on 1970 by Mayor Asistio as Asst. Secretary to the Mayor - appointment was permanent pursuant to Sec 24(b) of RA 2260 or Civil Service Act

● 1972: Mayor Samson fired Feliciano Talens citing “lack and loss of confidence” and replaced him with Hermogenes Liwag pursuant to Sec 5(f) of RA 2260

Section 5 of Republic Act No. 2260, as amended by Republic Act No. 6040 provides that "That non-competitive service shall be composed of positions expressly declared by law to be in the non-competitive service and those which are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature" and continues with an enumeration of specific officers and employees embraced within the scope of non-competitive service. Among those included in the enumeration are heads of departments created in charters of cities and secretaries of provincial governors, city mayors and municipal mayors.

ISSUE: Whether or not the position of Assistant Secretary to the Mayor is a competitive serviceHELD: YES - assistant sec. is part of competitive; Talens’ removal was illegal. AN assistant secretary IS NOT similar to a secretary.

● General rule: position in all branches, subdivisions and instrumentalities of the governmentalities of the government, including those in government owned or controlled corporations, belong to the competitive service. The only exceptions are those expressly declared by law to be in the non-competitive service and those which are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature.

● Statutory construction: expressio unius est exclusio alterius ● an "assistant secretary," although described as secretary, technically differs in function

from the "Secretaries." An "assistant" merely helps, aids or serves in a subordinate capacity to the person who is actually clothed with all the duties and responsibilities of "secretary." Needless to say, the functions strictly attributable to a "secretary" and which wo uld repose on such person the trust and confidence of the employer, is not automatically vested or transferred to an "assistant secretary," because the latter simply assists or aids the former in the accomplishment of his duties.

Borres vs. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 120 (KAT)Facts: Upon recommendation of the vicemayor, the mayor appointed respondents as security guards of the vice mayor. The mayor and vice mayor lost in the election. As the new mayor, petitioner terminated the services of respondents for lack of confidence. Respondents sued for reinstatement on the ground that

their removal was illegal.Held: The positions of respondents [security guards of the vice mayor] are primarily confidential, as they involve giving protection to the vice mayor. The relationship between the vice mayor and his security depend on the highest of trust and confidence. Hence, the tenure of respondents ended uponloss of confidence in them. Astruquillo vs. Manglapus, 190 SCRA 280 (KARL) FACTS: Astraquillo appointed as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and Chief of Mission to UAE was accused of improper interference. The Sec. of Foreign Affairs recommended termination which was approved by the President.2. Alunan Galang( to Kuwait) received a telex message informing him to vacate the post because his appt. has beenterminated.3. Alejandro Melchor (Moscow), the Pres. Terminated his service( described as a political( non career Ambassador)upon recommendation of the Sec of Foreign Affairs and was approved by the Pres. Issue: W/N the ³political/non-career appointments´ of the diplomats can be terminated at the pleasure of the Pres.Without just cause or in need of investigation. HELD: YES. Their appointments to the Foreign Service were made on ³ bases other than those of the usual test of merit and fitness ( determined by competitive exams or highly based qualifications). Their tenure therefore is coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure. Under the Foreign Service act of 1952:Career Officers: are Foreign Service Officers appointed by the President upon the recommendation of the secretary and MUST be eligible BY passing competitive examinations to determine fitness and aptitude for work, demonstrates loyalty to the RP and the Constitution. It is from This set of Certified Officers where the President can exclusively make such appointments. Non Career officers: did not qualify and not certified (to the req. mentioned above) their entry is based on³other bases other that merit and fitness by exam´.- Being non-career officers, their termination is not dependent on proof of some legally recognized cause but rests on the will of the Pres., in the exercise of her discretion. The termination was a political decision she can make, the recommendation of the secretary (as her alter ego in Foreign affairs) cannot be contested as not being a personal decision. Besides, her approval means she was the one in effect who ordered the termination Tamano vs. Manglapus, 214 SCRA 567 (YESHA)Yusoph Tamano vs Raul Manglapus & Franklin DrilonOctober 13, 1992 Facts:Petitioner, Yusoph C. Tamano, was appointed Foreign Service Officer II and Consul by then President Aquino. Before Tamano's appointment was submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation, President Aquino, in a communication addressed to Secretary of Foreign Affairs Salvador H. Laurel, revoked Tamano's appointment "effective ab initio owing to the absence of appropriate items"

Tamano filed this suit for mandamus, praying that the Court issue an order directing respondents Foreign Affairs Secretary and the Executive Secretary to reinstate him to his position and pay all his back salaries plus other benefits accruing to him from March 1, 1987 to date. Issue: WoN petitioner has a clear legal right to be reinstated as Foreign Service Officer II Held: No! He is a political appointee or non-career officer, served at the pleasure of the President. Ratio: The record shows that the petitioner was appointed FSO II and Consul without having taken — therefore, without having passed — the foreign service examination. Neither was his appointment confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. These are indispensable requirements for a Foreign Service Officer to be embraced in the Career Service Corps. He, therefore, belonged to the non-career service composed of those who have been appointed, not on the basis of the usual test of merit and fitness, but subject to the appointing power's pleasure, limited to the duration of a particular period or project for which, the employment was made. As a political appointee or non-career officer, he served at the pleasure of the President of the Philippines. He has no clear right to the office to which he weeks to be reinstated nor does the appointing authority have a clear duty to appoint or reinstate him thereto. Civil Service Commission vs. Salas, 274 SCRA 414 (THERESE) G.R. No. 123708, June 19, 1997 Facts: On October 7, 1989, respondent Salas was appointed by the PAGCOR Chairman as Internal Security Staff (ISS) member and assigned to the casino at the Manila Pavilion Hotel. However, his employment was terminated by the Board of Directors of PAGCOR on December 3, 1991, allegedly for loss of confidence, after a covert investigation conducted by the Intelligence Division of PAGCOR. The summary of intelligence information claimed that respondent was allegedly engaged in proxy betting as detailed in the affidavits purportedly executed by two customers of PAGCOR who claimed that they were used as gunners on different occasions by respondent. The two polygraph tests taken by the latter also yielded corroborative and unfavorable results. On December 23, 1991, he submitted a letter of appeal to the Chairman and the Board of Directors of PAGCOR, requesting reinvestigation of the case since he was not given an opportunity to be heard, but the same was denied. On February 17, 1992, he appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) which denied the appeal on the ground that, as a confidential employee, respondent was not dismissed from the service but his term of office merely expired. On appeal, the CSC issued Resolution No. 92-1283 which affirmed the decision of the MSPB. On September 14, 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered its questioned decision with the finding that herein respondent Salas is not a confidential employee, hence he may not be dismissed on the ground of loss of confidence. In so ruling, the appellate court applied the "proximity rule" enunciated in the case of Griño, et al. vs. Civil Service Commission, et al. Issue: Whether or not Section 16 of the PD No. 1869 has been superseded and repealed by Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution Held:

The Court of Appeals opined that the provisions of Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 1869 may no longer be applied in the case at bar because the same is deemed to have been repealed in its entirety by Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. This is not completely correct. On this point, we approve the more logical interpretation advanced by the CSC to the effect that "Section 16 of PD 1869 insofar as it exempts PAGCOR positions from the provisions of Civil Service Law and Rules has been amended, modified or deemed repealed by the 1987 Constitution and Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987)". However, the same cannot be said with respect to the last portion of Section 16 which provides that "all employees of the casino and related services shall be classified as 'confidential appointees.'" While such executive declaration emanated merely from the provisions of Section 2, Rule XX of the implementing rules of the Civil Service Act of 1959, the power to declare a position as policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical as defined therein has subsequently been codified and incorporated in Section 12(9), Book V of Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987. This later enactment only serves to bolster the validity of the categorization made under Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 1869. Be that as it may, such classification is not absolute and all-encompassing. Thus, the aforecited case was decided on the uncontested assumption that the private respondent therein was a confidential employee, for the simple reason that the propriety of Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 1869 was never controverted nor raised as an issue therein. That decree was mentioned merely in connection with its provision that PAGCOR employees hold confidential positions. Evidently, therefore, it cannot be considered as controlling in the case at bar. Even the fact that a statute has been accepted as valid in cases where its validity was not challenged does not preclude the court from later passing upon its constitutionality in an appropriate cause where that question is squarely and properly raised. Such circumstances merely reinforce the presumption of constitutionality of the law. Court of Appeals - G.R. SP No. 38319 set aside Resolution No. 92-1283 of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) and ordered the reinstatement of herein private respondent Rafael M. Salas with full back wages for having been illegally dismissed by the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), but without prejudice to the filing of administrative charges against him if warranted.

f. Right of Self-Organization Art. III, Sec. 8Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. Art. IX, B, Sec. 2Section 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.cralaw(2) Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be determined, as far as practicable, and, except to positions which are policy-determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical, by competitive examination.cralaw(3) No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law.cralaw(4) No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political campaign.cralaw(5) The right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees.(6) Temporary employees of the Government shall be given such protection as may be provided by law. Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 6, Administrative Code of 1987Chapter 6RIGHT TO SELF-ORGANIZATION

Sec. 38. Coverage. - (1) All government employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, can form, join or assist employees' organizations of their own choosing for the furtherance and protection of their interests. They can also form, in conjunction with appropriate government authorities, labor-management committees, work councils and other forms of workers' participation schemes to achieve the same objectives. *Alliance of Gov’t Workers v. Minister of Labor, 124 SCRA 1 (1983) (ZION) *National Service Corp. v. NLRC, 168 SCRA 122 (1988) (FROI)FACTS:

● Respondent Eugenia Credo was an employee (first as security guard, now as chief of property and records) of petitioner NASECO

● Credo was placed under forced leave for failure to follow memorandum of manager’s memorandum on company’s Statement of Billings Adjustment

While on forced leave, Credo filed a case against NASECO with Labor ArbiterWhile on forced leave, NASECO’s Committee of Personal Affairs had a meeting wherein they found out that Credo had offenses (all her offenses involved being rude and sarcastic in front of customers and superior officers) before and recommended Credo’s termination with no benefits

● After forced leave, Credo had a meeting with the boss informing her that there were certain charges against her, asked her to explain her side - she wasn’t able to explain so she got fired

Credo filed supplemental complaint for illegal dismissal with Labor Arbiter● Labor Arbiter: dismissed Credo’s complaint; ordered NASECO to pay Credo separation pay● NLRC: directing NASECO to reinstate Credo to her former position, or substantially equivalent

position, with six (6) months' backwages and without loss of seniority rights and other privileges appertaining thereto, and; dismissing Credo's claim for attorney's fees, moral and exemplary damages.

● NASECO: NLRC has no juridisction over NASECO - NASECO is a subsidiary of the National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC), a subsidiary wholly owned by the Philippine National Bank (PNB), which in turn is a government owned corporation

ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Service Law applies to tertiary corporationsHELD/RATIO: YES - NLRC has jurisdiction over such corporations: the Constitution [Art. IX-B, Sec. 2(l)] defines the Civil Service as only those government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters i.e. created by law, by an act of Congress, or by special law AND NOT formed under the General Corporation Code.

taken from records of the Constitutional CommissionNASECO is a government owned and controlled corporation WITHOUT original charter - NLRC and Labor Code applies, not Civil Service Code

● FOR THIS HEADING: in the records of the Constitutional Commissions, the Commissioners were discussing that those subsidiary corporations that have collective bargaining agreements are not part of the Civil Service.

*TUPAS v. NHA, 173 SCRA 33 (1989) (KAT)FACTS: Respondent NHC is a corporation organized in 1959 under the Uniform Charter of Government Corporations. Itsshares of stock have been 100% owned by the Government from its incorporation. Petitioner TUPAS is a legitimate labororganization with a chapter in NHC. TUPAS filed a petition for certification election with DOLE. It was denied. ISSUE: W/N employees of NHC have undoubtedly the right to form unions.HELD: The right to unionize is now explicitly recognized and granted to both employees in both governmentaland the private sectors. There is no impediment to the holding of a certificate of election among the workers of

NHC for it is clear that they are covered by the Labor Code, for NHC is a GOCC without an original charter.Statutory implementation of the Consti (par 5 sec 2 art IXB)is found in Art 244 of the Labor Code.

g. Right to Strike SSS Employees Association v. CA, 175 SCRA 686 (KARL)EO 180 *Manila Public School Teachers Assoc’n v. Laguio, 200 SCRA 323 (1991) (YESHA) Manila Public School Teachers Association v. Laguio, 200 SCRA 323 (1991) F: On September 17,1990, Monday, at least 800 public school teachers proceeded to the national office of the DECS and aired their grievances. The mass action continued into the week despite the DECS Secretary's RETURN TO WORK order. The Secretary filed administrative charges against the protesting teachers. The Secretary rendered the questioned decisions in the administrative proceeding. He dismissed some teachers and placed others in under suspension. Two separate petitions were filed to assail the validity of the return to work order and his decisions in the administrative proceeding. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE MASS ACTIONS ARE CONSIDERED AS STRIKES?HELD: Yes. The mass actions constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from work, which it was the teachers' duty to perform, undertaken for essentially economic reasons. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS CAN STRIKE?HELD: No. Employees of the public service do not have the right to strike although they have the right to self organization and negotiate with appropriate government agencies for the improvement of working conditions. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT DUE PROCESS WAS OBSERVED DURING THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS?HELD: This court is a court of last resort. It resolves questions of law where there is no dispute of the facts or that the facts have been already determined by the lower tribunals. It is not a trier of facts. It can not resolve the issue which requires the establishment of some facts. The remedy is for the petitioners to participate in the administrative proceedings. If they lost, they may appeal to the Civil Service Commission. If pending said administrative proceedings, immediate recourse to judicial authority was believed necessary, recourse is with the RTC where there would be opportunity to prove relevant facts 9. Review of Decisions Art. IX, A, Sec. 7Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members, any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.crala Dario v. Mison, 176 SCRA 84 (1989) (THERESE) -> I only put in the procedural aspect, in relation to Art IX A, Sec. 7. (medj magulo. haha) Facts: March 25, 1986: President Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 3 “DECLARING A NATIONAL POLICY TO IMPLEMENT THE REFORMS MANDATED BY THE PEOPLE, PROTECTING THEIR BASIC RIGHTS, ADOPTING A PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION, AND PROVIDING FOR AN ORDERLY TRANSITION TO A GOVERNMENT UNDER NEW CONSTITUTION”

Among other things, Proclamation No. 3 provided:SECTION 1. ...The President shall give priority to measures to achieve the mandate of the people to: (a) Completely reorganize the government, eradicate unjust and oppressive structures, and all iniquitous vestiges of the previous regime; Actually, the reorganization process started as early as February 25, 1986, when the President, in her first act in office, called upon "all appointive public officials to submit their courtesy resignation(s) beginning with the members of the Supreme Court." Later on, she abolished the Batasang Pambansa and the positions of Prime Minister and Cabinet under the 1973 Constitution. Since then, the President has issued a number of executive orders and directives reorganizing various other government offices, a number of which, with respect to elected local officials, has been challenged in this Court, and two of which, with respect to appointed functionaries, have likewise been questioned herein.On May 28, 1986, the President enacted Executive Order No. 17, "PRESCRIBING RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 2, ARTICLE III OF THE FREEDOM CONSTITUTION." Executive Order No. 17 recognized the "unnecessary anxiety and demoralization among the deserving officials and employees" the ongoing government reorganization had generated, and prescribed grounds for the separation/replacement of personnel. On January 30, 1987, the President promulgated Executive Order No. 127, "REORGANIZING THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE." Among other offices, Executive Order No. 127 provided for the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs and prescribed a new staffing pattern therefor. On January 6, 1988, incumbent Commissioner of Customs Salvador Mison issued a Memorandum, in the nature of "Guidelines on the Implementation of Reorganization Executive Orders," prescribing the procedure in personnel placement. On the same date, Commissioner Mison constituted a Reorganization Appeals Board charged with adjudicating appeals from removals under the above Memorandum. On January 26, 1988, Commissioner Mison addressed several notices to various Customs officials. As far as the records will likewise reveal, a total of 394 officials and employees of the Bureau of Customs were given individual notices of separation. A number supposedly sought reinstatement with the Reorganization Appeals Board while others went to the Civil Service Commission.The first thirty-one mentioned above came directly to this Court. On June 30, 1988, the Civil Service Commission promulgated its ruling ordering the reinstatement of the 279 employees. On January 6, 1989, Commissioner Mison challenged the Civil Service Commission's Resolution in this Court. On June 10, 1988, Republic Act No. 6656, "AN ACT TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF TENURE OF CIVIL SERVICE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION," 22 was signed into law. Under Section 7, thereof: Sec. 9. All officers and employees who are found by the Civil Service Commission to have been separated in violation of the provisions of this Act, shall be ordered reinstated or reappointed as the case may be without loss of seniority and shall be entitled to full pay for the period of separation.

Issue: Whether or not the Supreme Court may validly review the decision of the Civil Service Commission Held: YES. Ratio:The Court rejects contentions that the Bureau's petition raises no jurisdictional questions, and is therefore bereft of any basis as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The questions raised in Commissioner Mison's petition (in G.R. 85310) are, indeed, proper for certiorari, if by "jurisdictional questions" we mean questions having to do with "an indifferent disregard of the law, arbitrariness and caprice, or omission to weigh pertinent considerations, a decision arrived at without rational deliberation, 34 as distinguished from questions that require "digging into the merits and unearthing errors of judgment 35 which is the office, on the other hand, of review under Rule 45 of the said Rules. What cannot be denied is the fact that the act of the Civil Service Commission of reinstating hundreds of Customs employees Commissioner Mison had separated, has implications not only on the entire reorganization process decreed no less than by the Provisional Constitution, but on the Philippine bureaucracy in general; these implications are of such a magnitude that it cannot be said that — assuming that the Civil Service Commission erred— the Commission committed a plain "error of judgment" that Aratuc says cannot be corrected by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari or any special civil action. We reaffirm the teaching of Aratuc — as regards recourse to this Court with respect to rulings of the Civil Service Commission — which is that judgments of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court through certiorari alone, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In Aratuc we declared: It is once evident from these constitutional and statutory modifications that there is a definite tendency to enhance and invigorate the role of the Commission on Elections as the independent constitutional body charged with the safeguarding of free, peaceful and honest elections. The framers of the new Constitution must be presumed to have definite knowledge of what it means to make the decisions, orders and rulings of the Commission "subject to review by the Supreme Court'. And since instead of maintaining that provision intact, it ordained that the Commission's actuations be instead 'brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari", We cannot insist that there was no intent to change the nature of the remedy, considering that the limited scope of certiorari, compared to a review, is well known in remedial law. We observe no fundamental difference between the Commission on Elections and the Civil Service Commission (or the Commission on Audit for that matter) in terms of the constitutional intent to leave the constitutional bodies alone in the enforcement of laws relative to elections, with respect to the former, and the civil service, with respect to the latter (or the audit of government accounts, with respect to the Commission on Audit). As the poll body is the "sole judge" of all election cases, so is the Civil Service Commission the single arbiter of all controversies pertaining to the civil service. Under the new Constitution, as under the 1973 Charter, "any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari," which, as Aratuc tells us, "technically connotes something less than saying that the same 'shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court, which in turn suggests an appeal by petition for review under Rule 45. Therefore, our jurisdiction over cases emanating from the Civil Service Commission is limited to complaints of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction, complaints that justify certiorari under Rule 65. While Republic Act No. 6656 states that judgments of the Commission are "final and executory"and hence, unappealable, under Rule 65, certiorari precisely lies in the absence of an appeal.

Accordingly, we accept Commissioner Mison’s petition (G.R. No. 85310) which clearly charges the Civil Service Commission with grave abuse of discretion, a proper subject of certiorari, although it may not have so stated in explicit terms. Manalansang v. CSC, 203 SCRA 797 (1991) (ZION) Mancita v. Barcinas, 216 SCRA 772 (1992) (FROI)FILOMENA R. MANCITA v.HON. CEFERINO P. BARCINAS, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Camarines Sur, Branch 31, 5th Judicial Region, Pili, Camarines Sur, PRESCILLA B. NACARIO, HON. DELFIN DIVINAGRACIA, as Municipal Mayor of Pili, Camarines Sur, and HON. PATRICIA A. ST0. TOMAS, in her capacity as Chairman, Civil Service Commission Facts:

● 1 Aug 1980: Petitioner Filomena Mancita was appointed as Municipal Development Coordinator of Pili, CamSur on permanent status.

● 14 March 1983: BP 337 “Local Govt Code” took effect. BP 337 enumerates all offices common in all municipalities, one of which is the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator (MPDC)

● 28 March 1983: Sangguniang Bayan of Pili passed Resolution 38, creating the Office of the MPDC● 1 Jan 1985: Reorganization Plan of Pili was approved by the joint Commission on Local

Government Personnel Administration (JELGPA)● 17 June 1985: Filomena Mancita was informed by Anastacio Prila, Mayor of Pili, stating that with

the Reorganization Plan of Pili, the Office of the MDC was abolished and as such, her services are terminated effective 30 June 1985

● 30 June 1985: Mayor Prila appointed Prescilla Nacario as MPDC● Mancita appealed to the Merit System Protection Board (MSPB), with the same ruling in her

favor; she was to be reinstated.● CSC affirmed MSPB ruling● 15 Oct 1990: Mayor Divinagracia, successor of Mayor Prila, informed Nacario that her services

were to be terminated to give way to Mancita as ruled by the MSPB and the CSC● Nacario filed petition for declaratory relief and prohibition with the RTC● RTC: ruled in favor of Nacario

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the caseHELD/RATIO: NO - RTC has no jurisdiction; only SC has jurisdiction to review CSC decisions

● Since the decision, order or ruling of the Civil Service Commission is subject to review only by this Court oncertiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the Regional Trial Court of Pili, Branch 31, Camarines Sur, has no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. P-1781, an action which seeks a review of a decision of the Civil Service Commission.

10. Fiscal Autonomy Art. IX, A, Sec. 5Section 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released. Civil Service Commission vs. Department of Budget and Management, 464 SCRA 115 (KAT)FACTS:-The Civil Service Commission (petitioner) via the present petition for mandamus seeks to compel the Department of Budget and Management (respondent) to release the balance of its budget for fiscal year 2002. At the same time, it seeks a determination by this Court of the extent of the constitutional concept of fiscal autonomy.-By petitioner’s claim, the amount of P215,270,000.00 was appropriated for its Central Office by the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 2002, while the total allocations for the same Office, if all sources of funds are considered, amount to P285,660,790.44.[1] It complains, however, that the total fund releases by respondent to its Central Office during the fiscal year 2002 was only P279,853,398.14, thereby leaving

an unreleased balance of P5,807,392.30.-To petitioner, this balance was intentionally withheld by respondent on the basis of its “no report, no release” policy whereby allocations for agencies are withheld pending their submission of the documents mentioned in Sections 3.8 to 3.10 and Section 7.0 of National Budget Circular No. 478 on Guidelines on the Release of the FY 2002 Funds, HELD: Respondent’s act of withholding the subject funds from petitioner due to revenue shortfall is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. RATIO: -That the “no report, no release” policy may not be validly enforced against offices vested with fiscal autonomy is not disputed. Indeed, such policy cannot be enforced against offices possessing fiscal autonomy without violating Article IX (A), Section 5 of the Constitution - By parity of construction, “automatic release” of approved annual appropriations to petitioner, a constitutional commission which is vested with fiscal autonomy, should thus be construed to mean that no condition to fund releases to it may be imposed. This conclusion is consistent with the above-cited June 3, 1993 Resolution of this Court which effectively prohibited the enforcement of a “no report, no release” policy against the Judiciary which has also been granted fiscal autonomy by the Constitution-Respecting respondent’s justification for the withholding of funds from petitioner as due to a shortfall in revenues, the same does not lie. In the first place, the alleged shortfall is totally unsubstantiated. In the second place, even assuming that there was indeed such a shortfall, that does not justify non-compliance with the mandate of above-quoted Article IX (A), Section 5 of the Constitution. -Furthermore, the Constitution grants the enjoyment of fiscal autonomy only to the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions of which petitioner is one, and the Ombudsman. To hold that petitioner may be subjected to withholding or reduction of funds in the event of a revenue shortfall would, to that extent, place petitioner and the other entities vested with fiscal autonomy on equal footing with all others which are not granted the same autonomy, thereby reducing to naught the distinction established by the Constitution. - The agencies which the Constitution has vested with fiscal autonomy should thus be given priority in the release of their approved appropriations over all other agencies not similarly vested when there is a revenue shortfall.-Clearly, while the retention or reduction of appropriations for an office is generally allowed when there is an unmanageable budget deficit, the Year 2002 GAA, in conformity with the Constitution, excepted from such rule the appropriations for entities vested with fiscal autonomy. Thus, even assuming that there was a revenue shortfall as respondent claimed, it could not withhold full release of petitioner’s funds without violating not only the Constitution but also Section 64 of the General Provisions of the Year 2002 GAA.-The plain implication of the omission of the provision proscribing such reduction of appropriations below that for the previous year is that Congress is not prohibited from reducing the appropriations of Constitutional Commissions below the amount appropriated for them for the previous year. Civil Service Commission vs. Department of Budget and Management, 482 SCRA 233 (KARL) 11. Approval of Appointments by the CSC Barrozo v. CSC, 198 SCRA 487 (YESHA)Barrozo v. CSC, 198 SCRA 487F: On 11/10/88, David Borja retired as City Engineer of Baguio. At that time, petitioner Teodoro Barrozo was aSenior Civil Engineer of DPWH assigned to the office of the City Engineer of Baguio and resp. V. Julian was the Asst. City Engineer of Baguio. On 12/27/88, Mayor Labo extended to Barrozo a permanent appointment as City Engineer of Baguio. On 2/16/89, after his protest was rejected by Mayor Labo, pvt. resp. Julian appealed to the MSPB of the CSC, claiming that as a qualified next in rank officer, he had

a preemptive right over Barrozo. The CSC Cordillera Admin. Region, to w/c the appeal was referred, declared Barrozo's appointment void for being violative of Civil Service promotion rules. MFR was denied. CSC, on appeal, affirmed the decision. HELD: The CSC has no power of appointment except over its own personnel. Neither does it have the authority to review the appointments made by other officers except only to ascertain if the appointee possesses the required qualifications. The determination of who among aspirants with the minimum statutory qualifications should be preferred belongs to the appointing authority and not the CSC. It cannot disallow an appointment bec. it believes another person is better qualified and mush less can it direct the appointment of its own choice.xxxThe law does not absolutely require that the person who is next in rank shall be promoted to fill a vacancy. In fact, the vacancy may be filled not only by promotion but "by transfer of present employees in the govt service, by reinstatement, by reemployment of persons separated through reduction in force, or by appointment of persons w/ the civil service eligibility appropriate to the position. What the Civil Service Actprovides is that if a vacancy is filled by promotion, the person holding that position next in rank thereto "shall be considered for promotion."xxxOne who is next in rank is entitled to preferential consideration for promotion to the higher vacancy but it does not necessarily follow that he and no one else can be appointed. The rule neither grants a vested right to the holder nor imposes a ministerial duty on the appointing authority to promote such person to the next higher position. Luego vs. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327 (THERESE) Felimon Luego vs Civil Service Commission and Felicula Tuozo (August 5, 1986) Facts: Petitioner was appointed Admin Officer II, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor Solon. The appointment was described as “permanent” but the CSC approved it as “temporary,” subject to the final action taken in the protest filed by the private respondent and another employee. Subsequently, the CSC found the private respondent better qualified than the petitioner for the contested position and, accordingly directed that the latter be appointed to said position in place of the petitioner whose appointment is revoked. Hence, the private respondent was so appointed to the position by Mayor Duterte, the new mayor. The petitioner, invoking his earlier permanent appointment, questions the order and the validity of the respondent’s appointment. Issue: Whether or not the CSC is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement. Held: No. Petitioner is declared entitled to the office in dispute by virtue of his permanent appointment. Ratio: The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent and was therefore protected by Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had the right to do so, and it was not for the respondent CSC to reverse him and call it temporary. Section 9(h), Art V of the Civil Service Decree provides that the Commission shall have inter alia the power to “…approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil service… ….and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess appropriate eligibility or required qualifications.” The CSC is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of

the requirements of the CSC Law. When the appointee is qualified and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the CSC Laws. CSC is without authority to revoke an appointment because of its belief that another person was better qualified, which is an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the city mayor. Ø Temporary Appointments Romualdez vs. Civil Service Commission, 197 SCRA 168 (ZION) Province of Camarines Sur vs. Court of Appeals, 246, SCRA 281 (YESHA)Province of Camarines Sur vs Court of Appeals & Tito B. DatoJuly 14, 1995 Facts:In 1960, respondent Dato was appointed as Private Agent by the then Gov. of Camarines Sur, Apolonio Maleniza. 1972, Dato was promoted and appointed Assistant Provincial Warden by then Gov. Felix Alfelor, Sr. Dato had no civil service eligibility for the position he was appointed to, thus, he could not be legally extended a permanent appointment. He was extended a temporary appointment, which was renewed annually.1974, Gov. Alfelor approved the change in Dato's employment status from temporary to permanent upon the latter's representation that he passed the civil service examination for supervising security guards. This was not favorably acted upon by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) reasoning that Dato did not possess the necessary civil service eligibility for the office he was appointed to. His appointment remained temporary and no other appointment was extended to him. 1976,Dato was indefinitely suspended by Gov. Alfelor after criminal charges were filed against him and a prison guard for allegedly conniving and/or consenting to evasion of sentence of some detention prisoners who escaped from confinement. Two years after the request for change of status was made, Mr. Lope B. Rama, head of the Camarines Sur Unit of the Civil Service Commission, wrote the Gov. a letter informing him that the status of private respondent Dato has been changed from temporary to permanent, the latter having passed the examination for Supervising Security Guard. The change of status was to be made retroactive to June 11, 1974, the date of release of said examination.Sangguniang Panlalawigan, suppressed the appropriation for the position of Assistant Provincial Warden and deleted private respondent's name from the petitioner's plantilla.Dato was subsequently acquitted of the charges against him. Consequently, he requested the Gov. for reinstatement and backwages.His request was not heeded. Dato filed an action before the RTC. RTC Decision: Ordered the payment of backwages of Dato equivalent to five years. Province of Camarines Sur appealed the decision to the CA.CA: Affirmed RTC’s decision. Hence the present petition. Issue: W/N Dato was a permanent employee of petitioner Province of Camarines Sur at the time he was suspended on March 16, 1976. Held: No. Dato, being merely a temporary employee, is not entitled to his claim for backwages for the entire period of his suspension. Ratio: At the time Dato was appointed Assistant Provincial Warden on January 1, 1974, he had not yet qualified in an appropriate examination for the position. Such lack of a civil service eligibility made his appointment temporary and without a fixed and definite term and is dependent entirely upon the pleasure of the appointing power.

The fact that private respondent obtained civil service eligibility later on is of no moment as his having passed the supervising security guard examination, did not ipso facto convert his temporary appointment into a permanent one. What is required is a new appointment since a permanent appointment is not a continuation of the temporary appointment — these are two distinct acts of the appointing authority The letter communicated by Mr. Lope Rama to the Gov. of Camarines Sur is a clear arrogation of power properly belonging to the appointing authority. CSC has the power to approve or disapprove an appointment set before it. It does not have the power to make the appointment itself or to direct the appointing authority to change the employment status of an employee. CSC should have ended its participation in the appointment of private respondent on January 1, 1974 when it confirmed the temporary status of the latter who lacked the proper civil service eligibility. When it issued the foregoing communication on March 19, 1976, it stepped on the toes of the appointing authority, thereby encroaching on the discretion vested solely upon the latter. Decano vs. Edu, 99 SCRA 410 (FROI)FEDERICO DECANO v. ROMEO F. EDU, as Acting Commissioner of Land Transportation and CIPRIANO POSADAS, as Acting Registrar, Land Transportation Commission, Dagupan City AgencyFACTS:

● 12 Sept 1962: Undersec. of Public Works and Communications assigned Federico Decano as janitor in temporary capacity in the Motor Vehicles Agency in Dagupan - approved by CSC

● Decano worked for almost four years until 29 April 1966 when Cipriano Posadas (acting Registrar) received telegram from Romeo Edu (acting LTC Commissioner) to the effect of terminating the services of Decano

● Decano filed petition for mandamus and injunction in CFI: Posadas and Edu acted in excess of jurisdiction, having no power to terminate the services of Decano

● CFI: ruled in favor of DecanoIssue: Whether or not Edu and Posadas had authority to terminate the services of DecanoHeld/Ratio: NO - aforementioned officials had no authority to remove Decano from service.

● Decano could be removed from service, since his appointment was temporary - acceptance of a temporary appointment divests an appointee of the right to security of tenure against removal without case

● Decano could only be removed at the pleasure of the appointing official i.e. the Undersec of Public Works

Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila vs. Civil Service Commission, 241 SCRA 506 (KAT) FACTS:-This petition stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice filed with public respondent Civil Service Commission ("CSC") by private respondents, through Pamantasan Ng Lungsod Ng Maynila Faculty Organization ("PLMFO"), against petitioner Pamantasan Ng Lungsod Ng Maynila ("PLM") and its officers.-The sixteen (16) individual private respondents were full-time instructors of PLM under "temporary contracts" of employment renewable on a yearly basis. They, among other instructors, joined the PLMFO.-Uniform notices of termination, all dated 24 April 1990, were individually sent to private respondents informing them of "the expiration of their temporary appointments at the close of office hours on 31 May 1990" and the non-renewal of their appointments for the school year (SY) 1990-1991.-On 29 May 1990, private respondents, through PLMFO, filed with the CSC a verified complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice against petitioner and its officers.-In a Resolution, 2 dated 16 December 1991, the PSLMC found petitioner guilty of "Unfair Labor Practice" and held that private respondents "should be reinstated."-The CSC, accordingly, directed the reinstatement, with back salaries, of private respondentsHELD:Unfortunately for petitioner, however, the two supposed independent issues, i.e., the unfair labor practice charge and the complaint for illegal dismissal both filed by private respondents, are, in fact, here unavoidably interlinked. The non-renewal of an employment contract with a term, it is true, is ordinarily a

valid mode of removal at the end of each period. 11 This rule, however, must yield to the superior constitutional right of employees, permanent or temporary, to self-organization. While, a temporary employment may be ended with or without cause, it certainly may not, however, be terminated for an illegal cause. Padilla vs. Civil Service Commission, 403 SCRA 116 (KARL) Ø Lack of Eligibility after Reorganization National Land Titles and Deeds Reg’n Adm vs. CSC, 221 SCRA 145 (YESHA)National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration vs Civil Service Commission & Violeta GarciaApril 7, 1993 Facts:Petitioner Garcia, a Bachelor of Laws graduate and a first grade civil service eligible was appointed Deputy Register of Deeds VII under permanent status. Said position was later reclassified to Deputy Register of Deeds III pursuant to PD 1529, to which position, petitioner was also appointed under permanent status up to September 1984. By virtue of Executive Order No. 649 (which took effect on February 9, 1981) which authorized the restructuring of the Land Registration Commission (LRC) to National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NALDTRA) and regionalizing the Offices of the Registers therein, petitioner Garcia was issued an appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II on October 1, 1984, under temporary status, for not being a member of the Philippine Bar. In a Memorandum dated October 30, 1986, the then Minister, now Secretary, of Justice notified petitioner Garcia of the termination of her services as Deputy Register of Deeds II on the ground that she was "receiving bribe money". This was appealed before the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). MSPB dropped the appeal on the ground that since the termination of her services was due to the expiration of her temporary appointment, her separation is in order. CSC issued a resolution, directed that petitioner be reinstated in her position. Held that under the “vested right theory” the new requirement of BAR membership to qualify for permanent appointment does not apply to her but only to the filling up of vacant lawyer positions after the effectivity of the EO. ISSUE: WoN the membership in the bar, which is the qualification requirement prescribed for appointment to the position should be required of and/or applied only to new applicants and not to those who were already in the service of the LRC at the time of the issuance and implementation of the EO Held: Yes, EO expressly provided for abolition of existing positions in the now defunct LRC and required new appointments to be issued to all employees of the NALTDRA. Ratio:The law mandates that from the moment an implementing order is issued, all positions in the Land Registration Commission are deemed non-existent. This, however, does not mean removal. Abolition of a position does not involve or mean removal for the reason that removal implies that the post subsists and that one is merely separated therefrom. After abolition, there is in law no occupant. Thus, there can be no tenure to speak of. It is in this sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an absolute right to hold it. Except constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary. De Tavera vs. Civil Service Corporation, 200 SCRA 759 (THERESE) G.R. No. 92595 May 28, 1992HON. MITA PARDO DE TAVERA, in her capacity as Chairman, Board of Commissioners, Population Commission of the Philippines, petitioner, vs.CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and FELIX SEVIDAL, respondents.Leven S. Puno for private respondent.

NARVASA, C.J.: Facts:Section 21 of EO 123 promulgated on January 30, 1987, authorized the reorganization of the governing body and secretariat of the POPCOM as an agency attached to the DSWD. Pursuant thereto, a new staffing pattern was drawn up and an “Organization, Staffing and Classification Action Summary” (OSCAS) based thereon was prepared. The position of Population Programs Coordinator was upgraded to Regional Director for which, among others, an educational attainment of Bachelor's Degree in Health, Social/Behavioral Sciences or other relevant courses was prescribed. After a review of the qualifications and performance of the incumbent POPCOM staff, petitioner as Chairman of the POPCOM Board of Commissioners notified private respondent Felix Sevidal, then Population Programs Coordinator, in a Memorandum dated December 28, 1987, that he "was not being considered for reappointment under the approved Organization, Staffing and Classification Action Summary (OSCAS) by the Board of Commissioners." Appointed in his stead was Placido N. Triste who holds a Bachelor's degree. October 20, 1989: The CSC ruled favorably on private respondent's motion for reconsideration. Finding that he had never been found guilty of any offense, the CSC concluded that Sevidal's separation from the service was without legal basis. Thus, the directive, subject of this petition. Issue: Whether or not Sevidal may be appointed as Regional Director Held: NO. Petition granted. Ratio: The respondent Civil Service Commission did act with grave abuse of discretion in directing the appointment of private respondent to the position of Regional Director notwithstanding the fact that he clearly lacked the requisite educational qualification and that record of his public service raises serious questions about his moral fitness to remain in office. Consistent with the elevation of the position of Population Programs Coordinator to Regional Director in the new plantilla and staffing pattern of the POPCOM, the educational qualification standard for the upgraded position was changed so as to require the holder or appointee to have a Bachelor's Degree in Health, Social or Behavioral Sciences or other courses relevant to the position. Private respondent being only a third year college student, it is plain to see that he does not meet the minimum academic qualification for the position of Regional Director. For the respondent Civil Service Commission then to direct that private respondent be appointed to a position for which he does not possess the required educational qualifications is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, being at cross-purposes with its (CSC's) bounden duty to ensure that only the qualified are admitted to the public service, hence to "disapprove those (appointments) whose appointees do not possess the appropriate eligibility or required qualifications." Moreover, private respondent had also been accused of various charges (such as forging the signature of the POPCOM chair, using office funds for his own benefit etc.). The fact that he had not been convicted of any of these charges does not absolutely exempt him from being morally unfit or notoriously undesirable, especially through other perceived actions over a period of time but for which they were not formally called upon to answer. Parenthetically, Executive Order No. 17 effective May 28, 1986 cites as a valid cause for separation or replacement of a public officer or employee "the existence of a probable cause for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act as determined by the Ministry Head concerned or "any analogous ground showing that the incumbent is unfit to remain in the service or his separation/replacement is in the interest of the service."

Ø Imposition of Additional Qualifications by the CSC Juliano vs. Subido, 62 SCRA 480 (ZION) Ø Declaration of Vacancy Mayor vs. Macaraig, 194 SCRA 672 (FROI)Jovencio Mayor v. Hon. Catalino MacaraigFACTS:

● on constitutionality of RA 6715, insofar as it declares vacant "all positions of the Commissioners, Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission," and operates to remove the incumbents upon the appointment and qualification of their successors.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6715 is unconstitutionalHELD/RATIO: RA 6715 is unconstitutional.

● Right to security of tenure guaranteed by the Constitution● Valid cause for removal is abolition of office - abolition is within the prerogative of the legislative.

However, abolition of office is not the same as declaring the same offices as vacant - not within the power of the legislative; such an act would violate security of tenure. It can not be justified by the professed "need to professionalize the higher levels of officialdom invested with adjudicatory powers and functions, and to upgrade their qualifications, ranks, and salaries or emoluments."

● no express abolition of office in RA 6715, no implied abolition - no inconsistency so repugnant between the old rules with regard to functions of NLRC and RA 6715.

RA 6715 did not change the essential function of the NLRC as a supervisory and adjudicatory body.position titles are only that - new names (Executive Clerk, Deputy Executive Clerk) for old offices (Executive Director, Deputy Executive Director) and as such, there is no abolition of office.

Ø Demotion/More Qualified Persons Central Bank vs. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744 (KAT)DOCTRINE: Even if officers and employees in the career service of the Civil Service enjoy the right to preference in promotion, it is not mandatory that the vacancy be filled by promotion. The appointing authority should be allowed the choice of men of his confidence, provided they are qualified and eligible.FACTS:The questioned resolutions directed the immediate revocation of the appointment of Dr. Angela P. Jordan to the position of Assistant Bank Physician of the Central Bank of the Philippines and the issuance of an appointment in favor of herein private respondent, Dr. Basilio E. Borja to the said position.On October 3, 1984, the Promotions Board of the Central Bank, with a representative of the Civil Service Commission in attendance, deliberated on the filling up of the vacant position of Assistant Bank Physician of the Central Bank of the Philippines (Salary Grade 22). It found Dr. Jordan, who then had the rank of Coordinating Assistant (Salary Grade 20) as the only next-in-rank employee. After considering further the qualifications of Dr. Jordan, said Board certified her for promotion to the position of Assistant Bank Physician and submitted the proposal to the Office of the Governor of the Central Bank.On the other hand, it appears that as early as July, 1984, respondent Borja filed an application for the position of Medical Director in the Central Bank. His papers were acted upon by the Promotions Board and he was considered for the position of Physician (Salary Grade 16). The bank approved the Board's proposal in a Resolution dated October 5, 1984. 3 On October 9, 1984, respondent Borja reported for duty. On October 15, 1984, he was issued his appointment as Physician.

On January 2, 1985, the promotion of Dr. Jordan to Assistant Bank Physician was approved by the Senior Deputy Governor of the Central Bank under Personnel Action No. 001, Series of 1985. 4 On January 10, 1985, Dr. Jordan was designated to act as Assistant Bank Physician. On January 30, 1985, she was issued an appointment as Assistant Bank Physician to take effect January 2, 1985. On February 15, 1985, private respondent contested Dr. Jordan's appointment claiming that he was the next-in-rank employee and that he was more qualified than she.ISSUE:May the Civil Service Commission disapprove an appointment and require the appointment of another person whom it believes is more qualified for the position?HELD:NO.IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the questioned Resolutions of the Civil Service Commission dated May 26, 1987 and October 16, 1987, respectively, are hereby declared null and void and the Commission is directed to attest the appointment of Dr. Angela Jordan as Assistant Bank Physician. No costs.RATIO:It is well-settled principle that the appointing authority is given ample discretion in the selection and appointment of qualified persons to vacant positions. This is a management prerogative which is generally unhampered by judicial intervention. Within the parameters of this principle, the right to select and appoint employees is the prerogative of the employer which may be exercised without being held liable therefor provided that the exercise thereof is in good faith for the advancement of the employer's interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or under valid agreements and provided further that such prerogatives are not exercised in a malicious, harsh, oppressive, vindictive or wanton manner, or out of malice or spite. There is no question that the Central Bank of the Philippines is vested with the power of appointment under Section 14 of Republic Act No. 265, as amended, otherwise known as the Central Bank Act. At issue in this petition is the extent of the power of the Civil Service Commission to approve or disapprove a particular appointment.Under the Civil Service Act of 1959, the Commissioner of Civil Service has the final authority on appointments. But the situation has changed under the new law, Presidential Decree No. 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree, wherein the Commission is not authorized to curtail the discretion of the appointing official on the nature or kind of appointment to be extended. The authority of the Commission is limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the law governing the Civil Service.In the case at bar, the qualifications of Dr. Jordan were never disputed. The fact that she was qualified was attested to by the Promotions Board. A representative of the Commission was present in the deliberation of the said board.Private respondent anchors his protest on the ground that he is more qualified than the appointee. It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws. The Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position. It also has no authority to direct the

appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law.The Commission has the authority to check whether or not the appointee possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility or the required qualifications. If he does, his appointment must be approved; if not it should be disapproved. No other criterion may be employed by the Commission when it acts on an appointment.Thus, when as in this case, it is not disputed that the appointee, Dr. Jordan, is qualified for the contested position, the Commission exceeded its power in revoking her appointment on the ground that private respondent is more qualified. The Commission cannot substitute its will for that of the appointing authority.The appointing authority found that Dr. Jordan satisfied all the requirements set by the Central Bank on promotion the wisdom of which cannot be questioned00 Alim vs. Civil Service Commission, 204 SCRA 510 (KARL) Aquino vs. Civil Service Commission, 208 SCRA 240 (YESHA)Victor Aquino vs Civil Service Commission & Leonarda de la PazApril 22, 1992 Facts: Petitioner Aquino was designated as Officer-in-charge of the Division Supply Office by the DECS Regional Director in view of the retirement of the Supply Officer I.Two years thereafter, the Division Superintendent of City Schools issued a promotional appointment to respondent Leonarda de la Paz as Supply Officer I in the DECS division. The Civil Service Regional Office IV approved her appointment as permanent.Petitioner filed a protest with DECS Secretary questioning the qualification and competence of respondent for the position of Supply Officer I.Finding the petitioner better qualified than the respondent, the DECS Secretary in a decision sustained the protest and revoked the appointment of private respondent, and petitioner was issued a permanent appointment as Supply Officer by the DECS Regional Director. Said appointment was approved by the Civil Service Regional Office IV.In an appeal to the CSC, public respondent CSC found the appeal meritorious, thus revoking the appointment of petitioner and restoring private respondent to her position under her previously approved appointment.In the case at bar, petitioner assailing the revocation of his appointment, invokes the rulings in previous jurisprudence that the CSC has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position for that would have constituted an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the appointing authority. Issue: WoN Civil Service Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in revoking the appointment of petitioner Aquino as Supply Officer I as it found respondent Leonarda de la Paz better qualified Held: No. The conclusion of CSC in the questioned decision that private respondent is more qualified than petitioner merely supports the validity of the restoration of private respondent to her previously approved appointment considering that she meets the prescribed qualification standards required of the position of Supply Officer I and the appropriate civil service eligibility.CSC revoked the appointment of the successful protestant, petitioner herein, principally because the right to security of tenure of the prior appointee, private respondent herein, to the contested position had already attached. It must be noted that public respondent CSC did not direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. It merely restored the appointment of private respondent who was first appointed to the contested position.

It is well settled that once an appointment is issued and the moment the appointee assumes position, he acquires a legal, not merely equitable right, which is protected not only by statute, but also by the Constitution, and cannot be taken away from him either by revocation of the appointment, or by removal, except for cause and with previous notice and hearing. DECS Secretary directed to restore respondent Leonarda de la Paz to her previously approved appointment as Supply Officer I. Gayatao vs. Civil Service Commission, 210 SCRA 183 (THERESE) AGUSTINA G. GAYATAO, petitioner, vs.CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and BAYANI I. FERNANDEZ, respondents. Facts:Private respondent Bayani I. Fernandez was holding the position of Customs Operations Chief I (COC) in the Bureau of Customs since March 5, 1984 in a permanent capacity. He was assigned to the aircraft Operations Division. On October 15, 1987, per Customs Personnel Order (CPO) No. C-152-87 issued by Commissioner Salvador M. Mison, he was reassigned as Acting Chief of the Export Division at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) Customhouse. On February 15, 1988, Commission Mison, purportedly acting pursuant to Executive Order No. 127 implementing the reorganization of the Department of Finance, Bureau of Customs, appointed petitioner Agustina G. Gayatao, then a Supervising Customs Trade Examiner, to the position of Customs Operations Chief at the NAIA Customhouse, effective March 1, 1988 . Thereafter, in CPO No. B-27-88 dated March 3, 1988, petitioner was designated as COC of the Export Division at NAIA, while private respondent was designated as Customs Operations Assistant Chief (COAC) of the Aircraft Operations Division, both designations being effective March 1, 1988. Aggrieved by the actions of said commissioner, private respondent filed a letter of protest on May 18,1988 before the Merit System Protection Board of respondent Civil Service Commission (CSC) questioning the appointment of petitioner as COC and his demotion to the position of COAC. CSC: Revoked the appointment of petitioner Gayatao as Customs Operations Chief and directed the Bureau of Customs to appoint respondent Fernandez in her stead. Issue: Whether the CSC committed grave abuse of discretion in revoking the appointment of petitioner and ordering the appointment of private respondent in her place Held: NO. CSC decision is affirmed. Petition dismissed. Ratio:Petitioner: CSC has no authority to revoke her appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified, for that would constitute an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the appointing authority. In support of said contention, petitioner cites the case of Central Bank of the Philippines, et al. vs. Civil Service Commission, et al., where the Court ruled that under the Civil Service Decree (Presidential Decree No. 807), the authority of the CSC is limited to approving or renewing an appointment in the light of the requisites of the law governing the civil service. The CSC has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position. It will be in excess of its power if it substitutes its will for that of the appointing authority. The CSC not being the "appointing power" in contemplation of law, cannot direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. The abovementioned doctrines are inapplicable in this case.

A reading of the questioned resolution of respondent commission readily shows that the revocation of the appointment of petitioner was based primarily on its finding that the said appointment was null and void by reason of the fact that it resulted in the demotion of private respondent without lawful cause in violation of the latter's security of tenure. Records will show that prior to the reorganization, appellant was already holding the position of Customs Operations Chief I since March 1984. His reappointment to the position of Customs Operation Assistant Chief is therefore a clear demotion of rank and position. The Commission finds no sufficient justifiable reason for this demotion. The appointing authority cannot entirely disregard the rule on equity of the incumbent and justify demotion in the guise of reorganization, if such demotion will amount to a penalty without justifiable ground or will result in deprivation of due process on the part of the employee concerned. It is within the power of public respondent to order the reinstatement of government employees who have been unlawfully dismissed. The CSC, as the central personnel agency, has the obligation to implement and safeguard the constitutional provisions on security of tenure and due process. In the present case, the issuance by the CSC of the questioned resolutions, for the reasons clearly explained, is indubitably in the performance of its constitutional task of protecting and strengthening the civil service. Ø Unclassified Service Balquidra vs. Court of First Instance of Capiz, 80 SCRA 123 (ZION)Orcullo vs. Civil Service Commission, 358 SCRA 115 (FROI)Norberto Orcullo Jr. v. CSCFACTS:

● Petitioner was hired as Project Manager for the Coordinating Council of the Philippines-BOT Center on March 1996 - with his employment being contractual and coterminous with the project - which was to end on January 2000

● Sept 1996 - 6 months into work, petitioner was fired (inability to work together with other staff, always absent in outside meetings)

● Petitioner appealed to CSC, petition dismissed: his contract stipulates the condition that “Unless terminated earlier”

● Appealed to CA, petition dismissedISSUE: Whether or not employees in the public service, regardless of their status of employment, are protected by the tenurial security right embodied in the Constitution.HELD/RATIO: NO - unclassified service provided for by Civil Service Law

● contractual, coterminous service is defined falls under unclassified service by the Civil Service Law:

Sec. 9. Non-Career Service. - The Non-Career Service shall be characterized by (1) entrance on bases other that those of the usual tests of merit and fitness utilized for the career service; and (2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, or which is coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made.xxx

(4) Contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is in accordance with a employment in the government is in accordance with a special contract to undertake a specific work or job, requiring special or technical skills not available in the employing agency, to be accomplished within a specific period, which in no case shall exceed one year, and performs or accomplishes the specific work or job, under his own responsibility with a minimum of direction and supervision from the hiring agency.

● kinds of co-terminous service (as provided Sec 14 Omnibus Rules Book V Implementing EO 292):

(1) Co-terminous with the project - when the appointment is co-existent with the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made or subject to the availability of funds for the same;(2) Co-terminous with the appointing authority - when appointment is co-existent with the tenure of the appointing authority or at his pleasure;

(3) Co-terminous with the incumbent - when the appointment is co-existent with the appointee, in that after the resignation, separation or termination of the services of the incumbent the position shall be deemed automatically abolished; and(4) Co-terminous with a specific period - appointment is for a specific period and upon expiration and upon thereof, the position is deemed abolished. Ø Acceptance of Separation Pay Dytiapco vs. Civil Service Commission, 211 SCRA 88 (KAT) EDGARDO DYTIAPCO VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY AND DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF BROADCAST SERVICES [July 03, 1992] FACTS:This petition for review seeks to annul and set aside the resolutions of respondent Civil Service Commission dated June 28, 1989 and November 27, 1989 dismissing the appeal of petitioner Edgardo Dytiapco to be reinstated in the government service on the ground that he had already received his separation and terminal leave benefits.· July 28, 1977: petitioner, a Professional Career Service Eligible, was permanently appointed Junior Newscaster in the Bureau of Broadcast Services (BBS). Thereafter, he was promoted Senior Newscaster on February 16, 1979 and sent to Anaheim, California on September 1987 as representative of the Bureau of Broadcast in the National Association of Broadcaster Convention· Executive Order No. 297 reorganizing the Office of the Press Secretary including the Bureau of Broadcast took effect on July 25, 1987.· December 28, 1987: petitioner received a letter from the Press Secretary "That due to limited number of positions in the approved new staffing pattern," his "services shall be considered only until January 31, 1988]· Petitioner immediately appealed his dismissal to the Press Secretary and protested the adverse rating given him by the Evaluation Committee formed to effect the reorganization of the Bureau of Broadcast Services· finding himself in dire financial straits, petitioner filed a claim for separation and terminal leave benefits and on May 5, 1988 received from the Bureau of Broadcast the sums of P26,779.72 and P19,028.86 as separation and terminal leave pay· May 12, 1988: petitioner wrote respondent Civil Service Commission appealing for his reinstatement on the ground that his termination was without a valid cause as he is a Civil Service eligible holding a permanent appointmentISSUE:WON Dytiapco should be reinstated despite already receiving his separation and terminal leave benefits?HELD:YESRespondent Civil Service Commission gravely abused its discretion in finding that petitioner's receipt of separation and terminal leave benefits renders his appeal closed and terminatedThe Resolutions of the CSC of June 28, 1989 and November 27, 1989 are hereby annulled and set aside. Respondents Press Secretary and Director of the Bureau of Broadcasts are hereby ordered to reinstate petitioner Edgardo Dytiapco to the position he was holding immediately before his dismissal without loss of seniority with full pay for the period of his separation. Petitioner is likewise ordered to return to respondent Bureau of Broadcast the separation pay and terminal leave benefits he received in the amount of P26,779.72 and P19,028.86 respectively. RATIO:· Petitioner never abandoned his appeal for reinstatement when he accepted separation pay and terminal leave benefits.· His acceptance of separation and terminal leave benefits was dictated more by economic necessity rather than a desire to leave government employment.

· The procedures for the removal of employees pursuant to government reorganization such as that mandated by Executive Order No. 297 was laid down by Republic Act No. 6656, entitled "An Act To Protect the Security of Tenure of Civil Service Officers and Employees in the Implementation of Government Reorganization", which was given retroactive effect as of June 30, 1987.· Petitioner's dismissal was not for a valid cause, thereby violating his right to security of tenure. The reason given for his termination, that there is a "limited number of positions in the approved new staffing pattern" necessitating his separation on January 31, 1988, is simply not true. There is no evidence that his position as senior newscaster has been abolished, rendered redundant or merged and/or divided or consolidated with other positions. According to petitioner, respondent Bureau of Broadcast had accepted applicants to the position he vacated. He was conveniently eased out of the service which he served with distinction for thirteen (13) years to accommodate the proteges of the "new power brokers".· Respondent Commission's reliance on its earlier decision in the leofilo Pa-alan case promulgated on April 21, 1989, that acceptance of benefits renders an appeal "closed and terminated", is misplaced. It deprives petitioner of his right to due process and added another ground for his removal not contemplated by R.A. No. 6656, that is, the mere payment of his separation and terminal leave benefits.· Settled is the rule that separation or replacement of officers and employees pursuant to government reorganization should be only for "justifiable reasons" or for any of the grounds enumerated in Section 3 of Executive Order No. 17.· The separation of Career Civil Service employees pursuant to such reorganization must be done in good faith.· In recourse, petitioner is a holder of a Professional Career Civil Service eligibility. He had been permanently appointed to the government service since 1977, had been president and even sent abroad to represent the Bureau of Broadcast in the National Association of Broadcaster Convention in 1987. He was not removed for any of the grounds mentioned in Section 3 of E.O. No. 17 nor pursuant to a valid cause under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6656. Ø Validity of Appointment Dependent on Legality of Dismissal Costin vs. Quimbo, 120 SCRA 159 (KARL) Facts: Petitioner Estanislao Lajer was a member of the municipal police force of Abuyog, Leyte since Jan 1, 1949. He was extended a promotional appointment as sergeant of police on Oct 15, 1958. On Nov 25, 1959, the outgoing municipal mayor of Abuyog accorded him another promotional appointment as chief of police. This last appointment was not attested and approved as required by law. On Jan 14, 1960, the new municipal mayor dismissed Lajer and 8 other policemen and extended to respondent Higinio Verra a permanent appointment as Chief of Police. Verra¶s appointment was eventually approved as permanent in accordance with Sec. 24 (b) of Republic Act 2260 by the Commissioner of Civil Service. On Jan 19, 1960, Lajer, et al filed an action for mandamus (Civil Case No. 2713) against the mayor, treasurer and the municipal council of Abuyog, contesting their separation from the service. While this petition for mandamus was pending, there was a change in the admin as a result of the 1963 local elections. The newly elected mayor dismissed Verra and appointed petitioner Marcial Costin as chief of police. On Dec 29, 1964, Verra filed Civil Case No. 3606 for quo warranto with mandamus against Costin, the mayor, and the treasurer, questioning the legality of his separation alleging that he could not be dismissed because he was a civil service eligible and was in possession of a permanent appointment attested by the CSC. The mandamus suit (Civil Case No. 2713) filed by Lajer, et al prospered and was appealed to the CA. On Jan 22, 1966, CA held that Lajer and 2 others were illegally removed from office and are entitled to reinstatement with payment of the back wages. Thus, petitioner (then mayor) Tisado reinstated Lajer as chief of police on April 1, 1966. On Dec 2, 1969, respondent judge rendered his decision in Civil Case No. 3606, declaring Verra to be entitled to immediate reinstatement with back salary.

Petitioners then brought this decision to the SC in a petition for review, seeking its annulment or reversal. Issues: WON the appointment of Verra to the position of Chief of Police of Abuyog was valid and consequently his removal therefrom illegal.Whether the CA in its decision in the Civil Case No. 2713 ordered the reinstatement of Lajer to the position of Sergeant of Police or Chief of Police.WON Verra is bound by the decision of the lower court in Case No. 2713 for mandamus, not being a party to it.Held/ Ratio: 1.No. The validity of Verra¶s appointment hinges on the legality of Lajer¶s removal. It is elementary in the law of public officer that no person, no matter how qualified and eligible for a certain position, may be appointed to an office which is not vacant. There can be no appointment to a non-vacant position. The incumbent must first be legally removed or his appointment validly terminated. The lower court overlooked the fact that Verra could not have been permanently appointed to the position because no less than the CA had declared that his predecessor, Lajer, was illegally terminated from office and must be reinstated. Verra argues that Lajer¶s appointment was temporary and terminable at the pleasure of the appointing power as it could not be considered final or complete, not having been attested by the prov. treasurer in accordance with Sec. 20 of RA 2260 and not having been certified by the Commissioner of Civil Service as provided for in Section 2(a) of Rule VI of the Civil Service Rules implementing Section 16(g) of RA 2260. However, said requirements could not be complied with because Lajer who have been appointed on Nov. 25, 1959 was replaced on Jan 14, 1960 by the new mayor who appointed Verra. Citing Dichoso vs. Valdepenas, SC stated that the incoming mayor should have awaited the action of the prov. treasurer and the Commissioner, before appointing his own protégé. Thus, Verra cannot rely on the absence of an attestation and certification because by the fact of Verra¶s appointment, these requirements could no longer be fulfilled. Mayor Traya took the appointment away from the Office of the Prov. Treasurer and subsequently from the Commissioner before they could be acted upon. 2.Lajer was reinstated to the position of chief of police. Mr. Lajer did not go to court to contest the position of police sergeant. Lajer filed a petition for mandamus to be reinstated as chief of police. When the decision of the CFI of Leyte ordering Lajers reinstatement was appealed to the CA, the CA specifically described petitioner Lajer as chief of police. 3.Yes. The issue before the CFI and the CA in the Mandamus suit was WON the Mayor, Municipal council, Treasurer, and the Municipality of Abuyog illegally terminated the chief of police, sergeant, and six other members of the police and WON mandamus may issue to compel their reinstatement. Mandamus having issued, any person whether Verra or any other appointee to the contested position must give up the office in favor of the officer adjudged by the courts to be entitled to it. Disposition: Petition is hereby granted. Ø Transfers Department of Education, Culture and Sports vs. Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA 555 (YESHA)DECS, represented by Edna Azurin, Anastacio Ramento, and Hon. Onofre Corpus vs Court of Appeals vs Gloria Navarro Facts:Gloria V. Navarro was appointed Secondary School Principal II, without reference to any particular school. In 1982, petitioner Edna B. Azurin in her capacity as Schools Division Superintendent of Quezon City, effected a reshuffling of all high school principals in Quezon City in the exigencies of the service, as all of the principals had been overstaying in one station for more than five (5) years. As a result of said reshuffling, respondent Navarro was reassigned from Carlos Albert High School to the Manuel Roxas High School (both in QC) without demotion in rank nor diminution in salary. Respondent Navarro wrote a letter to the petitioner, requesting for a reconsideration of her transfer or reassignment and citing her achievements as an administrator of Carlos Albert High School as her reason therefor. Petitioner Azurin denied the said request explaining that respondent Navarro's new

assignment was made in the exigencies of the service and precisely in recognition of her capabilities as school administrator, and that since respondent Navarro had already spent ten (10) years as principal in Carlos Albert High School, she was accordingly advised to consider her new assignment as a challenge to accomplish new and bigger projects for Manuel Roxas High School. Despite the denial of her request for reconsideration, respondent Navarro gave notice to petitioner Azurin that she would not comply with her new assignment allegedly because the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers states that no principal/teacher could be transferred without her consent and that the reasons for her transfer are not plausible. Issue: WoN the reassignment of Gloria Navarro is valid Held: Yes, reasons given by Azurin in recommending Navarro's reassignment were far from whimsical, capricious or arbitrary. Ratio: Sec 6 of Republic Act No. 4670 known as the Magna Carta of Public School Teachers: Except for cause and as herein otherwise provided, no teacher shall be transferred without his consent from one station to another. Where the exigencies of the service require the transfer of a teacher from one station to another, such transfer may be effected by the school superintendent who shall previously notify the teacher concerned of the transfer and the reason or reasons therefor. Moreover, respondent Navarro has not exhausted administrative remedies as she did not elevate the matter of her transfer to the Civil Service Commission in accordance with Section 24 (c) PD No. 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree which provides: "(C) Transfer. – A transfer is a movement from one position to another which is equivalent in rank, level, or salary without break in service involving the issuance of an appointment. It shall not be considered disciplinary when made in the interest of public service, in which case, the employees concerned shall be informed of the reasons therefor. If the employee believes that there is no justification for the transfer he may appeal his case to the (Civil Service) Commission." By not appealing her case to the Civil Service Commission before filing Special Civil Action No. Q-37025, respondent Navarro is indubitably without cause of action. *De Guzman vs. Commission on Elections, 336 SCRA 188 (THERESE) -refer to my digest above (same case lang :D) Cariño vs. Daoas, 380 SCRA 355 (ZION)Pastor vs. City of Pasig, 382 SCRA 232 (FROI)Rualo vs. Petargue, 449 SCRA 121 (KAT)00Facts:On 26 October 1993, President Fidel V. Ramos (“President Ramos”) issued Executive Order No. 132, entitled “Approving the Streamlining of the Bureau of Internal Revenue.” On 28 July 1997, President Ramos issued Executive Order No. 430 (“EO 430”) entitled “Further Streamlining the Bureau of Internal Revenue in line with its Computerized Integrated Tax System.”On 17 September 1997, then BIR Commissioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato (“Commissioner Vinzons-Chato”) issued Revenue Memorandum Order No. 57-97 (“RMO 57-97”) prescribing the “Policies and Guidelines on Streamlining the Bureau of Internal Revenue under Executive Order No. 430” which included redeployment of personnel

On 24 November 1997, Commissioner Vinzons-Chato issued RTAO 28-97 reassigning certain revenue personnel citing the exigencies of the revenue service as well as EO 430 and RMO 57-97 as basis.Pitargue raised the issue of whether funds appropriated for a specific purpose may be transferred as a result of the reorganization of the BIR as provided in EO 430 and its implementing policies and guidelines under RMO 57-97 Pitargue, testifying in his capacity as a taxpayer, declared that he has a right to seek protection against the misappropriation of public funds resulting from the reorganization in the BIR which he claims is violative of the provisions of the Constitution and the General Appropriations Act of 1997. Perez, a Chief Revenue Officer of the BIR, testified that the issuance of several RTAOs threatens her right to security of tenureISSUE:Whether Pitargue, Perez and Vasquez are entitled to the writ of preliminary injunction granted by the trial courtHELD:NORATIOFor respondents to be entitled to an injunctive writ, they must show that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which the injunction is directed are violative of the right. We note that respondents employed the shotgun approach in their petition before the trial court to show their entitlement to the writ of preliminary injunction. Pitargue sued as a taxpayer fearing possible misappropriation of public funds. Vasquez, who received an RTAO reassigning him, raised violation of his constitutional rights to security of tenure and to due process. Perez sued as a BIR employee fearing a violation of her constitutional rights to security of tenure and to due process by a probable inclusion in the RTAOs. Let us examine whether their allegations are sufficient for the issuance of an injunctive writ.As to Pitargue, it is premature for him to raise violation of the appropriation laws as an issueSection 3 of EO 430 prevents any transfer of appropriation or any augmentation of the funds available for Personal Services. It is speculative on the part of respondents to assert that funds intended for another purpose have been transferred to meet the funding requirements of an impending reorganization under EO 430 and the present reassignments under RMO 57-97 and RTAO 28-97 and 1-98 to 35-98. It was premature for respondents to raise violation of appropriation laws as an issue as final placement shall take place only upon approval of the Revised Staffing Pattern of the BIR by the Department of Finance and Department of Budget and Management.Being BIR employees, Perez and Vasquez focused their objections on security of tenure. In the case of Perez, respondents object to the specter of a transfer. In the case of Vasquez, respondents object to the place of transfer. Under the law, any employee who questions the validity of his transfer should appeal to the Civil Service Commission. The trial court should have dismissed the case as to Perez and Vasquez, who both failed to exhaust administrative remedies. To subordinate essential government services, along with the great resources and efforts they entail, to the individual preferences and opinions of civil service employees, would negate the principle that a public office is a public trust and that it is not the

private preserve of any personSection 2(3), Article IX-B of the Constitution provides that “[n]o officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law.” Respondents did not cite any BIR employee who suffered a diminution of rank and salary as a result of the issued RTAOs. Neither did they cite any BIR employee who was removed from office as a result of the transfers. Failing these, we assert the presumption of regularity of the issuance of the RTAOs - that Commissioner Vinzons-Chato issued the RTAOs as part of a bona-fide reassignment of selected BIR employees to streamline the Bureau’s services. Courts should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary injunction which would in effect dispose of the main case without trial.[36] In issuing the writ of preliminary injunction, the trial court did not maintain the status quo but restored the situation before the status quo, that is, the situation before the issuance of the RTAOs. In effect, the trial court accepted respondents’ premise about an unlawful reorganization and prejudged the constitutionality of the questioned issuances (EO 430, RMO 57-97 and RTAO 28-97 and 1-98 to 35-98). B. Commission of Elections 1. Composition & Qualifications of CommissionersArt. IX, C, Sec. 1Art. VII, Sec. 13*Macalintal vs. Commission on Elections, 405 SCRA 614 (KARL) Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210 (YESHA)CaRespondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. ISSUE: W/N MONSOD HAS BEEN ENGAGED IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW FOR 1O YEARS? HELD: YES. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court. It embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of suchactions and proceedings on behalf of clients, and other works where the work done involves the determination of the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions (PLA vs. Agrava.)The records of the 1986 constitutional commission show that the interpretation of the term practice of law was liberal as to consider lawyers employed in the Commission of Audit as engaged in the practice of law provided that they use their legal knowledge or talent in their respective work.The court also cited an article in the January 11, 1989 issue of the Business Star, that lawyers nowadays have their own specialized fields such as tax lawyers, prosecutors, etc., that because of the demands of their specialization, lawyers engage in other works or functions to meet them. These days, for example, mostcorporation lawyers are involved in management policy formulation. Therefore, Monsod, who passed the bar in 1960, worked with the World Bank Group from 19631970, then worked for an investment bank till 1986, became member of the CONCOM in 1986, and also became a member of the Davide Commission

in 1990, can be considered to have been engaged in the practice of law as lawyer-economist, lawyer-manager, lawyer-entrepreneur, etc. ISSUE: W/N THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN CONFIRMING MONSOD'S APPOINTMENT? HELD: NO. The power of the COA to give consent to the nomination of the Comelec Chairman by the president is mandated by the constitution. The power of appointment is essentially within the discretion of whom it is so vested subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualification required by law. From the evidence, there is no occasion for the SC to exercise its corrective power since there is no such grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA. 2. Appointment & Term of Office and Rule against ReappointmentArt. IX, C, Sec. 1Nacionalista Party v. Angelo Bautista, 85 PHIL 103 (1949) (THERESE) Facts: President Quirino designated the Solicitor General as Acting member of the Comelec in November, 1949. The Nacionalista Party filed this action for prohibition on the following grounds: (1) the Solicitor General did not resign from his office; (2) there is no vacancy in the Comelec because the retirement of the Comelec member causing the vacancy was accepted by the President in bad faith (the granting of Commissioner Francisco Enage’s retirement application was said to have been done in bad faith based on the allegation that the Commissioner “voted to suspend the elections in Negros Occidental and Lanao and the Liberal Party fears he might vote to annul the said elections”); and (3) assuming there indeed was a vacancy, the functions of a Solicitor General are incompatible with that of a Comelec member. Issue: Whether or not the designation was valid Held: NO, it was not. By the nature of the Comelec's functions, the Comelec must be independent. Ratio: Members of the COMELEC are not allowed to perform other functions, powers and duties to preserve its impartiality. The Solicitor General's duties also require undivided time and attention for efficiency. Issue: Whether or not prohibition would lie Held: NO. The case is by nature a quo warranto proceeding because it questions the legality of the respondent's designation or his right to office. The proceeding is instituted by the other party claiming the position occupied and/or the Solicitor General.Prohibition however, has a different purpose, which is to prevent the usurpation of jurisdiction by a subordinate court.Although there is no other party who claims a right over the position occupied and nor will the Solicitor General file a case against himself, the court must grant the remedy of a quo warranto proceeding because the Solicitor General's continued occupancy as member of the Comelec is illegal. Brillantes v. Yorac, 192 SCRA 358 (DEC 18, 1990) (ZION)Art. IX-A, Sec. 1NP v. Vera, 85 Phil 149 (FROI)NP v. Vera, 85 Phil 149 (from polifile)

F: This is an action brought by the Nacionalista Party against De Vera on the ground that his appointment as Chairman of the COMELEC is a violation of the Constitution particularly Art. X, Sec. 1 of the 1935 Constitution which provides that the members of the COMELEC shall hold office for nine years without reappointment.

Held: The prohibition against reappointment comes as a continuation of the requirement that the Commission shall hold office for a term of nine years. Reappointment is not prohibited provided his term will not exceed nine years in all.

In July 1945, three Commissioners were appointed. De Vera was appointed for three years. If he were to succeed himself, he cannot be reappointed to do so because that would preclude the appointment of a new member after 3 years and would furthermore increase his term to 12 years since upon the expiration of his term, his successor must be appointed for nine years.

But in this case, de Vera's appointment was by virtue of the death of the Chairman in 1947 and he was promoted to occupy the chairmanship of the Commission for the unexpired term only. Thus, this is not offensive to the Constitution because it does not increase de Vera's term of office to more than nine years nor does it preclude the appointment of a new member upon the expiration of the first term of three years.

Republic v. Imperial, 96 Phil 770 (KAT)F: This is a quo warranto proceeding to test the legality of the continuance in office of Imperial as Chairman and Perez as member of COMELEC. When Chairman de Vera died in August 1951, before the expiration of the maximum term of nine years of the Chairman of the Commission, Imperial was appointed Chairman to succeed de Vera. His appointment provided for a term expiring July 12, 1960. The SG contended that the term for which he will legally serve as Chairman legally expired on July 12, 1954, the expiration of the 9 year term for which the first Chairman was appointed. Comelec member Perez on the other hand, was appointed for a term of 9 years expiring on 24 November 1958. The SG contended that his term legally expired on July 12, 1951, the expiration of the term of 6 years for which Commissioner Enage, his predecessor was appointed.Held: The terms cannot begin from the first appointments made in July 12, 1945 but from the date of the organization of the COMELEC under CA 657 on June 21, 1941. Thus, the term of office of the first Chairman, Lopez Vito began on June 21, 1941 and ended June 20, 1950. That of member Enage began on June 21, 1941 to June 20, 1944 (but this was not filled). Since the first 3 year term had already expired in 1944, the appointmentof De Vera on June 12, 1945 must be for the full term of nine years (June 1944 to June 1953). The first vacancy occurred by the expiration of the term of Enage. His successor, Perez, was named for a full 9 year term which shall have started on June 1947 to June 1956. The second vacancy happened upon the death of Lopez Vito on May 1947. To succeed him, de Vera appointed and lasted only up to June 1950, the unexpired period of Lopez Vito's term. Thus, on June 1950, a vacancy occurred which De Vera could no longer fill because his appointment was expressly prohibited by the Constitution. Thus, the next Chairman was respondent Imperial whose term of 9 years must be deemed to have began on June 21, 1990 to expire on June 20, 1959. *Matibag vs. Benipayo, 380 SCRA 49 (KARL) 3. Appointment of PersonnelArt. IX, A, Sec. 4 4. SalaryArt. IX, A, Sec. 3Art. XVIII, Sec. 17 5. Disqualification Art. IX, A, Sec. 2 6. ImpeachmentArt. XI, Sec. 2

7. Powers & Functions of the COMELEC a. Enforce Election LawsArt. IX, C, Sec. 2. (1) Sanchez v. COMELEC, 114 SCRA 454 (YESHA)Virgilio Sanchez vs Commission on ElectionsJune 19, 1982 FACTS- Jan. 30, 1980 local elections- Sanchez and Biliwang ran for Mayor of San Fernando, Pampanga- Biliwang was proclaimed winner- Sanchez filed with COMELEC a Petition to declare null and void the local elections due to alleged large scale terrorism- Ultimately, the COMELEC found that after the voting was over in the local elections, terrorism and irregularities were committed- counters were threatened by armed goons and policemen into making spurious election returns in favor of Biliwang.- Thus, COMELEC issued a resolution ordering:

1. The annulment the Jan. 30, 1980 election and the setting aside of the proclamation of Biliwang2. To certify to the President/Prime Minister and the Batasang Pambansa the failure of election, so that remedial legislation may be enacted, and pending such enactment, the President/PM may appoint municipal officials in San Fernando

- Sanchez sought reconsideration of the COMELEC Resolution certifying the failure of election, and praying instead that COMELEC call a special election in San Fernando- COMELEC denied reconsideration- Both Biliwang and Sanchez filed petitions with the SC, which were consolidated into the following issues: ISSUES1. WON the COMELEC has the power to annul an entire municipal election on the ground of post-election terrorism 2. WON the COMELEC has the authority to call for a special election HELD1. Biliwang asserts that COMELEC lacks the power to annul elections of municipal officials because, under Section 190 of the 1978 Election Code, the power to try election contests relative to elective municipal officials is vested in the CFI- SC: It may be true there is no specific provision vesting COMELEC with authority to annul an election. Under the 1935 Constitution, the SC said that COMELEC did not have this power, and that instead the power lay with the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal. Now, however, it is “the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all members of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials.” The COMELEC must be deemed possessed of the authority, in line with its plenitude of powers and its function to protect the integrity of elections.2. COMELEC opined that it had no powers to order the holding of a new or special election, because the actual election itself took place, and in a proper, orderly fashion. According to COMELEC, the Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 grants COMELEC authority to call for a new or special election only in a failure of election, but in this case, there was a failure to gauge the true and genuine will of the electorate, as opposed to a failure of election (tainted casting of ballots (failure of election) vs. tainted counting of ballots (failure to gauge the will))- SC: to state that this is not the failure of election contemplated by Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 because elections did take place is too tenuous a distinction. In practical effect, no election has been held; there has been in truth and in fact, a failure to elect. This interpretation only hampers the effectiveness of the COMELEC and delays the opportunity to the voters to cast their votes.Decision The SC upholds the power and prerogative of the COMELEC to annul an election and to call for a special election.

Gallardo vs. Tabamo, 218 SCRA 253 (THERESE) ANTONIO GALLARDO, ANTONIO AREVALO, CRESENCIO ECHAVEZ, EMMANUEL ARANAS, PALERMO SIA, RONNIE RAMBUYAN,PRIMO NAVARRO and NOEL NAVARRO, petitioners, vs. HON. SINFOROSO V. TABAMO, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of Mambajao, Camiguin, and PEDRO P. ROMUALDO, respondents This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. Petitioners seek to prohibit, restrain and enjoin respondent Judge Tabamo from continuing with the proceedings in a petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order filed as a taxpayer’s suit. At the time of filing both the special civil action and the instant petition, petitioner Antonio Gallardo was the incumbent Governor of the Province of Camiguin and was seeking re-election in the May 11, 1992 synchronized elections. Petitioners Arevalo, Echavez, Aranas, and Sia are the provincial treasurer, provincial auditor, provincial engineer, and provincial budget officer of Camiguin. Their co-petitioners Rambuyon, Primo and Noel Navarro are all government project laborers. On the other hand, the private respondent was the incumbent Congressman of the lone Congressional district of Camiguin, a candidate for the same office in the said synchronized elections and the Regional Chairman of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) in Region X. FACTS: April 10, 1992: private respondent filed his Petition (Special Civil Action No. 465) before the court a quo against petitioners to prohibit and restrain them from pursuing or prosecuting certain public works projects as it violates the 45-dayban on public works imposed by the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) because although they were initiated few days before March 27, 1992, the date the ban took effect, they were not covered by detailed engineering plans, specifications or a program of work which are preconditions for the commencement of any public works project. The questioned projects are classified into two (2) categories: (a) those that are Locally-Funded, consisting of 29 different projects for the maintenance or concreting of various roads, the rehabilitation of the Katibawasan Falls and the construction of the Capitol Building, and (b) those designated as Foreign-Assisted, consisting of fifteen (15) projects which include the construction of Human Development Center, various Day Care cum Production Centers and waterworks systems; the extension and renovation of various buildings; the acquisition of hospital and laboratory equipment; and the rehabilitation of office and equipment. On the same day, respondent Judge issued the question TRO. In the same order, he directed the petitioners to file their Answer within 10 days from receipt of notice and set the hearing on the application for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction for April 24, 1992. Instead of filing the Answer, the petitioners filed the special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. They contend that the case principally involves an alleged violation of the Omnibus Election Code thus the jurisdiction is exclusively vested in the Comelec, not the Regional Trial Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of Special Civil Action No. 465. RULING:The material operative facts alleged in the petition therein inexorably link the private respondent's principal grievance to alleged violations of paragraphs (a), (b), (v) and (w), Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881).There is particular emphasis on the last two (2) paragraphs which read: Sec. 261. The following shall be guilty of an election offense:(a) Vote-buying and vote-sellingxxx xxx xxx(b) Conspiracy to bribe votersxxx xxx xxx(v) Prohibition against release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds. Any public official or employee includingbarangay officials and those of government-owned or controlled

corporations and their subsidiaries, who, during forty-fivedays before a regular election and thirty days before a special election, releases, disburses or expends any public fundsfor: (1) Any and all kinds of public works, except the following:xxx xxx xxx(w) Prohibition against construction of public works, delivery of materials for public works and issuance of treasury warrants and similar devices. During the period of forty-five days preceding a regular election and thirty days before a special election, any person who (a) undertakes the construction of any public works, except for projects or works exempted in the preceding paragraph; or (b) issues, uses or avails of treasury warrants or any device undertaking future delivery of money, goods or other things of value chargeable against public funds. The court ruled that Comelec has jurisdiction to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections. The 1987 Constitution implicitly grants the Commission the power to promulgate such rules and regulations as provided in Section 2 of Article IX-C. Moreover, the present Constitution also invests the Comission with the power to investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election law, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices. It is not true that, as contended by the petitioners, the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court under the election laws is limited to criminal actions for violations of the Omnibus Election Code. The Constitution itself grants to it exclusive original jurisdiction over contests involving elective municipal officials. Neither can the Court agree with the petitioners' assertion that the Special Civil Action filed in the RTC below involves the prosecution of election offenses; the said action seeks some reliefs incident to or in connection with alleged election offenses; specifically, what is sought is the prevention of the further commission of these offenses which, by their alleged nature, are continuing. There is as well no merit in the petitioners' claim that the private respondent has no legal standing to initiate the filing of a complaint for a violation of the Omnibus Election Code. There is nothing in the law to prevent any citizen from exposing the commission of an election offense and from filing a complaint in connection therewith. On the contrary, under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, initiation of complaints for election offenses may be done motu propio by the Commission on Elections or upon written complaint by any citizen, candidate or registered political party or organization under the party-list system or any of the accredited citizen’s arms of the Commission. However, such written complaints should be filed with the "Law Department of the Commission; or with the offices of the Election Registrars, Provincial Election Supervisors or Regional Election Directors, or the State Prosecutor, Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal." As earlier intimated, the private respondent was not seriously concerned with the criminal aspect of his alleged grievances. He merely sought a stoppage of the public works projects because of their alleged adverse effect on his candidacy. Indeed, while he may have had reason to fear and may have even done the right thing, he committed a serious procedural misstep and invoked the wrong authority. The court, therefore, has no alternative but to grant this petition on the basis their resolution of the principal issue. Nevertheless, it must be strongly emphasized that in so holding that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of Special Civil Action No. 465. b. Decide Administrative Question re Election except Right to Vote Art. IX, C, Sec. 2 (3) c. Petition for Inclusion or Exclusion of Voters Art. IX, C, Sec. 2. (6) d. Prosecute Election Law Violations Art. IX, C, Sec. 2 (6)*BP Blg. 881, Sec. 265EO 134, Sec. 11, February 27, 1987

De Jesus v. People, 120 SCRA 760 (ZION)Corpus v. Tanodbayan, 149 SCRA 281 (FROI)People v. Basilla, 179 SCRA 87 (KAT) DOCTRINE: The COMELEC may validly delegate this power (Jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute cases) to the Provincial Fiscal FACTS:As an aftermath of the May 1987 congressional elections in Masbate, complaints for violations of Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881) were filed with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Masbate against the private respondents for vote-buying and for carrying of deadly weapon.ISSUEWON the Commission on Elections ("Comelec") has authority to deputize the chief state prosecutors, provincial and city fiscals and their assistants, under Sections 2 (4) and (8 ), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, and WON the Comelec did deputize such prosecution officers to conduct preliminary investigation of complaints for alleged violation of election laws and to institute criminal informations thereforHELD:YES The Petition must be granted.RATIO:There is no dispute that the Comelec is vested with power and authority to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the Omnibus Election Code and to prosecute such offenses in court.We note that while Section 265 of the Code vests "exclusive power" to conduct preliminary investigation of election offenses and to prosecute the same upon the Comelec, it at the same time authorizes the Comelec to avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the Government. Section 2 of Article IX-C of the 1 987 Constitution clearly envisage that the Comelec would not be compelled to carry out all its functions directly and by itself alone.The concurrence of the President with the deputation by Comelec of the prosecuting arms of the Government, was expressed in general terms and in advance in Executive Order No. 134.The prompt investigation and prosecution and disposition of election offenses constitute an indispensable part of the task of securing free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. The investigation and prosecution of election offenses are, in an important sense, more important than the maintenance of physical order in election precinct. 'without the assistance of provincial and city fiscals and their assistants and staff members, and of the state prosecutors of the Department of Justice, the prompt and fair investigation and prosecution of election offenses committed before or in the course of nationwide elections would simply not be possible, unless, perhaps, the Comelec had a bureaucracy many times larger than what it actually has. Moreover, the prosecution officers designated by the Comelec become deputies or agents of the Comelec and pro tanto subject to the authority, control and supervision of the Comelec in respect of the particular functions covered by such deputation. The acts of such deputies within the lawful scope of their delegated authority are, in legal contemplation, the acts of the Comelec itself. The only limitation the Constitution itself places upon the Comelec's authority over its deputies relates to the enforcement of such authority through administrative sanctions. Such sanctions-e.g., suspension or removal-may be recommended by the Comelec to the President (Sec. 2 [8], Article IX-C, 1987 Constitution) rather than directly imposed by the Comelec, evidently, to pre-empt and avoid potential difficulties with the executive department of the Government where the prosecution and other officers deputized are ordinarily located.

People v. Inting, 187 SCRA 788 (1990) (KARL)Article IX-C, Sec. 2 People v. Delgado, 189 SCRA 715 (1990) (YESHA)People v. Delgado, 189 SCRA 715 (1990)F: Upon recommendation of the provincial election supervisor, who conducted a preliminary investigation of the alleged election offenses of Delgado, et. al, the Comelec filed an information against the latter. The respondents moved for reconsideration and the suspension of the warrants of arrests on the ground that no preliminary investigation was conducted. The trial court ordered for reinvestigation. The Comelec opposed the order on the ground that only the SC may review the decisions, orders, resolutions of the Comelec. The trial court denied the Comelec motion. Hence this certiorari. ISSUE: W/N THE COMELEC ACTION MAY BE REVIEWED ONLY ON CERTIORARI BY THE SC?HELD: NO. According to the constitution, the Comelec has the following functions: (1) enforcement of electionlaws; (2) decision of election contests; (3) decision of administrative questions; (4) deputizing law enforcementagencies; (5) registration of political parties; and (6) improvement of elections. What are reviewable oncertiorari by the SC are those orders, decisions, etc., rendered in actions or proceedings before the Comelec inthe exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. Thus decisions of the Comelec on election contests oron administrative questions are subject to judicial review only by the SC. In this case, no Comelec adjudicatorypower is exercised. As a public prosecutor, the Comelec has the exclusive authority to conduct preliminaryinvestigation and prosecute offenses punishable under the election code before the competent court. But whenthe Comelec files the information, the subsequent disposition of the case is subject to the court's approval. TheComelec can't conduct reinvestigation unless so ordered by that court nor refuse its order of reinvestigation. Commission on Elections vs. Silva, 286 SCRA 177 (THERESE) G.R. No. 129417 February 10, 1998COMELEC vs. SILVAFACTS: The Private Respondents, who were charged of having tampered some certificates of canvass, moved for the Dismissal of the Cases filed against them. The Chief State Prosecutor, who had been designated by the Commission on Elections to prosecute the cases, filed a comment joining in private respondents' request. Eventually, the cases were dismissed. The COMELEC sought to appeal the dismissal of the cases to the Court of Appeals. When the Chief State Prosecutor was required to comment, he stated that he cannot give his conformity to the Notice of Appeal filed by the Comelec as it would not be consistent with his position that he would abide by whatever finding the court may come up with on the existence of probable cause as against the Private Respondents. Thus, the judges denied due course to the appeal. The sole basis for the denial was the fact that the prosecutor, whom the COMELEC had deputized to prosecute the cases, had earlier taken a contrary stand against the COMELEC. ISSUE: Who has the authority to decide whether or not to appeal from the orders of dismissal the COMELEC or its designated prosecutor? RULING: Whether the orders of dismissal should be appealed is for the COMELEC to decide, not for Chief State Prosecutor whom it has merely deputized to represent in it court. The 1987 Constitution mandates the COMELEC not only to investigate but also to prosecute cases of violation of election laws. This means that the COMELEC is empowered to conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving election offenses for the purpose of helping the Judge determine probable cause and for filing an information in court. This power is exclusive with COMELEC.

Prosecutors designated by the COMELEC to prosecute the cases act as its deputies. They derive their authority from it and not from their offices. Consequently, it was beyond the power of Chief State Prosecutor to oppose the appeal of the COMELEC. For that matter, it was beyond his power, as COMELEC-designated prosecutor, to leave to the trial courts the determination of whether there was probable cause for the filing of the cases and, if it found none, whether the cases should be dismissed Commission on Elections vs. Tagle, 397 SCRA 618 (ZION) e. Recommend Pardon, Amnesty, Parole or Suspension of SentenceArt. IX, C, Sec. 5People vs. Basilla, 179 SCRA 87 (FROI) Tan vs. Commission on Elections, 237 SCRA 353 (KAT) F: Prompted by the enactment of BP 885 w/c was enacted to create the new Province of Province of Negros del Norte, petitioners herein, who are residents of the Prov. of Negros Occidental, in the various cities and municipalities therein, filed w/ this Court a case for prohibition for the purposes of stopping resps. COMELEC from conducting the plebiscite w/c was scheduled to be held for 1/3/86. Petitioners contend that the law isunconstitutional and it is not in complete accord w/ the LGC as in Art XI, Sec. 3 of our (1973) Consti. xxx The plebiscite sought to be enjoined by them was held as scheduled but there are still serious issues raised in the instant case affecting the legality, constitutionality and validity of such exercise w/c should properly be passed upon and resolved by this Court. The plebiscite was confined only to the inhabitants of the territory of Negros del Norte. Bec. of the exclusions of the voters from the rest of the province of Negros Occ., petitioners found need to change the prayer of their petition to the end that the constitutional issues w/c they have raised in the action will be ventilated and given final resolution.HELD: We now state that the ruling in the cases of Lopez v. COMELEC and Paredes v. Hon. Exec. Sec., et al. sanctioning the exclusion of the voters belonging to an existing political unit from w/c the new political unit will be derived, from participating in the plebiscite conducted for the purpose of determining the formation of another political unit, is hereby abandoned. Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino vs. COMELEC, 423 SCRA 665 (KARL) f. Deputize Law Enforcement Agents & Recommend Their Removal Art. IX, C, Sec. 2. (4), (8) g. Registration of Parties, Org’ns & Coalitions & Accreditation of Citizens’ Arms Art. IX, C, Sec. 2. (5) LDP vs. Comelec, 423 SCRA 665 (YESHA)-same as Karl’s case [immediately preceding this one] Karl ikaw na yan ha! <3-joke, eto na nga. But wont touch on other ish, yun under this one lang :D Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino, represented by its Chairman, Edgardo J. Angara, vs The COMELEC and Agapito AquinoFebruary 24, 2004 [irrelevant but you have to read this, ang funny] The Bible tells the story of how two women came to King Solomon to decide who among them is the baby’s true mother. King Solomon, in his legendary wisdom, awarded the baby to the woman who gave up her claim after he threatened to split the baby into two.

It is fortunate that the two women did not ask the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to decide the baby’s fate; otherwise, it would have cut the baby in half. For that is what the COMELEC exactly did in this case. Facts:The General Counsel of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), a registered political party, informed the COMELEC by way of Manifestation that only the Party Chairman, Senator Edgardo J. Angara, or his authorized representative may endorse the certificate of candidacy of the party’s official candidates. The same Manifestation stated that Sen. Angara had placed the LDP Secretary General, Representative Agapito A. Aquino, on "indefinite forced leave." In the meantime, Ambassador Enrique A. Zaldivar was designated Acting Secretary General.However, Rep. Aquino filed his Comment, contending that the Party Chairman does not have the authority to impose disciplinary sanctions on the Secretary General. As the Manifestation filed by the LDP General Counsel has no basis, Rep. Aquino asked the COMELEC to disregard the same. ISSUE:Is the ascertainment of the identity of political party and its officers within COMELEC jurisdiction? RULING:Yes. The court ruled that the COMELEC correctly stated that "the ascertainment of the identity of [a] political party and its legitimate officers" is a matter that is well within its authority. The source of this authority is no other than the fundamental law itself, which vests upon the COMELEC the power and function to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election. In the exercise of such power and in the discharge of such function, the Commission is endowed with ample "wherewithal" and "considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will ensure the accomplishment of the great objectives for which it was created to promote free, orderly and honest elections."In the case at bar, the Party Chairman, purporting to represent the LDP, contends that under the Party Constitution only he or his representative, to the exclusion of the Secretary General, has the authority to endorse and sign party nominations. The Secretary General vigorously disputes this claim and maintains his own authority. Clearly, the question of party identity or leadership has to be resolved if the COMELEC is to ascertain whether the candidates are legitimate party standard bearers or not. Atienza vs. Comelec, 612 SCRA 761 (2010) (THERESE) Facts:- On July 5, 2005 Drilon, as former president of the Liberal Party, announced his party’s withdrawal of support for the administration of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.- Atienza and a number of party members denounced Drilon’s move, claiming that he made the announcement without consulting his party.- On March 2, 2006 petitioner Atienza hosted a party conference to supposedly discuss local autonomy and party matters but, when convened, the assembly proceeded to declare all positions in the LP’s ruling body vacant and elected new officers, with Atienza as LP president. Drilon contested this with the COMELEC, and it issued a resolution partially granting Drilon’s petition and annulled the election of new officers.- Both sides challenged COMELEC ruling, and the Court held that the COMELEC had jurisdiction over the intra-party leadership dispute; and that Drilon’s term as LP president was to end only on November 30, 2007.- Meanwhile the LP’s electing body NECO held another election, and this time Roxas was elected President. Atienza et al was expelled from the party for holding illegal elections. Issue:

- WoN the COMELEC had jurisdiction over intra-party disputes- WoN the election of the Roxas and the other new officers were valid Held:- Yes.- Yes. Ratio:- First issue:o The COMELEC’s jurisdiction over intra-party disputes is limited. It does not have blanket authority to resolve any and all controversies involving political parties. Political parties are generally free to conduct their activities without interference from the state. The COMELEC may intervene in disputes internal to a party only when necessary to the discharge of its constitutional functions.o The COMELEC’s jurisdiction over intra-party leadership disputes has already been settled by the Court. The Court ruled in Kalaw v. Commission on Elections that the COMELEC’s powers and functions under Section 2, Article IXC of the Constitution, "include the ascertainment of the identity of the political party and its legitimate officers responsible for its acts." The Court also declared that the COMELEC’s power to register political parties necessarily involved the determination of the persons who must act on its behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper case brought before it, as an incident of its power to register political parties.- Second issue:o The political party is still a private organization, not a state instrument. The discipline of members by a political party does not involve the right to life, liberty or property within the meaning of the due process clause. An individual has no vested right, as against the state, to be accepted or to prevent his removal by a political party. The only rights, if any, that party members may have, in relation to other party members, correspond to those that may have been freely agreed upon among themselves through their charter, which is a contract among the party members. Thus the removal of Atienza et al from the party is a valid act of discipline. Art. IX, C, Sec. 7Art. IX, C, Sec. 8Art. VI, Sec. 5Art. XVIII, Sec. 7 h. Regulation of Public Utilities & Media of InformationArt. IX, C, Sec. 4National Press Club v. COMELEC, GR No. 102653, March 05, 1992 (ZION)*RA 6646Chavez vs. Commission on Elections, 437 SCRA 415 (FROI)Adiong v. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 712 (KAT) F: Petitoner, Adiong, a 1992 senatorial candidate, assails Comelec Resolution No. 2347 insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers on mobile places, public or private, and limits their location or publication to authorized postiing areas.ISSUE: Whether or not the resolution is constitutional. RULING: NO. The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech. There is no public interest substantial enough to warrant the kind of restriction involved in this case. The posting of decals amd stickers in mobile places does not endanger any substantial government or public interest. Under the clear and present danger rule, not only must the danger be patently clear and pressingly

presentbut the evil sought to be avoided, must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a writing instrument to be stilled. Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the prohibition is not so much that of the candidate or the political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him. A sticker may be furnished by a candidate but once the car owner agrees to have it placed on his private vehichle, the expression becomes a statement by the owner, primarily his own and not of anybody else. Morever, The restriction is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen's private property, which in this case is a privately owned vehicle. In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal right guaranteed under the Constitution is violated which is that no person shall be deprived of his property without due proocess of law. Art. IX, C, Sec. 9 i. Decide Election Contests Art. IX, C, Sec. 2. (2) Art. IX, C, Sec. 3 RA 7166, Sec. 22 Lagumbay v. COMELEC, GR No. L-25444 (January 31, 1966) (KARL) 8. Rule-Making Art. IX, A, Sec. 6 Art. IX, C, Sec. 3 9. Other Functions Art. IX, A, Sec. 8 10. Act as National Board of Canvassers for Senators EO 144, Sec. 2, March 2, 1987 11. Review of COMELEC Decisions, Orders, and ResolutionsArt. IX, C, Sec. 2 (2)Art. IX, A, Sec. 7 Flores vs. Commission on Elections, 184 SCRA 484 (1990) (YESHA)Facts:Petitioner Roque Flores was declared by the board of canvassers as having the highest number of votes for kagawad on the March 1989 elections, in Barangay Poblacion, Tayum, Abra, and thus proclaimed punong barangay in accordance with Section 5 of R.A. 6679. However, his election was protested by private respondent Rapisora, who placed second in the election with one vote less than the petitioner. The Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tayum sustained Rapisora and installed him as punong barangay in place of the petitioner after deducting two votes as stray from the latter’s total. Flores appealed to the RTC, which affirmed the challenged decision in toto. The judge agreed that the four votes cast for “Flores” only, without any distinguishing first name or initial, should all have been considered invalid instead of being divided equally between the petitioner and Anastacio Flores, another candidate for kagawad. The total credited to the petitioner was correctly reduced by 2, demoting him to second place. The petitioner went to the COMELEC, which dismissed his appeal on the ground that it had no power to review the decision of the RTC, based on Section 9 of R.A. 6679, that decisions of the RTC in a protest appealed to it from the municipal trial court in barangay elections “on questions of fact shall be final and

non-appealable”. In his petition for certiorari, the COMELEC is faulted for not taking cognizance of the petitioners appeal. Issues: - WoN the COMELEC has jurisdiction Held:-Under Art IXC, Sec 2(2) of the Consti, the COMELEC shall have jurisdiction, hence, Sec. 9 of RA 6679insofar as it provides that the decision of the municipal or metropolitan court in a barangay case should beappealed to the RTC must be declared unconstitutional. P had a right to presume the law as valid. Hence his appeal to the RTC would be considered as an appeal to the COMELEC. Decisions of the COMELEC on election contests involving municipal & barangay officer shall be final & unappealable with respect to questions of fact & not of law. Art IX6 Sec 2(2) of the Consti was not intended to divert the SC of its authority to resolve questions of law as inherent in the judicial power conferred upon it by the Consti Sarmiento vs. Commission on Elections, 212 SCRA 307 (THERESE) Facts: This special civil action for certiorari seek to set aside the Resolutions of Respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in the following Special Cases:1) G.R. No. 105628 – SPC No. 92-2662) G.R. No. 105725 – SPC No. 92-3233) G.R. No. 105727 – SPC No. 92-2884) G.R. No. 105730 – SPC No. 92-3155) G.R. No. 105771 – SPC No. 92-2716) G.R. No. 105778 – SPC No. 92-0397) G.R. No. 105797 – SPC No. 92-153, G.R. No. 105919 – SPC No. 92-2939) G.R. No. 105977 – SPC No. 92-087 Issue: Whether the challenged Resolutions above specified (the SPC) as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion in that, inter alia, the Commission, sitting en banc, took cognizance of and decided the appeals without first referring them to any of it Divisions. Held: The COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, when it resolved the appeals of petitioners in the above mentioned Special Cases without first referring them to any of its Divisions. Section 3, subdivision C, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides: Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.Said Resolutions are therefore, null and void and must be set aside. Consequently, the appeals are deemed pending before the Commission for proper referral to a Division. A resolution directing the COMELEC to assign said Special Cases to the Divisions pursuant to Section 8, Rule 3 of its Rules on assignment of cases would, logically, be in order. However, Section 16 of R.A. No. 7166 6 provides that all pre-proclamation cases pending before it shall be deemed terminated at the beginning of the term of the office involved. The terms of the offices involved in the Special Cases subject of these petitions commenced at noon of June 30 1992. These cases have thus been rendered moot and such a resolution would only be an exercise in futility. Therefore, the instant petitions are DISMISSED but without prejudice to the filing by petitioners of regular elections protests. If the winning candidates for the positions involved in the Special Cases subject of these petitions have already been proclaimed, the running of the period to file the protests shall be deemed suspended by the pendency of such cases before the COMELEC and of these petitions before this Court.

Notes:1) G.R. No. 105628 – SPC No. 92-266 granting the appeal from the ruling of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Virac, Catanduanes which ordered the exclusion from the canvass of one (1) election return;2) G.R. No. 105725 – SPC No. 92-323 reversing the ruling of the City Board of Canvassers of Iriga City which ordered the exclusion from the canvass of six (6) election returns and in UND No. 92-243 ordering the said Board of Canvassers to include in the canvass the election returns involved therein;3) G.R. No. 105727 – SPC No. 92-288 dismissing the appeal of petitioner from the ruling of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Catanduanes which ordered the inclusion in the canvass the certificate of canvass for the municipality of Virac, excluding the returns from 48 precincts;4) G.R. No. 105730 – SPC No. 92-315 affirming the ruling of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte which dismissed petitioner’s opposition to the composition of the said Municipal Board of Canvassers;5) G.R. No. 105771 – SPC No. 92-271 affirming the ruling of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Cabusao, Camarines Sur which, among others, rejected petitioner’s objection to certain election returns;6) G.R. No. 105778 – SPC No. 92-039 dismissing said case for non-compliance with Section 20 of R.A. No. 7166;7) G.R. No. 105797 – SPC No. 92-153 affirming the rulings of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Davao Oriental which rejected petitioner’s objections to the canvass of some certificates of canvass; G.R. No. 105919 – SPC No. 92-293 dismissing petitioner’s appeal from the ruling of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Upi Nuro, Maguindanao;9) G.R. No. 105977 – SPC No. 92-087 denying the amended pre-proclamation petition, which is an appeal from the rulings of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Ternate, Cavite, and denying a subsequent motion to resolve the issues raised in said amended petition *Milla vs. Balmores-Laxa, 406 SCRA 679 (ZION)*Munoz vs. Commission on Elections, 495 SCRA 407 (FROI)*Bautista vs. Commission on Elections, 414 SCRA 299 (KAT)FACTS:-10 June 2002: Bautista filed his certificate of candidacy for Punong Barangay in Lumbangan for the 15 July 2002 barangay elections. Election Officer Josefina P. Jareño (“Election Officer Jareño”) refused to accept Bautista’s certificate of candidacy because he was not a registered voter in Lumbangan. -1 July 2002: the trial court ordered Election Officer Jareño to accept Bautista’s certificate of candidacy and to include his name in the certified list of candidates for Punong Barangay. -the COMELEC Law Department recommended the cancellation of Bautista’s certificate of candidacy since he was not registered as a voter in Lumbangan. The COMELEC en banc failed to act on the COMELEC Law Department’s recommendation before the barangay elections on 15 July 2002.-During the 15 July 2002 barangay elections, Bautista and private respondent Divina Alcoreza (“Alcoreza”) were candidates for the position of Punong Barangay in Lumbangan. Bautista obtained the highest number of votes (719) while Alcoreza came in second with 522 votes, or a margin of 197 votes. Thus, the Lumbangan Board of Canvassers (“Board of Canvassers”)[7]proclaimed Bautista as the elected Punong Barangay[8] on 15 July 2002. On 8 August 2002, Bautista took his oath of office as Punong Barangay before Congresswoman Eileen Ermita-Buhain of the First District of Batangas. On 16 August 2002, Bautista again took his oath of office during a mass oath-taking ceremony administered by Nasugbu Municipal Mayor Raymund Apacible.-In Resolution No. 5404, the COMELEC en banc resolved to cancel Bautista’s certificate of candidacyISSUE:Whether the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it issued Resolution Nos. 5404 and 5584;HELD:YESWHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. Petitioner Raymundo A. Bautista is ineligible for the position of Punong Barangay of Barangay Lumbangan for not being a registered voter of Barangay Lumbangan. The proclamation of the second placer Divina Alcoreza as winner in lieu of Bautista is void. Instead, the highest ranking sangguniang barangay member of Barangay Lumbangan shall assume the office of Punong Barangay of Lumba00ngan for the unexpired portion of the termRATIO:

Under Rules of Procedure(Sec.3) , jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy lies with the COMELEC sitting in Division, not en banc. Cases before a Division may only be entertained by the COMELEC en banc when the required number of votes to reach a decision, resolution, order or ruling is not obtained in the Division. Moreover, only motions to reconsider decisions, resolutions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in Division are resolved by the COMELEC en banc.In the instant case, the COMELEC en banc did not refer the case to any of its Divisions upon receipt of the petition. It therefore acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when it entertained the petition and issued the order of May 2, 1996. In this case, Election Officer Jareño reported to the COMELEC Law Department Bautista’s ineligibility for being a non-registered voter. The COMELEC Law Department recommended to the COMELEC en banc to deny due course or to cancel Bautista’s certificate of candidacy. The COMELEC en banc approved the recommendation in Resolution No. 5404 dated 23 July 2002.The proceeding on the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy does not merely pertain to the administrative functions of the COMELEC. Cancellation proceedings involve the COMELEC’s quasi-judicial functions.(t)he term “administrative” connotes, or pertains, to “administration, especially management, as by managing or conducting, directing or superintending, the execution, application, or conduct of persons or things.” It does not entail an opportunity to be heard, the production and weighing of evidence, and a decision or resolution thereon.While a “quasi-judicial function” isA term which applies to the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. (Emphasis supplied)The COMELEC’s exercise of its quasi-judicial powers is subject to Section 3 of Article IX-C which expressly requires that all election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, shall be decided by the COMELEC in division, and the motion for reconsideration shall be decided by the COMELEC en banc. It follows, as held by the Court in Canicosa, that the COMELEC is mandated to decide cases first in division, and then upon motion for reconsideration en banc, only when the COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial powers. Under Section 3, Rule 23 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a petition for the denial or cancellation of a certificate of candidacy must be heard summarily after due notice. It is thus clear that cancellation proceedings involve the exercise of the quasi-judicial functions of the COMELEC which the COMELEC in division should first decide. More so in this case where the cancellation proceedings originated not from a petition but from a report of the election officer regarding the lack of qualification of the candidate in the barangay election. The COMELEC en banc cannot short cut the proceedings by acting on the case without a prior action by a division because it denies due process to the candidate.We hold that its order to set aside the proclamation of petitioner is invalid for having been rendered without due process of law. Procedural due process demands prior notice and hearing. Then after the hearing, it is also necessary that the tribunal show substantial evidence to support its ruling. In other words, due process requires that a party be given an opportunity to adduce his evidence to support his side of the case and that the evidence should be considered in the adjudication of the case. “Petitioner cannot be deprived of his office without due process of law. Although public office is not property under Section 1 of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, and one cannot acquire a vested right to public office, it is, nevertheless, a protected right. Due process in proceedings before the COMELEC, exercising its quasi-judicial functions, requires due notice and hearing, among others. COMELEC is without power to partially or totally annul a proclamation or suspend the effects of a proclamation without notice and hearing.” Baytan vs. Commission on Elections, 396 SCRA 703 (KARL) *Jaramilla vs. Commission on Elections, 414 SCRA 337 (YESHA)Alberto Jaramilla vs COMELEC, Antonio Suyat, Municipal Board of Canvassers of Sta. Cruz, Ilocos Sur, The New Municipal Board of Canvassers (COMELEC) and Ireneo Cortez [phew!]October 23, 2003

Facts:Antonio Suyat and Alberto J. Jaramilla both ran for the position of Member of the Sangguniang Bayan in the Municipality of Sta. Cruz, Ilocos Sur in the 14 May 2001 elections. On 16 May 2001, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Sta. Cruz, proclaimed the winning candidates for the offices of Mayor, Vice-Mayor and 8 members of the Sangguniang Bayan. The Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation shows the following results and ranking with respect to the members of the Sangguniang Bayan, to wit: (1) RAGUCOS, Ma. Luisa Laxamana (6,324); (2) ABAYA, Juan Jr., Andaquig (6,013); (3) GINES, Fidel Cudiamat (5,789); (4) QUILOP, Renato Avila (5,227); (5) BILIGAN, Osias Depdepen (5,130); (6) RUIZ, Agustin Turgano (4,972); (7) JARAMILLA, Alberto Jimeno (4,815); and (8) CORTEZ, Ireneo Habon (4,807). In the tabulated results issued by the Election Officer and Chairperson of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Sta. Cruz, it is shown that Suyat obtained 4,779 votes and was ranked 9. Upon review by Suyat, he discovered that Jaramilla was credited with only 23 votes per Election Return from Precinct 34A1. However, when the figures were forwarded to the Statement of Votes by Precinct, Jaramilla was credited with 73 votes for Precinct 34A1 or 50 votes more than what he actually obtained. If the entry were to be corrected, the affected candidates would be ranked as follows: (7) CORTEZ, Ireneo Habon (4,807); (8) SUYAT, Antonio (4,779); and (9) JARAMILLA, Alberto (4,765). On 13 June 2001, Suyat filed before the COMELEC en banc an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Order to Reconvene, which the latter treated as a Petition for Correction of Manifest Error. Jaramilla countered in his Answer that said petition should be dismissed for having been filed out of time and for lack of the required certification of non-forum shopping. On 24 October 2002, COMELEC en banc issued a resolution, annulling the proclamation of Jaramilla and creating a new Municipal Board of Canvassers. Jaramilla filed the petition for certiorari with prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction ascribing grave abuse of discretion. Issues: - WoN COMELEC en banc properly assumed original jurisdiction over the Petition for Correction of Manifest Errors-WoN COMELEC correctly took cognizance of respondent Suyat’s petition for correction despite its having been filed beyond the 5-day reglementary period fixed in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure and its lack of certification against forum-shopping Held: -Yes to both Ratio:- Article IX-C of the Constitution states in part that "The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc." This provision applies only in cases where the COMELEC exercises its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers, and not when it merely exercises purely administrative functions. This Petition for Correction of Manifest Errors alleges an erroneous copying of figures from the election return to the Statement of Votes by Precinct. Such an error in the tabulation of the results, which merely requires a clerical correction without the necessity of opening ballot boxes or examining ballots, demands only the exercise of the administrative power of the COMELEC. Hence, the Commission en banc properly assumed original jurisdiction over the aforesaid petition. -The COMELEC has authority to suspend the reglementary periods provided by the rules, or the requirement of certification of non-forum shopping for that matter, in the interest of justice and speedy resolution of the cases before it. *Mutilan vs. Commission on Elections, 520 SCRA 152(THERESE) Facts: Mutilan and private respondent Ampatuan were candidates for Governor during the election of regional officials held on 8August 2005 in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). Private respondent was proclaimed as the duly elected Governor of the ARMM.

Petitioner filed an Electoral Protest and/or Petition to Annul the Elections. He contested the results of the elections in Maguindanao, Basilan, Tawi-Tawi, and Sulu on the ground that no actual election was conducted in the precincts in these provinces. Petitioner alleged that the voters did not actually vote and that the ballots were filled up by non-registered voters. Petitioner also contested the results in 7 municipalities in Lanao del Sur where massive substitute voting allegedly took place. COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petition. The Division stated that during the initial hearing of the case, petitioner’s counsel admitted that the petition was not an election protest but one for annulment of elections and sought for elevation of the case to the Comelec En Banc. The COMELEC Second Division ruled that jurisdiction over petitions for annulment of elections is vested in the COMELEC En Banc. However, the elevation of the case to the COMELEC En Banc is not sanctioned by the rules or by jurisprudence. Thus, the COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. Comelec En Banc affirmed upon Motion for Reconsideration. Issue: Whether the COMELEC Second Division acted in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the petition to annul elections and in not elevating the petition to the COMELEC En Banc. Held: The COMELEC Second Division is not prohibited from elevating the petition to the COMELEC En Banc. Under Section3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, all election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, must be heard and decided by a division of the COMELEC.The COMELEC Second Division ruled that automatic elevation of the case to the En Banc is not sanctioned by the rules or by jurisprudence. Petitioner argues that the COMELEC Second Division should have elevated the petition to the COMELEC En Banc instead of dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction. We agree with petitioner. While automatic elevation of a case erroneously filed with the Division to En Banc is not provided in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, such action is not prohibited. Section 4, Rule 2 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides: “Means to Effect Jurisdiction. - All auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry into effect its powers or jurisdiction may be employed by the Commission; and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such power or jurisdiction is not specifically provided for by law or these rules, any suitable process or proceeding may be adopted.” Hence, there is nothing in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure to prevent the COMELEC Second Division from referring the petition to annul the elections to the COMELEC En Banc. Nevertheless, the petition must still fail. In his Electoral Protest and/or Petition to Annul the Elections, petitioner alleged that no actual election was conducted in the contested areas. Petitioner further alleged that the voters did not actually vote and the ballots were filled up by non-registered voters. Petitioner also alleged massive disenfranchisement and substitute voting. Petitioner argued that the irregularities warrant the annulment and setting aside of the elections in the contested areas. There are three instances where a failure of elections may be declared, thus:(a) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes;(b) the election in any polling place has been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes; or(c) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to election account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes. In all three instances, there is a resulting failure to elect. In the first instance, the election has not been held. In the second instance, the election has been suspended. In the third instance, the preparation and the transmission of the election returns give rise to the consequent failure to elect; the third instance is

interpreted to mean that nobody emerged as a winner. None of the three instances is present in this case. In this case, the elections took place. In fact, private respondent was proclaimed the winner. Petitioner contests the results of the elections on the grounds of massive disenfranchisement, substitute voting, and farcical and statistically improbable results. Petitioner alleges that no actual election was conducted because the voters did not actually vote and the ballots were filled up by non-registered voters. Galido v. COMELEC, 193 S 78 (1991) (ZION)*Rivera v. COMELEC, 199 S 178 (1991) (FROI)Bulilis vs. Nunez, GR No. 195953, August 9, 2011 (KAT) CERIACO BULILIS vs.VICTORINO NUEZ, Hon. PRESIDING JUDGE, 6th MCTC, Ubay, Bohol, Hon. Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 52, Talibon, Bohol [August 9, 2011]LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:FACTS:

· October 25, 2010, petitioner Ceriaco Bulilis (Bulilis) was proclaimed winner of the elections for punong barangay of Barangay Bulilis, Ubay, Bohol. He won over respondent Victorino Nuez (Nuez) by a margin of four (4) votes.· On November 2, 2010, Nuez filed an Election Protest1 (for judicial recount and annulment of proclamation) with the 6th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Ubay, Bohol.· Bulilis filed a petition for certiorari6 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Talibon, Bohol. However, in an Order7 dated December 22, 2010, the RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that it is the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) that has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari in election cases involving municipal and barangay officials.

ISSUE:WON under the rules relied upon by the RTC, the COMELEC’s appellate jurisdiction in election cases is allegedly limited to decisions of election courts and not interlocutory orders.(WONthe COMELEC’s appellate jurisdiction is only limited to "decided barangay election cases)HELD:NO. The Petition must fail.WHEREFORE, the present Petition is DISMISSED.RATIO:There is no merit in petitioner’s argument that Rule 28, Section 1 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure limits the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari in election cases to issues related to elections, returns and qualifications of elective municipal and barangay officials. Said provision, taken together with the succeeding section,14 undeniably shows that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari with the COMELEC whenever a judge hearing an election case has acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.Neither can petitioner take refuge in Rule 14, Section 12 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC which provides:SEC. 12. Jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections in certiorari cases. - The Commission on Elections has the authority to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the courts in election cases involving elective municipal and barangay officials.the Court had in a subsequent issuance, A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC15 (which amended, among others, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court), clearly provided that:In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the petition shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.Plainly, from the foregoing, this Court recognizes the COMELEC’s appellate jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari against all acts or omissions of courts in election cases. Indeed, in the recent case of Galang v. Geronimo,16 the Court had the opportunity to rule that a petition for certiorari questioning an interlocutory order of a trial court in an electoral protest was within the appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC.Interpreting the phrase "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction," the Court held in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo, et al. that if a case may be appealed to a particular court or judicial tribunal or body, then said court or judicial tribunal or body has jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid

of its appellate jurisdiction. This was reiterated in De Jesus v. Court of Appeals, where the Court stated that a court may issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction if said court has jurisdiction to review, by appeal or writ of error, the final orders or decisions of the lower court.Note that Section 8, Rule 14 of the 2010 Rules of Procedure in Election Contests Before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal Officials states that:Sec. 8. Appeal. — An aggrieved party may appeal the decision to the COMELEC within five (5) days after promulgation, by filing a notice of appeal with the court that rendered the decision, with copy served on the adverse counsel or on the adverse party who is not represented by counsel.Since it is the COMELEC which has jurisdiction to take cognizance of an appeal from the decision of the regional trial court in election contests involving elective municipal officials, then it is also the COMELEC which has jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. Clearly, petitioner erred in invoking this Court's power to issue said extraordinary writ.Although Galang involved a petition for certiorari involving an interlocutory order of a regional trial court in a municipal election contest, the rationale for the above ruling applies to an interlocutory order issued by a municipal trial court in a barangay election case. Under Rule 14, Section 8 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, decisions of municipal trial courts in election contests involving barangay officials are appealed to the COMELEC. Following the Galang doctrine, it is the COMELEC which has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari involving acts of the municipal trial courts in such election contests.In all, the RTC committed no grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction. This being the case, the Court finds it unnecessary to resolve the other issues raised by petitioner. 12. Fiscal AutonomyArt. IX, A, Sec. 5 ***Relevant Case: Penera vs. Comelec, GR No. 181613, November 25, 2009 (KARL)